

QUEST

An
Adventure
of
Ideas

Editors: Abu Sayeed Ayyub, Amlan Datta

MICHAEL POLANYI

Tyranny and Freedom

P. SPRATT

The Uniqueness of India

HUMAYUN KABIR

India and Federalism

P. C. CHATTERJI

The Art Object

GURBACHAN SINGH TALIB

Modern Urdu Literature

HERBERT LUTHY


"Capitalism and Socialism on Trial"

ARCHITECTURE AND TOWN PLANNING
THE PASTERNAK AFFAIR

jan - mar 1959

20

rupees 1.25




International Panorama of Progress

Oasis for modern skypower



PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

Centuries ago, plodding caravans formed the link that joined peoples, made nations great. Today a new dimension in transportation—the air—has shrunk distances, brought the citizens of the world closer. By touching down at modern oases for refueling, giant transports traverse the earth, bringing increased commerce and other advantages of the air age wherever they go. Progressive airlines know that quality petroleum products are indispensable for economical, dependable operation. Caltex aviation fuels and lubricants send perishable cargoes to market... machine parts to industry... passengers to far-off places—faster than ever before. Through the power of petroleum, Caltex is playing its part in establishing a new pattern of prosperity in over 70 countries—partner in progress in Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia and New Zealand.




BOAC Britannia to Europe

ISTANBUL • ATHENS • ROME • ZURICH
FRANKFURT and LONDON for
PARIS • AMSTERDAM • BRUSSELS
or any city of your choice

*For information and bookings consult your local
 BOAC Appointed Travel Agent or any office of BOAC at
 Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras.*

Remember—it costs no more to fly by BOAC

A QANTAS Destination



World leader in air travel

B·O·A·C

takes good care of you

BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS CORPORATION



S-12

SHALIMAR BISCUITS PRIVATE LTD • BOMBAY 13




FOR ENDURING VALUE

By the sea at Konarak in Orissa stands the fabulous Sun Temple where obstinate stone, leashed to the skilled hands of ancient Indian sculptors, still blazons the majestic vitality of Indian tradition. To maintain the same vital traditions today skilled mechanical precision is invested in the Hind Cycle, built by those who have the million-cycle record in India.



ADMIRAL



KONARAK

ASP/HC-129

HIND CYCLES LTD. 250 WORLI BOMBAY 18



"Mr. Fison I presume..."

When Mr. Tata met Mr. Fison
a chill of terror was struck in
the heart of every insect pest in India.
They knew that this was war—a fight
to the finish. For the combined resources
of Tata Chemicals and the Fison Group
now put the widest, most effective range
of insecticides and fungicides into
the hands of farmers and Public Health
authorities all over the country.

As the Cotton Aphid said to the Mango Slug

TATA-FISON

will be the death of us!



*writing is a
pleasure
when you write with a*



plato

GOLD FILLED (quarter gold) PEN



elegantly designed
smooth in its flow of ink
with different filling devices
with a 14 ct gold nib
modestly priced at rs. 13.50

a mhatre product

*all trade enquiries should be addressed
to our sole distributors*

BEST FOUNTAIN-PEN DEPOT
79 devkaran mansion,
princess street, bombay

*There is no substitute for fine tobacco
and don't let anybody tell you different*

PANAMA
MEANS
FINE TOBACCO



GOLDEN TOBACCO CO. PRIVATE LTD., BOMBAY 24
INDIA'S LARGEST NATIONAL ENTERPRISE OF ITS KIND

GT 360



Gramma Adagio


A Great Sound of Machines . . .

When Balbir Singh came to Jamshedpur from Bahrain in 1957, the site for the new Rs. 100-million Blooming Mill—a key unit of Tata Steel's Two Million Ton expansion programme—had just been cleared after levelling a large hillock.

Today this new 46" Blooming Mill, the largest of its kind in India, with a rolling capacity of two million tons, is all set to produce the blooms and slabs from which rails, structurals, plates, sheets and many other products will be rolled.

Despite the Suez Crisis which delayed vital supplies and other difficulties, the rapid completion of the Blooming Mill was made possible by the devoted service of men like Balbir Singh. He and hundreds of other Indians, assisted by American and German technicians, worked round-the-clock on this major expansion project to produce more steel to strengthen India's economy.

TATA STEEL
ON TO TWO MILLION TONS



The Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited

TN 3132

Q U E S T

A Quarterly of Inquiry, Criticism and Ideas

Edited by ABU SAYEED AYYUB *and* AMLAN DATTA

Advisory Editors : NIRAD C. CHAUDHURI, SUDHIN DATTA, LAXMANSHASTRI JOSHI

ARTICLES

Tyranny and Freedom	9	Michael Polanyi
The Uniqueness of India	19	P. Spratt
India and Federalism	25	Humayun Kabir
What is the Art Object	35	P. C. Chatterji
Modern Urdu Literature	42	Gurbachan Singh Talib
Hindi	45	M. S. Kalyanasundaram
Language and Audience	48	Punya Sloka Ray
Boris Pasternak	52	Sibnarayan Ray

POETRY

Exchange	56	Amiya Chakravarti
Eagle Into Swan	57	Evelyn Wood
Early Korean Poems	57	Chong Mong-ju, etc
Winter	59	Amaresh Datta
On a Dead Freedom-Fighter	60	F. R. Stanley

ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW

Indian Intellectuals and Communism	61	A. D.
------------------------------------	----	-------

ARTS

Town Planning and Architecture	66	Benjamin Polk
--------------------------------	----	---------------

DISCUSSION

Fearlessness and Civilization	74	Shankar Trivedi
	76	C. Rajagopalachari

REVIEW ARTICLE

History of the World: A Deviation?	77	Herbert Luthy
------------------------------------	----	---------------

BOOK-REVIEWS

Dr. Zhivago	90	Nissim Ezekiel
The Twice Born	93	Pandharinath Prabhu
Exile and the Kingdom	96	C. L. Nahal
The Uses of Argument	98	S. Ookerjee
The Story of My Life	100	V. D. Rao
Unmarried Widow and Other Stories	101	Devdatta Dabhalkar

CORRESPONDENCE

Indian Intellectuals	102	Vasant Palshikar
----------------------	-----	------------------

QUEST is sponsored by the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom

Reviews Editor : A. B. SHAH

Business Manager : MISS SHEELA SINGH

All contributions, which must be type-written with double spacing, and correspondence regarding contributions should be addressed to THE EDITORS, QUEST 5 PEARL ROAD, CALCUTTA 17. Contributions will be returned in case of non-acceptance only when adequate postage is enclosed. For subscriptions and other matters please write : THE BUSINESS MANAGER, QUEST, 148, MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD, BOMBAY 1

For Marketing Research

MEET
THE
MEMBERS
OF
THE

GALLUP *International Family*

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF PUBLIC OPINION INSTITUTES

The Indian Institute of Public Opinion was elected at Helsinki in August, 1957 to the Association of Public Opinion Research Institutes.

This is the GALLUP FAMILY. It has one member in each of fifteen countries. These countries are: The United States, The United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, West Germany, Belgium, and India.

IT DOES INTERNATIONAL POLLING AND MARKETING RESEARCH ON A SCALE MORE THAN TWICE AS LARGE AS ANY OTHER GROUP IN THE WORLD.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GROUP IS PLACED AT YOUR DISPOSAL THROUGH THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE MARKETING RESEARCH CORPORATION OF INDIA.

Have you a market in any of these countries?

Do you need a reassessment?

More Important, Do you wish to enter any of these markets for the first time?

**THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION LTD.
THE MARKETING RESEARCH CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.**

14-15 F, CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI

Tyranny and Freedom, Ancient and Modern

By MICHAEL POLANYI

IN the course of the last half century the whole planet has become involved in one single tumult. Kindred political conflicts agitate the masses of eighty nations. The same slogans are heard in Chile and Ghana. Opinions mooted in Belgrade fill Peking with dismay, and Albanian newspapers react violently to the actions of a governor of Arkansas. The wars and revolutions of our age have fused humanity into a uniform mixture of common strife.

Many writers ascribe this turbulent transformation to the impact of modern technology. But I doubt this explanation. Technology has transformed England and America without arousing revolutionary movements, while movements of this kind have conquered countries like Russia and China before much industrialization had taken place there.

No, the ideas for which men fight today have a strength of their own. Technical and economic change offer opportunities for the spreading of modern ideas, but they neither produce them nor lend them power to convince men.

The reverse may be nearer to the truth. Campaigns for the unlimited multiplication of iron foundries are sustained largely by political aspirations. Leaders like Mossadeq or Anthony Eden, who satisfy national resentment at the cost of economic loss, will often find enthusiastic support. Five-year plans and nationalizations may be carried out irrespective of their economic consequences. They embody political passions.

BUT IS THERE a specific modern master idea, infecting all of this planet with the same fever? I think there is; I think I can name it. The ideal of modern man is self-determination. Therein lie both his greatness and his peril. The condition of society throughout the planet reflects the demand for self-determination in modern politics. All political movements share the conviction that human society can be improved indefinitely by the exercise of the people's political will and that the people—or those acting for the people—have a right to re-shape human society as they think fit. This principle of social self-determination has been both the leaven of modern liberty and the seed of modern servitude. It supplies the force and fire of all modern political dynamism.

Modern dynamism went into action for the first time in the French Revolution and all typically modern political movements have risen from this source. They overthrew the *ancien régime* throughout Europe and brought to an end, thereby, a political state common to mankind for hundred thousand years from the beginning of human society. All during this immemorial ages—throughout its myriad tribes and numerous civilizations—men have accepted existing custom and law as the foundation of society. There have been great changes, but never before has the deliberate contriving of unlimited social improvement been elevated to a dominant principle. The French Revolution marks the dividing line between the immense expanse of essentially static societies and the narrow ledge of time in which our modern experiment of social dynamism has so far taken place.

THIS DIVIDING LINE produces some odd results, which call for a sharp subdivision of the modern area. We regard the rule of law as a major safeguard of modern liberties. But one would expect that a static order based on unchanging law and custom offers a firmer ground for the rule of law than a dynamic society, bent on unlimited self-perfection. And it is certainly true that revolutionary governments have denied the very principles of a legal order. Lenin declared emphatically that the dictatorship of the proletariat rested on unrestricted power, beyond law, on force alone, and the political philosophy of Nazism has likewise accepted this principle. Some angry young men of Ancient Greece, had toyed with the idea that law was but the will of the stronger, but never before had lawlessness been accepted by the rulers of a state as their basic principle.

Shall we say then that modern dynamism has destroyed the rule of law which had securely prevailed in the rigidly ordered societies of old? Certainly not. The razing of the Bastille has remained a true symbol of the French Revolution because it struck at a hateful system of arbitrary imprisonment. The liberation of serfs throughout Europe which followed the French Revolution was a mighty extension of the rule of law at the expense of arbitrary powers exercised by one man over another. In spite of its dynamic principles, a modern society may achieve a far more complete legal order than the static societies of the pre-modern age ever did. This is one of its glories.

We must admit then that modern dynamism has operated in two sharply contrasting ways, once by extending legality far beyond any previously achieved range, and another time by totally denying the principles of law in favour of unrestricted violence. These contrasting results are the outcome of a great difference in the intensity of the underlying dynamism. One aims at perfecting society immediately and totally, the other acts piecemeal and

gradually. A revolutionary dynamism inevitably destroys legality, while reformist dynamism can extend it, and in fact has greatly extended it.

BOTH KINDS OF modern dynamism emerged already during the French Revolution. Jacobin terror demonstrated that a total transformation of society necessarily demands a single omnipotent centre of executive power; the Code Civil, born of the same revolution, erected a lasting legal framework for a liberal society. But the basic contrast between the two areas of modernity as we see them today, has crystallized only later, as they adopted different views about the nature of man. Revolutionary dynamism equipped itself with a materialistic interpretation of man and society which contemptuously denies the reality of moral motives in public affairs. Any appeal to idealism in politics is condemned then as ineffectual, debilitating and presumably hypocritical. Violence alone is recognised as honest, scientific and effective; it alone is relied on for achieving social progress.

This philosophy harmonises with the requirements of an immediate comprehensive transformation of society by a single centre of power. It justifies the necessarily lawless actions of such a centre and lends an unprecedented potency to its rule. For its tyranny becomes then the symbol of boundless hopes. It incorporates all the ideals of justice and brotherhood which the doctrine of violence had taught men to distrust and cast out. Modern tyranny converts these ideals into the internal fuel of its political machinery, which drives it onward, blindly, fanatically.

Such a materialism not merely elevates partisanship above law and custom, but acknowledges it as the final arbiter of truth and morality; as the supreme guide of science, philosophy and art; as controlling poetry, painting and music; and directing even the duties of friendship and love. It aims at absorbing all mental impulses in one single overriding political purpose.

But are we not all materialists today? Yes, in theory, but not in fact. In spite of its current utilitarian phraseology, dating back to Bentham, progressive liberalism remains rooted in 18th Century idealism. Rival pressure groups keep jostling each other in public life and we acknowledge the fact that politicians are carried to power by such forces. But rival politicians must also work incessantly to reconcile conflicting interests and for this they must rely on common standards of truth and fairness between themselves and their opponents. This aspect of politics is overlooked or disguised in utilitarian terms by current materialism.

Three conditions are indeed indispensable to the working of a liberal dynamic society. People must believe strongly enough in truth and fairness; they must trust that their opponents effectively share these ideals; and these

ideals must in fact be valid. The great moral and material achievements of modern liberal societies testify convincingly that they fulfilled the first two conditions and that they rightly relied on the presence of the third.

There is ample evidence also that whenever any part of a society denies the effectiveness of these ideals in public affairs, it cuts itself off from the rest and engages it in mortal combat. This has happened every time that a strictly Marxist-Leninist or strictly Fascist group has applied its principles consistently. Its declared total distrust of its opponents has justified such a group in acting entirely unscrupulously towards them and hence all ties were broken between the two sides. The utilitarian theory that social harmony is based on mutual interests is false; mutual interests can be discovered and brought into operation only on the grounds of existing social harmony. This is the principle on which a progressive liberal society actually works. For a masterly demonstration of this thesis see Bertrand de Jouvenel's *Sovereignty*.

LIBERALISM, TOTALITARIANISM AND the pre-modern static society are all three based on their own distinctive beliefs. Yet there are profound differences in the mode of acceptance of these beliefs and in the nature of the ensuing order. Static order is based on explicit doctrines taught and accepted as articles of faith. It constitutes an authoritarian orthodoxy, imposing a uniformity of beliefs. Such an authoritarianism can be said to uphold freedom in the important sense that it assures to each his birthright, with its traditional duties and privileges. It also upholds a belief in the power of truth and in the moral responsibility of man.

The beliefs of liberalism are ancient, but their acceptance has recently passed through a deep crisis. In earlier days it was thought that a belief in reason and justice was self-evident. But today we have learned that it is not. Modern man can hold this belief only as an act of faith, as I do myself. Yet a society guided by the ideals of reason and justice and dedicated to their service is not authoritarian. It is free because its particular orthodoxy allows a wide scope for independent thought. A liberal society can integrate a wide diversity of often contradictory impulses, all rooted in the same ideals. After 150 years of keenly contested reforms that have transformed every particle of its life, Britain's institutions still form a single harmonised system. It is a system of dynamic order.

A totalitarian regime imposes its orthodoxy not as a matter of faith but as a scientific fact. It suppresses thereby both doctrinal faiths and liberal convictions. The advancement of its own apocalyptic power is set up as the only valid aim and ultimate criterion of all human endeavour. Modern

tyranny not merely restrains the spontaneous powers of the mind, as authoritarianism has done in the past, but denies in principle their very existence. This determines the nature of its dynamism. A modern totalitarian society is subject to continuous revolutions from above. It is ordered by regimentation from a single dynamic centre of power.

REFORMIST DYNAMISM OPERATES by persuasion, which is consistent with its belief in the power of reason and rightness. Even when reforms are first initiated by pressure they must ultimately be ratified by a free consensus, if they are not to split the nation into hostile camps. A modern parliamentary system offers opportunities for unlimited progress by mutual persuasion. But parliamentary institutions neither offer a guarantee for freedom and progress, nor are altogether indispensable to freedom and progress. A parliament, which is mortally divided, can only function tyrannically. This is how Hitler gained power through the Reichstag, and how Peron established himself by popular vote. Similar possibilities have been adumbrated by Mr. Jagan's first electoral victory in British Guiana and by the communists' advent to power in Kerala. Three years ago the parliament of Lower Saxony duly appointed a Neo-Nazi politician called Schlueter to the office of Minister of Education and he was only unseated by the rebellious protest of the University of Göttingen which defied Parliament without the support of any single parliamentary party. The State legislatures of America have consistently shown less respect for academic freedom than non-elective authorities. At the peak of his influence MacCarthy has demonstrated that freedom of thought can be menaced throughout public life by the legally admissible operations of a parliamentary system.

Going back further in Western history we find that up to a point tolerance and parliamentary government developed on separate lines. The liberation of thought from control by censorship was carried out on the Continent by the spreading of a secular, antireligious outlook, without appeal to parliamentary sovereignty, while in England and America parliament was strengthened during the same period of history without the weakening of religious discrimination. It fell therefore to the enlightened absolutism of Frederic II of Prussia to initiate religious tolerance in Europe. His first move in this direction, declaring that 'Religion ist Privatsache' (a man's religion is his private affair) dates back to 1742. More than a century later, religious tests were still applied for entry to Oxford and for election to the British Parliament.

The Continental tradition of enlightened absolutism was carried on

right up to the outbreak of the First World War. The Chancellor of the German Reich was never made responsible to parliament, yet freedom of thought and the rule of law were not noticeably less complete than in Britain. The same conditions prevailed in Austria, where the Emperor explicitly retained up till 1918 the power to govern by decree without the consent of Parliament.

This is not to decry the value of well functioning parliamentary institutions. They are among the noblest achievements of man's civic sense. We may add also that parliaments have proved viable far beyond expectation in some newly independent countries. But it does suggest that a free society is not characterised by its electoral system. Public liberties exist wherever the rulers of a state respect the intellectual and moral ideals of man. A free society is one dedicated to the service of these ideals. If electoral procedures extend the people's participation in the service of these ideals, they extend freedom; otherwise they abridge freedom. In that case enlightened absolutism may be preferable to parliamentary government.

I HAVE SKETCHED a rough map of Western political thought: I shall now try to inscribe on it a tentative diagnosis of our time.

From its origins in the French Revolution, the great tide of dynamism has been mounting steadily during roughly 150 years. It carried Socialism at its crest. Even in notoriously reformist countries like Britain, Socialism proclaimed a complete transformation of society towards equality and unselfish cooperation. Even British Socialists excused the evils of a modern tyranny over and over again for the sake of its promises to establish Socialism.

But then—at the very centre of revolutionary dynamism—the tide turned. Pasternak represents the change as taking place in 1943. By that time the first angry reaction against Stalin had given way to the determination to conquer Hitler in spite of Stalin. Victory was in sight and with its approach came a growing realisation that the whole existing system of lies, hatreds and cruelties was pointless. Intimations of freedom began to spread. These thoughts denied the very foundations of modern revolutionary dynamism and dispelled for a moment its magic convincing power. The process of sobering had set in.

In 1948 Tito defected from Stalin, invoking truth and national dignity, as principles superior to Bolshevik discipline. The revolution had lost its pristine force. The destruction of the fictitious universe built up by Stalin has since gone on continuously and standards of truthfulness and humanity have gained ground correspondingly.

Was this the reason why throughout Europe the vision of Socialism paled and presently underwent a reduction in scope and intensity? It is difficult to say. May be that the latter process was but another part of a general recession in the tide of European dynamism. In any case, since 1950, European Socialists have begun to reinterpret their principles everywhere in terms of piecemeal progress. Revisionism is the order of the day. Modern dynamism, which after a century of continuous rise had reached its peak both in the West and in Soviet Russia in the middle thirties, entered in the nineteen forties on a rapid recession.

That is why a feeling of emptiness is spreading among young people throughout Europe. Deprived of its previous political tensions, their life appears meaningless. This is happening in countries as different as England, Germany, and the lands behind the Iron Curtain.

Indeed political indifference is spreading to a dangerous extent both in Europe and the Soviet Empire. The ebbing of political passions leaves behind a total distrust of political ideas. Their place is filled by a harsh hedonism which impairs civic sense itself at its core. Yet I believe that this condition has a positive content. The rebellious Communists of Hungary and Poland have clearly formulated it. They have declared themselves for the rights of truth against the overriding claims of revolutionary dynamism. They have challenged the denial of human responsibility by a mechanistic theory of man and history.

These are the ideas of 1956, for the propagation of which 2000 men were hanged in Hungary, and which yet continue to disturb the rulers of eight hundred million people from the Oder to the Yangtse.

The rebellious Communists of 1956 were condemned as revisionists. I myself would call them frankly reactionaries. For they turned back to the principles of the French Revolution in their original idealistic form. They returned to the ideas of the 18th Century which liberated Europe from the authoritarian rule of an immemorially established static society. These ideas had been discredited by a modern revolutionary dynamism which overruled them in the name of its own scientific superiority. They now re-emerged on the lips of young Communists who could suffer no longer the soul-killing system which they had helped to set up by denying them. It was an anguished return to truths foresworn for the sake of a frenzied delusion: a remorseful backing away from its baleful consequences.

This reactionary movement, resumed a track of history contemptuously abandoned by revolutionary dynamism more than a hundred years before. It reaffirmed the liberal ideals of 1848 which the Communist Manifesto had shattered; it vindicated the defeated Wilson against the victorious Lenin.

This affirmation implied that the revolutions of the 20th Century had deflected humanity from the right path. It was a reminder of the fact that the false teachings of revolutionary dynamism had already been refuted by German revisionism before the Russian Revolution, and that, therefore, but for Lenin's victory in Russia, liberal reformism would have carried on its majestic progress everywhere. Humanity would have moved on towards the higher levels of public morality to which Wilson's vision aspired: a vision which, in spite of the contemptuous hostility of a hard-boiled public philosophy, has been noticeably approached by the League of Nations and the United Nations. Without Lenin and Kun Bela there could have been no Mussolini, and Hitler would have failed to achieve power. All this was implied in the ideas of 1956, though nothing was yet said about it.

Such seems to me, in rough outline, the structure of political thought in Europe and in the countries which have shared at first hand the flow of European ideas since the French Revolution. If this picture is correct it should modify the policy pursued at present towards the Soviet Empire. For the past 20 years we have been haunted by the consequences of the Munich agreement, which proved that concessions do not appease a revolutionary dynamism but encourage it on the contrary to double its attacks on the appeasers. But in a period of *receding dynamism* concessions may accelerate the decline of dynamism and intransigence may revive, on the contrary, its fading fires. A blind Munich-complex may prove disastrous at this stage.

LET ME TURN to the political thought of the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. China follows the example set by the Soviet Union. But having conquered power 30 years later, its dynamism is still mounting while that of the Soviet Union is receding. India seems to have made so far an amazing success of a parliamentary system with extensive public liberties. On a smaller scale, Israel appears to have established a remarkably free process of self-government. By suppressing the fanatical factions of both the Moslem Brotherhood and the Communist Party, President Nasser seems to tread in the footsteps of enlightened absolutism to which Central Europe has owed the beginning of liberalism. I have watched at close quarters the unhappy internal strife in Lebanon during its first week and have admired the civic sense which kept the consequences of this division under control. The restrained dynamism of the new generation of rulers led by President Bourguiba in Tunis has deeply impressed me.

These scattered remarks should reveal rather than cloak the slightness of my acquaintance with the political history of the newly independent

country. But they may yet illustrate once more the fact that a dynamism aspiring at the unlimited improvement of human society is spreading among countless millions who have hitherto lived in the immemorial static conception of the social order. The new political ideas are almost entirely Western: Gandhism alone presents a genuinely Asiatic response to Western dynamism. My analysis of European political thought may claim therefore to interpret the predominant stream of political thought now affecting Asia and Africa.

I have avoided so far the word 'democracy'. Yet this term is not useless; we may call democratic a political system in which the rule of law sustains public liberties under a government elected by universal suffrage. But we must remember that the three components of a democratic system take up very different positions within it. Public liberties are the heart of democracy; the rule of laws is its muscular framework; and finally, a democratically elected government forms a dynamic centre for improving the laws by which men live in a free society.

Elective self-government is the final, most difficult achievement of democracy and not—as often seems to be assumed—the first step towards democracy. Nor is it its ultimate criterion.

There is an even more serious deficiency in the current definition of democracy. You cannot define a free society by rules of procedure. If everybody believed in the doctrines of the Spanish Inquisition, then rules of law operating under a popularly elected government would uphold a Spanish Inquisition. In a society in which everybody shared the orthodoxy of Stalinism, rules of law under self-government would uphold Stalinism.

We would, of course, oppose a Spanish Inquisition on the grounds of religious tolerance and oppose Stalinist orthodoxy as violating freedom of thought. But in doing so we would have to affirm explicitly our beliefs about religion and about human thought in opposition to those of the Inquisition and of Soviet Marxism. No such affirmation is included in the current procedural definition of democracy, and it cannot be included in any such definition.

This would not matter if the beliefs, which our ideal of democracy affirms, were self-evident. But they are not. We might perhaps ignore the views of some Catholics who would still maintain today that our religious tolerance is merely an irresponsible neglect of our fellow-men's salvation. But we certainly cannot disregard the fact that the very possibility of cultural liberty is denied by Soviet Marxism and that our advocacy of such liberty is a direct attack against a regime based on Soviet Marxism. We must acknowledge this to be true.

The unprecedented force of positivist scepticism, reinforced by

modern man's peculiar moral self-doubt, forces political theory today to acknowledge frankly its own fiduciary foundations. We can see this expressed in Bertrand de Jouvenel's book on *Sovereignty*. Only when stated on our fiduciary grounds, does our institutional definition of democracy acquire a definite libertarian content, and no formal definition can by itself ever convey this content.

It might be asked what the result would be if—as a counterpart to the filling of democratic institutions with the teachings of a Stalin—we supposed that Stalin and his followers would have been converted to an idealistic conception of man and history. Would this have made the Soviet system function as a liberal society? I think it would have at least transformed it into a very enlightened, progressive absolutism. But I am not arguing here that institutions are irrelevant to the life of a free society; far from it. Admittedly, a Stalin converted to liberalism would at first merely cease to use his own Constitution of 1936 as a disguise for tyranny and apply it instead to foster political and cultural freedom. But presently he would have to go further, for the growth of a free public opinion would inevitably induce him to give a fuller expression to political thought through a proper parliamentary system. Far from being irrelevant to freedom, the institutions of democracy are indispensable to its growth. They are the civic home of free men.

THESE OBSERVATIONS COULD no doubt be applied to an analysis of the political transformations now going on in newly independent countries; but I am not qualified to do this. I want to answer only one question. Is the cause of freedom not fatally weakened by basing it squarely on our belief in certain ideals and in the nature of man and society as dedicated to these ideals? My answer is that it is a part of such a declaration of faith that this question becomes meaningless. Surely, I cannot admit that it would be better to profess some falsehood because people would be more likely to accept it. If I believe as I do that it is man's calling to establish a free society, because this flows from man's nature as the only morally responsible creature in the world, I can uphold this demand only on these and not on any other grounds.

Discussion—Paper at the International Seminar on Representative Government and Public Liberties in the New States, Rhodes Island, October 6-13, 1958.

The Uniqueness of India

By PHILIP SPRATT

A European who has spent some time in India is bound to speculate on the striking differences in historical development and mentality between the two civilisations. The main sources of the populations and cultures of the two appear to be similar—the Dravidians and the Mediterraneanians are believed to be related in much the same way as are the Indian Aryans and the European Kelts, Greeks and Teutons. The ethnic and perhaps cultural relations between the two are closer than the relations of either to the Mongolians or the Africans. Yet there are conspicuous differences. Marx said that Indian has stagnated since the earliest times, whereas he thought the European civilisation intrinsically progressive. Europe is not known ever to have had an institution like caste. The religious beliefs and practices present a series of contrasts. As compared with Europeans Indians are reputed, I should say justly, to be more religious, philosophical, given to abstractions, less empirical and practical, more introverted, restrained, pessimistic, unaggressive, tolerant, docile. These differences of temper and outlook are recognisable almost as far back as our records go.

Marxist writers would be expected to discuss this subject, for such differences are a challenge to their theory of the unilinear character of history. A few such attempts have been made.

The late V. Gordon Childe, an undogmatic Marxist, in his book *The Prehistory of European Society*, explains in a popular manner his theory of the special character of the European civilisation. He says that

only the great wealth of the divine monarchies of Egypt and Mesopotamia could have nurtured a metallurgical industry. Their neighbours, the small and only semi-divine monarchies of the Aegean, were able, by imitation, trade and plunder, to take advantage of this vital technological advance, but were unable to imitate the totalitarianism of the eastern empires. The Aegean kingdoms were small and situated close together, and since they were normally at war, it was impossible to prevent a citizen who had made himself unpopular in one from taking shelter in another. This pattern of a society of small states whose citizens were able to assert individual rights established a model to which Europe has adhered ever since. On the other hand Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Turkey and Byzantium inherited the model of the oriental absolute empire with its totalitarian atmosphere and unprogressive slave population.

Childe does not mention India. But the contrast he draws between Europe and the Middle East has something in common with the contrast mentioned above between Europe and India, and this suggests that his explanation may hold good here too.

In the historical period India has been, just as much as Europe, a continent of small states, but in early time the Indus civilisation shows parallels with that of Mesopotamia. We do not know how long the Indus civilisation persisted, but it was finally destroyed about 2000 B.C., far earlier than the empires of Egypt and Mesopotamia. We do not know how far the population and tra-

ditions of historical India are continuous with those of the Indus civilisation. We must conclude therefore that this explanation may provide a clue to the special character of India, but our knowledge does not permit us to assert it with any confidence.

In his book *India from Primitive Communism to Slavery* Mr. S. A. Dange says that the Mahabharat war brought to an end the idyllic, egalitarian tribe and, though after an interval of chaos, led to the consolidation of the slave-state. In addition the war was itself a great catastrophe. On both grounds it is fittingly taken as the beginning of the Kaliyuga. He thus suggests—perhaps not too seriously—that the event gave a permanent cast of pessimism to the Indian mind.

It is doubtful whether the Mahabharat war, if it is a real event, was so important as Dange supposes. Despite its alleged confirmation by Schliemann's excavation, there is very good reason to regard the Trojan war as pure myth; yet it left a profound imprint upon Greek tradition. But there is no need to look for parallels in another culture: the story of the Ramayana is unquestionably mythical, yet it made as great a noise in Indian prehistory as the story of the Mahabharat. Mr. Kosambi points out that the literary celebrity of an event does not necessarily correspond to its real importance.

If primitive equality ever existed, it must have been abandoned in other cultures. There it left behind, perhaps, traditions of a golden age (though there is no need to explain such traditions in this way), but it has not left a permanent pessimism such as seems to infect the Indian mind.

As for historical catastrophes, there have been innumerable plagues, famines and massacres, but it is usually found after a short time that the survivors have taken the terrible event very cheerfully. Thus even

if the Mahabharat war was as great a disaster as the poet says, it would not have cast upon Indian culture a gloom so deep as to be felt 3000 years later.

Mr. D. D. Kosambi in his *Introduction to the Study of Indian History* confines himself to material culture, and is thus not called upon to account for such characteristics as those dealt with here. However, he refers to Indian pessimism at the time of the Greek invasions, and remarks that life probably was so bad that pessimism was justified. Life in the North Indian plain in 300 B.C. was probably no worse than life anywhere else, then or at any other time. Pessimism has almost always been justified, but has seldom dominated our ebullient species for long.

Kosambi also refers to non-violence as characteristic in the pre-Buddhist period; and later suggests that the adoption of *dharma* as the keynote of Asoka's imperial policy was to leave a permanent impress upon India. These two remarks are to some extent contradictory. If Brahmans were propagating social change by peaceful persuasion in earlier times, Asoka's dharmic policy was not a complete innovation and cannot be held wholly responsible for similar ideas and practices in later times. It seems unlikely in any event that such a policy as Asoka's could have succeeded as it did unless the ground had been prepared for it.

Thus hitherto Marxist writers have failed to account for the facts we are discussing. It is perhaps natural that they should scarcely have tried to do so, and should have concentrated on similarities between civilisations to the neglect of differences. But when they try to deal with differences they will probably find their theory unhelpful, for it is gravely misleading. In the Marxian picture, human communities and civilisations are like corn stalks in a field, all alike, growing straight up; only some are more or less behind others. Actually human com-

munities are like the plants in a jungle, all different, growing in various directions, some never rising above the ground. Food-gathering tribes—hundreds are known—differ greatly among themselves, and the more complex communities differ just as much. Cultural interchange, however, tends to make them resemble each other. In the days before agriculture, when much migration took place, cultural interchange was active and it has again become active, and in fact a dominating influence, in the modern industrial period. But in the long interval between the rise of agriculture and the industrial revolution, isolation was the rule and cultures grew in profuse eccentricity.

The unilinear Marxist doctrine is unsound. A psychological approach is more promising. Mr. Hamdi Bey in *Thought* (August 3, 1957) has, I believe, taken us some way towards a solution. He asks why caste persists, and answers by saying that Hindu civilisation remains dominated by kinship, and that it has failed to break away from this principle of social organisation because the urge to rebellion, of the individual against the group and of each generation against its predecessor, which Freud labelled with the name of Oedipus, is dulled or muted.

Indian society is still organised on the kinship principles, whereas this has long ceased to be the case in Europe. Professor P. Saran in his *Studies in Indian Mediaeval History* points out that the feudalism of Europe was based on contract, whereas the superficially similar social form which prevailed in Rajasthan was based on kinship.

According to Maine's discussion in *Ancient Law*, the principal cause of the change in European society from the kinship principle to that of contract was the doctrine of the Law of Nature. After the conquest of Greece the Greek philosophical ideas became familiar in Rome, and the teaching of the Stoics appealed particularly to the

Roman lawyers. The Law of Nature was a Stoic doctrine. It is the origin of *Aequitas*, the legal principle of equity. The Law of Nature was originally a physical principle of simplicity or symmetry; but it spread gradually from the physical to the human domain, and became equated with the *Jus Gentium*, the Law of Nations. 'The neglect of demarcations and boundaries,' says Maine, 'seems to me the feature of the *Jus Gentium* which was depicted in *Aequitas*. I imagine that the word was at first a mere description of that constant *levelling* or removal of irregularities which went on wherever the praetorian system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants. Probably no colour of ethical meaning belonged at first to the expression; nor is there any reason to believe that the process which it indicated was otherwise than extremely distasteful to the primitive Roman mind... I know no reason why the law of the Romans should be superior to the laws of the Hindoos, unless the theory of Natural Law had given it a type of excellence different from the usual one.'

Maine emphasises levelling. Though, as he remarks, the process was probably distasteful to the primitive Romans, we can assume that the Stoic doctrine generally and the *Jus Naturae* in particular appealed to some powerful though not necessarily conscious element in the Roman mind. Hamdi Bey points that element out by referring to the greater strength in Europe of the Oedipus complex, which comprises the two opposite developments of a punitive, father-type conscience, well expressed in the Stoic philosophy, and on the other hand an accentuated rebelliousness against the herd and against the older generation. There can be no doubt that the expression of the Oedipus complex in myth and literature is more manifest in Europe than in India, and that the conscience is more punitive and rebelliousness more prevalent

red for Kshatriyas, yellow for Vaishyas and black for Shudras.

The adoption by Indian society at a remote period of this form of organisation, with its religious or magical inspiration, goes far to explain the exceptional conservatism of India, and in particular the persistence of the mother-centred mentality typical of the tribe. Caste petrified the tribe by surrounding it with a set of magical prohibitions, and prevented its absorption into a wider community; and as the tribe was thus preserved, its distinctive type of mind, conscience and religion were preserved.

It is probable, however, that the sanctity of this system was reinforced by an influence of a quite different kind. This derived from the uniquely Indian "great discovery" of the identity of the *Atman* and the *Brahman*. The mother-centred type of mind probably tends to be introverted and to cultivate the fantasy of the return to the womb. At a very early period Indians appear to have experimented with introspection and devised techniques of breathing, etc., to aid it. It is not necessary to assume that the Indians were the only ancient people who did this: doubtless others did it, though no others produced any record of results comparable to the *Yoga Sutra* or the early *Upanishads*. Probably the Indians pushed these experiments further than was done elsewhere, and the results were correspondingly more definite and important. It is also not necessary to assume that the orthodox religious interpretation of the results is the true one. What were historically important were, first, that something was discovered which was objective and could be verified; second, that it appeared to confirm the basic propositions of the prevalent mother-centred religion; and third, the psychological effects upon the experimenters of their exercises in introspection. Many of those who achie-

ved success in *yoga* acquired striking qualities of personality, doubtless exaggerated by tradition, but in some measure genuine.

Yoga not only gave prestige to the religious and social system: it directly reinforced the conservative and mother-centred trends of the Hindu mind. It is an essential part of *yoga* to suppress all outgoing manifestations of the libido, more especially the sexual. But it is not mere suppression, such as Christianity (and perhaps the earlier and cruder types of *tapasya*) demands. Christianity simply says that sex is sin: the result in Europe has probably been to accentuate rebellion and aggression. *Yoga* eliminates aggression by providing a technique of sublimation. The procedure is pictured as a laborious ascent through the *sushumna* from *chakra* to *chakra*, until one attains identification with the goddess one finds there, or alternatively with the goddess and god. It is identification with the mother, the parents, the world, the community, in fact all possible objects of aggression.

Thus a society in which the *yogi* is honoured above everybody else will depreciate youth and honour age, and will eliminate at the source the self-assertion of the young against the old. From the straightforward and gory expression of the Oedipus conflict in the *Vedic* myths of *Indra* and *Prajapati*, it will progress to the situation represented by the *Puranic* myth mentioned by Hamdi Bey, that of *Puru*, the son who willingly surrendered his youth to his father *Yayati*, so that the old man could again for a thousand years enjoy the pleasures of the flesh.

Further, the *yogi* who concentrates all his attention on the world within, and finds everything of value there, develops the view of life expressed in the doctrine of *maya*, that the external world is less real than the internal. His attitude is what

India and Federalism

By HUMAYUN KABIR

THE principle of federalism may be traced back to the earliest days of human history and yet it would not be unfair to say that its practice constitutes one of the most difficult achievements of man. An element of federalism is inherent in the very concept of the State as is evident from even a cursory examination of the various theories of its origin. One may perhaps say that such theories are all partially true and partially false. Some hold that a State is nothing but a conglomeration of men based on the superior power of an individual or a group: they tend to ignore the fact that such superior power is ineffective in the absence of acquiescence by a majority of those who form the social group. However powerful a single individual may be, a combination of perhaps a dozen men can overpower him. Similarly, however powerful a group may be, it can be overpowered by the other groups if only they will combine. Domination of an individual or a group is thus in the end always based on acceptance of its rule by the rest. It may be willing acceptance or it may be mere acquiescence, but without this element of agreement to obey, no king or oligarchy could ever rule.

It was natural that recognition of this truth should lead to the formulation of theories in which the element of consent was made the essential fact of social cohesion. The various forms of the social contract theory differ in details but agree in their central contention that consent is the basis of political obligation. Men accepted the authority of a king or a ruling class be-

cause without such acceptance the individual could not survive. The general criticism against all forms of social contract theories is that they tend to regard men as more rational than experience seems to justify. Such theories also fail because they cannot explain why the State should command man's allegiance even to the point of death. If men agree to the formation of the State only in order to survive, why should the individual or the group be prepared to give up life at the behest of the State? Attempts to explain this paradox by the concept of the general will or even the general good are not fully satisfactory and lead to what may perhaps be called political mysticism.

Theories of the State which look upon it as an organism carry further this conception of the State as a mystic entity. It is argued that the State comes into being not because an individual or a group is able to dictate to members of a society nor because the members of a society enter consciously and voluntarily into a pact for furthering their common interests but because it is in the nature of the individual to act as a member of a social group. In fact, the individual is an individual only as a member of a social group. Cut off from his social moorings, he is a mere abstraction and devoid of most of the qualities and functions which are characteristic of human beings. The analogy of the organism is at times pressed to inordinate lengths and it is suggested that outside the social context man ceases to be man in the true sense.

None of these theories is fully acceptable but each refers to an important element in

producing animals. The discovery of agriculture marked a tremendous step forward in social evolution. Agriculture must from the nature of the case be a co-operative effort. Once conditions had been created where co-operation among individuals was not only possible but necessary, it was a simple step to evolve social laws which would give uniformity and durability to them. In fact as the social unit grew, the need for uniform modes of behaviour became more urgent. Within the small unit of the natural family, personal relations could provide the basis for social co-operation. As the unit expanded, the individuals could no longer have the same intimate personal relations and it became necessary to provide certain standard rules of conduct to take the place of the bonds of natural affection.

Whichever theory of the origin of the State we may favour, we find that all of them recognised the family as the primary unit. There was thus a distribution of function and authority between the family on the one hand and the community, society or state on the other. It need hardly be said that at this stage of development, the distinction between society and the State hardly existed. The family was a miniature society and state. The state or society was the family writ large. Each exercised almost absolute authority in its own sphere. We find the head of the family disposing of the life and property of all its members. On the other hand, we have instances where the head of the State behaved towards its members exactly as the father behaves towards his children. Though the family was still the primary unit, we find that social laws were gradually acquiring precedence over the dictates of family needs in certain fields and for certain purposes. We still have tribal societies where family feuds are continued from one generation to another. On the other hand we have in some

legends of Greece and Rome as well as in some of the stories of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata evidence of how laws of the State were gradually claiming allegiance even when they conflicted with the laws of the family.

One may therefore say that the primitive State was federal in form and purpose. Every family constituted a small social unit within which the head of the family reigned supreme. It was only for certain general purposes that the head of the family accepted the supremacy of social law. We have clear evidence of this state of affairs in the accounts of the Old Testament as well as in many tales of India and China. Gradually the power of the State grew at the cost of the power of the family. One reason for this gradual shift in the balance of power was the superior organisation needed for purposes of war. Another was the increasing complexity of methods of production and commerce.

The family as a unit of governance had a longer life in societies which were predominantly agricultural. In such societies, the family or the village unit was more or less self-sufficient. The existence of a large number of autonomous villages or communities in such societies preserved for a much longer period the federal character of the State. We thus find that the federal form retained its vigour for a much longer period in India than in many other countries of the world. In fact till the advent of the British, the form of the Indian polity was essentially federal even though its outward appearance was often unitary. One has only to think of the power of the village panchayats till almost the middle of the nineteenth century to realise the truth of this statement.

It is indeed possible to say that a strong dose of federalism was inescapable in all earlier forms of the State. I have already suggested that throughout the world the

circumstances thus compels a subordinate authority to exercise a degree of independence that was never intended. The result is very often confusion and not a meeting of minds. It has been suggested that one of the major reasons for the defeat of Hitler's armies was this lack of understanding between the High Command and the field officers and the reluctance of the latter to ask for any explanation or clarification of orders issuing from the High Command. States that refuse to recognise federalism as perhaps the only practical form of organisation of human society thus exhibit the weaknesses of federalism in their most blatant form.

Many western democracies are unitary in form but the federal principle is re-introduced through the emphasis on local self government. In a country like the United Kingdom, the State reserves to itself the functions of national defence in both its military and civil sense. Foreign relations, international trade and monetary policies are treated as necessary elements in a policy of national defence and are as such part of the functions of the national State. Defence against external aggression is a national responsibility, but maintenance of law and order within the community is regarded as a concern of the local authority. National educational and health policies are formulated at the State level, but their implementation is left largely to local authorities who conform to the broad national ideal but introduce local modifications to suit local needs. In fact there is a tendency for transferring more and more powers to local authorities, specially in respect of the various welfare functions which are increasingly becoming the concern of the State.

We thus find in the modern world two parallels and at first sight contrary processes operating side by side. On the one hand, the size of the State is continually expanding and there are people already thinking

in terms of a World State. Not only is the State expanding in size, but it is also acquiring functions which were formerly left largely in private hands. Social welfare is no longer the concern of charitable individuals or groups but increasingly a responsibility of the State. In addition, the State, through its control of education and mass media of communications, is exercising a degree of power beyond the dreams of the most powerful despot in the past. Side by side with this increase in the size and the authority of the State, there is a growing tendency to delegate more and more functions and powers to smaller local units. It is also being increasingly recognised that it is only in such units that individuals forming the community can have a more immediate and intimate participation in public affairs. More and more of the welfare services are thus becoming the concern of local authorities. The State is transferring to them many functions formerly regarded as the peculiar prerogative of the State. Federalism has been an essential principle in the organisation of the State from the earliest times. These recent developments justify the statement that the vitality of this principle has not abated in the modern world.

II

FEDERALISM IS THUS a universal principle of State organisation. There are however two special features which differentiate the growth of federalism in India from its development in other parts of the world. The first is that in India the principle of federalism was exalted into a philosophy of life in a way which has perhaps no parallel elsewhere. In most other countries, federalism was accepted out of necessity and its ramifications were often unconscious or at least undeliberate. In India on the other hand the principle of federalism was accepted as an essential characteristic of the nature of

transport and communication in the middle of the last century posed the first real challenge to the loose federal type of structure that had ruled India from immemorial times. The growth of the capitalistic form of production and distribution helped the process of transformation that was begun by the introduction of the modern machine age into the Indian village. The fact that there was an alien power ruling the country played an ambivalent role in this process. An alien Government concerned with bringing the whole of the country under its economic exploitation intensified the forces which worked towards the destruction of the federal principle and the growth of a unitary government. On the other hand, the fact that it was an alien power placed certain limitations on its intention or capacity to integrate the country. It was partly indifference and partly the lessons of 1857 which led the Government to adopt an increasingly neutral attitude towards existing social forces and institutions. There was also perhaps an awareness, not always explicitly formulated, that the diversity of the country checked the growth of national feeling and was thus a factor which helped the continuance of foreign domination. Scientific and technological progress was a factor for growing unification of the country but the preservation of local diversities worked against the forces of integration.

One may say that till 1921, the general tendency of British policy was to emphasise the unitary character of the State and discourage the federal elements. The introduction of diarchy in the Montford Reform scheme was a conscious reversal of the British policy towards centralisation and unity. There was as yet no open movement towards a federal government but the bias towards unitary government had considerably weakened. The process was given a much greater impetus by the introduction of provincial autonomy in the Government

of India Act 1935. This Act provided for a large measure of provincial autonomy and placed the administration of the Provinces in charge of popularly elected Ministers responsible to the legislature. The central government became openly federal in its structure, but the federal government provided in the Act was diarchical and reserved some of the essential functions of government to an irremovable and constitutionally irresponsible bureaucracy. What was worse was the undue weightage given to representatives of vested interests. The Constitution was so devised that the popular elements would always be in a minority. The central government would invariably be weak because of internal dissensions.

All the political parties in the country especially the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, reacted violently against the proposal and opposed the federal part of the Government of India Act. Their reaction was apparently right but only apparently so. In fact it was a great mistake to oppose the federal plan and accept provincial autonomy. If federation had then come into being, the opposition between British and Indian interests would have been brought to a sharper focus. Circumstances would have forced all Indians, regardless of political affiliations, to press for transfer of greater powers to Indian hands. Representatives of British interests would have opposed such a move, but their opposition itself would have forged stronger bonds of unity among Indians. This is what actually happened again and again in the Central Assembly. In spite of their bitter rivalry, the Congress and the League were forced to act jointly in almost every issue that affected Indian interests. In the provincial governments, on the other hand, the rivalries were invariably between Indians both at the individual and the group level. Acceptance of provincial autonomy without acceptance of the federal part of the Cons-

ties which would cut across religious and communal differences and thus help to overcome fissiparous tendencies that arise from religious and communal distinctions.

Those who argue for greater concentration of power in the Centre point out that this last argument of the protagonists of decentralisation itself indicates where the greatest danger to Indian unity lies. If territorial loyalties develop to an extent where they can overcome the differences that arise from religious, communal or cultural distinctions, it is possible that such loyalties may also provide a challenge to loyalty to the Union itself. The fact that territorial groupings will very largely be based on linguistic homogeneity adds to the risks of such a development. One of the major arguments used against the linguistic State in the organisation of Indian political life is based precisely on this fear. There is a risk that territorially compact areas which are homogeneous in language and culture may develop a kind of sub-nationality that may in course of time threaten a common Indian nationhood.

Two other weighty arguments are advanced in favour of greater centralisation. The whole tendency of history is towards the emergence of larger and larger political units. The obvious advantages in production and distribution offered by such units is one reason for the steady increase in the size of the State. The needs of defence also point in the same direction. Modern weapons of offence and defence are so prohibitive in cost and demand so developed an industrial organisation to support them that none but big States can hope to maintain a reasonably adequate system of national security. In fact, the stage has almost been reached when defence and peace can be maintained only through international action. The biggest and most powerful of States are today too weak to ensure safety on the basis of their own strength. Modern

scientific developments with the enormous increase in the speed and efficiency of transport and communications have removed one of the major factors which in the past limited the size of the State. In addition, a country like India engaged in a gigantic programme of national reconstruction can carry out her plans of development only through co-ordinated planning at a central level.

It must be admitted that both parties to the debate can advance many sound and valid arguments in favour of their respective positions. To recognise this fact would itself be in conformity with the Indian tradition which accepts elements of truth in rival positions. Both parties to the debate however seem to forget that in the principle of federalism India has evolved a device by which their rival claims can be satisfied. Hindu society has maintained its unity in spite of the greatest diversity in customs, beliefs and modes of behaviour. Some people have held that heterogeneity is a source of weakness to Hindu society but the evidence of history proves that this is not so. It is heterogeneity and flexibility that have permitted Hindu society to survive challenges under which more homogeneous and rigid societies have succumbed. The political problems posed by modern scientific developments can also be solved if we remain true to the principle which has served India well in the past.

The Republican Constitution of India is based on the faith that the diversity of her languages, religions and cultures will not in any way imperil Indian unity. The Constitution guarantees liberty, equality and opportunity to all the component units of the Indian people. All the languages of India have been recognised as national languages. The spirit of the Constitution demands that they must be treated on the basis of equality and given the same opportunities of development and progress. Untouchability has been declared to be a crime as its con-

What is the Art Object

By P. C. CHATTERJI

AESTHETICS, I take it, has a two-fold function which I would describe as interpretative and evaluative. Before we can decide on the value of a work of art, whether we are going to describe it as a masterpiece or a mediocre work, we must know *what* the work is. We must in some sense be able to understand it, and ascertain correctly what aesthetic qualities it possesses. But critics are in the habit of using strange words to describe the aesthetic qualities of works of art. For instance, a writer will remark of a picture, 'the painting had great depth' or will speak of the 'spatial rhythm' of its lines. And whatever we may mean by depth I think we would all agree that if one said of a Mughal painting that it has depth he was assigning a quality to it which it did not *really* possess and in the same way we would say that the phrase 'spatial rhythm' was being misapplied to a landscape in the Bengal school. The evaluative judgments of such a person could be dismissed. We would say that he had not even understood or appreciated the works of art correctly and therefore had no right to pass judgment. I want here to examine some of the basic problems which arise in understanding or correctly appreciating a work of art.

When I ask the question: What is the art object? You may be inclined to answer that it is the poem, or the painting or the piece of music and so on. This answer will not satisfy me. For instance, let us take Beethoven's Violin Concerto. Is the music the written score—the black signs on a white piece of paper? I think that you will

answer that the written score is not Beethoven's Violin Concerto; that the art object in this case is the actual sound we hear when it is being rendered by a soloist and an orchestra. But what happens when the last chord is struck? Would you say that there is no such art object as Beethoven's Violin Concerto? The fact is that there is a very close connection between the written score, the physical stimuli and the art object. In music we need what has been called a secondary artist or the performer to interpret the physical stimuli before the work of art can be actualised. This is also necessary in the case of drama. A secondary artist, however, does not appear to be necessary for the reciting of a poem or the viewing of a painting. I say 'does not appear to be necessary' because it may be open to doubt whether it is a valid distinction that a secondary artist is necessary for the realisation of some types of art objects such as music and drama, but not for others such as painting and poetry. There is a story about the distinguished Oxford philosopher, R. G. Collingwood, whose 'Principles of Art' will be familiar to serious students of aesthetics. Collingwood, who was passionately fond of music, never went to a concert; when he wanted to listen to good music he sat at home with the musical score of his favourite work before him!

I am content to leave the question unsettled as to whether a secondary artist is necessary for the actualisation of the art object. It is not of primary interest to me. I want, on the other hand, to examine in detail, the relationship which exists between

accurate, we should say, that much poetry gives expression to an emotion. But quite apart from an emotion which a poem may express, there is what could be more properly called a feeling, that is, whether the poet wants you to take up a favourable or unfavourable attitude towards his subject. Take such words as 'magnificent,' 'sublime,' 'awe-inspiring,' 'wonderful,' 'sunny,' 'warm' and so on. Do these words refer to a quality in the object described? Frequently the poet is only using these words to inspire what some philosophers have called a 'pro' feeling towards the object. There are 'con' words just as there are 'pro' words. There is an aura round words so that when we talk about the feeling of a poem we are thinking of these subtle pro or con feelings which the poet is arousing in us. Consider the following lines from Francis Thompson's 'Daisy':

'She looked a little wistfully,
Then went her sunshine way:—
The sea's eye had a mist on it,
And the leaves fell from the day.'

Then Richard speaks of the *tone* of a poem. This is the attitude of the poet to his audience. The example of tone which Richards gives is that of a person making a speech. For instance, if a young and aspiring philosopher is addressing the Aristotelian Society in London he will be highly impersonal and cautious. In short, he will be deferential. On the other hand, a person preaching a sermon tends to speak down to his audience and so on. In poetry, tone is something which is a lot more subtle and is not always easy to lay one's finger on. But perhaps Wordsworth is being a trifle superior when he speaks of 'the still, sad music of humanity' which he finds in nature. You will find it too, he seems to say, provided you take nature as seriously as he does. Or again, we have a tone of banter in Day Lewis' parody of Marlowe's 'Come

live with me and be my love.' In place of the romantic pleasures which the pastoral lover had to offer, the lover today can only say,

'Come live with me and be my love
And we will all the pleasures prove,
Of peace and plenty, bed and board,
That chance employment may afford.'

Finally we come to what Richards describes as *intention*. I think we can see fairly clear what is meant by the intention of the poem. I shall have something further to say about this point a little later.

Let me then recapitulate. The poem has to be interpreted. We have to become aware of its shape and sound, and we have to get clear about its meaning, and the meaning as we have just seen, is a complex affair. Richards describes this by saying that the poem exists in the reading of it. This reading of the poem is rather like a rendering of Beethoven's Violin Concerto.

We are then led to the view that the poem has to be *re-created* from the bare bones which are the words of the poem. This re-creation may take two forms:—

(a) Readings of the poem vary from individual to individual. There is in fact no such thing as *the* poem. For instance, when we speak of Keats' 'Ode to the Nightingale' this is merely a convenient label for a class of objects, the class formed by verbal shapes and noises which closely resemble each other. An important consequence of this view is that when I say, "Keats' 'Ode to the Nightingale' is a good Poem" I am making a statement about my reading of it, and when you say the opposite you are not contradicting me because you are talking about something quite different, namely *your* reading of the poem. And since there is no such thing as *the* poem there cannot be any arguments amongst the literary critics.

This view, which I would describe as the solipsistic view of the art object is in

fact, quite commonly held. Many of the critics who hold it do not seem to realise that if they were to be consistent they should cease to write literary criticism. I shall try to show that this solipsistic view is unjustified when I discuss the second view of the poem which I now propose to consider. Meanwhile I might mention that on this theory not only would our art and literary critics be thrown out of commission—it would have the same effect upon our professors and lecturers on poetry.

(b) A second school of philosophers, who contend that the poem is not out there on the printed page, argue that what we call the poem or the art object is an imaginative experience which exists in the mind of the poet. This theory is associated with the names of the great Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, and the British philosopher R. G. Collingwood. The theory is commonly referred to as the Croce-Collingwood theory of art. There can hardly be any discussion on aesthetics today in which this theory is not mentioned, as much by those who differ as by those who are its supporters.

To explain what should happen to you when you read a poem it is necessary to say a few words about what these philosophers believe occurs when a poem is created. Collingwood tells us that before an artist creates or a poet writes he has a feeling of intense uneasiness. If you say he is subject to emotion or feeling, that would not be quite accurate, because the poet cannot tell you what he is feeling; he is in a state of emotional confusion. In this situation the artist picks up his brush or his instrument or perhaps pen and ink. In trying to give expression to his vague and undefined emotion, he discovers it. And in discovering himself, or in realising this experience, he creates a language. According to Collingwood, 'art is language,' and Croce says, 'art is expression.' It is worth emphasising

the following points in this theory. *Firstly*, the poet does not know beforehand what he is going to write. He discovers the poem in the creation of it. *Secondly*, the act of communication is incidental to artistic creation. The poet has, as it were, a soliloquy, and what he permits you to do is to eavesdrop on him. Subsequently, he may write out his poem and publish it but the point is that a poet does not write *for* an audience. Communication occurs, because the poet is after all a social being, and what he thinks and feels will not be so very different from the experience of other individuals in his time.

So, in short, for Croce and Collingwood, the poem is not a particular set of words written and recited. The poem is an experience—an imaginative expression of emotion in the mind of the poet. When, therefore, you read the words, they may help you to recreate the poem. You will be aware of the poem to the extent to which you recreate in your own mind the experience of the poet. That experience is the poem.

The main criticism which is brought against this theory, especially by those who support the solipsistic view, is to contend that in fact it is reducible to it. It has all the drawbacks of the solipsistic theory, and a few more of its own. The solipsists admit, and embrace the fact, that each reader creates a different poem; that in fact, there is no such thing as *the* poem. It is all very well, the solipsists would say to talk about *the* poem in the mind of the poet. But how is anyone to know what is in the poet's mind? The poet himself cannot tell you what was in his mind. If he wants to, he can only repeat the words of the poem. The poem, they contend, is a closely organised whole, an organic unity with all its parts interlocked. If you disturb one part, if you change one word, you change the whole. Such critics might refer us to the story of Robert Browning who was once asked what

he meant by a particular poem. Browning looked at it puzzled, and replied that when he wrote the poem, there were two persons who knew what it meant, Robert Browning and God. Now only one person knew what it meant—God.

There is no doubt a germ of truth in this contention which every teacher of poetry and every art critic (even the most gifted of them) will realise. But I want to show in some detail that the case has been grossly overstated.

To begin with, let us admit that the poem is untranslatable. It is true that you cannot explain exactly what a poem means. Nevertheless, it is possible to decide between different readings of a poem, and it is possible to show that one reading is more likely to be correct than another. There are a number of ways in which this can be done.

Firstly, the critic can give us an analysis of the poem. For instance, he can give us the plain sense of the poem. In some poems, due to syntactical idiosyncrasies, it may be difficult to make out the prose sense and there might well be more than one possible sense. Thus the critic would have to explain the meaning of difficult words and the syntax of a poetical line. Again, he may draw attention to the correct way in which a line should be read or scanned and to the alliteration or assonance which bring out its music. In short, the critic would take the poem to pieces and say, notice these characteristics when you put the poem together again, and see that they fit in with each other—and in this way, I believe he can, in Collingwood's phraseology, help you to recreate *the* poem—not just any poem.

Perhaps an illustration would help. Consider the following poem entitled 'Peace' written by that great but obscure poet, Gerard Manley Hopkins:

'When will you ever, peace, wild wood
dove, shy wings shut,
Your round me roaming end and under
be my boughs?
When, when Peace, will you Peace?
I'll not play hypocrite
To own my heart; I yield you do come
sometimes; but
That piecemeal peace is poor peace.
What pure peace allows
Alarms of wars, the daunting wars, the
death of it?

O surely reaving Peace, my lord should
leave in lieu
Some good! And so he does leave
Patience exquisite
That plumes to Peace thereafter. And
when Peace here does house,
He comes with work to do, he does
not come to coo,
He comes to brood and sit'.

While the central idea is clear, I am sure that every one, especially those who may be making their first acquaintance with this poem, will agree that it can do with some explaining. For instance, the second line, '*Your round me roaming end, and under be my boughs.*' This has been described by some critics as an irritating grammatical tangle. But treat 'round me roaming' as a single word and the tangle ends. And we see how much more musical this is than if the poet were to have said, '*End your roaming round me.*' Then 'under be my boughs' is coined on the model of 'underlie' and carries a sense of passivity—of being. Then again there is the alliteration and punning in the line, '*That piecemeal peace is poor peace.*'

Those who may care to follow Mr. Gardner's¹ excellent analysis of this poem of Hopkins' will no doubt be better able to recreate the poem than they might have been able to do at the first reading. In short,

critical analysis can help us to achieve a fuller synthesis of *the* poem. This, I submit, is one way in which critics can help to explain a poem.

Secondly, I want to point out that as a matter of fact poets themselves have thrown light on their poems or have helped to explain them, just as in their turn the poems might help us in understanding the author. Apart from the poems we have the poets' letters, their diaries, notebooks and so on. We know for instance what sort of man Blake was, we know a good deal about his philosophy of life. So when we read a poem like '*Tyger, tyger, burning bright*' which we sometimes come across in books for children, we know that there is a good deal in it besides what meets the eye at the first reading. And without labouring this somewhat obvious point, I want to contend that when critics give us background material about the life and thought of a poet they are helping to explain the poem.

Thirdly, I want to contend that just as the poem is not an isolated fragment but part of the mental and emotional life of the poet, so the poet also is a member of society occupying a particular place and time in history. The language which he uses is a social and historical fact. I believe that the critic can help us to understand *the* poem by throwing light on the language of a particular period. For instance, it is well known that words change their meanings, that words such as 'strange' which we may quietly pass by, had a fairly terrible significance when what was not known tended to be linked with that which was dangerous. There are numerous and useful studies of an historical nature of this kind which can help us to understand poets and the poem, they wrote.

Fourthly, I want to urge, that the critics of the Croce-Collingwood theory seem to suggest that this difficulty in knowing that we have understood or recreated the poem,

is something which is peculiar to literary or art criticism. They seem to think that in history or economics or science we have absolute certainty but in literary criticism this certainty is lacking. I would, however, like to point out that as soon as we leave the realms of mathematics and logic, as soon, in short, as we start worrying ourselves about what exists in time and space, we have to forget certainly. All knowledge of this kind is probable and there can be no guarantee that what we have found or what we believe to be the truth today will not be upset tomorrow as the result of further research. And this is the risk which every one must face who would dare to know.

And when I have said all this in defence of the Croce-Collingwood theory, I feel almost afraid to confess that in fact I do not support it. My difficulty with it is not in the realm of practical criticism but is of a philosophical, perhaps, a metaphysical nature. Collingwood tells us that the poem, the art object, exists in the mind of the creator; it is not the words of the poem or the Jamini Roy canvas which you may have spent a good deal on to acquire, but then I would ask, 'What happens to that art object when the poet ceases to have that experience and when he finally dies?'

For Croce and Collingwood the art object cannot be separated from the process of its creation. In fact strictly speaking, the words *art object* cannot occur in the language of their theory. Collingwood tells us for instance, that there may be a calculable probability that if a monkey were left to play with a typewriter for long enough he would produce purely accidentally the complete text of Shakespeare. He adds, with considerable sarcasm, that there are people who might describe a text produced in this way as a great work of art. I must confess, nevertheless, that as a critic I am interested primarily in the art object, only

the physical stimuli, the printed musical notation, or words or the painted canvas, and what I have described as the actual work of art. For the sake of convenience I propose to confine myself to the art of poetry, and what I have to say may not apply in precisely the same way to the other arts; the situation may vary just a little in different arts. For instance, if a secondary artist is necessary in music this would make for a complication which does not exist in poetry. Poetry is simpler than music in this respect and this may be taken as one good reason why I have preferred to examine it rather than another art. There is another reason, too, why it is simpler to discuss the case of poetry rather than some other art. When we talk about poetry or when we want to interpret or discuss the interpretation of a poem we do so in prose—even poets do! Of course this will give rise to difficulties, and I propose to discuss some of them during the course of this article. But these difficulties are nothing in comparison with the difficulties which arise when a critic starts talking about a painting or about music. And the reason for this is easy to understand. Poetry and prose have at least language in common; they are in the same medium. Translation of the poem into prose for purposes of exposition can be done less inadequately than translation from a totally different medium such as line or colour.

So we come back again to our more circumscribed question: what is the poem?

THE WORDS ARE essential to the poem, but the poem is more than the words. We must remember that words themselves have, from the point of view of the appreciator, at least two aspects which are important in our apprehension of poetry—verbal shape, the printed word and verbal sound, the word as heard. A poem has to be considered from both these points of view. Swin-

burne for instance, must be *heard* and so must many other poets. On the other hand, verbal shape may also help us to see the pattern of the poem in print, for instance, in Dylan Thomas' *Dedication to his Readers* in his *Collected Poems*.

And then of course, to get nearer the heart of the poem, there is its meaning. Dr. Richards tells us that the meaning of a poem is also a complex business and is made up of four aspects. There is what he calls, first, the *plain sense* of the poem. This is what is explained to us in the classroom when poetry is being *taught*. And though we may scoff at this it is very important. Dr. Richards in his 'Practical Criticism' has pointed out that in a very large number of cases when readers fail to appreciate a poem, one reason is that they have not succeeded in making out its prose sense.

Then we come to feeling—the *feeling* of the poem. It is a little difficult to explain what is meant by the feeling of a poem because the word 'feeling' is a sort of omnibus which is used in a large variety of senses. Prof. Gilbert Ryle of Oxford has distinguished no less than seven senses of the verb 'to feel'—for example: 'I felt a toothache,' 'I felt a tickle,' 'I felt as if the rope were already round my neck!', 'I felt for the two-anna bit which had found its way into the seam of my coat.' And then perhaps a more important use from the point of view of the poet—'I felt that. . .'. Wordsworth says,

'And I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with
the joy

Of elevated thoughts; a sense
sublime. . . .'

It seems to me, however, that feelings enter into poetry in two main ways. For instance we talk of Shelley's 'Adonais' as a poem about grief, the grief which Shelley felt at Keats' death. In the same way, we talk about love poems and so on. And to be

tinuance would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of liberty, equality and opportunity to all Indian citizens. In fact, special measures have been provided for the less developed sections of the community in order to ensure that liberty, equality and opportunity become real and do not remain mere articles in the Constitution. For the same reasons, religious minorities as such have no recognition in the Constitution but the spirit of the Constitution requires that all individuals regardless of religion or community have the same obligations and the same rights. The result is that inequalities based on caste or religion or language are being steadily removed, but at the same time, individuals have the fullest freedom of forming associations of their own for advancing their economic,

political, social, cultural linguistic or religious purposes. Central planning is in one sense taking over some of the functions of State Governments but simultaneously there is the movement towards decentralisation and transfer of power to village *panchayats*. Local autonomy is growing side by side with the strengthening of national purpose and national unity. The Indian genius for synthesis has in the past developed a social system that combined unity with diversity. It is today engaged in an experiment of political federalism which may well offer a solution to the problem of reconciling the rival claims of global integration and maintenance of national identity posed by the phenomenal advances of science and technology in the modern world.

It is unmeaning to say that what is beautiful to one man *ought* to be beautiful to another. We take a certain pleasure in having our own judgements supported by those of others; we are intolerant, if not of the existence of a nature different from our own, at least of its expression in words and judgements. We abhor another man's doubt when we cannot tell him why we ourselves believe.

GEORGE SANTAYANA

titution thus led to an aggravation of the differences among different Indian groups and ultimately led to the unfortunate partition of the country.

During the last forty years or more, Indian political opinion has been slowly feeling its way towards the evolution of a type of federalism suited to the Indian genius. British support to the principle of federalism after 1921 made it suspect to many Indian political thinkers. Some of them were suspicious of even the diluted form of federalism introduced in the Montford Reform Scheme. They argued that so long as the British were sure of their position in India, they developed the administration of the country on an increasingly unitary pattern. It was only when the challenge of Indian nationalism created doubts about the continuance of British power in India that the British started introducing elements of federalism in the pattern of their Government. Indian political leaders who thought on these lines were unhappy at the expansion of the power of the Provinces under the Government of India Act 1935. Their suspicions were further strengthened by the British encouragement to the Muslim League in its demand for the partition of the country. They therefore desired that India should be organised as a unitary State administered from a strong centre.

There were other Indian political leaders who did not agree with this analysis of the situation in India. They did not always consciously relate their attitude to the basic Indian philosophy of federalism but they felt that the great diversity of the country with its many languages, many religions and many communities demanded a federal solution of its political problems. They therefore desired that more and more powers should be delegated to the federating units and only the minimum powers and functions necessary for maintaining the

unity and integrity of the country retained at the centre. They welcomed provincial autonomy in 1937 and actively worked for the acceptance of the British Cabinet Mission Plan which reserved only three subjects for the Centre and gave all other powers and functions to the constituent Provinces. They were therefore not very happy when after the attainment of independence there was a reaction against decentralisation. They recognised that in the revulsion of feeling created by partition, it was natural for people to want a strong unitary Government but they feared that if the pendulum swung too far to the other extreme, it might weaken rather than strengthen the unity of the country.

The debate between those who want larger powers for the constituent States and those who want greater concentration of power at the centre is not yet over. Those who plead for larger powers for the units argue that in a country so large as India, powers must be delegated to State units if we are to avoid delay and wastage. They also point out that conditions differ from area to area and any attempt at imposing uniformity is likely to lead to loss of functional efficiency. In their view, the diversities in language, religion and culture are additional reasons for reserving a minimum of functions for the Central Government. It has also been suggested by some of the advocates of this view that such decentralisation of power would have more than one advantage. It would develop local initiative and strengthen the foundations of democracy. The recent demand for decentralisation in the working of the Community Project Programme takes this demand still further and proposes power to be exercised not even at the State level, but at the level of village units grouped together for economic and cultural purposes. It has also been argued that decentralisation may lead to the development of territorial loyal-

reality itself. Expressed as unity in diversity, it has given a special character to Indian philosophic thought and indeed on the Indian outlook on life. The second special feature follows from this and is found in the special type of social structure which has developed in India throughout the ages.

Indian philosophical thought has declared that truth has many facets which appear at first incompatible and are yet united in the Absolute. It is not given to man to see the Real in its totality. No one can therefore claim to be an exclusive possessor of the truth. Contrary explanations of the nature of the Real may and indeed must be reconciled in a synoptic view. To attain such a view is the goal of knowledge, but once it is attained, the process of experience comes to an end.

The Indian attitude towards the real may to a western observer appear analogous to Hegel's dialectical approach. There are however major differences between the Hegelian concept and the Indian experience. They help to underline how the federal principle forms a part of the Indian philosophy of life. In the Hegelian account, there is a thesis and an anti-thesis and both are merged in a higher synthesis. Once this synthesis is achieved, the thesis and the anti-thesis both lose their claim to reality. In the Indian approach there is not a simple duality of contraries or even contradictories, but a multiplicity of various formulations each with its own degree of truth. When the individual is able to transcend the limitations of his special point of view, it does not still lose its claim to truth. Thus for Indian thought, the most sectional or partial appreciation of truth retains an element of validity even when the synoptic view of truth has been attained. Indian philosophical thought thus recognises a manifoldness in the nature of reality which goes far beyond the Hegelian conception of dualism. It further gives to each manifestation a

status and dignity that is higher than what the elements in the Hegelian dialectical process can ever claim.

Even more remarkable is the Indian attitude towards social organisation. Most societies have sought to impose not only uniformity of behaviour but also uniformity of belief upon their members. Such efforts have invariably failed in the end but in spite of repeated failures, the reality of the effort cannot be explained away. Indian society has from the earliest time recognised diversity and gradation in belief as well as conduct. In fact, Indian society is not a single unified social pattern but a federation of social patterns of many types. The Hindu pantheon houses an infinite diversity of gods and Hindu society is still a living museum of anthropology. I have described in greater length in *The Indian Heritage* how even the institution of caste may be explained as a device which enabled diverse social groups at different stages of organisation and evolution to live in comparative peace with one another.

I have already mentioned that in spite of the rise and fall of many powerful empires, the political organisation in India was at least till the middle of the last century essentially federal. Kings ruled and passed away. Dynasties rose to power and then decayed. In this endless procession of kings and dynasties, the social organisation of villages hardly changed. The *panchayats* were in a very real sense the true repositories of power and exercised all the functions of a local administration regardless of who ruled at Delhi or some other capital. It was easier for a man to defy the imperial command than the command of the village council. He could fly from imperial wrath and seek safety in some other part of India. He had no way of escaping the extensive and intensive control which the *panchayats* exercised.

The introduction of modern means of

State was federal in origin and grew out of the conglomeration of families and clans into larger units. This process of accretion was needed to ensure better co-operation for purposes of production and distribution. It was however natural that the acceding units should retain some of their powers and only part with those which were essential for the survival of the community. They equally naturally resisted encroachments on their authority when a powerful individual or group sought to concentrate power in its own hands and dictate to the rest of the community.

Apart from social inertia, another factor which prevented too early or too great a concentration of power was man's imperfect control over the forces of nature. As the size of the State grew and kingdoms developed into empires, we invariably find that they were feudal in character. Local satraps or rulers exercised almost absolute powers so long as they professed allegiance to the imperial authority. Since means of transport and communication were then slow and difficult, it would not be otherwise. However able and powerful an emperor might be, he was very often unaware of what was happening in the outposts of his empire. Even when he had information, it was not easy to take action on the reports he received. The fastest armies could not march more than twenty miles a day. Even the cavalry could do hardly more than seventy to eighty miles. In such a situation, it was inevitable that all residuary powers should vest in the local authority.

Whether it was the village panchayat in India or the feudal governor or baron in Persia or Europe, the essential form of state organisation was the exercise of almost all sovereign powers by local authorities with nominal allegiance to the king or the emperor. A powerful king did not tolerate any challenge to his authority and sometimes meted out dire punishment to those

who rebelled. In the normal course of affairs, he was however content to claim only a few essential rights and privileges and leave the rest of the administration to his local representatives. If one defines federalism as a principle of government where the constituent units have autonomy in the spheres allotted to them and owe allegiance to a central authority for only certain more or less well defined purposes, it would not be incorrect to say that all early forms of the State were federal.

Federalism is thus inherent not only in the organisation of the State but in the very structure of human society. Even the most absolute of despotisms has to delegate authority and functions to subordinate individuals and groups. The most totalitarian of States has been compelled to delegate power to its functionaries at different levels. In aim and purpose, a totalitarian State must be unitary. It tolerates no independence among its subordinate bodies but its insistence on absolute authority leads paradoxically to a larger delegation of powers than is sometimes the case in more democratic societies. In a democratic State, there is mutual give and take between authority at different levels. If a subordinate authority has any doubts about any order of a superior authority, it can ask for clarification and in certain cases even for modification of the original order. There is thus greater opportunity for the lower authorities to understand clearly the intentions of the higher authority and in some cases to share in the taking of policy decisions. In a totalitarian State, a subordinate authority dare not ask any questions. It is afraid that even a request for clarification may be interpreted as incipient insubordination. It therefore interprets the order as best as it may and carries it out according to its own understanding. This may however be very different from the actual intentions of the authority issuing the orders. The force of

the structure of the State. Man is a gregarious animal and cannot survive without social co-operation. He is also a centre of individual consciousness and cannot therefore be regarded as a mere unit in an organism. He often cooperates with his fellows, but there are also instances when he fights them and this in spite of the fact that such conflicts do not usually advance his interests. He is rational but not wholly so, and we find that without an element of compulsion even the most reasonable of men cannot always pull together. The object of the State is to eliminate violence and substitute it by the regulated use of force. It cannot however be denied that the presence of force in reserve is one of the conditions for the survival both of the State and the individuals which constitute it. All these theories imply a certain interplay of authority at different levels which is the essence of federalism. Before I refer to this element of federalism inherent in the conception of the State, I would like to mention another factor which helped in the emergence of the State.

It is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that there would have been no State without the institution of exogamy. Hunger and sex are the two primeval instincts of men and are linked up with the survival of the individual and the continuation of the species. Along with other animals man discovered quite early in his evolution that hunger could be best satisfied through the co-operation of individuals acting in a group. Where the individuals turned against one another, it was not only the end of the group but also a prelude to the end of the individual. Where man went beyond all other animals was to extend this principle of cooperation in the realm of sex. There is an elementary form of social organisation among many animals and such organisation enables them to hunt together and share their food on a more or

less rational basis. Animals have not however been able to solve the problem of sexual jealousy. The result is that in most types of animal societies, there is room for only one adult male. Young males as soon as they approach adulthood are usually driven off, or in the alternative challenge the supremacy of the reigning chief and drive him away. Animal societies are thus deprived of the services of a sufficient number of adult males. There is little doubt that this has been a source of weakness both in defence against aggression and in offensive action against potential enemies.

Human beings solved this problem by developing the institution of exogamy. In an exogamous group, social and religious taboo forbade the male from sexual relations within the family or social group. Since the young males had to acquire females from outside, one of the major causes of sexual jealousy within the group was reduced, though it was never completely removed. This made it possible to retain the services of the young adult males and gave groups which adopted the institution a decisive advantage in the struggle for existence over those which did not.

Once society had evolved institutions which enabled individuals to co-operate without the distractions due to the need for the satisfaction of hunger and sex, the emergence of the State was but a natural step. Such an emergence was due partly to the natural instinct of man, for man is essentially a gregarious animal. Man's physical weakness was also a contributing factor, for without social co-operation man could not survive. Intelligence and will were also important factors. They contributed towards the evolution of institutions like exogamy and removed one of the major causes of disruption among other animal societies. Intelligence and will also contributed to the evolution of the State by transforming human beings from food gathering to food

Schweitzer calls world and life denying. This must reinforce acquiescence in things as they have always been. The Buddhist movement was ineffective as an instrument of change because, though markedly less mother-centred than Hinduism, it remained imbued with the beliefs that all manifestations of the libido must be rooted out, that all value lies within, and that the external world bears a stamp of inferiority.

When, for military, economic or other reasons, tribes coalesce and the kinship principle is thus weakened, the natural tendency is for the mother-centred to give way to the father-centred mentality. This change did not progress far in India, from the causes suggested above. It did proceed in Greece and Rome, perhaps in part by the means pointed out by Maine. But the people of northern Europe retained the tribal and mother-centred mentality far into the Christian era. The principal means whereby the change was forced upon them was the Church, which after Constantine identified itself with the traditions of the Roman empire, but still remembered the horror with which the early Church had contemplated the unbridled profligacy of imperial Rome in its worst days. The Church lacked political power, and was able for that reason to concentrate upon

bringing about a change in the minds of its flock. For centuries in the Dark and Middle Ages its efforts seem to have been devoted mainly to forcing upon the lower clergy, and through them on the people, the strictest father-centred sexual code (It will be remembered that Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest leader of India out of tribalism into nationhood, wholeheartedly applauded the clerical celibacy of the Roman Church.) The success of the Church's campaign against sex was never complete, and for a time, at the Renaissance, the mother-centred mentality, with its sexual tolerance, hit back and conquered the very citadel of the Church. But the effort was resumed with redoubled zeal in both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and it is in the four centuries since then that the divergence between the European mind and the Indian has become most clearly marked.

I am not advocating Gandhian puritanism or the European example. I do not unreservedly admire either. But before we make choices for the future we must know the facts about the past. My concern has been solely with the past and the facts, and I believe that a true history of India must incorporate an analysis resembling that given here.

there. But these facts in their turn call for explanation.

It is a generally accepted, if not strictly 'orthodox,' psychoanalytic doctrine that man's emotional organisation conforms to one or other of two broad types, according as the boy identifies with the father or the mother. Identification with the father leads to worship of a jealous personal god, a punitive conscience and puritanical morality, high psychic tension, energy, aggressiveness, and a society capable of wide expansion and generally favouring equality under a leader. Identification with the mother leads to worship of goddesses, polytheism, pantheism, an easy-going conscience and moral system, low psychic tension, unaggressive behaviour, tolerance, and a social unit which tends to remain confined to bloodkin. Totemic tribes are usually dominated by the mother-centred mind, and the transition from a tribal to a national political existence is normally accompanied by a transformation to the father-centred psychic type.

India has remained dominated by the mother-centred mentality. Any amount of evidence, from religion, art, literature and ordinary behaviour, could be cited in support of this contention. This is the root explanation of the social conservatism of India, and in particular of the survival of the kinship principle and of caste. It also explains most of the other psychic characteristics which have been mentioned. Europe, on the other hand, shows a marked though not exclusive predominance of the father-centred mentality. How came these two societies, of similar ethnic character, to diverge so conspicuously? We cannot hope for a full explanation, but we can suggest some circumstances which help to explain it.

In India probably the most important circumstance was the rise of caste. Caste is thus called in to explain its own perpet-

uation, but there is nothing illogical about this. Caste happened to arise in India and nowhere else, and once established, it had immensely important effects. This is perfectly comprehensible except to the unilinear imagination of the Marxists. Marxist writers always treat castes and *varnas* as classes (Kosambi makes a concession to the race theory). But neither the class nor the race theory explains the endogamy, the ban on commensality, and the other rules of caste which are clearly of a religious or magical character. I am inclined to accept the theory put forward by A. M. Hocart in his book *Caste*, but there is no need, for the present purpose, to insist on all he says. It is enough that at some stage the *varnas* or castes were dominated by the ritual functions of their leading members, and that this made them quite different things from economic classes, craft guilds or racial groups. The division of society was determined by ritual requirements. Since, however, many ritual functions were also economic, the divisions tended to become occupational, though in fact caste and occupation have seldom fully coincided.

As the tribes grew into principalities they absorbed smaller tribes, and these were admitted as complete endogamous groups, i.e. they became new castes, and as they had usually been conquered they became *Shudra* or *Panchama* castes. This explains the fact pointed out by Hamdi Bey, that most existing castes retain many of the characteristics of tribes and evidently were tribes in former times. It also explains the marked, though by no means uniform, differences of skin colour, stature, facial form, etc., among castes, which misled most of the British Indologists, and Kosambi, into thinking that race was the original basic principle of caste, and that *varna* meant skin colour. *Varna* referred to the four ritual colours: white for Brahmans,

incidentally with the process which led to it. And one reason for my stand is that the art object is *there*; the process of creation is a matter of hypothesis. Moreover, having survived these two decades since Collingwood left us and having learnt of the recent exhibition of paintings by the chimpanzees Congo and Betsy my pride at being a member of the class 'homo sapiens' is at a lower ebb than his.

What then is the poem, the art object? I am afraid I will come back to the commonplace statement that the poem is the words of which it is composed, the painting is the canvas with its daubs of colour, and the concerto is the notes which go to make it. Collingwood asks you to recreate the poem from the words. What I would suggest is that you try to *find* the poem in the words; and you will know that you are on the right track when you can see a pattern, a configuration. Looking at a work of art I suggest is like being confronted by one of those cards which are thrust before you

when you go to the eye specialist to test your colour vision. In that mass of dots of various colours you are expected to find a letter or a figure—in short, a specific pattern. If you are completely colour-blind the whole thing will be an undifferentiated grey-white expanse. If you are blind to blue and yellow you will not be able to find the pattern or you may find what looks like a pattern and is not the right one. Only if your colour vision is correct—and provided you have the patience—will you be able to find the correct pattern. This, I suggest, is in fact the position in which the appreciator of art finds himself. In the physical stimuli, the verbal sound or shape, and in the meaning, he must search for the pattern, the configuration, which is the poem. If he is to be successful, the appreciator must have the right sensibilities and he must have patience. He must keep his own fantasies and predilections in the background. And then, if he is lucky, he will find the right type of teacher or critic.

A Glance at Modern Urdu Literature

By GURBACHAN SINGH TALIB

THE period elapsed since independence is only a decade, and consequently it is too early yet for any noticeable changes to have occurred in the literature in Urdu produced during this period. That, however, does not imply either that significant new trends in creation and expression are not slowly appearing, or that important developments may not be expected to take place in the not distant future. I might go a step further and say that new developments along certain lines in Urdu are inevitable in the peculiar circumstances in which this particular language has been placed, whereas such changes in other languages of the country might come about only with the normal course of evolution in social, political and economic conditions. The partition of the country placed Urdu in something like a quandary. It has lost the importance of its position in the social and educational set-up after partition in those regions of India in which it evolved over the centuries first as a spoken language of the upper classes, and later as perhaps the most powerful medium of intellectual expression over a vast area. This was inevitable, as new forces, different from those which fostered the growth of Urdu, emerged to take the field of popular approval, and other linguistic and cultural trends have consequently developed. In the change-over that is taking place, there has been, as may be expected, even a discouraging attitude towards Urdu, which let us

hope is only a passing phase. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Urdu has lost and is likely to lose still more, even without any specially directed ill-will, its pre-eminent position as the cultural, academic and intellectual medium which it has so far been in certain areas for more than a century. A feeling of frustration and pessimism, a deterioration of standards is visible among those who love the great traditions and literature of the language, and wish to see it grow and retain its place of importance.

Inevitably also, the centre of the growth of Urdu has shifted after partition to Pakistan, across our Western Border, where it has been adopted as the state language, and all the resources of the state are available for its development and progress. Some of the most eminent writers in the language were already resident in those areas now in Pakistan, many others migrated thither under various circumstances. The consequence of all this has been that the growth of the Urdu language and literature has now become concentrated in those areas where it is not the spoken language, except of a microscopic upper class minority. For growth, therefore, it will have to forget, as time goes on, the idiom and flavour of its native soil, and must draw its new characteristics from its new surroundings.

At least one area now in Pakistan, that is, the Punjab has been the centre of intensive activity in Urdu literature for about three quarters of a century, and, as is well-

known, has produced besides other writers of note, the greatest poet in Urdu since Ghalib, Iqbal. This tremendous tradition coupled with the powerful patronage of the state augurs well for the growth of Urdu in that area, although it is bound to shed some of its flavour of the past, which many of its votaries have valued in an almost immoderate degree.

This is not to imply that the development of Urdu in India after independence has been either negligible or poor. Some of the older authors are still active, and the established Institutions which have fostered the growth of academic and cultural work are not slackening in their activity. On the contrary, new lines of research and creativity are being discovered and pursued, so that the literary scene in Urdu far from being depressing is full and bright. Transitional problems are gradually being solved, a better perspective is emerging, and it is to be hoped that while with the passage of years Urdu may lose some of its former advantages, it will not be like a dried up stream or a garden run to seed.

II

THE PROBLEM WHICH Urdu letters has faced from the beginning, has been the problem of scope and approach. Unlike Persian, Braji, Marathi, Bengali or other similar language literatures, Urdu literature was developed by an extremely small and exclusive class in the eighteenth century, which was confined in its habitat to a few towns of North-Western India, and having lost all initiative in matters political, economic and social, was at that time in a condition of static decadence. This class was sealed off from contact even with the immediate country side, with the rich life of the people living around and pulsating with vigour and initiative—and also from the knowledge of traditions and

modes of thinking and feeling beyond their door step. It was a unique and pathetic sight—this of the upper class Northern Indian Muslims who lived mentally and morally in a mummified past, dating back culturally to the hellenized Islamic world of the eighth and ninth centuries and subsequent traditions which had accreted in Persia from the days of Firdausi till the times which were contemporaneous with the reign of Akbar in India. Since then, cultural contacts with Persia were fewer and were seldom absorbed into the tradition of the Indian Muslims. Their state was something like what has been presented in caricature in the story of Haji Baba—pathetic as well as comic.

Literature growing in these conditions would naturally be divorced from reality and would be encrusted with false and merely precious ornament. While such literature acquired a high degree of finish of form, it had little passion and hardly any philosophical outlook. It was all a restatement of medieval thinking, with a world of reference which had no relation to realities near at hand. The litterateurs of Urdu were developing their hot-house palace garden of verse while in the other languages the people's aspirations were pulsating, and brave and patriotic men were fighting against the rising tide of foreign rule in various parts of the country. This peculiar character of the people who expressed themselves in Urdu, which remained static from the inception of its literature till almost the end of the nineteenth century, has left an unmistakable plus and minus record behind. The plus record is the finish, subtlety, precision and academic comprehensiveness of expression. The minus side has been the divorce from reality and failure to interpret the passions and ideals of the people by which alone ultimately a literature acquires its stamp of greatness.

The change that came over the Muslim

upper class in the later nineteenth century after the failure of the Revolt of 1857, was that they were forced to stir out of their century-old surroundings, to struggle for economic subsistence in the new professions and opportunities and get to know the people of whose existence so far they were hardly aware. This new situation opened up, although in tragic circumstances, new fields for their experience and provided new themes and even techniques for their literary creation. A touch of reality began to creep into their writings; new forms were tried, and new techniques were adopted. Prose began to be written with ease and suppleness, and be it said to the credit of these masters matured in the school of tradition, that what they turned out along the new lines was also of the best in expressiveness, sensibility and precision of tone and temper. These masters were working on new material with highly sharpened precision tools, and consequently they were after a few decades, still ahead of their contemporaries who were working in the other Indian languages which were not so well developed.

The expansion of Urdu literature, the evolution of new techniques in prose and verse, the transformation of the *ghazal*, the technical experiments—all these from the beginning of the present century to the partition of the country are very well-known, and detailed accounts of these can be found in the various books on these subjects.

III

AFTER INDEPENDENCE, no absolutely new lines have been chalked out, no fresh

experiments have been initiated. As I said at the outset, the period has been too short for any remarkable developments to have taken place not only in India, but also in Pakistan. The previous experiments have been no doubt continued, and those which were of an ephemeral or capricious character have tended to be discarded. We consequently hear less now of free verse, the stream-of-consciousness technique, so-called expressionism, and emphasis on certain peculiar features of the sex-consciousness. There is on the other hand renewed emphasis on social and economic problems, the peculiarly morbid psychological state bred by poverty, frustration and despair, such as is found among the less fortunate classes in either country, and on the need for the people's struggle to end this painful state. While new bitterness is seen to emerge born of impatience, there is also a more positive grip on realities—the writer, so to speak, is more mature now, is shedding adolescent passion and sentimentality. A broader wisdom is dawning on the world of letters. This is all very satisfactory, and through this development we are approximating in certain ways to the criteria whereby we judge the great literatures in the Western languages.

In the purely academic fields, intensive research is being pursued in the problems of language and literature. In the social sciences while fresh discoveries are not being made, the learning of the world is being assimilated through translation and adaptation. All this record is not only satisfactory, but something to be proud of. The contribution of India in these respects is in no way inferior to that of Pakistan.

HINDI

A Fresh Approach to the Current Controversy

By M. S. KALYANASUNDARAM

NEWSPAPER readers are familiar with the controversy over Hindi, the proposed Common Official Language of India. There is resistance from a group in the South which fears—or takes political advantage of the room for fear—that meek acceptance of Hindi as the Common Language would lead subtly to the ‘domination of the South by the North’. I am not concerning myself over that aspect now. Other men and other factors will take care of that. I feel more concerned about the genuine difficulties in learning the language. I may be permitted to state here that I belong to an early batch of Hindi teaching volunteers of the South.

People who have looked into the problem, earnestly and dispassionately, know that for a non-Indian, Hindi is easier to learn than the languages of Madras State; and they also know that this comparative statement does not absolve Hindi from its inherent difficulties—and, I may even say, defects. They are, mainly, associated with:

- (a) gender of inanimate and abstract nouns,
- (b) absence of unambiguous ‘indirect narration’ form, and
- (c) the intrusion of the post-position ‘ne’ and its strange implications.

Gender: There are no reliable rules for fixing the gender of inanimate and abstract nouns, as the long and incomplete list of exceptions given under each rule makes the rule practically useless. Besides, the gender is more reliably known (subject to a know-

ledge of the exceptions) from the ultimate letter and syllable and the source of the word than from the sense—which is a tall order for a beginner. That the meaning does not help us here can be seen from:—

daam (m) and *qimat* (f) for ‘price;’

saamaan (m) and *chiz* (f) for ‘thing;’

and so on. The present method is to remember from usage; but memory sometimes plays bad tricks. The only solution appears to be that we must arrive at an agreement that inanimate and abstract nouns may be always used in the masculine (without losing marks in the All-India Service Examinations). A concession exists even now that, when in doubt, we must treat the word as m rather than f; if *chiz* is treated as masculine, it is considered excusable ignorance; if *saamaan* is treated as feminine, we have to show cause why. My suggestion would just imply that we are in a state of permanent doubt (like a bridgeplaying friend of mine who was always in doubt and hence played trumps as long as the suit lasted) in this connection.

The problem is further complicated by the practice of using the feminine form for diminutives—e.g.,

tokraa & *tokri* (basket); *rassaa* & *rassi* (rope; etc.)

This can be left to Time to straighten out, as there is no specific line dividing the big basket or rope from the small one. Or—wondrous thought!—perhaps, the Women’s Associations and Councils will take successful action against equating ‘diminutive’ with

'feminine'. The same Bodies may also, if they care to see the possible implications, take exception to the strange fact that the 'Hindustani' words for—

army, battle, sword, gun, cannon, shot, success, and failure

are all feminine. Can Mother India, pleading earnestly for World Peace, tolerate this Amazon-complex in her Common Language? (In one style of Chinese or Japanese writing, I am told, a certain symbol stands for *woman*; and two of the same, side by side, stand for *quarrel*! That gives woman something to quarrel with men about!)

The rationale or the complex which causes English words like 'scheme' to be treated as f is also hard to see.

Direct and indirect narration:

Kishan tells Gopal—

'Raam kahtaa hai ki rupyaa mujhe de do'

The learner is not quite sure, from the words, whether the money is to be given to Ram, or to Kishan under Ram's instructions. When Kishan tries to elucidate in the current North Indian English with 'Ram says that give the money to me,' it does not help much either. The ambiguity in the Hindi pattern has vitiated the English version. In olden days, the portion after *ki* was always mentally placed under quotation marks by the listener. But, of late, due to exposure to other languages, the indirect narration is also coming into vogue, and hence the confusion. This too has to be left to Time to solve. I expect the English pattern of indirect narration to prevail.

Ne: Whereas the intransitive verb in the past tense in Hindi conforms to the usage in other standard languages (and to reason), the transitive verb behaves differently and queerly. It brings about the following changes in the sentence structure:

- (a) A *ne* gets suffixed to the subject. (If the subject happens to be a pronoun, other complications also arise).

- (b) The universally accepted link between the subject and the predicate is thrown overboard.

- (c) The object and the predicate get linked, that is, the verb is conjugated according to the gender and number of the object.

The inevitable exceptions are, of course, there.

It must be agreed that this usage is not rational. To forget the gender and number of the subject, and to be influenced by the gender and number of the object, perhaps because of its greater proximity to the predicate, indicates mental inertia—to put it mildly. (Compare with the error, now gaining ground, in—'The maintenance of gadget-mad and finish-conscious modern cars are getting to be more and more expensive'. . . . It will not be approved if the easy-going bride-groom slips the ring on the bride's sister's finger just because the shy bride has moved away a bit and her sister, killed by curiosity, has intruded nearest to the groom!) If it is argued, as it sometimes is, that this *ne* is reminiscent of the instrumental (third) case in Sanskrit, the obvious reply is that the use of the instrumental case would imply a passive voice pattern, that:

Raam ne roti khaayi (Ram ate bread) is not passive, and that there does exist the passive form—

Raam se roti khaayi gayi (Bread was eaten by Ram).

If the stress is on the word 'reminiscent' in the above attempt at justification, the error needs conscious removal as stated earlier. Hence, the intruding *ne* must go, and—

Raam roti khaaya & Sitaa do phal khaayi (Sita ate two fruits) must be declared acceptable.

In this connection, it is much to be regretted that *ne* is intruding in another wrong way. I refer to the form—

hamne wahan jana hai (I am obliged to go there)

which has come from the Punjab, which has all the looks of a diehard, and which is even finding a place in school help-books; and it will be admitted that help-books are more widely, intensely and trustingly used than the text-books. (*Hamko* and not *hamne* is correct in the above).

It may also be noted that the Hindi graduates of Madras speak about the best Hindi in the offices of Delhi. Clerks from U.P., where Hindi is the mother-tongue, make mistakes in gender and in the secondary mis-use of *ne* which jar on the correctly tuned ears of the Madrasi.

While we are at it, we may also consider reformation of numerals in Hindi. They too offer a difficulty to the learner. If we stop with the form 'six and eighty' for 'eighty-six', it is bad enough. But when, in addition to the reversed juxtaposition, a transformation (often unrecognizable) takes place at the junction, each number practically becomes a new word—which is hard on one not born to the language. For example, 40 to 48 and 50 to 58 may be examined in this light. What exquisite non-uniformity! (I hope this will not be defended by quoting—

quatre-vingt-onze of French and

acht-und-neun-zig of German (hyphens mine).

Again, the 'one short of' business in 19, 29, 39 etc. (with 99 for an exception) may have the virtue of being considered simple, poetical or an interesting variation, but it is not rational and suitable for the present

tempo of life. It does not take full advantage of the concepts of 'scale of ten' and 'place value' invented by our great mathematicians of old to our eternal glory. Thus, it is clear that the pidgen forms—

tis aur chhe or *tis par chhe* or *tischhe* must be acceptable for 'thirtysix' instead of the present—

chhattis (*chhe tis*)

The above suggestions (though made by a Hindi-premi and Hindi-sevak) will, I am aware, cause displeasure or amusement—according to one's nature—to those for whom Hindi is the mother-tongue. But it does not matter. Anger and sarcasm are not arguments. In this context, the country is not concerned with Hindi, the *nominal* mother-tongue of U.P. (conversation between villagers and artisans of U.P. and me does not run on greased wheels in spite of my knowledge of Hindi and my many years of stay in Agra and other North Indian towns) but with Hindi, the rationalised Common Language of India.

If this simple distinction between the two functional aspects of Hindi—the Mother-tongue of a Province, and the Common Language of the Nation—is clearly and frequently stressed, I believe that it would do good to both the groups—the protagonists of a rigid classical form (which, in fact, does not exist) and the panicky resisters of 'unfair importance' being given to one specific language.

Taking 'National' in the sense of 'All-India,' may I suggest the slogan:

Make it rational; it becomes National.

Language and Audience

By PUNYA SLOKA RAY

THAT it is the audience which decisively shapes a language may be seen most clearly at the elementary level. For example, the people of North India have no difficulty in pronouncing the words 'hospital,' 'doctor,' or 'lantern' more or less as the Englishman does. Yet among them it is understood that only an upstart would pronounce thus when using these words in Urdu or Hindi. One must say 'haspataal,' 'daaktar,' or 'laaltain.' It is the Hindustani audience which decides that 'hospital,' 'doctor' and 'lantern' are foreign, but 'haspataal,' 'daaktar' and 'laaltain' are acceptable Hindustani, not the rare individual who knows the original and correct English pronunciations. Again, it is the Bengali audience which decides that 'tultule' is a Bengali word but 'pulpule' is not. When I use the former to a Bengali audience I get a determinate response, but when I use the latter I get either no response at all or only a query. It is not Humpty Dumpty who chooses but his hearers who choose which are acceptable forms and which are not. Using a language is not just a process of expressing oneself. It is much more a process of winning a voice that will be heard.

The principle is not different at any other level of language. Which determinate meaning a word will have, depends on the context and the context ultimately depends on the audience. If I talk about 'mates' to a factory hand he will be led to think of his colleagues. To a zoologist it will suggest that the discourse is about spouses of animals. To a mariner it will refer to commanding officers of medium seniority on board.

Such an utterance as 'I'll make it' expresses quite different meanings depending on the situation and the hearer. To my sports instructor it may mean that I am determined to achieve a set task. To my young son on the beach it may mean that he will have his sand-castle. It is true that the range of variation in meaning for a particular word or sentence is not unlimited. But within these limits the exact sense will depend on the context. Thus the meaning conveyed by a word or a sentence is there only as the intended audience will take it.

So it is again with regard to style. I do not speak to children, to old schoolfellows, to magistrates or to professional colleagues all in the same manner. The technical terms or the idioms permitted, the metaphors and the analogies preferred, even the tone of voice and the clarity or laxity in pronunciation vary according to the person to whom I believe myself speaking. For instance, when talking with my wife I sometimes use a special jargon that contains a number of jabberwockian terms that only we two can understand. I use a very different edition of the language when I lecture to my post-graduate students. In such ways then form, meaning and style all depend on and derive from the audience I wish to reach with them.

This is not easy to remember when the audience is not bodily present before me and I am alone in my study hammering at the type-writer. I often forget for what sort of people I write. Or perhaps I get confused and change the audience in the middle of a discourse. I may begin with the idea of

appealing to my colleagues and end with lecturing in the manner I practise daily with my students. Such lapses are annoying to the people who actually read the text and they defeat the very purpose of writing anything; for they hamper communication. They can occur because of a certain rigidity of psychological orientation. I know a professor of philosophy who evidently thinks and writes always as if he was arguing to win over his fanatically conservative elder brother. As a result the rare high quality of his thought has not been so well appreciated abroad as it should have been. When he talks with me in private sittings I profit enormously from his conversation. But when I read his writings they do not seem to be addressed to such modern young men as I happen to be. His language adjusts to the audience when he is conversing, but fails to vary when he is writing. This mistake in choosing his audience has had the effect of raising a barrier to communication.

Lapses and rigidities may certainly occur also when I have my audience before me. I may fail to remember exactly what kind of an audience it is. Do not I know officials who talk to visitors as if they were his appointed servants or husbands who forget themselves into preaching at their wives? The audience-orientation should be flexible, varying with the actual audience. It should also be firm and not sway during the same discourse. This orientation acts as a guiding force, drawing out certain words, figures and sequences and excluding others, and is never wholly conscious. But it is what makes communication succeed or fail. To speak is to speak to somebody.

It is from this angle that we should judge the attempts by our experts who are so busy creating technical terms en masse. When these scholars will have finished, that will be in a year or two, we shall have a ready-made language in which we could immediately start discussing and teaching

all the sciences. This does seem to be putting the cart before the horse. Even if we do have a complete and accurate list of technical terms in Physics, what can we do with it? One may talk to young beginners in any language they best understand. But if I wish to train up my students to compete and co-operate with others in any larger sphere of human knowledge how can I allow myself to teach them in any but a language that has at least borrowed its technical terms from a world language? And as regards publication, shall I reach my colleagues and my rivals if I write in a language the majority of them do not understand? The community of learning and research in any direction, even in Indology, is too far-flung now to be put back into the confines of any single language-defined political unit. If we nonetheless try, the result can only be a cultivated primitivity.

Of course the usual argument is that these technical terms are not meant for putting things across to the professional people, but for use of the common people. If that is the case, should not a greater attention be paid to the actual usage of the common people? Is there any such thing as a structural analysis or a semantic word frequency count even for the spoken Hindi? Do we have any exact or complete inventory of the words actually used today by our common people? In present-day India a peasant or a mechanic already uses such words as 'position,' 'commission,' 'police,' 'machine,' 'aeroplane.' Why then bring forth new-fangled monsters like 'pratishthaa,' 'aayog,' 'aaraksaa,' 'yantra,' 'vimaan,' to replace them? This lack of scruples in substituting learned inventions for familiar borrowing is surprising in people who profess so much respect for the common people. And even for new words do we really gain in preferring forgotten words of a dead language over those efficiently serving a living world language? Words are tools of

communication. Should we not adopt those which are the most efficient regardless of their caste or origin?

We see that the proposed terms could not have been seriously meant for either a professional or a mass audience. One may sometimes feel a pleasantly funny sensation in being able to recognise familiar ideas in unfamiliar words. That explains why Indian young men are so fond of writing verses in English. And that will also explain why anybody should choose to talk to the professional or the common people using these terms instead of those current native and English-derived terms which they would understand, so far they understand the subject of discourse, so much more easily and quickly. One cannot even argue that the intended audience is perhaps that infinitesimal population to whom Sanskrit is more familiar than their own mother-tongues. For the new words suggested are Sanskrit only in appearance. They are suggested for realities an ancient Indian did not know and for meanings he would not have countenanced. The truth is, our experts have been creating a language as God is said to have created the world in the beginning, once for all and in lonely self-sufficiency. They have not thought of any audience.

A serviceable language has never yet been created by sentimental patriots and their learned experts at one mighty stroke. It is built up piece by piece over decades and centuries, proving each addition by the manifold needs it serves. It takes time to accumulate the terms, regularise the constructions and standardise the techniques of a language. A language is not like a set of factories or a chain of telegraph stations that we may expect to put up in course of one or two five-year-plans. No single individual and no single committee can here and now survey all the needs that a language is called upon to serve. A language is always a composite product. Innumerable

individuals and generations build it up by their additions and alterations. A language develops only along with the development of the audience it reaches, only as more and more developed minds come to be accessible through that language. When our knowledge grows in wealth our language naturally grows in harmony with it. People begin to find the words and the idioms that will serve only when they have something to speak out and somebody to speak to. The people have to be there first.

It is the fanatic who decides to use a preferred language or a diction or a style without it even though there is no audience for it. He will write higher Physics in Hindi though there are very few indeed who will understand both the subject and the language. He will translate even when translation is treason, as for instance when the vital distinction between a Nation and its State is confused by substituting 'rastr' for both. He will use a hammer to untie a knot if the hammer comes from Sanskrit and the knife from English. He accepts foreign-born things but is afraid to accept foreign-born names along with them. It is not the thing that matters but the name. The fanatic lives in a world in which words are not just tools of secular purpose but are far more invocations of sacred magic. Such a man has converted an instrument into a value, a means into an end.

The distressing way in which the two questions of the technical terms and the federal language have been dealt with shows this very unhealthy confusion. A language is considered hardly as a means of communication. It is rather a symbol of social identity, a token of loyalty or an instrument of domination, dividing as it does 'the people of the language' from those who are not so fortunate. It does not seem to matter whether I can talk to my equals in a language if only I can use it to order

people about. Language is valued not as the means of persuasion and understanding but as that of report and command.

Force calls for force. But before I go and polish my stick for an argument with the fanatic, let me mention a problem for those who have love for reason. It is true that as a modern Indian I am faced with an agonising impasse. When I wish to reach my equals or superiors in modern technology or scientific research or scholarly criticism or art appreciation, I find that English is absolutely indispensable and will remain so till another world language replaces it. Yet it is a foreign language to me. I am only a guest-member of my audience when I use it. I am much less free to alter it or to add to it new words, idioms or similes than I am in relation to my mother-tongue. I can disregard this relative lack

of freedom only on peril of obstructing or defeating communication. This lack of freedom certainly hampers spontaneity and creativity. To write science in English and poetry in the mother-tongue is no solution. For, whether I write science or philosophy or poetry, it is always my desire both to reach the largest possible audience and to achieve the greatest possible freedom in expression.

I do not think any generalised solution of this problem is possible. We have to learn to live face to face with it and each work out a unique and personal salvation. But whatever is my choice let me not forget that the choice is primarily of an audience. The language, the diction, the presentation all will depend on that initial choice. I will choose what to say and to whom, but it is my chosen audience who will choose for me how I must say it to them.

Boris Pasternak

The Creative Artist in a Totalitarian State

By SIBNARAYAN RAY

"A man who is not free always idealises his bondage."—Dr. Zhivago.

SILENCE, exile or death—such are the alternatives left to any creative artist of integrity in a totalitarian state. About 2300 years ago Plato with his ruthless logic demonstrated as much in his dialogue of the *Republic*. Himself a poet in his youth he had none of the modern totalitarian's arrogant innocence of the wiles of poetry. On the contrary, his very first-hand knowledge of the poetic process made him all the more distrustful of the poet's parole. At first he had hoped that by denying 'chorus' or access to readership, the philosopher-kings of his ideal republic would be able to subdue the intransigence of the poets. But as he pressed his logic, he could not help recognise that inspiration was not tractable to alien dictation. And thus in the end he had to 'refuse to allow' the poet 'entrance to a city which is to be well-governed'—in other words, to exile him from his totalitarian state.

Why are the philosopher-kings of the Platonic republic or their coarser modern equivalent, the ideologist-commissars, so very afraid of the poet or the creative artist? For one, because their order is founded on the reduction of human beings into functional stereotypes whereas the artist invariably recalls us to our individual entity, its unique power of creation and self-transformation, its multiplicity and multiformity, its mysterious welling-up of supernumerous existence, its right to be recognised as an end in itself. The claim of the totalitarian

public order to 'infallible, impeccable all-pervasiveness' (*William James*) looks tenuous when confronted with the creative privacy of the poet. For another, while the commissars seek to compress existence into inelastic ideological moulds, the artist is impotent unless he has direct contact with reality. For him a form to be significant must be born in his own intuition. To be able to create he must freely explore; to him the given moulds are no more than material to be broken, melted, reformed or rejected according to his creative needs. He is thus a menace to the closed system of the commissars, more so because the anguish and exhilaration of his odyssey are truly infectious.

Fortunately, however, till our own times the totalitarian republic of Plato had been hardly more than a prophetic vision, fearful and fascinating, but incapable of realisation since the technics and instruments of all-inclusive regimentation were not available to earlier tyrants. The last four decades have seen this deadly vision come true in several countries, but nowhere with such thoroughness as in the Soviet Union. The first ten years after the Russian Revolution were a period of flux; in the dark heart of suffering there still throbbed fiery dreams of liberty and human brotherhood. The new tyranny, although already emerging, had not yet fully entrenched itself; among the old guard of the Revolution there were still a few who had not completely

emancipated themselves from every liberal scruple. This is the only period in the history of the Soviet Union when writers and artists enjoyed some measures of genuine freedom and when to create or experiment was no crime. Then came the first Five Year Plan and with it systematic regimentation of every aspect of life in Russia under Stalin and his associates. And of course one of the first victims of this process was creative imagination. 'Party-mindedness' became the highest virtue; and artists and writers were directed to employ all their cunning to shape the minds of the people in the moulds of party dogmas and gosplan dictates. As early as 1905, Lenin had laid down that 'literature must become... a small cog and a small screw in the social-democratic mechanism.' Under Stalin this order became the law in the Soviet Union.

STALIN'S death was followed by the so-called 'thaw', announced by Ehrenburg, himself hardly better than a talented journalist, but adept in sensing every shift and turn in the party line and in adapting himself accordingly. There were signs that taking advantage of the struggle for succession among the political leaders, Soviet writers may yet make a bid to recover some of their lost freedom. In 1953-54 the magazine *Novyi Mir* published several articles lamenting the sterility of Soviet literature and charging that this was due to the "perpetual fear of the censor". The most outspoken of these articles was V. Pomerantsev's "On Frankness in Literature", published in its December, 1953 issue. At the All-Union Conference of Young Critics in September, 1953, many speakers remembered that long forgotten phrase, "the writer's calling". In 1954 appeared several books (Ehrenburg's *The Thaw*, Vera Panova's *The Seasons*, Leonid Zorin's play

Guests) which besides criticising many aspects of the Soviet system called attention to that irreducible core of privacy in human life which 'socialist realism' would never recognise. Then at the Second Congress of Soviet Writers in December, 1954, several voices were raised against the Zhdanov line in art and literature. For example, Olga Bergholtz pointed out how under ideological pressure Soviet "theatre has lost all theatricalness... love has completely disappeared from our lyrical poetry just as nude bodies have disappeared from our paintings and movement has gone out of our movies". Veniamin Kaverin declared that "real literature begins where there is discovery... literary problems cannot be solved by ideological incantation". In a bitter attack on the literary bureaucracy in the Soviet Union Mikhail Sholokov maintained that the "demand for tendentious literature" had resulted in a "turgid flood of colourless, mediocre writing."

But the thaw was not allowed to usher the spring. Soon after the denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev took upon himself to restore the controls that had been somewhat loosened after the tyrant's death. The new campaign against the unquiet of the Soviet intelligentsia began officially with the third plenary session of the Soviet Writers' Union in May, 1957, and culminated in Khrushchev's speeches on literature in June-July of that year. Surkov, the new First Secretary of the Writers' Union, became the principal spokesman for partinost (party-mindedness) and ideological orthodoxy in literature. There was wholesale reshuffle in the editorial boards of literary newspapers and periodicals; heretical writers like Dudintsev, Evtushenko, Granin, etc., were severely reprimanded; some like Margarita Aliger were forced to make debasing personal recantation. This process has now reached its climax in the violent denuncia-

tion of the novel, *Dr. Zhivago*, and in the expulsion of its author Boris Pasternak from the Soviet Writers' Union.

BORN in 1890 of a painter father and a musician mother, Boris Pasternak belongs to the tall generation of Blok, Essenin, Mayakovsky, Zamyatin, Pilnyak and Babel. His first two volumes of poems were published in 1917 and 1922, establishing him as one of the major poets of his age. In style and temper he is affiliated to the Symbolists, to Baudelaire, Mallarmé and Rimbaud among his predecessors, to Rilke, Apollinaire and Yeats among his elder contemporaries. Although never a communist, he enjoyed great prestige as a poet in the twenties. But the establishment of the totalitarian state under Stalin completely altered the situation. He saw his gifted literary colleagues one after another driven to silence, death or exile. Essenin committed suicide in 1925, followed by Mayakovsky in 1930; Zamyatin escaped to Paris in 1931 having some years ago already got into trouble for publishing his novel *We* outside the Soviet Union; Pilnyak and Babel were exiled to Siberia where they were presumably killed later on. Unwilling to be a martyr, Pasternak abandoned creative writing (or rather its publication) and chose the safer course of translation from foreign classics, especially Shakespeare. When in the later part of the Second World War contact with the West brought about some relaxation of controls, he published two slim volumes of verse in 1943 and 1945. The postwar *kulturkampf* again drove him to silence; even then he was again and again attacked by official critics for his 'bourgeois aestheticism', his 'formalism', his 'enclosed little world of morbidly refined experiences.' However at the beginning of the thaw in 1953 he came out with a remarkable translation of Goethe's *Faust*.

Then in April, 1954, the magazine *Znamya* published ten magnificent poems, announced as forming part of the 'novel in prose, *Dr. Zhivago*.' This work begun after the death of Stalin was completed towards the end of 1954. The story of its suppression and dishonour in the native land of its author and its publication and high honour outside is too well-known to be repeated here.

DR. *ZHIVAGO* is a great work of art, in fact, the only truly great work of prose fiction written in the Soviet Union since the Revolution. In its combination of lyric grace and epic scope, of delicacy and plenitude, of subtle psychological insights and profound philosophical speculations, its wondrous odyssey of existence and its magnificent orchestration of characters, situations, moods, images, landscapes, introspections and dialogues, it well bears comparison with the greatest works of prose fiction of the last hundred and fifty years—of Stendhal, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekov, Proust, Thomas Mann or Joyce. Why are the Russian commissars, one may then ask, so dead set against the publication of such a work of which any age or country may be legitimately proud. Their reasons are presumably many, but what I believe has proved decisive is the recognition that, confronted with the multidimensional vision of existence offered in this epic, their own *weltanschauung* and total order would lose its mythical potency and be discovered for what it truly is—a mean and joyless system, born of ignorant enthusiasm and hardihood but nurtured on fear of truth, of freedom, and of life. For, although in this prose epic of about one hundred and forty thousand words overt criticisms of communism and the Soviet system are but few and then only in a low key, and although it is essentially a poet's work and not a critic's, yet

(and possibly for that very reason) this tale of a 'physician, a thinking man in search of truth, with a creative and artistic bent' imperceptibly brings about a renaissance of that spirit in its readers which cannot be moulded upon any closed ideological pattern, nor wielded as a cog or screw of a regimented social order. This is the spirit of humanism to which 'life itself is a breathtakingly serious thing,' which is creative because it has 'the talent for the arbitrary,' which 'shatters the barren harmony of sterile predictions by unpredicted discoveries,' which stubbornly holds on to the 'inward reticence' of the individual self against every inroad of reified collectivities, which would not sacrifice the particular to the general nor permit the multi-dimensional wholeness of human personality to attenuate into one of its many functional manifestations. While recognising the importance of action, this spirit nevertheless would

subordinate action to contemplation; to it nothing is deadlier than certainty untroubled by doubt, or efficiency bereft of compassion. To the fanatic rulers of a totalitarian state, 'those geniuses of self-limitation,' 'anxious to establish the myth of their infallibility,' without 'any perception of the fabulous in the common place,' incapable of love and wonder and meditation, the awakening of this spirit is the beginning of their end.

The ban on *Dr. Zhivago* conclusively shows that the truly creative artist has no place in a totalitarian state like the Soviet. Of far more profound significance than the ban, however, is the book itself. That such a work of exquisite loveliness and deep humanism could be conceived at all in a servile state bears witness to the creative integrity of the true artist who may be silenced, exiled or even killed, but never corrupted, neither by greed, nor frustration, nor fear.

I knew Pasternak 22 years ago, and made friends with him. I have never known a poet whose physical being and whose presence were informed with so much poetry. I can still hear him saying to me (does he remember? does he even still remember me?) at a time when we had just spoken of the rigours and difficulties of life: 'Life is more generous, all the same, and above all lighter.' And this lightness was like a reflection of the soul of the poet, the gleam of a serious and fraternal world.... He may become the victim of an atrocious and stupid battle, in this Manichean world where we have to live, but I can still hear him saying to me: 'Light,' and I pray that his everyday existence may, in spite of everything, and perhaps by the weight of a universal protest, keep this grace.

ANDRE CHANSON

INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE P.E.N.

POETRY

EXCHANGE

Such things have you received instead:
The silent waters of the pond
Reflecting all the brightness of the air;
A shadowy bough of blossoms
Curving as the shoulders of a swan;
And a deep deep cloud of violets
Filling all your heart—
For the empty heart holds all one looks upon.

Such things have you received instead of her:
Thoughts about a shadow's shade;
The dusty highway beneath your feet;
A cry which all the breeze unmade —
A familiar voice failing to repeat
From the distance of the all-lost noon.

But did you leave not-looking-back behind,
Or was your leaving incomplete?

AMIYA CHAKRAVARTI

(Translated from the Bengali by Jeremy Nelson and Abu Sayeed Ayyub)

EAGLE INTO SWAN

No longer young, full now of life and grief,
 the eagle soars towards the blinding sun.
 The power of his pinions has begun
 to fail. He finds the act of flight his chief
 but not his only joy. Bare of belief,
 improvident of all, his mind has won
 a single triumph, and a lonely one:
 in flight to be at rest, in thought's relief.

One echo of the past will linger yet,
 follows his shifting wings from place to place;
 ethereally hovering; storm-wet,
 dried by the sun. The eagle, face to face
 with sky and cloud and light, must still regret
 the trackless air, where flight can leave no trace.

EVELYN WOOD

EARLY KOREAN POEMS

SIJO

1

Were I to die again and again
 Dying a hundred times more,
 Were my bones to become dust,
 And my spirit depart,
 Could the fidelity of my heart,
 My single heart, be changed?

CHONG MONG-JU (1337-1392)

2

I cut in two a long November night
 And place one half under the quilt.
 Sweet as the spring breeze.
 When he comes I shall take it out
 And unroll it inch by inch
 To stretch out the night.

WHANG CHIN-YI (15th century)

3

Suppose the willow had ten thousand strings,
 Could they tie up the spring breeze?
 Suppose butterflies and bees seek honey,
 Could they stop the falling blossoms?
 However firm our tie may be.
 What becomes of it if she leaves me behind?

YI WON-IK (15th century)

4

The wintry wind blows away the snow
 And knocks on the mountain window.
 The bitter draught from the door
 Withers the sleeping plum-blossoms.
 But however much it despoils the flower,
 Can the wind prevent the spring coming?

AN MIN-YONG (c.1850)

(Translated by Peter Hyun)

The *Sijo*, or occasional verse, originated in the latter part of the 12th century. The *Sijo* had that spirited quality of the old Provencal poems of France, and the witty charm of epigrams. The themes were flexible and the poetry could be didactic, dramatic, humorous or metaphysical. Owing to the restricted number of lines and the number and arrangement of syllables, however, great technical discipline and much fluency was needed to write the *Sijo*.

WINTER

There are days like fruits
 Bitter to the core, where worms
 Reside, and nights that twist
 Like iron in the smithy of dreams.

Trees' fingers that gripped
 The air are numbed;
 The truncated body of a girl
 That frolicked lies cold
 Now by a railway track.
 And what remains of my days
 Are holes. I bite the skin
 For I seek the truth.

Hopes bark like way-side dogs
 Round the dustbin, while
 Cattle ford the stream
 For the wealth of ripened field.
 Desires tire of a distant trek
 Looking for a roof to rest the limbs.

These days are born of a dying sun,
 And I am the son of a revolving earth.
 I come home defeated, trailing
 Fumes of angry despair, for
 The stolen fruits are rotten
 With barren seeds, and the soil
 Turns into rocks that erupt
 At night. Under the dome
 Of my days mighty wars
 Convulse the sky and I
 Try to silence the scream, for
 I seek the truth.

AMARESH DATTA

ON A DEAD FREEDOM-FIGHTER

Sprawled in a corner
 of a street, beside an empty rifle;
 and some who pass are filled with pity,
 and some with terror, and some with longing
 and shame when they remember his dream
 which they shared, and his symbolic death.

A bullet in the afternoon
 Stopped the proud grin on his face.
 He spun round, staggered in his tracks,
 and fell, dragging his gaunt body,
 lean as a wand, to the pavement. Mother of God,
 there was no time for a prayer,
 a wish even.

His eyes are blank walls
 which seem to stare beyond time,
 and the unshaven face, stripped
 of the passions that distort in life,
 is white as a stone.
 Come rain, come sun, he will not heed,
 who died that the proud, his brethren, might be free.
 Somewhere a wife mourns her loss,
 mother of his children whose clear laughter
 he will no longer hear. Christ-like his body lies,
 broken between thieves in a landscape of skulls,
 and the eyes contain a memory of sorrow
 and betrayal, which once contained the sun.
 And to his lonely generation, in whom
 the old hunger, the old desire has died,
 his death remains a strange fact, to be forgotten
 perhaps, but never to be forgiven. His will be
 the martyr's fable, the thin exciting chapter
 in history's catalogue and inventory. He will be
 a cross among ten thousand crosses, beside
 a stone tablet and an epitaph. He will be dead.

F. R. STANLEY

ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW

Communism and the Indian Intellectual

THE average Indian intellectual is a 'neutralist'—with a bias. That bias is towards communism. He would be indignant if you called him a communist—and, in fact, he is not one. He would bear with some mild criticism of the Soviet system, but protest if the criticism is at all sharp. On the other hand, no criticism of 'Western imperialists' is too sharp for him.

This neutralism with a bias is easy to explain, even if it is not as easy to justify. There are three factors which work in favour of the Soviet Union. The USSR, from being an industrially backward country, has caught up with and, in certain respects, surpassed the West in course of a generation, and this corresponds to one of the most cherished dreams of to-day's intellectuals in this part of the world. Secondly, even the system of dictatorship is not without a certain appeal to us at this early stage of industrialisation and in the midst of the attendant social disintegration: communism is the substitute, 'on a higher plane,' for the vanishing joint family. But there are other ways to rapid industrialisation, and most of the things that have helped industrial growth in the Soviet Union can, in fact, be adopted without the communist philosophy and political system. There are equally other kinds of social solidarity which help overcome the sense of alienation from community which afflicts people in the present period. Something more is necessary, then, to complete our explanation of the pro-communist, or anti-Western, bias of many Indian intellectuals.

The average Indian has experience of Western imperialism; he has never had any experience of Soviet imperialism. His

political heroes are people who fought against and suffered at the hands of the British rulers in India. He has read or heard about, and in part bears personal witness to, real as well as imaginary acts of perfidy and oppression committed by the British from the time of Clive down to the partition of India. He has never quite understood why the British left India so peacefully; and he is ever ready to suspect that the foreign ruler who ruled till yesterday is hatching some plot somewhere—in Kashmir, or the Naga Hills, or Kerala, or some other obscure corner of the country—to draw us all into some fresh mishap. No such deep-seated suspiciousness colours his views about the Soviet Union, to which country he is always ready to give in generous measure the benefit of doubt in face of conflicting reports. In short, the Western powers are old convicts, and whenever there is some suggestion of new crime they must be held guilty unless they can prove their innocence, while the Communist governments are considered innocent until crime is proved. Despite all that happened between aggression against Finland and the annexation of Baltic countries, despite bullying tactics against Yugoslavia, despite the Twentieth Party Congress, despite tell-tale events in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, the Soviet Union continues to receive this benefit of doubt, though perhaps in diminishing measure. In the case of the Western countries, on the other hand, crimes in the Suez, Algeria and elsewhere effectively overshadow the general significance of the massive withdrawal of Western imperialism from large parts of Asia and Africa.

Even this contemporary retreat of Western imperialism from Asia and Africa is seen as a result of the rise of the Soviet Power. This, at first sight, is slightly surprising. The nationalist movement in India had already been established as a self-conscious and irreversible process by 1905, definitely before the Russian Revolution. It may seem more natural to take the view that it is the strength of this indigenous nationalist movement which is chiefly to thank for the ultimate retreat from India of the British as rulers. But a movement for national emancipation in one country hardly ever succeeds without being helped by circumstances beyond its boundaries. Just as at one stage Indian nationalism came to regard Germany and Japan as its potential allies against the British, so Asian nationalism to-day finds in the Soviet Union its chief ally against the Western imperialists. It matters little to the Asian that the risk of subjugation in future, for the smaller countries like Malaya, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan or Afghanistan, in the same way as for Tibet, comes not so much from the Western Powers as from China and the Soviet Union. The ways of the new imperialism are not sufficiently familiar to most Asians, as they were not to countless East Europeans until it was too late.

To the extent that the average Indian intellectual has knowledge of the more outrageous features of the Soviet system, he disapproves of them. But the antipathy that he feels towards the Western Powers inclines him again to excuse many of these as having been necessitated by circumstances created by Western imperialism. The Soviet rulers may have exploited the peasants, adopted methods of forced industrialisation, and in the process set up a system of tyranny over the proletariat by an all-powerful bureaucracy. But how could they have acted otherwise while the Soviet Union, as an island of socialism, was belea-

guered by hostile capitalist countries? The average Indian intellectual knows that capitalist governments militarily intervened on Soviet territory soon after the October Revolution. He is content to know no more; not to know, for instance, that, ever since Lenin wrote in 1918 that for the German working masses, for the German toiling millions, once they have made a start with the spirit of revolt, we begin to propose brotherly union, bread, *military help*, Soviet readiness to assist Communist insurrection inside capitalist countries has only been limited by considerations of tactics and strategy. To the average Indian intellectual, then, it is self-evident that the responsibility for the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Western countries since the birth of the Soviet state belongs wholly to the West. It does not occur to him that Bolshevism, with its philosophy of hatred, its unmistakeable designs to spread communism and insurrection abroad, and its calculated double talk, has contributed in no small way to the creation of, though it cannot be held solely responsible for, that atmosphere of fear and mistrust in which combative instincts have been aroused on either side. Again, the facts may be that after the World War II the USA speedily disarmed and to a greater extent than the USSR, and that it is only the Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovak coup and aggression in Korea, that put the West on the alert and the way to rearmament. But the average Indian, like his counterpart in any other country, would rather go by general impressions, and his most vivid impression, the impression which helps him to connect the largest number of facts within living memory in his own part of the world, is that the Western Powers are rapacious, aggressive, and hypocritical or half-hearted in their professions of democracy where colonies are concerned. The natural, ill-concealed, and all-too-slowly dying con-

ceit of superiority of the West combines with our own complexes to keep antipathy alive.

How this antipathy colours intellectual judgements in apparently unrelated fields is best illustrated by some absurd equations which the Indian "neutralist" is sometimes found to maintain while arguing about democracy. It is true that there is little freedom of thought under Soviet communism. But is not nearly as little freedom allowed in the Western countries too? If the Soviet rulers imprison those who criticise socialism or the Party line, neither do the Western countries, so it is argued, tolerate any really serious attack on capitalism. When it is pointed out that the Western democracies do, in fact, allow criticism of capitalism, that Marx wrote his monumental indictment of capitalism in the leading capitalist country of his day, that to this day there is a steady stream of critical and anti-capitalist literature coming out of the West while the only anti-communist theoretical work yet to emerge out of a communist country has at once landed Dijilas in prison, that, by and large, and notwithstanding occasional lapses from this rule, it is not criticism but attempt at forcible subversion of the established government which is not tolerated in the democratic countries while communism demands continuous conformity to the Marxist-Leninist theory as officially interpreted, the distinction seems unimportant to an extraordinarily large number of intellectuals here.

A fuller explanation of this last phenomenon is rather more complicated, but worth attempting. First, there is the average Indian's absence of direct experience of, or even imaginative contact with, modern totalitarianism. Thus, it is not evident to the average Indian that there is even less freedom of thought in the Soviet Union or in China to-day than there was in India under British rule. Secondly, unbelie-

vable as it may appear to some, the average Indian tends to be sceptical about the very possibility of regimentation of thought. It is only with the development of the critical tradition, more particularly in the social sciences, which call for a good deal of outward organisation and at the same time afford scope for great diversity of views and the individualistic trend in art and literature coupled with the recognition of its value by an appreciable number of people, that society is culturally prepared to treat the threat of total regimentation as a matter of vital consequence. Indian thinking in the near past has been, political thought apart, mostly of religious inspiration and concerned with the question of the relation of the individual to what is conceived to be the ultimate spiritual substance of the universe. This sort of thinking is particularly difficult to regiment by external compulsions.

AT this point the reader may start wondering why the Indian intellectual should be a 'neutralist' at all, or what prevents him from identifying himself or, at least, openly sympathising with the communist cause. There seem to be at least three reasons which dissuade him from adopting this course. These can now be indicated briefly in an ascending order of importance.

To represent the average Indian intellectual as anti-Western is an oversimplification which we have adopted thus far in order to bring into relief certain features of the situation. In fact, the attitude of the Indian intellectual towards the West is ambivalent. If he hates the Westerner *qua* imperialist, if, moreover, the importance that he attaches to freedom of thought is as yet limited, he does still have a real admiration for the British system of justice and rule of law and a certain attachment to parliamentary democracy. As regards justice, the average Indian, like the average Irishman, feels that

the British are quite hypocritical when it comes to questions of relation between States, but strikingly conscientious in matters which concern relation between individuals within a country. To the extent that Indians are attracted by the British conception of justice they naturally find communist ideas repellent.

Most Indians are repelled, for instance, by the mock trials of political opponents staged in the communist countries. Almost every Indian who had any opinion of his own in this matter deeply resented the execution of Nagy. Most of them, again, will deeply disagree with a point of view expressed from time to time in communist journals, such as the one reproduced below from an article published in the central organ of the Chinese Communist Party:

"We must thoroughly criticise the erroneous view of 'independence of the judiciary'... and give the People's Court—a weapon for the people's democratic dictatorship—full play in the socialist revolution and socialist construction." (*Jen Min Jih Pao, Peking*)

The attempt by communists in Kerala to practise this philosophy, in their own way and within the limits of their yet incomplete control of political power, has already created in India an unfavourable impression.

As regards the average Indian's attachment to the parliamentary system, this is eloquently attested by the declaration made by the Communist Party of India that it has no intention to overthrow this system even if it comes into power. One cannot, indeed, help questioning the sincerity of this declaration; but the very fact that the Party has deemed it necessary to make it is clear evidence of the strength of popular sentiments in favour of the parliamentary system. That the Communist Party has at the same time uphold the anti-democratic system in the Soviet Union and China as 'real' democracy deprives the Party of semblance of sincerity and the support of a

sizeable section of democratic opinion in India.

A second and even more powerful factor which stands between communism and the Indian people is religion. It is true that the religious tradition itself, in certain ways, makes totalitarianism appear innocuous, perhaps even acceptable. True, again, that the very tradition of freedom of speculation that Hindu religion has upheld since ancient times tends to make people accommodating in their attitude to the latest brand of atheism, Marxism-Leninism. (That tolerance as a virtue is subject to limits which it cannot cross without being involved in self-contradiction, that it does not include toleration of intolerance, still less that of systematised intolerance, is for many a rather fine point to grasp). Granted all this, it still remains true that even when people tolerate communism, the religious tradition prevents their wholly identifying themselves with it. Man does not live by spirit alone; but a religiously disposed people does not accept denial of spirit, even when that denial is dialectically couched.

Finally, the average Indian intellectual is far too much of a nationalist to be able to identify himself comfortably with the communist movement. That the communist has sold his soul to Moscow is a widely held belief which repeated protestations to the contrary by the Communist Party of India have not succeeded in shaking seriously. The more liberal anti-communists are prepared to concede that this subservience to Moscow has perhaps been accepted for no consideration of immediate gain, and often, indeed, from idealistic considerations; but the general impression is that the Communist Party, as Nehru is never tired of repeating, has lost the habit of independent thinking. The public may not care to follow every twist and turn of its policy; but it cannot fail to notice that the Communist Party invariably supports the current policy

of the Kremlin, and criticises that policy only after it has already been criticised from Moscow. The average Indian intellectual, even when he is attracted by the anti-Western slogans of the Indian Communist, is reluctant to leave the charge of his country to a party which, if it had the power, would reduce this country to the status of a willing satellite.

THERE is a large volume of non-communist opinion in India; but its effectiveness is reduced by internal division. First, there is the distinction between those who expect communism in India to be different from what it is elsewhere and others who have no such expectation. Of the not inconsiderable number of 'fellow-travelling' intellectuals in India the majority belong to the category of those who do not exactly like communism, but expect it to be different in this country. Abstractly considered, the idea of an Indian variety of communism may appear plausible. But a careful study of the actual career of communism in different countries lends little support to this idea. The most recent onslaught on 'revisionism', 'Titoism,' and 'national communism' brings out once more how difficult it is for any country to join the Soviet bloc and then strike out a new path.

More serious is the division based on attitude towards religion. Those in this country who are opposed to communism chiefly on grounds of religion and nationalism are typically drawn towards the Jan Sangh. Those others whose opposition is based chiefly on democracy and nationalism, and to a much lesser extent, if at all, on religion, are mostly attracted towards the Congress or the P.S.P. The few who do not feel any attachment whatever either to religion or to nationalism, and are critical of communism exclusively on the ground of democracy, are drawn towards some such group as the one founded by M. N. Roy.

Outright opposition to religion is confined only to a few; but faith in religion is weak in the urban areas and among the rising generation. The time is perhaps ripe for a re-examination of the fundamentals of religion, to find out how much of it must wither away with the rise of the rationalist spirit in an era of industrialisation and how much can be combined with reason—not in the sense that it would follow from reason, but in that reason would be neutral towards it or even find in it the affirmation of an end or a purpose which it would gladly accept. This, indeed, is what some pioneers of the 19th century renaissance in India, such as, Raja Rammohan in Bengal, tried to explore. It is not to be expected that such explorations will lead to universally acceptable conclusions. But democracy is likely to be stabilised if, as in England or some Scandinavian countries, reason and religion, the one purifying the other and receiving back from what it purifies intimations of a new depth, seek out an area of peaceful coexistence rather than follow the example of those Latin countries where these have tended to make of each other implacable foes. Yet to speak of peaceful coexistence is, again, to oversimplify. The point is so to conceive the contradiction of the contemporary human situation as to make both science and spirituality enter as positive dimensions of that conception. Whether communism will succeed here, and elsewhere, depends on whether the new totalitarianism already established over a third of the globe carries the day by its momentum quicker than its warnings crystallise in the consciousness of the age. It will be a pity if this crystallisation is delayed in this country, either by distracting memories of what is essentially a past conflict with the West, or by the adolescent excesses of an yet untempered and militant materialism.

A.D.

ARTS

Town Planning, Architecture, and the Spirit of the Place

By BENJAMIN POLK

Bare prairie hills and Music of the winter wind; the black ornament of the oak branch and its dance against the forest; a thousand hues of last year's grass, buff, and tan, and grey...

Or the warm monsoon of Bengal flashing sheets of rain across green jubilant trees—the excitement; the green, green, green of flat lands—and the space-creating trees clothed with insufferably poignant orange, yellow, and red; the towering clouds—all these are the heart's attachments.

The Architect who in nature's great diapason finds his at-one-ment, who in the sensitive use of his eyes and the vigorous use of his legs on the ground is freed from small mannerisms, will value vitality more than perfection, dignity more than elegance, and excellence more than originality.

As he discovers the meaning of the unique time and the unique place of each building-to-be, he will find the deep attachments of his work. If he goes further, interpreting them, he must re-collect himself spiritually; but before he can begin to create form and space there will be a slow, intense focusing of mind and body—and of heart—on the Place with which and within which his work will grow.

This is the frame of the encounter. It has not changed since the Pyramids were built. This sequence has no history—it is ultimate for man as Man, and it will remain so. Creative Architecture grows from intuitions of the inevitable.

IT is necessary to consider how town planning also, as an extension of Architecture, derives its strength and colour from these deep connections to what we see and feel about us.

Town planning is not office work, is not the drawing board thinking that to-day forms an ineffective substitute for the vital planning process, a process that was the very climax of human expression in the days of the cathedral and the temple build-

ers. For it was planning indeed when civic leaders on the site, addressing themselves to its visual and functional merits, decided to place a major building just here and not there. It was planning indeed when farmers gathered their dwellings together on a rise for protection against marauders or perhaps to conserve rich low-lying lands for crops. It was planning of some consequence when the Greeks sited the Parthenon with its dramatically subtle angle of ap-

proach on the Acropolis. And one knows that none of this siting was done with pencil and paper. It is only from the peak of the Eiffel Tower that the curious can discover the full effect of drawing board plans—but to ascend the Tower is an impractical exercise for daily living. Our world remains an eye-level world and the neighbourhood is still to be walked in.

The measure of our skill in dealing with this world is found in many small ways—making a path or building a house. Look for example at the natural vegetation and its trees. Are the trees brought into our hearts by their new relationship to our man-made work? Does the scale of our design reinforce the scale of nature so that our work overflows the bounds of mere brick and mortar to include the very lie of the land? If so, our work has been reverently conceived and lovingly executed, and the natural world of our site is itself more beautiful than before; if not, we have failed in our profession and our art. Love for the land gives the intuition of artistry, and the sharing with others of these perceptions may be the beginning of true Tradition in its fine and proper sense. Understanding what we see, our resources are renewed and we in turn may bring this renewal to the land. The wheel moves round and something of beauty enters our undertakings. The Architect as a growing point of the community is part and parcel of its strengths—perhaps also of its weakness. But aware of the genius of the place, he conserves and amplifies, if he is worthy of his hire, the essential beauty of his site knowing that each person and each place has special significance, that each is a special case.

In the countryside we learn from nature more quickly than in cities but we can merge the experience of town and country, so that whether deep in a metropolis or out in the fields there can be a satisfying balance. To planning of towns we can bring the experience of seasonal rhythms, letting the countryside enter small-scale elements of the city's structure. It is within

these elements that intimate personal relationship of small groups play a critical role. These groups will establish themselves as communities of close neighbours. Their locales will be distinguished visually from other locales. In the country the functional limits of village, field, and forest tend to be naturally determined by the lie of the land. In the city, dwellings must be grouped to form tiny neighbourhoods within which are spaces developed in convexities and concavities forming the texture of the plan. In these relationships, both tangible and intangible, is to be found the frontier where the frame-work of local community can begin to seize the initiative away from a paralyzing centralism. Here locales and groups, buildings and men, are the stuff of Architecture and planning.

The optimum sizes of particular cities are to-day very much in question—most being too large for efficiency or ease of living. But in all cities we need to bring the productive side of rural areas into the pattern of the city so that townsman and countryman are less differentiated and less specialised than at present. Mutual interest between town and country in practical ways, expressed ultimately in terms of land use, landscape, and buildings will lead us away from the isolation from which both ways of life suffer. In parts of the U.S.A., for example northern Ohio, this merging is noticeable already. In recent decades the population movements out of the city to the suburbs have expressed, although often in an undesirable form, the personal needs of the denizens of the megalopolis. This effort to have the best of both worlds points up the urgency that planners be inspired designers who can give to the changing visual and social scene its realization and its form.

Britain's Sir Charles Reilly has indicated the advantages of a small group of dwellings centered on a precinct. Again, the 'green wedge', consisting of open country leading straight into a city, is a transition area which can be further refined, like the American superblock, into networks of

local greenery with appropriate loggias or planted windbreaks for rest, reflection, games and outdoor work, each related to the other by footpath only. Always and ever, walking is the natural mode of progression. At this pace we can absorb what we see and can sense the scale of our work and play. A stroll in Venice is a delight.

It was the introduction of fast wheeled vehicles, the Baroque equivalents of automobiles, that began to disintegrate the medieval town plan. To-day the necessary provision of highways will be a liability unless we reduce the need to travel. Mobility carried to its logical conclusion destroys the town. But when the problem is rightly solved multi-story structures and free-standing one-storey homes, as well as two and three floor adjoining dwellings, will find themselves on friendly terms within one vista. The relations of these buildings and the intervening spaces they create demand our closest attention: emotional content is inseparable from functional necessity and structural logic. Reason and emotion reinforce each other, while dignity and gaiety, crispness and delicacy entwine themselves on every abstract argument and are the best conclusion of the work.

For the first time in history, men's eyes—and ears—are so dulled by the chaos of cities and the growing ugliness of adjacent countrysides that it seems to be difficult for the visual offenses that are peculiar to this time to be recognized. But certain insults to the human spirit are obvious: advertising bill-boards, the intrusion of automobiles, radios, and loud-speakers into every quiet space of life, repetition in the suburbs of minute mansions, the monotony of most of our public housing. These things, throughout the world, go to make up the characteristic modern landscape. A low point of history has been reached, for there is little now of that fitness of space and form which demonstrates the harmony of a culture. Unconsciously we defend ourselves against injury by learning not to see. Our sensitivity dies from lack of use — or

is never born—while the concern for form and space is replaced by the word 'esthetics.'

The negative side of this, this limiting of personality by poor environment, has been analysed—even dissected—in recent years; but positive liberation through environmental dignity—is usually beyond the ken of the statistical planner of to-day.

II

SUITABLE town planning survey techniques have been developed and described by Gaston Bardet, in the *Town Planning Review* of October 1951. His article entitled "Social Topography" points out that "An examination of the social topography leads one to reduce the widths of certain (land use) zones to narrow strips behind the frontages, and some special frontages may be designated within zones. A zoning map should not be a harlequin's coat but rather *a complex of surfaces and lines* to which will be added focal points where local groups meet". Bardet has evolved a survey notation where each person is represented, as the case may be, in production, commerce, residence, or agriculture. The resulting maps are complex but easily understood. He says: 'I believe that the introduction of the methods of social topography can be compared to the introduction of the microscope in biology'. 'Echelons' range from a small hamlet of five or ten families up to the neighbourhood of 500 to 1500 families. In analysing and synthesizing larger neighbourhoods or 'quartiers' he has evolved the 'sociological profile' which gives, visually, the economic base of the town. Thus, an appropriate technique is available to planners who have become aware of the sterile results of the prevalent misguided sociology. Bardet concludes: "It will be easier and safer, and results will be of longer duration, if we seek to cure our towns of the serious diseases from which they suffer by the use of micro-groups and micro-organisms instead of by vast blind plans that must be constantly revised".

Historically mankind selects from the available sites of a region an immediate locale for its life and its work. The nature of the precise locale depends, within these limits, on the social values and the needs of the time. In a given region different localities will have been selected from age to age, according to the values of the inhabitants. To-day then, although our new frontier in town planning is, to a degree, a macrocosmic one, it is, within the macrocosm, concentratedly and emphatically *micro-cosmic*. The *specific place*, the *local group* and its *special persons* are the very ground of planning, as of Architecture.

We must, especially in industrialised countries, rework our surroundings to a humane proportion, placing within easy walking distance most centers of daily affairs for each member of the family. Patrick Geddes used the term 'conservative surgery' to denote perceptive readjustments of the local scene designed to achieve these ends. Readjustment, and not rebuilding, will usually be the only economical mode of approach to urban redevelopment. It is significant that Geddes worked out and applied this idea to Indian cities during his long stay in this country, and it remains still the realistic mode of approach everywhere since drawings on paper, made as if we had somehow taken a fresh start, can seldom be applied in practice—though they may have illustrative value.

The strange notion that industry must be set apart in zones well separated from zones of residence, as if each activity of life were antagonistic with the other, shows an unbalanced analysis of man's nature. We must take industrial activities, except noxious ones or noise makers, into our landscapes, bringing homes to them; for it is quite impossible to understand and love ones home locale if the journey to work divides our life and makes our work a different thing from living. Industry needs 'green factories'.

The amplification of what we may call the transition zone, the zone of interplay between different types of land use,

whether farmland, neighbourhoods of homes, or in the larger sphere of the region, eliminates both visual monotony and crude contrast. The modulation of a skillfully wrought landscape reflects the continuous subtleties of this 'edge condition'. In animal distribution in the wilds, physical barriers and microclimates, together with niches and by-lanes of topography, more closely define the species' habitats than do generalized areas. Likewise in human affairs there is drama where two concepts meet, and the transition between them is conducive to the surprises that bring vitality to the landscape. These transitions often consist of areas of multiple use and they determine the quality of the landscape.

Geometrically, a smaller area has a very much greater proportion of 'edge' than a large area, and since edge conditions are vital ones this reinforces the necessity for detailed, intimate designs. This is true geometry for town planning. Communication routes may naturally become a function of the edge and waterways for instance, are potentially the finest parks. Motorways linked with footways and properly planted with native trees can likewise serve the principle of multiple use.

We must have small parks close to the family, for these small open spaces are the key to satisfying city life. As the natural world enters these spaces we may perhaps discover the fitting adaptation of each site to its purpose, just as Japanese gardens demonstrate in their own way this process of adaptation. The resort to aggressive control of ones materials, whether it be in land management or zoning, or merely in the accepting of what is called 'the international style' of architecture, does violence to the values of our new frontier where there is never any average best pattern; where we are always developing the special case.

In a study called *Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*, Eric Fromm writes, 'our moral problem... lies in the fact that we have lost the sense of the significance and the uniqueness of the

individual, that we have made ourselves into instruments for purposes outside ourselves, that we experience and treat ourselves as commodities, and that our own powers have become alienated from ourselves. 'Realists' are ignorant of some hard facts. They do not see that the emptiness and planlessness of individual life, that the lack of productiveness and the consequent lack of faith in oneself and in mankind, if prolonged, result in emotional and mental disturbances which would incapacitate man even for the achievement of his material aims'.

The experience of 'relation' may ultimately reconstitute our knowledge and save us from these depths. The equal importance of means with ends is the first frame of reference. The acquisition of leisure after an eight hour day of meaningless routine—whether it be on the production line or as an executive—does not give the hoped for happiness. Mass production has brought also mass entertainments, spectator sports, and the multiplication of trivialities mis-called the higher standard of living. Neither physically nor spiritually can the human frame long withstand this onslaught. But mechanical ingenuity can on the other hand be devoted to evolving machine methods for creative work, methods which would merge work with leisure; for the proper test of planning is that each person may find his own best functions, and voluntarily choose to integrate them with his fellows.

Our civilization is not a scientific one; it is technological, the result of applied science only, mass produced and mass designed; and the mass can manifest itself only in slavery. It may submit to Communism or to Fascism; or to some other form of bureaucracy. More often tyranny is a combination of all these. Technology has had a large part to play in this development of mass-mindedness. Here, the Architectural counterpart of the matter is seen in a smokescreen of refined techniques where the creation of inspired space is a memory of the past (the word 'monumental' is al-

ready in disuse) and where all is a facade to hide gadgetry, surface without form; while designers, taking seriously the restless tricks of world fairs, lead us farther down the desperate path of uniformity.

The author in a previous article has written: "The essence of Architecture is the design (or discovery) of space in such a way that human sensibilities are heightened. Let us stay close to this thought. For the past ten thousand years man has not changed biologically as far as is known, and his inherent sense of the fitness of things, the satisfaction of his inborn demands his capacity for inspiration through his own self-created environment, are evidently basic to his nature, almost constant facts; and the distinctive spatial concepts that comprise architectural history have not violated man's ten thousand year old nature. The rich variety of the world is proclaimed by differing cultures, expressing themselves through architectural forms, flowers on a tree nourished by the earth from which it springs. Their logic rises superior to reasonings, and their validity is the validity of collective personality. Variety, therefore, is inevitable. . . . But the raking up of (historical) stylistic mannerisms and their application to the fronts and tops of reinforced concrete frames is not of course architecture in any case'."

III

WE return again and again to our well-spring. The understanding of natural relationships points to our own role in the world. The earth's vegetation makes a place for us, feeding and sheltering our lives, and it inexorably tends towards a necessary equilibrium with climate, soil and animal life. This is the characteristic of organic growth. The succession of changes presented by a landscape over a period of time is the natural planning called ecology, and the fact that every landscape when undisturbed arrives at a balance that expresses its best potential leads us to see our role

*Marg, June 1956.

in discovery, rather than in conquest. As with the management of land where the existing community of vegetation indicates the past and future of the area, so in human ecology and human geography it is possible to predict the future, expressing this prediction in great Architecture and wise planning.

When led by art and governed by religion, the environmental sciences, read stereoscopically with human geography, will reveal our general and particular relation to the universe, and will aim at understanding the profound effect of nature—and of man himself—upon mankind; and they will show the earth and the solar system to be the sympathetic field of our existence. (See the magnificent first developments in solar heating, solar power, and power from wind and tides.) The large geographical region, often unrelated to national boundaries—for nationalism is itself an outdated concept—can be the half-way house between the small locality and the affairs of one world. Integration and coordination are still the principal jobs for Regional planners—but in a new context. Leaving aside the success or failure of wide spread birth control measures, the world's population will in any case rise from 2700 million in 1958 to 4000 million in 1980. Without successful control it will rise to 7000 million in the year 2000. Whether we wish it or not, vast changes will be required which will enormously intensify rural land use throughout the world. A multi-purpose regional pattern will be forced upon us, with the implications for Architecture and town planning noted above. The argument is again reinforced by considerations beyond our control.

We must pick our way among the profitless boulders of professional double-talk to the rich lode of a 'return'. But once sensing what is given us to do we soar in flight, building, perhaps, prophetically. We are spoken to and we reply, giving life to limitations that lovingly transcend us: limits that wish to be born again by laws of liberty, growing as our spirit grows.

We live out the paradoxical union of freedom and necessity. We are not able to compromise with a work seeking to be born. We are alone with it. All that happens is manifest and self-evident.

He who is aware of his time, fully aware of this 20th Century, knows certainly that neither the state, nor any mere institution, can yield either the life-giving relations of community or the inspiration of art. Community, if we find it, will depend upon a Living Source, and the effective action that flows from our relationship with it will constitute our art. To live in this dependence is to know freedom. This boundary is fulfilment.

It needs a clearing of rank weeds to get at the roots of form and function to-day, to come to grips with Architecture. Mass production of catch-phrases is done at the risk of democracy itself and now we have cash-on-hand and but little invested capital; so many easy words, but much less vital effort. The latest gadget is palatable, and the machine for comfort replaces the dignity of space humanly conceived. Architecture is many things, but its greatness is first, last, and always in the quality of interior and exterior space, and we lose our confidence and become less than men if we sell it over to the box-makers, the gadget vendors, the inventors, and the decorators. Before we build we need to disentangle easy words from the firm three dimensional realities of volume, mass, scale, line, proportion, ornament, colour and texture as these inhere in structural form set to the service of men; for these realities remain paramount and permanent. Farther back in time and deeper in need lies the very genesis of building. We require a protected place to sleep, for safety, perhaps also for comfort, during our helpless hours of unconsciousness. But these requirements are set over and over again in a different time and place—each unique, never precisely the same.

Every part of the world and every place in which we build is governed by two great prime movers: the energy of the sun and the earth's orderly force of gravity. The

sun's seasons give change to architecture and the earth's gravity gives stability; the window, the pinnacle; or the foundation and base. In the north, having less of the life-giving sun, men have wished to be known by the window and the pinnacle. In the south, shamed by the all encompassing energy of solar power, we have wished to be known by the foundation and the base. Everywhere gravity is the wise determinant of the structure. The cube of the linear dimension gave us weight, and this settled once and for all both the absolute size of the human figure and the scale of man-made landscape. Sometimes with eager perception and sometimes with reluctance, but always perforce with obedience, we have wrought with the wise force of the earth and the sharp force of the sun. In some places—France, India, China, the organic solidarity of human geography is old; elsewhere it may be new. Age hallows the ground of our work. Youth gives it keenness. The building, the landscape, the region, all together are the physical expression of our life, and when life grows sensitively in its environment its expressions will differentiate themselves and its vitality will produce rich textures and joyful variations. Fine buildings are climaxes of geography. They become possible when the Architect has brought his science and his technique to terms with the rootedness of his spirit; when he feels the sweep of history and knows the seasons changes, and when he finds himself at one with the purposes and customs of his people. Then as he rejoices in the significant and the particular of his immediate programme, he will submerge and depersonalize himself in his work, and will know the thrill of the divination of forms. He will hold mysterious converse with the tutelary genius of the Place. And through this converse his art will receive strong imprints from the natural world and its human counterpart. We have called this the frame of the encounter; a voyage of discovery; a growing point; or a fulfilment. This, and nothing less than this, is the necessary history of Architecture. Today's

self-consciousness must fall away as we seize space for our lives; and as our driving forces integrate with our interpretations of history we must come to know where we stand or we will be swept along with foolish fashions, being reasonable at each stage of our retreat. If we are to preserve temper and focus in our hearts and minds we will need an inward and an outward vision, and above all we will need aid from the conserving power of the natural world, and refreshment from the corroborating evidence of harmony with it.

Architecture is the visible link between the spiritual and material parallels of our lives. It is a flux of subject and object. Our landscapes witness the quality and tendency of our living, and in turn our living in good measure is determined by our man-made landscape. Recall the decline of North Africa after the departure of the Romans whose remarkable irrigation works were abandoned by the Vandals and nomadic Arabs. Goats took over the ploughed fields. Deforestation rapidly followed. To-day we have deserts where there was formerly a partnership between man and nature. Man-made landscape has indeed determined North African life. Parallel dynamics are found in Architecture: the great city for example. He who would build in New York to-day does his work in a wholly man-made world. But the fact of the neighbourhood, (whether planned for or not), the principles of human scale in civic design (ignored or not), the psychology of the small group which gives a visible characteristic setting to our self-expression (acknowledged or not), are ever-present. The unalterable axioms of human geography and human geometry encompass us even when denied. These axioms are the tangible links between our spirit and our body, and we break them at our peril. Will we be wiser than the nomads and avoid a similar fate?

Yet when all the limits are defined, there may be some who will still hold that Architecture especially now, stems from our freedom from limits, from our own conscious will. They will point to transportable struc-

tures that bear no relation to the 'spirit of the place,' not seeing that these transient conveniences partake, like the glass-encased skyscrapers, more of the quality of clothes than of Architecture. And there are factories where the mechanical equipment becomes the determinant of the design. But both these considerations call us even more emphatically to the fine adjustment of the new structural techniques with the human spirit and with the Spirit of the Place, and to conceptions based on these three. Neither physical man nor geography will change. We must know ourselves and order our affairs accordingly, since machinery and its economics are our servants, not our masters.

By cohesion between land and people, buildings do in fact become the place, as notations of the human spirit. And thus it is not only man's life that we recognise here: it is reverence for the earth—for place—as well. For the earth is the ground of our life. And so although the human spirit is not confinable by physical limits, it is free only to make a compact of fruitfulness with the natural world; or it is free to destroy itself altogether, either quickly now or slowly as in former centuries. When we consider Architecture in the natural world it is found to be greatly conservative and sensitively attached and adapted to the place of its growth. When, however, Architecture is considered as the result of free

will and choice it is discovered to be also prophecy. Both are true. We are most certainly fashioning our own world, succeeding as we accept gracefully the world that is given to us. But we are not in a vacuum alone with our scientists. It is not a question of what remarkable thing we are next able to do. The question we are concerned with, whether we like it or not, is the more profound and more searching question: what do we wish to be? What are our values? and do we recognise them in the friendly limits of our span?

From ancient China, a book on Man's freedom in his natural environment, the Tao Te Ching, has this to say:

'The men who set out to capture all under heaven and make it their own, according to my observation do not succeed.

*What is under heaven is a sacred vessel,
Not to be treated in such fashion,
And those who do so bring it to ruin.
Those who hold on to it, lose it . . .*

*The Way of Heaven is not to contend
and yet to be able to conquer,*

*Not to declare its will and yet to get a
response,*

*Not to summon but have things come
spontaneously,*

*To work very slowly with well-laid plans.
Heaven's net is vast with wide meshes:
Yet nothing is lost.'*

DISCUSSION

'Fearlessness and Civilization'

By SHANKAR TRIVEDI

SRI CHAKRAVARTI Rajagopalachari is a great man and a great thinker. It is with much diffidence therefore that I venture to criticise some of the ideas he has expressed in his article 'Fearlessness and Civilization' (Quest—19). My purpose really is to point out certain implications of these views, which at least appear to stem from some confusion in reasoning.

Civilisation has been defined by Rajaji in two ways. One makes it easy of attainment and seems to refer to a state of society of which a good many examples are at hand. The other brings civilisation pretty close to the *summum bonum* of the moral philosophers conceived in social terms, a goal to be approached through endless time but not envisaged as realisable (far less as already realised) at a particular historical date. The first definition of a civilised community ("A community is civilised when its members do not feel the need for physical protection against one another") and its contrary ("a people carrying weapons of self-defence is not a civilised community") would make it possible for us to regard a great many communities of the world today as already civilised, while the jungles of central Africa and Borneo could be taken as examples of the habitat of uncivilised communities.

It is no doubt true that individual disarmament indicates a state of society in which by and large an individual is not afraid of other individuals attacking his

person or property. And so Rajaji's definition of a civilised community rightly covers both these points: disarmament and fearlessness. But this condition of fearlessness itself might result from two very different causes: (1) from the attainment of a state of complete detachment from all worldly goods (not merely the overcoming of my greed of what another possesses); (2) from the evolution of statehood and a governmental machinery which is competent to protect the possessions of one member from the greed of another to a degree where it can inspire general confidence.

It is strange that Rajaji does not mention the second cause of fearlessness, and is almost solely concerned with the first. He cannot be unaware that the first kind of fearlessness does not exist in any large community known to us. Rare individuals here and there may have attained this kind of Upanishadic fearlessness. But not being fools they must have known that their own non-covetousness was no guarantee that other covetous individuals would not lay hands on their belongings. Only they did not care, and so did not fear. In fact, before they discarded the fear of losing their earthly goods, they discarded most of their earthly goods.

In the communities generally known as civilised, a sufficient degree of fearlessness prevails to make the carrying of arms by the citizens unnecessary, but this is almost entirely due to the second of the two causes

listed above. To be sure, 'they do not hope the police to arrive at every point where a crime may be committed.' But the potential criminals know that they are extremely unlikely to get away with their crimes — which normally prevents them from snatching purses, suitcases or kisses from unarmed citizens. But Rajaji's insistence that 'till we reach the state described in the Upanishad *mantras* we are not civilised' raises civilisation from facthood to ideality. A nation in which nobody covets anything is a conceptual norm, not a flesh and blood reality.

Nevertheless, Rajaji draws a sharp contrast between international affairs where 'nations are still savages' and intra-national affairs where some nations at least are presumably being regarded as civilised. This brings us back to the looser definition of the civilised community as a community of men not carrying arms because security is provided for by their governments. In this sense, international affairs are deplorably uncivilised — for the simple reason that no international force exists which can inspire enough confidence in the nations to make them discard their national armaments.

What is to be done? The commonplace recipe is: evolve an international government with an international police force (based on the realisation of common interest in peace and security and a feeling of world community) in the same way as national governments and constabularies were evolved, hoping that similar results would ensue viz., national disarmament, parallel to the individual disarmament of modern communities. Rajaji's rather uncommon recipe for the nation is: overcome greed, shed fear, and disarm. He knows that this formula was repeatedly taught by the Upanishadic sages, by Buddha and Christ and many other wise men of old times in the sphere of individual behaviour, but failed to produce the desired results. Many continued to be covetous and so all (at any rate all those who had any possessions to loose) continued to carry arms for self-defence, until modern governments made these superfluous. What reasons has

Rajaji to believe that nations are morally on a higher plane or are more teachable than individuals? It is well-known that a group behaves not with the morality of its average member but with a moral code far lower than that. As regards moral education, the group is even worse than that.

In the case of individuals, as I have just pointed out, a few saintly persons could discard fear in the midst of general covetousness and unprotection by discarding most of their worldly goods. Rajaji is exhorting some nations to become saintly in a bad and malorganised world just as some individuals became saintly in the earlier communities. I overlook the inconsistency of his appeal for unilateral disarmament being addressed to both India and Pakistan, for that amounts to bilateral disarmament — an altogether different proposition. I presume what he means is that India should disarm unilaterally even if Pakistan does not, and vice versa. Since Pakistan (which at the moment means General Ayub Khan) is likely to treat C. Rajagopalachari's advice as the latest joke of the officers' mess, let us think only in terms of India.

As things are, it is to be presumed that before the government and the people of India decide to throw their military equipments into the sea, they should have made up their mind to present all of Kashmir and most of their canal waters together with the Bhakra Nangal dam on a platter to General Ayub Khan or whichever other general happens to be issuing orders in that country then. Furthermore, it would be equally sound commonsense to expect that before many months are past, the port of Calcutta, the mineral deposits of the Damodar basin, a strip of land to serve as a corridor between East and West Pakistan, will have to be paid by India as the price of her moral progress. Not to be outdone, the military government of Portugal will lay its hands on a good bit of Bombay, probably the entire coastal area between Goa and Daman, if not more.

Of course the big powers may prevent

such pillage. But are we to disarm ourselves in the hope that we are after all going to be protected by the armed forces of other nations? That may be good policy but not good morals. And surely Rajaji is basing his whole plea on high moral grounds, not on shrewd diplomatic calculations. Therefore his exhortation for unilateral disarmament as far as it affects India implies one of two things. Either he is reckoning that India's self-denying moral example will so overwhelm the big generals of Pakistan and Portugal (to mention only two of the likely predatory powers) that they would turn into little Asokas; or he wants India to give up her moderate natural resources and quite possibly her political independence to whoever may covet them and be 'civilised', rather than live

in the enjoyment of her natural and artificial wealth and political independence but in a state of 'savagery' (i.e., maintaining her armed forces because afraid to lose her possessions). Rajaji speaks of a 'heroic undertaking of risk'—by which I take him to mean the alternatives given above. That is to say, if the risk turns out well, then the first alternative would be realised; if not, then we just have to face the second. I only want to be sure and clear as to his meaning. Or perhaps, his advice is not meant at all to be considered as a serious practical step for the morrow; it is only one of those well-intentioned high-principled moral precepts like: be absolutely pure in heart and deed; love those who hate you, etc. In that case I have nothing to say.

Sri C. Rajagopalachari writes:

I thank you for sending me Shri Shankar Trivedi's criticism of my article. Your letter came when I was ill and unable to do anything by way of reading or thinking. Even now I am just able to acknowledge your letter. As I should not be the cause of delaying the publication of Shri Trivedi's criticism, I write to say that his disagreement is based on a basic difference in ideology. All that I would have to say in answer to Shri Trivedi has been said with great clarity and irrefutable authority by many, for instance, Professor P. A. Sorokin of Harvard University in his book *Reconstruction of Humanity*. Shri Trivedi's view that we must race in armaments with Pakistan may be popular, but my opinion is that it will ruin India and place it at the mercy of more powerful nations than Pakistan.

My ill health prevents me from writing anything more now to refute Shri Trivedi's arguments.

Madras

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

REVIEW ARTICLE

The History of the World

A Deviation?

By HERBERT LUTHY

DR. FRITZ STERNBERG'S study of Capitalism and Socialism,* now available not only in the original English and German but also in French and in many other languages, is, if not a theoretical *sum-mum*, at least the ordering of materials gathered by a theoretician in the course of a lifetime. This bulky seven-hundred page volume offers, in the first place, all the advantages of a practical handbook of contemporary economic history, of a handbook whose breadth of outlook is on a scale with a world which, since the end of World War II, has ceased to gravitate about Europe. Sternberg has undertaken to compare, and to indicate the interaction of, the world's four major economic areas: Europe (which, however, is limited, in the author's view, to Germany and England), the United States of America, Soviet Russia and the great lands of Asia. He has undertaken to describe systematically their economic and political history from 1850 to 1950 and to follow the modifications of the "parallelogram of contending forces" relevant to our age. A handbook of this kind, the use of which is facilitated by a very complete analytical table which, in itself, constitutes a kind of abridgement of the last hundred years of world history, will be welcomed with pleasure by all persons who are trying to find their bearings in the radically changed world of our time and whom the standard handbooks have left unsatisfied. As we

leaf through these concentrated pages, which are chock-full of statistics, we constantly come upon relationships of size, longitudinal sections and cross-sections, and parallel figures that shed new light on a historical trajectory with which we thought we were quite familiar and for which this book furnishes quantitative criteria and measures.

It would be a mistake, however, to regard this work as a new kind of 'Statistical Atlas of the World.' We need only consult the analytical table to see that the author does not limit himself to an interpretation of economic curves and figures. Statements of fact alternate, more or less haphazardly, with theoretical explanations and philosophico-historical digressions; for example: 'Why have the ideas of Clausewitz ceased to be valid?' or 'Universal history and the individual: Tolstoi's views on Napoleon, and General Halder's on the Russo-German campaign of 1941.' To be sure, Sternberg wants much more than to give us a manual of economic history. The object of this book is to judge the 'conflict of the century,' or, in the somewhat Wagnerian title of the German edition, to summon Capitalism and Socialism before the Bar of History,—a tremendous and thrilling trial which, unfortunately, ends in no decision, for the litigants failed to turn up for the appeal. However, the central problem linking up the disparate and unequal parts of this dense

book is both simpler and less obvious than its dramatic title leads one to assume, and the profusion of data and analyses advanced by the author is almost amusingly disproportionate to the single question he is trying to answer. We must first find this slender thread through the labyrinth of universal history.

Sternberg's theoretical starting-point is the same that is to be found at the basis of all his writings. It can be formulated rather simply. When, a hundred years ago, Karl Marx undertook to analyze capitalism, he thought it was racing to final catastrophe. He saw it being transformed at dizzying speed into a society torn between a very small number of exploiters and an overwhelming mass of impoverished proletarians, a society whose only choice was between an immediate revolutionary transformation by the dictatorship of the 'overwhelming proletarian majority' or a collapse into barbarism. The least to be said is that the last hundred years have not confirmed this prognosis. In fact, when Marx wrote his *Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*, capitalism was not at all at the end of its course, as the theorist of socialism had thought. Quite the contrary. It was at the very beginning of an expansion that, at least until 1914, corresponded to a flowering of material and technical civilization unprecedented in the history of the world.

It seems, however, that the day of reckoning was merely postponed. Thus, Sternberg writes the history of the hundred years 'since Marx' as that of a long deviation which starts from Marx's conception and, at the end of an enormous detour, comes back to it, although in a modified form and on a 'vaster scale.' As the author sees it, the problems raised by the development of world economy, imperialism, the division of society into social classes and the evolution of production and of economic conditions in the leading principal countries are, in the last analysis, reducible to the following single question: Why, and in what ways, have things occurred otherwise than as predicted by Marx?

If Reality is Wrong.....

When a theory proves incapable of explaining or even describing reality, its supporters start writing books in which they explain why the theory nevertheless remains valid *in substance* and in what way *reality* has gone astray. Such was the case of pre-Keplerian astronomy, which got bogged down in an impenetrable mire of minutely elaborated auxiliary hypotheses, tables of deviations, and squarings of the circle, for the sole purpose of fitting the non-concordant results of the new observations into the established system of geo-centric astronomy (or into Copernicus's circular orbits). There exists at present a whole body of neo-liberal literature which aims at the rehabilitation of the classic authors of the Liberalism of the free-exchange era and which demonstrates, proof in hand, that famous 19th century economic harmonies satisfied mankind's needs very exactly, and that it was owing to such sinful aberrations as protectionism, state management, socialism, autarchies, monopolies, and monetary manipulation, that the world turned away from the broad, straight and gilded path that led to a world-market based on the rational distribution of labour, and on the freedom of movement of men, goods and ideas, a market that was its own regulator and that did not require the intervention of extra-economic forces. And they are probably right. If men and particularly the heads of the capitalistic economy themselves had had the forbearance to submit to the automatic workings of a competitive world market without restrictions or buffers, these automatic workings could possibly have done wonders....

The problem of Marxist literature after Marx is rather similar. These writings appear as an exegesis of world history *qua* history of the deviations from the Marxist blueprint. This resemblance is not fortuitous. There is a real kinship. Marx, like the classical authors of economic liberalism, based his analysis on an ideal type of integral, uniform and autonomous competitive

economy, with no structural elements other than private property and the free market, that is, by disregarding any established political, social and national framework. It was an economy in which a great multitude of private enterprises, small enough to exclude any agreement among them, clashed with each other in accordance with the absolute law of the individual's seeking the largest possible profit, in a merciless struggle to eliminate each other, categorically excluding any effort on the part of an organized group or public authorities to modify 'arbitrarily' the market conditions for goods, capital and labour. This Darwinian struggle for the 'survival of the fittest' was *beneficial* to mankind, according to the liberals and *immoral and depraving*, according to the socialists. All the economic, and political processes were to take place in the manner of molecular movements and to obey only statistical laws of supply and demand, which alone determined prices, wages and rates of interest. Even in the time of Marx and the liberal economists, this 'ideal type'—this device which served to illustrate 'economic laws' for students of political economy—was merely an abstraction, though one that was sufficiently close to the real economic conditions in the chief industrial countries of Western Europe to serve as a useful working hypothesis. However, in the decades following 1870, the economic structures of these countries, even of those which were the most liberal, departed so far—and in so irreversible a way—from this *archetype* that an analysis of the latter contributes little more to an understanding of the actual evolution than knowledge of elementary mechanics helps to understand nuclear physics.

An Economy in the Pure State

What would have happened if the ideal model of the economy had functioned in conformity with the definitions of the elementary outline? Would Marx's catastrophic prognosis have been verified—or would we have witnessed the functioning of libe-

ral *economic harmonies*? Indeed, an interesting question, though purely academic. It is quite understandable that theoreticians, liberals and Marxists alike, had difficulty in relinquishing so carefully elaborated a model—although it corresponded (and only very approximately at that) to a brief period in the history of economics, and of a quite limited area. Their schema has remained the only available model of an economy in the pure state. It was unmodified by *non-economic* factors. It was entirely abandoned to its own laws. Clearly, it is the only model in which they could possibly feel wholly at ease.

It is a fact that the economic history of the century just ended is a history of deviations from a certain *archetype*, and this not only from the point of view of the stubborn partisans of one or another dogma, but also from the point of view of economic theory in general. There has been talk of a 'decline of political economy', and it has been said that the masters of that science have not found worthy successors since the middle of the 19th century. In reality, the decline has been in the notion of 'autonomous economic laws'. The play of these so-called laws has been increasingly limited and their action checked with growing rigour. The path leading from J.B. Say to John Maynard Keynes is as long as that from Marx to Keynes. The distance is that which separates recipes for 'administrative action upon the economy' from objective (or supposedly objective) analysis of economic automatisms. This does not mean—and we are merely repeating here Stalin's last discovery in all its splendid platitude—that economic laws are *suppressed*. It means even less that the corrections, distortions and violations to which they were subjected constitute an advance over the 'blind laws of the market'. It is simply a matter of noting that these 'economic laws' have ceased to be autonomous. They have been reduced to the role of factors that act along with other factors; they are no more than *tendencies*, constantly opposed to other tendencies. The time is past—if ever it did

exist when the unfolding of history could be deduced from the fluctuations of the stock exchange. In our time it is rather the stock exchange that attempts, without knowing quite how to go about it, to foresee the historic fluctuations of politics.

The history that is conceived as a 'history of deviations' is that of the theoretician who sees reality eluding him. The liberal variant of this historiography has been manifested in such works as F.A. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* or Wilhelm Roepke's trilogy: *The Crisis in Contemporary Society*, *The International Order* and *The City of Man*. It is the history of the fall of the liberal economy into the paths of 'directed economy', 'collectivism' and 'state management'. In the Marxist variant, on the other hand, it is a matter of explaining not the fall, but the *surprising survival* of capitalism as a result of 'exceptional circumstances' that have enabled it, temporarily, illegitimately, to evade the inexorable destiny assigned to it by Karl Marx.

Sternberg's work still resounds with the discussions that took place within the Marxist school—before it hardened into a state religion—on the problem of why Marx's forecasts had not squared with reality. Sternberg himself is the last survivor of a debate whose participants included Rudolph Hilferding, Rosa Luxembourg, Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin. If Sternberg's demonstration and final conclusions differ somewhat from those of the other participants in this discussion, his reply to the fundamental question is identical: *Capitalism* has delayed the final catastrophe by resorting to *Imperialism*. This thesis has long since become the common property of all schools of the Left: Imperialist expansion has enabled capitalism to get around its inner contradictions and has given it a stay of grace. It is of such stuff that the writing of universal history 'since Marx' has been made. In order to understand this properly, one must turn to Sternberg's first major work, which has remained his definitive contribution to this somewhat forgotten Marxian discussion and which, as it

happens, was entitled *Imperialism* (Berlin, 1926). Sternberg, restudying *Capital*, had re-calculated the schema of the 'expanded reproduction of capital' formerly drawn up by Marx, and had made the sensational discovery—which had escaped the master—that, according to this fundamental schema, capitalist economy had never been viable, that it ought to have blown up or sunk into irremediable stagnation before completing a single cycle of reproduction, that is, even before having really got under way. One might think that this was a demonstration by *reductio ad absurdum*. If the system analyzed by Marx were never capable of functioning, then no doubt a slight error had slipped into the analysis. Not at all, replied Sternberg: Marx had given a perfect analysis of what 'pure' capitalism was supposed to be, and one had only to make it clear that this pure capitalism did not exist and would not exist as long as *pre* or *extra*-capitalistic countries or sectors of the economy remain to be absorbed. But wait until the world economy has become entirely capitalistic—then you will see! Alas. We shall probably never witness this final demonstration.

In the Light of Marxism

Sternberg's present book, which does not aim to be a theoretical work, presents itself as a chronological history of the 'imperialist era.' Instead of proceeding by mathematical deductions, the author is concerned solely with relating events, which he points up 'in the light of Marxism.' Often he does so in accordance with the most worn-out clichés of 'leftist' journalism. The dangers of this procedure are well-known. He replaces verifiable demonstrations by the simple appearance of 'logic' or 'historical necessity' that one finds in all well-constructed historical syntheses, whatever their way of viewing the chain of 'causes and effects.' It is then sufficient to align the various elements that are in keeping with the thesis one is maintaining, to stress a few of them and say nothing about others, in order to

be able to interpret the history of the world in accordance with almost any possible schema. Sternberg does not escape this danger. His history of the 'imperialist century' will be welcomed with the utmost satisfaction by all those for whom Marxism has remained the key to an understanding of world history, but who have not been able to find the key-hole into which this key fits. In Sternberg's book the key-holes are made to order.

In dropping the rigour of theoretical deductions, the author spares the reader the strictly Marxist terminology. There is little mention in this book of such notions as *constant and variable capital, surplus value, simple and compound reproduction, rate of profit, accumulation and circulation of capital*. His translator in France has put a finger into the pie by translating not simply from German into French—which was probably impossible, as Marxist jargon has never existed except with a German vocabulary—but from Marxist language into common language. The text is considerably lightened thereby and reads without too much effort, like a somewhat long editorial. If, from its title onward, the work has retained the basic vocabulary of Marxism as something self-evident, including the 'shock-notions' heavily charged with all these implicit theses, the 'leftist reader' will feel all the more at ease among these familiar terms. He will also find in it the amazing conceptual realism that unconsciously plays so great a role in Marxist mythology and that sets before us, like living, thinking and acting characters, such abstract entities of Marxist theory as *Capitalism, Imperialism* and *Socialism*, just as Jealousy, Slander or Avarice were in the habit of appearing personally on the stage in the allegorical plays of the European Middle Ages. It is here that, in transposing the author's philosophical affirmations into ordinary language, the translator has perhaps done more than correct a mere singularity of expression. 'English imperialism feared not only a further slowing down of its stride....' says Sternberg. M. Rovin translates this

into more sober and concrete language: 'London feared not only a further slowing down of the country's imperialist stride or an intensification of the tendencies to stagnation; from that moment on, England began to see a threat loom up against its political position in the world. Was not German capitalism, which continuing to pursue its economic expansion, going to found this expansion on solidly-rooted political and military bases that were incompatible with what remained of English hegemony?'

We must be on our guard here. It is not a matter of terminology or grammatical disputes. 'We are touching here,' says the author, 'upon the essential grounds of the imperialist antagonisms that were to lead to the First World War.' As this war is—in Sternberg's and any other history centered about Europe—both the climax and the turning-point, the way in which its causes are analyzed furnishes a valid criterion for evaluation of this kind of historiography.

This analysis is as follows:

'Not only did German capitalism appear on the stage of history at a time when the industrial evolution was already far advanced, but its progress took place in a world whose distribution among imperialist takers was just about coming to an end.... In fact, the distribution of the world among the various imperialist powers no longer corresponded, on the eve of the First World War, to the real economic force of these states.... England had lost her dominating industrial position to Germany, without this decline's being reflected in a re-distribution of the world among the imperialist powers. A result of this disparity of political and economic situations was the deep contradiction between the pretensions that the most important states based on their industrial potential and the extent of the real spheres of influence directly or indirectly subject to their control.... Thus, the two chief European industrial powers appeared more and more to be leaders of the two large opposing blocs.... Determined defenders of the capitalist mode of pro-

duction can hardly admit that *capitalism*, in its phase of imperialist expansion, was, *in itself*, the chief cause of the great carnage. Indeed, the diversity between the industrial evolution of the two great European powers and the growing tension of the two imperialisms flowed *necessarily* from what were then the structures of capitalism'.

Variations on this fundamental theme fill a good twenty pages. In passing, the author also touches upon a number of subordinate factors:

'Thus, by its imperialistic expansion the new German industrial power threatened the positions of England both as arbiter of continental Europe and as a world power. *England reacted by creating the Entente*, that is, *a system of alliances* having a military power at least equal—so it was hoped at the time—to that of the Central Powers. England found a well-disposed ally in France... where certain circles clung to the idea of avenging 1871. This tendency proved that Karl Marx's warnings had been well founded.... The general aggravation of the European and world political situation might, in the eyes of Russian Czarism, constitute a very convenient safety-valve for deflecting the oppressed masses from the fight against the corrupt feudal system....'

Such is Sternberg's précis of Marxist history. Let us now turn to another précis of history, the very one from which generations of German schoolboys and students have learned world history: Dr. Karl Ploetz's *Short History*, commonly referred to as *Ploetz H*:

WORLD WAR (1914-1919). *Causes*:

1) England's jealousy and envy at the sight of the economic and colonial power of her German rival, but above all the fear she felt at seeing her world domination threatened by a strong German naval force. 2) The thirst for revenge of

France, who wished to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. 3) The political situation in Russia which tended to become revolutionary and the expansion policy of the pan-Slav party and the Czarist government, which, by means of a war, hoped to ward off the spectre of revolution....

The concordance between the Marxist revelation and the teaching of history that was current in all German schools is very striking! The two analysis overlap point by point and even follow the same order of importance. The styles, of course, are far apart, though at times they attain the same heights. When *Ploetz* reaches the accession of King Edward VII, it abandons its dry listing of dates and names and waxes lyrical: 'Thus, he dreamt and thought only of destroying the German war fleet and weakening the commercial competition of Germany' (a statement supported only by a reference to the alliance of 1902 between Great Britain and Germany, which is called the 'beginning of the encirclement...' not of Russia, but of Germany). Similarly, Sternberg serves up, in connection with the building of a German war fleet, the following monumental assertion: '...the reasons for this naval policy should not be attributed only to the more or less arbitrary provisions of court circles or of the high general staff. The German naval policy was based on an economic foundation of iron....' From a Marxist point of view, this sounds somewhat like a *moral foundation of iron*.

Sternberg is obviously the opposite of a pan-Germanic sabrerattler. It is not his fault if the Marxist arguments tally with those of the German *Flottenverein*. It was not he who invented them. This concordance stands out against the entire tradition of German socialism and, to a large extent, explains its achievements as well as its failure. At bottom, there is nothing surprising in the fact that in 1914 the German Social-Democratic Party unanimously voted the necessary war credits. To be sure, it was, in principle, 'against capitalism.' But

should what was allowed 'the others' be forbidden to German capitalism? The fallacious doctrine whereby political conquest of world markets was the condition for the development and even survival of industrial capitalism, this bravura piece of the theoreticians of German Marxism, is neither Marxist nor liberalist. It is mercantilist, or Colbertist. In more or less subtle forms, it haunted all political groups. It was, with differences of vocabulary, the 'living space,' the '*Volk ohne Raum*' that demanded its 'place in the sun'. One may wonder whether the doctrine of the 'imperialist solution to the contradictions of capitalism', this widely-comprehensive condemnation of the reasons that guided the Kaiser, did not serve, in the brains of the German socialists, as a kind of 'ideological superstructure' of German imperialism. When applied to its disciples, the Marxist method at times gives excellent results. The Marxists did not wait for Stalinism to elaborate doctrines to justify all 'reasons of state'. Nothing is closer to the 'scientifically objective' analysis peculiar to the Marxist conception of history than the unpretentious, non-theoretical reasoning indulged in by the business barons of the Chambers of Commerce. Both sides indulge in the same casual way of brushing aside all the checks and inhibitions that an age-old civilization has tried to raise between *lustung after* and *taking*, between the disagreement and the brawl, between material force and brutal use of that force. Both have the same tendency to see only 'hypocrisy' or 'ideological superstructure' in behaviour that distinguishes an organized society from a tribe of primitive Neanderthal men.

The Myth of German-British Rivalry

The proposition that German-British economic rivalry was the cause of the First World War is for Sternberg so evident that he carelessly incorporates into it all the historical legends fabricated in support of that thesis. Great Britain is presented as guide and organizer of a block of powers

leagued against Germany. The alliances seem to have been set up long before with an eye to the Great War. Yet everyone knows that England had not involved itself in any military pact, that the German government did not *at all* expect to see it take up arms after the invasion of Belgium, and that England later was blamed *precisely* for not having prevented the war by declaring early enough that she would certainly intervene. In reality, the famous 'encirclement of Germany' under the leadership of England—which, according to Sternberg, was the essential cause of the First World War—never existed.

It was not until long after the war, when the 'lie of German guilt' was denounced in Germany, that the policy of balance and compromise practised by Great Britain in connection with all the points of international friction—with regard to the United States, with regard to Japan and Russia in Asia, with regard to France in Africa—was interpreted (in an atmosphere of persecution mania) as a policy of encirclement. And it was done on the basis of the following obvious reasoning: when two states get on with each other instead of fighting, they are bound to have sinister intentions...

Sternberg did not, of course, undertake to write a history of diplomacy. In that case, let us look at his statistics. Do they prove at least that German-British rivalry, which played no political role whatsoever in the causes of the First World War, was the 'decisive factor' in the depths of the 'economic substructures'? The tables published by Sternberg show that German production and exports did, in fact, exceed those of Great Britain. That is all. But it should be noted that no one attempted to prevent Germany from exceeding Great Britain in those fields. Nobody had ever said that Great Britain tried to set obstacles in the way of German economic expansion, not even within the limits of a British Empire devoted to the principle of free exchange. It was not until twenty years later, in a quite different context, that there began the period of the 'Ottawa Agree-

ments' and the 'Empire Conferences'. The figures say nothing about the famous 'vital space' of which Germany was supposed to have been deprived. They show that Germany's exports during the decade preceding the First World War increased twice as rapidly as German production, and that their rate of increase was more than double that of British exports.

There is one thing that the statistics with which Sternberg has so liberally studded the pages of his book show very clearly. It is that the First World War broke out in the midst of general prosperity, in a period of constantly rising production and of increased total wages and wealth, and that the German Reich was at the head of this upward movement. The supposed *economic* necessity of a political-military expansion is a pure invention. The expansion of her industrial and military potential did not force Germany to disrupt the world order. It provided her—in the minds of her leaders—with the *possibility* of doing so. This is quite another matter. The argument which maintains that as soon as the German Reich had acquired great economic power it also had to have a colonial empire—in one part of the globe or other,' according to Sternberg, in South America, Asia, or Africa—issued from the mentality of a Kaiser Wilhelm II, but certainly not from any economic imperatives. We might add also that though England was outstripped by Germany in the industrial and commercial sphere, she was outstripped at a much more rapid rate by America. And indeed, generations of master Marxists—including Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin—concluded from this that war between England and America was absolutely inevitable. As this great conflict has been long in coming, its historical necessity seems to have been somewhat forgotten. History, in the light of Marxist science, often has the simple-minded passion of arguments in sidewalk cafés.

The Imperialist Diversion

The time has now come to examine more

closely the basic postulate on which all these deductions are built, a postulate which 'flows from the facts themselves'—but only because the 'facts' have been adjusted to it. The postulate is as follows: only the 'imperialist diversion' made it possible for capitalism to survive the death sentence delivered against it by Karl Marx. This postulate is not false; it is merely futile. It is evident that the history of capitalism (or history, plain and simple) would have unfolded differently—had it remained limited to the British Isles, or if it had never exceeded the limits of Western Europe, if, in the nineteenth century, mankind had not witnessed the birth and organization of a world-economy under the impulse (and often under the domination) of Europe. Moreover, as Marx did not reckon with this element in his analysis—or rather, at the beginning of an analysis he was never to conclude—it is just as evident that his analysis remains inadequate, whatever the correctness and genius one may wish to ascribe to his partial investigations. But what this rather banal observation produced among the theoreticians of the 'imperialist deviation' is, strictly speaking, an aberration. In their version of history, the capitalists hurled themselves into colonial expansion in order to escape the consequences of Marx's pitiless diagnosis. Thus, England subdued India in order to sell her excess products there and to avoid the class struggle in the home country; and everyone knows how the Count de Polignac threw himself into the conquest of Algeria for the sole purpose of distracting Paris from the July Revolution....

This manner of writing history, which has been practised by generations of Marxists, is an insult to simple chronology. The history of colonial empires began long centuries before 'capitalism'—which was then in an embryonic state, and quite unable to perceive the slightest symptoms of its 'contradictions'. When, in 1494, the Kings of Spain and Portugal ran a line through a map of the earth and divided the globe between them, they escaped the clos-

ed world of the Middle Ages—but not a slump in the cotton trade. This matter cannot be reduced to the dimensions of a note appended to Karl Marx's *Capital*. The British Empire was thoroughly alive when Marx was writing his *Manifesto* and his *Capital*. If he did not reckon with it in his diagnosis, the reason was that, like all the liberals and all the socialists of his time, he regarded it merely as a left-over of the age of mercantilism, unrelated to the subject of his analysis (although he certainly knew that the East India Company was engaged in the sale of calico). France, at the time, was in the process of building her second colonial empire, after the collapse of the first. Statistics do *not* show that the creation of this colonial empire in any way stimulated the development of French capitalistic economy. In fact, they demonstrate the contrary. The French capitalists invested their capital throughout the world, except in 'their' colonial empire. And what were the 'capitalistic motives' underlying Russian expansion in Asia, which was, far and away, the swiftest and vastest colonial expansion of the nineteenth century—although Sternberg unhesitatingly ranks the empire of the Czars among the 'semi-colonial countries'? Certain people have always reaped profits from any enterprise—plundering generals, rapacious pro-consuls, munition makers, gold diggers or cross-bow merchants. If that is what one means by 'capitalistic motives', then one should drop this pretentious, pseudo-scientific vocabulary and, like everyone else, trace 'capitalism', 'imperialism', and all other evils, back to the first encroachment of the cave-man on the dry fish of his neighbour's cave.

The history of imperialism—to retain the expression that was coined not by Marx but by Cecil Rhodes—is not the history of 'super-profits' or the conquest of 'foreign markets'; this is childish imagery. With all its achievements and all its horrors, it is the history of the organization of our planet on a world scale, the motives of which have perhaps varied with time and place and in which 'feudalism' and 'mercantilism'

have played the same *subsidiary* role as 'industrial capitalism'. If you try to strike this chapter from history, you will realize that it is not a chapter, but the entire book: the tumultuous and frightening genesis of the world that knows it is a world and that it no longer stops at the edge of the visible horizon. It was a job that had to be done, well or badly, blindly or clear-sightedly; it was done, as always, rather badly and blindly. The sorcerer's apprentice opened doors all over the world. It was a concern for power and for treasure. It was in the course of their sordid quest for gold-dust that the Spanish and Portugese sailors discovered the new world and the Cape route—but they did discover them.

The History of the World and the Marxist Schema

We are thus in the presence of a juxtaposition of two entirely different things. It is evident, even to any non-Marxist historian, that European expansion and the creation of the world-market have thoroughly modified an analysis limited to England alone, even to the European area alone. Wouldn't the story of Robinson Crusoe have developed otherwise if it had taken place amidst the crowd of a big city? But in making 'imperialism' fit into the Marxist schema, it is grotesque to attempt to reduce it to a simple-minded function, to present it as a conquest of the world aimed solely at making possible the sale of capitalistic over-production. A causal relationship of this kind may conform dialectically to Marx's doctrine; but it is not based on any proof derived from actual history. The juxtaposition of these two different things is achieved by means of a gaudy vocabulary, the apparent simplicity and clarity of which deprive the reader (and probably our author too) of any possibility of varying and differentiating his judgements. Thus, for example, the notion of 'expansion' becomes extremely elastic and finally comes to mean anything, from an increase in coal production to a war of

conquest. The same holds for the looseness with which the author speaks of 'colonial and semi-colonial countries', which take in Canada as well as Czarist Russia, China and Turkey, the Congo and the Fiji Islands, all of these territories being merely 'objects of exploitation', in which everything—from extra-territorial banks to the building of rail-roads, including administration and emigration—is classified as 'imperial expansion'. Now, economic expansion does *not* necessarily go hand in hand with political imperialism. The economic development of the colonial powers would demonstrate rather the contrary. Furthermore, it is clear that the large European emigration to *free* oversea countries did *more* to attenuate social hostilities and the effects of the economic crises of the nineteenth century than, for example, the splitting of Africa among the European powers. This emigration cannot be placed under the heading of 'imperialism', any more than can the export of European capital which—it is a significant index—followed pretty much the same path as human emigration. To make of world history an extrapolation of the Marxist schema of capitalist economies is a little like presenting the ocean as the extension of the river and its delta. This is a point of view which would be easy to maintain with equally pertinent arguments—since the river does empty into the ocean.

The 1929 Crash

It was necessary, I think, to formulate these reservations; they seem to us to carry weight. It is just not possible to write history or to defend a theory in that way. It is all the more urgent to do this because the qualities of factual presentation, and of the theory expounded, ensure an attentive reading of Dr. Sternberg's work among men of the Left all over the world. Once the thesis that is maintained here is turned inside out, it would seem to be entirely correct. In the nineteenth century, European capitalism developed in the form of an apparently limitless expansion ('expansion'

meaning not only 'imperialism'), as a result of which the problems formulated by Marx within the framework of a 'closed capitalist economy' are never really posed. They presented themselves (in a form very different from Marx's working hypotheses, only after the end of the First World War, after the market of world dimensions had shrunk, having even, in part, disappeared. These problems then appeared all the more acutely; for the economies of the various countries had been developing for almost a century with a view to a world market. There, too, Sternberg tries too hard to bend the facts to fit his thesis. Although he does not explicitly state that the 'great depression' was the direct consequence of the 'stopping of the imperialist expansion' of Europe, he at least suggests it. Now, the 'great depression' which swept down upon Europe (more weakened in its *ability to expand* rather than in its *possibilities*) was a repercussion of the *American* economic depression, of the economic depression of a country in whose development 'imperialist expansion' had never played an important role, and on whose internal expansion the theory of imperialism can be transposed only by sleight-of-hand. The catastrophic violence of the Great Depression resulted from a coincidence of various factors which resist any attempt to reduce them to a *single* and *common* cause.

Having said this, Sternberg is right in explaining emphatically to the reader that the depression of the years after 1929 differed profoundly, in dimension and gravity, from all preceding depressions. It was not one of those 'cyclical crisis' after which the evolution of the economy continues on its way. It was an actual turning-point. The chapter on 'The Never-Surmounted Crisis' should become the bedside reading of all those economists and experts who have begun again to preach a high-interest economy and who have not understood how terribly fragile are the bases on which the European economies continue to rest. In fact, the 1929 crisis was never overcome by *economic* means. Hitler 'overcame' it by

setting up a war economy. World War II spared the other countries the necessity of having to seek a new balance between production and consumption (a balance not only quantitative, like the one that seems to be Sternberg's sole concern). Since that period, the world has continued to live under the regime of the 'war economy'. One need only imagine the elimination of the present expense of one to two billion dollars a year for re-armament; one need only eliminate from Western budgets the direct and indirect aid received from the United States; and one will find oneself faced anew with a problem that the war of 1939 had simply masked and temporarily thrust aside. Furthermore, this problem will probably never be solved in the form given it by the great economic crisis. It will probably share the fate of many Marxist problems and never quite receive a full answer. In the last analysis, it will, in all likelihood, be transcended by developments as yet unforeseeable. In this sense, history is truly the history of deviations.

Discovery of America

As he approaches the present period, Sternberg increasingly gives up as a bad job the effort to force history into the brilliant abstractions of Karl Marx—though perhaps without realizing that he is doing so, for his unchanged vocabulary masks the breaking-points. His book offers the striking example of a stratification of thinking. Past events continue to be interpreted according to a theory which the author formerly held to be valid, but which he implicitly recognizes (by his own views on the present) to have abandoned. The major chapters of Sternberg's book are: 'THE RISING PHASE OF CAPITALISM'—'THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR'—'THE STAGNATION OF CAPITALISM'—'THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR'...*And then?* Instead of the logical sequence, the downfall, the revolutionary overthrow, or the relapse into pre-history, the last part is presented under a neutral title 'THE WORLD OF TODAY.' Far from

affirming that all that remains for us is to choose 'between socialism and barbarism,' the author believes that we have entered the age of 'the transformation of capitalism'. This is an expression which can apply to fascism as well as to the Soviet state, the New Deal and the Welfare State, and which, in reality, covers over a deep modification in the analysis of the situation.

This change is due to the fact that the unity of the line of development has been irremediably broken. If I may say so, an America has been discovered whose originality Marxist theoreticians, incapable of transcending purely European concepts, had not even suspected. To be sure, the United States is classified under 'capitalism'. It is even presented as the only country in which capitalistic evolution has been able to continue uninterruptedly. But Sternberg draws a sufficiently shaded picture of the American 'deviation', and sufficiently points up its differences with respect to old Europe—no 'primitive accumulation', no historical stratification of social classes, no proletariat in the Marxist sense of the term, no 'imperialist expansion'—to make it apparent that the use of the *same word* to designate such *fundamentally divergent* realities is very questionable. America never obeyed the logic of the conventional definitions of a 'capitalistic society', and departed from it once and for all in its reaction to the Great Depression.

Lenin's Errors

Another reason cuts short, midway, the exposition of a history *à thèse* which changes imperceptibly into a simple account accompanied by socio-economic comments. Indeed, in many countries the period between the two World Wars was marked by a collapse of the social order which *seemed* to confirm the forecasts of orthodox Marxism, but the results of which completely escaped its schemas and concepts.

We know that Marxist theoreticians were never able to offer anything but slogans or

platitudes about fascism. Sternberg's work will not make us change our minds on this point. However, the first of the great modern "irrational" forces before which the Marxist analysis had to abdicate was not Hitler, but rather a genuine representative of Marxism itself, Lenin. Sternberg musters all the verve one still found thirty years ago in debates among Marxists in an effort to denounce Lenin's basic errors regarding the situation of the European working class and of European capitalism, the nature of the First World War and the maturity of the 'revolutionary situation'. However, Lenin was by no means alone in the most fundamental of his errors. Sternberg is right to dwell on the fact that, on the eve of the First World War, almost all socialist theoreticians defended with unshakable conviction the classical thesis on the 'continuous proletarianization' of the European population and on the inevitable 'pauperization of the proletariat', whereas for a half century this population had grown more and more bourgeois and the standard of living of European workers had *risen* more than a hundred percent. Hence, these theoreticians confronted the First World War with utterly erroneous ideas. This remarkable fact might almost lead us to wonder whether the Marxist method can even render its theoreticians capable of reading statistics correctly.

It was Lenin who was to save these 'erroneous ideas' from the wreck of the war. In order to preserve them, despite the disappointment caused him by the attitude of the working class of Western Europe, he elaborated his theory of the 'working class aristocracy' and of the 'treason of the socialist leaders' who had been corrupted by the bourgeoisie and whom it was therefore important to separate from the truly 'proletarianized masses'. This theory became the basic dogma of the Third International; its effect was to destroy the European working-class movement. The error did not stop on the level of theory: 'Thus, Lenin organized the October Revolution with totally erroneous conceptions regarding

European capitalism and its capacity for resistance', and he organized it in accordance with these views on Western Europe, not in accordance with Russia. There was nothing of the simple-minded demagogue about Lenin; but this did not prevent him from setting off a revolution in the 'wrong place' (which should only have served as a springboard for the 'true revolutions' of the West) and from propagating it in words—'Land and Peace'—which served only to camouflage its real aims, to wit, the setting up of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which, in conformity with his 'entirely erroneous conceptions', was to give the signal for the world revolution. Let us translate this freely. If Lenin had not committed a grievous error regarding the real situation in the capitalistic countries, he would not have set off the October Revolution....

This conclusion is less paradoxical than it seems. But if it is true that the event of our century most weighty with consequences occurred only as the result of an error in interpreting statistics concerning incomes in the Western European countries, then historical materialism is not really of much use. For although the theory that governed the October Revolution was false, those who made the revolution were nevertheless victors. This 'historical error' has given rise to something totally unpredictable, to a state of affairs which cannot be classified under a familiar heading and about which Sternberg is right in saying that 'we can understand it satisfactorily only if we go back to certain tendencies that existed in the countries of the ancient Orient, such as Egypt or Babylonia'. His analysis of the Soviet economic system is among the best things in his book, chiefly because it brings out plainly the extraordinary dynamism of an accumulation of power, stimulated by terror and forced labour, which had transformed the relations of forces in the entire world.

Capitalism and socialism before the tribunal of the world? Socialism has already prepared its alibi and its justification, Stern-

berg refuses to grant the Soviet Union the name *socialist*. As for the Western states governed (whether temporarily or over a long period) by socialists, he grants at most that they represent 'capitalism in transformation.' Thus, one of the parties has been defaulted. What about capitalism? A definition of capitalism that embraces Japan and Denmark, the United States and Spain, would be so extensible that it no longer defined anything at all. The enquiry about capitalism opened by Karl Marx a hundred years ago now seems, in the 'age of transformations,' no more than an enquiry into the unknown.

The World "Since Marx"

At the end of his study, Sternberg points out that all economic evolution and all economic policy decisions will henceforth be determined by the race now going on between the Soviet bloc and the free world. He formulates recommendations about American investments abroad (which are to be made more and more through the channel of the state rather than through that of private interests) and which he would like to see conform to political and strategic requirements in the sense of 'aid to underdeveloped countries.' He sees no salvation for Western Europe except in a democratic and socialist European unification. He shows, with an insistence that deserves our gratitude, the dangers of European stagnation in a rapidly transforming world. He observes, in the light of the present world situation, that the United States, which is engaged in a cold war, can no longer allow itself another 'big economic crisis,' and that consequently such a crisis will not recur, even if it appears, *per*

se, to be inevitable. Under these circumstances, the field of application of the Marxist formulae, whatever its breadth or narrowness in the nineteenth century, is now very close to nothing. Sternberg himself has little by little adopted forms of analysis perfectly agreeable to men who are not partial to the methodology of *Capital*. There is in this work an effort of genuine reflection, which is often hampered by fidelity to the old formulae, but which is not their prisoner, and a fundamental honesty which, despite certain very questionable analyses, is unfailing.

The world has changed a little 'since Marx'. This discovery, which might seem banal to ordinary mortals who are free to be wise or foolish without reference to the sacred texts, is eminently courageous and praiseworthy on the part of a writer such as Sternberg; but there is little about it to 'MAKE ANY IMPACT' on anyone other than those for whom the history of the past hundred years is nothing but the verification of the Marxist prophecies — and they, alas, do not like to be disturbed in their habits. Sternberg's book, the English and German editions of which have been available for some time now, has not aroused the great theoretical discussions that the publication of such a 'summum' would certainly have excited only a few decades ago in the socialist camp; it could no longer be other than a retrospective debate. If Marxist theory is to-day petrified, it is not because the theorists have grown lazy, but simply because its equipment has become utterly incapable of dealing with reality — it is a set of formulas and concepts devoid of content. Perhaps the time has come for taking up new problems with the help of a new terminology.

* Fritz Sternberg, 'Kapitalismus und Sozialismus vor dem Weltgesicht,' Capitalism and Socialism on Trial' (Gollencz, London; John Day, New York).

BOOK REVIEWS

Dr. Zhivago: The Accent of Greatness

WHILE I was mid-way through *Dr. Zhivago* two letters appeared in the correspondence columns of the *Times of India*. One purported to find Pasternak's novel mediocre and attributed cold-war politics to his winning the Nobel Prize. The other, developing the same theme, dismissed *Dr. Zhivago* as slander of the Soviet Union. Pasternak, the writer pointed out, continued to live in the country he had run down, receiving royalties and guests (including, horror of horrors, foreigners!) while the hypocritical Western world exploited the novel to denigrate Soviet achievements.

Both letters went unchallenged. One is reminded of Burke's saying that for the triumph of evil nothing is needed except that enough men should do little about it. From among the three or four lakhs of people who read the *Times* every day, not one was found to express a contrary view of the novel. Not one expressed surprise that an author's right to live in his own country should be questioned because of his opinions, whatever they may be. Pasternak had his defenders. Even the Prime Minister publicly disapproved of the treatment meted out to him. But his detractors were allowed to get away with far too much considering they had no case at all.

There is not a touch of the mediocre in *Dr. Zhivago*. Its most obvious quality is a distinguished style, not of prose only but of narration. It has the voice, the accent of greatness. It is wholly free of the sentimental and the commonplace. Judged by the critical standards applied to the classics, Pasternak's novel fails on many counts, but

it can be assessed by no other. Though not in the same class as the best works of Tolstoy, Turganov, Flaubert, Henry James and a few other masters of the Western tradition in fiction, it has to be compared with them and not with lesser achievements. This is the only honest measure of Pasternak's success and of his failure.

The major flaw in *Dr. Zhivago* is the use made of the long arm of coincidence. A wide web of characters and situations is spun out in the first hundred pages which is tightened as the story moves both in time and in place until it is known what happened eventually to everybody. The various destinies intertwine across vast stretches of the Russian continent, spanning generations and decades. This does not always happen meaningfully.

An example is the moving chapter, a perfect little cameo, in which Zhivago dies in the street. He rushes out in a dazed condition from a tram which is constantly breaking down and blocking the traffic all along the line. Every time it stops, he sees an old lady passing forward. Then the tram starts and overtakes her but soon breaks down again so that the old lady moves ahead of it. At the close of the chapter, this woman is identified as 'Mademoiselle Fleury' a Swiss national wishing to return home, on a visit to Moscow for her exit visa, granted after twelve years of petitioning. As an incidental comment on the Russian scene this is deadly, and the identification also serves to dispose off the character, who plays a very minor role in the novel. It strikes a false note because it is not quite credible. To have Mademoiselle Fleury there, at that time, in that place, is mere sleight of hand by the novelist. As a false note, it is not important, but as a device used over and over again, forming

DR. ZHIVAGO by Boris Pasternak: English translation by Max Hayward and Manya Harai. Publishers: Collins and Harvill Press, London, Pages. 510: 21s.

an essential part of the narrative pattern, it is a serious weakness in Pasternak which vitiates his art. To note how easily it could have been remedied, one has only to study the two-paragraph Chapter 17 of the *conclusion*. The second paragraph reads:

'One day Lara went out and did not come back. She must have been arrested in the street, as so often happened in those days, and she died or vanished somewhere, forgotten as a nameless number on a list which later was mislaid, in one of the innumerable mixed or women's concentration camps in the north.'

The quiet, casual horror of this, incidentally, sums up one persistent feature of life in the Soviet Union since 1918, which Pasternak obstinately remembers.

The second great flaw in *Dr. Zhivago* is the autobiographical element untransformed or realised as fiction. It is not quite clear whether the hero is a poet who is also a physician or a physician who writes poetry. He is not given any career as a poet nor filled in and rounded off as a credible physician in whose long life the practice of medicine would unquestionably have a greater relevance. The credo which sustains him in his double role is rather slight.

'I should like to be of use as a doctor or a farmer, and at the same time to be at work on something lasting, fundamental; I should so very much like to be writing a work of art or science.' This reminds us of Goethe and Schweitzer but it is not enough to make Zhivago come alive in depth, because we do not see him adequately in his concrete attempts to act out his convictions.

Zhivago is most vital for us in his love of Lara and in his abstract ideas, but as poet and physician he is nebulous. The beautiful poems collected at the end of the book and attributed to him are wholly Pasternak, while in the novel Zhivago is both more and less than his creator. The novel is complete without the poems but Pasternak's life would not be complete without them. That the novel is named *Dr. Zhivago* and not *Zhivago* or *Yuri Zhivago* only deepens the flaw.

Pasternak's is not a novel of ideas, as Shaw's drama deals with ideas, but it is

full of ideas. Zhivago responds to the life around him and to the events in his own by a steady stream of philosophical reflections, in speech and in diary notes. Though there is little debate, properly so called, there is an implied conflict between Zhivago's point of view and the official faith. This becomes increasingly explicit. Zhivago's attack on the accepted ideas of his time, from youth to old age, is no mere academic exercise but a fundamental challenge, a total denunciation. Its focus is on what communism makes of its exponents and exemplars. *Dr. Zhivago* is no anti-communist tract after Koestler and Orwell, but a study of humanity saturated in communist attitudes and values. It is not a formal 'self-critical' analysis within the climatic exigencies of the Thaw nor a rebellious portrait of a communist hero suffering frustrations in a communist society, in the manner of *Not By Bread Alone*. It is a complete rejection and a radical return to an earlier tradition.

The Soviet society, as it appears in *Dr. Zhivago*, is the inhuman society. Communists, by virtue of their communism, are called "ungifted" in the greatest capacity of all. "Man is born to live, not to prepare for life." Men drugged with dogma "are made of stone, they aren't human." These reshapers of life "have never understood a thing about life—they have never felt its breath, its heart—however much they may have seen or done." The ideal of left-wing intellectuals were men like Pamphil, whose "inhumanity seemed a marvel of class-consciousness, their barbarism a model of proletarian firmness and revolutionary instinct." The revolutionaries were "master-craftsmen of the new torture chambers," their declamations and demands "were unchanging, shrill, crazy...more lifeless, meaningless and unfulfillable as time went by."

Zhivago reads a fragment of one report by the Soviet authorities on the great Russian famine.

"Only mass searches in the commercial districts of Yuryatin and Razvilye, only terror applied in all its harshness, down to the shooting of speculators

on the spot, can deliver us from famine."

His response is full of despair:

"What kind of people must they be to go on raving with this never-cooling, feverish ardour, year in year out, on things which are non-existent, themes which have long vanished, and to know nothing, to see nothing, of the reality which surrounds them."

A man who goes over to communism is described as handed over to something lofty but deadening and pitiless. Against this deadly ideological disease, Zhivago asserts the value of personal opinion, "the conviction that it was right and natural to do what your conscience told you." These simple but perennially valid ethical ideals permeate Pasternak's novel, giving it a sadly archaic and naive air. They achieve an explosive effect when pitted by the novelist against an all-powerful creed which rages like a tempest around the non-political characters of *Dr. Zhivago*. They practice the politics of the non-political, displaying faith, charity and generosity in unobtrusive, non-heroic ways in contrast to the ruthlessness of those who want to improve the world.

I have deliberately emphasised the political aspects of the novel to avoid the impression, created by many reviews, that the communist fuss over it is unjustified. It is not. Inability to smell an enemy is not a revolutionary failing. But *Dr. Zhivago* is not a political novel, except to the extent that it shows character frustrated in its destiny by the evil genius of Soviet politics. Zhivago's daughter, symbolically, becomes a washergirl. The woman he loves disappears in a concentration camp. His wife is in exile when he dies, barely rescued from voluntary isolation and poverty. Their drama is played out against an urban and rural landscape which Pasternak describes with extraordinary poetic power. Love of one's country and love of nature pervade the novel and often fuse in passages of almost unworldly beauty. The wind blows through the story, it rains repeatedly, the snow falls again and again, often a curse of discomfort but sometimes a benediction, episode after episode is enacted to the accompaniment of

sharp visual images and a symphonic flow of sound. This descriptive lyricism gives the novel a convincing density, making it thick with the illusion of real life.

Dr. Zhivago is a great love story, in the sense of love as myth. It is too mature to be romantic, but it endows love with the youthful freshness, the human yearnings and longings of romance. Through the torment of her subservience to a lecherous middle-aged man, Lara preserves her capacity to love. Zhivago shows the same capacity. In different ways, most characters of the novel do. They live by love. Deprived of it they move away from life into acts of desperation and madness. Love is a calming, peaceful force, bringing insight and inspiration, as much as excitement and anxiety. It comes as fullness of being and fulfilment; also as tragic dilemma and unspeakable distress.

Nothing is distorted in Pasternak's novel as it seems distorted in so much modern fiction. Despite the short, jerky chapters and the episodic technique, the flow of narrative is often lucid and natural. In this respect it does resemble not only Tolstoy and Turgenev but a certain characteristic Russian quality, difficult to define but easily discerned in, say, any one-volume anthology of Russian literature. Pasternak unquestionably belongs to that tradition of Russian greatness in literature. He, and he alone, among his living contemporaries. Compared to him, the author of *The Thaw* whom the Soviet Union prefers to honour, is a hack. Pasternak alone of contemporary Soviet writers understands despair when he speaks of it, understands suffering when he deals with the Children of Darkness, is truly familiar with spontaneity and gaiety of spirit. While the others purvey fake heroism and a self-deceptive cheerfulness, he alone sounds the authentic note of hope:

*However many rings of pain
The night welds round me,
The opposing pull is stronger,
The passion to break away.*

NISSIM EZEKIEL

THE TWICE-BORN: A study of a Community of High-Caste Hindus: by G. Morris Carstairs. With a Preface by Margaret Mead. The Hogarth Press, London. Price 30 sh.

THIS book is based on a ten months' stay and a further two-year study in 1951 and 1952, by a psychiatrist-anthropologist, of the three upper-caste Hindus, Brahmanas, Rujputs (Kshatriyas) and Baniyas (Vaishyas), in a village in Rajasthan, called by the fictitious name Deoli in the book. The author's position as a medical practitioner and his ability to speak Hindustani gave him a special advantage in mixing freely with the community in the village, where he spent ten months. Thereafter, he stayed for three months among a Bhil tribe in Mewar living in the jungle valleys of the Aravalli Hills, who present a striking contrast to their neighbours the Hindus of Deoli and thus acted as a corrective or check on his impressions about the Hindus by serving as a contrasting pattern for relief of the Hindu pattern.

The author has made an attempt in this study to present Hindu "personality structure by means of planned, systematic and psychological observations," so as to discover the essential differences between Indian and Western personality structure, if any, by face-to-face inquiries into the personalities and the formative experience of early years of young high-caste Hindu men. The author's personality theory is basically that of Adolphe Meyer's electric psychobiology, according to which an "adult is viewed as the product biological, physical, economic and social factors as well as of the material and emotional experience."

Such psycho-biological theory includes the study of the unconscious motives too, and for this purpose, the author used extensive non-directive interviews. By observing the spontaneous sequences of associations in these interviews, he attempted to identify some unconscious complexes which were commonly encountered. Freudian interpretation of the unconscious processes is used in analysis of communal phantasies, supernatural beliefs, ritual practices and dreams,

in order to identify the common processes through which "group personality characteristics are transmitted".

In all a total of 45 case-histories were collected, comprising of 11 Brahmins, 13 Rajputs, 12 Baniyas, and 9 Muslims. Though the last group was not of direct interest to the study, it threw into relief some of the peculiar aspects of the Hindu personality formation. In addition, use has also been made of some hundreds of interviews and informal encounters and observations of Hindu character traits made in between various other general observations, in the first five chapters. Of the next six chapters, five are specifically based on the author's intensive case-histories, and one gives a contrasting side of personality formation among the Bhils of Mewar, so that again the Hindu picture may stand out in relief, as it did against the Muslims group.

The Author has reproduced in full three of this informants' case-histories at some length, together with the analyses of their performances on Raven's Progressive Matrices, Roschach Test, and World-Association Test. The Rorschach protocols have been interpreted by Dr. Rosemary Gordon.

It is not possible to summarise here all the conclusions of the author about Hindu personality formation, mainly presented in eight chapters in the book. We can only offer our comments and remarks on a few points he has made:

After a brief introduction on the village Deoli, a brief description of each of the 37 Hindu informants is presented, his age, marital status, economic status, education, hobbies, occupation, contact with Western thought and practice, and his prestige level in the eyes of his caste-fellows.

This is followed by a chapter on interpersonal relations of the members of the village community (ch. iii). Their behaviour was characterized by fitful spontaneity, suspicious at one moment, very friendly and warm sometime later all of a sudden. They generally insisted that there was no one in the world whom one could

really trust. Even the wandering *sadhus*, who were supposed to have renounced all worldly desires, could not be trusted!

One is tempted to ask the question, at this point: What part does the customary over-insistence in a group, by too high-sounding precepts, on extreme and absolute standards of all moral qualities, like non-violence, total renunciation of all worldly desires, self-control, *brahmacharya*, in every one, play in this psychological reaction of distrust of men? When one finds that there is hardly anyone or actually none in his experience or knowledge who has succeeded in reaching the extreme levels expected, and when even the occasional failures to attain these levels seem to be ever so great in magnitude by contrast with the absolutely impossible standards prescribed, is it not natural for man in his disillusionment to find anybody capable of living upto *all* the standards, to conclude that all this talk of high moral qualities is meant to be left at the verbal level, as unrealistic, as mere talk, as impossible and also not really expected of practical implementation? And further, was it not because of this type of mental reaction that Carstairs' informants could frankly add that they should themselves not be trusted by him too, rather than because they wanted to impress him with the sincerity of their own general characterization of men by a supposed candid admission of their own failings? For example, a true "friend" was supposed to be one who is ready to forget his own interests out of regard for you. But obviously, no one can attain this quality one hundred percent, and so, a 60% friend, or even one who is a friend to the extent of 14 annas in the rupee (to use the expressions of the villagers themselves) is no friend in the real sense of the term! Hence, their conclusion is that in this village, and therefore in this world, there is no true friend of men! The world, therefore, is full of false pretences!! And so forth!!! The same was true of self-restraint and self-control, which was let loose once the lid was off on the slightest pretext, leading to anger, rage,

quarrels, obscene abusing, beating and belabouring each other.

There is a kind of emotional detachment among the people in regard to the acts of omission as well as of commission of others, high and low. Everyone would reap as he sows, so why worry about these? There is also a general prevalence of holding and pronouncing self-contradictory or inconsistent views and of vascillating behaviour. But the examples in this connection given by the author are not all quite convincing. For example, a villager may actually believe in ghosts, and express his belief in a natural way while talking to a European, but very soon, realizing that he was talking to a 'civilized white' who (according to his information) disbelieves in the existence of ghosts, may immediately proceed to protest that he himself personally does not believe in ghosts! The existence and role of *hinjras*—transvestites, men who dress as women—is interpreted as an alternative social role available for the aberrant individuals who were unable to adjust themselves to their normal social roles. But what about the aberrant women? Or are we to imagine that social deviants are to be found among males only?

THE NEXT DISCUSSIONS deal with family relationships, the Hindu ideas about the human body, its functions, control of baser manifestations of bodily impulses and cleanliness and defilement, ideas of religion and magic, common and uncommon traits among the three high-castes, a comparison and contrast of Hindu with the neighbouring Bhil group and conscious and unconscious processes in the formation of Hindu personality. The deep influence of the basic Hindu ideology of *dharma*, *karma*, *moksha*, etc.—are discussed. The state of mind and body after drinking of *bhang*, an intoxicant, is interpreted in terms of a state of approximating *samadhi*.

There is an unquestioned acceptance of one's place and role in the caste system. This left little room for ambition and initiative. The new careers available owing to

industrialization are introducing opportunities as well as problems.

A remark of a Hindu to Dr. Lois B. Murphy, the American child psychologist, is quoted with approval, as showing the difference between the Indian and Western way of bringing up children: 'You bring up your children—we live with ours.' The mother's attention to the child and the father's highly authoritative role and their repercussions are discussed. There is an inhibition of any open expression of affection between father and son. The high-caste Hindu children seem unnaturally well-behaved because of such control and authority by the father. Security in the family as well as in the society is due to the acceptance of one's limited role and the confidence that all one's kin will share one's troubles and aid him.

'A high-caste Hindu presents a deliberate self-control over spontaneous impulse.... Behind this facade, however, irrational impulses are at work, betraying themselves indirectly in a number of ways—for example, in a man's attitude towards his wife, and woman in general. Ideally woman is regarded as a wholly devoted, self-forgetful, or as a dutifully subservient wife, who is ready to worship her husband as her lord. In fact, however, women are regarded with an alternation of desire and revulsion. Sexual love is considered the keenest pleasure known to the senses; but it is felt to be destructive to a man's physical and spiritual well-being. Women are powerful, demanding, seductive—and ultimately destructive. On the plane of creative phantasy, every one worships the Mataji, the Mother-Goddess, who is a protective mother... but who is depicted also as a sort of a demon... who stands on top of her male adversary, cuts off his head and drinks his blood. This demon-goddess has the same appearance as a witch... (suggesting that) any woman whose demands one has refused is liable to be feared as a witch who may exact terrible reprisals.' (Pp. 156-157. Italics by the author)

However, the author's attention may be drawn to one or two important fundamental ideas here, leaving aside, at the moment, the 'psychoanalytically symbolic' interpretation: *Durga*, the name of the fierce-looking goddess, is interpreted by the author as meaning 'unapproachable', which is not quite correct. Siva's wife Parvati receives

her name *Durga* from the name of the demon (*asura*) *Durga* (= difficult of access, hence invincible) who was slain by her by assuming the terrifying form of a war-goddess. She is therefore also called *Durgaghni* (*ghni* = slayer). And *Maha-Kali* is another epithet of Parvati in her fierce form.* Siva is also called *Maha-Kala* in his character as the 'destroyer', but *Parvati* is known as *Maha-Kali* in her own rights not as the consort of *Maha-Kala*. The war-goddess representation of *Durga* is supposed to be one of the forms which the Mother Goddess (*Mataji*) takes, in times of need of the humanity suffering from sinful elements, which she is out to eliminate. The male adversary represents the sinful elements. He is not her consort, as Carstairs says. Her actual male consort is God Siva, who is himself represented as the god of destruction, though the word *Siva* means 'welfare' or 'happiness'; and therefore it may imply that he destroys the ungodly elements for the welfare of mankind. And the *Durga* form of Parvati is worshipped not in all parts of India. We feel that the author's interpretation in this regard is rather far-fetched, though we are aware that psychoanalysis can take only such direction of interpretations.

There are other interesting interpretations on the psychoanalytic plane on the phantasy level, which are worthwhile for the reader to study in the book-relating the Mahakali, Nandi, Vishnu, Krishna and other phantasies relating to the father as the victim, to the oedipal situation, to self-castration feeling, to asceticism, to paranoid trends, to homosexuality, and so forth. Consider the following for example:

'The identification of the male goat with the male victim of the Goddess is made explicit by the bhopa's act of drinking the goat's warm blood mixed with alcohol, while he is possessed by the spirit of the Mataji. The goat is sacrificed to appease her devouring rage, and then her worshippers unite in eating its meat. This act, which is felt by Brahmins and Banias to be one of grave

* See Apte's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Revised and Edited by P. K. Gode and C. G. Karve, with the assistance of an Editorial Board. Vol II. Prasad Prakashan, Poona, 1958.

impiety, which even Rajputs feel to be incompatible with the enlightened religious life, means symbolically that the child feasts with his demon-mother upon his father's blood. To take meat means to eat the father's penis and so acquire his virility. This makes one strong, because meat is a builder of semen, but it puts one in peril of a similar castrating attack, either from the Goddess or from her still more fearsome consort, the Bheruji; and it estranges one from the path of submission and denial of one's sexuality, which is felt to be the only way to ultimate re-conciliation with one's mother and father figures. The orthodox Hindu ban on eating meat and the stress on ahimsa (not taking life) can thus be interpreted as the conscious reaction-formations against repressed oedipal feelings of hostility against the father, feelings which are never allowed direct expression'.

(Pp. 165-66)

The book suffers from a lack of diacritical marks for the English spellings of Indian words. Such marks make for correct pronunciation, and are very necessary in using foreign words with English spellings. Throughout the book and in the Glossary, Hindustani words, most of which are really Sanskrit, though sometimes not accurately pronounced by all people, but usually written correctly for them, are spelt out in this book incorrectly.

Though one may not agree with all the interpretations of the author, the book represents a very refreshing and stimulating attempt by a European, equipped with the necessary sympathy, understanding, knowledge of the basic tools of collection and interpretation of data, and further—and what is more important—an ability to speak the dialect of the people and also to establish cordial relationship with the group he studied.

PANDHARINATH PRABHU

EXILE AND THE KINGDOM: Albert Camus. Translated by Justin O'Brien. Hamish Hamilton: 1958: 13s.6d.

FOR the last half century almost all French novelists have exclusively devoted themselves to one main problem: the desire to probe the true nature of man's existence. These premeditations were perhaps forced on them because of the suffering and want through which the country passed—two world wars, unstable economy, political bankruptcy. But whether it was the urbane irony of Anatole France, or

sensitiveness of Marcel Proust, or—in our times—unconventionality of Andre Gide, moral seriousness of Francois Mauriac or bitterness of Jean Paul Sartre, the basic enquiry has remained the same: that is, a rational understanding of the cause of human suffering and misery.

At the head of this illustrious list of cosmic interrogators now stands the young, Algerian born (b. 1913), controversial author, Albert Camus.

Camus has been known to his countrymen for a long time—as an essayist, as a journalist, as a worker in the resistance movement—though international fame came to him only with the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature in the year 1957. When his first novels appeared (*The Outsider*: 1942; *The Plague*: 1947) he was condemned by a section of critics as a perverted experimentalist, a man without any vision, whereas another section—which, incidentally, included the great Andre Gide—immediately recognised in him a distinguished writer and a distinguished thinker. By now, there is almost a complete unanimity about his superior ability in both the fields.

To understand Camus' thought we have to go back to the beginning, to the Danish Philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard who propounded, what is known by a badly misused word, the theory of existentialism. To put it briefly, it is a body of thought which lays more stress on human experience than on abstract reasoning. Opinions not based on experience are liable to mislead man, it says. Hence, in order to live well, one has to be extremely honest with oneself and not to depend on the vague promises of non-provable philosophies. This idea of human behaviour, after Kierkegaard, passed through various hands, primarily German and French (Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, etc.). But the basic concept essentially remained the same. Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus are two of its greatest living exponents.

Camus expressed himself forcefully, and in a forthright manner, long back in *The Outsider*. It is the story of a man who in

the midst of life finds himself a 'stranger' to most of the things that are happening to or around him. Consequently he reaches a state of mind where nothing, not even the death of his mother, is shocking enough to disturb his queer tranquility. For him this life is too precious to be wasted, or to be grieved over, on any account whatsoever.

His subsequent books—of fiction, of essays, his plays—repeat the same idea in greater detail. We have been all along giving wrong weightage to things, he means to say. The traditional logic with which we have been doped for centuries has done us no good. To misquote Wordsworth: the 'other' world is too much with us. The vision of Heaven and Hell as fabricated by the Bible and artists like Dante and Swedenberg has so hoodwinked us that we have always remained blinded to the facts of *this* life. We have repeatedly failed to recognise a sense of justice in this world—justice right now, before our eyes. If we were to do that, if we were to relieve our parts giving more emphasis to 'now', we might be, if not more happy, at least less miserable. We would certainly feel less out of place with men and things.

The volume under consideration, *Exile and the Kingdom*, contains six of Camus' stories. They are all of identical length, and have more or less identical themes, on the lines indicated above.

It would be unnecessary here to mention of Camus' skill as a novelist. He can hold his reader as a professional and all the six stories included in the present collection are gripping, exciting tales. As mere illustration of tropical life,—its heat, its cold, its sand, its dreariness—, they surpass much topical literature on the subject. As penetrating studies of colonial settlers, they have another important, independent place. As specimen of good, descriptive prose (difficult to assess completely in a translation though), there are passages in them—the dance episode in 'The Growing Stone', for instance—which are filled with breathtaking beauty and poignancy.

But it is as commentaries on human life in general that Camus wrote them and that we should consider them. And it is here that the French can lift their head with pride as the leaders of world thought today. Even though it has won no victories in recent times—its story of the past forty years is a story of decline—France has produced the most stimulating writers of the post war era. There is no sense of meaningless frustration there (U.S.A.: Norman Mailer: *The Naked and the Dead*), or blind fear of extinction or subversion to a state of barbarity (England: Aldous Huxley: *Ape and Essence*. George Orwell: *Nineteen Eighty-four*); nor escapist sensualism (Italy: Alberto Moravio: *The Woman of Rome*); nor, again, semi-heroic, semi-critical rededications to idealism (Russia: Vladimir Dudintsev: *Not By Bread Alone*). None of these attitudes will help us, the writers there feel; running away from life is no solution to its problems. To remake this broken and shattered world would be being a bit too ambitious at the present moment. All that we could do is to "prevent it from destroying itself further."

The characters of *Exile and the Kingdom* are fearless figures who continue to face the rut of existence boldly, each one of them working out his individual salvation. The title is rather symbolic. We are all exiles and there is no promised kingdom for us. If at all, we have to search within ourselves and readjust ourselves to our surroundings.

The stories range in treatment from the farcical to the deeply introspective. One of the most delightful tales, 'The Artist at Work', rivals Voltaire's *Candide* in giving a mock-heroic account of an artist's 'lucky star' and his preoccupations in society. Tired of the set-up in which he has to pass his time, he ends up with a one word philosophy of life, which he scribbles illegibly on a piece of canvas and which might be either 'solitary' 'solidary.' May be, the one compliments the other. 'The Guest' is a thought-provoking piece about an Arab who knowingly carries himself to his destruction and a school teacher who receives hatred for

love. 'The Adulterous Woman', the opening story, pierces the very depth of boredom which we have to suffer in the discharge of our day to day obligations (one of the obligations being husband and wife).

In the course of his Nobel Prize speech (Dec. 1957) Camus mentioned two self-imposed tasks of a writer: the service of truth and the service of liberty. *Exile and the Kingdom*, in its own way, is a living testimony to these high ideals.

If a reviewer may be allowed an occasional sweeping statement, this probably is the most important work of fiction to have appeared during the last year.

C. L. NAHAL

THE USES OF ARGUMENT: by Stephen Toulmin (Cambridge, 22sh.6d.)

ON reading Toulmin's book one gets a mild shock. In these days of Symbolic Logic, it is refreshingly different—one may even say, old-fashioned! His inquiry is concerned with 'the rational process,' the 'procedures and categories by using which claims-in-general can be argued for settled and 'standards of achievement which a man can come up to or fall short of. . .'. He puts his central question thus, 'How far logic can hope to be a formal science, and yet retain the possibility of being applied in the critical assessment of actual arguments.' This is answered by considering two main themes: (1) *the difference between arguments in different fields is essential and all arguments cannot be reduced to a common type* (p. 150). (2) the demand that all arguments, to be valid, should measure up to the analytic standard where the premises entail the conclusion, is fallacious, and it must therefore be recognised that 'scientific, ethical, aesthetic and theological' arguments are all as rational and valid as (say) mathematical arguments. In holding that these various types of argument fall within the competence of Reason, that they involve no 'logical gulf,' that the last three of them are not merely expressions of emotion, and in thus rejecting the exaggerated claims of Symbolic Logic, Toulmin is swim-

ming heroically against the contemporary current, and wishes, in his own words, to meet, head-on, 'the collision between formal logic and practical argument criticism.' He holds that 'a radical re-ordering of logical theory is needed in order to bring it more nearly into line with critical practice.'

Chapters I and III develop the first theme. Ch: I seeks to show that whether it is a meteorologist predicting rain, an injured workman alleging negligence, a historian defending the character of Tiberius, a doctor diagnosing measles or an art critic commending a painting—'in each case we can challenge the assertion' and 'demand an argument.' What is it, then, in our arguments, which is 'field invariant' (the same regardless of the field) and what is 'field dependent?' By examining the word 'cannot' Toulmin shows that its 'force' is field invariant, while the criteria or grounds for using 'cannot' are field dependent (pp. 29-39). Similarly of 'good,' when we say that an apple, an action, a motor-car or a Van Gogh are good, the force or meaning of 'good' remains the same, while the grounds judging each of them good are field dependent. Logicians have always been unwilling to come to terms with the latter feature of arguments, and, instead, have felt it possible 'to display arguments from different fields in a common form.'

I found Ch: III the most original and illuminating in the book. All arguments have a common pattern consisting of Claim, Data, Warrant for data and Backing for warrant. In the major premise of the traditional syllogism the warrant (whose force is hypothetical and field invariant) is often confused with its backing (which is factual and field dependent), thus giving rise to the dubious problems about 'existential implications'.

In spite of what the publishers say, the book is not for the 'ordinary reader', for it requires an acquaintance with the history and problems of philosophy which 'the ordinary reader' is not likely to possess. This would be especially noticeable in Ch: II on 'Probability', where the views of

Kneale and Carnap are combatted with detailed and subtle argument. The main point, however, is clear and reinforces the author's principal thesis, namely the schism between modern discussions of 'probability', 'chance' and their use in everyday situations. All attempts at reducing probability statements to statements of frequencies or mathematical relations is due, he believes, to the confusion between the force of the word 'probability' and the grounds for using it.

The latter half of Ch: III and the whole of Ch: IV develop the second theme of the book—the fallacy of giving 'a pride of place' to the analytic syllogism, in which the backing for the warrant includes the claim sought to be warranted. (The old 'petitio principii' bogey of Mill is laid.) Such arguments are contrasted with 'substantial arguments'. The thesis is that the 'categories of formal logic' were built up from the 'unrepresentative and misleadingly simple' analytic syllogism, and so misapplied to 'arguments of other sorts' (pp.146, 149). Formal logicians claim to speak strictly, 'whereas the conclusions they present turn out... not so much strict as *beside the point*.' Toulmin also accuses them of 'conflating five distinctions into one single distinction' that between Deduction and Induction (p. 149). He substantiates this charge by quoting from Hume, Kneale, Strawson, Carnap and Hare and concludes that it is no shortcoming in an argument 'that it does not match up to analytic standards.' We should demand from arguments only 'that they shall achieve whatever sort of cogency or well-foundedness can relevantly be asked for in that field.' Otherwise the divergence between the theoretical use of words like 'possible' and 'necessary' and 'our everyday practice cannot fail to strike us.' (p. 151).

I expect Toulmin does not share any of the metaphysical or logical principles of Idealism; he certainly makes no reference to the Idealists. But in his general conception of, and programme for, Logic, one cannot but see an astonishing resemb-

lance to Bosanquet, whose logic is 'the high-water-mark of Idealistic logic.' Compare the following passages. From Toulmin—'the question is discussed, in what ways the formality and structure of argument change... as we move from one sort of claim to another or between arguments in different fields.' From Bosanquet—'If I have at all reproduced for others the spectacle of unity and continuity in the intellectual life, combined with the most varied and precise adaptation of its fundamentally identical function to manifold conditions, ... I shall so far have succeeded in the object of my work.' From Toulmin—'depending on the logical types of the facts adduced..., the steps we take—the transitions of logical type—will be different. From Bosanquet—'We cannot and must not exclude from the form of Knowledge its modifications according to "matter." From Toulmin—'We must learn to tolerate in comparative logic a state of affairs long taken for granted in comparative anatomy. A man, a monkey, a pig or a porcupine... each will be found to have its own anatomical structure... normality and deformity are "intra-specific," not "inter-specific" notions, and the same kind of situation holds for terms of logical assessment... we must ask these questions within the limits of a given field, and avoid... condemning an ape for not being a man or a pig for not being a porcupine.' From Bosanquet—'In giving to the present work the title of "Morphology of Knowledge" I intended to indicate... the unprejudiced study of judgment and inference... I would treat the forms of judgment and of inference as science treats the forms of animals or of plants...'

Among minor points, Toulmin's insistence on the 'need for a rapprochement between logic and epistemology,' his meeting of the modern dread of 'psychologism' in logic by his explanation of the double aspect of thinking—the psychological and the critical (p. 87); his strictures on behaviourism—all these have a very old world and satisfying flavour.

Toulmin once again proves the notion

that philosophical writing is dull and heavy. to be a popular misconception. His style is throughout lucid and straightforward, and the argument always clear, pointed and precise, constantly illumined by apt examples. The only complaint is that there is too much repetition—the legacy of G. E. Moore!—though an occasional glimmer of wit relieves the repetitions from being tedious. I shall give an example: *“When a woman says ‘Perhaps,’ she means ‘Yes’ when a diplomat says ‘Perhaps,’ he means ‘No’.”*

How far has Toulmin succeeded in his thesis? If you accept that Logic studies the ‘rational process’, then, I think, he has succeeded in showing that the forms of argument are field-dependent and so Symbolic Logic is too narrow to do justice to them. But if you hold with Russell, Ramsey or Stebbing that Logic is ‘a science of pure form, not to be distinguished from mathematics’ and ‘not at all the same thing... as the analysis and criticism of thought’, then Toulmin has failed. The collision between the two views is indeed met head-on, but there has been no reconciliation. It is hardly enough to say that *‘most logicians still think for time to time that their subject is concerned with the principles of valid reasoning!’*

S. OOKERJEE

THE STORY OF MY LIFE: Vol. 1, 1877-1922 by M. R. Jaykar, Asia Publishing House, Bombay; P. XIII & 627; Rs. 25.

AMONGST the elders we have the good fortune to have with us today, Dr. M. R. Jaykar occupies a distinct position. His long and chequered career has witnessed the waxing and waning of three generations of the leadership of our national movement. As a child, he admired Vasudeo Balvant, the well-known rebel of Maharashtra and retained a similar admiration in his youth for the then terrorist movements in Maharashtra, led by Savarkar and others. He was impressed by Gokhale, who, on his part, appreciative of Jaykar's legal acumen and oratorical talents, desired to enlist him in his mission. A family circumstance—the

keen disapproval of his grand father—precluded Jaykar's entry into politics till his grand-father's demise. Tilak eventually persuaded him into it with his election as the President of the Poona District Conference in 1918; with Gandhi, he was closely associated in many a critical moment. The four-volume work, of which the present one is the first, will, therefore, naturally arouse great expectations; that Jaykar at the age of over eighty, should have planned and started executing it, is a proof potent of his industry and perseverance.

The significance of Jaykar's career perhaps lies in the fact that thought it moves most of the time parallel to the National Movement, it has often touched it, and on several important occasions, has appeared to move almost to its centre. There is thus reason to expect in its unfoldment a happy balance of interest and detachment, of concern and objectivity. It is perhaps too early to judge how far such an expectation will be fulfilled. Although Jaykar's political career actually began in 1918, which is almost the closing part of the period 1877-1922, covered in this volume, one could still expect to get in it his reactions to the numerous political events of the period which incidentally synchronises with the whole of Tilak's political life. But he insists on eschewing all incidents in which he was not concerned. Such an approach is bound to qualify his object in writing the work, viz. recording the events in the history of Indian Freedom Movement as he knew it in his time; and that the work, planned in four volumes can hardly be expected to form ‘a complete history of the events of nearly 70 years’. Its focus may become much narrower and more limited, which, of course, need not detract us from appreciating its merit. It is bound to shed significant light on the personalities participating in various movements, revealing them in all their diverse shades and colours, with their strength and their weaknesses. It may, however, be better to wait awhile, for what we have at present is just the beginning.

An unfortunate remark occurs in the

book (p.98) about the sub-editor who wrote the article for which Tilak was sentenced to transportation that *'he should have boldly come out and made the fact known.'* The reference is obviously to K. P. Khadilkar who was in no way a man to take aback on such occasions. Who does not know of his having accepted a sentence himself in 1928 under a similar charge for an article written by his sub-editor? One hopes such lapses from the judicious level the author possesses, will be absent in the volumes to come.

V. D. RAO

UNMARRIED WIDOW AND OTHER SHORT STORIES by Arvind Gokhale, Translation from Marathi by Smt. Snehprabha Pradhan; Jaico Publishing House, 1957. Pp. 121. Rs. 2.00

THE Marathi short story has taken some rapid strides during the last about fifteen years. Shri Arvind Gokhale has been one of the leading lights of the new trends. A collection of his stories in English translation is therefore a welcome event.

There are books which you cannot lay aside unless you avidly go through them from cover to cover. This at once is their success and their failure. *The Unmarried Widow* succeeds and fails on this very count. A collection of short stories—and in the serious vein at that—which carries you from cover to cover, without making you pause and ponder, may have all the qualities of masterly craftsmanship but lacks the touch which transforms artistry into art beating the pulse of life.

Shri Arvind Gokhale's characters though generally well drawn sometimes give purely fictitious reactions (*'Geeta,' 'The Unmarried Widow'*) and at places the story takes the reader through the trap of a familiar trick of the trade (*'Chengiz Khan'* even gives an echo from a well known story by Maugham). The end at times is forced (*'The Woman without Individuality'*). *'The Sale of Flesh'* though unbearably poignant in its theme is otherwise conventional, formless and flippantly

reminds one of the Arab who refused to sell his horse. 'Sacrilege' deals with a real situation which we face in our society, where teenage lovers meet some years after they are separately married. The treatment in some places, however, is not consistent with the general mood. The young man's mind is mainly dominated by animal passion. (*'The rest is easy now he thought. Forget the interval of ten years and complete what was left unfinished'*) On the other hand the young woman who is exasperatingly steady in this encounter had a different background. (*'So many times she had shown eagerness to give him this same body'*) Truth, we all know, is many times stranger than fiction but this does not make any strange fiction truth. The *'Childless'* is a fine story well-narrated with only a little flaw, of detail. *'Madame Mercy'* is far-fetched and trivial. In *'The Stigma'* a strange theme has been well-handled. The last paragraph is however unnecessary and detracts from artistic composition. Perhaps it is an apology and an explanation for Indian readers. *'Nuisance'* is just that. From the beginning you expect the end and the turn at the end is unduly forced. *'Asmat'* falters through narration perhaps because of its theme and unrealistic treatment.

'Manjula,' however, redeems the whole collection with its polished perfection and unerring effect. Here is a story that can stand comparison with the best in any language. It is such a story, deeply tragic without tears and vibrant with the agony of the age that makes you pause and feel 'the heartbreak in the heart of things.' A chain may be only as strong as its weakest link but a necklace is always as precious as its most precious pearl. If they did not choose to put in a few more precious pearls in this collection,—well, ask them 'why?'

DEVDATTA DABHOLKAR

Books for review, book-reviews and the correspondence regarding book reviews should be addressed to the Reviews Editor, 148 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay-1.

—Editors

CORRESPONDENCE

DECLINE OF THE INDIAN INTELLECTUALS

Dear Sir,

Though I agree with Prof. Ray about the decline of the Indian intellectuals, I have some doubts about the validity of his analysis of the causes leading to the decline.

I wonder whether it is wise to apply definitions and standards current in the West regarding culture, progress, intellectuality, stagnation, etc. today to a people and society functioning in a totally different framework of values and ideas. In such a case one must make judgements within that framework, reserving our general criticism of the system as a whole for other times.

If looked at from this angle, I think, Prof. Ray would come across many persons, during the period he characterizes as a 'very long period... of social and cultural stagnation', in whom 'man's search for significance had become particularly articulate'. He would also find them 'consciously transmitting the structure of tradition and amending, enlarging and even transforming that structure through reflection and inquiry'. A saint is such a person *par excellence*. Prof. Ray does not find them because he applies standards which were non-existent then. I should think this to be an elementary mistake in methodology.

This initial mistake impairs the whole of his analysis. Whoever does not agree with his ideas is branded as an anti-intellectual, and the enemy of the intellect. All thinking which does not agree with him becomes parochial, authoritarian, verbalism and reified abstractions, etc. It is in the same spirit that he calls the thought of Vivekananda, Tilak, and Aurobindo 'religious collectivist populism'.

I cannot speak for the whole of India. But looking at the social and political history of Maharashtra since the advent of the British, one finds a man like Justice Ranade leading both the social and political reform movement. He was the representative of the first three generations of the educated in Maharashtra. Even a man like Vishnu-shastri Chiplonkar did a first rate job of spreading

knowledge through his Nibandh-Mala. It is interesting to note that foreign knowledge was characterised by these men, who were intensely nationalistic in politics, as 'tigress's milk'. We fail to find the estrangement that Prof. Ray talks about in this period. On the other hand, the educated at this time were filled with an unparalleled energy and enthusiasm and in no way felt either guilty or impotent.

It was around 1890 that conflicting schools of thought arose as to the relative importance of social and intellectual reform and struggle for political independence. For a few years this conflict centred around the two powerful personalities of Tilak and Agarkar. Tilak, though orthodox in many of his habits, was never opposed to social and intellectual reform. He was not opposed to the development of science and industry. No doubt, he was an adherent of Hindu philosophy. But his acceptance of Hindu philosophy was essentially intellectual in character. The monumental *Gita Rahasya* is a proof of that. The conflict between him and Agarkar was undoubtedly on fundamental issues, but was not of a nature which would have led to an alienation between them. Because, though Agarkar believed social and intellectual reform to be his mission, he was equally a protagonist of Indian independence. Had he not died, most unfortunately, in 1895 at the raw age of 39, there is enough evidence to believe that that the alienation that came about later on between liberals, social reformers and intellectuals on the one hand, and political workers on the other, would not have occurred at all.

The estrangement or alienation of the 'intellectuals' from the common people came about not because of their acceptance of a dynamic culture of the West but because socially and even intellectually they became inactive and withdrew into the shell of private life. This private life often meant pursuit of wealth and cooperation with the British Raj. It is also difficult to find any dynamic quality in their westernised life, any real absorption of a new culture. It was often an imitation of expensive and fashionable habits of the European.

They were not free of greed and selfishness. They displayed cowardice and servility before the Sahib. Their talk was often full of condescension and arrogance. It was a combination of all these things that put them out of the stream of social life.

With the coming of Gandhi this process was accentuated. Prof. Ray talks about the monolithic personality of Gandhi, his anti-intellectualism, his cult of the masses. But I see it in a different light. Before Gandhi, politics in India was largely limited to conferences, representations, talking and writing. Gandhi made self-sacrifice an important part of the struggle, and also made the struggle broad-based and democratic in character. The so-called intellectual class in India was averse to the idea of sacrifice. It was also afraid to mix with the people on the level of equality. It took fright and fled farther from active social life, continuing further the process that had begun earlier. It has since then done a lot of name-calling, but nothing constructive and creative on its own.

I further doubt whether education did really 'wait' because of Gandhi. I ask if it is not true that a large part of the intellectuals did stay out of political strife. It will not do to blame Vivekananda, Tilak and Gandhi for the decline of the Indian intellectual. Even if one agreed with Prof. Ray's views about things, I cannot see how these

men could be blamed for not doing something in which they did not believe. The onus of the situation squarely rests on those who, styling themselves as intellectual leaders, remained inactive and pursued their self interests.

The reasons for the decline of the Indian intellectuals have to be sought elsewhere. It may be found in the attitudes of the educated people. The decline may be due largely to the rootlessness of the modern Indian. We see that till about the turn of the century the educated were not alienated from their society. They had acquired new ideas, new habits but they had absorbed them into the traditional way of life. They were not rootless. In contrast with them the modern educated Indian is neither here nor there culturally.

I also think that we have not rightly stressed the distinguishing qualities of an intellectual and the responsibilities of his vocation. For a long time in the past the term intellectual has been equated with academic learning and erudition. With some it has come to mean accepting western outlook on life. But an intellectual is distinguished by honesty, truthfulness, fearlessness, humility, and kindness. He is selfless and dedicated to principles. He is a deeply moral man.

Kuruduwadi,
Bombay State.

VASANT PALSHIKAR

CONTRIBUTORS

Philip Spratt of Meerut Conspiracy Case fame was sent by the British Communist party in the middle twenties to guide the Communist party of India in its formative phase. Since then he has made India his home. Later he moved "*beyond communism*" (name of a book of which he was joint author with M. N. Roy), and is now counted amongst its ablest critics. At present he edits *Mysindia* from Bangalore.

P. C. Chatterji is a station-director of the All India Radio who spends his leisure in philosophical study and writing. He has recently published *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*.

Gurbachan Singh Talib, Principal, Khalsa College, Bombay, is a member of the Sahitya Akademi.

M. S. Kalyanasundaram, Hindi Prabhakar of the Punjab University, has brought out several Hindi primers and collaborated in the production of Hindi-Tamil Dictionary.

Punya Sloka Ray lectures on Philosophy at the Utkal University, Cuttak.

Amiya Chakravarti, one of the closest associates of Rabindranath Tagore and a leading poet of Bengal for the last two decades, is at present professor of Comparative Oriental Religions and Literature at Boston University. He holds a doctorate from Oxford on modern English poetry.

Evelyn Wood describes himself as "ethnically Celtic, legally British". He has been resident in India for the last 34 years, and has contributed to many periodicals beginning with early issues of *London Mercury*. Professionally, mechanical and hydraulic engineer and consultant in communications.

Peter Hyun, educated in Seoul, New York, Madrid and Paris, has contributed verses and articles to *New World Writing*, *The Westminster Review*, *l'Express* etc.

Amaresh Datta, Lecturer in the department of English Literature, University of Saugor, has just finished a book on *Shakespeare's Tragic Vision and Art*. The International Association of Poetry in Rome is publishing some of his poems in their *Journal of Poets*.

F. R. Stanley is Lecturer in English, Madras Christian College, Tambaram.

Benjamin Polk is a member of the Indian architectural and town planning professional institutes, also of the American Institute of Architects and the Town Planning Institute of England.

Shankar Trivedi describes himself as a "critical student of world affairs."

Herbert Luthy, historian and essayist, is generally recognised as one of the foremost journalists of Europe. He hails from Switzerland and has recently published a volume on modern French politics.

Humayun Kabir, the Union minister of scientific research and cultural affairs, is a frequent contributor to *Quest*. The article in this issue formed the text of his lecture at the Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad.

Michael Polanyi, F.R.S. and **Sibnarayan Ray** were contributors to our last issue.

C. L. Nahal, teaches English Literature in a New Delhi College and the University of Delhi.

A. M. Ghose, who wrote on the "Necessity of English in India" in our last issue is a lecturer in philosophy at the Maharaja's College, Jaipur.

Devdatta Dabholkar teaches Economics at the Bombay College.

Pandharinath Prabhu, Professor of Psychology, Gujarat University; was attached to the Tata Institute of Social Science as Professor of Psychology until recently.

V. D. Rao, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Bombay; teaches History at Ramnarain Ruia College, Bombay.

Nissim Ezekiel, Ex-editor of *Quest*; two of his collections of poems have already been published, contributes to a number of periodicals and journals.

S. Ookerji, teaches Philosophy at Wilson College, Bombay; a contributor of *Quest*.



He's never colour blind about vitamins!

YES, vitamins *do* produce colours! And this expert can tell the exact strength of a vitamin by the colour reading on his photo-electric equipment.

Why all this precision? Because we know that you expect *unvarying* high quality when you buy Hindustan Lever products.

To ensure that these standards are maintained, we test at every stage. From the buying of raw materials, to the manufacturing process, to the performance of the finished product...experts, technicians, scientists are checking and double-checking. This *quality control* also helps conserve precious national resources and vital production time.

In this way, we are providing you with quality *products you can trust*, at economical prices.



HINDUSTAN LEVER SERVES THE HOME

Reports of Conferences convened by
the Congress for Cultural Freedom

Science And Freedom

The Hamburg Conference of 1953 included a discussion of the social and moral obligations of the scientist and the freedom of science in the West. "One of the greatest concentrations of leading thinkers in the natural sciences ever to meet under one roof"—*Manchester Evening News*.

Published by Secker & Warburg, London,
21s. net

Cultural Freedom In Asia

At the Rangoon Conference of 1955 forty distinguished Asians discussed the problems cultural, economic and political, of the Asian people since the Second World War. This Report is a contribution of prime importance to Far Eastern affairs.

Published by Charles E. Tuttle Company,
Tokyo. Price in Asia: U.S. \$1.00 Rs. 4-12
£ -/7/2 Y 360 etc.

The Soviet Economy

The first of a series of booklets arising out of the Milan Conference of 1955 on "The Future of Freedom." Contributors include Raymond Aron, Colin Clark, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Edward Shils, Peter Wiles and Bertram D. Wolfe.

Published by Secker & Warburg, London,
5s. net

Founded by

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Visvabharati Quarterly

*Old Series 1923-31
New Series from 1935*

India's leading journal of general
cultural interest

EDITOR: KSHITIS ROY

**Contents of Summer 1958
Volume 24 No. 1**

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| <i>Dushan Zbacitel</i> | : | Winternitz and Tagore |
| <i>Abinash-Chandra Bose</i> | : | (Tr) Hymn to the Earth: Atharva Veda XII.I |
| <i>M. Mujeeb</i> | : | Maulana Abul Kalam Azad |
| <i>Gouriprasad Ghose</i> | : | Guy De Maupassant |
| <i>Geza Gardonyi</i> | : | Is a Dog Really Human |
| <i>Prabodh-Chandra Sen</i> | : | Kazi Nazrul Islam, The Muslim Poet of Bengal |

**Book Reviews, Books received,
Contributors and Illustrations**

Contributions, Exchange Journals, Books for Review, Advertisement Material and annual Subscription Rs. 8.00, 14sh or \$3 to be sent to the office of:

The Editor:

**The Visvabharati Quarterly
Santiniketan Post
West Bengal
INDIA**

Practical Aids to Beauty...

To keep your skin perfectly clean, to keep it germ-free, blemish-free, odour-free 24-hours-a-day, every day of the year, use products containing **G-11** (Patent Hexachlorophene U.S.P.).



CINTHOL

The only **DEODORANT AND COMPLEXION BEAUTY SOAP** — *proved* on millions.



Godrej TOILET POWDER


Deodorant	•	Protective
Fragrant	•	Soothing

Used after bathing with **CINTHOL**, it ensures perfect personal daintiness.

Godrej HAIR TONIC & SHAVING STICK also contain G-11.

For Streamlined Beauty

Godrej **STEEL FURNITURE**



**YOUR
COUGH
WILL GO
QUICKLY**

IF YOU TAKE **PEPS** THROAT AND CHEST TABLETS

Suck a Peps and *feel* its healing vapours at work easing the pain and killing the germs of sore throat, bronchitis, cough or cold. Peps give instant relief and rapid cure.



Contain no dangerous drugs
May safely be given to children
**QUICKLY RELIEVE
BRONCHITIS,
SORE THROAT,
CATARRH,
CONGESTION,
COLDS and
COUGHS**

Sold by all
medicine dealers

C. E. FULFORD (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD.

FPY-54

Sole Agents: Bombay:

KEMP & CO. LTD.
P. O. BOX 937 BOMBAY-1

“The Magazine of the Fifties . . .”

THIS is how one critic described ENCOUNTER, Britain's leading monthly review, edited by Stephen Spender and Irving Kristol. He added: "It has articles about foreign events and trends, is markedly international in outlook, and is well aware of the new forces in society today".

This tribute emphasises, of course, only one of ENCOUNTER's many virtues—its alertness to political and social trends. Those whose main interest is literature, art or philosophy will find ENCOUNTER equally rewarding.

ENCOUNTER is particularly alive to Asian affairs and the work of Asian writers. Recent issues have contained reports on China, Siam and Malaya, stories by Krishna Baldev Vaid and Nakashima Ton, and a profile of Jayaprakash Narayan. Details of a short story competition for Asian authors, sponsored by ENCOUNTER and the International P.E.N., were announced in the April-June issue of *Quest*.

ENCOUNTER is sold in India by all good booksellers, including INTERNATIONAL BOOK HOUSE, 9 Ash Lane, Bombay; CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, Delhi; FOREIGN PUBLISHERS AGENCY, Grand Hotel Arcade, Calcutta; and HIGGINBOTHAM'S, Madras. The price per copy is Re. 1/-; the annual subscription is Rs. 12/-, including postage. The U.K. address of ENCOUNTER is 25 Haymarket, London S.W.1.



PEOPLE WITH A PURPOSE

THEY know where they're going, and they know what it takes to get there. They demand the best in everything because they know the best will help them to achieve success. And, of course, when it comes to their cars they want the best too.



STANDARD-VACUUM OIL COMPANY
(Incorporated in the U.S.A.
with Limited Liability)

That's why they always go with

Mobilgas and Mobiloil

STANVAC products for better motoring


Style 17. A smart step-in casual in smooth brown leather with mudguard front and concealed elastic gore. 32-95.

Style 29. A free and easy moccasin casual in black, high front and finely stitched apron. 32-95.

Style 55. A handsome Blucher, black or brown calf, three-eyelet tie, the long toeline stressed by a mudguard. 34-95.

Style 74. A bold look plain toe Derby, black or brown, two-eyelet tie. Cleated rubber sole and heel. 32-95.

Style COMBINED WITH Quality



To men with a flair for the distinctive, the first choice of footwear has always been the Bata Ambassador. A supple blend of selected leather, Bata Ambassador shoes combine traditional craftsmanship with a fine styling and finish that is a necessity for the well-dressed man.

Bata Ambassador

Issued by Bata Shoe Co. Private Ltd.



Welcome! Britannia Biscuits are always welcome. Crisp—delicious—oven-fresh and in the widest range of varieties made in India. Plain, cream filled, sweet, spicy or salty. All delicious and all high quality biscuits. That's why Britannia Biscuits are *better* biscuits.



THE BRITANNIA BISCUIT CO. LTD.

*May we remind you -
The Indian Railways are
The Nation's Property!*



Do not please throw away scraps of food, fruit peels on platforms or in compartments. Kindly help Railways to keep our premises clean.



Do not please spit indiscriminately. Spittoons are provided on station platforms. Please make use of them.



Please do not throw lighted cigarette ends inside the compartments. They may result in fires.



Those who pilfer or cause damage to Railway property hinder the Nation's progress. Please help the Railways to preserve the Nation's property and improve their service.

CENTRAL & WESTERN RAILWAYS

subscription form

To QUEST, 148 Mahatma Gandhi Road, BOMBAY 1

Please enter/renew my subscription from.....
to.....I am sending Rs. 5/-* (Rs. 4/- for
members of the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom)
by cheque | M.O. | P.O. | in cash

NAME

ADDRESS

DATE.....

Signature

* Annual subscription: U.K. 12s; U.S.A. \$3; France 450 Francs; Italy 984 Liras;
Ceylon Rs. 7/8/-; Burma Rs. 7/8/-; Germany 7 Marks; Israel 12s; Pakistan
Rs 7/8/-; Japan 567 Yens; Foreign subscriptions entered in India Rs. 7/8/-.

gift subscription form

Please enter gift subscription to the following in my name.

Signature

ADDRESS

NAME

ADDRESS

NAME

ADDRESS

NAME

ADDRESS

specimen copy form

*Please send a specimen copy of QUEST to the following with
an appeal to subscribe, mentioning my name.*

Signature

ADDRESS

NAME

ADDRESS

NAME

ADDRESS

And for them...a cup of cool cheer!



'Tushar' Water Coolers provide cool, hygienic drinking water for offices, factories, schools, colleges, hospitals, hotels, etc. You have a choice of three models—the R10 gives you 180 cupsful of cool water every hour, while the R40 and SC-40/40 each have a capacity of 720 cupsful an hour.

Made, sold and serviced by **VOLTAS**

VOLTAS LIMITED

Bombay • Calcutta • Madras • New Delhi • Bangalore • Cochin • Secunderabad • Ahmedabad • Lucknow

Printed and published by MISS SHEELA SINGH for the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, Army and Navy Building, 148, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay 1, at the Kanada Press, Podar Chambers, 109, Parsi Bazar Street, Fort, Bombay 1.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

A handful of Rice



India has more acreage under rice than any other country in the world. Yet production is not large enough to meet the demand. During 1957 it was found necessary to import 7,00,000 tons of rice at an estimated cost of Rs. 30 crores.

The country has been making steady progress in increasing production by improved methods of cultivation. Among these, control of the paddy stem borer is of special importance as it has been estimated that this deadly insect pest costs the country over Rs. 30 crores a year. The States

worst affected are those of Andhra, Kerala, Madras, Mysore and Orissa.

Shell endrin provides effective, persistent control of the paddy stem borer and can thus increase rice yields on affected fields by up to 50%.

True—Shell endrin has to be imported because it is not manufactured in India; indigenous materials are however used in its formulations. And for every rupee spent on importing Shell endrin, as much as ten rupees worth of rice can be protected—which is a sensible way of saving foreign exchange whichever way you look at it.

**SHELL Chemicals can save crops
and Foreign Exchange too!**