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QUEST

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R. BHASKARAN

Indian Intellectuals and Communism

K. A. JELENSKI

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
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
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
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The Indian Intellectual and Communism

R. BHASKARAN

THE intellectual in India has recently been accused by a Central Minister of being unreliable, of frequently changing his mind. That was in connection with the Chinese aggression and the policy of the Indian government. Though we should all hesitate to subscribe to a general statement on the Indian intellectual we must agree that the person is not easy to identify and his attitude is not readily predictable. It is therefore desirable to find out whom we mean here when we refer to intellectuals in our country. It is possible to be scientific or objective about it; it is not every one who is literate or earns his living by work that is not manual that would qualify to be called intellectual; nor can we call members of certain professions like law or teaching intellectuals. And one can very well argue that creative writers, like Shakespeare for example, do not belong to the society of intellectuals. Thus we can be sure who is not an intellectual, but we cannot agree who is. The opinion, borrowed (like many others) from Britain, is that an intellectual must be anti-Establishment and generally 'progressive' because the Establishment as such must be 'reactionary.' There is a vague reminiscence of gadfly Socrates of democratic Athens and a semi-learned and wholly condescending tolerance of a 'lunatic fringe' for its potential worth in the ultimate evolution of utopia. The intellectual is himself a holder of some such image of himself and his tribe though he feels free to rate himself and his close friends much higher than the rest. Like Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition the intellectual too is now borne on the Establishment and so there are Right intellectuals and Left intellectuals busy writing and speaking for

the proper direction of society and government. Their primary function seems to be censorial, to explain right morals and good taste and exhort their general adoption and condemn observed lapses. This salutary function can be performed with reference to almost every social activity; but as the fierce preoccupation of our age is with politics, most intellectuals get occupied with political questions to the exclusion of almost every other interest. The result is that the general public comes to believe that an intellectual is one with passionate political convictions about which he is incessantly articulate.

Since intellectuals do not hold responsible positions and do not have to know much about the past or the present and can concentrate wholly on the future which they are free to fancy in an untrammelled way, they generally tend to be 'progressive' in their attitudes. As our world has been in the last few decades expecting and discovering miracles of progress in Communist Russia and China, progressive intellectuals are, in a manner of speaking, compelled to admire communism and to hope for the realisation of ultimate justice in a communist society. Most intellectuals have been and continue to be politically 'leftwing'.

I venture to suggest that the historical reason for this is the fact that a self-conscious 'intelligentsia' wholly outside the ranks of socially and politically significant persons came up in Tsarist Russia and brought about a revolution there, based more on books and arguments than the more natural elements of social change. Burke has pointed out the grave danger of the exclusion of talent from the ranks of political management and it is wellknown

that in Britain 'Inquilab' has been aborted by the continuous discovery and seduction of talent by the ruling class. Elsewhere the talented intellectuals experienced personal frustration and social despair and came to be committed to subversion.

Thus the tradition of the contemporary intellectual is a revolutionary and left-wing tradition. Indian intellectuals are a western product because we do not have a native tradition of intellectualism any more than we have a native tradition of electoral politics. A person trained to express himself, to argue, and to feel generally indignant about injustice in every shape or form encountered anywhere and everywhere, who at the same time has no useful or practical function in society is a creature unknown to ancient or mediaeval India. He is a modern phenomenon, engendered by literacy and the printing press, the producer and product of the industry of broadcasting ideas divorced from action. The growth and elaboration of the means of disseminating ideas tend to increase the number and importance of intellectuals. What they think and say has far-reaching social consequence; what they think of communism for example can be very effective in determining the political choice of the Indian people in the coming decades.

And it is fair to proceed on the assumption that the Indian intellectual will have been shaped and conditioned by western experience and debate; it seems to me that it may take more than one generation, assuming no catastrophe and the rapid replacement of English by Indian languages, for new Indian intellectuals to arise unaffected by western modes of thought and expression and aware of local and native hopes and aspirations. Meanwhile Indian intellectuals will be 'Anglo-Indians' in the sense of having their intellects furnished from English stores even if some of the ideas relate to non-English and non-western history and experience.

Since the condition of the Indian intellectual is by the exigencies of his educa-

tion and language, a derivative, colonial and English condition, there is a conflict in him between the 'progressive' requirement of an advanced faith in Marxism and his knowledge of the disappointment with communism especially of western intellectuals. Moreover the contemporary Indian intellectual is heir to the 'liberal' English politics of his father, the sort of politics which advocated 'compromise', and hoped for steady pragmatic progress by hard work, clean living and the help of God who prefers to help those who start by helping themselves. This complex of moral, political, social and religious notions which late Victorian education spread in India and fixed in the minds of its intellectuals has not fully disappeared yet.

One may observe that intellectual fashions are subject to the same laws that govern other fashions such as the sartorial. The ordinary working class woman is happy and proud to dress herself up in the manner of the day decreed by the idle rich who in turn obey the behests of the conspiracy of commerce and technics which is haute couture. In the intellectual world, too, broadly one fashion supersedes another; at any given time one sees besides the prevalent or ruling fashion affected by the many, several old fashions shining in isolated pockets and some very new fashions outrageously flaunted in advanced circles. Thus it comes to pass that most of our intellectuals are committed to progressive economic equality, the destruction of caste and the release of the creative spirit in the world of art and literature. A consensus of this kind implies politically an ambivalent attitude to communism composed of a Western liberal concern for personal freedom and the old Indian aversion to positive action especially if it involves physical violence. Mr. Nehru may be taken as a type and symbol of the kind of official or 'majority' intellectual in India who talks and thinks eclectically, deliberately striving to combine the best that has been thought and said anywhere, anytime by homo sapiens.

Two elements in this intellectual attitude, a total lack of a sense of history and complete ignorance of the political process except at its base of power, are special to Indian intellectuals and derive from our own past. It is because of this that we are unable to share Western apprehension about Communism; this may also account for the inability of our own professed and active communists to think and act like communists abroad. The good Indian intellectual therefore will not subscribe to communism in toto but will continue to detect in it several excellences which he will labour to incorporate in his own society; he makes an ideal fellowtraveller up to a point.

This position is reached by the dogma of the affluent society viz., the excellence and the inevitability of a rising standard of life. It may be debated who invented this ideal for Western man, the *laissez faire* capitalist, the doctrinaire communist or the managerial bureaucrat. To the Indian intellectual who has rejected the superstitious religion of his fathers and adopted the new religion of secular welfare, the highest spiritual and social need is to reach the 'take off' stage as quickly as possible and achieve equal plenty for all. This socio-economic commitment being fundamental, moral, political and cultural concepts have to conform to its imperatives.

In so far as it is godless and promises speedy plenty to the proletariat, it appeals to the Indian intellectual; but when it comes to counting costs, social and personal, he is as careless and optimistic as an aristocrat of the *ancien régime*. He is generous in recognising and applauding the scientific and economic achievements of Russia and China; he sympathises with the ambitions of Soekarno and Nkrumah and wishes the Jagans and the Castros good luck. But he does not care to bother about the difficulties and problems of the colonial powers including the U.S.A. because the first duty of these people is to atone for their past misdeeds by unlimited

present generosity to the newly freed countries of Asia and Africa. This cluster of political ideas and attitudes is the mental background of most Indian intellectuals who take it for granted and have not felt the need to examine it critically. That is because, I suggest, the Indian intellectual has had no occasion to meet historical and political realities thanks to the cold war and the profits of neutralism. These, of course, will not last for ever. In fact our intellectuals may be seen later as having been brought face to face with reality in 1962.

When a communist state invades your territory and another communist state while giving you a few airplanes and continuing its economic aid does not feel obliged to stop the invader and when anti-communist states are anxious to come to your aid, you get involved in the contemporary problem and cannot pretend to float above it. So the Indian including the intellectual must now be more definite and positive about his attitude to communism. He can join the communists or the anti-communists, or he may go on exploring the possibility of continuing to be neither. I think Indian intellectuals are specially equipped for the last position; but since it is not wholly in our choice and the external world decides the issue the third position is now virtually lost.

So there will be a division among our intellectuals, so long happily united, between the Right and the Left. An intellectual, I think, should welcome this as helping towards clarity and better understanding. The last ditch nonaligners or neutralists can be written off as men who have had their day and the relics dismissed as absurd fossils. The Left intellectuals will have the task of describing the virtues of the equality and the collectivism that are basic to communism. They will enjoy the advantage of having had their ground prepared for over 15 years by government propaganda and the benefit of a general climate of articulate opinion favouring a planned directed socialistic state. This

positive climate of opinion favourable to a nonviolent constitutional transformation of the Indian state into a communist state arises from the anxious fostering of the material interests of the less than four million industrial workers of our land and a simultaneous safeguarding of the owners of industrial and finance capital by protectionist policies perpetuating a seller's market. The interests of organised capital and labour have been safeguarded at the expense of the salaried middle class and the masses. It is a condition favourable to further development of a communist outlook and the Indian intellectual who favours communism can see an attractive 'objective situation' in India for him to explicate and exploit. Internally the choice before the communist intellectual is between the Eastern and Western versions of the creed, the approach of Khrushchev or the approach of Mao.

The Right wing intellectual who has by definition to be anti-communist has handicaps which are the same as the advantages noted above as accruing to the procommunist intellectual. The anti-communist, avowedly and openly anti-communist, comes late in the field and he can be attacked as a capitalist stooge, a lackey of colonial imperialism, a traitor to the Indian nation and so on. Because of the variety, the wide distribution and innate capacity for perpetuation of the vested interests arising out of the state capitalism which is called socialism here, right wing ideology when it is openly advocated, will attract the implacable hostility of the beneficiaries of pseudo-socialism. At the same time the mass of the people will find it difficult to follow the arguments of modern liberal democracy with its emphasis on work, on personal responsibility and social cooperation.

While thus it is true that the Indian intellectual who is against communism will encounter serious obstacles, some of which are universal and not special to India and part of which are special to India on account of her recent past, it is

also true that our rightwinger has advantages which his counterpart outside India does not possess. I refer to the active scheme of moral values which still prevails all over the land and from which the 'educated man' is only partially emancipated and that too only for limited periods of time contingent upon the degree and duration of material success he has been able to achieve. Viewed from this angle the prospect for the anticommunist intellectual is much brighter. If he can recover the idiom of Indian traditional thought and employ it in his analysis of contemporary conditions he can hope to wean communists from their faith and give the non-communist a philosophy of life which he can express and of which he need not be ashamed.

The principles involved are (1) a refusal to accept a perpetually rising material standard of life as an inescapable goal of human endeavour and a standard of international comparison. This does not entail austerity or asceticism but a moral or religious conviction that a technology and a commerce based on perpetual increase need not dominate men and their institutions, (2) a refusal to let the state have the monopoly in defining, human ways of life and human values, (3) the assertion of the uniqueness of every man and his natural right to be so unique which may admit of modification for social purposes but cannot admit nullification for the sake of planned economic progress. (4) denial of the possibility or the goodness of the principle of equality. These principles can be found to be compatible with the traditional Indian outlook which posits values independent of secular circumstance and the vagaries of time.

A new Sanatanism, native to India and intellectually equal to any other expression of the human spirit here or elsewhere, can be imagined as the outcome of an intellectual effort in India directed away from or against communism in its numerous manifestations.

Three Aspects of Polish Revisionism

K. A. JELENSKI

STRICTLY speaking, all Marxists have been revising the doctrine ever since historical developments did not bear out Marxian predictions, ever since experience revealed obvious discrepancies between theory and reality. We know, however, that, whenever directed from above, such revision is known as 'creative development of Marxism'. In the more restricted sense, 'revisionism' refers to attempts to 'rethink' the Marxian doctrine independently of its official guardians, as was the case with the 'socialist' revisionism of Bernstein, or with the communist revisionism of communists, mainly Polish and Hungarian, after the death of Stalin. However, as Leopold Labedz points out in his introduction to the Symposium on Revisionism published recently in London by Allen and Unwin, in the terms of the history of ideas the distinction is by no means so unambiguous: 'Revisionism might be frontally defeated, but creeps in through the back door, and the "orthodox" Marxists also contribute to the development of "revisionist" ideas'.

I think that this interplay between 'orthodox' revisionism and 'heretic' revisionism has been particularly complex in recent years in Poland. I shall therefore try to show how revisionism has been at work in Poland on three levels: the pragmatic revisionism of the rulers, the orthodox revisionism of the guardians of the doctrine, and finally the heretic revisionism of those young Marxists who endeavoured, after the death of Stalin, to abandon myths for reality, to restore the Marxian emphasis on humanist values and genuine internationalism, and to apply Marxian social analysis to the contradictions within

the collectivist system, instead of concealing them.

Gomulka's Road to Orthodoxy

Gomulka's disgrace in 1948 and his triumphal return to the Party's leadership in October 1956 were due to his close connection with a policy known as the 'specific Polish road to socialism'.

'National communism' is, after all, so recent a phenomenon that it still sounds almost like a contradiction in terms. For the Founding Fathers, for the early revolutionaries, even for the stalinist *apparatchiks* (at least at a certain level of their consciousness) there never was any doubt that the victory of communism on the world scale would mean the end of nationalisms, the realisation of the universal society and of Marx's vision in which society would replace the state. This is not the place to retrace the history of the gradual erosion of the internationalist features of the communist movement. But even after the Russian revolution, when it could be seen that communism was not going to be realised according to the predictions of Marx, an internationalist conception prevailed, in the form of the voluntary accession of each new communist state to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was conceived not as a geographically defined area, but as a federation of all the communist states of the world. This principle was even used to justify the annexation of the Baltic states. The first *theoretical* departure from this line was the post-war conception of 'popular democracies'. Still, the purely tactical character of this new form of 'national communism' was obvious; the communist

parties of the satellite states were merely given time in which to use nationalist feelings in order to lead their countrymen eventually into the Union. It was in Poland (after Yugoslavia) that it became clear what would happen to communist leaders who took the 'independence' line too seriously.

The term 'the Polish road to socialism' first coined by Gomulka in 1948, when he wrote in *Nowe Drogi*: Both for the Polish Socialist Party and for the Polish Workers' party, the independence of Poland is a supreme consideration to which all others are subordinated.' Indeed, the nationalist issue was—together with the attitude to collectivisation—the main feature of Gomulka's conception of 'the Polish road to socialism'. Like many Polish communists, he was led to analyse the reasons for the failure of the communists to build a mass movement in pre-war Poland. He attributed it to their insistence on internationalism and their indifference to Polish independence, which they identified with reactionary nationalism. This meant that among the left wing, all the power of attraction which patriotism has for the Poles was exerted by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which had broken with the left-wing internationalists before the first world war precisely on the independence issue. The merger of the Polish Communist Party with the PPS in 1948, was used by Gomulka as an occasion for reviving the 'patriotic argument', and he was quite explicit in his condemnation of the old Luxemburgist tradition and in extolling the patriotic virtues of the PPS.

But Stalin did not like his local agents to take their tactical role too seriously. The central committee meeting of August-September 1948 took Gomulka to task for his conception of 'the Polish road to socialism' and denounced him as a 'national deviationist'. Between September 1948 and December 1949 three major purges were conducted in the Polish CP under the slogan of eradicating the nationalist deviation, affecting more than one quarter of

the total membership. Even so, the reactions of the rank and file in October 1956 proved that the purges had merely driven the nationalistic majority underground.

The key to Gomulka's past and present policy is perhaps given by his confession of his cardinal sin, concerning his attitude towards the USSR and the CPSU, published in the September-October 1949 issue of *Nowe Drogi*:

'The core of my rightist, nationalist complex must have been my attitude to the Soviet Union, to the CPSU... My attitude could be reduced not so much to... the relationship between the CPSU and the Polish party as to the relationship between Poland and the USSR as states... It never entered my head that Poland could progress along the road to socialism without being supported by the Soviet Union... These things I understood, but... it was... difficult for me to shift my attitude as regards the Soviet Union to the ideological party plane.'

In other words, Gomulka was, and remains, a good communist and a faithful ally of the USSR. But he objected to the total dependence of the Polish Communist party on the CPSU. That was a heretical attitude in 1949, but the very terms of his confession sound pretty orthodox now, since it is the CPSU which has evolved towards acceptance of his position.

In fact, 'the Polish road to socialism' appeared as a slogan when it encountered Soviet resistance, and disappeared when the Soviet Union recognised and admitted the realities behind it. The dramatic eighth Plenum of the Polish Central Committee, in October 1956 gave express approval to it, but later the slogan was dropped. The conference of the Communist parties called by Khrushchev to Moscow a year later, under the pretext of celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, was in itself a manifestation of the fact that Moscow recognised the existence of some degree of polycentrism within the communist movement. Gomulka played

back on this occasion and emphasised the need for unity, solidarity, and cohesion in the Soviet bloc, while at the same time opposing the revival of any international communist organisation. The 22nd congress was a further important step on the road which seems to be Gomulka's, and he has less to fear than ever from any eventual Soviet pressure on the basic tenets of his policy—his own conception of agriculture and of relations between Church and State. Khrushchev himself went further than ever in his report to the 22nd congress in giving indirect approval to Polish agricultural policy. Through a fortunate coincidence, the Polish harvest for 1961 was a record one and this year's will be better than was expected. As 87 per cent of the cultivated area in Poland is still in private ownership, this stands out in contrast with the Soviet Union where Khrushchev, in spite of his reforms, has not been nearly so successful. During his visit to Poland last spring, Demichev, secretary of the CPSU central committee, congratulated the Polish communists on their agricultural successes, and shortly after the congress *Kommunist* echoed Khrushchev's oblique approval.

In these conditions, Gomulka is certainly satisfied. He never had any liberal leanings himself, and the appointment of the sinister General Witaszewski, a former supporter of the Natolin group who, as head of the Security Police, threatened Polish intellectuals with 'gas-pipes', leaves no doubt about his determination not only to forget the 'Polish road to socialism' verbally, but to prevent its following the path indicated not merely by the young October revisionists, but also by the more enlightened representatives of orthodox revisionism.

Polish Revisionism:

From Protest to Heresy

There is probably no better way of introducing you to the intellectual and political atmosphere in which Polish re-

visionism was born, than by tracing a profile of the weekly *Po Prostu*, which was, until its suppression in September 1957, its most important mouthpiece.

As one looks back on the development of *Po Prostu*, one has the feeling that one is learning something about the whole future of post-Stalin society, and not just about one particular episode in Polish politics. The really curious thing is that all the editors of *Po Prostu* started out as fanatical Stalinists. Their careers run so closely parallel that one is tempted to draw a single composite portrait. Coming mostly from working-class origins, brilliant and favoured pupils, the oldest among them joined enthusiastically in the electoral campaign of 1945 in support of the Communist Party. They came under the intellectual influence of *Kuznica* ('The Forge'—the intellectual focus of Polish Marxism between 1945 and 1948), but reproached the older writers grouped around that journal—Kott, Putrament, Zolkiewski—with being 'lukewarm', with giving way to liberal inclinations of petty-bourgeois origin. They thought they were choosing the career of the 'professional revolutionary', without perceiving that it had become degraded to that of the Soviet-style bureaucrat, the 'aparatchik'. One of them confessed later his former disillusionment at not having been able to join the ranks of the political police. They gave no sign, at that period, of the Orwellian 'double-think', of Milosz's 'Ketman' mentality. At the moment when Gomulka was arrested, they probably secretly scrutinised their companions for any sign of 'Rightist deviation.'

Po Prostu was born in 1947, as organ of the Z.M.P. The weekly did not differ at all from the papers published at the time in other popular democracies, which explains its lack of success: its circulation was between 10 and 20,000 copies (it reached 150,000 copies at the time of its revisionist action). In 1955, after the third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, which launch-

ed, still very prudently, the theme of democratisation of the country, the ties between *Po Prostu* and the sad orthodoxy of the Party began to weaken.

While the older Polish intellectuals remained embedded in their conception of pre-war 'Western culture', perpetuating Gide's dialogues with Claudel, emulating Maritain's Catholicism and Giraudoux's wit, the young Marxists of *Po Prostu* struck one right from the outset as international and contemporary. A curious osmosis seemed to link them directly with the post-war generation in other countries. Their vision of the world embraced an odd juxtaposition of various countries. The USSR, while being hated for its Stalinist tyranny and despised for its post-Stalinist conformism, had its part there with the October Revolution of 1917, with Mayakovsky and sexual freedom and constructivism. America came in too, with its successful materialism, with jazz of course, and Steinbeck, science fiction, gangster films, and new methods of sociological research. From France they acquired a tendency to reconcile 'open' Marxism with existentialist psychoanalysis. They would have had no difficulty in speaking the same language as the 'angry young men' in England. The result of all this was a curious mixture—as if *Po Prostu* looked to *Fortune* for its major sociological enquiries, to the *New Yorker* for its humour, and to *Les Temps Modernes* for its documentary method and manner of philosophical exposition.

As we know, the revolt among Polish writers occurred several months before Khrushchev made his 'secret' speech. Nevertheless, a good many writers who had actively participated in the establishment of the Stalin regime staged their rebellion in such a way that they could also use it as an apologia for their past submissiveness. 'Evil' had certainly occurred, but that 'evil' was the product of a 'tragic historical necessity'. . . . The young editors of *Po Prostu*, with their deeper and more rigorous Marxist training—which one sus-

pects they gained by clandestine means—were not satisfied by such reasoning. Their line of thought followed a course which recalls that adopted by Djilas subsequently; and although they did not share his scepticism as to the possibility of building a genuinely socialist society, it was they who were the first to invent the term, 'New Class'.

The basic direction taken by *Po Prostu* was against the 'New Class', it was for a genuine socialism. To that end, it was necessary to develop the methods of Marxist analysis. Naturally, there was no place for Marxist-Leninism as interpreted by Stalin, 'who was not a Marxist and did not represent Marxism'. The attitude of the young writers of *Po Prostu* was anti-dogmatic.

'Even while we consider historical materialism, Marxism, to be the most fecund current in the social sciences, we regard that sectarian attitude as nonsense which says that one should scorn all the discoveries—often of major importance—of other schools of thought. . . . We consider that Marxism should be subjected to the same methods of scientific scrutiny and verification as any other intellectual discipline—one must perpetually check it against the facts, be prepared for revisions and further developments. . . .'

The Marxists of *Po Prostu* thus embarked on a critique of Marxism by comparing it with historical experience. And they were led to reject a great many theses which only yesterday were still Marxist dogmas: the law of the progressive impoverishment of the working class in a capitalist system, the Marxist theory of crises, the theory of the socialist revolution, all the clichés concerning the mechanism of power in countries governed by Communist Parties, considerations concerning imperialism, technical progress. . . . The young writers of *Po Prostu* denounced the utilisation of man as an 'element of productive forces', serving 'the economic interests of the State'. Socialism has no sense if it makes an abstraction of the

individual's place in society. And that is precisely what Stalinism had done, covering with the term of 'socialism' that 'process of primitive accumulation attributed by Marx, in his historical scheme, to capitalism.'

One can, in fact, resume *Po Prostu's* attitude in one crucial phrase, which echoes Bernstein: 'For the Communist the goal is not only communism, but also the movement towards it.'

But while *Po Prostu* played a leading role in the crucial period before and during October 1956, we must look elsewhere for the most important contribution of Polish revisionism on a deeper, philosophical level.

Two quotations from the leading Polish revisionist philosopher, Leszek Kolskowski, will best characterise the moral tone of this contribution:

'We are not Communists because we joined communism as an historical necessity; we are Communists because we have joined the side of the oppressed against the oppressors, the side of the poor against their masters, the side of the persecuted against their persecutors... No one is exempt from the moral duty to fight against a system or rule, a doctrine or social conditions which he considers to be vile and inhuman, by resorting to the argument that he considers them historically necessary.' ('Responsibility and History', *Nowa Kultura*, Warsaw, September 1-22, 1957).

And, from the same essay:

'I shall never believe that the moral and intellectual life of mankind conforms to the laws of economic investment, that is, that one should expect better results tomorrow by saving today, i.e., use lies for the triumph of truth and take advantage of crime in order to pave the way for righteousness.'

Polish philosophical revisionism has a strong moral orientation. It is based on a revaluation, in the Marxist doctrine, of the relationship between objective statements and statements of value.

But Kolakowski and his colleagues—Jan Strzelecki, Pawel Beylin—have also pointed out the fact that, since Marx's death, Economics, Sociology and Historiography have made great progress. Entirely new fields of research, new relationships, new theories and new methods have made their appearance which were unknown to Marx. How can one rationally apply the term 'Marxist' or 'non-Marxist' to the theory of functionalism in the new Anthropology and Sociology, to input-output analysis in Sociology and Economics, or to such relatively new disciplines as psychoanalysis or logical analysis of language?

Polish philosophical revisionists maintained that Marxism would be unable to come to life anew, so long as it refused to put questions which it had hitherto avoided, until it faced problems which its enemies were unable to solve, until its whole outdated apparatus was modernised. We shall see that while, to begin with, the orthodox guardians of the doctrine endeavoured to stifle these new voices, they have later done a lot to meet their challenge, while branding those who first made it as heretics.

The Merits and the Limits of Orthodox Revisionism

The 22nd congress started off a discussion in the Polish press about the freedom of science, socialist humanism, the need for internal party democracy. This new discussion was so lively and interesting that at times it recalled the intellectual atmosphere of October 1956. However, it was not initiated by young revisionists, but by communist intellectuals of the older generation, who not only did not join the revisionists in October 1956, but showed a strong ideological resistance to their ideas.

Those responsible were Adam Schaff, Oskar Lange, Professors Infeld and Ehrlich, Stefan Zelkiewski, Putrament, Alicja Lisiecka, and others, generally fairly close to party orthodoxy. They are repre-

sentatives of what might be called 'orthodox revisionism'.

The role of orthodox revisionism in Poland since October 1956 has been both important and ungrateful. Orthodox revisionists have attempted to 'modernise' marxist thought, to enlarge its field of interest to include disciplines and methods of research hitherto considered 'idealistic' or 'reactionary', while claiming to remain entirely faithful to Marxism-Leninism. Like the party's political leaders, they were striking out on two fronts—against dogmatists accused of fossilising Marxism, and against revisionists accused of liquidating it. The position of orthodox revisionism can be summarised by two quotations from Adam Schaff: against dogmatists: 'There is no thesis in Marxism which should be preserved if it is denied by facts. There is no thesis in Marxism which should be preserved from discussion if new facts and arguments appear.' Against revisionists: 'But with all the tolerance and breadth of the approach, there are limits which cannot be crossed without obliterating one's marxist position.' And what are these limits? Who is to determine them, if not the Party? Here lies the one, essential difference between 'philosophic' and 'orthodox' revisionists.

Orthodox revisionism is important because it has often served to pick up previously condemned theses of philosophic or 'authentic' revisionism and obtain the seal of party approval for them. Thus, one of the main fights of Polish revisionists after 1955 was directed against the notion of *partiinost* in philosophy and science (in the light of which 'academic objectivism' was considered reactionary). Leszek Kolakowski devoted a number of essays to this question; but the decisive theoretical blow against the crude concept of *partiinost* was dealt by the orthodox revisionist Oskar Lange. Lange made a distinction between mystifying ideologies and ideologies tending to uncover reality. He added, following Max Weber, that both kinds have the character of ideal types,

and are never realised in their pure form. Mystifying ideologies cannot entirely ignore the real character of social relations, or they could have no practical bearing. On the other hand, mystifying elements are creeping into ideologies designed to uncover reality (Lange pointed to revisionism, dogmatism, and the cult of personality). On the strength of this reasoning he proposed to distinguish between two approaches to reality; a progressive and a conservative one. The progressive approach favours the advance of science, the conservative approach tends to restrain it. What was left of *partiinost* in this new conception was the notion that the progressive approach needs to be related to 'the workers movement and to the construction and development of socialism', a notion obviously designed to secure official approval of greater scientific freedom.

The contradiction between Marxism as the ideology of socialism and Marxism as a social theory leading to positive knowledge about the world is well-known. Orthodox revisionism tries to find a way out of this dilemma by distinguishing between a 'creative' and a 'liquidatory' revision of Marxism. In practice this does considerably enlarge the field of application of various scientific and philosophical methods, and implies a break with the stalinist principle of *partiinost*. But—theoretically at least—orthodox revisionism continues to have one feature in common with dogmatism: it is the Party which, in the last instance, decides what is 'creative' and what is 'liquidatory' revisionism.

We come here to a point which seems to have been decisive in the negative attitude of orthodox revisionists during the October upheaval and since the 22nd congress. Communists like Schaff and Zolkiewski belong to a generation which was completely seduced by the myth of party monolithism. Whatever their intimate hopes and sympathies may have been, they saw in revisionism a threat to the unity of the party and opposed it on those grounds. It may have been both a

surprise and a relief for them to see that the monolithic character of communism is being destroyed not by 'revisionists' but by Khrushchev himself, fighting it out against 'dogmatists'.

In some measure, Polish orthodox revisionists like Schaff and Lange may consider themselves the pioneers of a trend which won at the 22nd congress, and which faces the scientific and social implications of the transition to an industrial society. Not long ago Professor Schaff was criticised in Soviet learned journals for his attempts to enlarge the methods of Marxism by introducing new sociological methods of enquiry, by opening the door to questions raised by existentialism and by the logical analysis of language. But since the 22nd congress, Schaff has acted as mentor to an international meeting of communist ideologists in Prague, devoted to modern sociology, while the December meeting of Soviet and Polish sociologists in Moscow proved that the Soviet Union had at last resolved to borrow, through the intermediary of Poland, some of the new Western methods of sociological enquiry to achieve a more rational social and economic development.

Much has been said—since October 1956—about the influence which Poland does, may, or should exert on the evolution of the Soviet Union. It made a definite impact on the literary and artistic ferment in Russia, and, through the instrumentality of such orthodox revisionists as Lange and Schaff, helped to implant in the social sciences and economics new ideas and methods of research. But manifold obstacles continued to exist throughout these years: the animosity, if not the hatred of the Polish public towards the Soviet Union, and the ostentatious lack of interest in Soviet problems on the Polish side; on the Soviet side, a combination of the traditional national distrust of the Poles, and suspicion of Polish revisionism. The trend represented by the 22nd congress, however slow and hesitant its pace, may well reduce some of these obstacles. For

the first time since its accession to power, Polish communism is benefiting from conditions which may enable it to influence the approach to Soviet internal contradictions (between the rationalisation of economic and social policy and the insistence on ideology as a justification for the party's monopoly of power) in a more liberal sense. But if Polish communism is to accomplish this, the kind of problems the Poles are dealing with must always be ahead of the kind of problems the Soviet Union is tackling, and the really new problems are invariably posed, not by orthodox revisionism, but by philosophic revisionism.

It is philosophic revisionism which provides the challenge necessary to the development of orthodox revisionism, which then in its turn is in a position to establish a dialogue with Moscow. To use concrete examples: the natural Polish partners in a philosophic, scientific, social dialogue with the Soviets are men like Schaff, Lange, Zolkiewski. But we know to what extent the contribution of these leading orthodox revisionists is due to their own debates with Kelakowski, Ossowski, Strzelocki, Chalasinski, Beylin.

The discussion raised in the Polish press at the time of the 22nd congress on freedom of scientific research and discussion was started by such orthodox revisionists as Schaff, Lange, Infeld, Ehrlich, and has been widely reported in the West. It found an echo in a round-table discussion on the crucial theme of 'Ideology versus Sociotechnics' organised by *Nowa Kultura*. The economist Edward Lipinski was particularly outspoken:

'I once said in polemical fervour that the first duty of a real marxist is to fight for freedom, since I consider that when freedom is lacking mistakes accumulate, and around these mistakes forces crystallise which hamper progress. Even in fighting against evil, we create new elements of evil. There will always be people and groups in whose interest it will be to preserve evil. And here the basic condition

is freedom to fight for one's own convictions. Had there been a greater freedom to express our thoughts and formulate criticism during the period of the cult of personality, the crimes of Stalinism might have been averted.'

It must be said, however, that most of the recent statements by Polish orthodox revisionists, however outspoken, are limited. While the 22nd congress brought new life into Polish discussions concerning freedom of science, economy, sociology, it seems to have had adverse effects on the Polish literary scene. Here the recent trend is disquieting. An apparently innocuous *vie romancée* of Julius Caesar by Jacek Bochenski was awarded the literary prize for 1961 by the jury of *Nowa Kultura*. But it seems—paradoxically—safer to criticise the cult of personality by referring directly to Stalin than by transposing the scene to classical times. The jury was instructed to select another book for its award, and its refusal to do so brought about, first, a reshuffling of the editorial board and, later, a governmental decision to abolish all official literary prizes. Bochenski's book was finally withdrawn from circulation. The prohibition on pre-

senting two short plays by Leszek Kolakowski after five days on the stage is another indication of the renewed rigidity of the Polish censorship.

The young veterans of October revisionism joined eagerly in the new discussion now initiated by their elders; Pawel Beylin and Jan Strzelecki made brilliant contributions to the 'freedom of science' discussion, and the Warsaw 'Crooked Circle' club, which is the centre of liberal socialist opinion, organised a public discussion on the theme of freedom of speech. The famous poet Antoni Slonimski, one of the most courageous figures in Polish literary life, was quoted as saying: 'Let us press for freedom, then freedom of speech will come automatically.' But the distinction between the kind of freedom whose need is recognised by technocrats for the sake of efficiency, and the kind which is feared by ideologists eager to keep the party's monopoly of power unquestioned, appeared again. After a heated debate in which Professor Schaff argued—against a sceptical audience—that there is greater intellectual freedom in Poland than in the United States, the 'Crooked Circle' was closed down.

The Problem of Value in Recent Political Theory

A. H. SOMJEE

THE problem of value in recent political theory has given rise to a controversy of great magnitude and importance. Almost all the political theorists of our time are involved in it. Roughly speaking the issue underlying the controversy may be stated as follows: Can we adopt the method of science for analysing all the aspects of political phenomena including the valuational? To narrow down the issue still further: Can science be of any use in the analysis and statement of values in politics? No doubt such a question is part of a broader question concerning the relevance of science to values. Nevertheless, it has been the practice among political theorists of recent times not to go beyond the framework of the problem of the relevance of science to values which had been supplied by the philosophers and social methodologists of the nineteenth century. My contention is that the controversy on the relevance of science to values among political theorists has been barren and even misleading. It is barren because political theorists have taken for granted that the participation in this controversy is an end in itself. And misleading, because it has obscured the true nature of the problem of value in political theory. Correct appreciation of the problem, I believe, lies in the direction of discovering what I have called *value situations* in which values may be said to affect the course of political investigation. Value situations, as we shall see in this paper, are created by the interaction of a group of factors and not always by a particular kind of subject matter or the professed and the unprofessed values of the analyst or investigator. The basic problem of value in political theory is to identify the

factors which give rise to value situations and not to take for granted the influence of values on political analysis or political investigation on the basis of any a priori assumption.

In this paper I shall first of all analyse the philosophical formulation of the problem of the relevance of science to values. Since Max Weber acted as a kind of bridge between such a formulation of the problem and its influence on political theorists I shall analyse his ideas in some detail. After Weber there comes a rift among political theorists on this problem for which, to some extent, Weber himself was responsible. I shall therefore separately analyse their ideas and trace them back to Weber's. Finally, I shall analyse the factors which are responsible for giving rise to what I have called value situations.

II

From Aristotle right upto the period of Enlightenment, social sciences did not have any independent existence of their own. For all practical purposes they were branches of moral philosophy. In the post-Enlightenment period economics particularly came to be liberated from moral philosophy. It acquired an empirical character under the influence of two dominant philosophies of this period, namely, the natural law and utilitarianism. Both these schools had done away with the distinction made by Hume between 'is' and 'ought' statements in their concepts of 'natural', 'utility', 'happiness', etc. On the other hand they put considerable emphasis on environment. They believed that human happiness would result once the necessary

changes in the legal and political structure of society were made.¹

In the face of value-free economics and the science-inspired philosophy of positivism in the post-Enlightenment period, two German thinkers, namely, Simmel and Rickert had their sympathy with science but they could not accept the naive scientism of the positivists and classical economists. Simmel felt that science was inherently limited in its application. Like Kant he also maintained that it could operate only in a field where causal laws operate and not in the field of ends and values. This is because, 'science itself never sets a norm. . . . questions asked by science are causal and not teleological'.² The fact that 'we put value on something at all is, in the ultimate analysis, a matter of will, beyond all deductions'.³ Science therefore has a very limited function to perform so far as values are concerned. While science cannot *choose* between values for us, it can certainly help us to judge the consistency of ideas involved in our values. It can also help us to judge whether or not our means are adequate to the realisation of our ends.

Rickert came to a more or less similar conclusion. He maintained that the objective validity of religious, aesthetic and ethical values cannot be demonstrated. Least of all can they become the subjects of scientific proof and refutation.⁴ Only one value can be scientifically demonstrated and that is the 'value of truth'.

Such a formulation of the problem of value in relation to science vitally influenced Max Weber. It served as a matrix *within* which he developed his ideas. In his celebrated paper on "*Objectivity*" in *Social Science and Social Policy*" (1904), Max Weber expounded his views on the relationship between science and values. Like Rickert and Simmel he too was sympathetic to science. Unlike them, however, his treatment of values displayed in the end some kind of ambivalence. This was due to the fact that on the one hand he was driven to make the treatment of values scientific, and on the other hand his strong

Kantian background forced him to acknowledge that the ultimate source of values is the human will and conscience.

In order to find out how and to what extent values can become the subject matter of science, Weber equated the problem of value with the problem of means and ends. Science, he maintained, can help us in finding out the 'appropriateness' (in a purely pragmatic sense) of the proposed means to the desired end. For this purpose alternative sets of means can be conceived and their consequences estimated before finally selecting any one of them.

So far as ends are concerned science can help the agent to acquire an insight into the significance of his desired object. This he can do by making explicit the 'ideas' which underline his proposed end. Science can thus help us in our *rational understanding* of the ideas implicit in our desired goal. This is because the function of science is ultimately to present an 'analytical ordering of empirical reality'.⁵

Further, science can also help us in judging the end critically. That is to say it can help us to find out whether our desired end is internally consistent or not. This is because science would compel us to make explicit our final axioms from which our ends are derived.⁶ But what it cannot do is to formulate our final axioms for us. Similarly any ultimate standard involved in passing a value judgement cannot be formulated by science. Both our final value axioms and ultimate standards have their source in our will and conscience.

Weber related his views on the relationship between science and values to the social sciences by maintaining that the function of the social sciences is to undertake a scientific criticism of social policies. Social policies involve values. So do their examination. Hence the need to determine the relevance of science to values in social sciences.

Weber's view that social policies as well as their scrutiny involve values was theoretically arrived at. In other words he

did not *discover*, as it were, the incidence of the influence of value on the formulation or the analysis of social policy. With him it was more or less a priori argument. Like his predecessors he too treated the problem of value in the social sciences as a part of the larger epistemological problem.

No other thinker has gone deeper into the problem of the relevance of science to values than Weber himself. While his treatment of the problem was original, the framework within which he examined it was supplied to him by the epistemological controversy (between the positivists and antipositivists) of his time. In that sense, therefore, his treatment of the problem remained closely bound with this controversy and can hardly be said to have opened a new perspective.

His treatment of the problem of the relevance of science to values remained ambivalent. He had given a free hand to science, as we have already seen, in the realm of means. It was also extended to the realm of ends but with considerable hesitation and reservation. His ambivalence gave rise to a fresh controversy among social and political theorists. Some of them felt that he had clearly acknowledged the limits of science in the field of values; while others implied, with or without mentioning him, that he believed in the total relevance of science to values. In taking one of the two sides these social and political theorists failed to go beyond his frame of reference.

III

Charles Beard and George Sabine restated the problem of relevance of science to values in a slightly different fashion. They were both interested in exploring the relevance of *empirical* method, which is commonly believed to be a substitute term for the method of science, to the field of values, preferences, ideas opinions, beliefs, etc. They both came to the conclusion that it was impossible to adopt a purely empirical method in the

study of social and political phenomena which are replete with values and opinions.

In his *The Nature of Social Sciences* (1934), Beard argued that, in the last analysis, a social inquiry is an ethical inquiry and as such it is concerned with the problem of 'good or better conduct and good or better material and social arrangements.'⁷ No social inquirer can therefore be morally neutral. His values, beliefs and ideas would affect the course of his inquiry even when he adopts an empirical method:

The classics of social sciences — Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Adam Smith, Hamilton, Madison, Jay, Comte, Marx and Ruskin, for example — do not proffer the complete neutrality of empirical science. Consciously or unconsciously they posit values to be realised in society by social action, individual or collective. These works are arguments for the adoption of policies deemed desirable as positive good or as better than prevailing policies.

While Beard put forward the case in favour of a preference-oriented empirical method, he failed to make a distinction between an empirical method undertaken to *justify* a moral or a political preference and an empirical method in which the inquirer's preferences influence the conduct of his inquiry. As we shall see later, such a discrimination in the position and influence of value or preference in inquiry can help us to grasp the true nature of the problem of value in social and political theory.

Unlike Beard, Sabine appeared to concede the relevance of the empirical method to a restricted aspect of political phenomena. To the extent to which any specific problem of politics requires a factual or causal analysis, Sabine maintained, we can make use of the empirical method. But so far as the valuational aspect of the phenomena is concerned the empirical method is ruled out.

The distinction between the factual, causal and valuational aspects of political phenomena which Sabine seemed to make,

did not find support in some of his writings. His papers on *The Pragmatic Approach to Politics* (1930)⁹ and *What is Political Theory* (1930)¹⁰ were devoted to the task of refuting the attempts of contemporary social and political theorists to correlate values with facts.

Sabine ruled out the possibility of an ethically neutral empirical political theory. Political theory includes, 'either expressly or by implication both a judgment about what is likely and what is desirable'.¹¹ There again in theory a distinction between these two elements of political theory may be possible. With Sabine the statement of what is likely is always made in terms of what is desirable. 'Characteristically political theories are bred', says Sabine, 'of the interest that makes men want to do something about a situation which they believe to be bad'.¹² The factual and causal analysis of any specific problem of politics remains with Sabine value-oriented.

This point was clearly brought out by David Easton in his *Political System* (1953). Easton devoted a complete chapter to the explanation of Sabine's viewpoint. He maintained that a moral frame of reference plays a very important part in any empirical political research: 'While moral views may be logically separable from factually oriented knowledge, in actual research our moral frame of reference plays an influential and inextricable part in conditioning our observations and conclusions'.¹³

Basing his arguments on Sabine's ideas, Easton did state the problem of value in political theory in terms of the influence of value on the conduct of empirical enquiry. This certainly was a step forward in the direction of a correct statement of the problem. Nevertheless, Easton did not question his a priori assumption that all moral frames of reference within which empirical enquiry is conducted affect such inquiries. He merely took it for granted. The crux of the problem is a statement of conditions under which the moral or valuational considerations of the inquirer begin to affect his inquiry.

The statement of the problem of value at the hands of Beard and Sabine thus remained similar to Weber's. Although they had treated the problem from the point of view of empiricism rather than science, like Weber they were also engaged in pointing out the limitations of the empirical method. The fact that they had attempted to consider the problem of value in relation to its *influence* on the empirical investigation in politics, gave a correct perspective to the problem itself. This should have been treated as a starting point rather than a conclusion. Their difficulty, however, was similar to Weber's. Like him they too failed to consider the problem outside the framework of the positivism anti-positivism or scientism anti-scientism controversy.

IV

Let us now take into account the ideas of Dewey, Catlin, Kaufmann and Brecht who tried to explore the possibility of the total relevance of science to values to which Weber had attached certain limitations. In their treatments, however, they differ from each other. Dewey and Catlin tried to integrate values to 'an act of thought' or to do without values or to redefine them. Their attempts were inspired by the desire to make the study of political phenomena scientific. Kaufmann and Brecht on the other hand tried to demonstrate that, within certain limits, we can make the study of values an objective study. They were also guided by the consideration of bringing the entire range of problems which are in social and political phenomena under scientific scrutiny. Basically, in their attempts they tried to transcend the limits which Weber had acknowledged while discussing the relevance of science to values.

Dewey had made a very bold attempt to consider value as an integral part of 'an act of thought'. In order to reach such a conclusion he had attributed 'tertiary qualities' to objects. Then he made use of 'reflective enquiry', which takes place

against the background of the situation of deficiency, to discover the value of objects. For Dewey, therefore, value was not a subjective concept.

The process of 'reflective inquiry' was considered by Dewey in a broad sense. He believed that the factual, causal and evaluative analysis which we undertake are nothing but the 'logical forms' which accrue *within* the process of 'reflective inquiry'.¹⁴

Having chained down the 'logical forms' of various analyses to the psychological process of inquiry in which they arise, the next step for Dewey was to chain down the psychological process of inquiry itself to a particular hypothesis and the problem of its confirmation or what may be said to be an investigator's end-in-view. Thus with Dewey the three kinds of analyses were integrally connected with each other, because each one of them was undertaken with the same end-in-view, namely, the confirmation of the inquirer's hypothesis.

Consequently, with Dewey the valuational factor found its expression in the investigator's preference for a *particular* hypothesis. Such a preference is both intellectual and public in character. It expresses itself through a sophisticated intellectual hypothesis which is to be confirmed publicly.

The intellectualisation of all preferences in Dewey's theory of inquiry remained his weakest argument. Not all preferences find their expression in our hypotheses. And, therefore, as we shall see in the next section, they do not always possess an intellectual quality.

Equally bold attempts were made by Catlin and Lasswell in dealing with the problem of value. Both were primarily inspired by the achievements of economics and sociology in formulating general theories in these fields. Both felt that the problem of value presented the greatest obstacle in the formulation of a general theory of politics. Catlin, thinking that economists and sociologists do not worry about the problem of value in their fields, decided to do without it. Lasswell redef-

ined it to suit his all out political empiricism.

In his *Science and Method of Politics* (1927), Catlin provided an analytical framework for the interpretation of political phenomena. Power, according to him was the most important variable in politics. He tried to study its pursuit through what he called a 'political act'. A 'political act' for Catlin was essentially an assertion of one's will over others. It leads to a conflict. And conflict of wills becomes for him the subject-matter of politics.

The conflict of wills tends to create at some stage an equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is not permanent. It is in fact continually renewed. Politics is then a study of conflict of wills and the consequent equilibrium which is brought about. As such it is not a study of ends.¹⁵

Such an interpretation of the nature of political phenomena helps Catlin to build up his own value-free political theory.

As opposed to Dewey and Catlin, who by various means tried to *get rid* of the problem of value, Felix Kaufmann and Arnold Brecht made an extremely sincere attempt to come to grips with the problem posed by Weber. They were mainly concerned with the *objective* treatment of the problem of value and therefore they strictly defined their own frames of reference in advance.

Kaufmann devoted one full chapter to the problem of value in his *Methodology of Social Sciences* (1949). In it he made a distinction between values as such and 'emotional reactions' to situations. Of the two he dealt with the former.

According to him the very problem of value in the social sciences arises as a result of the use of value-terms in propositions which appear to be empirical. There too the real source of difficulty is not the value-term as such but 'the lack of axiological rules determining their meaning'.¹⁶ What would help us to overcome such a difficulty is the formulation of commonly agreed axiological rules which would eliminate the disagreement on value-terms.

Kaufmann, however, had no answer to

the following two difficulties: (a) What can one do in the case of a disagreement between two persons holding two different sets of axiological rules; and (b) what about the meanings of value-terms outside the group which accepts certain axiological rules?

Axiological rules would no doubt help us to establish the communicability and objectivity of certain value-terms. Even in more advanced branches of human knowledge *agreement* on fundamental terms is the basis of their progress as intellectual disciplines. In mathematics and theoretical physics propositions are considered to be valid only *within* the framework of certain accepted procedures, rules and hypotheses. Therefore any scientific approach towards value would indeed call for the giving up of any extremely subjectivistic approach to the problem of its meanings.

This brings us to the analysis of the ideas of Arnold Brecht on the problem of value in political theory. No other political theorist in recent years has made such a systematic attempt to grasp the problem of value as Brecht. His monumental work *Political Theory: The Twentieth Century Foundations* (1959) puts the problem in its historical perspective. The present writer owes his inspiration for this paper to this book in spite of his disagreements with Brecht's analysis of the problem and with his conclusions.

Brecht's analysis of the problem of value which displays an unmistakable influence of Weber on him, is highly sophisticated. In his paper on *Beyond Relativism in Political Theory* (1947),¹⁷ Brecht developed the concept of 'Scientific Value Relativism'. By this he meant that 'no scientific method has yet been devised to determine the superiority of any ends or purposes over any other ends or purposes in absolute terms'.¹⁸ Since ultimate values have to be stated in ultimate terms scientific method is of no use in the study of values. In his *Political Theory*, twelve years later, Brecht traced the history of the concept of 'Scientific Value Relativism' and its repercussions on practical politics.

The source of 'Scientific Value Relativism' is the Humean distinction between the statement of 'is' and the statement of 'ought' and the subsequent exclusion of the statement of the latter type from scientific scrutiny. On his part Brecht contends that although no 'logical link' exists between the statement of 'is' and the statement of 'ought' it would not be difficult to discover a 'factual link' between the two.

What Brecht was trying to do was in fact to discover an objective base for value-terms. In that respect his attempt was similar to Kaufmann's. While Kaufmann provided an objective base to value-terms with the help of commonly accepted axiological rules, Brecht endeavoured to find out the extent of agreement on what terms such as 'justice', 'right' etc. would imply. He took the intersubjective common denominator meaning of the value-term as its objective base.¹⁹ In order to provide such an objective base to value-terms Brecht suggested that we should undertake an empirical survey of the view of the people.

Brecht's approach to the problem of value remained basically Weberian. Weber, as we have seen, had experienced difficulties in seeking the relevance of science to values. Brecht tried to overcome these difficulties. For this purpose he widened the definition of science so as to include intersubjectivistic phenomena on the ground that this did not interfere with the communication of knowledge *qua* knowledge. In working out his ideas therefore Brecht did not go beyond the frame of reference supplied by Weber, and that was the problem of the relevance of science to values. Consequently, with all his learning and originality, the problem of value continued to be with Brecht a part of the scientism anti-scientism controversy.

V

It has been argued so far in his paper that the statement of the problem of value in political theory, as we find it in the writings of some recent social and political theorists, was largely influenced by the

epistemological controversies of the nineteenth century. In this section I propose to point out that we *can* restate the problem of value in political theory outside the framework of such a barren controversy. The basic problem of value in political theory is: how to identify those factors which give rise to a situation in which political analysis or political investigation comes under the influence of values.

In order to examine such a proposition we shall have first of all to make clear what we mean by the term 'political theory'. The term 'political theory' has become in recent years a subject of controversy. For a long time it remained identical with 'political philosophy'. During a seminar on Political Theory at the Northwestern University in 1954, orthodox political philosophers showed their unwillingness to consider 'political theory' as distinct from 'political philosophy'. They were, however, forced to reconsider their position by the behaviourists in politics who believe that the framing of conceptual frameworks for the empirical investigation of phenomena is the function of political theory. The seminar on Political Theory failed to arrive at a common agreement on the meaning of the term 'political theory'.

For our purpose therefore we shall use the term 'political theory' in a comprehensive sense so as to include the rational and philosophical approach of political philosophers and the empirical approach of political behaviourists. Used in this sense, the term 'political theory' would include both *political analysis* and *political investigation*. Political analysis includes an analysis and statement of principles underlying political institutions and processes. It would also include the function of evaluating political conduct and of making explicit the significance of political movements and events. And political investigation includes investigation of a specific problem of politics from an empirical point of view. It is not contended that political analysis is purely rational and non-empirical and political investigation is purely empirical and non-rational. Nor is it con-

tended that they can always be precisely classified. Both, in fact, to a lesser or greater degree, make use of rational as well as empirical techniques. Their basic difference, to my mind, lies in the fact that while political analysis rationally analyses, interprets and draws inferences from a phenomenon which may be in part empirical and in part interpretive (or the result of prior interpretations), political investigation seeks the empirical confirmation of its conceptual and theoretical assertions. In that sense the assertions of the latter remain open to a greater degree of empirical challenge, refutation and confirmation than those of the former.

Having stated the difference in the nature of intellectual activities involved in political analysis and political investigation, we shall now go on to the examination of the term *value-situation*. By *value-situation* I mean a situation in which the conduct of political analysis or political investigation is influenced by the values of the analyst or investigator. *Value-situations* also arise as a result of an explicit evaluation or passing of judgments. These being *prima facie value-situations* we shall not consider them here.

Negatively speaking, *value-situations* are necessarily caused simply because the subject-matter of analysis or investigation is of a social or political nature. Not all aspects of social and political phenomena when investigated into come to be affected by the values of an analyst or an investigator.

Nor are the *value-situations* created simply because the analyst or the investigator says that he has certain values or that others *detect* his values for him. Not all analyses or investigations are affected by the professed or unprofessed values of the analyst or investigator.

Nor indeed do *value-situations* arise as a result of certain values in the social milieu of the analyst or investigator. Not all social values affect the conduct of analyses or investigations.

None of these factors, in short, *necessarily* give rise to *value-situations*. *Value-*

situations are the products of the interaction of certain factors within the following: (a) Dominating motive in undertaking the analysis or investigation; (b) Psychologico-Intellectual qualities of assertions; and (c) Testifiability of warranted assertions. Each of these factors needs further elaboration.

(a) Broadly speaking the dominating motive in undertaking an analysis or investigation of a political problem may be stated, among other things, as follows:

- i) It may be undertaken with a view rationally to *comprehend* the political problem. The idea behind it may be to throw light on the hitherto confusing political situation.
- ii) It may be undertaken with the help of an elaborately formulated conceptual framework with a view to grasp *conceptual* relations between different aspects of the problem in question. The idea behind such an attempt may be to open a novel perspective on a problematic situation.
- iii) It may be undertaken with a view to formulate a *grand theory* about the entire phenomena. The idea behind such an attempt may be to substitute an abstract theoretical construct in place of an incommunicable or baffling phenomenon.
- iv) It may be undertaken as a *pilot* project with a view to encourage further analytical or empirical investigations in that field. The idea behind it may be merely intellectually to lead the way.
- v) It may be undertaken with a view to suggest policy proposals at the end of the analysis or investigation. Here the motive of the analyst or the investigator is not purely intellectual as it was in the first four instances. The motive involved here is to bring about a *reconstruction* of the problematic situation. Such an approach to the problem will be directly responsible for introducing certain value or moral considerations into the analysis or

investigation. This is because the formulation of policy proposals, when it becomes the primary aim of analysis or investigation, is bound to affect the human condition. Therefore the analyst or investigator is sure to evaluate them with reference to certain moral or valuational standards of his own.

- vi) Finally it may be undertaken with a view *morally to justify or condemn* the existence of a situation. The idea behind it may be to appeal to our conscience and stir us to act in a desired direction. Moral or valuational considerations are explicitly involved in such an analysis or investigation.

In short each of these motives has to be carefully discriminated to be able to determine, in their interaction with other groups of factors, whether it has contributed to the creation of *value situation* or not.

(b) *Psychologico-Intellectual quality of assertions*:

This brings us to the examination of another group of factors concerning the quality of assertions in our analysis or investigation. Any analysis or investigation of a specific problem of politics cannot be undertaken without the help of an 'assertion' of some kind. Such an assertion or supposition may be of the nature of a psychological bias or a sophisticated and well-argued intellectual hypothesis or a theory. Whatever its quality, an 'assertion' alone guides the analyst or the investigator through a maze of arguments or facts. It helps him to discriminate the relevant arguments and facts from the irrelevant ones. The presence of an 'assertion' in an inquiry of rational or empirical nature cannot therefore be denied.

Only *through* our 'assertion' do values, if at all, affect the course of our analysis or investigation. It would however be wrong to suggest that all kinds of assertions possess Value-quality. There are occasions when an assertion is merely of the nature of a psychological bias. This is so when an analyst or an investigator has

a hunch that 'this is what it is' 'that explains', 'that rings the bell' etc. It is not at all possible to trace such hunches to a value-source, either of the individual or his social milieu. There may be certain values prized by the individual and the social milieu in which he functions. Nevertheless, so far as hunches of this nature are concerned they do not emanate from the values of the individual or his social milieu, but what he thinks is correct under the circumstances.

Similarly at the other extreme there might be an analyst or an investigator who formulates his assertions in such a manner that they might be publicly subjected to the severest possible tests. Like the person with a psychological bias, he and his social milieu might also have certain recognisably dominant values. But it would not be true to say always that his highly intellectualised proposition is derived from his values or the values of his social milieu. This is because the nature of his assertion being of intellectual quality cannot be derived from a valuational source, for values ultimately indicate a moral and not an intellectual preference of the agent.

Nevertheless, in between these two extreme positions of assertions being either of a purely psychological or of a purely intellectual nature, there are assertions which are influenced by the moral frame of reference of the analyst or investigator. The problem that I am trying to present here is that we must discriminate between assertions of the former and assertions of the latter type, for the simple reason that the assertions of the former type do not give rise to *value-situations*.

(c) *Testifiability of warranted assertions:*

This brings us to the examination of the third factor concerning the problem of publicly testing our warranted assertions. That is to say, our assertions which we believe to have been substantiated by our arguments or facts collected by us should be capable of being challenged or confirmed publicly.²⁰

As we have already noted, there are assertions which are not affected by the presence of the values of the inquirer or his social milieu. The results of analysis or investigation based on such assertions are capable of being publicly challenged or confirmed. This is so on account of the fact that in spite of the professed values of the analyst or the investigator, the ideas and symbols implicit in his assertions are capable of being communicated. Consequently, the difficulty of either comprehending them or challenging them does not arise.

As opposed to these, assertions which are influenced by the values of the analyst or investigator or his social milieu, imply a language of ideas and symbols which is neither easily nor entirely communicable. Consequently, the possibility of publicly challenging or confirming such assertions does not invariably exist. Such assertions then, on account of their lack of testifiability, give rise to *value-situations*.

Value-situations, to sum up, do not arise simply because of the subject-matter, or because of the analyst's or investigator's professed and unprofessed values. They are the products of the interaction of a complex group of factors, some of which have been analysed here. Our analysis of these factors suggests that *there are* possibilities of coming across situations which are value-free even in the study of political phenomena.

This is then an attempt to look at the problem of value in political theory from a different angle. It points out the futility of the controversy which ranged around the problem of the relevance of science to values. It implies a belief that such a controversy has obscured the true nature of the problem of value in political theory. In the interest of a better understanding of the problem of value in political theory, this paper suggests an operational analysis of the problem outside the framework of the epistemological controversies with which it has been traditionally bedevilled.

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 - ¹⁵ *Science and Method of Politics* by George Catlin, p. 331.
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 - ¹⁹ *Political Theory* by Arnold Brecht, p. 386.
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Prospects of Democracy in India

H. R. PASRICHA

POLITICAL thinkers and leaders in many Eastern countries that came in contact with the West have generally assumed with too great a facility that Western democratic institutions can be transplanted amongst and accepted by their people without any great difficulty or risk. The end of the Second World War saw the liberation of many of these countries and the chain reaction has extended into Africa with accelerating speed.

The tender plant of democracy is still striving hard to strike root in the extremely inhospitable soil of Congo and the process has been accompanied by some gruesome happenings. In more than one country on the periphery of India the seedling of democracy withered away soon after its ceremonial transplantation or was forcibly uprooted and supplanted by authoritarianism of one kind or another. In one it is languishing, perhaps awaiting suppression.

This snuffing out of democracy in so many countries in quick succession within a short period of time after its establishment constitutes a phenomenon which deserves more than the scant attention it has received in our country. Those in power have, no doubt, given a great deal of silent thought to it. Their reactions seem to indicate that their interpretation of the phenomenon has been narrow and personal rather than broad and objective. It has been taken to mean a threat posed to them personally and not much attention seems to have been given to the natural forces that precipitated it. It was styled reaction of the right, and, as a corrective or preventive, a further and bigger dose of Socialism prescribed. No one seems to have realised that the real fault lay in the mode of introduction of democratic forms of govern-

ment amongst people steeped in traditions of autocracy. Perhaps, a more gradual mode of introduction, confining it to the educated first, would have given democracy a fairer chance of survival by permitting its notions to soak slowly into the lower strata of society. In other words, the stages by which it was established in the West should have been deemed indispensable. However, such a mode of introduction would have meant a confession of that inferiority which the leaders had hotly contested for long and could not possibly make.

Since democratic institutions continue to prosper in free countries, the existence of forces inimical to democracy in the countries in which it was sought to be transplanted may be inferred with a fair amount of certitude. Further, since it fell so easy a victim to authoritarianism and so soon, it must have encountered resistance as well as indifference from the very beginning. It may, therefore, be concluded that the genius of the people refused to accept it. This requires fuller consideration.

Freedom and the entire future of this country depend upon the acceptance of democracy by the people of this country, and, indeed, the right conception of democracy. This latter clarification is necessary because there are brands of authoritarianism which pass muster for democracy.

II

Although boastful claims continue to be made from time to time about the existence of primitive representative institutions in ancient India, democracy, as it is understood and practised today in free countries, is Greco-Roman in concept and

origin. It is the outcome of a pragmatic, rational outlook on life and a conviction that man can make his own destiny: he is born free and should remain free and freedom is better than life and slavery worse than death.

Greek contact with India was too short and ephemeral to permit the complete absorption of the Greek outlook and culture by the ancient Indian. Vouchsafed longer life and opportunity, Alexander might have been able to build a lasting bridge of understanding and friendship between the two countries which would have facilitated the ultimate mingling of the two cultures — Greek and Indian. Given such an advantage, India might today have been the foremost democratic country in the world. Instead, Indian abstract thought remained undiluted by Greek pragmatism. Abstract thought dwelling upon God and purity of self has resulted in identification of God and self through a process of introversion and immersion in self. The outcome is a personality steeped in self, vain and egotistical. Such, in fact, is the corporate personality of this nation; such is its genius. It is difficult for it to rate freedom above self; love of self dominates and colours all. It is a hurdle in the path of democracy.

En passant, it is interesting to observe that this domination of the psyche by the abstract and the transcendental is at the bottom of the backwardness of the Indian in the field of science. It is hard for the Indian mind to emerge out of abstractions into the field of experiment and observation. Therefore, originality of thought in empirical sciences eludes him for a long time if not altogether. He has to make a clean breakaway from his earlier moorings of thought and train his mind along new concepts. He has to work harder and longer than his European colleague, and, even so, he seldom comes up to him. There is a tendency in this country to disregard these handicaps of inherited patterns of thought and heap blame for a poor showing on lack of opportunity.

This is an illusion which will be cleared only when adequate opportunity has been provided without achieving commensurate results. Not all who seek and follow a scientific career in this country are aware of this handicap. I have emphasised this though for several years to all my students. To get back to democracy.

Submergence of mind in abstract thought has led to a preoccupation with the eternal in preference to this life. The latter is a transient episode of which there may be many before the eternal is attained. The hardships of present life are the punishments of deeds in past life and not of man's making and, therefore, not amenable to eradictory efforts. They must be borne patiently. Suffering is elevated to the level of a purifier and is not subject to remedial measures. To be seriously occupied with present life to the exclusion of the eternal is to be satisfied with tinsel. It is immaterial if freedom is lost in this life for in the realm of the eternal there are no bonds at all.

Democracy cannot be built on such concepts. With great perspicacity Lord Birkenhead, when Secretary of State for India, once remarked in the house of Commons, 'You cannot distil Western wine into Eastern bottles'.

Laziness and inertia engendered by a hot climate have degraded labour to the occupation of the lowest of the low. For the well-affording, labour is undignified. A post in government service or a job elsewhere is taken for a sinecure, and insistence upon a fair return for wages in work cruelty of the most inhuman kind. A man in government service rightfully regards hard work as an imposition and, unhesitatingly passes it on to the lower strata of the hierarchy. Overt manifestations of this widely held feudal conviction are available to anyone who cares to look into any of the numerous government offices any day. Overstaffed and underworked workers lounge about, smoke cigarettes or engage in loud personal conversation brazenly ignoring any member

of the public who might be waiting to be attended to. These inherited attitudes of feudal times have not changed with the advent of freedom, but the explanations offered in justification of the attitudes have changed. They are couched now in concepts of Socialism: 'As little as possible of work, as much as possible in wages'. Such attitudes are inimical to all good government including democratic government.

Conceptions of serfdom, another carry-over of feudalism, are still widely though subconsciously held. A rich man still considers it his right to expect and demand free service from those financially not his peers. Persons who work for a living are still the objects of commiseration. As a doctor, I have often received sympathy from my clients that I have to work for my living. A rich factory owner introduced to me at a social gathering presented himself at a free hospital next day for free treatment. He insisted upon being seen before the others who had been waiting before him. When it was explained that such gross inconsideration to the poor embitters them and makes them lean to communism, he left in a huff. A general officer of the army who later became Chief of Staff once ordered me to come and see his daughter urgently, but added it must be before six o'clock in the evening since the acutely ill patient had to go and see a picture. The General Manager of a Railway instructed his Chief Medical Officer to start harassing an honorary medical consultant because his wife felt that homage befitting her status had not been paid her by the consultant. These instances could be multiplied many times from personal experience only, but what has been said should be enough to prove that serfdom still survives in the Indian mind.

III

An elaborately written constitution cannot create a democracy, nor can it be created by repetitious professions of

loyalty to its ideals. The number of hostile, anti-democratic tongues that bandy the word about increases daily. The word has become cheap and distorted in usage; it has lost its sharp semantic contour, for even communist authoritarianism styles itself democracy, albeit peoples'.

Democracy is created by the genius of the people. Democratic values and notions must sink into and become part of the thought processes of the people before they can become truly democratic in thought and deed. A great democracy like that of Britain can rest secure on an unwritten constitution and prosper through the democratic thought and tradition of the people. On the other hand, a well-written constitution may flounder where not so backed and supported by the people.

The constitution that the Weimer Republic gave itself was easily the most liberal and democratic of its kind. It was almost ingenious in the plentitude of devices and guarantees intended to ensure a smooth, flawless machine. The idea of cabinet government as in Britain and France was combined with a strong popular President as in the U.S.A. (the Indian Constitution repeats the same combination). The President, however, was invested with dictatorial powers during an emergency. This provision enabled the last three Chancellors (Bruening, Von Papen and Schleicher) to govern without popular support and so destroy democracy long before Hitler brought an end to all democratic parliamentary government.

A keen study would reveal a great deal in common between the Weimer and Indian Republics; the parallel between them is astoundingly close. To begin with both Republics were unfortunate in having inherited traditions of autocracy and absolutism. The atmosphere at their nascence lacked democratic convictions. India had had a brief knowledge of them through British contact, but Germany had had no such advantage. On the contrary, she had been blessed with a number of philoso-

phers who had glorified the state and looked down upon the freedom of the individual. She also had Bismark who did his utmost to destroy liberalism.

Fichte condemned the French and the Jews as decadent and credited Germans alone with the capacity of regeneration. (*Addresses to the German Nation 1807*). Hegel succeeded Fichte in 1814 at the University of Berlin. To this subtle mind belongs the credit of having inspired Marx and Lenin to produce Communism and Hitler to produce National Socialism. To him the state was all or almost all. He called it the highest revelation of the 'world spirit', whatever the latter term may signify. And war to him was a great purifier. In 1874, Heinrich von Treitschke carried on Hegel's good work at the same University glorifying the state and enjoining obedience to it. 'It does not matter what you think,' he wrote, 'as long as you obey'.

India cannot lay claim to having produced any Hegelian prophet or gospel; no one seems to have taught a kindred philosophy, yet worship of and submission to power and authority is more ingrained in the Indian than perhaps in the German. Self-abasement by the people, even the educated people professing strong faith in democracy, before political leaders, often of revolting personality as well as reputation, is the most astounding feature of Indian life. All strata of society, through long submission, have acquired the virtue of suffering in silence. Therefore, all oppressions and imposts by the government, no matter what its complexion, have been accepted and continue to be accepted as acts of God. Such prostrate submission cannot be expected to lay the foundation of any strong notions of equality or the dignity of man, and, therefore, of democracy.

A few more considerations arise from the study of the two constitutions—Weimer and Indian. The former came to grief on the twin rocks of proportional representation which led to a multiplication

of small splinter parties and the presidential decree which enabled the last three Chancellors to rule without popular support. The Indian constitution is almost equally well-written, on paper, and embodies all the principles that sound sweet to a democratic ear including a Charter of Rights. However, like the Weimar constitution, it has a built-in device of weakness and self-destruction—Adult Franchise.

IV

It needs a little explaining to show how such a democratic procedure could prove to be the destruction of a democratic constitution. The privilege itself cannot be considered anything but ideal for a genuine democracy, but its endowment on an illiterate and ignorant electorate is quite another matter. In such circumstances, and in skilled hands, it is capable of being forged into a powerful weapon for the perpetuation of one-party dictatorship. A poor ignorant voter has no great stomach for high principles of democracy nor does he comprehend them. Unscrupulous politicians can easily mislead, beguile and pressurise him and he can be easily purchased. The last general election afforded enough proof of the determination of the party-in-power not to spare any measures of guile, cajolery, bribery or official pressure to stay in power. Since a government like ours which has gathered unto itself so much economic power would always be in a position to offer many times more than an opposition party, in privilege as well as money, the question has to be seriously considered whether a one-party dictatorship is not already upon us. Also, since the almost illiterate proletariat far outnumbers the educated electorate, the one-party dictatorship is really a dictatorship of the proletariat. There is just one little difference; those in power do not belong to the proletariat. They just profess concern for it, but, in fact, they are very strongly determined to rise into the capi-

talist class, very often through means that would not stand the light of the day.

In the name of Socialism, enough good-for-nothings have been placed in remunerative and prestigious positions to create a new privileged class with a strong vested interest in the perpetuation of the rule of the present party. Too many ne'er-dowells derive sustenance through political influence via licenses and permits. All these vested interests are ranged against the establishment of a genuine democracy in the country and would resist it to the last. That is a great threat to democracy.

In more propitious times, when truth cannot be coerced by political and official pressure, it would be interesting as well as instructive to inquire into the motives and men behind the enshrinement of Adult Franchise in the Indian Constitution. Perhaps, it would be possible to establish that this measure was motivated not so much by political altruism as by a deliberate and scheming determination to impose one party rule on the country.

It cannot be gainsaid that given determination, a defective constitution could be worked to produce a successful democracy. The greatest handicap of the Weimer Republic was the lack of determination on the part of all parties to work the constitution. The number of amendments to our own constitution already made and their increasingly authoritarian nature indicate a marked tendency towards dictatorship rather than a desire to work the constitution in the spirit in which it was made. It may turn out in the end that lack of determination to stick to democracy and freedom and a willingness to surrender democratic rights in return for the glittering prizes of authoritarianism would be as fatal to our constitution as the same tendencies were to the Weimer Constitution.

V

Political leadership arises from amongst the people and cannot be widely different from them. It has the same heritage

and is the product of the same environmental influences. This is certainly so in India. A large majority of the leadership is made up of men who have no vocation, no profession; who were incapable of earning a decent livelihood in the open market and many of whom did not even know where their next meal was coming from before they were pitched into the lap of power. Be that as it may, no one would claim that with few exceptions they were ever known for either scholarship, study, erudition or wisdom. In the early stages, before the advent of freedom, they confined themselves to the agitational aspects of political work. Not many took to the study of the numerous problems, economic and others, facing the country, to equip themselves for the day when responsibility for running the state would devolve on them. Conscious of their own intellectual handicaps they adopted a hostile attitude towards others who were better equipped and did their utmost to exclude them. To that end dress restrictions and abstinence were imposed as obligatory for the elite of the party. The country is now confronted with a strongly entrenched coterie whose main interest is to stick like limpets to the springs of power and collect such crumbs as may fall to them. Their intellectual limitations preclude them from recognising clearly the implications of their policy and the consequent peril to the country. Also they are painfully clear in their minds of their inability to make a living for themselves shriven of power, and this realisation further fortifies their determination to stick to power somehow, anyhow. Their inferiority in the field of intellect is not compensated for by any virtue in the field of morality or integrity. Like all poor men, they have found it very hard to resist the temptation of filthy lucre, and most of them, one must regretfully say, have succumbed in a humiliating manner.

The conclusion may, therefore, be briefly stated: neither the people nor the leadership of this country is determined to

exert itself to strike a blow for democracy. The people are too ignorant and callous, the leadership too self-centred, opportunist and careerist. In such circumstances, the fate of democracy in this country is anybody's guess.

This short article does not pretend to deal with the large question of the effect

of an uncontrolled population increase on democracy, which could suitably be the subject of a separate article. Suffice it to say that a rapidly increasing population not only quickly undoes the rise in national income, it constantly widens the sector of hungry unemployables who gravitate easily to communism.

In order to avoid unnecessary delay all contributions (except book-reviews) and correspondence regarding these should be addressed to **The Editors, 5, Pearl Road, Calcutta 17.** Book-reviews, books for review and all correspondence concerning business matters are to be addressed to **The Business Manager, Quest, 148, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay 1.**

George Lukacs*

LESLIE BODI

IT is difficult to talk about George Lukacs before an audience of Australian philosophers, his approach to philosophical and aesthetical problems being so unfamiliar to the English-speaking world. His method is basically an historical and sociological one — very different from the a-historical conceptual analysis prevailing at most British Universities. Herbert Read, for instance, tells us in an essay how he had to be persuaded by Thomas Mann and Karl Mannheim that Lukacs was 'the most important literary critic of today', possessing 'the formidable superiority of a polemicist who combines dogma with sensibility'. So far, only two of Lukacs' major works (*The Historical Novel*, 1962 and *Studies in European Realism*, 1950) have been published in English, another indication of the slowness with which Lukacs has been 'accepted' in the Anglo-Saxon world.

Philosophy, aesthetics and politics are inextricably interwoven in Lukacs' work, as they were in his life. In a short lecture it is perhaps best to present the story of Lukacs and his writings as the interesting case-history of a great modern thinker and his contradictory relationship to the closed ideological system of Marxism.

I. THE EARLY WORKS

George Lukacs was born in Budapest in 1885 of a wealthy bourgeois family. He studied at various German Universities — mainly in Berlin and Heidelberg, — but soon turned against the extreme subjective

idealism of his neo-Kantian teachers and tried to find an antidote to philosophical agnosticism in Husserl's *Phenomenology* and Dilthey's 'Geisteswissenschaft'. He was strongly influenced by Stefan George's 'Circle' and Paul Ernst's neo-Classicism. His strong historical interests soon led him to the study of such sociologists as Georg Simmel and Max Weber. Lukacs established his reputation with *Die Seele und die Formen*, ('The Soul and the Forms', 1911), and the *History of the Development of Modern Drama*. (In Hungarian, 1912). Already at this early stage his purpose was to examine the complex relationships between 'forms of life' and 'forms of art', and on a genuine philosophical basis to develop a sociology of art.

In his *Autobiography* (1933) he speaks of a 'deepening philosophical crisis' in the years after 1910 — leading him from subjective to objective idealism, from Kant to Hegel. This transition is most obvious in the essays written between 1914-15 and later published as *Die Theorie des Romans*, ('The Theory of the Novel', 1920). The starting point of this book is determined by the Classicism of Schiller and Goethe. Lukacs shows, how, in the development from Homer to Plato, the 'totality of existence', the fullness and harmony of the early Greek world, is slowly lost to mankind. We could almost say that *The Theory of the Novel* is a highly sophisticated version of the story of the 'Golden Age' or 'Paradise Lost'. Homer's 'absolute immanence' leads to Plato's 'pure transcendence', the 'intensive totality of being' which can still be seen in Greek tragedy is 'alienated' and replaced by an 'artificial totality' in Plato's philosophy. In modern times, the novel becomes the most suitable form to

* Based on a lecture given in June 1962 to the Melbourne University Philosophical Society in a lecture-course on "Contemporary Continental Philosophy".

express man's 'transcendental homelessness and loneliness' in a world dominated by a 'totality of objects'. This work is beautifully written though in a strikingly abstract and speculative manner. The author is much more interested in the place of a work of art in an historical and sociological process than in the work of art itself. Lukacs is inclined to identify the 'theory' of a literary genre with its history; the hero of the modern novel is not important for him as the artistic representation of a human being but as a symbolic representative of an historical trend or epoch. This approach to art and literature remains almost unchanged throughout the whole of his later work.

II. LUKACS TURNS TO MARXISM, 1917-1933

Between the genesis of *The Theory of the Novel* (1914-15) and its publication as a book (1920), a dramatic change had taken place in Lukacs' life. Deeply shocked by the tragedy of the first world war, he turned from Hegel to Feuerbach and to the early writings of Marx, and saw as his most important task the achieving of a synthesis of Marx and Hegel. He was strongly influenced by Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin, and after joining the Hungarian Communist Party, became Commissar for Education in the short-lived Soviet Republic in Hungary (1919). Necessarily he had to emigrate after its collapse. He lived first in Vienna and then in Berlin for the next fifteen years.

Between 1919-23 he wrote the articles and essays subsequently published under the title *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* ('History and Class Consciousness', 1923). This is one of the most interesting and influential books of Marxist philosophy in the West. Its theme is again the process of 'alienation' and 'reification' ('Verdinglichung') in modern life, — but narrowed down from the universal application it had in *The Theory of the Novel* to the sociological problem of 'class-consciousness',

Hegel's 'self-alienation' of the absolute spirit' is identified with Marx's 'alienation of labour'. The tragic loss of human 'totality' and 'harmony' in the modern world is attributed solely to the development of capitalism. New harmony and totality can only be achieved by the Proletarian Revolution; Marxism alone can overcome the split between consciousness and existence, between theory and practice. It is the only antidote to the 'atomization' of man in modern society, the 'reification' of all human relations. 'Alienated' bourgeois consciousness is false; 'proletarian class-consciousness', as expressed in the politics of the Communist Party, is in keeping with 'historical reason' and is therefore true.

History and Class Consciousness is 'the profession of faith of an aesthetic Humanist turned Marxist' (Morris Watnick). A new, consistent, highly sophisticated dialectic philosophy of consciousness is developed from a synthesis of Hegel, Marx and Lenin. Marxism, in Lukacs' treatment, becomes a moral philosophy, a secular eschatology, with a tremendous impact on intellectuals in the East and the West alike. There are clear lines leading from this work to Existentialism and to certain trends in modern Sociology (Mannheim, Adorno, etc.) — but it also marks the start of Lukacs' strangely ambivalent and contradictory career within the Communist Party which finally led to his becoming one of the most 'dangerous' representatives of 'Revisionism'. *History and Class Consciousness* marks the end of Lukacs' career as an official spokesman of Communist Party philosophy. The Party bureaucracy immediately started an offensive; 'Lukacism' became a term of abuse in the mid-twenties, a synonym for 'leftist deviationism'. Things were made worse by the publication of Lukacs' *Blum Theses* (1929), a political pamphlet stressing the necessity of a democratic dictatorship based on an alliance between workers and peasants in a Communist-led revolution. These theses were immediately denounced as an example of 'rightist deviationism'.

III. IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-45

After the Nazis seized power in Germany, Lukacs emigrated to the Soviet-Union. Events had seemingly justified his earlier position: the publication of the early writings of Marx (1932) proved that Lukacs had been completely right in his Hegelian interpretation of Marxist philosophy; in 1935 the Party endorsed the policy of the 'Popular Front' which was fully in keeping with Lukacs' *Blum Theses*. Yet he was regarded with distrust and suspicion in the Soviet Union, forced into a series of utterly debasing acts of self-criticism, and even imprisoned for a short time in 1941 by the NKVD.

Since the violent attacks on *History and Class Consciousness* Lukacs had devoted himself almost completely to literary criticism. Yet here, too, he ran into trouble. In the last Berlin years he had already vehemently criticised the schematic hack-writing of minor Party-authors. But it became increasingly difficult to keep up the high standards on which he based his criticism. In 1934 the Party declared 'Socialist Realism' to be the official communist literary doctrine, practically subjecting the writer to the everyday needs of Communist propaganda. During the years in the Soviet Union Lukacs wrote a great part of his essays on 18th and 19th Century German, French and Russian Literature. Most of these essays and longer studies were first published in book form in Switzerland and East Germany after the war. (*Goethe und seine Zeit; Der historische Roman; Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft; Deutsche Realisten des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts; Schicksalswende*; etc.) These books, for the most part, show a clear continuity with the works of Lukacs' pre-Marxist period. He uses a highly sophisticated philosophical and sociological method of literary analysis, which always betrays, however, the insoluble contradictions arising from an attempt to apply within the framework of the closed totalitarian system of the

Soviet Communist Party the philosophical categories of German classical aesthetics.

IV. LUKACS AND THE PROBLEM OF MARXIST AESTHETICS

The positive and negative sides of Lukacs' method can probably best be shown by a somewhat closer analysis of one of his books; I will therefore briefly discuss *The Historical Novel* which is, at present, the most easily available of Lukacs' works in Australia. The book was written during the winter of 1936/7 and published in Russian soon after its completion. German and Hungarian editions followed after the war; an English translation was published in 1962. The work arose out of a striking phenomenon of the time: the prevalence of the historical novel in the writing of the German anti-fascist émigré writers. In his preface to the English edition Lukacs explains that he had by no means intended to write a 'purely literary-historical' work. 'My aims were of a theoretical nature,' he says. 'What I had in mind was a theoretical examination of the interaction between the historical spirit and the great genres of literature which portray the totality of history...' (p. 13)

The first part of the book deals with what Lukacs calls 'the classical form of the historical novel.' He gives a concise sketch of the 'social and historical conditions for the rise of the historical novel' and shows how a new form of historical consciousness arose all over Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. In the fights for or against the French Revolution and Napoleon it had become increasingly clear that national and regional histories were but a part of universal history. The opponents as well as the champions of Restoration had to start thinking in historical categories. In philosophy this process reached its climax in the works of Hegel and Marx; in literature it gave rise to the 'classical' historical novel. In a brilliant analysis, Lukacs proceeds to examine the structure of Sir Walter Scott's novels which he regards as the prototype of this new literary

form. He shows how Scott overcame the basic dilemmas and difficulties of historicism, the 'necessary anachronism' (Hegel) of the historical approach by introducing a new type of 'middle-of-the-road hero'.

The starting point for Lukacs' reasoning is Hegel's distinction between 'maintaining individuals' and 'world historical individuals', between common people and great historical figures. By making 'maintaining individuals' the heroes of his novels, Scott was not forced to 'modernize' the great historical figures of the past, who only appear as marginal figures in his novels; neither was he compelled to motivate their actions with 'anachronistic' psychological methods. In this way, Lukacs states, Scott could achieve a highly realistic presentation of historical events. He says: 'Scott... recognizes that no civil war in history has been so violent as to turn the entire population without exception into fanatical partisans of one or other of the contending camps. Large sections of people have always stood between the camps with fluctuating sympathies, now for this side, now for the other. And these fluctuating sympathies have often played a decisive role in the outcome of the crisis. In addition, the daily life of the nation still goes on amidst the most terrible civil war...' (p. 37). Within the same paragraph, however, Lukacs gives yet another explanation for Scott's use of his 'middle-of-the-road heroes'. He writes: 'Scott's conception of English history is, as we have seen, that of a 'middle course' asserting itself through the struggle of extremes. The central figures of the Waverley type represent for Scott the age-old steadfastness of English development amidst the most terrible crisis...' (p. 37) As opposed to the first statement, this might strike the reader as containing an element of speculation which he may not be willing to accept.

In the following chapter of his book, Lukacs raises the question: 'Given the historical basis of new historicism in art, why did the latter produce the historical novel and not the historical drama?' He then proceeds to prove that in the given

historical situation it was impossible to create a historical drama on the same structural principles as those underlying Scott's historical novels. Primarily, however, this question only serves as an opening for a most penetrating analysis of the differences between the drama and the novel. The starting point is Hegel's contraposition of the 'totality of movement' in drama to the 'totality of objects' in epic. (p. 93; Lukacs uses epic 'in the German sense of the' term which covers both epic poetry and prose narrative.) He examines the 'facts of life' underlying the division between epic and drama and the peculiarities of dramatic characterization. He discusses the differences between the portrayal of the hero and the specific characteristics of the collision between hero and society in epic and dramatic art. These chapters indeed show Lukacs' method of philosophical and historical aesthetic analysis at its best. It has always to be borne in mind that with analyses of this kind Lukacs was breaking into hitherto almost completely untouched territories of literary criticism. He himself is fully aware of the fact that—apart from some casual remarks of Marx' and Engels'—'Marxist aesthetics' does not exist at all, and that he can only give 'methodological pointers' to a future 'Marxist genre theory'. Lukacs emphasizes that his book is 'only an attempt, an essay; a preliminary contribution to both Marxist aesthetics and the materialistic treatment of literary history...' (p. 15)

The second half of the book deals with the development of the historical novel after 1848. Here we can already see the interference of Marxist Party-dogma with Lukacs' serious philosophical attempts at laying the foundations of a new Marxist aesthetics. He tries to prove that the 'decadence' of the historical novel (Flaubert, Thackeray, C.F. Meyer) in the second half of the 19th Century is a result and an expression of bourgeois decadence, and tries to show how a new and 'progressive' form of the historical novel (R. Rolland, H. Mann) is developing in the wake of a

humanist and democratic protest against imperialism and fascism.

In an introductory note, the translators of the English edition have found it necessary to apologize for Lukacs' style. 'It has been difficult', they say, 'to produce a readable version of highly theoretical idiom in the German'. (p. 11). The translators have managed remarkably well in their difficult task, but *The Historical Novel* still remains hard and tiresome reading. Many explanations have been proposed to account for Lukacs' ponderous style: it has been said that Lukacs was never really able to free himself from the clumsy and involved language of German philosophers. Time and again, Party officials have attacked his 'aristocratic' style which made his works incomprehensible for the 'toiling masses'; on the other hand, his involved language has often scared off illiterate functionaries from dabbling with 'Lukacian heresies.'

The whole matter, however, is not only a question of language and style. Thomas Mann once spoke about 'the impression of almost eery abstraction' that he gained after Lukacs had in a most convincing way developed his theories before him — and later on he used certain traits of Lukacs' personality to shape the figure of the totalitarian Jesuit Naphta in his 'Magic Mountain'. This was not only and not primarily a judgement of the man, but of the ideas he stands for and of the methods he uses. Lukacs ultimately shrinks from acknowledging the validity of anything else but sociological and philosophical factors in the estimation of literary works, and rejects all sorts of psychological, of stylistic or linguistic analysis. He does all this with great mastery — though on a much lower level this attitude is characteristic of Marxist literary criticism as a whole. In the last analysis, individual traits are of no relevance, — only the historical features count. The philosophical or sociological Idea, the content of the work is always much more important than its form which — even in the most penetrating analyses of Lukacs — is ultimately nothing but an

outward garment, something secondary and ornamental which serves to make the Idea attractive and comprehensible. The Marxist concept of artistic form has many similarities to the old notion of poetic 'sugar' on the 'bitter pill of moral truth'. Marxist literary criticism is in general at its worst when dealing with lyrical poetry; Lukacs, when talking about problems of artistic form, in most cases limits himself to the discussion of the structure of epic and dramatic works.

Even with Lukacs, the main cause of the feeling of 'eery abstraction' conveyed by Marxist literary criticism lies, I think, in the fact that it works with absolute categories which have to fit into a closed, abstract system of thought. These categories cannot be discussed and have to be accepted as infallible truth. So the interrelations between 'content' and 'form' in a work of art are never really made clear, and terms like 'realism' and 'typical' are often used in a most contradictory way. Although Lukacs' writings show Marxist literary criticism on its highest philosophical level, he seems to be reluctant to solve some of these most blatant contradictions. He is compelled to accept, for instance, Lenin's mechanistic 'theory of reflection' which implies the notion that the main function of a work of art is to 'reflect Reality'. On the other hand, he has to use the concept of the 'typical' which in Marxist literary criticism is a very ambivalent term. It is in keeping with the postulate of 'realism' in so far as it means 'a characteristic feature or trait of reality'. At the same time, however, it contains an almost prophetic and altogether 'unrealistic' element: a 'typical hero' in art may have certain features, that symbolically foreshadow future developments.

Throughout the main body of his work, Lukacs writes as a Communist, trying to maintain the basic dogmas of Marxist-Leninist faith. On the other hand, Thomas Mann is fully justified in stressing the importance of Lukacs' 'conservatism', seeing in his work 'a mediation between the spheres and epochs'. (Letter to Lukacs,

1955). Lukacs' work is deeply rooted in the best traditions of European and, especially, German literature and philosophy. He always fought for the right to apply the highest standards in literary criticism, and not to subordinate aesthetic judgement to the demands of mere propaganda. These highest standards are, for Lukacs, embodied in the following names that appear time and again in his books: Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe, Balzac, Tolstoy, Thomas Mann. In his struggles with the Party bureaucrats, Lukacs very often refers to a passage in a letter of Friedrich Engels, who saw the 'greatest triumph of realism' in the fact that Balzac was a great 'realistic' writer notwithstanding his 'reactionary' political views. For Lukacs, this quotation became the basis of his theory of the 'fundamental bias' of great art: every great work of art, is, by definition, a 'realistic' work, in some way committed to the idea of progress and humanism. This leads on to further equations. The great artist need not follow any political 'line'; in our times, he will necessarily stand for humanism and will oppose brutality, Fascism and war. This attitude can also clearly be observed in *The Historical Novel* where the 'classical historical novel' as developed by some great writers of the early 19th Century serves as a yardstick for the appraisal of the modern novelists. It implies the statement that the 'reactionary' Walter Scott might have written better historical novels than a contemporary 'progressive' or fellow-travelling or even communist writer.

V. AFTER 1945

In 1945, at the age of 60, Lukacs returned to Hungary as Professor of Philosophy of Culture at Budapest University. He was a most important asset to the Communist Party. For the Communist intellectuals and the hosts of fellow-travellers in the West he was still known as the author of *History and Class Consciousness*, as 'a Communist with whom one can talk'. Some of his weakest books and articles

were written in the years around 1945. He fought all 'Modernist' trends in literature and art, and tried to prove that Existentialism, Nietzsche, and Abstract Art were all leading to Fascism, or were weapons used in the Cold War by the American Imperialists. Even then, his writings were on an incomparably higher level than those of most other 'philosophers' of the Communist orbit. He had a very great impact on the younger generation of leftist intellectuals, mainly in Hungary, East Germany and Poland. After 1947, however, with the tightening of Communist dictatorship in Hungary, the position of Lukacs became increasingly difficult. In these years, 'Socialist Realism' became compulsory in East Europe. Lukacs fought back. He put forward the 'partisan theory': the poet must be an ardent follower, a 'partisan' of the Party — but poetry and art cannot be subordinated altogether to political 'prescriptions'. The poet who belongs to the Party and supports its aims need not fight 'as a uniformed member of the regular army of Communism'. A poet is a poet — he will serve the aims of Communism in a different way. Lukacs theory of the 'fundamental bias of great art' was also regarded as a violation of the Party dogma which proclaimed that Soviet and Communist literature was a priori superior to anything else. In a public lecture, Lukacs told the parable of the little rabbit and the elephant. Marxism, he said, undoubtedly is the highest peak among all ideologies. If, however, a little rabbit claimed the Himalayas and looked down at the world below, it would still not be larger than the elephant standing at the foot of the mountains. The implications of the parable are clear: an elephant is an elephant; a great work of art is a great work of art under all circumstances.

At that time a wave of 'great purges' was sweeping through the satellite countries of East Europe. Lukacs had to be silenced and the attacks against his 'middle-of-the-road' attitude became more and more violent. He was again forced to exercise self-criticism and only permitted

to go on with his University teaching under certain restrictions. After the XXth Party Congress and Krushchev's secret speech in February 1956 it seemed as if Lukacs' fortunes were to change. Before an audience of about 1,000 mutinous Hungarian intellectuals, Lukacs was re-habilitated. In October 1956 he became Minister for Cultural Affairs in the Revolutionary Government of Imre Nagy and a foundation member of the new — he hoped, purified — Hungarian Communist Party. All this proved to be once again an illusion. Three weeks later he was kidnapped by Soviet armoured cars and deported to Rumania, but was released after four months. Since then, he has been living under constant attacks as one of the chief and most dangerous representatives of 'Revisionism'. A recent anonymous article on Lukacs in the 'New Statesman' entitled 'The Survivor' lucidly summarizes his pre-

sent position: 'The Communist movement could not live with Lukacs; yet, somehow, it could not live without him either...' 'The philosopher who identifies Truth with the dogma of a totalitarian political Party 'cuts the ground from under his feet', and becomes 'deeply committed to the forces that would destroy him.'

This is undoubtedly true. But it is also true that George Lukacs has made full use of life in the face of the forces aiming at his destruction. He wanted to survive because he felt that he still had much work to do. Now, at the age of 77, Lukacs is in good health. His most important books are soon to be published in English. He has at last finished the book he regards as his chef d'oeuvre, his *Aesthetics*, and although saddened by the realization that it will probably not be published in the near future, has immediately embarked upon his next major work, his *Ethics*.

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Brahmoism in Retrospect

MIHIR SINHA

IN our time the Brahmo Samaj has come to occupy a rather controversial position in the society. It is a small community, intermarriage with traditional Hindus is not at all uncommon, but still to the Hindus at large, the Brahmos constitute a special and exclusive class of outcasts. To the Hindus the members of the Samaj are the objects of much jealousy, ridicule and even distrust, although the general impression is that the Brahmos lead a more refined and progressive way of life. That may not be valid for the Brahmos of the day but it remains a fact that the average Brahmo would normally be distinguishable from the average Hindu. Moreover, the Samaj includes persons who have attained very high place in the society, in the spheres of education, public service and even business. To a student of social history, however, it appears to be really intriguing that although Brahmoism is generally taken to have begun as a sort of religious movement, very little of religiosity is to be noticed among the Brahmos of today. In other words, no great spiritual leader has been seen in the ranks of the Samaj in recent times. It would be escaping the question if one were to say

that Brahmoism is a spent-force and to stop at that. To understand what Brahmoism is today one has to go back to the days of Ram Mohan Roy and retrace the path travelled by Brahmoism since then.

Ram Mohan Roy is generally regarded as the founder of Brahmoism. Benoy Ghosh voices the opinion of many when he says that 'historically the movement is of tremendous importance, owing, mainly to the fact that it was set in motion by no less a person than Ram Mohan Roy'. As a matter of fact, however, it is just the other way round: Ram Mohan Roy's historical importance is partially due to his participation in the movement which came to be known as Brahmoism later on. Significant social movements, particularly when they involve the fundamentals of the thinking of an age, are never dependent on the fortuitous presence of a leader. The age-old conflict between the institutional frame-work of society and the forces of economic development and intellectual progress have a natural tendency to become acute at certain critical phases of history. When the pressure of development becomes too great for the institutional structure to bear, they make a break through and the presence of people suitable for pioneering becomes very useful. There is no doubt that in the figure of Ram Mohan Roy the historical forces of that age found a remarkable expression. Yet it would be wrong to assume that the social forces would have remained without expression unless this particular leader had arrived on the scene,* although they might have had to wait for Iswarchandra Vidyasagar or Debendranath Tagore for effective articulation. As a social leader

* We are constrained to make this point not because we are unwilling to allow him the position he is normally given in Indian history — a student of history would hardly deny that. As a matter of fact, besides Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, there is no other character in the history of the Bengal Renaissance to be placed alongside him. But Ram Mohan Roy's personal role in the Brahma movement should not be overplayed, as has been done by so many. He was no great religious leader like Shri Chaitanya; he was a social thinker and as such his personal role must be looked at as a part of the currents of history. What is more, a student of history must necessarily keep himself free from the all too common tendency toward hero worship.

Ram Mohan Roy's main contribution was in expediting this historical process.

Ram Mohan Roy, like his contemporary, Dwarka Nath Tagore, was a very active man—physically of course, but what is more important, mentally. His intense desire to experiment with new ideas coupled with his acute intuition of the demands of his time led him into pioneering ventures along so many lines of activity. One of these lines happened to be his rational and conscious effort to understand the fundamentals of different religions. It was felt by Ram Mohan Roy and his associates that the social structure that was in existence at that time was proving a great hindrance to the forces of development. Ram Mohan's whole life was dedicated to the task of making these forces free of the obstacles. It is too well-known to repeat that the activities of the Atmiya Sabha and the Brahmo Sabha took the shape of an individualistic and intensely anti-authoritarian movement. The participants were impatient of the rituals of Hinduism and the social taboos which were not in conformity with the idea of progress. The movement as it was at that time was hardly a religion by itself, but was only one of the aspects of the Renaissance or the nation-wide attempt at coming to terms with the new social and economic forces that were to bring about the Industrial Revolution. Inevitably, therefore, Brahmoism grew through the press and through discussions, not through spiritual or pedantic pronouncements or organisation of rituals. From this angle it appears unreasonable to condemn the movement for having failed to 'reform' Hinduism. On the contrary, its real failure is its subsequent success as a sect of 'reformed Hindus.'

It has been noticed by some scholars that among the associates of Ram Mohan Roy were many landlords. Looking back at that age it appears however that the big landlords had to be attracted by the Sabha. These landlords were not actually the descendents of the old feudal class,

these were the members of the new aristocracy created with the wealth earned from trade dealings with the foreign interests. The British Imperial policy at that time was deliberately meant to create a situation in which this new wealth could not find its channel of employment in legitimate business or industry. The situation was so managed that this wealth had to be invested in land and the Sale Law helped this new aristocracy to take over the property of the old aristocracy. People of the old school who were content with belonging to this new landed aristocracy were later grouped under the leadership of Radha Kanto Deb and others and they were not for industrialisation or for bringing about a new social order. People like Ram Mohan Roy or Dwarkanath Tagore were on the other hand not satisfied with this state of affairs and were therefore playing the part of entrepreneurs, be it in the field of commerce and industry, social reform or intellectual and cultural pursuits. It was in conformity with the nature of things that the enterprising among this new aristocracy flocked around Ram Mohan Roy and participated in the programme of Atmiya Sabha and Brahmo Sabha.

Ram Mohan Roy settled down in Calcutta in 1814, when he was 42. He had already amassed a fortune in trade and in service under the East India Company, had established himself as a landlord and had made his mark as a scholar—he had acquired mastery over a number of languages including Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian, English, Greek and Hebrew. There is also no doubt of the fact that he was deeply concerned with the philosophy of all the four great religions, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. His was however a rationalistic approach to the issues of religion. It was, therefore, natural that he was attracted by the philosophic systems of the Christian Unitarians, the Muslim Unitarians and the Hindu Vedantists. It was but one step from there to find the fundamental similarity among these

three great schools of religious thought. Thus was born the basic philosophy of Brahmoism. The Atmiya Sabha was established by Ram Mohan Roy in 1815 to provide the unitarians and the progressives with a forum for free discussion. That Ram Mohan Roy had a genius for leadership is proved by the immense popularity among the intelligentsia gained by the Sabha. The Sabha, its sister organisation the Unitarian Committee (established by Ram Mohan Roy in 1821) and the vigorous campaigns through the Press filled a great void in the upstart society of the booming metropolis of Calcutta. The greatest single event of the Atmiya Sabha days was perhaps the publication of the Bengali edition of Vedanta.

But the radicals of Calcutta were not sitting idle. Their answer to the challenge of the age was the formation of the Academic Association under the leadership of Derozio. It would be wrong to presume that they were just a bunch of 'angry young men'. On the contrary they had a definite message to deliver — wholesale rejection of the traditional ideas and acceptance of the western way of life. Ram Mohan Roy must have felt the necessity of a more close-knit organisation to combat the tide of radicalism, and the Atmiya Sabha or the fraternity of unitarians yielded its place to the Brahmo Sabha in 1828. It was no coincidence that the old guard of the Calcutta Society under the formidable leadership of Radhakanto Deb formed themselves into the Dharma Sabha in the same year. These were all parts of a conscious struggle for the ideological leadership of the rising middle class of Calcutta. Or, to put it the other way round, the urban middle class was building up its own foundations through participation in these ideological movements ranging from Radicalism and Christian Missions, to the die-hard conservatism of Dharma Sabha. To the liberals Brahmoism seemed to offer a rational synthesis of the clashing philosophies of the East and the West, the old and the new. The non-

sectarian Brahmo Sabha during its early days seemed to be eminently placed for providing social and spiritual leadership to the liberal middle class of Calcutta.

Subsequent history, however, took a curious turn and two events proved to be of crucial importance; one was the journey abroad of Ram Mohan Roy (and his death there in 1833) and the other was the assumption of leadership by Debendranath Tagore. Where Ram Mohan Roy was a man of action interested in people and their affairs, Debendranath Tagore was an introvert and a man absorbed in spiritual speculation. It is true that out of his intense thirst for knowledge was born the famous Tatwabodhini Sabha which attracted the intellectual heirs of the Atmiya Sabha but even in that respect there was a difference. Although in the ranks of Tatwabodhini Sabha were men like Iswar-chandra Vidyasagar and Akshoy Kumar Datta it was dominated by men of learning and the religious-minded — not by people like the enterprising companions of Ram Mohan Roy. That Debendranath Tagore was more interested in building up a religious system than in social reform or quest after knowledge as such would be fully proved by his later step of abolishing the Tatwabodhini Sabha (1859). A rigorous superstructure of rituals was built up almost as an answer to the then established religions — particularly Hinduism. Thus what had begun as a liberating movement tended to become entrenched in religious formalities. The best evidence of this retardation in the Brahmo movement would be found in Debendranath Tagore's decision to collaborate with the arch leader of organised reaction, Raja Radhakanto Deb when the two respectively became the first Secretary and the first President of the British Indian Association. Debendranath Tagore's logical mind, however, grasped the real issues involved and closed the confusing but fruitful chapter of the dual existence of the Sabha and the Brahmo Samaj. In a way

this marked the end of the original movement.

That was a point of no return. The spirit of the self-righteous missionary that is inherent in all new religions found its full expression in the figure of Keshab Chandra Sen. There does not seem to be any scope for controversy over him. His was a completely consistent development from his highly successful days as the fire-brand missionary of the Brama Samaj to the revivalism of the Naba-bidhan Brahmo Samaj. As a missionary with expansive ideas his first clash with the contemporary Christian missionaries like Dyson and Lalbehari Dey ended in further success for the Brahmo movement. The following years saw a rapid growth of the Samaj in the districts of Bengal as well as elsewhere in India. The English mouthpiece Indian Mission came out in 1861 and schools and associations dedicated to the philosophy of Brahmoism were organised everywhere. The zenith of Keshab Chandra Sen's ascendancy in the Brahmo Samaj was reached in 1862 when he was installed as the Acharya of the Samaj, after which the course of events described a downward trend. On questions of personal leadership and on various socio-religious issues the difference between himself and the other leaders of the Samaj became too great to be amicably settled and the followers of Keshab Chandra Sen broke away to form the Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj while the parent body came to be known as the Adi Brahmo Samaj (1866).

The Adi Brahmo Samaj as such never regained the leadership of socio-political reawakening although individual members like the Tagore brothers attained pinnacles of success. As a matter of fact, the cultural contours of the middle class of Bengal were fashioned by the Tagores but the Adi Brahmo Samaj clung to the hesitant conservatism of Debendranath Tagore and irretrievably lost its place in the heart of the middle class. The progressive people at that time looked to the Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj for positive

leadership. They were completely sold to the fiery personality of Keshab Chandra Sen as in the midst of their newly established economic affluence they were beginning to feel the want of a positive philosophy which was to plague them till this day. But the subsequent career of Keshab Chandra Sen belied this immense hope placed on him. It was hardly a volte face on his part that he came to develop the cult of man-god and ultimately renounced the avowed principles of social reform. On the contrary, he was all along a believer in himself—his initial success as a Brahmo missionary was due to that and not to any deep sympathy with social progress as in the case of Ram Mohan Roy nor to an inner spiritual fire as with Debendranath Tagore. Being primarily interested in himself and partially under pressure from the growing vested interests in the upper ranks of the middle class he quickly aligned himself to the revivalistic movement in Bengal, the most important leader of which was Shri Ramakrishna Paramhansa. Yet, in spite of its reactionary nature, the programme of the Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj was much more popular than the earlier movements of the Samaj precisely because of the 'deviations' which added colour and ritual to the dry and too intellectual character of Brahmoism. To the progressive members of the movement, however, the behaviour of Keshab Chandra Sen appeared either an aberration or, worse still, a great betrayal of the resolution of the Brahmo Pratinidhi Sabha of 1866 which had given birth to the Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj. The revolt in their ranks grew in intensity and ultimately in 1878, the secessionists formed the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj while the Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj came to be known as Nababidhan Brahmo Samaj. Thus was made the full circle—from the formation of the Brahmo Samaj and the abolition of the Tatwabodhini Sabha through the formation of the Bharatbarshiya Brahmo Samaj to the formation of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj.

The Sadharan Samaj was established under the leadership of great middle class intellectuals like Shibnath Shastri and Ananda Mohan Bose. Its character was quite different from the Adi or the Bharatbarshiya Samaj in so far as it regained to a limited extent the leadership of the intellectual middle class. It had lost the pioneering zeal of the Atmiya Sabha and the Tatwabodhini Sabha but had not completely thrown overboard the rituals introduced during the days of the Bharatbarshiya Samaj. The importance of the Samaj had decreased precisely because of its emergence as an exclusive sect, but the new leaders were passionately engaged in the task of the generation—the political upsurge against the British Imperialism. As a result the Brahmos, in their individual capacities, though not in the collective form of the Samaj, played a significant

part in the national movement, particularly in providing the movement with an educational and cultural basis. With the diffusion of the new cultural and educational standards in the society at large this function of the Samaj was accomplished and since then the Samaj has been gradually relegated to the position of just one of the sects in the vast structure of Hindu Society. The purely religious aspect which was dominant in the Nababidhan Samaj was not attractive enough to the masses while the intellectual leadership passed away with the first rankers of the Sadharan Samaj—as it had passed away twice before in the time of the Brahmo Sabha and of the Tatwabodhini Sabha. But today, the members of the Samaj are continuing to reap the material benefits of the social pioneering undertaken by an older generation.

Linguistics in India

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

THIS is a one-man report on the state of the scientific study of languages in India. As such it will inevitably reflect certain biases in preference and gaps in information, neither of which should detract from its value if others equally or more knowledgeable take the trouble of sharing their dissident opinions with the broader public. The inevitable question is: why study linguistics? English one learns from the departments of English. Similarly any other language for which there is any wider interest in the country. Tribal languages need not be learnt, for interpreters are available, and many of these languages are in any case dying off. Moreover, should not one really encourage more the study of the substantive sciences, especially the physical sciences, instead of trying to improve what needs only be passable?

These honest objections have to be answered honestly. First, most of our English, Hindi and such departments have been traditionally oriented towards imparting the appreciation of esthetic literature. It is still their main aim, and they are not going to be easily persuaded that what the majority of us want today is practical mastery of conversation and correspondence with engineers, colonels, businessmen, scientists, officials, and the like. Given their social distance from that kind of people, they would not find it too easy either, even if they had the will.

Secondly, there must be some people who (a) already know many languages, (b) can learn very fast and very well such languages they do not already know, and (c) can teach either kind of languages very fast and very well to engineers, colonels, businessmen, scientists, officials, or the like. This is perhaps most urgent from the

political and the military points of view. As long as political and military operations were as they could afford to be before 1947, the crude products of crude interpreters were indeed adequate. But now even small distortions of information can lead to votes for the wrong candidate, or to military disaster. A modern campaigning of either the civil or the military kind is not possible without rather thorough communication with the local people. It is not for nothing that Acharya Vinoba Bhave has felt the need to learn single-handedly some 18 languages.

Thirdly, it is not right to draw a sharp line between learning a subject like physics or mathematics or biology, and learning a language like English or French or Russian. Modern science is not really an extended common sense and common practicality, not really based on the kind of inarticulate shrewdness which peasants and mechanics and mystics often demonstrate, not really very independent of verbal discussion of subtle formulations. Physics cannot be learnt as easily by gesture and visual displays as can growing vegetables or making tin-boxes or even doing long division.

Fourthly, modern linguistics has become a full-fledged intellectual discipline in its own right, nearly as demanding of talent and industry as any physical science. It is far indeed from the days when the kind of ability that the pandas of Banaras or Puri demonstrate would pass as knowing languages, or the ability to recite Panini from memory would pass as knowing grammar. One who wishes to get acquainted with the spirit of modern science can now do it here as much as anywhere else.

The kind of linguistics that has been

locally displayed to our lay administrators has been only too often either too extremely narrow or too obviously senile. Our universities have generally failed to find worthy successors to the first, so eminent, generation of scholars. Also, mainly because of the pernicious practice of having never more than one full-rank professor in any department, any one eminent man tends to dominate the scene far too much. Since he is as much liable to specialization of interest or obsolescence of outlook as any other human being, he may thus too easily, even involuntarily, force the advancement of learning into one narrow channel, or even just dam it up for his lifetime. Nor has the government department of anthropology been too helpful. It is interested in folk-dances, ruined temples, inherited customs, and the like, in many useful things, but not in more effective communication with the currently alive tribal people. There is just about one competent linguist in its entire cadre. Nothing seems to exist in its files on most of the languages and dialects more recent than Grierson's ancient survey. Even a layman who is not able to see the state of linguistics elsewhere in the world, can only find that linguistics as is locally available is often not worth much. The shocks come this way. Set an official to learn a new language, and he takes one whole year to start exchanging the simplest greetings. Is any language that hard? Russians arrive in Calcutta who speak Bengali almost as well as native Bengalis do. The British never did this. The Chinese are discovered to have a very efficient intelligence network in a certain border area. The British were satisfied with visiting these places once a year and collecting information through grunts and shrugs. A man who has been granted an MA sends a paper for publication abroad, which is returned to him on the ground of unintelligibility. Must every MA be as necessarily misunderstood as a great religious mystic is traditionally expected to be?

I have painted the situation harshly, not to titillate a morbid pleasure in gloom, but

to see in which direction we have to go and where exactly we are by accidents of history compelled to begin.

Let me then sketch an inventory of our resources, and a survey of our priorities. The former is quickly done. For there are less than two dozen Indian scholars who would be considered competent by modern standards. Of these, the majority are again without any inner drive or sense of direction to productive work, and therefore need considerable external pressure and guidance as regards what is to be done.

The physical equipment that will be needed for a competent linguist working full-time is not expensive, is in fact almost ridiculously inexpensive, though certainly beyond what an Indian teacher can afford to spend out of his personal savings. A relatively cheap tape recorder and a few dozen well-designed tape recordings will go a surprisingly long way. Repairs and additional tapes would not add too much more. A working library of the most often needed books, journals, and microfilms should not cost very far beyond an additional Rs. 500 a year. The major cost will indeed be in field trips and office-keeping.

As for the facilities of training, there is just one place in the country that deserves to be named at all. This is the Deccan College at Poona. It takes about two years of hard work there for a relatively bright Indian MA to reach the standard of competence that would be prerequisite for admission into the postgraduate courses in the better universities of the U.S.A. The facilities at the Deccan College are far from adequate, though, and suffer from two serious shortcomings. One is the lack of staff in regard to certain vitally important subjects, such as the Tibeto-Burman languages of India, general syntax, suprasegmental phonology, and monolingual-field methodology. The other is a continuous war with a strong minority of students and their regional patrons who claim a diploma or a degree as a political right.

Little can be done in a hurry to improve the university departments, about which I have already recorded my very low

opinion. It is not true that there are no good scholars in them. Most of those in my above-mentioned list of the competent are in fact university teachers. But they are too scattered, too much exposed to local pressures, too ineffective. It is also not true that there are not enough good students. Some of the students are superb material, but they are compelled to waste years of their lives because of faulty training. The crux of the matter is that few of our university administrators know, or, in the light of past performance, even care to inquire what is what and who is who in linguistics.

Something can be done as regards selection of the places abroad where our more advanced students are sent for further training. New places have come up, and many of the institutions of learning for which our laymen have inherited respect are no longer good enough, at least in linguistics. The Sorbonne in Paris, for example, has superlative staff, but is too overcrowded to provide good training.

Far more important is the issue of the envisionment of the tasks and their relative urgencies. Too many, even among the less than two dozen competent linguists, have inherited the conviction that the most urgent thing to do is to narrate the origin and the development of what he cannot really yet describe but only vaguely demarcate as his mother-tongue. Many others are persuaded that the faster a dialect is dying off, the more urgent it must be to divert most precious resources for recording its structure. Some again, including this author himself, are fascinated with the idea of contributing to the most general, even philosophical, points of linguistic theory.

I therefore give just my personal impressions about the priorities. These are:

a) Structural descriptions of the leading Indian languages, in their prestige spoken dialects. Whatever exists is very incomplete, near zero on intonation and syntax.

b) Contrastive presentations of these in relation to English, and also in relation to

Hindi. To a great extent, the tasks (a) and (b) can be combined, especially as adequate structural descriptions of English already exist.

c) Bilingual dictionaries designed to teach or explain not English or Hindi, but these other languages to those who already know English or Hindi well. No such thing exists for most of these languages.

d) A centralized pool of information concerning the newly coined technical terms in all the leading languages, so that innovation in any one of them is thereby given a chance of influencing and being influenced by innovations in the others, in spite of the barriers of script diversity and the like.

e) Briefer structural-contrastive descriptions and bilingual dictionaries of the above-mentioned kind for the more important tribal languages, especially of those tribes which inhabit strategically more sensitive areas, whether within or just outside the political boundary of the country.

f) Brief manuals outlining the general kind of linguistic diversities one should expect in broad areas, like northern NEFA or the Nicobars, i.e., general instructions how to prepare to learn any of the less well-studied languages or dialects of each area.

Apart from these extremely urgent and dismally neglected tasks, there should of course be given some scope to pure science for its own sake, for such things as the study of the varieties of ancient Prakrit, of the dialects of Hindi in Bundelkhand, of some language which has barely 200 speakers left in densest Dandakaranya, of the universal laws of language standardization, and like. For emergencies are not all predictable, and what appears today as sheer pleasure or pure piety, might readily one day become only too practical. Also, in any intellectual field, the lag in the supply of talent and inspiration is altogether too long and too inflexible to let the demand have all of the upper hand. But I find it sad that impoverished and imperilled as we are, we should be so very complacently unworldly in our scale of priorities.

Crime in a Welfare State

S. B. SINHA

IN *Ram Charit Manas* Tulsi Das described a state where nobody did anything wrong even in a dream. To us this *Ramrajya* might itself appear no more substantial than a dream, haunting but unrealizable. Yet although a crimeless society may remain an impossible ideal, in a welfare state it should be possible to reduce crime to a great extent. The issue is this: how far may crime be averted by education and improved living conditions? To what extent may crime be attributed to the built-in tensions of society? Or are some men born with criminal instincts which erupt into acts of violence irrespective of the social surroundings and the family background?

These are big questions, and it is not possible to go into their implications in this article. But this much is clear: if one believes that crime is not independent of factors external to the criminal, if he believes that a nearly crimeless society should be the goal of a welfare state, his belief will lead to action which will do no harm if his belief is wrong *but will do an immense lot of good if it is right*.

And it is not such an open question either. Although in India not all cases of crime are recorded, in the United Provinces (as Uttar Pradesh was known before independence), ten murders were registered for one in Great Britain. How does one explain this except by linking crime with social factors?

In fact, there are good grounds to believe that nobody is born a criminal. The chromosomes do not transmit criminality as such, just as they do not transmit the Tubercle on the Leptra bacillus. It is the circumstances or the milieu which twist and warp the impressionable mind of a child

just as the green twig bends or snaps under undue stress and strain. The parents (particularly the mother), the childhood environment and education are the triad which sustain or mar the individual's character.

While the education part of the triad is generally accepted as a state responsibility, the two other factors, namely (i) providing a decent home and (ii) assuring economic stability, are equally serious and important responsibilities of a welfare state. In other words, a working individual must be kept above the physical strain of constant worry about finding enough food for himself and his family, or enough clothes, and he must also be free from the fear of unemployment or starvation or of his family and children being left destitute or unprovided for if some accident happens to him. He must also be assured of effective and timely medical aid in case of emergency or need. We must see whether our welfare state has assured the individual that these needs, the bare minimum, would be met and whether we are on the road to our ideal of a crimeless society.

Crimes are mostly directed against persons or property or simultaneously against both. Of crimes directed against persons, a fairly large number are sexual and some few are emotional leading to murders. A large number again arise from personal or love feuds and jealousies and group and class rivalries etc. Often, crimes against property turn into crimes against persons if resistance is offered against the removal of the property or from fear of detection.

The perpetrators of sexual crimes are either men past the active sexual age or the sexually starved or the over-sexed aggressive male. The sexual crimes of the rich never come to light except occasionally

and there is no doubt that our society being constituted as it is, a very large number of sexual crimes are never reported to the police and perhaps a fair number of these never come to the notice of even the parents themselves. Some two or three decades ago, the chief cause of violent crimes was deviation from morality on the part of women. And, sometimes, disputes over land, crops or irrigation facilities so excited two rival groups in a village that they clashed violently. These can be called 'emotional' crimes, for these were committed by people who were not cold-blooded schemers working for money but by people who were passionately involved in their acts. Often such emotional murders happened due to family or group feuds, zamindar and ryot feuds etc. and not infrequently a brooding young man of the persecuted family nursed a grudge for long and wrought his vengeance, on opportunity presenting itself, by sometimes wiping off all the men in the family of the persecutor and by dishonouring and even raping the younger women in the family. This would be usually followed by a first bold confession which would subsequently be retracted.

Sir Louis Stuart, a Chief Judge of the Oudh High Court, also mentioned a case in which an old farmer hacked to pieces his daughter of nine just because the motherless child had the cheek to tell him on his return from the field one summer morning that she had not yet made his breakfast ready. Such cases as the murder of one's own child for such a trivial reason can occur only among men with very low intelligence or no intelligence, in whom the finer sentiments of love and affection have had no opportunity to develop. With education, the possibility of such unbridled outbursts could probably be reduced.

The other categories of 'emotional' crime, however, can be directly linked with the present social set-up. The caste and clan feuds, the sex crimes and zamindar-ryot tensions were (and still are) inevitable in our society. The caste and village feuds have perhaps increased during the decade and a half of our independence. The

village panchayats which were supposed to usher in an era of peace and brotherhood have led for the present to ambitious strivings for power and pelf and have fanned rather than soothed animosity and hatred. The illiterate villager has alas become conscious too soon of the power of his vote. And the panchayats, instead of harmonizing village interests, have become the arena where they clash. But given better education in good citizenship, the panchayat could become what it had been designed to be from the start — an agency to integrate villagers into a harmonized community. This would be something similar, or even better, than what the poets had sung about.

But do we have the right approach to this question? Have we planned for the necessary educational and psychological background? Have we initiated any scheme to awaken mass consciousness against crime? The individual must learn not to minimise or connive at or condone and tolerate wrongs or shady deeds or criminal offences in any form or shape. If we succeeded even to some little extent in arousing this consciousness in our society, not only would we have a community of conscience-prone or morally awake individuals but also a strong community fully alive to the basic needs of protecting the society from crime and criminals. And to such an ideally awake community, the state would ipso facto provide not only an honest and clean police but a highly independent and upright judiciary and an equally assiduous, hard-working and humane set of jail and probation executives, so that the nation's police, penal and prison systems would be run by men of unimpeachable conduct and integrity. The evolution of such a system would not only lead to the prompt detection and quick apprehension of crime and the criminal or of the offence and the offender but it would also mean that fewer crimes would be committed.

We are, of course, far from this goal. In fact, in the years after Independence there has been an upward trend in crime, while

corruption and favouritism have increased. Two factors are responsible for this: one unavoidable, and the other, though not entirely unavoidable, almost necessarily following from the grant of Independence and the installation of popular government.

Among the unavoidable reasons for the rise in crime, the chief ones were the Partition (which let loose an orgy of violence and uprooted millions from their homes who were freed from the social restraints that ruled them earlier), the agitations connected with the linguistic reorganization of States, the rise in unemployment following a population explosion, increased migration to cities and partial prohibition.

It is easy enough to see why these factors have led to a rise in crime. The linguistic demands set off outbursts of mass violence and prevented stabilization of the State machinery. The link between unemployment and crime is too obvious to deserve elaboration. And the effects of partial prohibition have been not only an increase in illicit distillation but also the creation of a massive racket for the distribution of liquor.

And there is no sign that these factors are becoming less potent. There are demands for a separate Vidarbha and for a Sikhistan. The question of a separate Nagaland has not yet been really settled. The Dravidland demand is gaining strength. The bonds of unity which the British had cemented in spite of all their faults have all but snapped under the strain of linguism, provincialism and separatism. In spite of the platitudes about emotional integration which we hear ad nauseam, we are faced with the sad spectacle of hearing five or six languages spoken at the National oath taking ceremony although Hindi had been unanimously acclaimed as the national language and given the place of honour in the Indian Constitution adopted by us nearly thirteen years ago.

In the wake of Independence came urbanization with its myriad problems and large numbers of villagers moved into the towns with the result that men had to live

without their families or in huts and tenements which were hardly sufficient for a family to reside in with decency. The larger towns in the North, particularly such cities as Delhi and Calcutta, had already received an influx of refugees, and the housing and administrative problems which had been created were made all the more acute with the migration of rural people. The post-partition administration (already sadly depleted) found itself hardly capable of dealing with the many evils which necessarily arose out of the unsettled state of large numbers of a more or less mobile population. The adverse affects of such a situation on the morals of men can be well surmised and needless to say the welfare schemes had to yield to the exigencies, the primary and basic needs and the biological demands and urges of the people. The population explosion in the last decade and a half had a similarly disastrous effect. Unemployment rose fast, and despite the plans, the backlog of the jobless went on and goes on accumulating.

The number of the unemployed has reached the staggering figure of nearly 10 million. The idle brains of the unemployed pose one problem for us while those of the educated unemployed pose another, for not only has white-collar crime increased considerably, but varied *modi operandi* have been contrived and the gentleman cheat or swindler or the gentleman forger or murderer may now figure in crimes of a particular pattern which have lately become all too common. The gentleman-cadet who may pose as an Army or a 'liaison officer', the cheat who may successfully contract marriages with rich and eligible virgins, the idler who may form an employment bureau, the cycle-lifter, the motor car thief, the gentleman who may successfully gas and kidnap his unsuspecting friend for ransom or the gentleman traveller who may whip out a knife or a revolver in a running train to rob and murder his fellow passengers, the cheque-forger and the counterfeiter are all members of the vast mass of the educated unemployed or of the group of inadequately

or partly employed men who easily combine with the anti-social elements to augment their meagre incomes.

The weakening of the administrative machinery consequent on the departure of senior and experienced British officers after 1947 has again been a factor in the greater incidence of crime. While the Indian officers in the Civil Services did their best against all odds, it cannot be denied that there were not enough men left over of the required calibre to fill the various jobs in the many schemes which were launched simultaneously, and the raw and inexperienced officer had mostly to bear the brunt of the burden of a whole district or of a heavy police administration. There was thus a general all round lowering of administrative efficiency. While this was bad enough, the abler officers found themselves for obvious reasons out of favour with the newly appointed ministers who, though in most cases inexperienced, were only too anxious to exercise their newly acquired power and instead of laying down the policies and ideals of a truly democratic state, indulged in the pastime of job hunting and 'shifarrish' for their supporters and camp followers. There was interference in the day to day working of government. There was nepotism and corruption. M.L.As. and such others could bring pressure indirectly through ministers or even directly by speeches in the Assembly.

To the several factors already mentioned, we must add yet another, namely, the lack of sound leadership at the provincial governmental level. When the Congress formed the Central and the provincial governments in 1947, only very able men were chosen to form the Government and though they were new to the art of governing, instances of any glaring abuse of power hardly ever came to light. It must, however, be remembered that Gandhi, Father of the Nation and also incidentally its 'conscience-keeper', was still at the helm of things. It will be remembered that soon after the attainment of Independence, the Mahatma advised the winding up of the Congress as a political body and there can-

not be any doubt that things would have been different if the assassin's hand had not removed the Mahatma from the scene of Indian Politics. It was tragic indeed that the nation had earlier lost Subhas Chandra Bose, the uncrowned hero of Indian youth, and if it were not for their death, the country's history would have been differently written. Perhaps the craze for power and the feeling cherished by some Congressmen that they and their dependents should be rewarded with pensions and jobs would not have become so grossly evident. While posts and departments multiplied, sinecure appointments and commissions were created and in opposition to the Mahatma's advice to the ministers to live in huts and eschew luxury, they led a life of ease.

While things were bad enough between 1952 and 1957 due to the smugness of the Congress feeling safely entrenched in the ministerial 'gaddi', the period between 1957 and 1962 has been worse because of the group rivalries and the constant wranglings in the Congress itself. Needless to say the ministers have hardly had the time to concentrate on the task entrusted to them, and important matters concerning the welfare of the common man, such as provision of unadulterated food, and important social and welfare matters such as the increased incidence of crime, the callousness of the police, bribery, etc., have all remained as they were during all these years of the Congress regime. The question of separation of the executive from the judiciary which would have in itself gone a long way towards minimizing bribery and corruption has also remained shelved and while controls and licenses have multiplied and restrictions been imposed on almost all the necessities of life, the poor man in the street has neither felt happier nor more secure than before. It is no wonder then that the common man has become crime-minded rather than conscience-minded which must be the avowed objective of a Welfare State.

But although the ruling class has failed to set a high standard of personal and

group conduct, its puritanic pretensions remain. Many of the State Governments have introduced partial prohibition. This should have been introduced only after people had been persuaded to give up drinking, and, once enforced, it should have been total and rigorous rather than partial and half-hearted with 'wet areas' bordering 'dry areas'. As a result prohibition has not only been ineffectual but has led to a considerable increase in excise offences such as illicit distillation, smuggling, unauthorised sale of country liquor and the surreptitious use of even the medicinal tincture of ginger. The consequent bribery and corruption it has led to in the Excise and the Police Departments can be imagined, besides a lowering in the ethical and moral standards of large numbers of the population.

Similar have been the effects of efforts to abolish prostitution. Prostitution was referred to by Mahatma Gandhi as a necessary social evil. Anti-prostitution measures have only spread the evil; it has assumed new forms and infiltrated into areas free from it before. This situation has led to an increase in crime. By this, I do not want to advocate legalisation of prostitution. This evil must be abolished, or at least curbed. But to do so it is more important to reform society, to assure the woman a good home and make it possible for the man to get the love, affection and company he needs without having to go to a brothel. At the moment, the cities have large populations of single men — men who have come from the villages to earn their livelihood in the cities, who live huddled together in miserable hovels, who lack not only the affection and care that they had known in their village homes but also the restraints of a settled social order. It is easy enough to see why this situation helps prostitution to thrive. A welfare state should attack the roots of this evil, instead of passing a law without even making arrangements for reform and rehabilitation, and so only making the evil thrive in secret.

The vast hordes of bootleggers, prostitutes, beggars and wandering sadhus con-

stitute a major menace to the State, for it is from among them that most of the professional criminals are recruited; it is to 'protect' these that organized rackets are formed and the criminal gangs are nourished by the funds that come from these quasi-criminal professions. And these can be removed only through social and economic reform.

Lastly, the part the idiots, imbeciles and the subnormally developed individuals play in the incidence of crime must not be minimised. Quite 10% of the total criminal population in our jails consists of the diseased, the idiots, the imbeciles or the mentally underdeveloped. We should have a regular check on the physical and mental development of our children between six and fourteen. Those among them who suffer either from some stigmata or disease or disability which interferes with the normal functioning of their mind, which makes them lag behind the normal ones and become aloof or segregated from feelings of inferiority, and even depraved or obsessed, should be helped not left to themselves. They have all the instincts of satisfying their primary needs and desiring even the good things of life. With proper care and treatment the diseased and mentally retarded children could be turned back from crime and made into good citizens. Their incarceration in jails is to say the least inhuman, for they hardly have the intelligence or sense to control their actions.

This is a rough outline of the crime situation in India: a vacuum of leadership; social tensions in the village and floating populations in the cities; misdirected reformist urges which have led to partial prohibition and the fanning of prostitution; the absence of any attempt to reform and win back for society such elements as the beggars and the mentally retarded; the slow pace of social and economic reform and the fast rise in population and unemployment and lastly (but most important of all) the absence of any awareness of the role of a welfare state in formulating and implementing a comprehensive crime policy.

Letter from New York

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

TO the naked eye, not much that is new or exciting appears to have been happening here, not since the Cuban crisis, anyway, and not during the newspaper strike, or so it seemed. The absence of newspapers almost proves the absence of news. There is a funny calm, the calm of overadjusting to the present because one does not know about the future: with such side-effects as fatigue, smugness, indifference, of settling down for the long haul, and abandoning oneself to something called history. (History is usually invoked when men cannot control their fate.) The reasons for this pall are not hard to find, most of them having to do with the fact that for the time being there is both a national and international stalemate and extremes of action or thought are frowned on by everyone but the lunatics. Nor are the lunatics in this period, as they sometimes are, particularly interesting, or clever, or compelling, or creative.

The Cuban affair was the last drama, and if at the time it was frightening, it has since become clear that World War III could have come only out of desperation, not from planning. Anything leading to war or even to a serious shift in the balance of power was the last thing any responsible person wanted. Brinksmanship had become a defensive instead of an offensive weapon, a tactic not for getting some advantage, but for keeping the peace by keeping the stalemate. After the Cuban scare, everyone felt, in this country at least, that everything had been resolved. It was somehow assumed that tensions and crises would be reduced to the point where they could be handled by the experts, and that the amateur could

now forget about world politics; it was as though the confrontation of the two massive powers had produced some magical catharsis. Russia could now sit back and wait for the "inevitable" triumph of communism instead of forcing the issue by risking a war over a beachhead in Cuba. In this country, the war scare turned into its opposite, so that in the end it was taken as the final proof that war was out of the question because neither side was so insane as to think anything short of national existence was worth destroying the world for. And if the United States acted as though it was ready to fight, this was understood as a way of saying to the Soviet Union that the way to keep the peace was to keep missiles out of Cuba, because Russian missiles in Cuba were regarded as a threat to the security of the United States.

The peace was kept. And if some people still believe that war is possible, through accident or design or miscalculation, it is an abstract belief, divorced from time and place, for nobody really thinks war or even a major crisis is something to worry about right now. Our mood is almost completely non-political; politics is left mostly to the professionals, and among the amateurs it lingers on only among certain anti-communists. Even the dreamers and the radicals are apathetic, and the Birch Society seems dead.

It is true that the Republicans have opened up on the Kennedy administration for failing to get rid of Castro and for being generally "soft" on Russia. But the Republicans have to get their campaign going for the next Presidential election, and they must have some issues. Unfortu-

nately, there are only two possible issues, the domestic and the foreign one. And since the Republicans may not be so lucky as to have a depression just before the election, this leaves the foreign issue—which is simply one of hardness or softness on communism—as the only one to be counted on. Softness on Russia—and Cuba—is always the policy of the party in power. Toughness, that is, muscle-bound Americanism, is always the policy of the party out of power, the defeated party. Eisenhower and Dulles, it will be recalled, came in as heroes of the anti-communist crusade, as ‘liberators’; the Democrats, they charged, had no will to stop the Russians, and even in theory were so timid they could not go beyond a policy of containment. Then Kennedy, speaking for the ‘outs,’ attacked the liberators for letting the missile and space programme lag and for permitting communism to establish a ‘beachhead ninety miles from the American shore.’ So it goes. But the point is that these periodic displays of toughness have more to do with domestic than with foreign questions. Hence the magic of the Cuban showdown solved a number of problems, at home and abroad, at one stroke. It stopped the Russians, it displayed the necessary political virility, it avoided a war, and by some kind of political alchemy it converted war into peace.

What is next? Nobody knows. But where in the past not knowing was a form of anxiety, today it is a sign of international calm. Of course, Castro is still a thorn for many Americans, but how to remove the thorn is another question. More and more people are learning that the only way to prevent the spread of the Russian brand of communism in Latin America is through some kind of democratic socialism that would wipe out the backwardness and the corruption of semi-feudal countries, and introduce economic planning without regimentation. The trouble is that this lesson is being learned in a purely abstract way. So far no one

has come up with a formula for building genuinely democratic and socialist movements against both conservative and communist opposition. As we know, the conservatives are out to destroy all progressive and revolutionary movements, the communists only those they cannot control. This, of course, is the problem that has worried liberals and radicals ever since the shape of the Russian revolution became clear, though recently it has been covered up by all kinds of idealogical chatter that tells one little more than that freedom is better than dictatorship.



In the so-called cultural sphere, things have been changing quite radically if not dramatically, but it is difficult to write about this, perhaps because the change has been creeping up on us for years. It is hard to define or to evaluate just what is happening and where we are heading, or even to be sure that one is observing correctly. Perhaps the main difficulty lies in the fact that one must think about new things partly in terms of old traditions and categories. But some confusion also comes from the fact that some people, particularly those who are addicted to innovation, find it easier to think about new things in their own terms.

One of the most obvious symptoms of change is the apparent breakdown of distinctions between serious and popular audiences, subjects, magazines. I say ‘apparent’ because I think the illusion is greater than the reality. And though the phenomenon is not a sudden one, things have gone much further than they ever have in the past.

Here are some examples. *The New Yorker* just ran a long series of articles on the Eichmann trial and on the disturbing question dredged up by it by Hannah Arendt, whom a small enlightened audience usually found hard to read in the past. *The New Yorker*, too, has been using Harold Rosenberg, another avant-garde

ideologue up to now, as its art critic. Also in *The New Yorker* there appeared recently the much-discussed essay on the Negro 'question' by James Baldwin. These are all examples from the traditionally more popular magazines, which for one or another reason give the impression of lifting their level, at least in part. But there are also such new magazines as *Nugget* and *Playboy*, which have found a formula for mixing sex and culture that is good for circulation. They use pieces on 'high-brow' subjects by name-writers to add intellectual respectability to their main content, which is either sexy or chichi or fashionably off-beat. Then there are magazines like *Esquire*, which publishes movie pieces by Dwight Macdonald, a column by Norman Mailer, and articles by other 'serious writers.' Lately the women's magazines and even the *Saturday Evening Post* also have been going in for the new intellectual fashions, and until you become used to this national up-to-dateness, you wonder whether some piece was not sent to the wrong printer.

This new sophistication means different things to different people, depending on one's idea of tradition and one's stakes in what is happening. There are always the cynics, of course, who never think anything means anything, and in the end are for everything. Then we have the professional optimists who find signs of progress whenever a new intellectual cemetery is built. And there are the traditionalists, who really combine modernism with a kind of cultural conservatism, and who, therefore, look at what is happening with some alarm. I suppose I would have to count myself mostly in this camp, for one of the effects of the new trend is clearly to promote the chic, the shocking, the slick, and thus transform ideas into sensations and writers into celebrities. Sex becomes the principle area of innovation: and success becomes the real test of quality. Those who like to think of this process as part of intellectual history might note that the forces behind it have

more to do with money than with the natural developments in the arts. Nor is there, if we are to weigh cultural gains against losses, enough evidence to indicate the genuine audience for modern ideas and modern art is either livelier or larger.

The Baldwin piece in *The New Yorker* is almost a test case. All last winter it seemed nothing else was being talked about in New York. And there was a good deal of cultural self-congratulation by people of good will, who felt that Baldwin's message about the plight of the Negro was reaching a bigger audience. It is true that many people who have not had a good cause for a long time acted as though they had finally found one. But what this cause is never became clear. On the contrary, I have the impression that for many people the excitement of reading Baldwin's piece took care of their guilt and their responsibility. Actually, Baldwin's piece, after a moving description of Negro life in the North as well as the South, peters out into various suggestive and titillating remarks about sex and love. The effect is to convert a painful and explosive subject into another form of entertainment, of 'interesting reading.' Another piece on the Negro 'Problem,' by Norman Podhoretz, appeared in *Commentary*. I thought it a strong statement of white entanglement, very well done, but its advocacy of miscegenation as the final solution begged the question of what political changes must be made before miscegenation is possible for large numbers of people. These changes would have to be so radical in themselves as to abolish the existing prejudice and discrimination.

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Recent fiction has been mostly on the slick side. Philip Roth's latest novel, *Letting Go*, a genre story of Jewish life in modern prose, is an instance of talent feeding on itself. Roth has become an ac-

complished novelist, but one would like to see a writer of his gifts let go more, take more chances, make more mistakes. I haven't yet read Updike's new novel, *The Centaur*. But his first two books, *Rabbit, Run* and *Pigeon Feathers*, struck me as outstanding examples of undergraduate prose, the kind of prose that is at once proficient and empty and therefore automatically rates a mark of A. Baldwin's novel, *Another Country*, is slick too, but in its subject rather than its style. The writing is quite crude, which gives the novel the appearance of reality. But the experience of the novel, which consists mainly of the sexual permutations of colour and gender, is so conventionally presented that its main effect is to be shocking and chic.

The theater remains haphazard and unpredictable. The best and least pretentious play is *Beyond the Fringe*, an import from England. It is a political satire, quite funny and gay. Of the native products, *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, by Edward Albee, is one of the most pretentious. (It just missed a grand slam of all the awards for the best play of the year, as the Pulitzer committee found it too gamy.) Albee, who only a few years ago had the freshness of a new talent, has now come all the way: his new play is the work of a veteran playwright, fast, smooth, witty, engaging. Ironically, now that Albee has found himself, he sounds like a polish-

ed version of Tennessee Williams, as he makes a drawing-room tragedy out of Williams' favorite themes of self-destruction and impotence. *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* converts the living room into an unused bedroom.

On the whole, one has the feeling of a lull, as though we were in a period whose shape had not yet been determined. In such a time, since people are afraid of betting on the wrong trend, we get a little bit of everything, usually scrambled together to play it completely safe. The safest, and so far the most successful formula, is to mix sex, social consciousness, and advanced thinking, and to give the whole thing an experimental look.

If what is going on here is typical, it means we are living through some gigantic paradox. The same policy — as we saw in the Cuban crisis — that might lead to war can insure peace. A work of art — as in the recent rage over pop-art — that has an avant-garde form, has a fashionable content. In enlightened circles, radicalism has become respectable, irreverence has become fashionable, and the unpopular has become popular. Maybe we are moving toward the ultimate paradox, which is to think that everything that is bad is at the same time good.

(Exclusive to Quest)

CURRENT POLITICS

Tribalism and Modern Political Developments in Africa

[This article is an excerpt from a discussion which took place recently between Mr. Masika, a research student at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (London), from Uganda, Mr. Asfaw Damte, an economist from Ethiopia studying at Cambridge, and Mr. Charles Patterson, an American research fellow of the University of California, Berkeley. The discussion was chaired by Professor Ernest Gellner.]

GELLNER: The first thing I should like to do is to distinguish three senses of tribalism or tribes, which are sometimes confused.

One, small village units or groups of villages, which in pre-industrial societies often, though not always, take over many of the functions which in industrialised societies are taken over by the State and its agencies. This is the first sense of tribe — a small unit consisting of people who are actually in contact with each other and who are generally kin, or have kin beliefs — beliefs in a common ancestor or ancestress, as the case may be.

The second sense of tribalism is simply culture; the sense in which people are said to be the same tribe if they speak the same language, have the same traditions, customs, legends, values — and so forth. This sense of tribe can embrace, of course, many millions of people.

The third sense of tribalism is, perhaps an unfortunate use of the word, that term used to describe any traditional political organisation in Africa. And, of course, traditional political organisations sometimes involve quite large units, what in fact, are states — and sometimes empires.

In each of these three senses, tribalism can be in conflict either with the modern political units of Africa, or with the aspirations for larger political units still, and I

think each of these aspects has to be discussed.

DAMTE: I think the definition of a tribe that is acceptable to most people and the one which I am accustomed to understanding is the second one; that is, a tribe means a group of people living in a given territory, not necessarily small, and speaking the same language or one common language with slight variations and usually believing in a common ancestor.

MASIKA: The first definition fits, I believe, what anthropologists call a clan. The clan is a subdivision of a larger group, the tribe, whose only cohesiveness lies in a certain cultural homogeneity. It is merely incidental if this tribe has certain territorial boundaries and is organised into a state.

PATTERSON: What about tribalism in respect to the whole question of Pan-Africanism? Is it possible to conceive of Pan-Africanism as a kind of super extension of much of what you would conceive to be what goes into making up a tribe, particularly, I think, in regard to the second part of your typology? It seems to me that Pan-Africanism stresses the communalities, the common culture. It seems to me that

there is a kind of tribal mystique involving this whole notion of Pan-Africanism, and in some sense, the notion of nation-state stands in a way as a development of the tribe from the smaller cultural units to this large super African national tribal unit which will have a sense of community and a sense of common culture.

DAMTE: I think we must avoid pushing the text-book definitions too far. When we say a tribe and its culture is distinct, we really mean this in a relative sense because most African tribes have certain basic things in common. For instance you will find the practices of certain tribes in Ethiopia similar to those of the Ashanti in Ghana. But I do not think that Pan-Africanism should be founded on a tribal or even an ethnic basis. All those who live in Africa and who consider themselves Africans — whether red or white — must be considered as raw materials for a Pan-African state. The importance of Pan-Africanism is that in a world of giant units such as the United States, the Soviet Union and the European Common Market, independent individual African states cannot really survive. Not only are they too small, but they are poor and backward, and they must work together and pool all their resources so as to advance economically and politically. The basis of this sort of union should not be tribal or even racial.

GELLNER: But there are a number of quite acute problems in connection with the notion of tribalism and the ideal of Pan-African unity. Suppose this ideal achieved, do you or do you not encourage tribes in the sense which you prefer, i.e. the second sense, the cultural units? There are obviously enormous disadvantages in perpetuating a number of separate cultures, some of which are quite small. It is the kind of problem which India is facing at present with her huge and linguistically very diversified population. It is difficult to run a modern administration and a modern industrial society without some kind of cultural homogeneity. People must

be able to move from job to job and place to place, be understood wherever they go, read the same instructions, the same papers and so on. If you wish to insist on the old tribal cultures as somehow legitimate, one can foresee enormous difficulties. Sentimental bonds are one thing, but can you have, for instance, a strong Ashanti culture in a unified and economically dynamic West Africa? Regional cultures do, of course, survive — take the Welsh for example — but do you want to encourage them?

MASIKA: I don't think we in Africa intend to encourage what cannot survive under modern conditions. The purpose of looking into the question of tribalism is to discover which of the cultural aspects can survive and which must be modernized or modified. Because we Africans are in a hurry for development along the lines of the other nations of the world, we must foster what is common to our African heritage in order to provide a basis of unity for a Pan-African state.

Language is obviously one problem of this larger unit. In East Africa, for example, Swahili is spoken throughout Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, but it is unacceptable in Uganda. The difficulty will persist as long as there is a sense of tribal pride, for the adoption of the language of another tribe implies a certain inferiority. Swahili is acceptable mainly because the Swahili are a dying race. Since they were originally a product of the Arabs and Bantus living on the East Coast, their language is Arabic mixed with some Bantu words. As it was used by commercial travellers, the language has now spread as far down as the Congo. Eventually it might envelop the whole of East and Central Africa.

DAMTE: I think that those aspects of our tribal cultures which can survive the impact of a Pan-African unit and the modernized political structure are to be maintained. And, of course, those which

are an obvious impediment to any such progress will naturally die out.

PATTERSON: What you are saying is that tribal units do have to go at some point, and not only will they go, as it were, out of a kind of natural development, but because in the light of Pan-African ideology they have to go. Since the process of adaption will take place within the framework of Pan-African goals, the small tribes will lose their basic identity through the adoption of the cultural attributes of the larger tribes by the creators of Pan-Africanism.

MASIKA: I do not share your pessimism about the disappearance of the smaller cultural units. Pan-Africanism could very well result in cross-fertilization rather than destruction of regional differences.

GELLNER: As we are all agreed that cultural pluralism is a good thing as far as it is compatible with modern political and economic organization, I should like to turn the discussion to the political aspect of Pan-Africanism.

Again assuming this ideal of Pan-Africanism, how does one join in a Pan-African union? Does one join it as an individual, does one join it as a political unit inherited from the past by often accidental circumstances, or does one join it as a tribe? Is the membership card issued to tribes or to the inherited political units or to whom? You see what hinges on this is the practical and immediate problem concerning the political legitimacy of the tribe. If one is a member of Tribe X and at the same time a citizen of accidental State Y, accidental in the sense of being inherited from the colonial period, is being a member of Tribe X a legitimate ground for wishing to change the boundaries of State Y in order to include all the fellow tribes of X — or fellow culture sharers of X — in the same political unit?

DAMTE: I think the main reason for changing some of the boundary lines

drawn by the colonial powers is not so much to perpetuate the tribal system as to create more efficient administrative units.

GELLNER: It is not always the case that tribal unity makes for a more efficient administration, because some of the tribes are extremely discontinuous territorially. A Berber state would be like spilt milk stretching all the way from Egypt to the Atlantic Ocean in bits and pieces.

MASIKA: I should have thought probably the one merit of Pan-Africanism is its attempt to overshadow the desire to bring together people of the same tribe who were divided by colonial powers.

The paradox of this creation of a state in Africa is that although some tribes would feel at a loss when you talk of a state being created and some tribal loyalties being given up for the sake of the state, you will, nevertheless, find in every tribe — at least among the well informed — those who support the idea of Pan-Africanism. But a state to link up all these tribes must be achieved before we can look forward to something greater.

If, however, each tribe is afraid of the creation of a state without safeguards for itself, the idea of such a union will collapse and the tribes will look towards Pan-Africanism.

GELLNER: One does rather fear from what you describe that the notion of Pan-Africanism is an easy way out. What I mean is this: the minority tribes are liable to be frightened of their local national state which may be a genuine danger to them, but everybody is in favour of Pan-Africanism just as everybody is against sin. Because as a Pan-African state doesn't exist at the moment, there's nothing to be afraid of.

MASIKA: They regard the state as the immediate successor to a colonial power. Pan-Africanism will be our own creation; its appeal is that it comes into being remotely and promises not to subjugate the

tribes forcibly as the state or the colonial power has been doing.

GELLNER: One must not invoke the idea of a Pan-African state simply as an automatic solution for problems which are quite difficult or on a smaller scale. They are obviously problems about the coexistence of a number of culture within one state. Even if you had a larger Pan-African unit, there would of necessity be some kind of internal arrangements since it is unlikely that you would have one Minister of Education for the whole of Africa. Suppose you had one for a region consisting of three cultures, one of which was dominant, the two minor ones would fear that their language was being neglected in the schools and so forth. Constitution designing is an amusing game.

MASIKA: Until the issues arise in a concrete way, we cannot really say what the

ordinary person, the ordinary tribe or the ordinary state would feel.

Already Pan-Africanism has had a setback because of the split between the Monrovia and the Casablanca Groups. The question at present is how far the state which is in the process of being created as a successor to the colonial state will safeguard the interests of the others. The question of Pan-Africanism is in the future, and until some more definite planning is done, I don't really see how anyone can be against it.

DAMTE: I think the main drive behind the Pan-African political leaders is the thought that a small independent country in Africa cannot survive viz-a-viz the European Common Market and the Super-Powers. There is also a positive aspect. Those who favour a large political unit hope that the influence of the neighbouring tribes will be counterbalanced by that of large tribes in other parts of Africa.

A R T S

Atomic Operas

MARTIN S. DWORKIN

THERE is a moment when prophecies of doom no longer terrify, when the horripilant repetitions themselves give reassurances, in the way of delicious bedtime tales; or, when the imagined disasters are savored as creations of imagination, and judged primarily as works of art. The former attitude may well trouble the moralist or statesman, at any time of peril. But it is the latter that is more dangerous, as cynics and theologians have always recognized, in marking the seductive salvations of art. The dramatization of atomic holocaust, for example, is by now an established genre, especially on the screen, and has its devoted connoisseurs as well as its day-to-day consumers. As signs of worldly concern over any imminent disaster to the world, however, these atomic operas generally indicate more fascination than aversion. For all their precise forebodings, and despite any occasional serious intentions, the films are likely to have as much value off-screen in affecting the omnipresent event as have detective stories in deterring actual murder.

These sad doubts might be relented, if only for once, if it were only possible for so superior an example as *The Day the Earth Caught Fire* to be seen without pleasure — if not altogether in fear and trembling; or, for so credible a foreboding as the more modest *Panic In Year Zero* to be taken more as warning, and less as morbid wishing. And the matter may be less one of the artistic values of these films,

than of the commitment of audiences. When dooms become a genre of any art, prophecy is put up for sale. The people purchasing this or that apocalypse know what they are buying, the ceaseless drumming of advertising having called them most carefully. By the time they may be telling themselves how shocking are the revelations of an impending future they have seen, the relevance of the work of imagination, that happens to be a movie, to any real present has been transformed. For all the reality of the shock in the theaters, its administration, following forms of so many familiar entertainments, carries its own catharses, providing conventional substitutes for thought and action. The more enjoyable the film, in fact, the less likely its therapeutic disturbance of complacencies, apathies, surfeits of senseless comfort and witless peace of mind.

The Day the Earth Caught Fire, to be sure, has sincere purposes beyond those of traditional science fiction moralities, that conjure up space-age spooks for safely Victorian vainquishment. Writer Wolf Mankowitz, and his collaborator Val Guest, who also produced and directed the film, can claim full marks for earnest pro-survivalism. A goodly number of the right things about saving humanity are said, and in well-aimed shards of dialogue jagged and brittle enough to keep sophisticated sentimentalists from becoming self-conscious, and clever enough not to offend the *fanatics* of astounding stories. And it may

reassure the former as much as the latter to have them said, not by conscience-stricken physicists or other plainly psychotic Faustians, but by knowing newspapermen — those traditional spokesmen, in didactic fiction, for the sovereign but inarticulate public. In fact, some trouble has been taken to insist on realism in depicting these archetypal prophets, placing them in the office of an actual London daily (the *Express*), complete with a living, fire-breathing editor (the flamboyant Arthur Christiansen, who drove the *Express* for 25 years) playing himself and any editor with more than minimal competence.

The realism in presenting the newspaper as the daily arbiter of reality is intended to emphasize the effect of the fantasy — of what happens to the world after it has been jarred out of its normal orbit by simultaneous thermonuclear test explosions, unwittingly set off by the Russians and the Americans. Imputing journalistic objectivity also allows for some nice neutralism in placing blame. Such an outlook is surely comforting to many in the film's immediate audiences in Britain and the Commonwealth — although it may puzzle some to see the *Daily Express* playing at being neutral about anything. In fact, the grimy newsroom detail and gritty dialogue contribute to a certain old-fashioned aura about the film, despite the topical urgency of what is being said, and the futuristic imagery of what is being shown.

There have been so many bustling newsrooms in the movies, so many stop-the-presses exposés and cries of noble journalistic outrage in the name of humanity and truth, so many hard-bitten reporters and hard-bitten desk men. There even have been a sufficiency of once-promising writers trying to eschew the booze and pick up their careers after disastrous divorces or love affairs. These are not too unlike the embittered, disillusioned, all-but-disinterested fellow in this film, played by Edward Judd, who finds himself again in his awakening feelings for a fresh new love, Janet Munro, and in his professional obser-

vation of the disaster that is so much bigger than his personal defeat.

This time, the scientist-explainer making everything clear to the others in the cast — and to the audience — may not be the familiar professor or high-domed researcher of innumerable space-age fantasies. But making him a science desk man somehow adds to the period romanticism, and all the newsroom realism. Played with discerning warmth by Leo McKern, he displays his awesome expertise with more wit than do the movies' usual academic know-it-alls. The newspaper milieu, however, puts a roto tinge of Sunday-supplement sensationalism upon the fiery explanations of how the earth is being roasted. Whatever nostalgia this may evoke for ante-television times of newspaper prestige and influence must eventually provoke a measure of doubt concerning the educational value of this kind of journalism — and, by reasonable projection, this kind of cinema. In fact, the effect is to associate the two forms of sensationalism — by reason not of their power to shock, but their familiarity, built up of decades of mutual confirmation.

The vivid images of the dying earth and its resigned or frenzied people inevitably recall countless newsprint sermons heralding world's end and judgment day, usually tinted to attractive shades of suspicious disparagement of scientists, for suitable Sunday services along with the comics and sports pages. The scenes of advancing desiccation, such as a grim postcard view of London Bridge gauntly spanning a parched-out Thames, may be compared with the special effects of the finest vintage science fiction — implying the recognitions intended in comparison. Lines of empty, silent streets, like nightmare vistas after Chirico, repeat a now familiar pictograph of an ascendant language for describing the world following atomic war — as articulated, for example, in Stanley Kramer's *On the Beach* (1959), and Randal MacDougall's *The World, the Flesh and the Devil* (1959). Another set of symbols, denoting as many fearsome wishes as reasonable fears, presents the ultimate liberation

of adolescent behaviour in the aftermath of disaster and the certainty of doom. The carousing and vandalism of the kids of *The Day the Earth Caught Fire* are at once more forlorn and innocent than the rapine, pillage, and murder of the snotty hoods of *Panic In Year Zero*. These post-atomic kids and hoods, however, are pitiable or terrifying in their familiarity.

For even as the people who may set off the bombs are our contemporaries, so are all the others we choose to fear or admire, for what they might be to live with after the worst has been said and done. In fact, the ominous recognitions draw both frank escapists and those yearning to promote the atomic operas as anti-atom audio-visual aids. And it is in considering what the films are asking us to do, beyond joining uncommitted crowds in theaters, that we may judge any effectiveness in changing, rather than reinforcing the attitudes — to any end of relaxing the fingers on the buttons now, or encouraging the survival of some decency later.

While both *The Day the Earth Caught Fire* and *Panic In Year Zero* are fictions about what has followed atomic disaster, the former is plainly intended to say something about prevention: specifically, to cry halt to the testing of bombs and to all thinking that preparations for total warfare can be carried on endlessly without total judgment and penalty. And, as has been remarked, it may be as much the fault of audiences as of the film itself that, finally, it only entertains, or instructs in such a way as to no more than corroborate the vagrant certainties of popular newsprint about science — as, for example, that the order of weather, as well as of all nature, surely has been unbalanced by the scientists and all their learned madness. The intentions of *Panic In Year Zero*, however, point to other, more personal fears, and to present conceptions of future alternatives that may be even more corrosive and terrifying.

From a screenplay by Jay Simms and John Morton, and directed by Ray Milland, the film is a straightforward rendering,

carefully realistic in detail, of a now constant daydream of the struggle of a family to stay alive after the bombs have fallen. Again, the realism asserts not only the plausibility, but the essential familiarity of the fantasy — in the classic 'What would you do if...' form that offers incantations of dreadful imaginings to turn fear to wishful play. From the moment the vacationing family, led by Milland himself as the father, notices the terrible illumination of the sky, and the tell-tale cloud over where Los Angeles had been, there unfolds a cold prediction of the behaviour of neighbours and strangers in first panic and extended chaos. This guess is no more fanciful, at the least, than all the recent cocktail talk of guns defending family fallout shelters against ferocious refugees, or the manoeuvres of secret companies of amateur commandos, endlessly vigilant amid uncounted enemies.

It therefore comes as no surprise that Milland immediately comprehends the almost total breakdown of order, in which every encounter with others is a possible and even probable battle for life. Similarly, the reactions of his model family follow careful lines of vicarious precedent — even to playing an antique space-age joke straight in retreating to a cave in a remote part of a favourite hunting ground. In their perilous anabasis, it is not unexpected that the mother, Jean Hagen, will stand four-square for the preservation of culture as well as civilization, passionately presenting the conscientious objections to all the suspicions, fortifications, and outright violences that Milland maintains — and demonstrates are necessary for survival. After all, it is an hallowed preachment of the movies that the decent folk should do their dirtiest reluctantly — albeit with quick-draw, iron-fisted proficiency — while Mom or the girl friend looks on, tentatively horrified.

In fact, this point is firmly made by Milland to his 19-year old son, played without singing by singer Frankie Avalon, when it appears that the youth is beginning to enjoy the thrills of righteous violence a

bit too plainly. And, it is no more than a reassertion of ancient moral values of the movies that sex and violence should be eventually conjoined, and with tasty rectitude, as father and son blast the vicious punks who have raped the family virgin, Mary Mitchel. The film, it should be said, is more than fair to the punks in having made the girl an exemplar, a sweet-sixteenager who protests bitterly that 'This whole thing...' of struggling for survival — without cokes, telephones, and all the sacraments of adolescent American life — '...is a drag. It's such a bore!' The moment carries nice didactic irony, although the unqualifiable outrage is made to seem somehow deserved — or, at the least, inevitable.

The retaliation, of course, is obligatory in the canon of movie melodrama, once again raising the question of the kind of catharsis that is appropriate in dramatic works having purposes beyond escapist entertainment. Such purposes, if it needs

saying, may hardly be denied in considering something so explicit as is *Panic In Year Zero* about how we are likely to behave, and even how we ought to behave, in the situation that is so universally feared. But in judging both the lesson and the entertainment in this film, as in *The Day the Earth Caught Fire* and others of what is a growing genre, it does make a difference whether we are being led not only to envision, but to enjoy the worst or the best we are capable of imagining about our possible future. So much horror and terror is sold so often in the theaters, to so little effect in exorcising the endless horror and terror in the world, and to some dread measure of mirroring a perpetual destiny. And insofar as they truly reflect the world of our times, in their coeval fictions and inevitably familiar prophecies, the movies may be showing us much more of our future than is being made visible on the screen, and than we could bear seeing, if only we would look.

Ustad Amir Khan

CHETAN KARNANI

AMONG the contemporary Hindustani Vocalists, Amir Khan is one of a few singers, who can create a time — 'Svar' continuum. In the Akashvani Sangeet Sammelan held in the year 1958, he contemplated over the notes of Abhogi for half an hour, and still it appeared as if he had just started the recital.

This complete identification with the raga and the avoidance of an attempt to make a deliberate effect would easily remind one of T. S. Eliots' dictum: 'Art is not an expression of personality but an escape from it.' In the first half of his recital, Amir Khan does not render any note in a hurry, nor does he execute a pattern of notes. Instead, he believes in the primacy of a musical note, which has a power to chasten and subdue the mind.

To attain this state of serenity and repose, Amir Khan has introduced a daring innovation by discarding altogether the use of the sarangi in his recitals. This itself is a proof of his amazing vocal resources and the delectable sweetness of his mellow voice. Amir Khan has made us realise that if one wants to contemplate over notes, the sarangi is not an aid but an obstacle. Still many vocalists, who have a craze for speed and fondness for vocal acrobatics, further spoil their performance by admitting the jarring notes of the sarangi in their recital.

A rigid classical mind will always seek freedom within form. Unlike the vocalists of Dhrupad style, Amir Khan renders alap in slow tempo to the accompaniment of the tabla, but he preserves the depth and repose of the great Dhrupadiyas. Few vocalists of the Khayal style elaborate their raga in the lower octave as gracefully as Amir Khan does.

The art of Amir Khan is best understood in relation to that of Bade Ghulam Ali Khan. Two of our sweetest vocalists of Hindustani classical music, they have an entirely different approach to their art. Amir Khan regards it as the function of music to soothe the mind of the listener and help him to achieve complete identification with the musical note. I. A. Richards tells us that the valuable states of mind in aesthetic experience are those wherein we attain a perfect organisation of our impulses or a state of nervous equipoise. From this point of view, an Amir Khan recital is far more effective than that of Ghulam Ali. The latter, even as he starts his recital, renders an intricate pattern of notes to leave us amazed at his art.

So it is hardly surprising that a Ghulam Ali recital, not only does not soothe the mind, — but also lacks in 'architectonics' which an Amir Khan recital always has. Amir Khan builds his musical edifice note by note in observance of the principles of Gestalt psychology — namely when you touch the next higher note, an entirely new whole is formed in relation to the earlier notes. Amir Khan takes at least half an hour to develop his favourite depth ragas like Marva, Todi, Purya Dhanashri or Darbari. I have never heard any other singer render such an emotional 'Madhyam' with all its subtle nuances as Amir Khan has done in his one-hour recorded rendering of Miyan Ki Malhar. Opposed to this, Ghulam Ali's favourite ragas are pentatonic modes like Bhopali and Malkauns, which have a fitting grace and which enable Ghulam Ali to render his 'tan' (fast figures) ranging over all three octaves to our great surprise.

In fact, all the schools of Hindustani classical music—Agra, Gwalior, Kairana, Jaipur or Delhi should be reduced to the two schools initiated by two of our great vocalists—namely the ‘contemplative school’ of Amir Khan and ‘active school’ of Ghulam Ali. Within the frame-work of this classification, if further subdivision is to be made, then Amir Khan, who originally hails from Indore, represents the highest consummation of the Kairana school of Hindustani music.

However, this does not mean that Amir Khan fails to impress in allegro rhythm. On the contrary, he believes that the Vilambit and the Drut styles of singing have, or at least should have, distinctly separate qualities. Whereas the Vilambit singing should be contemplative, serene, and reposeful, the Drut singing should be trim, inspired, and surprising. The virtuosity of the last

portion of his recital would fill anyone with wonder that the same singer could have an equal mastery of the two styles of singing. If the Vilambit part of his recital reveals the possibilities of development of a raga in the lower octave, the Drut part has all the unpremeditated ‘tans’ ascending in the upper octave, giving an impression of a breathless leap into verticality.

More than all this, Amir Khan is great because of his realisation of the deeper values, which transcend formal exactitude, and constitute the inner reality of classical music. He has always held that the function of classical music is not only to please and surprise, but to soothe and elevate the mind. Since not many contemporary vocalists have realised this principle, Amir Khan’s contribution to Hindustani classical music is far greater than is generally realised.

DISCUSSION

Convergence

Do you foresee a gradual convergence of the social and/or political systems of the West and the Soviet Union?

CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW: The principal differences between the two systems arise from the Soviet Union's lack of political, personal, and cultural freedom, its lower living standards, greater social equality, and higher level of economic planning and stability. If each of these fields is examined, it becomes evident that a distinct convergence between the two systems has taken place and is likely to continue to do so.

Political freedom: From the Western side there has been, and is likely to be, little significant development towards Soviet political methods. But it should not be overlooked that the power of the executive over the legislature—and perhaps also over public opinion—has increased in Western countries and is likely to increase further. The trend towards bi-partisanship in foreign affairs, and the steady erosion of party differences on internal questions will continue, and this could possibly be represented as a trend towards single-party as against multi-party democracy.

On the Soviet side there have been some notable advances towards Western standards—a marked decrease in the power of the secret police and in the personal power of the Head of State; a significant increase in freedom of speech for private citizens and in their foreign contacts; and a small increase in the autonomy of the courts,

and of local and central government institutions.

These advances are likely to continue. As in the past, they will not be accompanied by spectacular changes in the formal structure of the Soviet political system. (This system is already so democratic in form that it can accommodate any predictable advance towards genuine freedom without substantial change.) Power will continue to rest overwhelmingly with the Soviet Communist Party.

Nevertheless, on the reasonable assumption that the rapid increase in living standards is maintained, further liberalisation along established lines can be confidently forecast. When Mr Khrushchev disappears, his successor is unlikely to inherit his full measure of personal power. A further increase in the relative power of the Central Committee is probable, and differences of opinion in the committee are likely to become more open. This trend will not constitute an unmanageable threat to party unity unless—which does not seem likely—a strong 'Chinese' faction emerges. It is hard to envisage indigenous political forces strong enough to produce a decisive anti-revisionist reaction on the Central Committee.

We can therefore conclude that the Soviet and Western political systems will continue to converge in the coming decade, with the Soviet system making much

the greater contribution towards closing the gap.

Personal freedom: While there will be no diminution of fundamental civil rights in the Western countries, the increased complexity of their societies will continue to add to petty restrictions on personal freedom. On the Soviet side, though penalties for anti-social activities may increase as a result of increased opportunities and temptations, there seems no reason to forecast any reversal of the current trend towards greater respect for individual rights and 'socialist legality'.

Cultural freedom: On the Western side, no significant change need be expected. On the Soviet side, there will be tactical fluctuations in the amount of freedom allowed to musicians, writers, and artists; but the long term trend towards greater liberty will not be stopped or reversed. The popularity of the changes, and the increasing dependence of the Soviet State on its intelligentsia, make this increasingly difficult. Similarly, the Soviet Government is now so deeply and publicly committed to the principle of cultural contacts with foreign countries that a sudden restriction on these would be extremely embarrassing and would not be lightly undertaken.

The spread of popular Western-type music among young people in the Soviet Union is also virtually unstoppable and will continue. Western style of dress and other consumer goods, being brighter and better, will continue to gain a hold. In general, the cultural gap between the two systems has narrowed, and will continue to do so.

Living standards: The convergence of living standards, which has been a feature of the last decade, will continue. East-West differences in housing conditions, standards of dress, and recreational habits (other than motoring) will tend to disappear.

Economic planning and stability: The avoidance of a major capitalist slump for two decades has probably been the outstanding feature of 'East-West convergence'. This is an all-important Western advance towards Soviet standards. The Western trend towards central planning—through budgetary policy, incomes policy, large public expenditures, and direct public enterprise—is likely to continue, in response to technological developments, especially those involved in the United States' space and defence programmes.

At the same time, continued Soviet failures in agriculture and retailing will compel measures of de-centralisation and increased personal financial incentives. The accounting system in Soviet industry will develop the important concept of rent and interest as charges for land, machinery, and other capital assets. Here again, therefore, continued convergence is likely.

Social equality: In the Western countries, the trend over the last decade has been, on balance, towards educational and social equality, and uniformity of manners and culture; and this is likely to continue. Further advances will be made in the United States against racial discrimination.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, rising living standards, the increased availability of luxury goods, the state's dependence on the intelligentsia, and increased financial incentives, are likely to produce greater social differentiation.

From this survey, a further general convergence of the systems seems very likely. This process will be hastened by the increasing tendency on both sides to conceive competition between the two systems in concrete terms—i.e. not in terms of 'freedom' and 'socialism', but in precise measurable economic achievements. This will create a strong incentive on both sides to apply empirical tests to political and economic nostrums, and to abandon those which, however attractive ideologically, fail to produce results.

HENRY L. ROBERTS: In commenting on the prospects for a gradual convergence of the Western and Soviet social and political systems I shall limit myself to a few observations on this question as it has presented itself in the past, on certain fairly predictable impulses towards either convergence or divergence, and on the necessarily uncertain nature of the outcome.

Interpreting Russia's relationship to Western Europe has long been a staple of Russia historiography, and, rightly or wrongly, a number of features of this relationship have been subsequently incorporated into comparisons of the Soviet Union with the West. In my judgement pre-revolutionary contrasts have probably been drawn too sharply; Russia's traditional relations to the rest of Europe are, on the whole, more satisfactorily described in terms of the gradations of a spectrum extending across the continent rather than of an antithesis or polarity. That there was a *sense* of antithesis, in both Russia and the West, is clear, and the importance of such subjective views should not be underestimated. Moderate differences in degree can easily be conceived of as symbols of a major difference in kind.

In any event, I have the impression that this picture of antithesis, whether we take it to be a historical reality or a subjective projection, was becoming increasingly irrelevant in the two decades preceding the first world war, clearly on the cultural and intellectual plane, less so on the political. The creative burst in arts and letters of Russia's Silver Age is closely allied to similar activity in the West, and the nineteenth century formulas about Russian-Western relations seem oddly out of place in this setting. It should be noted, however, that this growing similarity was not the consequence of a coming together of the two societies or a synthesis of their differences; it was rather a common irruption into the strange and disquieting moral, intellectual, and esthetic landscape of the twentieth century, a landscape we are still trying to chart. If there was a convergence

between Russia and the West at this time, it was not through resolution but through advance into the unknown.

Then the first world war struck. While it was both a symptom and an expression of new and disruptive impulses, in some respects it also—like other major convulsions, such as the Reformation—seems to have set the clock back. Out of war and ensuing revolution there re-emerged the old East-West antithesis, this time garbed as Communist East and Imperialist West. This is not to deny an explicit and central conflict between the goals and means of communism and those of other societies. But one of the continuing problems of historical scholarship on communism has been precisely the double, and extremely difficult, task of relating the dynamism and hostility of communism to the Russian soil in which it developed, and of ascertaining wherein this soil differed from that of Germany or France or Great Britain.

In addition to the doctrinal hostility of communism and the uncertain influence of earlier historical differences, once the Revolution had taken place and sought survival in an unfriendly environment (in good part of its own making), there was a quite important impetus for divergence in the very act of breaking away, of disaffiliation. This struggle for separate identity is a common feature in human affairs: in a child's escape from its parents, in a colony's separation from the mother country, in a religious or social revolutionary movement's withdrawal from the culture which brought it into being. This process of separation is a painful and intricate one, not a struggle between two unrelated and alien orders, but an intimate internecine conflict. In the course of this conflict features of the old order inevitably carry over into the new, giving it a necessary if unacknowledged texture, but also presenting a threat in the form of 'backsliding' or, at the extreme, of explicit Restoration. (Nothing more clearly indicates Russia's involvement in European culture than the contrast between Soviet

communism's sensitivity to the possibility of religious revival and Chinese communism's far less engaged, if brutal, anti-religious stance.)

For many years the danger of backsliding or of restoration was undoubtedly a central preoccupation of Soviet leaders, especially those of the first generation, whose own lives and characters had been involved in the revolutionary break. In the 1920s and 1930s the fear of apostasy was an important element in nearly every major political crisis. (Even if one views certain features of Stalinism as backsliding and a desertion of revolutionary ideals, the ferocious care Stalin took to prevent any intimation that this might be the case suggests the importance of this concern.)

This particular source of divergence would appear to be of diminishing significance for the future, simply because of the passage of time and the rise of generations born and reared in the new order. The Soviet system is a going concern; the prospects for an explicit Restoration—in the sense of an overt denial of the Revolution and its values—seem infinitesimally slight. The result may be somewhat paradoxical: the achievement of a securely established 'distance' between the Soviet system and the West may reduce the divergence. I have felt this reduction in some of the young Soviet scholars with whom I have spoken, men of the postwar generation. In some respects they were more remote than their fathers; one could not count on certain overtones and connotations getting through to them. On the other hand, I sensed less personal combativeness, no particular need to demonstrate to me that they were on the other side of the fence—they simply were.

Now if only this were involved, one might conclude that the achievement and maintenance of the new order over a protracted period of time might continue to reduce the feeling of a need for divergence and might even promote an attrition of the hostile and aggressive elements of the ideology.

In times past, however, these acts of disaffiliation were assisted in their consolidation by the opportunity of going separate ways; there was more geographical and social space. Today, the Soviet Union and the West are constantly being thrown back on one another, not only by the demands of power politics, but by the universality of contemporary science and the pervasiveness of means of communication. Along the entire front of contacts between the two societies there are constantly appearing a host of what one might call partial convergences. Some are inimical, such as adaptations by one side of some real or imagined advantage of the other; some are neutral or positive, such as the exchange of insights and techniques in various areas of the arts and sciences. It is these latter partial convergences that often produce such sanguine expectation on the part of scientific and artistic visitors to the Soviet Union.

Yet one may question whether these areas of partial or specialised convergence can actually promote any general political or social meeting of the two systems. Indeed, their presence might have quite the contrary effect of arousing, and perpetuating past their natural span, the political sensitivities of the period of revolutionary break. It is perhaps significant that when a French correspondent suggested to Mr. Khrushchev three or four years ago that modern science might unify the world, the latter at once denied that this was possible so long as the overriding political and social issue—the overcoming of capitalism—was not achieved.

In looking forward to the future, then, I am sceptical whether these partial convergences, which promise to increase in scope and range, will lead by themselves to political convergence. And while I see with the coming of new generations ('which knew no Joseph') the fading of certain subjective obstacles to convergence, I do not expect any explicit reconciliation of the political and social divergences: too much human history has now gone into them.

If it is permissible to indulge in pure speculation, one might suggest that any general political convergence, if it is to come, will not be in the form of a drawing together after a reconciliation of political differences, nor in the form of two mirror-image antagonists forced into hateful identity (even the mirror game of chess does not permit the opponents to adopt the same stance). Perhaps it will come about in the manner of the aborted pre-1914 convergence: as a common breakthrough into the new and uncharted, but this time on the social and political level, though presumably with roots in the intellectual and artistic explosions of the earlier decades. If one is sensitive to the jolting and disturbing implications of these explosions (post-impressionism, Nietzsche, Freud, Joyce, existentialism), one can hardly look forward to an equivalent movement on the social and political plane with any complacent optimism. The political future of both sides would equally be at stake; conventional and traditional notions of strengths and vulnerabilities would be in question. And while the outcome might be politics 'in a new key', it would be a strange key with unsettling dissonances. If such a transition occurs, the question of convergence may well seem a matter of slight importance.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Not really. Obviously, there are certain universal traits inherent in the industrial order, in so-called modern society, as well as in certain manifestations of mass culture and leisure. In that sense, there is, there has been, and there will be, a convergence of the West and the East, including also China. Every factory built in some isolated Chinese town reduces the time gap, the cultural, economic, and social distance between, let us say, Chikurting and Chicago. But these are superficial considerations, as shown by the profound chasm which separated Essen under the Nazis and Detroit notwithstanding certain economic and technological similarities. The internal political organi-

sation, the fundamental purposes of the political system, the methods used to obtain the desired aims—these are the crucial considerations which differentiate political and social systems.

These considerations, in turn, are shaped by the methods used in the past to build the present society, and here too the differences are so profound as to render unlikely any meaningful convergence. The forced, brutal means used to industrialise the Soviet Union, repeated today in China, leave their mark on the subsequent social order, create vested interests, shape institutions and values, that differ profoundly from a socio-economic system that developed gradually, spontaneously, and pluralistically, through an adjustment of competitive interests. The Soviet image of the future communist society leaves little doubt that their system is moving towards a welfare totalitarianism, combining elite leadership with mass voluntarism, with little room for political pluralism. It would hence differ profoundly from the welfare democracy towards which the West is evolving.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD: It entirely depends on what is meant by 'gradual'. Provided that no startling changes occur (e.g. the potential crisis of leadership mentioned earlier), such a process should evolve slowly. Any mutual convergence would take place mainly in the social and economic sphere. The growing influence of the state in the economy of Western countries would be matched by a decrease in state control over the economy of the Soviet Union—for instance, the replacement of detailed state planning by a broader framework, or the introduction of Common Market features into the Soviet economy. The increasing importance of the managerial class within both forms of society and the burgeoning similarity in training and outlook bear witness to the existence of such a process. From the political aspect, however, prospects for a rapprochement between the two systems appear far less favourable. The party

machine will probably exercise absolute control over all spheres of life in the USSR for a long time to come, and there is virtually no question of any departure from the fundamental tenets of the ideology which provides the basis and justification for the party's complete supremacy.

VICTOR ERLICH: No, I do not. As Alex Inkeles recently pointed out, the two systems, especially as represented by the US and the USSR respectively, already have a number of common features which are either inherent traits of large-scale industrial societies or corollaries of the Cold War. One might mention the expanding bureaucracies, the vast productive plants geared in large part to military purposes, mass culture and mass education, strong emphasis on science and technology, and finally—though, in this latter realm, differences are ultimately more im-

portant than similarities—the average citizen's increasing inability to participate meaningfully in political decisions based on classified information and on data intelligible to experts only. Yet an actual convergence of the two systems appears highly improbable. Such a process presupposes either a gradual drift in the West towards the garrison state, or a far-reaching democratisation of the Soviet system, or, for that matter, a considerable measure of both. As I have already indicated, I don't see any tangible sign of the latter. Nor do I envisage the former. In spite of the dangers inherent in the much touted eminence of the 'military-industrial complex' in the United States, the American, and more broadly the Western 'social and political system' remains fundamentally pluralistic and thus qualitatively different from the somewhat modified version of Soviet totalitarianism.

POETRY

TRANSIENT MIGHT

Our states are like leaves
Nations of dead leaves
And Earth a hungry monster
That swallows us. We cannot escape.

Trees like fecund women preserve our numbers,
Although we turn yellow and die.
Crushed in the mouth of Earth
That swallows us. We decay like leaves.

In the autumn park
I've seen the world's parts
Nations of dead leaves
And time the maddening wind
That tosses them about. So little we weigh.

I've seen those leaves meet
Rustling in agitation
In the wind of time
That governs us. We struggle in vain.

I've closed my eyes in time of fear
And seen myself only a leaf
Already struck by yellow fever
In death's prelude. And so I drop like a falling leaf.

MBELLA SONNE DIPOKO

IT IS FOR YOU

I shall take you beyond today
Take you to my mangrove swamps.
You will meet my people
Living on mangrove trees
In huts like light houses
Rooted in the mangrove swamps.

You'd like the mudskippers
Those pets you'd never have to feed;
We shall have our garage among the lanky roots
And a canoe for our car.

We shall ride through the sea
A field fringed by surf-like flowers.
For clothes we'd have but loin cloths
While the sun will bronze your breasts
Like cocoa pods hanging from your naked chest.

You would like my people and love their ways
Among the tropic mangrove trees;
You would like the chorus sung by winds
In sunless evenings on the meadow-like sea
And when night sprinkles on its darkness
You will see the lights of merchant ships
Like torch-bearers in a distant field
And you will look around for clapping hands
Of waves lapping against our canoe
As we paddle home to your mother-in-law
Waiting on the mangrove trees.

Like a mermaid you shall kiss my lips
Among the tropic mangrove trees.

MBELLA SONNE DIPOKO

ON SEEING CLOUDS AND WITH THE CLOUD IN MIND

Now it is winter in my god. Skies
 Moving from the early blue
 Of his cooed-over summer eyes
 To great grey, dark grey, curling black
 Forelocks that also waved in youth—
 Young clouds horizon to the head
 Brushed to and fro or falling back
 Upon the blue beach of his eyes made
 Mackerel and sunset red,
 Made holy fish and blood stand still
 To see the sun-blood freely spill
 Across his godhead at the kill —
 Now dark, deep dark, you cannot mention
 Comparison of fog or night or wittier
 To boot and wanting something prettier
 Than soot say gentian. No,
 Black into black, multiplying dark
 That tolerates no flame or flickering,
 That sits upon the spark
 Without the usual bickering of flint
 On flint and woody fire to warm
 Man's first ten fingers; now his falling last
 Fistful of wisdom, knowledge, intellect,
 His know-how and his supermarket truth
 Only returns in small change of a god
 Containing winter; though he ask — not praying
 Any more — the darkness break and the old cod
 Cloud redden at the sun's shame in dying
 There comes no crack or crackle but the soul
 Tramped underfoot and dry with lying
 Cannot lie and lies down for a rest and waits
 For truth
 And the early blue of ribbon-coloured skyway
 Tying the nimbus of a youthful god
 In youth.

LAWRENCE BANTLEMAN

THE DESCENT

He had coveted the purple power,
 And the centrality of the sun,
 And his majestic poise in the western sky
 On the crest of silence, islanded
 By the ripples of colour and light.

Failing he sought the sun's promise
 Of unfailing ripeness to the core,
 And the rock's geologic maturity
 In the world of liquid girls
 And rivers of time and tide and winds.

Now he ponders justice and fate:
 Between one frustration and another
 And moves from trance to trance
 Drunk with the opiate of living:
 He has no heart for the sun or the sun's symbol of hope.

In the cold corner he weaves
 Strange patterns between the walls
 Mossed with the damp of darkness.
 Lying he lets his anaemic grin rise and fall
 When chance blows some faint shadow of longing.

He has learnt the smooth gliding
 Down the curve of rolling stone.
 He does not remember now those moments
 Of defeat and daring. He is Time's ally
 Happy and sheltered in his revolving orb.

AMARESH DATTA

RECAPTURE

The way led down a dark, half-wooded heath
Where moss-grey boulders humped above the mould
And curious drops, disquieting and cold,
Sprayed up from unseen streams in gulfs beneath.
There was no wind, nor any trace of sound
In puzzling shrub, or alien-featured tree,
Nor any view before — till suddenly,
Straight in my path, I saw a monstrous mound.

Half to the sky those steep sides loomed unspread,
Rank-grassed, and cluttered by a crumpling flight
Of lava stairs that scaled the fear-topped height
In steps too vast for any human tread.
I shrieked — and knew what primal star and Year
Had sucked me back from man's dream-transient sphere!

G. C. S. MARAR

SHORT STORY

Lala Dharam Das

KRISHAN KUMAR

LALA Dharam Das was of very orthodox views. Not that he was not educated or had not travelled much. He had been on a trip all over Europe, for example, and business had taken him on more than one occasion to America. But he was a thorough-going Indophile for all that and the more he saw of other countries, the more orthodox he seemed to become.

Look at the women of other countries, he would exclaim in horror, going around flaunting their faces and bodies in public like cheap hussies. Thank God this country has not yet reached such depths of depravity, he would say thankfully — look at the women of my family. Such models of modesty and chastity and brought up in the correct Hindu traditions, thanks to the grace of Rama, he would say, raising his face devoutly towards the heavens.

And in fact the women of his family were noted throughout the town for their modest demeanour and graceful behaviour. No one had ever seen the women of Lala Dharam Das' family go out unescorted or in a car in which the back seats were not properly hidden behind delicate and opaque curtains. The pundits of the town never tired of pointing out the women of Lalaji's family as models to be followed by women everywhere. To them it was a matter of intense satisfaction to see that none of the girls of the family had ever been sent to College or school or otherwise allowed to get ideas which would have

meant destruction of the old values. And it was even more satisfying for them to see that even where in some cases considerations of dowry and family had made Lalaji choose daughters-in-law who had received some formal education, as soon as the girls entered Lalaji's family they conformed to all the old traditions.

Lalaji, in short, was a pillar of orthodoxy and respectability and so it was not without some inner qualms that his wife approached him about her widowed cousin. She had waited for some days to broach the subject to him and she felt that she might as well do it now for a more favourable opportunity might never occur again. For Lalaji had recently made a profit of some lakhs in the stock exchange and in consequence his mood was as sunny and amiable as it was ever likely to be.

Lalaji's wife approached him timidly and, after the usual preliminaries and sparring, said,

'I have been meaning to talk to you for some time. You know Shakuntala, my mother's brother's daughter. Well, her husband has died and she has no other place to go. I wondered...'

Lalaji sat up with a jerk.

'You wondered whether she could come and stay with us, isn't it? Is my home a widow's home that every widow in town should come here? What about my daughters? What will people say? And I the president of the Arya Samaj! All our good luck would vanish if we let that

'abhagin' enter our doors. No, no. Lala Dharam Das' house can never be defiled like this. Come what may, no widow shall ever darken my doors. Don't let me hear any more about it, Munni's mother. So far as I am concerned the topic is closed'.

'Don't be that hasty,' said his wife. 'She will be able to help in the kitchen work and, being a relation, we don't have to give her anything except her food. And she can accompany the girls whenever they go out. After all it is much better to send the girls with a relation rather than with a servant however trusted the latter may be. If you agree I'll write to her at once and she can come at the earliest possible opportunity'.

Lala Dharam Das pondered over what his wife had just said. This aspect had not occurred to him earlier.

'Alright, since she is a relation of yours I'll agree for this time. But let it be clearly understood that if she doesn't behave in the proper manner, I may be forced to change my mind.'

But his wife had already hurried off to her room to write the letter before Lalaji had time to think the matter over and maybe change his mind. A few days later Shakuntala arrived. Misery was writ large on her face as she got down from the tonga that had brought her from the station. Her pitiful belongings consisted of only her bedding and one small trunk. She got down and touched the feet of Lalaji and his wife.

'I don't know how I can ever thank you both for the shelter you have given me,' she sobbed.

Even the gruff Lalaji was touched and because of this, perhaps, his voice was rougher than usual as he said:

'Remember you are entering Lala Dharam Das's house and once inside you must never behave in a manner that would bring disgrace to it. I hope you will always remember that'.

'How can I ever bring disgrace to the house of my benefactors', she sobbed as Lalaji's wife raised her from the ground and clasped her to her capacious bosom.

Shakuntala fitted into the routine of

Lalaji's household very easily and soon proved to be a real asset. She got up early in the morning before anybody had even stirred in their beds, cleaned up the kitchen and had the fire going long before the others got up. She looked after Lalaji's daughters also and they had after a long time found a companion after their heart. And she was always modest and shy of demeanour and behaviour much to the satisfaction of Lalaji who congratulated himself on his wisdom in having changed his earlier decision on the importunities of his wife.

The only thing about Shakuntala that would have impressed any outside observer immediately was her constantly depressed and subdued behaviour. It was as though Tragedy had caught hold of her and just refused to let go. And her attitude to Lala Dharam Das was even more subdued and cringing than towards anyone else. As though sensing his inner hostility to her she seemed to shrink within herself whenever he was near and he also made no effort to put her at ease.

It was in this state of rather uneasy emotional equilibrium that Ratan Das, Lalaji's only younger brother, made his entrance. Ratan Das had studied abroad and if Lalaji was a pillar of orthodoxy, Ratan was just the opposite. Hostile to everything Indian, he was never happy except when he was abroad and Lalaji too was happy to let him handle the overseas part of their business. It was from one of his periodical trips abroad that he now returned to find an addition to the household.

'Who is she?' he asked his sister-in-law soon after his arrival. 'I don't remember seeing her before'.

'She is my cousin sister', his sister-in-law said. 'The poor girl was widowed at a rather early age, and thanks to the grace of your brother, she is now living with us'.

Lalaji, who overheard this conversation was filled with gloomy forebodings. Ratan, he felt, had lived abroad for too long and was out of touch with the fine traditions of his country and Lalaji was afraid lest

something happen that would blacken the face of the family. That night he had a long talk with his wife. Warn Shakuntala to be careful, he told her, Ratan is young and has been abroad and one never knows what complications may arise. The reputation of the family was at stake, he said, and he hoped that Shakuntala would understand.

His wife was in favour of sending Shakuntala away for the duration of Ratan's stay but Lalaji would not hear of it. The neighbours would talk, he said, and that would do even greater harm to the reputation of the family than any possible future incident. No, the best thing would be to warn Shakuntala. He was sure she would understand. After all hadn't they given her shelter when she needed it most?

His wife promised to talk to Shakuntala the next morning but who can alter the course of destiny? Ratan was young and idealistic and everytime he saw Shakuntala's tragic face his whole being revolted at the way she was being treated. His education, his trips abroad, his advanced thought, all reproached him for the tyranny of Lalaji's society which neither killed widows nor allowed them to live decently but insisted on keeping them as living corpses.

As for Shakuntala, hemmed in as she was by the society in which she lived and the unthinking tyranny of Lalaji, Ratan appeared as the only ray of hope, the only bit of sunshine in her drab and dreary life. So it was not long before the two were meeting secretly in the early hours of the morning, long before anybody got out of their beds.

These meetings seemed to have given a new life to Shakuntala. Her shoulders straightened out somewhat and there appeared the suspicion of rosiness in her cheeks. She still looked depressed and cowed but with the difference that now there also appeared to be some inner strength in her frail body. If Lalaji noted this, he said nothing but kept his own counsel.

Things came to a head very soon, how-

ever. Ratan had for a long time been urging Shakuntala to wear something brighter than the drab and neutral white which she always wore. Shakuntala had consistently refused. Conventions and society were too strong for her, and to her a widow's life was meant to be lived only as a penance for the sins of the last life. Why else should the Almighty have taken away her husband?

Ratan was very much exasperated by all this. Life is to be lived, he said, and one cannot always mourn for the dead. If she did not wear a sari of some other colour, he threatened, he would never talk to her again.

What was poor Shakuntala to do? On the one side was Lala Dharam Das, society, and all that she had learnt from childhood onwards. On the other side was Ratan with his revolutionary ideas. Fearfully she compromised between the two and after long deliberation chose a sari having a very, very slight creamy tinge.

The effect on the household of her appearance in the very, very light yellow sari was electric, and Lalaji was furious.

'How dare you defile my house like this,' he thundered at poor Shakuntala. 'Have you lost all sense of propriety and shame that you appear thus indecently clad before me? You should have died before daring to do a thing like this. Go to your room at once and change your dress. Otherwise I won't answer for the consequences.'

Poor Shakuntala made as though to go to her room, when Ratan intervened. What was wrong with Shakuntala's wearing the dress, he asked. What crime had she committed by appearing in a pale yellow dress?

Lalaji's anger knew no bounds. The scene that followed was terrible with the brothers shouting at each other at the top of their voices and Lalaji's wife vainly trying to calm them both. Ratan threatened to marry Shakuntala, hearing which Lalaji almost had a stroke. The scene ended as stormily as it had begun with Shakuntala and Ratan being sent to their rooms and Ratan being told that the very next day

he would have to leave for abroad. Ratan would have defied this order but for the entreaties of his sister-in-law who implored him to go to his room for her sake.

That night there was a violent thunderstorm. As violent a disturbance raged in Ratan's brain. He felt that he was responsible for all that had happened and he shuddered to think of what would befall Shakuntala if he left her to the tender mercies of his brother. After all he had an equal right to the property and why should he not act as he wanted to and marry Shakuntala? Why tomorrow itself he would move for partition of all the family property and assets, he decided. But first he


felt that he should go to Shakuntala and explain it all to her as otherwise the poor girl might almost die of shock and terror.

His mind made up, Ratan cautiously mounted the stairs to Shakuntala's room. As he neared her room, he heard her door open and someone came out. Was it Shakuntala, he wondered, as he flattened himself against the wall, or his sister-in-law gone to comfort her? Just at that moment there was a flash of lightning and as he sought to hide himself from the brilliant light, Ratan had a momentary glimpse of the ascetic and saintly face of Lala Dharam Das as he stealthily, and slowly, made his way back to his room.

REFLECTION

Yes, she said, the trees look ridiculously nubile.
But, observe — the twinkling stream
Now laced with cracks, like the chasms in your heart
Where once the roses were.
Did the palimpsest sigh, when it knew
Things unseen?
But despair was sticks and stones,
Killing, crushing, nothingness. Perhaps they see
What I cannot. The beacon, to me,
Was always a mirage.

INDIRA MAHANTY



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B O O K S

THE SPINOZA OF MARKET STREET and other stories by Isaac Bashevis Singer (Secker and Warburg, 18s.)

MR. SINGER is a Polish Jew, living now in the United States, (a refugee from Nazism) and writing in Yiddish. Surprisingly, considering the translations are by different people, his remarkable style comes through unflawed—an archaic simplicity, with some of the traditional earthiness of the peasants and provincials through the ages. To call his writings 'short stories' conveys a misleading sense of the contemporary: when you read them, you find yourself taking a startled glance at the calendar to see what century it is. Indeed at first glance I thought I had got hold of a collection of fairy-tales—'In the village of Lukoff,' I read with bafflement, 'a witch was seen riding a hoop and brandishing a broom. Before her ran something with black elflocks, a furry hide and a tail.' Let us call them simply stories. If demons and spells appear in one place, Hitler and Zionism crop up in another. The folklore of Polish Jewry figures largely in them, but recounted with the shrewd irony of a rabbinical scholar with a keen eye for the grotesque.

I imagine Jewish readers would greet Mr Singer's pictures of the Jewish community of small-town Poland with smiling recognition: noodle soup, kosher shops, the Synagogue, the scandal. To me, the background is as exotic as the actual plots of many of the stories are fantastic. Distracted, agreeably, by sapphire-studded covers for the Sabbath loaf; phylacteries; writs of divorce hung on door-knobs and husbands called back from the dead, I only later realized that Mr Singer has also an almost

forgotten talent for straightforward realistic description.

'There was a door to the left of Dr Fischelson's attic room which opened off a dark corridor, cluttered with boxes and baskets, in which the odour of fried onions and laundry soap was always present. Behind this door lived a spinster whom the neighbours called Black Dobbe. Dobbe was tall and lean and as black as a baker's shovel. She had a broken nose and there was a moustache on her upper lip.'

This is from the title-piece: a charming story of an elderly, dyspeptic scholar who goes to market with a basket in one hand and Spinoza's *Ethics* in the other, and is miraculously rejuvenated by his marriage to Dobbe. After an alarming wedding-night, he leans out of his window, gazes up into the starry sky, and murmurs, 'Divine Spinoza, forgive me. I have become a fool.' The tradition drawn upon here is that of the German short story of the nineteenth century. In the same, relatively unfantastic, category, is 'Caricature'—which like 'Spinoza' deals with an elderly scholar wedded to an ignorant, devoted wife. (I remember now knowing just such a couple in Oxford, who might have been the prototypes of Mr. Singer's—what extraordinary staying-power the Jewish family tradition has!)

In 'Caricature' the grotesque element is more pronounced. Mr Singer is fond of opposing dry, sly intellect to coarse-grained gullible ignorance and bringing out the comic and horrid elements of both. Whereas in 'Spinoza' Dr Fischelson's metaphysical meanderings find a fresh lease of life in Dobbe's practical kindness, in 'Caricature' the wife, Mathilda, undergoes

a repulsive physical transformation when she is converted to her husband's intellectuality.

'There sat Mathilda clad in his dressing-gown and slippers. Never before had her beard seemed to him so grotesquely long and thick; in sleep her eyebrows were drawn together, and her hairy masculine nose protruded. In some mysterious way she had grown to resemble him.'

O flesh, flesh, flesh, how art thou fishified! Such nasty physical vignettes abound in Mr Singer's tales; he takes the gravedigger's view of human life—as food for worms, and fit food too. Perhaps this explains the preponderance of bad ends achieved by his characters, and also the fact—here we get on to the extra-ordinary stories—that he likes to take a demon as his narrator. In 'A Tale of Two Liars' the devil, speaking in the first person as he, or perhaps I should say He, does in mediaeval moralities, tells us how he pushes his erring human plaything down the primrose path to Gehenna with all the slick competence of a Screwtape. Glicka Genendel and Reb Yomtov (are Yiddish names really like this?) are a pair of provincial confidence-tricksters, whose lies and counter-lies, owing to the machinations of the Evil One murmuring sour nothings in their ear, eventually cancel each other out. You will be distressed to hear that their punishment in purgatory is to hang suspended by their tongues—the statutory punishment for liars. This is quite a funny parable.

A longer, and more sombre one, is 'The Destruction of Kreshev', where the devil also appears as narrator and *diabolous ex machina*. He is rather an engaging fellow, a junior executive, plainly, of the great Mephisto in *Faust* (northerners, globally speaking of course, are traditionally good at devils). Cynical, with a certain snappish whimsy and the robust agricultural scepticism we have learnt to expect from Mr Kruschev. Kruschev, Kreshev. Ah, well! 'The Destruction of Kreshev' is set in the 17th century (also the period, you may

remember, of *The Witches of Salem*) and tells how the devil destroys a family of respectable Jews. Lise, the lovely virtuous daughter of Rabbi Reb Bunim, is married off to a young and learned man, Shloimele, who reveals himself during conversations in the marriage bed as a secret disciple of the False Messiah, Zevi. He is a relativist, and by telling the infatuated Lise that good is evil and evil good, forces her into the lascivious arms of Mendel, the coachman. After gloating over the details of Lise's seduction, he goes and confesses his crime in the synagogue, and the ensuing public scandal—the community taking the law into its own hands in the accepted way—causes Lise to kill herself.

This story of course can be read in modern terms (apart from the proposition, another favourite of Mr Singer's, that much learning, especially of a rabbinical sort, makes a man mad) as a study in sexual perversion. Shloimele, I suppose, would be called a fetishist, a voyeur, one of those unfortunate people who take their sexual pleasure vicariously. Mr Singer is very good at evoking, without a hint of psychological description even of the literary sort but in colourful physical images, the sexual fantasies of innocent women on the verge of marriage. Lise, Helena in 'The Shadow of a Crib', Hindele in 'The Black Wedding'—a ghoulish little piece—are all the victims of these nightmares and hobgoblins. The men, on the other hand, principally suffer from more prosaic upsets, like indigestion; here, again, their sufferings are invested with a touch of the macabre, so that the transition from the human to the demonic is scarcely more than a step. The logical conclusion of all this is that human beings are really demons, and vice versa, and in 'Shiddah and Kuziba' the conclusion is worked out, in a semi-comic story of two demons locked underground, telling each other horror-stories about Man.

'But what are human beings, mother? Tell me.'

'What are they? They're the waste of

creation, offal; where sin is brewed in a kettle, mankind is the foam. Man is the mistake of God.'

This peculiarly Jewish antithesis—of good, evil; God, Devil; mind, matter, runs through Mr Singer's work, giving it body and tension.

JILL HUGH-JONES

Fantastic Sense?

THE TERRIBLY WILD FLOWERS by Gerald Kersh (William Heinemann Ltd., 257 pp. 21s.)

THE trouble with Mr. Kersh is that he is lousy with ideas. Little wonder therefore that the reader repeatedly finds himself scratching his head. The truth of the matter is, I think, that the astral skeletons of the soothsayers and minor prophets (who had once confounded and enslaved Man's mind by bullying him with an exotic blend of fact and fantasy wherein his susceptibilities were well shaken before serving) have been returned to us as Science Fiction writers. These worthies have once again managed to obscure the frontiers of knowledge so completely with their colourful and imaginative language that they must themselves be taken aback when, on occasion, their predictions prove true. Naturally, the professional success of these gentlemen depends, as it did in the past, on the extent to which they have been blessed with a gift of the gab coupled with a knowledge of psychology and science, and on the manner in which they apply their little encyclopaedia of odds and ends to exploit the current scene.

In the present day one might say that this breed has split into two somewhat indistinct factions. The first consists of those writers in whose stories Machines are the real heroes: they operate the Men, and the whole excitement lies in prodding the possibilities inherent in extending existing scientific devices to their logical conclusion and a little beyond. The second faction, which is very much smaller than the first, consists of writers who treat Scientific Possibility only as the environment in which the oddness of human

character can be shown up. This faction has the advantage that it can add to the range and variety of its writing by moving in and out of the gambit of 'Science Fiction', and of late it is considered very U to provide a political slant to the stories by making the supposedly imaginary characters coincide with familiar historical personages. While Mr. Kersh belongs very much in the second group, he has carefully avoided getting mixed up in politics, thereby ensuring a much longer lease to the interest in his writing.

Indeed, in this collection of Kersh stories, only the first one, *The Terribly Wild Flowers* can, strictly speaking, be said to fall into the Science Fiction category; but it is a story which may well serve as a model for aspiring SF writers. The hero, Dr. Agnus Huish, whose special interest lies in the fifteen thousand million neurons which make up the human brain, reckons that the high hope for the health of the mind of man lies within the structure of the vegetable, for plants have a power of adaptation superior to that of any man considering that a plant has no constructive consciousness. The ultimate master of the earth must be that organism which most effectively eats up its fellows: Man eats anything and everything. A pig will eat most things but is, in its piggish way, selective, and therefore doomed to extinction. But grass eats the pig in the end. Grass eats man. Much may therefore be learned by cultivating something like a human intelligence in plants. So Dr. Huish starts with grass that directly eats flesh: Sundew, and the Venus Fly Trap—which secrete something like human digestive juices.

After the first treatment the Venus Fly Trap slyly gives out an irresistible perfume to attract the gardener who is passing by, and as soon as he bends to sniff it, snaps at him with those needly little teeth of hers. While the doctor is extremely pleased with the special type of madness induced by the Trap's bite, it is lucky for the world that the wild flowers are destroyed by a timely fire, and Dr. Huish com-

mitted to an asylum. What however distinguishes the story and Mr. Kersh from his co-SF writers is the fact that the characters not only always dominate the plot, but continuously provoke a rethinking of accepted strangenesses. For instance, the gardener who – like the hard-handed old nurses that ‘have a way’ with children – has something about him which growing green things appear to understand – this ‘green thumb’, could it after all be a matter of secretions, a glandular agreement which creates a certain spiritual contact between animal and vegetable?

In the other stories, though physics and chemistry are left out, Mr. Kersh treats everyday characters with the same type of perverseness with which an SF writer converts simple known scientific phenomena into a bewilderment, the effect of which is as if – to borrow a phrase from Mr. Kersh – ‘walking downstairs, you have forgotten the last step’. But since, essentially, SF is the art of mixing the familiar with the unfamiliar, Mr. Kersh has a way of unexpectedly producing a character who might easily belong to the reader’s own home, as, for instance, the one who remarks: ‘I hate charities and all forms of benevolence – they impoverish the giver and degrade the taker’.

Somehow Mr. Kersh’s characters have a chronic tendency of coming a cropper, and only too often the hero is left with ‘a taste in his mouth as of green mould on old pennies – the taste of defeat’. And in spite of the author’s ‘whole second-hand jewellery shopful of semi-precious similes’, he has one failing which would have guaranteed failure for him among his counter-parts 2000 years ago: he has a sense of humour, and that of the worst kind – one which laughs at Man.

IQBAL LUKMANI

Seeing Through India

FLIGHT OF WHITE CROWS by John Berry
(Victor Gollancz, 189 pp. 18s.)

THE poise and clarity of the writing marks an advance on the author’s

novel, ‘Krishna Fluting’. This sureness carries with it the relish of sympathy for an alien environment which has helped one to grow up, together and apart. Caught in the prismatic focii of these distancing experiences is the style, dilating the imagination with its overall reference to the transcendental world of experience postulated in Indian philosophy, wryly critical in its observation of personal and particular detail. The combination is like a floating bubble, carrying wherever it drifts the iridescent spectrum of lyrical unreality (rather like the ethos of the world of Sudhin Ghose) which surrounds a recognisably camouflaged Bengali provincial university and an easily discernible Himalayan hill-station.

Reality is used to prick the bubble continually with cruel western insights, such as this description of a Vice-Chancellor’s dinner from the story entitled ‘The Lover of Bharatpur’:

The only Indians present were the V.C. and the registrar and their wives, whose unenviable Karma required that they entertain the foreign scholars once a year. It was a grim business, that dinner. Chairs that martyred the flesh were squared off against one another in geometrical opposition, and they were not to be moved. People sat facing each other stiffly, at precise distances. The V.C. and the registrar sat like policemen at opposite ends of the table. At the V.C.’s right were To the left of the V.C. were It was the entire foreign contingent of the university, and this dinner was expected to appease for one year their persistent but vain hunger for a social life’.

Elements of the story, the tale and the paradox, though formally separated in the scheme of the book, in fact intertwine throughout in each unit. Thus ‘The Golden Hair’ can be taken as a twilight fable but its point is the metamorphosis of cultural disenchantment; a nostalgic but implacable re-definition of identity. Mr. Berry gives a display of the three-card-trick by extending this idea in his title story, a hill-

station cameo of foreign wives married to Indians — 'India will go on like an incurable disease, but you will die of it, and ...we shall never be anything but white crows, embarrassed to see one another, shunned by the rest of the flock.... We resent other Western women here. We fear that they will expose our contradictions by behaving normally.... If you have no serious defects, India will create them....' This legerdemain with actualities does not quite come off and it is not the most successful of Mr. Berry's stories. The formal parodies (read paradoxes) also fall into this less satisfactory category. Nevertheless we should be grateful that a writer of Mr. Berry's temperament and calibre, capable of twisting Indian 'exoticism' by its tail, found his way to India. The resulting entertainment (at everybody's expense) is also our gain.

FOY NISSEN

The First Viceroy

'CLEMENCY' CANNING by Michael MacLagan
(Macmillan & Co., Ltd, 420 pp.)

TO refer to Canning's administration as a watershed in Indian history is probably something of a cliché, yet the description is apt. The six years from 1856 to 1862 saw the beginning of the strangulation of many traditional institutions and the emergence of others which replaced these and became the foundation of modern India.

The most obvious contour in the watershed was the Indian Mutiny of 1857. For some, this was merely a sepoy revolt, precipitated by the question of whether the cartridges for the rifles were greased with cow's fat or pig's fat, either of which resulted in hurting the religious susceptibilities of a section of the Indian army. The Mutiny was totally unexpected and took the British administration entirely by surprise. The mystery surrounding the sending of lotuses and *chappaties* from village to village is added largely to give the story

a romantic flavour. The sepoys revolted in some of the more strategic garrison towns and cantonments, and while they held these centres the British administration had an anxious time. However, the Mutiny was suppressed, although at the considerable cost of some of the finest British officers. The end result of the Mutiny was that India was brought under the direct control of the British Government. It was no longer administered *via* the East India Company, and British administration in India was modified in a manner which would prevent the recurrence of another Mutiny.

This (to put it rather bluntly,) was the standard view of the events of 1857 in most histories of British India until recent years. Mr. MacLagan in this biography of Canning has not deviated significantly from this view, and in a sense this pinpoints the weakness of the book. To write of a period vibrating with the conflict of old and new forces and to soft-pedal this conflict results in a study which seems to have an uncertain historical grip. The Mutiny was superficially a sepoy revolt, but, under-pinning the stories about the greased cartridges was the fact that this was a concerted though unsuccessful attempt of the Indian feudal order to assert itself. The capture of Delhi was the highlight of the Mutiny, the Red Fort being the symbol of the continuing existence of the Mughal systems, and the feudal institutions which accompanied it. It is not surprising that when the Mutiny subsided, Bahadur Shah, the last of the Mughals was removed from the Red Fort and imprisoned in distant Rangoon. That the Indian feudal order had begun to disintegrate is also clear from the events which followed in the late 19th century, when the initiative in Indian leadership moved from the feudal nobility to the newly emerging professional classes.

The post-Mutiny years saw the initiation of new policies at various levels. The first major change was the termination of the office of the Governor-General and of

the rule of the East India Company. Canning became the first Viceroy, the representative of Queen Victoria and the British Government under the Government of India Act of 1858. A Council was established to assist and advise the Viceroy. The inclusion of a Financial Member in the Viceroy's Council was an attempt at bringing method and order into the financial administration of India, and at introducing the idea of an Indian economy. The latter was to be visualised as the economic development of India, which although seen in terms of the over-all British economy, was nevertheless an improvement on the policy of earlier administrations which had utilised the economic processes in India in a rather haphazard manner.

The army was reorganised and the stationing of troops, Indian and British, was such that in no town could an Indian regiment take over the essential services. The lesson of the Mutiny was not to be forgotten. There was also a tendency to segregate troops province-wise with an emphasis on recruiting Punjabis and Gurkhas.

Another lesson of the Mutiny had been poor communications. Consequently new railway lines were laid down linking cantonments and strategic towns. The idea of university education was encouraged. The three universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay having been founded during the Mutiny period were looked upon as centres of the new professional classes. These and other policies had the support of Canning, and it would be of considerable interest to discover the nature of Canning's comprehension of the historical forces being activated and his own intellectual commitments to these policies.

Mr. MacLagan's intention, however, is not to become deeply involved in the historical analysis of the events which made up the Governor-Generalship and the Viceroyalty of Lord Canning. He has confined himself to a straight biography of the administrator. To that extent the

book has succeeded. It provides an interesting narrative of Canning's six years in India, with generous quotations from his private correspondence, much of which has been published for the first time. The biography aims at a portrait of the man, yet one would have wished for further glimpses of the man behind the image of the official. The satirical nick-name 'Clemency' was given to Canning by his political opponents when, on the termination of the Mutiny Canning refused to demand blood for blood, and instead supported amnesties for those who had mutinied. It would be interesting to question the motivations of this policy. Was Canning making a sophisticated psychological and political gesture, or was it the action of a simple-hearted man who genuinely felt that the sepoys had been misled? When the attack on Canning in the British Parliament had subsided and his name cleared, his friend Granville wrote to him:

'I shall be sorry for India but glad for yourself and me if a temporary bilious attack obliges you to come back before the end of your time. You will then take your place among the real swells from which I have sometimes thought your complete want of charlatanism might have kept you away.'

One wonders whether it was merely a complete want of charlatanism that kept Canning from taking his place among the real swells. Perhaps he was not cut out to be a real swell.

ROMILA THAPAR

Slowly To The Left

FABIAN SOCIALISM AND ENGLISH POLITICS 1884-1981. by A. M. McBriar. (Cambridge University Press, 387 pp. 50s.)

EVERY reviewer of Dr. McBriar's evaluation of the Fabians has taken up his conclusion that the small group, though remote from the centres of power, wielded

an influence far beyond its size because the Fabians numbered in their ranks 'some of the wisest, most learned and wittiest men and women of their age'. Most reviewers charitably pass by Dr. McBriar's significant qualification that the influence exercised was 'mostly in minor but important ways.' Naturally, where a few individuals did so much to develop socialist concepts, the history of the Society becomes the record of the work of individuals. Dr. McBriar gives us a comprehensive study of Bernard Shaw; Annie Besant's role in the early years of the Fabians is well brought; credit is accorded to Hubert Bland's part; and of course the Webbs figure prominently in this as in other histories of the Fabian Society.

Dr. McBriar builds up from the original records the various influences that went to make the Fabian Society. An interesting point Dr. McBriar makes is that the men who formed the Social Democratic Federation with a Marxist programme, were older, with private incomes and 'that revolutionary zeal which overcomes fear of dismissal from employment.' The Fabians, in contrast, were civil servants — Webb and Oliver; struggling journalists — Shaw, Bland and Clarke; teachers — like Graham Wallas; and moderately successful professional or business men. Though many of them were connected with other Socialist groups at the outset, they gradually evolved into a group which reflected English constitutionalism and English Radicalism. It bridged the way from the concept of *laissez faire* to that of a consciously organized society.

The Fabians did not aim at establishing a mass following; they addressed themselves to teachers, officials, managers and generally the professional and administrative classes. While Shaw attributed the 'sanity' of the Fabians to their capacity to laugh at themselves, the reputation they acquired owed much to Webb's dislike of indulging in personalities. Though the author touches lightly on the subject, the Fabians' claim to distinction from other Socialist groups emerges as the agreement

to disagree which seems to be a peculiarly English characteristic. The link between tolerance and the objective of permeating the leaders of the community is natural and obvious.

It is difficult to evaluate the influence of such a group without exaggerating or minimising it. Dr. McBriar has been careful to indicate the limits within which some judgment can be made; so careful, in fact, that one is left wondering whether the Fabians were the product of England or whether modern England has been moulded by the Fabians. Because of this innate caution, he withholds from the Society the credit of being original in their thinking and of making any special contribution to political, social or economic thought. Pleasing as such an appraisal may be to those who would like to see Fabianism cut down to size, there is an element of unfairness in it. The mass of material presented in this book testifies to the evolutionary, as opposed to the revolutionary, approach of the group. 'Those who live in the past,' remarked Mahadev Govind Ranade, 'secure popularity. Those who bury their past obtain ease. Men who can neither hold on to the past nor forget it altogether, by that very fact obtain neither ease nor fame.'

Going through these pages it is strange to find how much of what existed in their society the Fabians accepted. After all, they were only tolerated because they were, compared to Socialists of other brands, restrained and moderate. They evolved to acceptance of the Monarchy, of Imperialism — but not 'jingo-imperialism' — and of the desirability of spreading Western commercial civilization. They even displayed a distrust of 'democracy' which Dr. McBriar attributes to Shaw's early failure as a novelist and playwright. Shaw at any rate developed his enthusiasm for an elite to an extent which disturbed the others. Having decided to concentrate on practical questions, the Society eschewed all theoretical speculation; and the salutary result was that political extravagance tended to fade out. 'The Fabians,'

observes the author, 'supplied a doctrine which could enable a churchwarden or an English trade unionist to call himself a Socialist.' In other words, if one is to equate Socialism with Marxism — and it must be remembered that when the Fabians started, this was very much the case — then 'far from the Fabians breaking the spell of Marxism on England,' as E. R. Pease put it, 'they opened England up to ideas which ordinarily she would not have considered.'

S. NATARAJAN

The Heritage of Poverty

PATHS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH: Edited by Amlan Datta (Allied Publishers, 352 pp. Rs. 18)

AN economic goal is a pleasant goal but an unpleasant process. More unpleasant still is the constant necessity of having to make a choice at every step of the process. In an administered economy like ours the politician-administrator inclines to make the least unpleasant choice, though not the necessary one. Most of the time he makes no choice at all. He would rather have the pleasure of repeating the goal than the pain of going through the process. This political schizophrenia would easily, if economists by their utterances encourage it, pass off as economic eclecticism. There is obvious danger, therefore, in starting off with a large question like 'Is there an alternative to Capitalist and Communist paths to Economic Growth?' especially if in the answers given no alternative path emerges, let alone a number of them as the title of the book suggests.

This is not to belittle the efforts of a group of economists from Africa, Asia, Europe and America who discussed this question at a Seminar in Poona in January, 1961. But economists would do well to remind the elite of all developing countries that their political commitment to democracy by itself is a very inadequate answer to the problem of the economic

development of their countries. Notwithstanding this very obvious experience of the post-war world the discussion at the Seminar opens with M. Bertrand de Jouvenal's startling statement in the Draft Programme that economic growth is the end and other things, including political and ethical changes in the community, are just means. The discussion ends with Professor D. R. Gadgil's presidential exhortation on the need for proper understanding of the processes of economic development and for a considerate treatment of those who are called upon to pay the price of that development.

To be effective economic growth will have to be rapid. To retain unimpaired the democratic framework for such growth the developing countries are beginning to discover the economic necessity of recasting the existing structure of power and privilege. This recasting cannot proceed without sweeping away a big bulk of traditional ideas and institutions. Apart from the facts of geography and geology these ideas and institutions make up the common milieu of the developing countries in which economic growth is to be carried through. Faced with the need for a bold statement, meaning a bold choice, the Seminar cannot avoid the issue, however deep the sentimental attachment of some of the participants may be to 'traditional values'.

Once the operative field for the philosophy of economic growth is the entire underdeveloped world economists, unlike politicians, should not fall back upon the cliché of national genius and national heritage. For them the discernible and dispensable heritage is poverty and the goal growing out of it. That is the simple fact from which criteria of growth have to be derived. Internationally applicable criteria of economic growth would be available only after the acceptance of the truth apparent throughout the discussion of the Seminar that the economics of development is related to and dependent on

the ethics of development. An arrogant member of the family of social sciences, Economics does not accept it. And the Seminar appears to do it only haltingly. No wonder, therefore, that Sri Jayaprakash Narayan's first comment when he addressed it was that 'our discussions have become somewhat disconnected with the main topic of the Seminar.'

These discussions, most of the time, centre around the many problems that the developing countries have to resolve—food, transportation, location of industries, population, land reforms, wage policy. Even on these subjects the Seminar as a whole was singularly unproductive of new ideas. Maybe because it did not like to examine critically the implications of the significant statement made by some of the participants: Mr. Dandekar's analysis of the economic consequences of land distribution; Mr. Onitri's honest observations about Nigeria; Mr. Shonfield's unsentimental assessment of the motivations of urbanisation and economic growth. The feeling persists that the Seminar failed to measure up to the scale of economic development being attempted in the world to-day, of the areas and populations involved in its myriad processes.

It is this scale which is really the cause of their concern and its justification. Enlightened humanists, they do not want the developing countries to overlook the values of civilised life in their anxiety to achieve economic growth. That economists should be concerned about humanising the difficult task of economic growth is something to be grateful for. But their humanism is not enough. Their economics must demonstrate the overriding economic importance of keeping these values at the core of the processes of growth. Once they begin to do this they might legitimately lay claim to discovering a new path to economic growth. The Poona palaver of the economists may not be entitled to this claim.

MAHESH DESAI

A Positive Aesthetic

PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCHES by Susanne K. Langer (The John Hopkins Press, 190 pp. \$ 5.00)

P*HILOSOPHICAL Sketches* is an important work both on account of what the book itself contains and also on account of the fact that the essays, as the author says in her Preface, 'are previews or incidental products of an undertaking, still in progress, which will require some years for its completion.' Some of the papers included in the book have been read at learned gatherings in the United States and a few of them have appeared in scholarly journals. Underlying all these essays and talks one can see a unity of purpose and it is well that they have been brought together for the benefit of those who admire Mrs. Langer's writings.

Art and literary criticism often has a tendency to degenerate into clichés. Some of the best critics find it difficult to talk in a language that is really lucid and intelligible, and the reason behind this kind of infelicity is their inadequate acquaintance with the speculative implications of the views and opinions they hold. Literary criticism and philosophy may be 'quite distinct and different kinds of discipline' only if one is concerned with the 'more pedestrian range of critical aesthetics', a phrase coined by Mr. Harold Osborne. Mrs. Langer, a student of Cassirer and Whitehead, is more serious. Her ability to get to fundamentals is extraordinary. In spite of her professed indebtedness to her illustrious teachers she is an original thinker of considerable eminence. (According to the new edition of Chamber's Biographical Dictionary Mrs. Langer 'is the leading aesthetic philosopher of her time'.)

Like Whitehead, Mrs. Langer urges the importance for contemporary life of supplementing logic with aesthetic intuition. 'Art' defined by Mrs. Langer, 'is the practice of creating perceptible forms expressive of human feeling', 'is indeed the

spearhead of human development.' (pp. 83, 105 and 107) She likes to believe that a new culture is probably in the making and that Art has an important rôle to play in that new culture. Concluding her talk on *The Cultural Importance of Art* she says, 'The arts objectify subjective reality, and subjectify outward experience of nature. Art education is the education of feeling, and a society that neglects it gives itself up to formless emotion. Bad art is corruption of feeling. This is a large factor in the irrationalism which dictators and demagogues exploit.' (p. 94)

The first and perhaps the most important chapter in the book, *The Problems of Feeling*, contains some of her basic concepts. Mrs. Langer, to put it broadly, is against the behaviouristic explanation of mind. Let Mrs. Langer speak for herself. 'Behaviourism of some sort and degree has become such a prevailing attitude today in psychology, sociology, and various related fields of study that these are generally called 'the behavioural sciences.' Yet the term is not simply descriptive; it expresses a methodology and, further, an accepted belief about the relation of metaphysics to those sciences, if not about metaphysics itself. The consensus of social scientists, especially in America, is that such a metaphysical problem as the existence of something called 'feeling', 'consciousness', or 'subjective experience' lies outside the realm of factual description which is the realm of science, and that consequently one may hold any philosophical opinion on such matters without the least effect on one's scientific investigations and findings. This opinion seems to me to be erroneous.' (p. 3)

Mrs. Langer's examination of the views of Russell, Ryle and Morris on 'mind' and 'mental', though a little brief, is illuminating. Explaining the sense in which she wants 'mind' to be understood, she says that 'feeling' should not be conceived as a separate sort of entity, ontologically distinct from physical entities and therefore belonging to a different order or con-

stituting 'realm'. 'Feeling' is to be understood 'in its widest possible sense, i.e., to designate *anything that may be felt*.' (pp. 8, 85 and 98)

The essay entitled *Speculations on the Origins of Speech and Its Communicative Function*, if a little technical, is extremely interesting. The short paper *On A New Definition of 'Symbol'* is one of the most lucidly written essays. Read along with what Mrs. Langer has written in her earlier and better known work, *Feeling and Form*, the chapter ought to make anybody think again about the problems which are taken as solved. 'Any device', writes Mrs. Langer, 'whereby we make an abstraction is a symbolic element, and all abstraction involves symbolization.' (p. 63) Elsewhere in this book, by symbol, Mrs. Langer means 'all kinds of signs that can be used and understood whether the things they refer to are there or not.' (pp. 111-112.) Animals interpret signs, but only as pointers to actual things and events, landmarks and earmarks in the world, while human beings use symbols—especially words—to think and talk about things that are neither present nor expected. The words convey ideas, that may or may not have counterparts in actuality.

This is a work written by a fine scholar with a deep insight into the human mind. We look forward to the larger work of which this book claims to be only a preview. A striking feature of Mrs. Langer's thoughts is her indomitable optimism, a rare thing these days among the philosophers of the west.

A. M. GHOSE

Governmental Expertise

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR A WELFARE STATE by Paul H. Appleby (Asia Publishing House, 105 pp. Rs. 5.00)

DR. Paul H. Appleby, an expert on public administration, is not unknown in India. He has paid four visits to this country. At the end of his second visit (1953) he submitted to the Government

of India a report on our Public Administration; at the close of his third visit, Dr. Appleby prepared a report for the Government of India on 'A Re-examination of India's Administrative System with Special Reference to the Administration of Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises (1956)'. He came to India for four months as visiting professor at the Indian School of Public Administration in December, 1960. During this period he delivered a series of four public lectures on 'Individual Initiative and the Welfare State'; 'The Politician and the Administrator'; 'The Generalist and the Specialist in Administration'; and 'Who is a Good Administrator'? It is these lectures which have now been published in book form.

Dr. Appleby has given an illuminating and thought-provoking analysis of some of the basic administrative issues in a contemporary Welfare State. His approach is pragmatic and he is concerned with the development of competence and responsiveness in the individual as administrator, politician, and member of the different sectors of society as well as of society as a whole. He reminds us that the only way to make manageable 'the burdens of leadership in advancing civilization' is to enhance the capacity and utilize 'the knowledge and judgment of all citizens'. Mass aspiration could thus be translated into welfare ethics expressed in administrative terms, 'Action through democratic government, then is in an important and valid sense self-help, since the Government has no means with which to be helpful except those which are produced by the people'. Irrespective of pitfalls, trial and error is a better choice than shifting of direction to a miracle man whom everyone will blindly obey.

Striking a note of caution, he says, 'It is the responsibility of those now presuming to lead in any country to use their special capacities so as to fulfill the mass aspiration. The mass hope must be reasonably realized or they will do — and what the mass can always do — end a regime, give followership to another, or, in com-

plete frustration, substitute disorder for order to the great damage of everybody'. He goes on to counsel that what present leaders need to do is to find ways 'to accomplish most, most rapidly, with least waste and least failures'. Dr. Appleby rejects the notion generally held that the Welfare State will make the citizens entirely dependent on authority. He clinches the issue by asserting that 'there cannot be any dependence more alarming than that which results from its absence.'

According to Dr. Appleby, in any organization the individual at the lowest level of the hierarchy is as important as the top administrator. He points out that 'Recognition of personal dignity and importance is a compelling incentive for everyone — eminent or lowly — and the low employee of any worthy organization is important if the establishment is well administered'. Another point he stresses is that while development of personnel holds the key to effective administration, it is equally important to adapt the organizational structures to new demands of development. Dr. Appleby is for institutional changes, in particular for more and better staff aides for Ministers to supplement the expert advice given to them by the administrative hierarchy.

Dr. Appleby puts his finger on a major weakness of a democratic government when he says that 'the more democratic a Government is, the more thoroughly political it is' and 'the higher one goes in Government, the greater is the involvement in politics'. He does admit that a very significant difference exists between the nature of involvement on the part of the politician, on the one hand, and that on the part of the Civil servant on the other. Both being engaged in governmental work, and being administrators, both may be said to be in politics. The difference lies in that while the politician has a party responsibility the civil servant has not. It is perhaps because of his American background that Dr. Appleby takes this as correct and inevitable. Those of us who are closer to the British experience feel inclined to take a

somewhat stricter view of the civil servant's position. He must, we feel, remain non-political in his outlook and his attitude. He must leave it to his political chief to modify the conclusion he may have reached on the merits of a case for reasons of political expediency.

As to the rôle of the political parties, Dr. Appleby is on sure ground; he establishes their validity as a means of providing top leadership through election in a responsible government based on consent, not consensus. Emphasizing the quality of politicians he says, 'Government betterment is not to be had by throwing out the politicians. It can be achieved by substituting high-grade politicians for inferior ones.'

Over the controversy of generalists vs. specialists Dr. Appleby feels that the need for generalists to co-ordinate and integrate the work of specialists and to make overall judgment also grows as specialization within government increases. The basic principles underlying the arguments in favour of generalist-administrators occupying top positions are three:

Firstly, administration is considered to be a science by itself, proficiency in which can be gained only through practical experience in administration. Since administration is a science, a trained administrator can be put in charge of any job irrespective of the nature of its functions.

Secondly, the administrator should be non-partisan and neutral as between different fields of specialization and should be able to adopt an unbiased approach to the problems under his charge on the basis of his general ability and administrative competence.

Thirdly, the permanent generalist-administrator, as an expert in the science of administration is the person best qualified to advise the amateur Minister.

Dr. Appleby enumerates twelve essential characteristics of a good administrator:

(i) Willingness to assume responsibility; (ii) a steadily enlarging ability to deal with more problems, more varied problems and more diverse people; (iii) a strong bent to-

wards action; (iv) a good listener and a good initiator of that to which he listens; (v) unusually effective with people, possessing quick emotional perceptions; (vi) prefers to have around him the ablest people he can find; (vii) Uses his institutional resources rather than relying too heavily on himself; (viii) aims at effectiveness and avoids using power or authority for its own sake; (ix) possesses self-confidence that enables him readily to confess ignorance and personal fault; (x) welcomes reports of troublesome things lest they reach unmanageable dimensions before he hears of them; (xi) a team worker; and (xii) tirelessly pursues means of improving administration.

Dr. Appleby is conscious of the limitations of his list. He says that 'so many different functions have to be administered in so many different situations in an advanced society that it is extremely difficult to speak usefully about qualities generally characterizing good administrators'. He is equally aware that it is impossible to find all these qualities in any single individual.

SUBHASH CHANDRA MEHTA

Chairman Mao

MAO TSE-TUNG: *Emperor of the Blue Ants* by George Paloczi-Horvath (Secker & Warburg 410 pp. 42s.)

HOW far has an individual's megalomania contributed to China's present bellicosity? China, many have recently discovered, has long been expansionist. There is also, now a more willing recognition of the fact that the Communist ideology turns a state imperialistic given only the opportunity and the ability. But it is finally left to the man at the helm to express these traits in his own style. A study of Mao's life is, therefore, of immense importance.

Mr. George Paloczi-Horvath, who has written a biography of Khrushchev, has now addressed himself to a study of the Emperor of the Blue Ants. Chinese litera-

ture of the day abounds in fulsome praise of Mao. 'The sun shines only in the day, the moon shines only at night. Only Chairman Mao is the sun that never sets.' Mr. Palocz-Horvath's book is 'an attempt to give as detailed an account of "reality" as possible in one volume.' There is a good account of Mao's early years. The turbulent boyhood, the persisting discord with his father, the student leadership and the entry into the Party. 'A careful examination of the sequence of events and publications indicates that all those who became the founders of Chinese Communism in 1921 were converted not so much by what they had read about Communist theory, but far more by what they had learnt about Communist practice.'

Mao's first conflict with Stalin arose in the middle twenties when he encouraged peasant revolts which Stalin's emissary Borodin sought to stifle. It led eventually to Mao's total exclusion from leadership and even of a deprivation of the right to vote. 'If one shouts every day about 'arousing the masses of people' but is scared to death when the people do arise, what is the difference between that and Lord Shih's love of dragons?', Mao asked. Nearly forty years later he was to use worse language ('afraid as mice') for Stalin's successor.

However, Stalin's policies failed even as Mao's showed promise of success in Chingkangshan. It is interesting to note that despite the ouster the rebel was keen on making his peace with the Red orthodoxy in China when the latter modified its stand towards the acceptance of the peasantry as part of the Red Army. Mao's overtures received a rebuff and it was a foolish rebuff too. As the author writes, 'As a Communist theoretician, Mao Tse-Tung was no 'peasant deviationist'. Even during the years of the peasant revolution, Mao insisted that the aim was to establish a Communist state based on heavy industry and the leadership of the proletariat. He was attacked by the dogmatists

because of the unorthodox means by which he wanted to reach the most orthodox Communist ends' (Italics mine).

His deviationism lay only in his opposition to the tactical Party line and not to the Party's creed, which he fully shared. Mao went his own way through the famous Long March, recognition of his leadership by the Party in 1935 (though not by Moscow), the United Front with Chiang and the Sian incident which led Chiang to withhold his offensive. The respite enabled Mao to consolidate his gains and eventually expand them all over the country. During this trying period Mao wrote and wrote purposefully, 'His lectures and theoretical writings of the 1935-37 period show that, while hoping for Red China's victory over Japan and over Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's armies in a decade or two, Mao Tse-Tung was already planning the colossal task of 'remoulding' the whole of China after these victories.' He reminded his Party on November 6, 1938 'As a National war of resistance is going on, we must further contend for military power for the nation ... the working class and the toiling masses cannot defeat the armed bourgeois and landlords except by the power of the gun; *in this sense we can say that the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun*' (emphasis added).

Of course Stalin differed with Mao on the Reds taking the offensive after the war. Once again Mao was proved right and Stalin wrong. Naturally, misconceptions arose in the West over Mao's role. One school thought he was Moscow's tool, another that he was no Communist but a mere peasant reformer. Both were wrong. Mao was and has ever been a dedicated Communist with his own definite views on tactics; views, whose validity success has confirmed to his own satisfaction. The cult of the infallible Mao is a measure of this self-satisfaction. The author ably documents Mao's policies since the seizure of power. He goes astray only in some of his

bolder interpretations of the facts. It is difficult to accept that 'there were indications that Stalin would not mind if the Korean war spread over the Chinese mainland'. Mao was not such a bad ally then and in any case, he was preferable to an embittered enemy like Chiang. Equally fanciful is the opinion that Mao wanted the Hungarian revolt to succeed and 'had every reason to welcome the possibility of a Russo-American war over Hungary'. The author also writes, 'In fact, Red China never joined the Soviet bloc. From 1949 until 1960 Mao and his associates paid lip service to Soviet leadership for the sake of appearances.' The bloc, of course, functioned in rigid departments in Eastern Europe and the rest, but for long it functioned all the same. When it comes to the later events the book is altogether disappointing. Although published in 1962 there is no reference to the conflict with India. The analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict is altogether superficial. This is a pity. However, the author does succeed in providing a convincing answer to the question posed at the beginning of the review. Why does Mao's China behave as it does? 'The answer lies in the concrete content of Mao's obsession: Marxism-Leninism. By the sixty-ninth year of his life, Mao had become the most extremist and most dogmatist Communist ruler among his contemporaries. In fact, the Mao cult did not exaggerate when it depicted the Great Leader as the embodiment of Communism. During his years of power, Mao carried Marxism-Leninism to its *logical extreme*. He differed from Khrushchev and from the somewhat less dogma-bound members of his entourage not in the content and direction of his obsession but *only in its degree*. The dedicated Communist inevitably becomes a tyrant the moment he gets power; and the greater the dedication, the more complete the tyranny.'

A. G. NOORANI

Hide-bound Music

STUDIES IN INDIAN MUSIC by T. V. Subba Rao (Asia Publishing House, 224 pp. Rs. 15.)

THE stylised modern jacket design by R. G. Sthalekar quite belies the style of the writing inside: that remains traditionally sentimental. So does the approach of the late Mr. T. V. Subba Rao, the author. Writing of Tyagaraja, the famous saint composer of Karnatik music, in terms of 'the hero of heroes, fit object of adoration and festive celebration, the idol of the nation, nobler than poets and philosophers, loftier than statesmen and law givers...' he also believes that one of the *main* essentials of good music is '*sampradaya* or faithfulness to tradition'.

In a chapter called the 'Seven Lamps of Sangita' in which he defines the quality of good music, the first condition he postulates for it is that it must be pleasing to the ear. But what makes a good ear? 'An ear', he says which is '...accustomed to the right type of traditional music'. He doesn't even say 'classical'. He says 'traditional'. The emphasis is obvious.

Mr. Rao's scholarship is indisputable, but his vision is limited — at least it seems so from this collection of speeches and writings — by his reiteration of most of the expected theories. The subtleties of Indian music cannot be captured in notation, he says. Yes, of course. Then, '... nothing but the most intimate knowledge of practical music, hard sustained practice on the *vina* and a highly sensitive ear that can distinguish the smallest differences in tones, can qualify a man to make an authoritative pronouncement on music, theoretical or practical'. Self-evident in a way, with the *vina* idealised typically. He goes on to extol the *gurushishyaparampara*, the personalised teaching of old; he attempts to prove that because Indian music includes the principle of harmony, which distinguishes the Western system, it is above and beyond it, harmony being taken as a rather generalised concept. He argues for voice culture, believes in inspirational

music, and laments the fact that musicians in modern days tend to exploit the mechanics of the art rather than transcribe its essence. If only, he says, 'our artistes... are brought to realize that the aim of Art as an end in itself is rasanubhava...'

In a book which deals with the Karnatik style of Indian music, Mr. Rao has an exhaustive chapter on Tyagaraja as composer and saint, as well as a detailed and rather vividly embellished account of his actual compositions. The composition 'Giripai' for instance is said to describe Tyagaraja's experience of 'God-vision' whereby he is promised within three days liberation from the eternal cycle of birth and rebirth. Mr. Rao however takes it upon himself to describe, with apparent gullibility, how the auspicious sign is manifested when 'there rose from the head of the immortal singer, a blinding flash of light that ascended heavenward'. Mr. Rao is certain that 'the great *darsan*, the promise and the fulfilment are authentic incidents in the life history of Tyagaraja'. For the rest, there is a discussion of the ragas of the Saramita, a music treatise of the pre-Tyagaraja period by Tulajendra. This abounds in technical know-how as does the analysis of the evolution of the 22 *srutis* on the basis of the *sa-pa* and *sa-ma* intervals.

Brief biographical sketches of Shyama Shastri and Muthuswami Dikshitar are followed by those of three modern musicians, Vinai Dhanam, Mutha Bhagvatar and Tiger Varadachariar. Under *Miscellaneous* comes his review of various trends and his opinions on the future development of Indian music. Here, one of his most constructive suggestions is that since the written method is inadequate in conveying the exact nuances of our music — Karnatik or North Indian — exhaustive recording of classic and well-known compositions by leading musicians should be made and preserved as reference works for posterity. He attaches an oddly exaggerated importance to the instrument, particularly the *vina* as an example in 'range, flexibility and tonal richness for the human voice to follow, while it is generally

thought that it is its approximation to the human voice which gives distinction to the *vina*.

My main quarrel with this or most of the books or articles that appear on Indian music is that none of them deal with the basic *problems* of creativity. Our music is stagnating. Why? The social milieu has changed: does it affect the musician? How? What is it that inspires the Indian musician? If, as Mr. Rao states, there is more emphasis on *laya* (rhythm) rather than on *bhava* (emotion), why does he not probe into the reasons? Has the musician lost his genius or is the music itself insufficient to meet the demands of the age? Mr. Rao, I feel should have tackled these questions. A lawyer, founder of the Music Academy of Madras, editor of the Music Academy Journal, Principal of the Teacher's College of Music, Madras, a musicologist and a practising musician, he had the background, the knowledge and the opportunity to have done a more probing study. Instead, he himself plumbed for technical argument: useful for the academic files of a serious student but dispiriting for those who might have wished for an enlightening analysis of the conditions, of mind and circumstance, that produce great music.

UMA VASUDEV

SHORTER REVIEWS

Lack of space prevents us giving full-length reviews of all the books we receive. Those we think are likely to have some interest for our readers are briefly noticed in these columns.

BY LAEEQ FUTEHALLY

AN ANTHOLOGY OF COMMONWEALTH VERSE Edited by Margaret J. O'Donnell (Blackie & Son Ltd. — 318 pp.)

For the purpose of this carefully organised anthology Scotland and Wales are separate countries and New Zealand is independent of Australia. All the countries of Africa are however lumped together although South Africa, which produced the only poets of any stature, is technically no longer a member of the Commonwealth.

It is not really necessary to say anything about the first part of the book, the sections on English, Welsh, Scots and Irish poetry. Most of the writers are modern and contemporary poets whose names are household words and whose work is familiar to everyone who ever picks up a book. A few pieces by Tennyson, Wordsworth and Browning are included at the beginning possibly to indicate the standards on which the earliest colonial poets based their writings.

Outside the British Isles, the Commonwealth writers can be divided into two groups. There were those who, like the Canadians and Australians took their language with them to a new land; while the others, the Africans and Indians, wrote in an alien tongue which they had acquired through political necessity — a disadvantage which has never been fully overcome.

The beginning of literary life for both these groups is occupied in imitating the English poets. 'Our cultural capital is still in London,' as one clear-eyed African critic put it. The favoured masters were the Romantic poets — the imagery and the language were modelled on Wordsworth and Byron. By the turn of the century the idiom had in most cases become strongly local and though the language still had its headquarters in London, it had become a pliant medium for communing intimately with the poets' own people.

Canada was, perhaps, the earliest to break free from the nostalgic imitativeness of the early colonists. Ralf Gustafson has hotly defended it against the prejudice 'that Canadian poetry is a feeble and pale reflection of the British poetic scene.' 'Canadian poetry,' he says 'has had self-respect and integrity from the first. John Masefield described something of this integrity in speaking of the work of Duncan Campbell Scott. 'Like most of the poets of the New World, Mr. Scott uses the verse forms of Europe; but . . . his subjects are Canadian . . . they deal with a life, a landscape and a climate unknown over here.' Indeed the very titles of the poems included in this anthology — *The Logs, Canoe, Men of the High North, Lullaby of the Iroquois*, and *Canadian Authors Meet* — tell us of the poet's preoccupation with his own land. The most attractive poem in this section is Duncan Scott's own 'Prairie Wind' which begins:

Indolent wind on the prairie

Wind that loiters and passes . . .

The lack of any great interest in the main stream of cultural and intellectual life is more openly exposed in the pages of Australian and New Zealand poems. The balladry which grew out of the unlettered man's need to sing is sharply

divided from the thin efforts of the 'intellectual' to compose poems in the proper tradition of Eng. Lit. What is surprising is, in a way, the strength and lasting qualities of some of the work of the balladists. Banjo Paterson's 'Song of the Artesian Water' is rhythmic and swift, unburdened with any feeling of reverence.

*'Now the stock have started dying,
for the Lord has sent a drought
But we're sick of prayers and Providence
we're going to do without'*

Both Roy Campbell and William Plomer, whose poems are included in the African section are too well known to be discussed here. The work of most of the other African poets is interesting because it reflects so clearly the aspirations, desires and frustrations of a people who had lost their past and have only just acquired political consciousness. Many of the verses have short simple lines. Sometimes the simplicity can become excessive as in these lines:

*'It can be!
How can it be?
No, it cannot be.'*

For us, naturally, the most interesting part of the anthology is the section on Indian poetry. Here too the choice of poems is representative rather than selective. It begins with all the old stalwarts like Tagore, Mrs. Naidu and Aurobindo Ghosh. Among the large number of poems by contemporary writers Dom Moraes' contribution is his 'Glitter of Pebbles' while that of P. Lal's is a 'Song for Beauty'. The only Indian who is represented by more than one poem is Nissim Ezekiel, with 'Morning Prayer' and 'Enterprise'.

The editor has diligently uncovered much work by some little-known Indian poets. Perhaps one strong argument which we could put forward for the retention of English in our country is the fact that it gives our more obscure versifiers the chance to be published between the same covers as T. S. Eliot and Dylan Thomas.

CLOWN OF BOMBAY by Aaron Judah (Faber and Co, Ltd. 252 pp. 18s.)

This novel is written in a fast smart-alecky language which is likely to induce in most readers a feeling of nausea. Since the hero-narrator is a Bombay boy of part-Indian Jewish parents, one assumes that the language used is the established argot of the school-age Anglo-Indian. Its authenticity seems to be vouched for by the fact that, whatever else, the author certainly knows his Bombay. He knows it so well that he does not,

like most Indian writers tend to do, labour to describe it.

The story concerns the guilt feelings of an unpleasant boy (or does his language make him sound more unpleasant than he is?) who has allowed a classmate to be killed in an accident which he could have prevented. The root of the hero's troubles is, naturally, his nasty family where the father works sixteen hours a day to make money and the mother is a society social worker who has no time for her own family.

It is possible that the author intended us to feel sympathy for his protagonist. This never becomes clear, but in case he did it is only fair to say that he does not succeed. Neither does he succeed in writing a book worth reading.

PSYCHOLOGY by R. S. Woodworth and D. G. Marquis (*University Paperbacks, Methuen and Co, Ltd. 674 pp. 18s*)

The publishers' claim that this is 'one of the most successful introductions to psychology ever

published' is probably well founded. The book was originally written by R. S. Woodworth and published in 1922. Since then its publishers have been able to produce a new edition almost every year. Even with a rapidly developing subject like psychology, the author did not fall behind in the race to keep the book up to date. For the twentieth edition brought out in 1949 — of which the present paperback is a reprint — the whole book was revised and reorganised by Prof. Marquis. In that sense, the present work is the joint work of the two authors.

The incorporation of many special features exerts a gentle pressure on the reader to study the book for profit rather than read it cursorily for pleasure. A chapter by chapter bibliography, a summary of the main points at the end of each chapter, and the list of questions, alarmingly reminiscent of examinations, are some of the tricks used to persuade the student to read this book with greater earnestness than perhaps he had any intention of doing.

Our Reviewers

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A. G. NOORANI is a Bombay lawyer who is a frequent commentator on political affairs.

CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Sir,

I have to request you to print this letter in *QUEST* and permit me to register my protest against the cavalier manner in which my article on 'Government and Opposition in a National Emergency' has been handled by you while publishing it in the April number of *QUEST*. You will remember that in your letter of January 2, 1963, you had expressed the desire to make what you regarded as 'minor deletions'; in particular you had suggested the omission of my comment on the Congress acceptance of donations from Tatas as well as of an extract from the Lok Sabha Debates (December 10, 1962). Though I did not concur with your views as indicated in my letter to you of January 11, 1963, I wrote to you that the matter could be given a second thought and left it to your considered judgment. I regret to find now that you have gone well beyond what we had agreed to. The concluding sentence has been chopped off in the middle. The last part of the sentence seems to have been deleted because it paid a compliment to the Swatantra Party. This is evident from the needless and somewhat loaded introduction to the article. You mention for example that the article 'is evidently written from the point of view of the Swatantra Party'. On pages 56-57 of the article I write:

'In the newspapers at this time one looks in vain for any clear exposition from the Prime Minister or from other Ministers of the importance of adapting the machinery of parliamentary government for the purposes of meeting the challenge of the situation. We may therefore take a look at the stand taken by the Swatantra Party and consider the merits of its approach.'

This quotation should make it clear that the role of the Opposition is treated objectively and the standpoint of the Swatantra Party is given special attention only because alone among the parties of India it considered the role of the Opposition from a theoretical angle. I do not see how it would follow that the article is written

'evidently from the point of view of the Swatantra Party' — a party with which I differ on a number of issues. Your comment does justice neither to you as the Editor nor to me as contributor. Even if my article were written from a party point of view, it should be for the readers to judge. I do not see why the editor should take upon himself the responsibility of thinking for the readers of the journal. I am specially grieved because intellectuals normally do not like to be bracketed with a political party unless they agree with it. In my case it is all the more unpleasant to be treated in this way because I belong to the academic profession, in which intellectual integrity would be more valuable than socialism or *laissez faire*.

Deptt. of Civics & Politics
University of Bombay

Yours faithfully,
S. P. AIYAR

Dear Sir,

The last clause of your concluding sentence was deleted accidentally. The dropping of an independent clause which leaves the remaining part of the sentence quite meaningful, is liable to escape the notice of the proof-reader. We are sorry for the error.

To state that a particular article is written from the point of view of a political party is not to assert that the writer is a member of that party, nor to deny that he has differences with that party on issues not covered by the article in question. Nonetheless, we regret that we were misled by the general tenor of your article into assuming a closer agreement between your own political views and those of the Swatantra Party than, we now understand, is in fact the case. We are therefore glad to provide you the opportunity for making it clear to our readers that you "differ from that party on a number of issues".

It is our misfortune that you missed the real point of our editorial note — which was just to explain that in the newly introduced political section it would be neither possible nor desirable to exclude articles contributed by writers having

definite political preferences; therefore readers with only one issue before them should not hastily conclude that QUEST shares the particular political preference which has found expression in that issue. This caution may be unnecessary for our regular subscribers, but the number of our stall purchasers is not small.

Yours faithfully,
The Editors of QUEST

Sir,

Dr. Punya Sloka Ray's article, *The Teaching of Philosophy in India* (QUEST 34) is admirably frank and perspicacious. As keenly interested in the problem, I should like to make a few observations.

For one thing, the traditions of higher learning are relatively new in this country. I know I shall be immediately reminded of our pandits and maulvis and the hoary traditions they continue to represent. But by 'higher learning' I mean something else. A liberal outlook at once free from subtilized mysticism and gross utilitarianism, an outlook that does not revel in scholastic hair-splitting but cares more for intellectual adventure, unhurried research and urbane yet purposeful inquisitiveness, is almost wholly a gift of European education. With all the grand and imposing speculative systems we are proud of, the fact remains that we in this country rarely valued knowledge as power. Learning or knowledge was most of the time subservient either to esoteric and mystical experiences or to immediate personal needs. Apart from this brute historical fact, the other factor that operates fiercely against advancement of learning is our widespread and acute poverty. I am not speaking only about our poorly equipped educational institutions and their indigent libraries and laboratories. A nation steeped in poverty for centuries scarcely produces men who can stand apart and reflect. And reflection, in the final analysis, is the mother of higher learning. Those who are interested in educational policies and programmes can ill afford to ignore these two formidable handicaps.

For another thing, philosophy as a discipline, like any other, sprouts from life, its profounder needs and requirements. In a sense, our needs and requirements are so numerous and complex that we have neither the patience nor the courage necessary to ponder over them. They are simply overwhelming. In another sense, again, they are so few and simple: admitting students, prescribing

text-books, taking classes, conducting examinations and announcing the results!

Our academic philosophers, it is true, are seldom interested in problems that agitate the minds engaged in other spheres of thought and activity. But men pursuing other disciplines, strictly speaking, are not bothered about such problems either; what they are passionately interested in are career, recognition, committees and conferences. To be sure, our academic life is inane largely because the problems which ought to worry our eggheads remain undetected, unexamined and unsolved. And since nature abhors a vacuum, demagogues in their way look after those problems. Save a few at the top — academically not bureaucratically — scholars and scientists in this country either borrow problems (and often solutions) or just do not bother about them so long as other avenues of promotion, etc., remain open and not utterly disrespectful. If 'professional philosophy in India is sick', as Dr. Ray rightly thinks, that is because our entire academic life neither offers nor accepts challenges, the only two ways by which it can show signs of health. After all is said and done, the unpleasant truth is that Education is very much a neglected portfolio. And that is not unnatural in an atmosphere where men with little education can get concession tickets to celebrity. The root problem, therefore, is to devise methods by which the vast electorate can regain faith in education, education not as a casual means to career or quick success, but as an arduous means to true knowledge and power.

What to my mind is desperately necessary is to orientate our courses and syllabi to the actual problems of our lives and country. A learning that consistently sneers at usefulness and aims exclusively at disinterested intellectual appreciation is doomed to sterility. It is certainly desirable that our professors should know what their counterparts in Europe and America are doing and thinking, but they should know all that only in the course of their own investigations and not as a precondition. What is much more desirable, however, is that they should be keenly aware of their own heritage, worthy of preservation and otherwise, and problems as they bristle in real life and the factors that make those problems unique. Unless our system of education in general and study of Philosophy in particular are harnessed to the task of detection, examination and solution of such problems, they will remain showy and often excellent exhibits or prim, infertile mechanical and routine affairs.

I do not know if serious attempts have ever been made at any level to revise our syllabi in so far as the study of Philosophy is concerned. Dr. Ray's suggestions in this connection are commendable. Most universities in the north, for all that I know about them, prefer to remain satisfied with stereotyped syllabi framed two, three or even four decades ago. Attempts at revising, even partially, the syllabi have been foiled by a practical, if serious, difficulty, the difficulty created by the enthusiasts of regional languages. Batches of students coming to universities with little or no knowledge of English, a fact for which they are not at all sorry, offer a kind of resistance which demands serious attention. Or is that a different problem?

Any move, however, in the direction of bringing together our senior and junior teachers of Philosophy to talk their difficulties over with a view to changing our syllabi is surely welcome.

Dept. of Philosophy

University of Rajasthan

Yours etc.,

A. M. GHOSE

Sir,


In the January issue of *QUEST*, Shri P. Kodanda Rao has written a full length review of Stanley Wolpert's book 'Tilak and Gokhale'. In the course of the review, Shri Kodanda Rao has given expression to his political prejudices and has remarked, 'While Gokhale sought political progress through constitutional agitation in the open, Tilak sought it through revolution including political assassination.' Any one who studies the political career of Tilak in an unbiased manner, would have to acknowledge Tilak as the apostle of civil revolt. It was mainly through Tilak's efforts that the message of Swaraj could reach the people. Tilak strove to create a mass sanction for our freedom struggle. His methods were qualitatively different from those of revolutionaries like Aurobindo Ghosh. Tilak strongly objected to terrorist actions. It is well known that during the first world war Tilak tried to dissuade the revolutionaries from sporadic actions. He was too mature a statesman to believe in political assassination. I was amused to read the remark of Shri Kodanda Rao that Gokhale believed in 'constitutional agitation'. Gokhale believed in constitutional protests and not in constitutional agitation, because the latter implied direct action in some form. Most of our liberal leaders were allergic to the very word agitation. Shri Kodanda Rao also would not have used the expression in the pre-independence period.

I think a time has come when one can take a detached view of the principles and policies advocated by Gokhale and Tilak, and evaluate their work in an objective way. To me the book of Mr. Wolpert is an amateurish effort, full of hasty generalisations and oversimplifications. He may, however, be forgiven for his inadequate grasp of a phase in Indian political life; but one is pained to find that an elder statesman like Shri Kodanda Rao cannot get over his earlier prejudices and preconceived notions.

Yours faithfully
G. P. PRADHAN

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Reviews Editor



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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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A. H. SOMJEE occupies the Chair in Political Science at the M. S. University, Baroda. His published works include **Voting Behaviour in an Indian village** and **Politics of a Periurban Community in India**.

H. R. PASRICHA held the rank of Lt. Colonel in the army as Consulting Surgeon to the Western Command from which he retired at his request to resume private practice as an orthopaedic surgeon. He is a leading member of the Swatantra Party.

LESLIE BODI was born in Budapest and lectured on German Language and Literature at Budapest University during 1946-47. At present he is a lecturer in the Department of Modern Languages at Monash University, Melbourne.

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PUNYA SLOKA RAY is visiting Assist. Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics at the University of Chicago. His book on **Language Standardisation** will be published this year by Mouton & Co.

S. B. SINHA (Major), retired Superintendent, Central Prisons, U.P., was a member of the Indian Medical Service.

WILLIAM PHILLIPS is a well-known American writer and editor of the distinguished quarterly **PARTISAN REVIEW**.

M. S. DWORKIN is a reputed New York film critic.

CHETAN KARANI is a free-lance journalist.

MBELLA SONNE DIPOKO, born in Cameroun, was reporter with Radio Nigeria, Lagos, until 1960. He has published short stories and poems some of which have been broadcast by the BBC.

LAWRENCE BANTLEMAN'S book of verse **Graffiti** was published by Writers' Bookshop in 1962.

G. C. S. MARAR has contributed verse to **Extension**, **Atlantic Monthly** and **Poetry of U.S.A.**


AMARESH DATTA is Reader in English Literature at Gauhati University.

INDIRA MAHANTI says she is nineteen, longing to go abroad and would like to be a free-lance journalist.

KRISHAN KUMAR's address is unfortunately not with us at the moment. Would he please communicate?



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commence, read the sacred texts," she commands, "for I shall now complete the marriage." She mounts the pyre and sits next to her prince. As the air trembles with the chant of Vedic hymns and the weave of gay lutes, the flames lick away...

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
I am a born optimist —what about you?

If a man can look at the bills his wife runs up and say: "Thank heavens she has not spent more!"—then he is an optimist. AND THAT'S ME.

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Not that I never groan, of course. I groan when the postman brings those premium notices on my Life Insurance. But I pay up and say: "One payment less; one more chunk saved; one step nearer maturity." It *does* make for peace of mind. The thought of my wife and the children having this little security feeds my optimism.

I AM AN OPTIMIST—I think.



Moti of Jamshedpur


Not a show dog perhaps. But Moti doesn't worry about that. Nor about anything else, as long as he has enough to eat and the sun to bask in. Certainly he neither knows nor cares that he lives in Jamshedpur—a city devoted to producing one of today's most precious metals...steel.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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