

An
Adventure
of
Ideas

QUEST

Editors: Abu Sayeed Ayyub & Amlan Datta

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

Experts and Laymen

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Progress in Islamic Law

JAYANTANUJA BANDYOPADHYAYA

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
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
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How to Live with Ignorance

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

EACH one of us is frightfully ignorant. The more we know, the more we realize how humiliatingly little we do know, and even can know. This is not just the prospect of an as yet unrealized knowledge. For only too often the knowledge from which any one of us finds himself excluded is already there, in possession of others among us. These others therefore serve as specialists, consultants, authorities. The most awesome aspect of civilization is the self-accelerating speed at which knowledge is accumulating into existence. This is a veritable explosion, in which the common sense, the everyman-sufficient-onto-himself-and-alike-onto-one-another image of knowledge, has begun to fragment into ever tinier bits of specialization. As much as we are jointly becoming more and more knowledgeable, we are severally becoming less and less knowledgeable. Each one of us is becoming more and more ignorant.

How to live with this godly process? There is no easy answer. For we cannot trust the specialists, the consultants, the authorities absolutely. They may err, they may lie, they may be biassed, they may be wrongheaded, they may be lazy, they may be just incompetent. Each one of them is also one of us, and therefore as much liable to be ignorant and to become more ignorant. Shall we believe that a specialist or consultant or authority is, within the limits of his specialization or consultation or authority, always right? Shall we say with the voice of traditional mysticism that a true king is always worth obeying? The problem then becomes one of knowing when the authority is a true one. Self-proclamation will not be enough, mass or public recognition will not be enough, nothing will be enough but the

consent of any one of us. No, mysticism is no solution. A specialist, consultant, authority of this world is not God, not to be absolutely trusted, not to be absolutely identified.

Faced with this agony, we may prefer a three-pronged strategy. Firstly, we may try to learn more and faster than ever. Secondly, we may build up an art by which the ignorant may rule the knowledgeable, a system of checks and balances for the specialists, consultants, authorities, for those to whom we delegate tentatively and partially our quest for knowledge. Thirdly, we may learn to deal with situations in which neither knowledge nor ignorance can be given the upper hand.

I

A passion must arise for knowledge, for such knowledge as is desired to cease being unconditionally sufficient soon, and the sooner the better. The most knowledgeable is he who becomes less knowledgeable the fastest. To say this is not to confuse science with journalism. Isn't it desirable that the limits of application of a grand theory like quantum mechanics be found as soon as possible? For, to come to know the limits is also to know where to start for the next discovery. If a discovery becomes permanent and unlimited as truth, then knowledge will slowly grind to a stop. There will be enough opportunity then to dissipate the distinction between a specialist and a layman. For the layman will have an unlimited time to learn what the specialist knows. Knowledge and ignorance will sooner or later cease to be different. Since this will mean the end of the characteristic disadvantage of igno-

rance, the net result can only be a gain for ignorance. It is only because we in India had found an absolute knowledge in the 9th Century that we had come by the 18th Century as near as possible to an absolute ignorance. We had forgotten the more ancient Indian injunction that he who truly knows wishes his son or disciple to beat his record.

This is learning as research, which includes but exceeds learning as drill. To learn is not only to learn what has been learnt by others, but also to learn what has not been. To learn is not only to learn this here now, but also to learn better every next thing that is learnt. To learn is not only to learn what is predictable, but also to learn as it comes what is not predictable. Science includes many drills, but rather as a fountainhead than as a collection of them. If research without drill is blind, then drill without research is empty. Yet the mutual dependence is not quite so symmetrical. Drill is subordinate to research. Nothing is in drills that has not been there first in research. Certainly, it often happens that a field of knowledge becomes so completely a set of established propositions that there is no longer any prospect visible for additional discoveries in it. It becomes then a closed system, monumental in perfection. Euclidean geometry and trigonometry have attained this status. Spectrography within physics and phonemics within linguistics may also be said to have reached it. When this happens to a particular field of knowledge, research in it becomes increasingly less promising and soon dwindles into nothing. It is no longer a research science. If it is still called a science, then only by a kind of courtesy, comparable to the American custom of addressing their ex-Presidents as Mr. President Hoover, Mr. President Truman and Mr. President Eisenhower.

A sentimental preference for ex-sciences undoubtedly exists in many people. Often it invokes in its aid the love for beauty, so that a settled elegance is valued above the upstart insights of research. Or it invokes piety to predecessors, so that a formal

presumption of continuity is valued above the apparent radicalism of research. Or it invokes loyalty to particular human beings, so that pleasantness in social relations is valued above the impersonal obtrusions of research. Or it invokes just the natural resentment at being pressured and the consequent preference for such demands as do not impose time limits.

A far subtler temptation is to deny the need to compete. Purely on the empirical evidence, there is indeed no adequate basis for asserting any unity of knowledge. Why shouldn't there be English physics and French physics, American linguistics and British linguistics etc., on the analogy of Parisian cooking and Viennese cooking, Indian music and Western music, and the like? Alternative vantage points and measuring scales may be found for any observation. Alternative axioms and inference rules may be found for any deduction. No identifiable set of propositions may be found that will unambiguously entail the possibility of genuine error, as distinguished from mere difference of preference. The distinction between 'culture' or 'worldview' which are always one of a changing many, and 'civilization' or 'science' which are always one for all, is not objectively demonstrable, but ethically imperative.

Every new insight comes into existence in an aura of absolutism. For a moment in the awareness of a passionately interested individual, it appears as the revelation of a knowledge that will suffice and endure without limits. Yet this is only a sensation, soon lost and not predictably repeated. The desire to hold it, or predictably to repeat it, has certainly been widespread, perhaps because of an analogy to the desire to live forever or surely again.

We will seek immortality for knowledge in a different way. Instead of vainly attempting to hold what will not be held and to repeat what will not be predicted, we will deliberately and joyfully seek to limit every new insight by placing it within a various and varying multiplicity of insights. Science is the passage from the

momentarily sufficient totality of an incomplete knowledge to the eternally insufficient totality of completed knowledge. The one sure way to know on and again is to know where this knowledge ends.

Each of us will therefore know more and more about less and less, and so become a specialist, consultant, authority. Let there be no firm or wide gap between those who are specialists in everything and those who are specialists in nothing. Let there be neither relief nor attempt that one single individual, regional group or social class may have the greater share of all special authority. This itself will be the most important check against a misleading authority, since each of us will know from the inside the temptations of an authority. For, although not in the same directions, each one of us will be both a layman and a specialist.

II

What are the other means of checking and balancing those in comparison to whom we are ignorant, so that a politician can handle professors, a civilian can handle generals, a lawyer can handle doctors, a physicist can handle mathematicians, and so on? We will distinguish several possible approaches and explore the characteristic dangers of each. The important point to note is that there is no panacea, no single technique which known all others are superfluous, so that different techniques must be used jointly and successively for any degree of success.

We may, for instance, distinguish the fundamentals from the details, and then let the layman have the former, while the specialist is entrusted with the details. This is unobjectionable as long as we are confident that we can identify what is fundamental and not detail. Let us consider the example of geography. What is fundamental in it and what is detail? That the earth is round, that its surface is three quarters water etc. are perhaps fundamental, while such things as Malaya's growing rubber and Bolivia's mining tin

are perhaps detail. How about such things as the gold mine at Kolar or the cotton crops of Berar, which can hardly be left out of any syllabus for use in India? And, of course, if we have just marked off some areas of knowledge as detail, then the specialists will not be prevented from misleading us precisely in regard to those details. Suppose we take a different example, that of geometry. We may distinguish the Euclid-Hilbert axioms as fundamental and the Pythagorean theorem as detail. But then if we do not know the Pythagorean theorem already, our layman's knowledge of geometrical reasoning will not enable us to deduce it from those axioms. No, fundamentals are not of much use without the detail.

We may, alternatively, distinguish the results from the methods by which they have been obtained, and then let the layman have the former, while the specialist is undisturbed about the methods. We may not try to know how the geologist knows that there is oil here, as long as we do know that he knows it. We may refine this approach to distinguish procedures of proof and procedures of discovery, and then let the layman control the former, while the specialist remains unquestioned on the methods of discovery. But if we really know nothing about procedures of discovery, we will be totally helpless in regard to any as yet untested innovation. Since any testing costs money and time and talent, we shall find it soon quite a disaster that every claimed result equally requires testing.

We may, for an other plot, invert the above relationship, and let the layman have the methods, while the specialist is left alone with his results. This seems at first sight to be better. For if we have the methods, we can when necessary rediscover the results, and so need not carry them around in memory. And yet there are difficulties. Methods are far more difficult to learn than results, so much so that many people have assigned methods to divine inspiration or to inscrutable heredity. And it takes a lot of special knowledge to use

a method, whereas much less can do for the results. Though neither is learnt without effort, typewriting letters is far more difficult an accomplishment than reading typewritten letters.

We may, instead, ask the specialists to give us a set of general principles in the light of which their knowledge may be tested. Such rules may be described as the logic of that particular branch of science, or even be collected together into an all-purpose logic, a Logic with capital L. For example, we may be told that the law enacted is valid and good, because it is consistent with previously enacted laws. Or, we may be told that this is a right course of action because it is in the direction of the tide of history. The difficulty of this approach is of course that only too often the proffered general principles turn out to be even more indistinct and unstable than the merits of the particular case. Who can define satisfactorily what is logical consistency or happiness of the greatest number or the like?

We may, alternatively, ask the specialists to give us concrete hints whereby we may discriminate between their claims. For example, we may be told that whatever is published in *Nature* is clearly good science, but what is published in the *Scientific American* is not always that. Or, we may be told that economics Ph.D's from Cambridge are usually brighter but also more dogmatic than those from Harvard. Such hints are given and taken all the time, although it is undeniable that they are always biased by the accidents of personal experience and frequently several years or even decades behind the events.

We may, further, set up one class of specialists just for the purpose of checking upon other specialists. For example, an anti-corruption division may be set up to check the police, and a surveillance squad to check the anti-corruption division. Similarly, scientists may be followed by historians of science, and historians of science by philosophers of science. The trouble with this approach is of course that

the second or the third order specialists are progressively less specialist in the field reviewed, and so assimilate to laymen in their inability to understand the first order specialists.

We may, again, depend on such crude results as are immediately and materially evident. For example, if the patient dies, this may be held to prove that that doctor did not know or did not do his job. The trouble is of course that patients die even in the hands of the most learned, skilful and dedicated doctor, and that even after recovery patients may fall ill again and more severely. The seemingly most tangible criterion is probably the most unreliable of all criteria.

We may, also, distinguish specialists with approvable non-specialist qualities and those without, and then prefer to trust the former. For example, we may prefer to have in the committee such nuclear physicists as are charming conversationalists, handsome to look at, good amateur poets, graduates of certain schools, subscribers to the *New Statesman*, or the like. The danger of this approach is obvious, though we should not overlook the fact that certain qualities of character and accidents of biography are indeed frequently associated with reliability as a specialist.

We may, further, ask some specialists to evaluate the work of other specialists. This is a very dangerous method indeed. For specialists usually check each other only on the relatively more technical points, and leave the more general or practical interpretations without criticism, as things obviously outside their specialist competence. Yet the boundaries are not so obvious to the layman as to the specialists. Thus the philosophical or political bias of the popularizer becomes very often implicitly and unthinkingly endorsed by the authority of the evaluating specialist.

We may, instead, depend on the greatest common factor between a plurality of equally ranked specialists. But a mass of specialists is far less sensitive than an individual specialist, is more inclined to

give us the non-controversial and the obsolescent, the forced compromise between incompatibles, and thus approximates the virtues and the vices of a layman, withal a layman not well experienced and not too motivated in making decisions.

We may, finally, utilize mutual overlaps in specialization. Not even the narrowest specialist is a specialist in one thing alone, but in several things. Even the most apocryphal logical postivist admitted two different things in his heaven of certainty, set-theoretic algebra and the physical experiment. In real life, Mr. A may be a specialist in astrophysics and hydrodynamics, Mr. B may be a specialist in hydrodynamics and statistics, Mr. C may be a specialist in statistics and plant taxonomy, and so on. Because of these overlaps, one direction of specialization may to a considerable extent be checked against others without needing to go all the way to the layman. And yet the specialist is usually more of a specialist in one of his several competences, and so this method too is more limited than it might easily be taken to be.

Above all, we must be fully alive to the fact that intellectuals are just as prone to assume without questioning that whatever is good for them is also good for everybody. Most of them are adult, male, born intelligent, experienced in the evaluation of information and ideas. Quite often they forget that these characteristics are not true for large sections of the people, who consequently have somewhat different needs. To take one example, leading liberal intellectuals of even very chaste inclinations have defended the right of anybody to send printed incitement to sexual perversion into family mail-boxes, or even to extend practical invitation to sexual intercourse to young children. Since they themselves know very well how to protect themselves from such seduction, no one else apparently needs any other protection. For precedent to this kind of insensitivity, we shall have to go to the early 19th century industrialists, who so righteously defended the right of anybody

to be offered any kind of goods or employment. The knower-sayer barons are barons, no less than the better-known farmer-soldier barons, or the trader-manufacturer barons, or the manager-fixer barons.

Yet we cannot do without these barons. Nor do we gain if their morale of performance is too low. For it is they who more than all others are in immediate contact with that explosive dynamism of research which is rushing onwards without consideration for the peculiar difficulties of particular nations or groups or individuals. It is they who fight for us all in the great supranational, even suprahuman, struggle for survival and prosperity. Not to trust them enough is but to opt out of this world. Alas, even could we sincerely wish it, the world is not so obliging as to meet us on our preferred terms or leave us alone.

III

Although each of the three prongs of the overall strategy is essentially philosophical, it is possible and is indeed frequently the case that the first is considered part of science and the second part of politics, and so there is no explicit awareness of the philosophical character of the enterprise. This is not possible with the third prong of the strategy, that of finding one's way when neither knowledge nor ignorance is certain. We are here inevitably aware that it is philosophy that we have gone in for. In this sense, it is a more restricted but at the same time a more paradigmatic act of philosophy.

Philosophy is not made without either an awareness of authority or an awareness of the limitations of any authority. This is not all like the legend of kicking off the ladder after climbing it. If others are to climb after us, the ladder will continue to be needed. A ladder takes enormous courage and labour over a great many years and a great many men to build, and will not be conjured out of nothing on short notice. Furthermore, those who have climbed up are never able to stay up very

long, so that if they have not kept the ladder, they will never find their way back up again. No, authority has to be accepted if chaos and waste are to be avoided. Yet, authority has to be transcended, if only in the sense of refusing unique necessity for any one arrangement, and keeping open for any arrangement a small number of mutually independent and mutually unsegregated alternatives.

What authority I propose will inescapably be tied to your disposition. If you believe in your social superiors, it shall be the scriptures or the classics. If you believe in your social inferiors, it shall be science or history or some such special lore. If you believe in your social equals, it shall be natural law or human reason or common sense or ordinary language. In every case, I must depend on your unwillingness to limit yourself even so provisionally to demonstrable objectivity in some particular direction. If you have learnt how to do modern philology, then the scriptures and the classics begin to be unusable. If you have learnt to listen to the specialists with a pinch of salt, then science or history or mystic wisdom begin to totter on their thrones. If you have learnt to do cultural anthropology, then common sense or ordinary language or human reason begin to feel like quicksands. However, no disillusionment is either total or final, and however sophisticated you may be, you are less willing to limit yourself to demonstrable objectivity in some directions than in others. This philosophical inclination of yours founds my philosophizing.

A specialist audience is the only place where the dream of logical positivism comes true. For specialization cannot be defined except as the willing suspension of philosophy. From the point of view of the specialist in the abstract, it is not necessary to have any distinct or stable philosophy. One may change one's philosophy by the hour, for material inducements or by sheer whim. One need not even have a positive philosophical evaluation of the particular special branch

of knowledge. One might regard it as mortal sin or idle pastime or sordid necessity. It has been well said that two mathematicians can agree all the way on one definition of good mathematics only when one of them is dead and so can't contradict the other, or when one of them is an assistant facing promotion by the other. But of course the majority of mathematicians will agree that mathematics is to be regarded as a worthwhile pursuit. And there is little doubt that a colloquium of them will unanimously interrupt their proceedings to save quite unmathematical human beings if there is a fire in the nextdoor art school. They do in fact have some common and some frequent priorities of valuation, even as much as they have bathrooms in their labs and coffee-makers on their tables, although purely logical and positive intellects should not theoretically need anything beyond pure observation and pure deduction. If only Science were a liquid under 'lab conditions and Ordinary Language a countable number of chips on a countable number of squares on a chessboard! In brief, a specialist audience does not need to philosophize, but it exists only for the momentary supposition, only as Euclidean straightness exists in this chalk line on the blackboard.

Philosophy is abolished also if a uniform laymanship becomes the assumption, and every man is considered sufficient unto himself and alike unto all others. If each of us could know as much as any other, there would be no need either to research or to communicate, and the dream of egalitarian populism would be fulfilled. Such a layman-to-layman audience may be as much actual or non-actual as a specialist-to-specialist audience, true only as a momentary supposition within a very different kind of proceeding. Philosophy is not this kind of un verbalized understanding between neighbours any more than it is the link between specialists of the same field. Philosophy arises only as you and I agree that a certain identifiable class of specialists possess an advantage of authority so as to exceed the limitations of technicality

more proper for other specialists, and that a certain identifiable class of laymen possess an advantage of inquiry so as to exceed the limitations of practicality more proper for other laymen. It begins to exist when neither the technical neutrality of the specialist nor the inarticulate practicality of the layman is alone allowed to prevail.

A mass audience will always be inclined to trust the specialist, whether he is a pundit talking up or a popularizer talking down, whether invoking the classics or some lore like science. Trust the man in the know, after all he has studied the matter, or is in the best position to know. Since this is something all of us are constantly compelled to do, its extension to philosophy is easy and plausible. Let philosophy be a specialists' concern, not specialists to one another, but to the laity.

An elite audience will always be inclined to trust the layman, which for its awareness consists of any one within its own privileged group. Trust the typical representative of the class, the person with the right background, the man of common sense, the speaker of ordinary language. Since most of those who are inclined to read and write philosophy belong to some elite class or other, the extension to philosophy is not at all difficult or implausible. Let philosophy be only a codification or elucidation of what everybody knows, a collection or dissection of the wisdom of that special group within which commonness and obviousness exhaust themselves.

In this way, if I appear to you as philosophizing, it is only insofar as you are already philosophizing with me. If our paths do not meet, and your imaginative sensitivity does not suffice to throw a bridge across to me, you will not see in my thinking anything more than a bizarre hotch-potch of facts and inferences, mostly undemonstrated, some inconsistent, quite a few already refuted. Indeed, it should be an excellent exercise for each one of us deliberately to withdraw the philosophical

understanding once in a while from the best beloved of philosophers, and see what a wretched mess his efforts show up as in terms of factual information and technical arguments.

Heaving the anchor off what is objectively demonstrable for a specialist audience is prerequisite before you can even begin to see that a philosophy is being proposed, good or bad as it may be. But to exercise your own personal judgement is not rational unless you let it be educated by an authority that you and I acknowledge. It is not your whims or dreams, but your philosophy that alone can make contact with mine. And yet it remains true that no one can totally or finally delegate or submit his judgement to that of someone else. I should not be a good philosopher if I fail, either to use such delegations and submissions as you have preferred to make on the way to your residuary judgement, or to reach beyond your trusted principles, methods, authors, offices, backgrounds, traits and like instruments to your residuary judgement.

Does this make philosophy a subjective affair, in the class of such things as taste or pleasure or pain? Not demonstrably. Pleasure or pain is usually predictable. I know, for example, that a cup of coffee appears to me as wonderful after meals and awful on an empty stomach. My belief in the goodness of my drinking coffee is demonstrated to be correct every time a universe containing me with a full stomach is granted. Philosophical beliefs are not tied to the demonstrable in any comparable way. Philosophy is neither objective nor subjective, just as much as it is neither proved knowledge nor proved ignorance. Philosophy is not definitely known to be anything, even to be there. It is made, detected, sorted, described or evaluated only as you and I happen to meet philosophizingly in transition between certain knowledge and trusted authority and personal judgement, and there is fusion in and beyond the moment of dialogue and doctrine.

The Concept of Progress and Islamic Law

NOEL J. COULSON

ALL innovation is the work of the devil.' These alleged words of the founder Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, do not merely reflect the innate conservatism and the deep seated attachment to tradition which was so strong among the Arab peoples who formed the first adherents of the faith. They also express a principle which became a fundamental axiom of religious belief common to Islamic communities everywhere — namely, that the code of conduct represented by the religious law, or *shari'a*, was fixed and final in its terms and that any modification thereof was necessarily a departure and a deviation from the one legitimate and valid standard.

Among Muslim peoples, therefore, it is what we may call the traditional or classical Islamic concept of law and its role in society that constitutes a most formidable obstacle to progress. Western jurisprudence has provided a number of different answers to the question of the nature of law, variously finding its source to lie in the orders of a political superior, in the breasts of the judiciary, in the 'silent, anonymous forces' of evolving society, or in the very nature of the universe itself. For Islam, however, this same question admits of only one answer which the religious faith itself supplies. Law is the command of Allah, and the acknowledged function of Muslim jurisprudence, from the beginning, was simply the discovery of the terms of that command.

Having thus been discovered, the religious code of conduct (thus formed) was a comprehensive and an all-embracing one, wherein every aspect of human relationships was regulated in meticulous detail. Moreover, the law, having once achieved perfection of expression, was in principle

static and immutable: for Muhammad was the last of the Prophets, and after his death in 632 A.D. there could be no further direct communication of the Divine Will to man. Henceforth the religious law was to float above Muslim society as a disembodied soul, representing the eternally valid ideal towards which society must aspire.

In classical Islamic theory, therefore, law does not grow out of or develop along with an evolving society as is the case with Western systems, but is imposed from above. In the Islamic concept, human thought, unaided, cannot discern the true values and standards of conduct; such knowledge can only be attained through divine revelation, and acts are good or evil exclusively because Allah has attributed this quality to them. Law, therefore, precedes and is not preceded by society; it controls and is not controlled by society. If in Western systems the law is moulded by society, in Islam exactly the converse is true. The religious law provides the comprehensive, divinely ordained and eternally valid master plan to which the structure of state and society must, ideally, conform.

Obviously, therefore, the clash between the dictates of the rigid and static religious law and any impetus for change or progress that a society may experience poses for Islam a fundamental problem of principle. The Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East have sought the solution in a process which may be generally termed legal modernism; and it is the purpose of this paper to appreciate in broad outline the nature and efficacy of the solution which has thus been proffered. To do so I propose that we should focus our atten-

tion upon one particular legal reform introduced in Tunisia in 1957. This was the outright prohibition of polygamy, which represented a complete break with the legal tradition of some 13 centuries standing. I have chosen this particular case not because polygamy is one of the most pressing social problems in Islam today — it is generally not so — but because, firstly, it is concerned with the status of the family where the influence of the traditional religious law has always been strongest; secondly, because it highlights the various issues involved in legal reform which are common to Muslim communities the world over, and finally because it is one of the most extreme and significant examples of this process of legal modernism which may not only radically alter the shape of Islamic society but may well affect the very nature of the religion of Islam itself. Our approach to the subject must be essentially historical: for it is only in the light of past tradition that the significance of legal modernism and its potential role in the future development of Islamic peoples may be properly assessed.

Traditional Muslim jurisprudence is an example of a legal science almost totally divorced from historical considerations. Islamic orthodoxy sees the elaboration of the law as a process of scholastic endeavor completely independent of and in isolation from considerations of time and place, and the work of individual jurists during the formative period is measured by the single standard of its intrinsic worth in the process of discovery of the divine command. Master architects were followed by builders who implemented the plans; successive generations of craftsmen made their own particular contributions to the fixtures, fittings and interior decor until, the task completed, future jurists were simply passive caretakers of the eternal edifice. The picture of the elaboration of the system of Allah's commands thus presented lacks therefore any true dimension of historical depth. Recent researches by scholars, however, have shown that the genesis of Islamic religious law lay in a complex pro-

cess of historical growth intimately connected with current social conditions and extending over the first three centuries of Islam.

The first steps in Islamic jurisprudence were taken in the early years of the second century of the Muslim era, around 750 A.D., by scholars working in various centres of which the most important were to prove those of Kufa in Iraq and Medina in the Hijaz. For these scholar-jurists, the fundamental axiom of Islam — that of total submission to Allah — indicated that all human relationships were subject to regulation by the divine command. Their aim, therefore, was to elaborate such a system of law as would express, in terms of the rights of men and their obligations, the will of Allah for Muslim communities, a system which was to be called the *shari'a*. But for these loose fraternities of legal scholars, whom we may refer to as the early schools of law, this activity entailed nothing more than the assessment of existing legal practice in the light of the principles embodied in the Qur'an. Now the Qur'an does not contain, in any sense, a code of law. It merely sets out to reform, in a limited number of particulars, the existing customary law, by precepts which often suggest rather than command, which are predominantly ethical in tone, and which amount in all to some one hundred verses. The Qur'anic legislation, in fact, amounts to little more than the preamble to a code of conduct for which succeeding generations were to supply the operative parts.

Accordingly, there was a wide scope for the use of reason — or *ijtihad* as it came to be called — in the formulation of the doctrine. And it is not surprising that this accepted freedom to speculate led to considerable divergence of doctrine in the different localities; for outside the limited field covered by the Qur'anic precepts, the thought of the scholars was naturally influenced by the particular social conditions prevailing in their locality, and local customary practice was accepted as part of their ideal scheme of things, unless some

explicit principle of the Qur'an was thereby flagrantly violated. We may take one outstanding example of such divergence.

The law of Medina held that every woman, minor or adult, could contract a marriage only through her guardian (for this purpose a close male relative such as the father or the paternal grandfather). If the guardian did not conclude the contract on her behalf, the marriage was a nullity. Furthermore, the guardian possessed the power to give his ward in marriage regardless of her consent or otherwise — and again this applied whether the female concerned was minor or adult. These rules were natural enough in the traditionally tribal and patriarchal society of Medina, where the inferior status of woman and the interests of tribal pride in marriage alliances combined to place the power to contract a marriage in the hands of the male members of the tribe. But in Kufa the rules are fundamentally different. Here the adult woman is completely free to contract herself in marriage without the intervention of any guardian, and can never be given in marriage without her free consent. These rules in turn were conditioned by the particular social climate of Kufa, where the cosmopolitan atmosphere, resulting from very mixed population of a new town in a predominantly Persian milieu, naturally accorded to woman a greater freedom and a higher legal capacity.

For the greater part of the 8th century, therefore, Islamic law was represented by a number of different legal systems built by human reason around the common stock of the Qur'anic rules — systems designed to fit the varying conditions of the different localities.

This practical approach, however, was not to remain for long unchallenged. The opposition materialised in the form of a group who sought to enlarge the area of law specifically regulated by the divine command. This they did by appealing to the authority of the Prophet of Islam. Such legal decisions as the Prophet himself had given, they argued, must be regarded as divinely inspired: and it was these Prophe-

tic precedents, and not the custom of a particular locality, which represented a positive manifestation of the divine will, and which formed the only acceptable supplement to the Qur'anic revelations. So formulated, the appeal of this thesis was irresistible, and the zeal of its exponents resulted in the discovery and collection of a great mass of reports and alleged rulings of the Prophet which were termed *hadith* and which, modern research suggests, represent not what the Prophet actually did say or do, but what this group were convinced, in all good faith, that he would have said or done in the circumstances envisaged. Prior to this time, all indications suggest, the 'Establishment' in the early schools of law had regarded the Prophet as a human interpreter of the Qur'an, a *primus inter pares* because he was closest in time and spirit to the Qur'an, but nonetheless a human and therefore fallible interpreter. The 'Establishment', however, could now no longer maintain the validity of their own human reason in the face of what was now asserted by the doctrinaire opposition group to be divinely inspired conduct: and they reacted by gradually expressing their own doctrines in the form of *hadith* from the Prophet.

From this point onwards Muslim jurisprudence evolved a legal theory which expressed to perfection the notion of *shari'a* law as a divinely ordained system. This theory asserts that there are two material sources of law and two only. The primary source is, naturally enough, the very word of Allah himself as expressed in the Qur'an, and the second source lies in the body of precedents established by the Prophet and recorded in the *hadith*. Known collectively as the *sunna* of the Prophet, these precedents represent material divine in its content if not in its form, the function of which is to explain, interpret and supplement the general Qur'anic precepts. Questions which are not specifically answered in these two sources, and new problems which might arise, are to be solved by a disciplined form of reasoning by analogy known as *qiyas* — that is to

say, deducing from parallel cases regulated by the Qur'an and the *sunna* the principles to be applied to these new cases. This theory therefore achieved a synthesis of the roles of divine revelation and human reason in law, but before it came to be generally accepted, the basic conflict of principle involved produced further schools of law in addition to those which already existed.

The first systematic exposition of this novel theory of the sources of law was the work of the great jurist al-Shafi'i, who died early in the third century of Islam. Initially there was strong opposition to his thesis in the established schools of law in Kufa and Medina, which both continued to support a far wider use of human reason in the formulation of the law than Shafi'i's insistence upon the restricted method of analogical deduction allowed. Accordingly, the immediate and convinced disciples of al-Shafi'i formed a group, and on the basis of his teachings, elaborated a body of doctrine which differed considerably from that recognised by the schools of Kufa and Medina. On the other hand, there were extremist elements who refused to accept the validity of any kind of human reason at all in law, rejected the use of analogical deduction and purported to rely exclusively upon the Qur'an and the *sunna* as sources of law. In the late third century of Islam this group formed the Hanbali school, taking their name from the founder of the movement Ahmad b. Hanbal, and their particular jurisprudential principles are responsible for many distinctive and individual features of their positive law which stand in sharp contrast to the law of the other schools. One such particular feature calls for consideration here since it is highly relevant to the question of polygamy.

Contract law in general, according to the views of the majority of Muslim jurists, consists of a series of individual and strictly regulated types of contract. Once a person enters into one of these defined contractual relationships, certain rights and obligations must of necessity result,

and it is in general not permissible for the parties to modify or avoid these results by mutual agreement expressed in the form of a stipulation in the contract.

As applied to contracts of marriage, this principle means that the marital relationship, the result of the contract, is defined by the law in terms of the rights and obligations which accrue to and upon the husband and wife respectively. One of the rights which the law ascribes to the husband is the right of polygamy, the right to take additional wives up to the maximum of four concurrently. Should, therefore, the parties agree by stipulation in the contract that the husband will not take a second wife during the continuance of this marriage, they have attempted to deny what the law regards as an essential right of the husband. This they cannot do. The stipulation is void and does not bind the husband. If he breaks it and takes a second wife the first wife has no remedy. This approach, which largely negatives any concept of contractual freedom, does not arise from any dictates of the Qur'an. It is simply the result of the liberal *ijtihad* of the early jurists, based upon local practice and influenced strongly by the concepts of Roman law current in the former provinces of the Roman Byzantine Empire. Now for the early Hanbali lawyers such juristic speculation was, as we have seen, devoid of any authority. Relying exclusively upon the Qur'an and the hadith and in particular upon the Qur'anic text: 'Muslims must honour their stipulations,' they held that the courts must give effect to any stipulation which the parties to a contract might mutually agree upon, provided only that such a stipulation did not involve anything expressly forbidden by the law and was not manifestly contrary to the particular contractual relationship in question. The effect of this principle in contracts of marriage is obvious. It is not expressly forbidden, nor is it manifestly contrary to the institution of marriage that a man should have only one wife. If then the husband is in agreement to take a second wife, Hanbali law will regard this stipula-

tion as enforceable — not in the sense that the husband will be prevented from marrying a second wife, but in the sense that if he does the first wife will be able to claim a dissolution of her marriage.

As opposed to the Shafi'i and Hanbali schools, whose law was formally derived from the sources laid down in the legal theory, the early schools of Medina and Kufa had already developed a corpus of positive law before the legal theory was formulated. These two schools now became known as the Maliki and Hanafi schools respectively, taking these names from outstanding representative scholars; and although they eventually adopted Shafi'i's theory of the sources of law, they retained this pre-established body of positive law and simply harmonised it, by devious means, with the dictates of the legal theory. For the Malikis and Hanafis the legal theory was a formal and post facto rationalisation of existing doctrine, and the result was that doctrines which had in fact originated in particular local customs and individual juristic reasoning were now represented as expressions of the divine command. And the same holds good, in fact, for Shafi'i and Hanbali law, for the purported Prophetic precedents which were the corner stone of their law were in reality largely expressions of local precedents and the views of particular scholars. For example, we referred previously to the fact that Medinise law required every woman to be given in marriage by her guardian, while the law of Kufa allowed an adult woman to contract her own marriage without the intervention of her guardian. Hanafi law conserved the Kufa tradition and Maliki law the Medinise tradition, and since the latter was now expressed in the form of a hadith from the Prophet, it was taken over by the Shafi'i and Hanbali schools. Accordingly wherever today in Islam the Hanafi school prevails, as it does in the Indian sub-continent, an adult woman has the capacity to conclude her own marriage contract but has no such capacity where the Shafi'i school prevails, as it does in South East Asia — a

distinction which stems from particular social circumstances obtaining in Kufa and Medina in the 7th century A.D.

The final stage in the historical evolution of the classical Islamic concept of law was perhaps the inevitable result of this idealistic identification of each and every term of the law with the command of Allah and the growing rigidity which this entailed. The material sources of the divine revelation, the Qur'an and the sunna, were fixed and final in their form. There were obvious limits to the exploitation of this material by way of interpretation and analogical deduction, and by the beginning of the 19th century the belief gained ground that this task of exploitation, by way of *ijtihad* had been completed and that nothing further remained to be done. Perhaps the chief contributory factor to this process of ossification was the development of the principle of *ijma*, or the consensus of the legal scholars. In the search to ascertain the will of Allah, which is the essence of Muslim jurisprudence, the *ijtihad* of individual scholars was a human and therefore fallible process. Its results could constitute only probable interpretations of Allah's will. But jurisprudence asserted that where a rule was the subject of general agreement by the scholars this was proof positive of its correctness and it thus represented an incontrovertible expression of the divine will. This principle obviously precluded further discussion on the points so settled. Furthermore, where differences of doctrine between the various schools persisted, the notion of *ijma* was carried to the point where it was held to cover these differences as equally possible and equally legitimate interpretations of the law but at the time to deny the right to adduce any further solution. And it was because the jurists had thus agreed to differ that the four schools of law were regarded as equally orthodox definitions of the will of Allah. In each school, therefore, the current body of law embodied in their authoritative legal manuals written in the early mediaeval period came to be regarded as the final and perfect expression of the

system of Allah's commands. The role of future jurists was to be confined to the consolidation of this doctrine. There was no longer any need or scope for *ijtihad*, and ultimately this attitude was expressed as an infallible consensus of opinion that 'the door of *ijtihad* was closed.' Henceforth all jurists were known as followers or imitators, bound by the doctrine called *taqlid* to follow the law expounded in the authoritative manuals.

As part of this body of crystallised law the doctrine of polygamy was fundamentally common to all the schools. In permitting polygamy the Qur'an had stressed the desirability of the husband being able to provide for his several wives and of his treating them impartially. But, naturally perhaps under the prevailing social conditions, the import of these precepts had been minimized by interpretation, and they were generally regarded as imposing merely moral obligations upon the polygamous husband. For their breach the law did recognise certain limited sanctions. The wife might be relieved of her duty of cohabitation or the husband might be subject to minor forms of punishment. But the obligations were not construed in any way as restricting the exercise by the husband of his undisputed right of polygamy. In this as in all other respects, the law was now artificially set in a rigid mould — not, I may suggest, as the result of any incontrovertible axiom of the Islamic faith, but as the outcome of a complex historical process springing from the desire to set upon each and every detail of the law the stamp of divine approval.

So it was, then, that the classical Islamic concept of law finally emerged as that of a law totalitarian in its terms and immutable, its authenticity guaranteed by the infallible *ijma*. It was a concept of law which was to dominate Muslim thought until these last few decades of our own century.

In modern times the problem presented by the clash between the dictates of a legal system based upon the state of society in early mediaeval times but allegedly un-

changeable and the demands of contemporary Muslim society naturally became acute. By the present century the criminal and commercial law of the *shari'a* had almost entirely been abandoned in the Middle East in favour of codes of law based upon Western models. In the realm of family law, however, which was always regarded as a particularly vital and integral part of the religious faith, such an extreme solution was not acceptable. Turkey, it is true, abandoned *shari'a* family law outright in 1927 and adopted in its place the Swiss Civil Code. But it is a significant fact that over the past forty years, when such intense thought has been given to this problem, no single Muslim country has as yet seen fit to follow this example. Instead, conscientious endeavours have been made to adapt the *shari'a* to the needs of modern society. This is the process of legal modernism, and we will now attempt to briefly outline its principal features as they have developed in the Middle East.

Due to the strength of the classical concept of law, the reformers at first strove to remain within the bounds of the traditional doctrine of *taqlid*, or imitation, and to base their reforms upon juristic principles recognised as legitimate by classical jurisprudence. The basis of their work was the doctrine of *siyasa*, which defines the position of the political authority vis à vis the *shari'a* law. This doctrine asserts that while the political authority has no legislative power to modify or supersede the *shari'a* he nevertheless has the power and, indeed, the duty, to make supplementary administrative regulations to effect the smooth administration of law in general.

Two main types of such administrative regulations attracted the attention of the reformers. Firstly there was the power of the sovereign to define the jurisdiction of his courts. In general, argued the reformers, this allowed him to codify the *shari'a* and in particular, where there was a conflict of opinion among the jurists on a given point, to adopt and embody in the Code that particular opinion among the existing variants which he deemed most

suitable for application. Conflict of opinion within the *shari'a* is, as we have seen, reflected by the existence of four distinct schools of law, whose varying doctrines are regarded as equally legitimate expressions of Allah's law. It was therefore open to a Hanafi ruler in the Middle East to select, and to order his courts to apply, the doctrine of one of the other schools on a given point. It was on this juristic basis that the *Ottoman Law of Family Rights* in 1917 took a first step towards the limitation of polygamy by 'selecting' the Hanbali doctrine governing stipulations in marriage contracts as better suited than the Hanafi doctrine to the needs of the time. The Hanbalis, as we have noted, were the only school who allowed a wife to claim dissolution of her marriage if the husband married a second wife in breach of a prior agreement not to do so.

The widespread use of this principle since 1917 has resulted in many changes in the law as traditionally applied in the Middle East. Peoples who are officially Hanafis are now governed by codes of law which represent an eclectic amalgam of the doctrines of all the four schools.

The second limb of the doctrine of administrative regulations successfully utilised by the reformers was the recognised right of the sovereign to confine to jurisdiction of his courts, in the sense that he might set limits to the competence of the *shari'a* tribunals by forbidding them to entertain certain types of case on procedural grounds.

For an example of the subtle application of this principle in legal modernism we may turn to a sphere of the family law other than that of polygamy — the topic, namely, of legitimacy. The one aspect of legitimacy in *shari'a* law which concerns us here is its importance in regard to succession. For the legitimate child is by law indefeasibly entitled to the bulk of the deceased father's estate, while the illegitimate child is barred from any right at all. Where a child is born to a widow, whether or not such child is to be regarded as the legitimate child of the deceased husband

will depend upon whether or not the law will presume that the child was conceived during the husband's lifetime. The law therefore lays down a maximum period of gestation — which it presumes may possibly elapse between the conception of a child and its birth. If a child is born to a widow within this period it will be presumed the legitimate child of the deceased husband. This maximum period of gestation laid down in the authoritative manuals was two years according to the Hanafis, four years and upwards according to the other schools. From the standpoint of modern medical knowledge of gestation the harsh and inequitable results of this rule were obvious. In particular the bulk of a deceased Muslim's estate might pass to a child who could not be his own child.

An Egyptian Law of 1929 therefore enacted in terms that no disputed claim of legitimacy would be entertained by the courts where it could be shown that the child concerned was born more than one year after the termination of the marriage between the mother of the child and the alleged father. In short the jurisdiction of the courts in matters of legitimacy was confined to hearing cases in which the factual situation involved was in accord with modern medical opinion. The rule of traditional *shari'a* law was not, as such, contradicted or denied: but by a procedural device the courts were precluded from applying that rule.

By such methods far-reaching modifications were effected in the *shari'a* law as traditionally applied. And formally at any rate the reforms had been accomplished within the framework of the doctrine of *taqlid*; for it was the law as expounded in the mediaeval texts which was still accorded an exclusive and binding authority. The limitations of such methods, however, are readily apparent, and eventually the desired reforms could not be supported by any shadow of traditional authority. At this stage the reformers had perforce to abandon any pretence of *taqlid*. They came to challenge the binding nature of the mediaeval manuals of law and the inter-

pretations of the original sources which were recorded in them; they claimed the right to step beyond this corpus of juristic speculation and to interpret afresh the Qur'an in the light of modern needs and circumstances; in short they renounced the duty of *taqlid* and claimed the right of *ijtihad*.

This approach was, of course, met with the argument from traditionalist elements that it contradicted the infallible *ijma* and as such was tantamount to heresy. But its supporters argued with some force that either such *ijma* did not exist at all — it being manifestly impractical to ascertain the views of each and every legal scholar throughout the far-flung territories of Islam in the 9th century — or, alternatively, that if it did exist it was not binding, for it amounted to the arrogation by a self-constituted human authority of a legal sovereignty which belonged only to Allah. However, although scholars like Muhammad Abulh in Egypt at the turn of this century and Iqbal in Pakistan had already advocated a dynamic re-interpretation of the Qur'an as the basis for comprehensive legal reform, the reformers were very conscious of the fact that their activities constituted an outright break with the practical legal tradition of ten centuries standing, and so their first steps in this novel direction were somewhat hesitant and tentative.

Their approach to the problem of polygamy centered upon the Qur'anic suggestions that a husband should be financially able to support his several wives and that he should treat them impartially. In 1953 the Syrian Law of Personal Status interpreted the requirement of financial ability as a definite condition limiting the exercise of the right of polygamy. With this was coupled an administrative regulation which required all marriages to be registered and further required the permission of the court as an essential preliminary to such registration. Accordingly the result was that a court would not give its permission for a second marriage unless it was satis-

fied that the husband was financially able to support a plurality of wives.

It may of course be argued that the only practical result of this reform was to make polygamy the privilege of the rich. Yet the real importance of the Syrian reform lies in its juristic basis and the fact that a novel interpretation had been given to the text of the Qur'an. Thus unlocked, the 'door of *ijtihad*' was swung fully open by the *Tunisian Law of Personal Status* of 1957. This law interpreted the Qur'anic injunction regarding impartial treatment of co-wives in the same way as the Syrians had interpreted the requirement of financial ability — namely as a legal condition precedent to the very exercise of the right of polygamy, and which would naturally apply regardless of financial standing. But it was now no longer within the discretion of the court to permit a polygamous marriage on the ground that it was satisfied that this condition would be fulfilled. For the law goes on to state that in the circumstances of modern society it is impossible for a husband to treat several wives impartially to their mutual satisfaction: in technical language there is a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption of law that this essential condition precedent is incapable of fulfillment. Polygamy therefore was prohibited outright.

Such is the phenomenon of the current evolution of an allegedly immutable law in the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Two considerations must be borne in mind. In the first place these reforms are not put forward as deviations, occasioned by practical necessity, from the ideal Islamic law, i.e. *hila*, but as contemporary expressions of that ideal law. And in the second place there is no uniformity in the method of legal modernism or in its results throughout the Middle East, and it is apparent that the process will tend, initially at any rate, towards a growing diversity in Islamic legal practice conditioned by the varying reactions of the different areas to the stimuli of modern life. This is made quite clear, even on the one question of polygamy, by the three most recent

modernist enactments of Islamic law. The Moroccan law of 1958 merely gives the court the power to intervene retrospectively by way of dissolution of the marriage where a polygamous husband has in fact failed to treat his wives impartially. The Iraqi law of 1960 goes only a little further than the Syrian law in decreeing that the permission of the court is necessary for a second marriage and that such permission will only be granted when the husband has the necessary financial status and when 'no inequality of treatment is to be feared.' Finally the *Muslim Family Laws Ordinance*, promulgated in Pakistan in 1961, makes the permission of a duly constituted Arbitration Council necessary for a second marriage under pain of penal and other sanctions, and states that such permission will only be given where the Council is satisfied that the 'proposed marriage is necessary and just.' As to when a second marriage will so be considered 'necessary and just,' it is obvious that the consent or otherwise of the existing wife will be extremely relevant, but such factors as the sterility, physical infirmity or insanity of an existing wife are specified as circumstances which may be taken into account.

We are now perhaps in a position broadly to appreciate the significance of the Tunisian reform in the context of the phenomenon of legal modernism.

In its simplest forms the problem facing Muslim jurisprudence today is the same problem which it has always faced and which is inherent in its very nature — namely, the need to define the relationship between the standards imposed by the religious faith and the mundane forces which activate society. At the one extreme is the solution adopted by classical jurisprudence, a divine nomocracy under which religious principles were elaborated into a comprehensive and rigid scheme of duties to form the exclusive determinant of the conduct of society. The other extreme solution is that of secularism, adopted by Turkey, which relegates religious principles to the realm of the individual conscience, and allows the forces of society

an unfettered control over the shape of the law. Neither of these solutions, it would appear, can be acceptable to contemporary Muslim opinion generally. For while the former is wholly unrealistic, the latter must inevitably be regarded as un-Islamic. Obviously the answer lies, therefore, somewhere between these two extremes, in a concept of law as a code of behaviour which is founded upon certain basic and immutable religious principles but which, within these limits, does not neglect the factor of change and allows the adoption of such new standards as may prove more acceptable to current Muslim opinion than indigenous tradition. Law, to be a living social force, must reflect the soul of a society. And the soul of present Muslim society is reflected neither 'in any form of outright secularism nor in the doctrine of the mediaeval text books.

In its efforts to solve the problem of the clash between the dictates of the traditional law and the demands of modern society, legal modernism, as it appears in its most extreme stage in the Tunisian reform, rests upon the premise that the will of Allah was never expressed in terms so rigid or comprehensive as the classical doctrine maintained, but that it enunciated broad general principles which admit of varying interpretations and varying applications according to the circumstances of the time. Modernism, therefore, is a movement towards a historical exegesis of the divine revelation, and as such can find its most solid foundation in the view of the early historical growth of *shari'a* law which we described earlier in this paper. For recent scholarship and research have demonstrated that *shari'a* law originated as the implementation of the precepts of divine revelation within the framework of current social conditions, and in so doing it provides a basis of historical fact to support the ideology underlying legal modernism. Once the classical theory is seen in its true historical perspective, as a stage only in the evolution of the *shari'a*, modernist activities no longer appear as a total departure from the one legitimate posi-

tion, but preserve the continuity of Islamic legal tradition by taking up again the attitude of the earliest jurists of Islam and reviving a corpus whose growth had been artificially arrested and which had lain dormant for a period of ten centuries.

It cannot be said, however, that legal modernism has yet reached the stage where it provides a completely satisfactory answer to the problems of law and society in present day Islam. Traditionalist elements condemn some of the modernist activities as the unwarranted manipulation of the texts of divine revelation to force from them a meaning which accords with the preconceived purposes of the reformers objectively determined; and this, argue the traditionalists, is, in substance if not in form, nothing less than the secularisation of the law. Modernist jurisprudence does in fact often wear an air of opportunism, adopting *ad hoc* solutions as a matter of expediency, and does not as yet rest upon systematic foundations or principles consistently applied. 'Social engineers' the modernists certainly are, inasmuch as their activities are shaping the law to conform with the needs of society. Yet if Islamic jurisprudence is to remain faithful to its fundamental ideals, it cannot regard the needs and aspirations of society as the *exclusive* determinant of the law. These can legitimately operate to mould and fashion the law only within the bounds of such norm and principles as have been irrevocably established by the divine command.

Looking to the future, therefore, it would appear to be the primary task of Muslim jurisprudence to ascertain the precise limits and implications of the original core of divine revelations. And this perhaps will come to involve a re-orientation of the traditional attitude towards the reported precedents of the Prophet, not only as regards their authenticity, but also as regards the nature of their authority if

their authenticity is duly established. And it would seem axiomatic, that when the precepts of the divine revelation have been so established, they must form the fundamental and invariable basis of any system of law which purports to be a manifestation of the will of Allah.

It cannot be denied that certain specific provisions of the Qur'an, such as that which commands the amputation of the hand for theft, pose problems in the context of contemporary life for which the solution is not readily apparent. But generally speaking the Qur'anic precepts are in the nature of ethical norms broad enough to support modern legal structures and capable of varying interpretations to meet the particular needs of time and place. And on this basis it would seem that Islamic jurisprudence could implement, in practical, realistic and modernist terms, its basic and unique ideal of a way of life based on the command of Allah. Freed from the notion of a religious law expressed in totalitarian and uncompromising terms, jurisprudence would approach the problem of law and society in a different light. Instead of asking itself, as it has done since the tenth century and still generally does today, what concessions must be wrested from the law in the face of the needs of society, its new terms of reference would be precisely the opposite; to determine what limitations religious principles set upon the frank recognition of social needs.

But however considerable the problems that still face Islamic jurisprudence may be, legal modernism has at least infused new life and movement into *shari'a* law and freed its congealed arteries from a state fast approaching that of rigor mortis. The era of *taqlid*, of blind adherence to the doctrines of the mediaeval scholars, now appears as a protracted moratorium in Islamic legal history. Stagnation has given way to a new-found vitality and potential for growth.

The Growth of Modern Socialism

JAYANTANUJA BANDYOPADHYAYA

I

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

1. *Pre-Marxian and Non-Marxist Socialism of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*

IN the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries individualism had brought in its train adult franchise, the rule of law, and capitalism. All these were essential concomitants of the concept of individual freedom. Political and legal freedom for every individual were to be safeguarded by political and legal equity as embodied in adult franchise and the rule of law, while the institution of free enterprise was regarded as a guarantee of equal economic opportunity for all. In the philosophy of individualism freedom and equity were thus inseparable.

But these guarantees were soon found to be inadequate for ensuring equity, and hence for safeguarding the freedom of every individual. The main reason was the radical change in the scale of production brought about by the technological transformation associated with the Industrial Revolution. Technology-oriented capitalist agriculture and industry required the investment of large amounts of capital in relatively large units of production and this situation almost automatically led to the ownership of the means of production being concentrated in only a few hands, and the overwhelming majority of people being converted into exploited wage-earners. Instead of ensuring economic equity, free enterprise thus led to economic inequity. Moreover, it was soon realized that economic inequity bred, in practice, poli-

tical and even legal inequity. Thus, individualism was faced with a dilemma posed by the development of an apparent contradiction between freedom and equity which had not originally been anticipated.

Early socialism sought to resolve this dilemma. Pre-Marxian and non-Marxist socialists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries all realized, in different degrees, that capitalism created inequity and exploitation and, therefore, thwarted the freedom of the majority of people. All of them sought to replace capitalism by some form of workers' ownership or control of industry. Saint-Simon, while glorifying industrialization, sought to subordinate private enterprise to councils of experts who would maintain the harmony of the economy as a whole and thus eradicate many of the maladies of the capitalist system. Charles Fourier was in favour of spontaneous cooperative associations as a substitute for capitalism, and was against State control. Robert Owen sought to reform capitalism through State-supported trade unionism, cooperative movements and education. Louis Blanc advocated productive associations of workers with capital furnished by the State, which however, must not be the proprietor, or even the administrator of these associations, but should be responsible for enacting the laws regulating them. Proudhon advocated the concentration of the ownership of all capital in a central cooperative bank which would liberally extend credit to workers' productive associations exchanging products on the basis of labour-value. So powerful indeed was Proudhon's influence that for several years it was uncertain whether the First International would be Proudhonist or Marxist. Lassalle wanted to

replace capitalism by State-aided workers' productive associations; he was, incidentally, a Hegelian who believed that the State was the supreme reality, and wanted the workers to cooperate with the State.

Thus of the pre-Marxian and Non-Marxist socialists mentioned here, all, with the possible exception of Saint-Simon, sought to establish economic equity through workers' productive associations as a substitute for capitalism. Similarly all, with the possible exception of Louis Blanc, wanted the State to interfere directly or indirectly in the economic system with a view to ensuring economic equity.

It must be emphasized, in order to clear the common confusion created by the textbook contradiction between individualism and socialism, that the type of socialism discussed above was not opposed to individualism; rather it was an extension of individualism. There was no question, except, perhaps, in the case of Lassalle, of the State being higher than the individual. These socialists wanted the State to interfere in the economic system not because the interests of the State were higher than those of the individual, but the other way round. In order to ensure the full freedom and development of every individual, the State was to guarantee certain basic economic conditions designed to safeguard economic equity along with political and legal equity. The pre-Marxian and non-Marxist socialists of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries merely sought to restore the old identity in the philosophy of individualism between freedom and equity by reforming or eliminating capitalism.

It should also be understood that this type of socialism had certain special characteristics, which were to distinguish it from Marxist socialism. In the first place, it was not backed by any philosophy of history and was purely pragmatic and experimental in character. Secondly, it had no international programme, although the international outlook was not always lacking. Thirdly, it had religious and moral overtones. Fourthly, it had no sociology

and no theory of class struggle. As a consequence, fifthly, it believed in a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, and sixthly, it sought thus to eliminate class conflict by abolishing the system of exploitation, rather than by the elimination of one class by another.

2. Marxist Socialism

With Marx socialism entered an altogether new phase. First, dialectical materialism sought to give a new meaning and inevitability to history and enabled Marxists to regard their ideology as historically inevitable. Socialism thus became 'scientific'. Secondly, with Marx Socialism became for the first time positively international, with an international revolutionary programme. Thirdly, Marxist socialism shunned all religious overtones and regarded religion as positively harmful to society. Fourthly, with the help of the labour theory of value, Marx developed a broad political sociology, the central points in which were the class struggle and the denunciation of the State as an organ of exploitation. Fifthly, violence as a socio-political means was freely sanctioned, although it is not certain to what extent Marx regarded violence as inevitable. Sixthly, Marxism sought the solution of the problem of exploitation in the elimination, including physical annihilation, of one class by another. Seventhly, for the first time Marx developed a purely negative or destructive socialism which contained a clear programme for bringing about the downfall of capitalism, but none whatsoever for the future reconstruction of society. Eighthly, on account of Marx's occasional references to the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which was to succeed the proletarian revolution, Marxist Socialism, or at least one brand of it, took a turn for the theory of transitional dictatorship, and thus ran away with the original identity between individual freedom and equity which pre-Marxian and non-Marxist socialism had regarded as axiomatic.

It has been said that there was very

little that was new in Marxism; that dialectical materialism was just a combination of Hegelian dialectics and the materialism of Feuerbach; that the labour theory of value, along with the concept of surplus value, was borrowed from Turgot and Ricardo; that the theory of capitalist concentration was borrowed from Charles Fourier and Louis Blanc, among others; that the theory of the eternal immiseration of the working class had already been developed by Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Sismondi and Rodbertus; and that the theory of class struggle which had existed in an inchoate form even in Plato and Aristotle, had already been modernized among others, by Louis Blanc, von Stein and Guizot. Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that Marx's analysis of history and of capitalism was far more comprehensive than anything attempted before.

But in one sense, Marxist socialism was hardly socialism at all in the traditionally understood sense of the term. As already explained, traditional socialism was wholly concerned with a constructive and experimental programme of socio-economic transformation. Marx paid practically no attention to the programmatic aspect of socialism. He developed a broad humanist sociology and prescribed a revolutionary method of upsetting the existing order of society. Beyond that he was practically silent; he contented himself with referring broadly to the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would eliminate the capitalist class and lead to the eventual disappearance of the State. Of course, it must be pointed out here, in fairness to Marx, that it is nearly certain, though not altogether beyond dispute, that his conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat was not a dictatorship in the usual sense of the term, but was more democratic than the forms of government prevalent in Europe at the time.

In this partial, negative and direct character of Marxism lies both its strength

and weakness. Its unambiguous prognosis of capitalism and its direct revolutionary appeal opened up new vistas of hope before the socialist movement and transformed it from an experimental programme of isolated social reformers into a revolutionary international mass movement. But as Marx left no blueprint for the future, the socialist movement can expect very little guidance from Marxism regarding the actual construction of a socialist state. It is possible for almost anyone seizing power through unconstitutional means in the name of the working class to claim to be Marxist. This is the chief weakness of Marxism.

3. *Revolution Miscarried*

Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century and at the beginning of the Twentieth, the socialist movement in the different countries of Europe was saturated with Marxist ideas. The Russian Revolution and the government which was set up after the Revolution in the name of Marxism and the proletariat, therefore, raised high hopes in the minds of socialists everywhere. But within a few years it became quite obvious that the Revolution had miscarried. Marxists had rightly expected a government to emerge in Russia that would be more liberal and democratic than any other in Europe. As John Plamenatz, a noted authority on Marxism has observed: 'Marx conceived of proletarian government as being, from the very beginning, more truly democratic and liberal than anything known to bourgeois Europe.'¹ But what was in fact established in Russia was a ruthless dictatorship of a very small Communist Party in the name of the proletariat, which forcibly suppressed all political opposition and depended for its support on the army. Bertrand Russell has vividly described this deviation from Marxism in the following words: 'Marxists, like other progressives, advocated democracy, free speech, free press, and the rest of the liberal political apparatus. The Soviet government, when it seized power, revert-

¹ John Plamenatz: *German Marxism and Russian Communism*, London, 1954, p. 159.

ed to the teaching of the Catholic Church in its great days; that it is the business of authority to propagate Truth, both by positive teaching and by the suppression of all rival doctrines. This involved, of course, the establishment of an *undemocratic dictatorship*, depending for its stability upon the Red Army.² Lenin and Stalin repeatedly declared that the Communist Party contained the vanguard of the working class and, therefore, exercised the dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat. The party alone represented, as it were, the General Will of the working class which was superior to the sum total of their individual wills. An undemocratic theory of political trusteeship was thus developed in Russia which was repugnant to all socialist political principles. Moreover, the Soviet dictatorship, according to Stalin, was 'unrestrained by law and based on force'.³ The inalienable socialist principle of individual freedom and political equity was thus sacrificed in the Soviet Union at the altar of an anti-Marxist one-party dictatorship.

The second fundamental principle of socialism, namely, that of economic equity, was also soon surrendered in Russia. Peasant resistance to forcible collectivization, coupled with the resultant famine caused millions of deaths and untold human suffering. Besides, collectivization of agriculture and exploitation of the peasantry for the sake of industrialization created a wide socio-economic gulf between the peasantry and the industrial working class. The attempt to raise agricultural and industrial productivity in the absence of free initiative, and the maintenance of a top-heavy one-party administration necessitated abnormal labour incentives and extra-ordinary payments and rewards which ran away with the original idea of equality and created artificial divisions in society. The dictatorship of the Communist Party necessitated the

liquidation of a significant proportion of the population and the employment of another big part of it as forced labour, helping to build up sections of the economy without any capital and at very little cost. To ensure the stability of the dictatorship, the working class had also to be subjected to oppressive rules and regulations which deprived them of whatever the term 'economic freedom' may connote.

Wide disparities of income have been caused in the Soviet Union not only by wage differences but also by the whole pattern of Soviet fiscal policy, which is characterized by the regressive income tax, regressive turnover tax, and the absence of the inheritance tax. Apart from Soviet official statistics, we have such renowned communists as Milovan Djilas to prove the existence of wide disparities of income in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries and the growth of the New Class.

Thus both political freedom and economic equity, the two essential and inalienable principles of socialism, have been lost in the Soviet Union and other communist states. As this realization slowly dawned on the socialist parties of Europe, there developed a growing alienation between them and the Soviet Union. And gradually, while the Communist parties which had grown up in different countries of Europe after the Russian Revolution continued to support the Soviet Government as sections of the Comintern, the socialist parties started on an independent career of their own. The story of modern socialism is largely the story of these and other anti-communist socialist parties throughout the world.

II

MODERN SOCIALISM

1. Debt to Marx

Whether dialectical materialism is historically and logically valid is a somewhat immaterial question from the point of view

² Bertrand Russell: *Power*, London 1960, p. 80. Italics introduced.

³ Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow 1947, p. 43.

of the socialist movement, for as Bertrand Russell and others have shown,⁴ Marx's sociological, economic and political views could be accepted or rejected without any reference to dialectical materialism. It is from Marx the political thinker and revolutionary rather than Marx the philosopher that modern socialism derives a great deal of its inspiration. Modern social sciences have categorically rejected the deterministic approach to historical and social phenomena and deny the possibility of explaining such phenomena by any single irrevocable law or by any single unique factor. Consistently with this new development in the social sciences, modern socialists take a plural view of history and society and do not consider it necessary to have a deterministic philosophy of history to buttress their socialism. Dialectical materialism, therefore, does not constitute the philosophical basis of modern socialism.

The greatest debt of modern socialism to Marxism lies in the field of political sociology. Socialists all over the world broadly accept the Marxist view that there is 'exploitation' in a capitalist society in the sense that labour produces a surplus which is appropriated by the capitalists who partly spend this surplus on conspicuous consumption and partly reinvest it for private gain rather than for public good; that the private profit motive which governs capitalism is a serious barrier to balanced economic progress and the equitable distribution of the national income; that there is in capitalism a positive tendency towards the progressive concentration of capital; that in capitalism there is also a tendency towards a deterioration of the relative economic position of the working class (John Strachey has shown that

during the hundred years from 1850 to 1950 the British working class was just able to retain its share of the national income, but was not able to improve its relative economic position, in spite of the tremendous growth of the trade union movement and the progressive governmental legislation of a hundred years⁵); that there is a broad class-contradiction between the capitalist owners of industry and agriculture on the one-hand, and the industrial and agricultural proletariat on the other; and that the economic factor is a very important determinant of the broad pattern of social relations and of social progress.

But that is almost the limit of the indebtedness of modern socialism to Marxism; for while accepting the Marxian prognosis of capitalism, contemporary socialism broadly rejects the Marxian remedy. In at least four important respects modern socialism has transcended Marxism, so far as the cure for the capitalist malady is concerned.

In the first place, contemporary socialism does not accept the Marxist view of armed revolutions. To what extent Marx considered violence necessary or inevitable for the socialist revolution is, of course, as already stated, a matter of some ambiguity.⁶ The consensus of opinion seems to be (1) that before writing the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848, Marx was mainly talking of the 'social revolution' which involved a perpetual preparedness for violence, but not the inevitability of it; in other words, violence was sanctioned without any reservations, the prospects of avoiding it were not considered bright, but it was not regarded as altogether unavoidable;⁷ (2) that even during this period Engels was more in favour of armed revolutions than Marx⁸; and (3) from 1848 onwards Marx was talking of a 'proletarian revolution' instead of a 'social revolution', especially in the second stage, that is, after the 'bourgeois democratic revolution' had already been completed, and that during this period he regarded violence as inevitable.⁹ The last point is specially important, be-

⁴ Bertrand Russell: *History of Western Philosophy*, London, 1948, pp. 816-17.

⁵ John Strachey: *Contemporary Capitalism*, London, 1956, Ch. VIII.

⁶ For a discussion of the problem see Karl Popper: *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, London, 1957, Vol. II, Ch. 19.

⁷ George Lichtheim: *Marxism. An Historical and Critical Study*, London, 1961, pp. 51-56; Karl Popper: *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

⁸ George Lichtheim: *op. cit.* p. 58.

cause it is from the *Communist Manifesto* and the subsequent writings of Marx rather than from his earlier writings that Marxism as a political movement derives its inspiration.

Now, contemporary socialism rejects this Marxian emphasis on violence. Whether the view held by many that an armed revolution would inevitably lead to a minority dictatorship is valid or not, is considered to be a somewhat irrelevant question by socialists today, for they consider violence as largely unnecessary. The socialist parties believe that owing to the system of adult franchise and the growth of the political awareness and power of the working class, it is possible for capitalism, in the majority of cases to be transformed into socialism through the peaceful struggle of the working class. This view is also now apparently shared by Soviet theoreticians including Prime Minister Khrushchev. Socialists consider armed revolution necessary only in such states as are controlled by despotic governments which block all roads of peaceful struggle by the masses, like the Soviet Union, Communist China or Franco's Spain.

Secondly, socialists today abhor the very idea of dictatorship, in whatever way it may be described. As already stated, Marx's conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat was in all probability quite different from what is normally understood by a dictatorship. Nevertheless, modern socialists would refuse to accept a dictatorship in any form, whether it is a dictatorship of the minority or of the majority, whether it is claimed to be transitional or permanent. Democracy with its principles of freedom of opposition to the government, free elections, freedom of the press, of expression, opinion and belief, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, of protection of the rights of minorities and of cultural freedom, is a guarantee of political equity which is regarded as a fundamental postulate of modern socialism. If economic inequity is

a menace to political and social equity, political inequity is an even greater menace, from the point of view of contemporary socialism, to economic and social equity. Socialism rejects political trusteeship as much as it rejects economic trusteeship.

Thirdly, modern socialism has transcended the Marxist prophesy that the socialist movement would be successful only in those countries where capitalism had already matured. Historically, from this point of view, Marx has proved to be a false prophet; for the only two Marxist-Leninist type of armed revolutions have taken place in Russia and China, countries which were predominantly agricultural and feudal when the revolution took place. On the other hand, in none of the mature capitalist countries has the working class shown any inclination to stage an armed revolution. Moreover, the dismal conclusion would follow from the Marxist prophesy that the Asian and African countries would have to undergo the long and painful process of capitalist development before they can expect to build socialism. Today socialists all over the world reject this idea in its entirety and believe, on the contrary, that the socialist movement which demands economic progress with equity at every stage of development, is a perennial movement, and can and must be launched in every society at every stage of development, whether agricultural or industrial, feudal or capitalist.

Finally, modern socialism as distinguished from Marxism is programmatic and experimental in outlook. Marx, as already explained, was primarily concerned with the prognosis of capitalism and the revolutionary method of overthrowing it; he paid very little attention to the concrete problem of the socialistic reorganization of society. Contemporary socialism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned (largely owing to its belief in the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism) with the concrete and detailed problems relating to the socialistic reorganization of the political, economic and social framework. In

⁹ Ibid, pp. 57, 60-62.

this respect, modern socialism derives its inspiration and material largely from the pre-Marxian and non-Marxist socialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, just as it derives its inspiration and material regarding the prognosis of capitalism largely from Marx. This is possibly the most important distinction between Marxism and post-Marxian socialism.

2. Political Philosophy

Being positivist and experimental in outlook, contemporary socialism does not possess a unanimously accepted and rigid political philosophy comparable to that of Marxism or Communism. Nevertheless, some fundamental political principles and ideals are now generally accepted by socialist parties everywhere, which represent the theoretical outcome of a long period of development of the socialist movement. An attempt will be made here to sum up the most important of these fundamental political principles and ideals of modern socialism.

(i) *Pluralist view of sovereignty*

Socialism rejects the monistic theory of sovereignty or the theory of unified state sovereignty which holds that sovereignty resides in the State alone, which is thus supreme, and that individuals and social groups of all kinds must, therefore, be totally subservient to the State. Centralised State power is anathema to the modern socialists and they take, on the contrary, a pluralistic view of sovereignty. Pluralism believes that the various organizations and groups within a State, political, economic and social, should be allowed to manage their own affairs and thus be vested with a partial sovereignty; it demands a division of power along the functional as well as territorial divisions of democracy. Logically, according to the pluralist theory of sovereignty, the individual is also sovereign within limits. As already explained, socialism regards individual freedom as an inalienable principle and socialistic pluralism

has, therefore, a strong tinge of individualism.

Early socialists like Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc and Proudhon had already advocated plural sovereignty. Later on, the socialists in England and France sought to decentralize state functions and to entrust the management of economic enterprises to non-political public bodies representing the various interests involved. This view was strengthened by the growth of trade unionism. The French syndicalists became Proudhonist in outlook and challenged the theory of state sovereignty. In recent times the socialistic idea of plural sovereignty received a powerful impetus from Harold Laski who championed the corporate personality of social groups. Laski explained that the so-called sovereign acts of the State are in reality the acts of those who hold power, and cannot therefore, be regarded as sacrosanct. Sovereignty, according to Laski, must be shared by all the social groups within a state as in a trade union or church, and the State has no claim to supremacy in this respect. Modern socialism thus combines a pragmatic philosophy and a positive sociology, a strong individualism and an unyielding functionalism, to discredit the idea of the absolute power of the State and to demand the autonomy of all functional and regional groups in society.

(ii) *Devolution of power from below*

The divisibility of sovereignty, which is an essential postulate of the pluralist view of sovereignty, logically demands the diversification and diffusion of political power. But there is a fundamental distinction between the socialist idea of diffusion of power and the various other schemes of decentralization. Socialists believe that sovereignty should be delegated by the lower units of social organisation to the higher units, and not the other way about, as envisaged by the theory of decentralization. In other words, power must vertically devolve from the primary units of territorial and functional organisation pro-

gressively upwards, each stratum of organization receiving only the residuary powers delegated to it by the lower units concerned, until the central authority of the State is left with the last group of residuary powers delegated to it by all the lower units.

(iii) *Political Institutions of Democracy*

The salient features of the political aspect of democracy are now relatively well known. Nevertheless for the sake of completeness and for emphasizing the special features of the socialist conception of democracy, the essential political characteristics of a democratic system, as the socialists understand it, are briefly summarized below:

a. A democracy must permit the existence of any number of political parties with conflicting ideologies and with alternative political and economic programmes for the country. But it is a moot question whether parties which openly declare their faith in violence, dictatorship, communism, casteism etc. should be allowed to function in a democracy.

b. A democracy must have a system of elections based on universal adult franchise and the secret ballot contested freely by people belonging to different political parties and other organizations with alternative ideologies and programmes.

c. Elections in a socialist democracy, as distinguished from the so-called democracy of the capitalist or quasi-capitalist countries, must be totally free from the influence of money. There must be a built-in mechanism within the election system which precludes the possibility of wealthy individuals or other organized vested interests from corrupting and influencing the elections. A poor but deserving individual must be able to contest the elections freely and fairly in a socialist or real democracy.

d. Elections in a true democracy must also be free from the influence of the political and financial power of the government in all forms, and from gerrymander-

ing by the bureaucracy or organised vested interests and pressure groups.

e. As already explained, the socialist ideal of plural sovereignty necessitates the maximum possible devolution of power. People's participation in government is one of the cardinal principles of democracy, and socialists believe that such participation can be ensured only through the development of a chain of autonomous institutions of self-government at all levels of political organization based on the socialist principle of devolution from below.

f. In a true democracy the bureaucracy must be subject to direct popular control. The subordination of the bureaucracy to elected people's representatives at all levels of self-government is essential for safeguarding the sovereignty of the people. A State in which all effective power is concentrated in the hands of the bureaucracy, has in fact a system of political trusteeship rather than democracy.

g. In a truly democratic society all shades of opinion must be allowed to be freely expressed through the national or international press, so as to give free play to alternative programmes, principles and ideologies.

h. The rule of law, that is, the complete equality of all citizens before law, is a fundamental principle of democracy. But the rule of law can be safeguarded only by an independent judiciary. Therefore, an independent judiciary, that is, a judiciary which is undefiled by executive control or by politicians or other pressure groups, is one of the pillars of democracy.

i. Equally important from the socialist point of view is the principle of cheap and expeditious justice. Justice in many countries is so expensive and long-drawn-out as to be above the reach of the majority of people. The rule of law in such cases loses all substance.

j. In a democracy minorities, whether political, racial or religious, must not be persecuted. Democracy does not mean only the rule of the majority, for the majority can easily rule dictatorially.

k. A democracy must be characterized by

an educational system and a cultural pattern which are free from any kind of authoritarian control from the government. Knowledge must be free to be true, and free knowledge can be obtained only by studying and assimilating the entire stock of human knowledge, in any branch of study, with all the contrary and contradictory theories and laws which may be in existence. In a democratic society, therefore, the opinions of a group of individuals about particular theories or events must in no way force the pattern of knowledge to be pursued by the people in general.

1. Secularism is also an essential characteristic of a democracy. Unlike Marxism, modern socialism does not denounce religion and spirituality. But the socialists hold that religion and spirituality are very much personal and subjective interests of the individual and must be left, like human instincts and emotions, outside the scope of political organization. To what extent organized religious institutions with vested economic interests and corrupt practices can be left outside the sphere of political control is, however, not so certain.

The above categories relate only to the political aspect of socialist democracy. As every socialist knows, the political aspect of democracy is inextricably intertwined with its economic aspect. Without its economic counterpart, the political aspect of democracy loses all substance and meaning. Attention will now, therefore, be turned to the economics of socialism.

3. Economics of Socialism

Contemporary Socialism, being pragmatic, positivist and experimental in outlook, does not have any rigid and deterministic economic doctrines. Nevertheless, in the course of the evolution of the socialist movement, certain common aims and objectives have developed which now constitute the core of socialist economics, and are briefly summarized below:—

i) Socialization

Marx used the term socialization to

indicate the growth of mass production and the total absorption of the entire labour force within the capitalist system. He spoke of the entire production process being socialized in the last stage of capitalism, a phenomenon that would help the transition to socialism. Post-Marxian socialism, however, uses the term in a different and pragmatic sense.

There does not as yet seem to be any unanimity of opinion among the socialists as to the extent to which the State should own or regulate the socialized economy and the extent to which private enterprise should be allowed to exist. But it is unanimously held that ownership should be cooperative as far as practicable. Logically, in an ideally socialist society there should be very little, if any, private ownership of the means of production. Even to begin with therefore, the aim of a socialist movement should be to restrict private enterprise to the maximum possible extent, and to entrust the management of industry, agriculture and trade to the workers and peasants. This is the sense in which the term socialization, often briefly referred to as auto-management, is used by socialists today. What is commonly known as nationalization is more aptly characterized as statization or government-alization by the socialists. In the opinion of socialists, statization leads to bureaucratization, gives wide dictatorial powers to the government, curbs the sovereignty of the people and poses a serious threat to democracy.

ii) Decentralization

It is clear that socialization involves functional economic decentralization. But since socialism envisages not only a functional integration and development of the economy, but also territorial economic integration and development, it demands territorial economic decentralization as well. Territorial decentralization should take place both in the sphere of development and of management. It is sometimes pointed out that with the progressive

development of high technology and automation neither functional nor territorial economic decentralization will have much substance from the point of view of the sovereignty of the people and local economic development. Socialists believe that this argument is fallacious for at least two reasons. First, socialization is a total process that would permeate the entire economic system without leaving any scope for trusteeship at the top, and, therefore, no amount of technological change can run away with the sovereignty of the people or stunt initiative even in the lowest unit of auto-management. Secondly, socialism believes that even at the highest level of technology there would be great scope for local initiative and development.

Functional and territorial economic decentralization is thus an essential characteristic of a socialist economy. Moreover, socialists regard it as extremely important that the scheme of economic decentralization, functional as well as territorial, should be coordinated and integrated with the scheme of the devolution of political power.

iii) *Equality*

Historically, the demand for economic equality has had both a rational and a romantic foundation. The rational approach follows from the scientific fact that from a fundamentally biological point of view all human beings are equal and that the development of the individual depends largely on environmental factors. Since the economic foundations of society in general, and the relations of production in particular, are highly important environmental factors, it is demanded that the economic system be so remoulded as to ensure a more or less common material environment for all human beings and thus safeguard their natural equality. The romantic quest for equality is moral and even spiritual in character, the term spiritual being taken in a broad humanistic sense. It follows from the assumption that humanity is not merely a biological phenomenon, but

possesses a natural moral and spiritual fraternity which, however, cannot express itself except in an environment in which the material needs of life are more or less equally shared. Modern socialism combines the rational and romantic approaches to equality and demands the equitable distribution of material wealth on both scientific and moral grounds. Equality of personal valuation is the basis of the socialist demand for economic equality, as it is also the basis of the demand for political, legal and social equality.

In the history of socialism the movement for economic equality has never been based on a demand for absolute equalization of all incomes. The general principle accepted by socialists everywhere today is: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. Whether this principle can be satisfactorily implemented or not depends largely on the broad pattern of the politico-economic system. In a politico-economic system characterized by trusteeship of one form or another, where the majority of people have no say in the determination of the economic valuation of their ability and their needs, the implementation of this principle of equality is bound to be largely characterized by arbitrariness, and almost any degree of inequality can be claimed by the trustees to be consistent with socialism. Thus although in the opinion of such eminent authorities on the wage-structure of the Soviet Union as Abram Bergson the wage-differentials in the Soviet Union are as large as in any Western country, the self-appointed trustees of the Soviet people have always maintained that they have established economic equality. But they have been forced to admit that the Soviet type of equality is based on a need principle — from each according to his ability, and to each according to his work. This principle is so vague and arbitrary that any degree of inequality can be justified under it. On the other hand, in a politico-economic system based on sound democratic principles as explained earlier, the masses of people will have a role to play

in the determination of wage rates etc. at every level of functional and territorial organization, and thus a fair implementation of the basic principle of equality — from each according to his ability, to each according to his need — would be possible.

Therefore, contemporary socialism regards a politico-economic system based on the plural view of sovereignty, devolution of political and economic power, political democracy and socialization, as the primary pre-condition for the establishment of equality, political, economic or social. In other words, according to modern socialists the establishment of genuine equality of any type is possible only in an integral socialism. From the purely economic point of view, of course, the greatest single pre-condition for equality is socialization.

Once the basic conditions are fulfilled, however, it is necessary to ensure that differences in income are limited to a certain well-defined range. There is, of course, no fixed ratio between the highest and the lowest incomes universally accepted by socialists. The exact ratio at a particular stage has to be determined in the context of the objective situation in each country, but the range of income differences should be as narrow as possible. The consensus of opinion among the socialist parties seems to be that the ratio between the lowest and the highest incomes must not be higher than 1:10. Israel has so far successfully experimented with a ratio of about 1:3.5. It is also generally understood that within the range of income differences fixed by any country, the structure of incomes is to be determined by free competition.

It is often argued that such relative equalization of incomes would lead to a great loss of incentive and hence of productivity. This is a grossly fallacious argument, for the incentive and productivity of an individual do not depend on the absolute volume of his income but on his relative position in the scale of income distribution and what is equally important, by the degree of his general interest in his

undertaking. From both these points of view, the socialization of the economy and the general reduction in income disparities are sure to raise the incentive and productivity of the masses of workers to such an extent as to far outweigh any loss of productivity resulting from the scaling down of the highest incomes. This is a point so fundamental to socialism that no socialist movement which doubts the truth of it can hope to stand.

It is often argued that this socialist contention has not been conclusively proved anywhere so far. The socialists would reply that it has not been disproved either. They would freely admit that socialism has not yet been fully established anywhere in the world, and that it is based on a new concept of human civilization and culture. Until it is disproved conclusively that socialization and equality would lead to a sharp rise in labour productivity, this assumption will remain an article of faith with them.

The fixing of the range of income disparities has to be coordinated with a redistributive fiscal policy characterized, among other things, by a progressive income tax, a steeply progressive tax on inheritance of wealth, heavy taxation of luxury articles and exemption from taxation or low taxation of daily necessities. The opinion is also generally held by socialists that a socialist economy must be characterized mainly, if not exclusively, by direct taxation, so that the incidence of taxation may not be shifted by those for whom it is meant on to the shoulders of those who do not have the ability to pay. Some socialists also make the radical suggestion that there should be no taxation at all in a socialist system, and that the revenues of the State should come from the profits of socialized undertakings. This is a subject on which a great deal of further research and experiment is called for.

Socialist economics also demands the absence of unemployment, equal opportunities of education and employment for all, and certain minimum guarantees in the form of a comprehensive social security

system for every individual. These are inalienable objectives of any socialist movement, but their achievement depends basically on rapid economic development which is one of the fundamental aims of socialism.

III

SOCIALISM IN A BACKWARD ECONOMY

Of late the idea has gained ground, partly as a result of the writings and political activities of Asoka Mehta, until recently a socialist leader of India, and partly on account of the Marxian misconception that socialism can only come close on the heels of a mature capitalism, that the socialist ideology is subject to some inherent limitations in a backward economy which has its inner 'compulsions'.

Those who hold this view opine that the socialist movement in a backward economy should extend its broad cooperation to the ruling party, which may not be socialist and may even represent the capitalist and feudal classes, with a view to ensuring the rapid growth of the economy which is the first necessity. This plea for a temporary suspension of the socialist movement in a backward economy seems to rest on three main arguments.

In the first place, it is presupposed that socialism can be introduced only after the economy has risen to a certain level of growth. Therefore, the movement for the establishment of a pluralistic society, for the devolution of political and economic power, for socialization of the economy and for economic equality, must be suspended until that level of growth has been achieved. A little reflection would reveal that this argument is really based on the Marxian misconception that a period of capitalist growth must precede the onset of socialism. Modern socialism, as explained earlier, has rejected this Marxian view, and is regarded by socialists everywhere as a universal and perennial movement applicable to all stages of economic development. Mere economic growth has never been an objective of the

socialist movement in the modern period anywhere. Economic growth has taken place in capitalist USA, fascist Germany or communist Russia. The distinctive characteristic of the socialist movement is that it demands economic growth with the maximum possible equity at every stage of development. When a country is poor, socialism demands an equitable distribution of the poverty. No socialist who challenges this basic fact is worth his salt.

A second argument behind this view is that there is a basic economic contradiction between equality and development. According to Keynesian economic theory, the marginal propensity to consume of the lower income brackets is rather high in all economies and in a backward economy, the existing level of consumption being unusually low, it would be equal to unity or very near unity. That is to say, in a backward economy the majority of people, who belong to the lower income brackets would spend the whole or nearly the whole of any increase in income on consumption. Therefore, runs the argument, if there is a redistribution of income, there would be a smaller volume of total savings in the economy than before available for investment. The rate of development would thus be retarded. This argument is fallacious on at least two grounds.

First, as Prof. Duesenberry has shown, the rate of growth of consumption of a particular income bracket does not depend primarily on the rate of growth of its income, but on the relative position of this income bracket in the scale of income distribution. If there are grave inequalities of income, the conspicuous consumption of the high income brackets will have a demonstration effect (also called Veblen effect after the name of a famous economist) which will induce a sharp rise in the consumption of the lower income brackets. There would thus be a greater danger to savings and capital formation in a society characterized by inequality than in an egalitarian society. For, in an egalitarian society the Veblen effect would disappear and there would, therefore, be no urge on

the part of the lower income brackets to increase their consumption by a high percentage.

It is argued in reply to this contention that the Veblen effect may be an important determinant of consumption in an affluent society where the basic consumption needs have been satisfied, but that in a backward economy, owing to the abysmally low level of consumption of the majority of people, there would in any case be a very sharp rise in consumption following a redistribution of income. But it has nowhere been proved so far that poor people consume the whole of their additional incomes even if attractive opportunities for small investments are present. If the worker is given the opportunity to buy shares of socialized undertakings, for instance, or to invest in profitable small scale industries, there is no reason to suppose that he would not invest in this manner a substantial part of his additional income. The belief that the worker would spend the whole or nearly the whole of his additional income on consumption even if he is given certain reasonable incentives to invest, owes its origin to a fundamental lack of faith in his rationality. It presupposes that he is not interested in improving his economic position and that of his family, which is a highly unreal assumption.

Secondly, whatever rise may take place in the consumption of the lower income brackets, this need in no way retard the rate of economic growth, for the rise in productivity which would inevitably follow a redistribution of income would more than offset any falling short in capital formation. It is a perverse illusion to which we have become habituated through long periods of tutoring in capitalist economic thought, which induces us to believe that a country can have economic development, or any kind of development for that matter, by starving its people. This anti-socialist

view-point smacks of a belief in a system of politico-economic trusteeship and a disbelief in the human nature and rationality of the masses. As Prof. Reddaway and other eminent economists have pointed out, the best way to develop an economically backward country with a large population like India is to concentrate on the fullest utilization of its manpower. And the most effective way of utilizing the manpower is to give it better nutrition.

The third argument of these believers in the 'compulsions of a backward economy' seems to be that if there is devolution of political and economic power and socialization of the economy, this would lead to the management of the economy being vested in the hands of educationally and technically unqualified or under-qualified workers, and hence, to mismanagement, general confusion and loss of production. Needless to say, those who believe that the workers would be too ignorant and incompetent to undertake the management of industry and agriculture until and unless they were given some form of higher education, need not degrade socialism by calling themselves socialists. It must be a curious dichotomy within the human mind which enables people to believe that the masses are able to choose their representatives for ruling the country, but would be unable to do so for managing a factory or a farm.

It may be emphasized again that the socialist movement is a universal and perennial movement. The task of building socialism in a backward economy is all the more challenging, because such economies are transitional in nature, generally speaking, where neither capitalism nor communism has entrenched itself and where there are infinite possibilities of reconstruction, and because the human material which is at work in such an economy is infinitely more exciting than that of any developed economy.

A National University for India

B. R. SHENOY

THE purpose of this note is to outline a plan for a national university for India. The case for a national university emerges from the virtual failure of Indian universities in general to make their due contribution to our national life. Under the British regime, the main objective of university education was considered primarily to be providing for government service at all levels. The country now expects the universities to assume their customary functions of leadership in national intellectual activities. A review, in brief, of the limitations of the existing set-up of our universities which stand in the way of their achieving their full stature in Indian national life would help to indicate the appropriate set-up for a national university.

'There are few earthly things more beautiful than a university', wrote John Masfield, in his tribute to the English universities. Its great beauty lay in that it was 'a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see.'

It is an unwelcome thought that the description 'beautiful' may not fully apply to many of our 54 universities. First, judging from the quality of output, our effort to perceive truth — study and research — may not stand international comparison very well. The level of instruction — making others see truth — as some visiting observers have remarked, is often elementary. Specialists seem to lack specialisation. Secondly, the motivation of the university students is more dominated by the desire for a degree than by the urge 'to know'. In the prevailing state of affairs, sound scholarship may not be a reasonable

assurance of good performance in examinations. The two being divorced, the general preference is for the latter. Thirdly, our universities are too redtape-ridden to foster beauty. The theory of the university administration is patterned on that of the government secretariat, which ill suits the needs of a temple of learning.

To allow this state of affairs to continue is perilous. Not only is the university the cradle of the nation, where our men are trained in the professions, the arts and the sciences, though this in itself is adequate consideration for focussing national attention on this problem; it is part of the concern of a university by study and investigation to give the lead in extending the frontiers of progress in all fields of human affairs and human interest, and to throw light for the solution of our problems.

If study, instruction and research, the principal activities of a university, are to attain the excellence we aspire for, the universities should be able to draw on the best talent in the land. This is far from being the case today. The teaching profession does not attract the most talented graduates. The latter seem to prefer positions of junior executives in banks, business and industry, or government service. Men of talent in the profession often wish to leave.

This is the crux of the problem, as the greatness of a university is apt to be in proportion to the greatness of its teachers. The university teacher, observed Professor Harold J. Laski, is the university. It would seem that we have still to discover this basic truth. Today we seem to have other ideas on the subject. The university administrators — the Vice-Chancellor, the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, the Rector, the

Treasurer, the Registrar and the members of the Executive Council — at times seem to fancy that they constitute the University much more than the university teachers, the latter being perhaps regarded as their employees. The success of an enterprise, whether a bank, a factory or a business house, largely rests on the quality of its personnel at all or at critical levels, much more than the quality of its capital equipment and other material factors, though the importance of the latter should not be underrated. The dependence of success on personnel is perhaps the greatest in the case of universities, as study, instruction and research, being personal achievements, cannot be replaced by mechanisation.

The failure of universities to attract and keep men of the right quality seems to rest, principally, on three factors. First, the contrast in the remunerations of university teachers — which have always been below the emoluments of men of comparable rank and merit in other fields — has widened with the increase in the salaries and perquisites all around. The real content of the recent salary revisions — which all universities have not adopted, though the bulk of the cost would be financed, for a period, by the University Grants Commission — has lost significance with the rising prices. Outstanding university professors cannot command special terms reflecting their scarcity, unless they have left the profession. A young man of ability joining a bank or a business firm as a junior executive, after six or eight years' service might easily reach the University Professor's salary, and in about a dozen years of service get twice or more the latter's remuneration.

There is little justification for this salary contrast. In Europe and America the contrast is getting less pronounced. Rigid salary grades to university teachers is not the rule as in India; an individual of outstanding merit may be offered special terms. In the Soviet Union the Academicians are reported to be on the top salary scales in the Union. The salaries of our

National Professors — their number may be counted on the fingers of one hand — are not placed higher than those of the (new entrant) Joint Secretaries to the Government of India. Against our highly monetised background, it is but proper that financial compensations offered to the university teachers should reflect in some measure the importance of their work. The prevailing practice in India in this regard is outmoded, to say the least.

Secondly, the administrative set-up of the universities leaves much to be desired. The prime concern of the university administration should be general matters and the provision of physical facilities for the most efficient functioning of university teachers and students, such as management of the library, conduct of examinations, meetings and convocations, registrations, maintenance of buildings and hostels, provision of civic amenities and organizing the availability of finance and other resources.

But university administrators wish to go far beyond this. Observed Sir Eric Ashby: 'A University is a society, not a public service. Its vitality depends on the maximum opportunity for initiative being distributed among the maximum number of members of the society. You cannot issue directives for scholarship and you cannot devise assembly lines for research.' Our university administrators run the university as though it were bureaucracy and wish to bring under their scrutiny and regulation almost everything. Though by the very nature of things, they may not be able to comprehend the quality of study, instruction and research in the diverse subjects, they seem to be fond of policing and regulating the activities of academic men. This produces tension and irritation.

The hostility of administrators to faculty men is common and the latter being generally without power or authority, petty harassments and indignities result. The physical and financial facilities available to university teachers are generally poor in the extreme, though some improvement is now evident here and there mainly as a result of the activities of the University

Grants Commission. Though the top university administrators are usually well provided with offices, secretaries and official residences, niggardliness characterises the provision of these facilities to university teachers. There are Universities in India, some of them over 40 years old, where a University Professor may not have a room of his own for work, let alone secretarial assistance. Most research projects involve money expenditure. Provision for this may be meagre or non-existent. Where provision exists the procedure for the use of the funds is tortuous. It lacks dignity, if indeed it is not a slur on the university teachers.

The arrangement under which power and authority even in academic matters rests with the administrators and the responsibility for 'delivering the (academic) goods' rests with the faculties has not worked eminently well. The unseemly incidents which caused much public concern regarding the state of affairs in some universities lately would seem to be an end result of this divorce between authority and functional responsibilities in the set-up of universities. The administrators being unaccountable for the quality or quantum of academic output, they do not have any great stake in making the best selections to fill vacant posts. The members of the faculty, even the heads of departments, often have little or no hand in making appointments, though — the responsibility for delivering the goods being theirs — they are most vitally concerned in getting the right men. When interested people can muster majorities in the Executive Council, the decisions of Expert Selection Committees may be turned down. The quality of the people in the faculties being rather indifferent as a consequence, the standard of study, instruction and research becomes indifferent too.

Though, obviously, if we plant thistle we cannot complain that we are not having a harvest of roses, the selfsame administrators who acquiesced in recruiting indifferent people, now look round for ways and

means of improving academic standards. They formulate Statutes and Ordinances, issue circulars, add to the number of lectures and tutorials, require the staff to remain in the faculty buildings during 'working' hours as people do in business and industrial houses, call for returns on research and investigation, and attempt to weed out the 'unruly' elements in the faculties. But as alphonso mangoes cannot be made to grow on babul trees, this *bandobust* produces little fulfilment; it has produced, on the other hand a great deal of conflict and, in desperation, legal action by academic persons against the universities.

These developments do not add to the dignity of the academic profession nor to the stature of our universities. It has sometimes been suggested that the remedy to this state of affairs is a strong administrator with powers of summary dismissal. This is more likely to convert the universities into little police states than raise their stature functionally as research is not the product of a drill on the parade ground, nor can it be made to order by pressing the administrative button. It thrives best under freedom and it needs the right men with complete devotion.

It is incorrect to suppose that the malady is due to the administration of universities being weak. It is rather due to the fatal separation of power and accountability. The influence of the Faculty in Faculty matters in the renowned centres of learning abroad is well worth our attention. In these centres the Faculty controls not only the course of instruction and the expenditures essential to it but, more generally, also appointments; the members of the teaching staff are 'elected', the electors being generally Faculty men. Consider what might happen to the textile mill industry, in India if the mills were run not by the shareholders and mill-agents, who finance them, but by retired members of the judiciary, whose merit and service may call for rewards, or by politicians discarded by the electorates, who have to be provided for under Party etiquette, as chairmen of

the Boards of Directors and by lawyers, doctors, hoteliers and traders, without any direct stake in the mill, as members of the Board.

Since administrators cannot assume functional responsibility for the work and output of the faculties, there is no remedy to the prevailing state of affairs in our universities other than to place power where responsibility for academic work and output belongs. All decisions in academic matters must rest in virtual entirety with the body of faculty men concerned, the administrators doing little more than assist them in this work. It is in the fitness of things that the Presidents of some renowned overseas universities have a role more ceremonial than functional, one of their functions being to attract endowments. Otherwise, they may not be far from honorific cyphers.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that a university does not have a chief executive in the conventional sense of this term. The set-up in the University is unique. The top University administrator can assume no functional responsibility — as heads of business houses, for instance, are endowed with — for the work and output of the several Faculties. The hierarchy in the Faculties — Professors, Readers, Lecturers and Fellows — is not a bureaucratic hierarchy either. The weight of an individual in this hierarchy is determined, regardless of his rank, by his achievements in learning and research. The best known and the most influential Economist in Cambridge was nothing more than a Fellow of the King's College. Apart from general administrative matters, where the final decision must rest with the top university administrator, a university has as many chief executives as there are university teachers. To quote Sir Eric Ashby again: 'Conformity, orthodoxy, the Party line, are out of place in the academic world.'

To these deterrents to men of talent choosing the academic profession, must be added regionalism. Less in some places, more in others, it is growing rapidly almost everywhere under the new compulsion of

the regional medium of instruction. A faculty member from outside the region of the university is becoming a rare sight. Regionalism, on the one hand, repels from the academic profession men from outside the region and, on the other, adds to the pressures for migration out of the profession.

The combined effect of these factors is that the quality of university teachers is deteriorating fast. They also largely explain the preference of some of our younger men for work in overseas universities. The response to advertisements is generally depressing, half-a-dozen (indifferent) applications per post being common. With new entrants mostly substandard and the better quality people migrating to other professions, the faculty men in our universities today are largely left-overs. With this material, all measures for raising the standards of study, instruction and research must be largely futile.

Though the University Grants Commission has taken some steps regarding the remuneration of university teachers and has shown awareness of the effects of regionalism, the issue of the relationship between faculties and the administration has received little attention. No institution can grow unless importance is placed where importance belongs. The set-up of our universities needs to be radically changed. The university teachers must be masters in their own house. The guiding principle of policy should be flexibility and decentralisation. Appointments, promotions, disbursements of funds budgetted for academic work, courses of studies, examinations and grading must be controlled in virtual entirety by the members of the faculties concerned. This subject-wise decentralisation, on the one hand, would take the wind out of the sails of much of the 'power' politics in universities and, on the other, would place the responsibility for academic results where it properly belongs — with the body of university teachers concerned with each particular subject.

These basic reforms may take long to

achieve, especially as the present university managements may not very much favour them. In any case, the reversal of the deterioration in the quality of faculty members, on which everything hinges, must be a slow process. The effect of regionalism on universities is not an easy problem to tackle, as regionalism raises issues with political ramifications.

It may be much more practicable to organise a model national university embodying these reforms, setting an example, in respect of set-up, functions and achievements, to the existing universities. An immediate issue to be considered is whether the national university should be 'teaching' and 'residential' or an 'affiliating' one, too. With the spread of regionalism and the regional media of instruction, there is great need to have some colleges with English as the medium of instruction in the several language regions. As affiliation of these colleges to the regional universities may raise practical difficulties, there are advantages in affiliating them to the national university. It may be necessary, therefore, for it to have two wings, one affiliating and the other devoted to teaching and research. But it is important to keep the two separate, in view of the experience of interference in the working of the teaching wings of some universities by the people in the affiliating wings. The colleges will generally provide undergraduate instruction, while the teaching wing will also have full-fledged post-graduate departments. The managements of the two wings should be independent of each other, the teaching wing being controlled by its faculty men. If for some reason, independent management is not practicable, we may have two national universities, one meeting the needs of affiliation and the other for study, instruction and research, taking both undergraduate and post-graduate students.

The medium of instruction in the national university should be English, though Hindi may be a compulsory language at the Intermediate level. The window to the scholarship and learning of

the English-speaking part of the world, which English as a medium of study provides, should be kept fully open. As the university will have students from all parts of India, to permit optional instruction in Hindi would handicap students coming from the non-Hindi parts of the country. English as a medium of instruction will also facilitate full use of the arrangements for visiting scholars from overseas, which the university should foster and develop as a regular feature.

The administrative set-up of the university should be basically different from that of the existing Indian universities. In all academic matters its management should be decentralised on the lines indicated in the foregoing discussion, the body of university teachers concerned being responsible for such matters, including appointments and disbursement of funds allotted for academic work. The administrators should assist the faculties by taking over routine administrative work and attending to general matters. Much of the work now done by the Executive Councils of Universities being thus taken over by the faculties, the body corresponding to the Executive Councils should be properly described as the Board of Trustees, headed by a President. The Board may confirm the decisions and recommendations of the faculties, where such confirmation may be called for. In academic matters, extreme cases apart, it will be the ceremonial executive of the university. The Board of Trustees will have for its primary function attracting endowments and donations and organising the availability of funds and other resources.

The national university will be a wholly autonomous body; it will be free from interference by the government or any political organization. The members of the faculty and the students will have full academic freedom in all their activities.

Such a university cannot, indeed, be brought into being overnight. It should grow with the availability of university teachers of the requisite competence and devotion, faculty being added to faculty.

When Indian nationals of the requisite competence may not be available, the necessary finance should be mobilised to recruit suitable men from overseas. Under no circumstances should an indifferent appointment be made to fill a vacancy. The damage done to generations of students and the cost to the nation cannot be measured in money terms. If suitable men are not available, the posts should be left vacant or downgraded. Though growth may be slow, it must rest on solid foundations.

It would be a fatal error to create an elaborate administrative machinery first, hoping this machinery would do the 'organizing' of the university in due course. Buildings and 'academic' bodies such as Senates, Academic Councils, Boards of Studies and so on may indeed spring up. But there would be little work to show immediately or with the lapse of time. Nor

should the matters be left to the initiative of any non-academician as an 'organizer'. This would be to repeat the mistakes of the new universities in India, which are but copies of the older ones with all their faults and are universities largely in name only, lacking that 'beauty' of which Masfield spoke. There is a real danger of the 'organizer', unwittingly perhaps, building an empire for himself.

My suggestion is that the national university should commence in embryo as soon as possible with a faculty or two, the subject depending on the availability of scholars of ability and reputation. From this beginning it should grow by first adding allied subjects and then others. The Charter should provide for this slow growth. Given freedom and funds and the establishment of attractive precedents, we should have in due course a noteworthy national university.

National Planning and Social Change

A. P. BARNABAS

PLANNING seems to be becoming more and more the mode of operation by which many countries, particularly the underdeveloped countries, are trying to raise their standard of living. It is an organised and deliberate attempt by a nation or society to develop itself. Mannheim defines planning as 'a conscious attack on the sources of maladjustment in the social order, on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the whole mechanism of society and the way in which it works'. The social organism cannot be cured by pure enthusiasm, but only by a sober investigation of the causes of the disease. In most underdeveloped countries, the cause of the disease seems to be the irregular development which upsets the tendency to equilibrium in society. As it is, there can be no set stability in a society but there has to be some order and some system of organised relations in it if it is to function effectively. Societies are dynamic, and reconstructing them is like replacing the wheels of a train while it is in motion, rather than rebuilding a house on a new foundation. The factor of planning enters in where there is a feeling that the direction of change is not correct and needs to be redirected, or that the rate of change is not rapid, or that the society is disintegrating.

The present paper attempts to study certain social factors which seem to lead towards planning, and to indicate the major ways in which a social system is affected by national planning. Some thought is also given to the stability of the changes brought about by planning.

The problem is broad and rather difficult. A general theory of the process of change of a social system is not possible in the present state of our knowledge. The fact

that there is no such general theory makes it difficult to have a frame of reference in which to analyse the process of planning at the national level. Hence the approach is necessarily one of ex-post-facto analysis.

For this purpose observations are drawn from four countries, Turkey, China, Russia, and India – which adopted planning as a technique of development, and an attempt is made to answer these questions:—

1) Was there any similarity in the pre-existing conditions in these countries which led to planning?

2) Were the societies affected in the same way and what social aspects were changed by planning?

3) What factors were involved in planning?

4) What means were adopted to provide for the stability or the continuity of the changes that were occurring?

FACTORS LEADING TO PLANNING

The following are some of the factors which seem to lead to planning:

a) *Disorganisation in Society*

There is ample evidence that in each of the four countries the tendency to equilibrium in society had been badly shaken. In a sense, it was almost a choice between complete disorganisation of the society or the acceptance of some new system to stabilise it. The disorganisation did not appear suddenly. It was a gradual process attaining more and more serious proportions. The seeds of disorganisation were probably sown long before the first consequences were perceived. In India, the

disorganisation of society began with the attempt by a central agency to collect revenue, which dislocated the rural society, as the economic and the social structures were closely woven together. This was almost 150 years before the achievement of Independence or about 100 years before the beginning of the Independence Movement.

In Turkey, although distinct signs appeared only in the beginning of the present century, dis-satisfaction with the rule of the Sultans had been existing for quite some time before.

China suffered from outside pressures, humiliating treaties, international concessions and extra-territoriality from 1840 onwards. The continued foreign interference, aggravated by Soviet-directed communist operations, prevented the Nationalist government from gaining full control of the country, as a consequence of which complete chaos and confusion prevailed.

What led to social disorganisation in these countries? All these countries have large rural populations which had been more or less self-sufficient. The norms and the values were defined, and their life was more or less ordered 'from the cradle to the grave'. The societies had an economic structure which could be described as a village economy. However, this more or less self-sufficient economy was broken as there was a transformation from a village to a national economy resulting from increased communications, transportation and partial industrialization. This transition was unplanned and the people were not prepared for it. Moreover there was no attempt to help the people adjust themselves to the transition. As many of the traditions and norms seemed no longer relevant, confusion prevailed.

The transition from village economy to national economy brought about a change in the mode of division of labour, and specialisation became necessary. The simple division of labour which existed within the village structure was no longer relevant. This naturally led to a change in the inter-group relationships. The 'mechanical' solidarity was broken, but there was no

'organic' solidarity to replace it. With the change in the economic structure and the division of labour, confusion arose with regard to the status of the individuals, and the groups and their role in the social set-up. The old values and controls could not hold water in the emerging pattern. The strain of living in a new system with old values led to disorganisation of society. Every society based on specialisation and division of labour produces in practice separate and more or less isolated institutions and relationships. There was thus a breakdown of the old social fabric.

Another factor that contributed towards the social disorganisation was the unconcern of the 'elite' or those in authority regarding the conditions of the average population. The feudal lords of China, the Czarist regime in Russia, the Sultans of Turkey and the British Government in India, all failed to realize the aspirations of the common people, whose sufferings went unnoticed.

New technical innovations were brought into these societies, but these were not integrated into the total system. No lead was given in adjusting to the strains created by the introduction of these innovations. This led to a progressive increase in the strains of the social structure. As there was no attempt to lessen the strains, the social disorganisation continued.

b) Emergence of New Ideas

To counteract the process of disorganisation, new ideas were developed by a small group of people, who attempted to restore some vitality to the society. In Turkey, the driving idea was to 'be like westerners' in order to regain respect as a nation. Nationalism was another force. In India the dominant force was nationalism arising out of the struggle to get rid of an alien government. In China and Russia, Communism gained ground. These societies, being already in a state of flux, were prepared to accept any new idea that seemed to give direction. Ideas have to exist for some time before they become commonly

acceptable. The state of society had led to thinking about a change in society. The stronger the impulse to change society, the more the people are compelled to question things which once they passively accepted.

c) *The Crisis.*

Under these circumstances, a clash between the protagonists of the new ideas and the existing power structure becomes inevitable. We term this clash 'Crisis'. In Russia and China, the clash was very violent. In Turkey, it was not too violent. In India, except for sporadic outbursts the clash was non-violent. Thus when a society is disorganised and the 'elite' is unconcerned, and at the same time a new idea that is being propagated gathers a substantial following, a clash is unavoidable. This clash can be considered the climax of the factors that lead to planning. If the old regime succeeds in suppressing the protagonists of the new ideas, there is very little chance of planning taking place. In India, the crisis occurred when Indians demanded that the British quit India. In China, it began with the fight between the Communists and Chiang-Kai-Shek's regime. Similarly civil war in Russia, and the fight between Mustafa Kamal and the Sultan in Turkey, were the beginning of the crisis.

The crisis was resolved when one party succeeded in subjugating or eliminating the other. As a result a new power structure took over the reigns of government. In all four countries, the clash resulted in a victory for the protagonists of the new ideas. This indicates that the disorganisation in society had reached such a state of anarchy, that people were eager to back any new idea which gave some hope of their being relieved from the chaos in which they found themselves. The assumption of power and authority by the protagonists of the new ideas was the beginning of planning, as the new ideas had elements of planning in their approach to the reconstruction of society.

BEGINNING OF PLANNING

Planning at the national level in almost all countries was undertaken only after continued thought had been given to it. A line, though a thin one, could be drawn between the emergence of the idea of planning, the development of the idea, the gaining of authority to implement the plans, a blue-print and finally the actual plan and its execution.

The initial period of revolutionary development began with the emergence of the revolutionary party and witnessed the foundation and elaboration of its ideology and programme of action with successive adjustments to meet the exigencies of the situation. In Russia this period began roughly in 1898 with the formation of the Social Democratic Party. The national revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people had a history of one-hundred years beginning with the Opium War of 1840. In India, too, there had been a considerable awareness of the importance of planning for a long time. The Indian National Congress appointed in 1938 a National Planning Committee under the Chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. Similarly in Turkey, there was a period of political intrigue and then a period of realisation that something drastic had to be done to revive the country.

It may also be of interest to note that in each case, the new power structure did not launch into a planned development immediately after assumption of power, although planning had been long indicated in their programmes. In China, the Communist Party took over in 1949, but the planned programme started only in 1953. India achieved independence in 1947 but the first Five Year Plan came into force only in 1952. In Russia, the Revolution ended in 1918, the constitution was adopted in 1924 but the plan was launched only in 1928.

Centralised Power Structure

Planned change in all the cases had to rely upon a very strong bureaucracy.

Centralisation became necessary, because 1) Co-ordination of different measures was essential to planning. 2) In a planned society government and community are no longer separable entities, and 3) lawful State interference in economic life by its machinery and powers of regulation was essential to maintain full production and exercise control over arbitrary monopolies.

In the case of Russia, China and Turkey, the centralised power was that of the dictators. In India, the Central Government was very powerful and had a very effective leadership.

All these countries willingly accepted a centralised power because 1) the societies had been in a state of disorganisation and had neither the strength nor the will to resist; 2) they were willing to be guided by any authority which promised to lead them to the desired goals; 3) there was a strong desire to revitalise and regain national self-interest and prestige, and a strong centralised authority gave hopes of this achievement at a quick pace.

Nature of Planning

In all these countries, the plans were essentially economic in nature. The reasons for great emphasis on economic development were: 1) the standard of living had been extremely low in all these countries. 2) The gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' was very wide. 3) There was a strong desire to attain as quickly as possible the levels achieved by the 'developed' or 'Western' countries'. The economic development therefore became in all these countries a dominant question of the day. Not only were the plans economic in nature, but also the major emphasis in economic development was on industrialization.

PLANNING AND SOME MAJOR SOCIAL CHANGES

Although the plans were essentially economic in nature, they had vital reper-

cussions on the social systems. The introduction of technology led for instance to the rise of new occupations, new organisations, new values, rural migration to urban areas, availability of greater facilities by way of services, etc. However, the changes in social aspects were incidental rather than basic. The following seem to be the major changes that took place in the social systems, as a result of planned development.

1) *Change in Individual Status*

Inkles, writing about Russia said, 'In interpersonal relations the 'familistic' or what Talcott Parsons call the 'particularistic' patterns of an earlier era have invariably been pushed into the background to be replaced increasingly by formal impersonal or 'universalistic' relationship patterns under the impact of the increasing role of specialisation and spreading bureaucratisation and technilization. A relatively stable system of social stratification based largely on role ascriptions and traditional criteria for the assignment of prestige, has been replaced by extensive social mobility with status largely assigned on the basis of achievement, in turn intimately linked with the attainment of education and technical skill.'⁹ What was true of the Soviet situation was equally true of other cases. In rural and agrarian societies, the tendency is for roles to be ascribed. In India, the office of the village headman was hereditary. Now, it has been replaced by the elected Pradhan or Sarpanch of the village Panchayat. The 'reward system' has also undergone a change. It is now based on the performance of a function rather than on fulfilling an ascribed role in society.

The shift from ascription to achievement has accelerated social mobility. Caste barriers in India can now be crossed at least in occupational and educational levels. There is evidence of similar changes in other countries also. The basic purpose of planning is to increase national wealth, and it is only natural that those who con-

⁹ *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, 1954 - Page 243.

tribute most to it get greater reward. As Mannheim says, 'In a planned society, the principle of equalising opportunities must be linked with objective criteria of achievement.'

Another aspect related to the status of the individual was that the status of women was gradually raised. In Turkey, one of the major symbols of change was the removal of the veil of women. In India, laws have been passed to give equal share of property and the right to institute a case for divorce to women. They can compete with men for almost every job. In Communist countries also, women are treated at par with men.

2) *Relation to Religion*

In China, Russia and Turkey, religion was affected directly. In the Communist view, 'religion is the opium of the people', and it was inevitable that the Communists should directly attack religion. In Turkey, Mustafa Kamal was able to create a far-reaching cultural revolution in which the place of religion was fundamentally altered. In India, many of the laws passed indirectly affected religious practices and beliefs.

It is interesting to note that the acceptance of a technological culture resulted in the acceptance of a secular philosophy. All these countries declared themselves secular democratic republics and teaching institutions were forbidden to give instruction in any specific religion. The idea that religious beliefs stand in the way of social progress thus seemed to be dominant in all these cases.

3) *Relation to Social Values*

The new structure came into power with a new ideology. It committed itself to undertaking an economic plan for the increase of production and rise in the level of living. These became the basic values and any values which stood in the way of economic progress became suspect. In passing legislation many long cherished ideals were brushed aside. Legislative

measures were adopted to reformulate many social values held regarding the family, marriage, religion, women, status of the individual etc. This was easily possible because of the strong bureaucratic structure and also because legislation now became the major means of social control. There was a considerable decline in the power of religion and of institutions like the family and the village community which exercised till recently a predominant control over individual behaviour.

STABILISATION OF CHANGE

The usefulness or the validity of any changes introduced, is usually judged by their stability. Although it is not yet possible to state definitely whether the changes brought about by national planning are stable or not, some of the measures that were adopted or are being adopted for this purpose, can be stated.

- 1) Rewriting of history with a view to bolster the values that were being advocated was undertaken. In China even the old legends were rewritten with a new twist.
- 2) The educational system as such was not disturbed, but the content of the subject matter was changed. It was directed to the fostering of new ideas and values.
- 3) New organisations for young and old were set up to educate them in the 'new way of life'.
- 4) Legislation was also employed to stabilise the change.
- 5) The introduction of vast capital goods and large construction projects also stabilised the changes. They provided stability to the economic structure and to some extent the social system dependent on such an economy.

Here it may be pointed out that while there were similarities in the factors that led to planning in all four countries and in the nature of the planning adopted with its emphasis on economic development, the techniques adopted in the various countries for planned development were

not quite similar. In China there was extreme centralisation and the planning machinery was almost entirely in the hands of the bureaucracy. On the contrary, in India while the planning process for major national schemes has been centralised, for local schemes there has been some decentralisation and an attempt has been made to bring bureaucracy closer to the people by setting up various non-official bodies from the centre down to the villages. In fact in many ways bureaucracy has been brought under the direct or indirect control of the representatives of the people. A thing like the Chinese 'Communes' which aim at a thorough overhaul and reorganisation of the entire social, economic and cultural fabric of Chinese society but where 'human beings are reduced to the level of the inmates of a zoo' is unthinkable in a country like ours which believes in the dignity and freedom of the individual. This aspect of the question is, however, beyond the scope of the topic discussed in the present paper and hence is not elaborated.

To conclude, it may be said that in all four countries under study where planning

was adopted, there was evidence of disorganisation of society due mostly to economic upheaval, resulting in the emergence of new ideas for the reconstruction of society. The clash between the old and the new referred to as the 'crisis' was followed by a change in the power structure. Planning at the national level was undertaken after a prolonged period of preparation. There was a strong central bureaucratic power structure which undertook planning. Planning was basically economic in nature and the attempt was made to move from an agrarian to industrial economy.

The social changes were mainly due to the introduction of industrialisation, the transition from a village to a national economy and the emergence of a strong central power, the importance given to achievement as a criteria for gaining social status as against ascription, the acceptance of a secular philosophy and the weakening of the influence of religion. With the decline in the influence of religion and local groups, legislation became the major means of social control. In pursuance of the new goals, the existing social values were often ignored.

Moral Implications in Hemingway's Work

S. K. NARAIN

IN his acceptance speech, read by the U.S. Ambassador in Stockholm, who accepted the Nobel Prize on his behalf, Hemingway wrote: 'For a true writer each book should be a new beginning where he tries again for some thing that is beyond attainment'. He should always try for some thing that has never been done or that others have tried and failed. Then sometimes, with great luck, he will succeed.' He once remarked that the writer's first obligation is 'to put down what I see and what I feel in the best and simplest way I can tell.' A writer's first problem, he told the second Writer's Congress held in New York City in 1937, is always how "to write truly and having found out what is true, to project it in such a way that it becomes a part of the experience of the person who reads it.' These statements define Hemingway's aesthetic creed from which he refused to be deflected by any non-aesthetic purposes. These statements provide the right clues to Hemingway's work and are important in any consideration of his achievement as a writer.

Hemingway has always been an extremely conscientious craftsman; his absolute devotion to his art and his constant striving for perfection puts him in the tradition of Jane Austen and Flaubert. Fairly early in his career, he achieved literary fame and international recognition. And he came to be the most powerful influence on a whole generation of American writers. But he has also been one of the most misunderstood writers of our age. A number of accusations — and they are pretty serious ones — were brought against him. He was reproached, especially in the 'thirties', for being socially irresponsible. In a decade dominated by politics when fascism was

raising its ugly head in Europe and a world war seemed inevitable, Hemingway chose to write about bull-fighting and big-game hunting in *Death in the Afternoon* and *The Green Hills of Africa*. It is difficult, wrote Wyndham Lewis in 1934, to imagine a writer whose mind is more entirely closed to politics. Lewis went on to say that Hemingway appeared to be interested 'in the sports of death, in the sad things that happen to those engaged in the sports of love, in war, but not in the things that cause war, or the people who profit by it, or in the ultimate destinies involved in it.'

Another source of dissatisfaction with Hemingway is his obsession with a limited number of themes, or what has been called his fascinated fixation with bull-fighters, touts, gunmen, professional soldiers, prostitutes, hard drinkers, dope fiends. Cynical and disillusioned, his characters spend their time drinking, fishing, fighting, wenching; and these activities are no mere diversion they appear to be the very goals of existence. What is more, the experience that Hemingway records in his work exists merely on the physical plane. Physical sensations are everything; they are recorded with great minuteness and intensity. This has led to the view held in some quarters that Hemingway's is an art of 'surfaces and anecdotes'; that his work lacks the third dimension: the life of the spirit, it is alleged, has been completely ignored.

A yet more serious charge is that Hemingway is totally devoid of the moral sense. He has been called the high priest of naturalism; both in his beliefs and mode of expression he has been held to be an out and out naturalist. The naturalist's concern is with what is brutal and sordid

in life and human beings are shown in naturalistic fiction as pawns, with no free volition, driven relentlessly by the basic urges of self preservation, sex and ambition. The world the naturalist depicts is devoid of beauty, nobility, grandeur; it is a world which has done away with all moral values. Hemingway is thus sought to be classified with the naturalists because of his preoccupation with violence and death, his refusal to make explicit affirmations, and because of the deterministic implications of his work.

The accusations against Hemingway stem from the critics' failure to consider the aesthetic on which his fictional work is constructed as also the circumstances both personal and environmental which formed his attitudes. Another source of misunderstanding is their inability to see that Hemingway's work as a novelist shows a development, a definite progression during the three decades over which most of his writing was done. These accusations may have some validity if they are applied to his earlier works. But in his case there is a definite transition from the bleak despair and nihilism of his early writing to the solid affirmations of his later work. Therefore to extend their application to the entire body of his writing is entirely to miss the point of what Hemingway had set out to do and succeeded in doing. Adhering faithfully to his aesthetic, namely, to write about what he knows and feels, he wrote only about those aspects of life which he had encountered personally.

Hemingway is essentially a product of the post-war spirit of revolt. World War I had brought about a new generation, both in Europe and America, a generation emancipated, disillusioned, cynical, a generation that in the words of Scott Fitzgerald, had grown 'to find all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faith in men shaken.' The world in which the American writer of the twenties grew up was a world of violent actions and mechanical impulses, of senseless brutality and heartless cynicism. The literature that came of this moral climate — and it was a literature exceed-

ingly rich, varied and original — was born in protest and rebellion. It expressed the writer's sense of horror, uncertainty and bewilderment before the reality of American life. The cry of the writer was one of liberty; liberty to express himself, with the utmost simplicity and forthrightness. This new generation of writers — what Gertrude Stein called the 'lost generation' — felt uprooted, betrayed, and disinherited, a generation for whom life would be forever shadowed by violence and death. 'Lost and for ever writing the history of their loss,' they became, as Alfred Kazin has said, 'Specialists in Anguish. They became the evangelists of what had been most tragically felt in the American war experience.' And perhaps no writer felt as acutely as Hemingway did the tragedy of this life, its emptiness and *nada*. No wonder John Peale Bishop writes: 'It was given to Hawthorne to dramatise the human soul. In our time Hemingway wrote the drama of its disappearance.'

The most important influence in Hemingway is his early experience of war on the Austrian Front and the impact it made on his sensitive mind. It is this experience which made him acutely conscious of the horror, the cruelty and the meaninglessness of war. Since Hemingway was concerned as observer and participant in five separate wars between 1917 and 1947, one can well understand his fixation with war and the dominant part it plays in his writing. In his novels and stories he has tried to study human behaviour under the pressure of war, and his own attitude as well as that of his characters is one of bewilderment in the face of a life in which Death is the only absolute certainty. And the theme that was to dominate his work during this period is that of the wounded hero who tries hard to learn how best to live with his scars, both physical and psychic. In one of his earlier stories, 'Soldier's Home', which appeared in the volume *In Our Time*, we have the story of Kerbs who went to war and after the war returns to his home but is utterly unable to become a part of the town's life.

We find him emotionally withdrawn from experience, disclaiming life's responsibilities. In *A Farewell to Arms*, through Henry's desertion, this attitude of withdrawal, a sense of separateness, is given a fuller expression. This is symbolic also of Hemingway's own attitude in this period — his own revolt and isolation and his total rejection of the social patterns of modern civilization.

This negative phase is predominant also in *The Sun Also Rises*, a novel about the lost generation of Montparnasse in the 1920's, a mixed group of aesthetes and intellectuals and playboys who do nothing in particular but travel, drink and make love. In these two novels as also in the stories of this period collected in *Men Without Women* (1927) and *Winner Take Nothing*, Hemingway depicts a spiritually nihilistic world, a world of thousands of isolated and despairing individuals whose lives are governed by a blind and blank necessity, finding an escape in dissipation, vice and in frenzied and meaningless action, which is just a means of avoiding thought and escaping responsibility.

In his next two books, *Death in the Afternoon* and *The Green Hills of Africa*, we find the same framework of revolt and isolation. They present the world of the matador and the kudu in which the central theme was the hunter, the hunted and death; a world of deep and always fatally irrational feelings, which was marked by a sense of dissolution, until all forms of action and modes of thinking became a sort of opiate, a nihilistic spiritual world — that was the real world between the two wars.

It is usual to class Hemingway with the hard-boiled school of fiction whose personal experience of the first world-war had a shattering influence on their faith in traditional values and who show in their work a heightened awareness of violence and death. War undoubtedly was an important influence on Hemingway. But that is not the whole story. Hemingway's revolt against society and his rejection of civilized values has a deeper significance. For one

thing, there is in Hemingway a natural propensity to scepticism and a pessimism which very often takes the form of stoic resignation. This tendency is further strengthened by the sham and hypocrisy that he saw in the world around him. He seems to have developed a distrust of all values in a world where there is such divergence between men's professions and their deeds. Even before he became acutely conscious of the reality of war, he shared the disgust of contemporary writers with American society, with its commercial values, its emphasis on work and material achievement, its worship of success. All these various factors must be taken into account to explain the absence of positive and explicit affirmations in his early writings.

A Farewell to Arms may be taken as a naturalistic account of what happened on the Austrian Front in 1918. Like all Hemingway's writing, it succeeds in creating the feeling of 'the way it was' in a particular place and time; it possesses a vividness which has not been paralleled in modern fiction. But to read it only as such is to miss its real significance and power. For, beneath the surface of an objective, unimpassioned record of facts, one can discern the operation of an emotional and moral dimension. At the deeper level, the novel is a protest against war; in fact it is a study in man's progressive degeneration under the conditions of war. Superficially, Hemingway's technique is that of reportage — objective, bare. But the reporting is done with subtle undertones and overtones. The editorial comment is scrupulously kept out; he works entirely by suggestion and implication, by the use of evocative symbols to elicit a response which is definitely moral.

The symbols which he uses, however, are seldom literary and conventional; they are symbols derived from nature. The rain plays an important part in the novel; it is a symbol of disaster. The retreat at Caparitto, the escape of the lovers to Switzerland, Catherine's death — they are all accompanied by rain. Catherine is

'afraid of the rain because sometimes I see me dead in it.' Hemingway can effectively use his landscape to convey emotions of repulsion and pleasure. Thus he uses the landscape to build up an atmosphere of loneliness, fear, disgust and weariness, from which the reader recoils with horror. The reader finds himself in full sympathy with Henry's desertion which is symbolic of his own protest against war — its futility, its corrupt and demoralizing influence on human behaviour, manifested most sharply in the progressive degeneration of the Surgeon Rinaldi. And the reader finds himself in the fullest sympathy with Henry when, like Nick Adams, he makes his 'separate peace'. But Henry's desertion is not a mere gesture of protest and rejection. It is at the same time an effort on the part of the lovers to fulfil themselves; their lyric passion is an assertion of life and its moral value.

The other significant novel which belongs to what I have called the negative phase in his development, *The Sun Also Rises*, is an accurate portrait of the lost generation. It is a study in social disruption that followed the first world war. It sums up admirably the plight of a whole generation — their ennui, their frustration, their emotional exhaustion which is everywhere implicitly condemned. You have here the same symbolic contrast between mountain and plain, the beautiful mountain landscape contrasted with the bitter, degenerate people inhabiting the plains. Prostitution, drunkenness, violence play a large part here, as they do in *A Farewell to Arms*, but the decent characters reject this life. The fishing trip which Jake and Bill decide upon while Cohn is preparing expectantly to meet Lady Bret Ashley, the Circe of the novel, who turns men into swine, symbolizes an escape to nature from civilization and decadence. If Cohn, Mike, and Bret are emotionally and spiritually diseased, Jake, Bill and Romero represent an element of sanity; they believe in the virtue of loyalty and solidarity; above all they are learning to love in the face of disaster with courage and honesty.

Thus we see that in this early phase, Hemingway is depicting the world overshadowed by war, violence and death. But it is a world which Hemingway does not accept. There is throughout these two novels an implicit condemnation of the senselessness and brutality of war and the futility of seeking an escape from this world into drink and dissipation. Both Jake Barnes and Henry made a heroic effort to dedicate themselves to a cause, to something that transcends the nothingness of the world in which they find themselves. They are both defeated in the end and that, Hemingway seems to say, is the tragedy of modern life, for them no less than for countless people caught in the toils of pain and suffering for which the responsibility is not theirs.

To dismiss Hemingway, on the basis of this early work, as a pure nihilist, denying all moral values, is entirely to misinterpret him. If Hemingway is preoccupied with pain and violence, it is because no sensitive mind of his generation could possibly fail to be shocked by the impasse of his time and truthfully to record the tragic experience of a whole generation. The fact that he should be preoccupied with the fate of the individual in a world whose every accent is tortured with pain and suffering shows that as a writer Hemingway is essentially a moralist. This, in fact, is the source of the strength, vitality and significance of *The Sun Also Rises* and *A Farewell to Arms*, which will survive among the classics of our time.

However, the important thing is that Hemingway did not get stuck here. The thirties were a turning point in his career, and he moved on by gradual steps to an acceptance of a few positive values which are unmistakably implicit in his later works, particularly in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* and *The Old Man and the Sea*. Another novel of his, published in 1936, the year in which the civil war began, *To Have and Have Not*, represents a transition from the earlier to the later phase. Here, after the lapse of many years, Hemingway returns to the American

scene, and concerns himself with social problems. This novel is a study of the Great Depression of the thirties; it presents in a masterly manner the social confusion of the time. Though not one of his best novels — it has serious structural defects — it carries with it marked undertones of revulsion at the decay and disease in the social organism. But Hemingway presents the social tensions in personal and dramatic terms which accounts for the superiority of the novel to many other novels of this period which are mere propagandist tracts. And the book carries with it the important message, spoken by Harry Morgan, as he lay dying: 'No matter how a man alone ain't got no chance.' It thus marks a turning point in his career and anticipates the ethical theme of *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, that man cannot stand alone; that only in union with other men can he find the strength to face up to evil.

For Whom the Bell Tolls coincides with the phase, in Hemingway's own life, of a kind of commitment to a cause, the cause of Republican Spain whose betrayal by the Fascist powers sent a thrill of horror throughout the civilized world and awakened the writer's conscience as nothing else had done since World War I. The writer, both in Europe and America, woke up to his social responsibility. As a war correspondent, Hemingway had known at first hand the struggle for power in Europe and the post-war machinations of European diplomats. He had by now become sufficiently aware of the implications inherent in Fascism. In his address to the Second American Writer's Congress in New York City in 1937, he said, 'There is only one form of Government that cannot produce good writers, and that system is Fascism. For Fascism is a lie told by bullies. A writer who will not lie cannot live and work under Fascism.' Like many European writers of the avant garde, he wholeheartedly espoused the Republican cause. Both in his play *Fifth Column* and in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, he is deeply concerned with politics and with showing its effects on individual lives. But he was

ever on his guard against confusing the writer's job with that of the propagandist. The remarkable thing about this novel is that he has succeeded in maintaining a fine balance. He is far too honest an artist to seek to gloss over the weaknesses of his own side or the excesses committed by them. He has seen the idealism which inspired the volunteers in the International Brigade as also the cruelty displayed on both sides. He does not hesitate to show the inner dissensions in the Popular Front or the mixed motives that actuated many of its leaders. But his artistic neutrality is seen most clearly in the account Pillar gives of the massacre of the leading citizens of a town by Pablo and his mob; the reader is made to share her sense of horror and disgust at the senseless brutality of mass-slaughter. He presents the political and philosophical issues not as contrasts of black and white; his characters are not stereotypes of vice and virtue, but human beings actuated by mixed motives. In the final analysis, it is their human motivations and the human values, going beyond political affiliations, which sustain the interest and appeal of *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. In this novel Hemingway has moved forward from his early attitude of isolation. The themes of his earlier phase recur here; there is the same preoccupation with violence and death. But a new element has appeared — the acceptance or affirmation of a few values, chief among them being constancy and loyalty in human relationships. The title itself, borrowed from Donne, is significant and does full justice to the central theme: 'any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind.' And the final impression yielded is one of love and sacrifice, of courage and heroism, that triumphs over death.

But his most affirmative work is *The Old Man and the Sea*, his last published novel which asserts the dignity of the human spirit; it affirms man's courage and endurance in his struggle with fate. The hero is an old fisherman, who after a long spell of inactivity and bad luck, sails far out on the Gulf Stream and succeeds in hooking a

giant marlin. But the fish proves too big for his strength and for his small skiff. And for three days and two nights he sails back and forth, enduring the scorching heat of the sun and the chill of the night, struggling first with the fish, then with the sharks who attack the fish and bit by bit tear away the flesh. When he reaches the harbour, all he has left is a head and a bare skeleton. Santiago knows that he has been defeated; but even in his defeat he has wrested a moral victory. Physically he is worn out—'Something in his chest was broken'—but spiritually he remains undefeated; he has lost neither courage nor hope.

It is a magnificent story, told with amazing intensity and vividness. But the real power of the narrative lies in its symbolic meaning. It has rightly been interpreted as a parable on 'fighting the good fight'. Never before in his writing had the two levels—the literal and the symbolic—become so completely fused. The true meaning of the parable is to be found in the words of Santiago: 'But man is not made for defeat. A man can be destroyed but not defeated.' These words seem to echo the view of Thomas Mann that 'to be poised against fatality, to meet adverse conditions gracefully, is more than simple endurance; it is an act of aggression, a positive triumph.'

It will thus be seen that as a writer Hemingway is essentially a moralist. He works in his art by implication rather than by explication, and his writing is rich in

symbolic suggestiveness. Even when he is writing with the utmost detachment and objectivity, intent on recording his experience with perfect fidelity, his work is not devoid of moral implications. Rather he is eliciting all the time from the discerning reader a response that is essentially moral. The Hemingway code, by which his heroes live, is one of courage, honesty, and a determination to live head high in the face of adversity. And, as Carlos Baker has put it, 'with the endurance and acceptance comes a recognition of the necessity of right action for the soul's sake, the counsel of freedom from perturbation and fear, and the constantly renewed assertion of the complete independence of the inner self.'

It was this moral aspect of his work that the President of the Swedish Academy stressed to justify the award of the Nobel Prize to Hemingway. He referred to 'a heroic pathos which forms the basic element in his awareness of life and a natural admiration of every individual who fights the good fight in a world of reality overshadowed by violence and death.—He is one of the great writers of our time, one of those who, honestly and undauntedly, reproduces the genuine features of the hard countenance of this age.' Hemingway has indeed given in his work a faithful transcription of the hard reality of his age. But at the same time his art is profoundly original and meaningful. It is rich in symbolic suggestiveness and firmly rooted in moral values. Herein lies Hemingway's triumph as an artist.

The Image of a Nation

BASUDHA CHAKRAVARTY

THE national emergency is widely regarded as having made us self-aware as a nation. It is believed to have brought out the fundamental unity that exists within the nation in as much as what appeared to be problems of national integration disappeared in the wake of the danger posed by foreign invasion. That claim may be regarded as valid in as much as even the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam abandoned its secessionist programme of Dravidistan for which, it might be supposed, danger to India provided an opportunity just as at one time England's danger was said to be Ireland's and sometimes looked like being India's opportunity. That party discovered somewhat paradoxically that Dravidistan was not possible without the security and integrity of India as a whole: that the programme would have no future if the Chinese obtained a foothold even in distant Assam. Basically indeed there was no danger of disintegration at all. What looked like disintegration was a frightful fight for integration. Every State, every class, every community—linguistic or otherwise—claimed what it thought a worthy place in developing, emergent India. These tendencies even reappear at what seems recession of danger from outside. But the claim to national awareness has been justified. National self-awareness is patriotism and the content of patriotism is, generally speaking, nationalism.

It is necessary to probe further into the content of nationalism. Nationalism presupposes that we take the nation and our membership of it seriously. If we have done that, we must have accomplished, at least partially, the philosophical revolution which M. N. Roy considered an essential

pre-condition of the nation coming in to its own. The national emergency makes it possible for us to focus a light on ourselves from the angle of philosophical revolution. Asceticism is supposed to be in the way of our taking earthly life, which includes national and social life, seriously. It did not however inhibit our struggle for national freedom to which Mahatma Gandhi brought the spirit of his famous words:

'The cave-dweller builds castles in the air but a dweller in a palace like Janaka has no castles to build.... I want to identify myself with everything that lives.'

Rather, asceticism in the sense of discipline as adumbrated in the Gita, moulded revolutionary ideology. It is doubtful if the ascetic image that we have built of ourselves, is not merely an achievement of spiritual salesmanship. The English poet writes of the oriental seer who just looks at passing hordes and plunges into his meditations again. Many a foreign visitor paints us as ready at any moment to throw the world away and repair to seclusion. The image hardly fits into the frantic hunt for sordid self-interest which goes on all over the country on the individual as well as on the social plane and supplies grist to the mill of our self-pity as corrupt, nepotist and black-marketeer. Yet the collective being often transcends the individual and the Hindu mind does retain a streak of the other worldliness that has been instilled into it through the ages in an effort to limit its involvement in concerns of this world. That has not however dimmed the national image in which he has been placed. Even as early

as the Vedas Bharatavarsha was the Indian's eternal home, and fears of national disintegration ignore the geographic, ethnic and spiritual unity embodied in Bharat. As the Puranas say:

*Atrapi Bharatam srestham
jambudvipe mahamune
Gayanti devah kile gitakani
dhanyastu te Bharata bhumi bhage
Uttaram Yat samudrasya
Himadreshchaiva dakshinam
Varsham tad Bharatam name
Bharati Yatra santatih.*

(Oh great sage! Of these Bharata is the best where it is said the gods sing songs. Blessed are those who (live) in this region of the land of Bharata.

That Varsha is known as Bharata which lies to the north of the sea and to the south of the Himalayas. The natives there are known as Bharati).

But the religious overtone of this integrating factor sets limits to its operation which have to be taken seriously into account.

It is necessary to note here that the philosophical revolution stressed by M. N. Roy was not confined to the need for freedom of the popular mind from unconcern for worldly affairs. Its scope extended to release of that mind from the trammels of authoritarianism and fatalism which shelter obscurantism of various sorts, thus stunting and thwarting the peoples' self-expression. Authoritarianism operating through a hierarchy of spiritual authorities, both divine and human, lays the people under perpetual submission. Fatalism which is an offshoot of pre-destination, of which the arbiter is supernatural authority, inhibits all human effort at self-assertion. So the people are unable to rise to their full stature and to work themselves up to the freedom, both mental and material, that is potentially theirs. M. N. Roy arrived by scientific reasoning at denial of all supernatural authority and drew upon the primordial declaration of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things, for his

philosophy of Radical Humanism. But a philosophical revolution with a complete canvas of that nature cannot be regarded as a precondition of a mere sense of national freedom. Ever since it broke through the Holy Roman Empire nationalism has proved itself sustainable even by obscurantist social philosophies though perhaps these latter are likely to be found wanting in a world set on a career of scientific progress. It thrived for a time even on such antitheses of freedom as Nazism and Fascism. So nationalism is safe even in the orbit of reactionary philosophy. There it loses its progressive content and is allied to reaction. There it is the much condemned narrow, aggressive nationalism.

Also the internationalism of communism in theory has not detracted from nationalism as the base of communism in power. Communism disowns nationalism, sometimes cutting across the integrity of national states, only when it is in opposition to the national democratic or capitalist state. Communism in power appears as ultra-nationalist. A big communist state even claims small communist states to be within its orbit if that is in its political, economic and strategic interest. So it happened that the Communist International, while it lasted, was subject to Soviet foreign policy. Communist states of Eastern Europe move within the Soviet orbit. Communist China seeks to dominate not only communist but even small non-communist countries in adjacent areas. So nationalism is basically in no danger from communism.

Here of course communism faces a contradiction within itself. Its professed basis is materialism which connotes a philosophical revolution. But faced with the exigencies of political power it fails to carry that revolution through. Even basically it has not developed a character independent of time and clime but partakes of the environment of the particular time and clime in which it is placed. This would explain the present ideological differences between Soviet Russia and Communist China. As Lewis Mumford has said, just as religions

of the world have not retained their pristine purity but have lent themselves to various interpretations at the same time as they have developed vested interests, so communism is diluted by the social and political environment, both national and international, and stops short of the mental revolution that could enable man to exert himself to attain complete freedom. This is quite evident from communism in power which invokes a political and social purpose in order to subject the individual to a total political authority. That certainly is an anti-climax for a creed that promised to release man from his chains, and requires to be explained. For that it is necessary to go deeper into the fact that Communism came to power when it did not riding on the crest of a philosophical revolution but by a physical revolution which, according to the doctrine of reality before idea, is supposed to have been followed by an ideological revolution. But the ideological revolution also is useful only as sub-serving the cause of physical revolution and in giving it a stable and solid basis. The philosophical revolution and the upset it must cause the fundamental approach to life do not seem to occupy an important place in the communist scheme. Rather it is kept in the background in order to make possible the expedient tactics of humouring the religious proclivities of the various sections of the people if only in the name of sympathetic participation in their festivals. Witness the wail in the communist press over the peoples's supposed inability to enjoy their festivals owing to high prices and all that. Even if such lament be sincere, it shows that scientific orientation of the people's minds is obviously not on the communist party programme. That programme is content to cast the popular mind into a firm ideological pattern. It would rather stop short of the philosophical revolution which would inevitably challenge the authoritarian character of the communist regime. For the people, emancipated from supernatural authority, would naturally not willingly accept the totalitarian claims of a party government.

They would question the *raison d'être* of the all-embracing authority of a human agency in place of the authority of God. So communism in power imposes on the people a thought-pattern best suited to and limited by its interest. It is not concerned to disturb nationalism. Rather it invokes nationalism when it thinks it needs to. Thus did Soviet Russia re-install the national images of Czarist times in order to strengthen defence against Nazi invasion.

Humanism sometimes opposes nationalism on the score of the latter setting up barriers between nations; but being more of a philosophical than a political creed its opposition is confined to the academic level. It has not yet received concrete political or social shape. Even so it is likely to break its head against nationalism which, to quote Lewis Mumford again, 'may be defined as the bond of common purpose that unites those who have the same language, the same background of nature, the same rituals of life; one or more of these is necessary, but the patch of earth is all but indispensable, if only to serve as a common ground in the imagination—and a common speech, a dialect if not a language, is part of it. Clusters of emotion form about such ways and objects, and nationalism overcompensated for the general neglect of emotion by giving it full sway.

'Now the individuality of groups of men is as genuine a fact as personality itself . . . the sense of group identity preserved and fortified through historic memories is the very essence of nationality. This was true before nationalism had taken on a political role; it will remain true, though the apparatus of democratic political life be shattered. He who uproots nationality kills personality.'

Nationalism in the chauvinistic or aggressive sense is by now sufficiently discredited not to need additional denigration by humanism. National barriers are out of place in human values, but nationalism in the positive sense is the base of international society. Men and women

have their immediate lives determined and sustained by memories and traditions of the nation to which they belong. Even conceding that nationalism is out of place in the context of humanity at large, it cannot be ruled out of existence until the emergence of an operative organism for humanity. Imperialism has been on the decline since the end of the Second World War and objectively it is a spent force. But it has had and still has to be taken into account in places where it has been and is still alive and active such as in vast areas of Africa, and in Goa where we had to take active measures to put it to an end. So nationalism still operates against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. It proved its validity by rising against communist colonialism in Hungary. Apart from its political significance it is a yearning for the collective expression, fulfilment and realization of a geographical-linguistic group every member of which looks for his or her own fulfilment in the nation. So nations are units of the world community of man. They are realities that cannot be by-passed in a sweep of humanist idealism. Nationalism is the trait of a nation and is a component of humanism so long as it does not transgress internationalism. Pending realization of a world entity nationalism is the shelter and security of a people. Danger to the nation becomes in this context personal danger to everybody within it. So everybody rallies to the nation. In the same way the Indian people have rallied to defence against foreign aggression.

Now the nationalism evoked by national danger needs to be given a close look. For, it is a denominator of the real state of our nation and must certainly reflect the strength as also the weakness of our national being. The feeling of unity that has been aroused undoubtedly comprises the different races and regions of the land. This is often facetiously attributed to the administrative unity forged by British rule. While that is true so far as it goes, the sentimental crust of that unity was built up by the common trials, sufferings and

ordeals of the fight for freedom from that rule. Also national planning and development without which the requirements of regional progress cannot be met, help the developing process of unity. But the emotional appeal of that unity largely rests on the Hindu religious background. This is best evident from what are the most intimate avenues of the people's self-expression—namely, poetry and literature. Spontaneously they have reflected Hindu history and ideology as the mainspring of our inspiration—particularly because emotion rather than intellectual perception conveys such inspiration in times of danger. The jingling of the temple bell from time immemorial, the abiding message of the Gita and the consciousness of a tradition of religiosity through the ages, are the sources of our strength in defending ourselves against the invader. They are even poised against the atheistic character of the aggressor. That perhaps explains the admitted accession of strength to what are called Rightist political parties, particularly those with a religio-communal emphasis. The debunking of the parties called Leftist is the political factor that has contributed to this development. The communists have stultified themselves by transgressing nationalism and those other leftist parties who had opportunist alliances with the communists as against the ruling party, have failed to command enough credentials to stand on their own. This has helped the rightists, but their real strength is what they call the religio-cultural spirit of India. They accuse the ruling party which stands by secular nationalism, of departing from that spirit. But secular nationalism at once maintains the country's political balance and keeps the path open for cultural synthesis among the various racial, religious and linguistic groups inhabiting the land. It has held its own against what has always been the challenge of religious nationalism. But it cannot be gainsaid that the nationalist reaction to the country's danger from foreign aggression is largely tinged by Hindu tradition and offers no evidence of

the synthetic strength which is the object and claim of secular nationalism. Non-Hindu communities are taken for granted; they may actively come to the aid of national defence or they may not: either way, it seems, it would not much matter. Only they must not hamper national strength, and since at this stage of India's post-independence history that seems assured, no more is required. Just as in a family danger there are some people who are tolerated on the fringe but are neither taken into full confidence nor expected to undertake much obligation, so the emotional set-up at India's present danger seems oriented by the majority community. There have been even complaints not, it is hoped, very wide or substantial, of the minority communities, particularly Muslims, being left out of the tasks of national preparedness. Emotionally, however, the overall picture does bring into view the lags and imperfections of nationalism.

Nationalism is up against the same problem of integration that dogged it before the national danger arose. But there is a change: the problem is not one of disintegration as was feared before. The national danger has shown that fear to be unreal. But it has also shown that positive integration is not yet, that religious minorities remain where they are, even communal parties have to solicit their votes but nevertheless they are not yet quite a part of the national being. So their integration is still of a negative nature. It might be suggested that there is no question of communities as such becoming parts of the national being, but individuals, whatever the communities they come from, constitute the nation. That would be all right and quite idealistic, did persons of particular religious communities not find themselves treated in a casual manner and were they not just tolerated and sometimes not even that. Integration must be organic, not merely conditioned by tolerance or generosity. If Indian nationhood lacks organic integration, it is only in terms of the religious communities subsisting within the nation.

That deficiency of nationhood has necessarily to be traced to the ages. However much we may rationalize it as due to our industrial backwardness or retardation of industrial development by foreign rule, the dominance of religious-communal strands in our national life appears as a stark fact often glorified into a pretension of India being, of all countries, most steeped in religion. That explains why even Mahatma Gandhi could not neutralize the appearance of Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah—and more than that, why the Mahatma had to risk his life to fight segregation of a section of his own community, why ultimately obscurantist forces in his own community struck him down. Even now these forces vaunt a sort of primordial fervour and even suspicions of offence to Islam send crowds seeking Jihad along city streets. T. S. Eliot in his *Notes on Culture* has traced the origin of all cultures to religion and the Indian nationalist's pride in the synthetic essence of culture must, it seems, own that the synthesis has been only on the fringes—in certain sectors of manifestation such as art, poetry and architecture. Much is made of the syncretic achievement of medieval Indian culture of which Kabir is believed to have been the central figure and Amir Khusrau a magnificent interpreter. It is supposed to have been the result of the impact of Islam upon Hinduism and such impact always helps realization of common human values. Yet the fact remains that the attempt at religious synthesis made at the time grievously failed and its cultural influence did not extend to ritualistic religion which subsequently supplied to divisive politics the strength of communalism. That was why all political palliatives failed and the whole story of efforts, mistakes and failures at inter-communal adjustment boils down to the fundamental maladjustment which the ups and downs of political history rotating round Hindu and Muslim reigns and then veering to alternative alignment with foreign rule, had only accentuated. Attempts at patches and compromises necessarily failed. Pan-

Islamism was a continuing demand on the Muslim mind. Abul Kalam Azad's zeal for the resurgence of Islam did not take long to recognize its pre-condition in national freedom, but in its consequent secular orientation fell a victim to communal divergence within the nation and was branded as a surrender to Gandhian eclecticism. The rot is so deep that even after sixteen years of secular freedom communalism can be successfully played in elections. One's real self is best known in danger and the national image in the light of danger appears intense but in parts, pale.

Of course it is simply not true that the lives of the two communities have been through the ages without points of contact. They have certainly commingled in the realms of art and culture as poetry and classical music amply testify. Social contacts in the villages have been real. Yet the political antagonism which developed between the conqueror and the conquered did not cease when both fell under a foreign conqueror. Except in brief interludes—perhaps there was not more than one such—when the two considered their aims and aspirations to be the same, the reactions of the two to foreign rule oscillated and differed until Muslim separatism split with Indian nationalism. The latter was unable to contain the former less due to inadequate political skill than to the momentum the former had gathered out of its historical background. Separatism was also the last resort of the Muslim community in the crisis of confidence caused not only by its minority position but by lack in recent centuries of enough material and intellectual achievement whereby to build up an edifice of strength through self-assurance. The community reacted to its loss of rule over the country by retiring within its shell and for about a century refusing modern education. It was so much concerned to preserve what it considered to be the only thing left to it—namely its religious distinctiveness, that it refused to recognize talent even within itself if and when that talent appeared to be insuffi-

ciently harnessed to the cause of Islam. So it was that Nazrul Islam was for years disowned by the community in which he had been born, and a school of rational thinking that centred round him at Dacca was virtually treated as out-caste. So Muslim separatism carved a homeland for itself in Pakistan and did not end with that as is evident from the tortuous relations between the two countries. These relations have now been projected into international relations where India's enemy has reached the status of being Pakistan's friend. The resultant psychological barrier corrodes even residual social and personal relations between the two peoples.

However regrettable all this may be, it is a lesser calamity than that Indian nationhood has not yet absorbed the cultural and spiritual perceptions of all the communities of which it is composed. To put it bluntly, Indian nationhood has not yet outgrown Hindu nationalism to attain a real, secular, tangible national entity. There are political and social forces opposed to such growth and as noticed above, in view of the fact that we have had in a time of national danger to sustain ourselves by our past heritage, these forces have, due to the lack of an integrated national heritage, gained strength from the spiritual and material urgencies of the situation. All the more so because defence against the atheist—materialist invader has invoked faith in God, which in view of the lack of an integrated understanding among the religions of the country, has leant heavily on the religion of the majority community. It need hardly be added that popular understanding has nowhere reached humanism which alone could face up to a creed that, derived out of the same materialist premises, has grown into a standing peril to all human values. Defence against the communist invader has inevitably developed this dimension, though attempts have been made by, among others, the Prime Minister himself, to evaluate the invasion as mere expansionism. He has sought to disown the idea that defence against China means defence

of democracy against communism though in more lucid moments he has said that the Chinese intention is to destroy our democracy, our foreign policy of non-alignment and our economic progress. Bearing in mind China's view of the world relation of forces, involving serious differences with Soviet Russia, her aggression on India must mean all these things, and the inherent momentum of it can be checked only by proportionate and adequate defence. Again the refreshing distinction sometimes made and asked to be made between the Chinese people and their Government has no practical value, for it is not merely communists who would scoff at the idea that the Chinese people are not behind their Government. Even the Nationalist Chinese regime at Formosa supports the stand of the Peking Government on the Sino-Indian boundary issue, though professing to dislike the latter's methods for forcing a decision. We are also asked to remember China's inheritance of an ancient civilization—something we are certainly not likely to forget, if only because we have been in not unfruitful contact with that civilization from very early times to the most recent. But the question why the people of China should have allowed all the values of that civilization and its outside contacts to go by the board, is passed over in silence. In this context indeed our defence must draw on all the spiritual, moral, cultural and material resources of the nation to be massive in strength, majestic but dignified in self-assurance. This should not be difficult because the impact of sudden, massive and treacherous, invasion has been strong enough to make us stand up in a mighty resolve to face up to the invader, getting rid of the long-nourished inhibition of non-violence and tortuously realizing, even after the end of the initial emotional upsurge, the full requirements, mental and material, of the defence of liberty and freedom. Perhaps the hour of historical

integration of our nation is now. It is the beginning of our destiny.

Indian nationalism did not admit the two-nation theory but had to accept the secession of Muslim-majority areas largely on the principle of communal self-determination. Adherents of Indian nationalism and Muslim nationalism chose their respective countries by compulsion of events or of their own will. It is up to secular nationalism to integrate the residual Indian people into a homogenous entity. For that purpose it must not only transcend Hindu nationalism but neutralize the residue of communal nationalism in minority communities. It is not always realized that the continuing lack of normal relations with the country formed by secession impedes, due to action and reaction of communal nationalism, the process of internal integration though in theory the two processes might and should remain apart. Politics overshadows and impedes the cultural assimilation of the secession which closed a chapter of our history. Its final consummation would be its proper emplacement in the history of India which through the architectural, sculptural, musical or literary links cast throughout the country haunts devout Indians with a sense of ageless mystery.

They feel they have something supreme in common and even media of contact like a common language are not absolutely necessary. The Bengali or Assamese pilgrim to South Indian temples does not feel hampered by lack of knowledge of the local language; he feels the temples to be as much his own as the local people's. The English language has certainly given the English-educated community a vast dimension of common political and social feeling. Yet it is not material to the primeval perception among the masses of belonging to a land which traces the stream of life to pre-history and has been enlivened by waves of foreign contact which have left their abiding impress on community life.

CURRENT POLITICS

The Inevitable Revision

(On the seventh anniversary of the Hungarian revolution)

M. TIBOR MERAY

DURING the course of the Sino-Soviet controversy, the Hungarian affair, as was only to be expected, could not be passed over in silence. The Chinese declaration of September 5, which chiefly attracted world attention because it disclosed for the first time a serious frontier dispute that had broken out last year between China and Russia in Central Asia, also added a new element to the history of the Hungarian revolution. Referring to events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, the Chinese comment that 'these two events were different in character, but in both of them the leaders of the Russian Communist Party committed serious mistakes. First, in bringing up their troops and forcing the Polish comrades to submit to armed might, they committed the error of Great Power Chauvinism. Secondly, at the critical moment when the Hungarian counter-revolutionaries had occupied Budapest, they momentarily entertained the idea of capitulating and abandoning socialist Hungary to counter-revolution.'

According to the Peking document, it was thanks to Chinese intervention that the Russians finally adopted harsh measures to 're-establish order' in Hungary. 'The Chinese Communist Party,' the declaration of September 5 goes on to say, 'resolutely opposed their mistaken methods at the time, and proposed correct suggestions.

The Soviet leaders adopted these proposals (that is to say, they suppressed the Hungarian revolution), but subsequent events have shown that as a result they nursed a feeling of resentment towards the Chinese Communist Party.'

The main interest of the Chinese declaration does not lie in its confirmation (from a Communist source this time) of the theory that there had been a moment during the revolution in Budapest when the Russians would have been prepared to relinquish Hungary. That was more or less known already, although it had never been expressed in such definite terms before. On the occasion of a visit to Hungary on December 2, 1959, at a meeting held in the Budapest factories of 'Ganz-MAVAG' Khrushchev made allusion to the events of October 1956 and declared: 'During those days of peril for the working class of Hungary, we Soviet Communists held discussions to decide how we should come to the help of the working class and people of Hungary. Some of our comrades wondered if the Hungarian comrades would understand our way of coming to their help.' So it is obvious that the Soviet leadership went through a period of indecision, when it was divided over the desirability of armed intervention. Similarly, it is obvious that at the heart of the party leadership it was not the Molotov,

Malenkov, Kaganovitch group (subsequently dubbed 'anti-party') which was against intervention, but Mikoyan and Souslov, who still have a hand in the leadership.

These two Soviet statesmen twice visited Hungary during the revolution. It was they who, on their first visit, fired Gero, the Stalinist first secretary of the Hungarian Party and, on their return, gave their colleagues a fairly objective account of the situation. And it was this account of theirs which inspired the Soviet government's declaration of October 30, 1956 (the key document to the Magyar rising), in which Moscow expressed self-criticism, admitted having violated 'the principle of equality of status among socialist states' and, giving the order for Soviet troops to be evacuated from Budapest, declared herself ready 'to open negotiations with the government of the People's Republic of Hungary and with the governments of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact on the subject of Soviet troops remaining in Hungary.' It was Mikoyan and Souslov again who, on their second visit, assured Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of the revolutionary government, of their absolute confidence in him, guaranteed that no more Soviet troops would cross the Hungarian frontier and accepted the idea of a multi-party political system. In return they demanded one thing only: that the Hungarian leaders safeguard their country's socialist gains and that they prevent Hungary from becoming an anti-Soviet base. Imre Nagy's attitude and his action, which the official Soviet press afterwards continually belaboured as 'treason', are inextricably bound up with Mikoyan and Souslov's promises and with the violation of those promises.

Looking back, it is hard to get rid of the idea that these two Soviet statesmen were only trying to gain time, and that they were quite sure that their undertakings

would not be honoured, even while making them. But however plausible this theory may appear from other evidence, it is contradicted by Khrushchev's declaration quoted above, in which he refers to the 'hesitation' of certain comrades, and by the recent Chinese document, which speaks of the Soviet leadership being ready 'to capitulate'. It is probable that Mikoyan and Souslov had no ulterior motives and were quite sincere in their negotiations with Imre Nagy, Tildy and Kadar, who was then still on the revolutionaries' side. Why then the Soviet government's sudden reversal of policy? And why the complete change of attitude from one day to the next? It is precisely on this point that the Chinese document of September 5 throws some light. Of the explanations hitherto brought forward, the one which seemed most probable (as I tried to show in my book¹ on the Hungarian revolution) was that the Kremlin had recourse to armed force, not as a result of any one single factor, but of a whole series of contributing factors, the Chief of which are as follows:—

1) Fear of the total disintegration of the Soviet empire. From the attitude of the East German Walter Ulbricht, the Czech Zapotoczky and the Bulgarian and Rumanian press, it was quite clear that the leaders of the satellite countries had made it known to Khrushchev that if he did not crush the Hungarian revolution, they could give no assurances of being able to retain power in their own countries.

2) The pressure Molotov and his friends exercised at the heart of the Soviet leadership. These inveterate Stalinists could point out to Khrushchev, quite rightly, that the events in Hungary would never have happened but for the XXth Party Congress, and make him responsible for all further aggravation of the situation.

3) The stand taken by the Soviet military leaders, who doubtless were not prepared to give up their bases in Hungary and withdraw 'defeated' from a country of scarcely 10,000,000 inhabitants.

4) The Suez affair which was dividing

¹ *Imre Nagy, l'homme trahi*, Julliard, Paris, 1960; Praeger, New York; Thames and Hudson, London; Langen - Müller, Munich.

the attention of world opinion, and even dividing the great Western powers.

5) The fact that the United States happened to be on the eve of a presidential election, which would have hampered Eisenhower's freedom of action even if, on other counts, he had been prepared to act.

The result was a situation in which all the objective factors, without exception, favoured armed intervention, and to which there was only one objection, a mere question of morality: the breaking of a promise. And now the Chinese have added a new element to a case that was already well-documented: it was upon their advice that intervention was adopted. It is possible that they exaggerate the importance of their rôle a little, since the factors we have listed could have carried weight without them. Nevertheless, the position adopted by the Chinese could have swayed the balance if there still remained any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders.

It was no secret that the Chinese had made sinister contributions to the consolidation of the Soviet occupation of Hungary (one has only to think of Chou En-Lai's visit to Hungary in January 1957, and the corrosive speeches he made there), nor that they had had an overwhelming influence in the matter of the execution of Imre Nagy ('The death sentence passed on the ring-leader of the Hungarian counter-revolution is a good piece of news'—headline in *The People's Daily*, June 18, 1958). But until they published this recent declaration, it could not be proved that they had also had a hand in the decision to intervene on November 4, 1956; on the contrary, there were indications that they were in sympathy with the Hungarian revolution, and with less reservation than the 'liberals' at the Kremlin.

On November 1, 1956, the government of the Chinese People's Republic published a communique dealing with the Soviet government's declaration of October 30. It exposed errors committed in relations between socialist countries which were able

to cause misunderstanding and mistrust, and declared: 'During the course of recent events, the Polish and Hungarian peoples have demanded the consolidation of democracy, independence and equality, and the increase of the material wealth of the people on the basis of development of production. The government of the People's Republic of China consider these claims to be just; given the ideological unity between socialist countries, and their common aims in the struggle, it can easily happen, and often does, that certain countries neglect the principle of equality of status between socialist countries. Such an error is the fundamental error of bourgeois chauvinism. It is the error of great power chauvinism.'

This declaration of solidarity with the Polish and Hungarian peoples in their claims showed that Peking wanted to take immediate advantage of the events in Budapest and Warsaw in order to level at the Russians for the first time the accusation which they now repeat incessantly: that of bourgeois chauvinism, or great power chauvinism. The declaration was transmitted from Peking by Tass agency on November 2 (i.e. hardly forty-eight hours before armed intervention took place in Hungary). If it is true that it was the Chinese Communists who persuaded the Soviet leaders to intervene, as they now maintain, and as we have no reason to doubt they did, considering the evidence mentioned above, it could have been done only on November 2 at the earliest, the Friday before the tragic Sunday. It is a disquieting detail, which shows that the Hungarian revolution had every chance of triumphing, and that the decision to crush it was only taken at the last moment.

Moscow has not yet replied to the passage in the Chinese declaration dealing with the Hungarian revolution. Will a reply be given some day? Or will it be found more convenient to avoid it? By claiming for themselves the glory of having inspired armed intervention in 1956, the Chinese Communists do Khrushchev a service vis-a-vis public opinion in the West

and even in Hungary, Poland and the other popular democracies. They help him to clear himself a little of the darkest stain in Soviet history since Stalin's death, the suppression of the Hungarian revolution with bloodshed. If Khrushchev really was willing to let Hungary quit the Eastern bloc, and if it was only at Peking's request that he crushed the Hungarian uprising with his tanks, he could be absolved from at least part of the responsibility for this monstrous act.

The interesting point, however, is not whether the Soviet leaders are going to refute the Chinese accusation, but whether they actually intend to accept it and all that it implies. Will they be prepared sooner or later to tell the world that they intervened in Hungary only reluctantly and under pressure from China? Will they be prepared to take the first step, however painful it may be, towards reinstating the Hungarian revolutionary movement? And yet it is very unlikely that they will take such a step in the near future, since in taking it, despite all their adroitness, they would have to back down themselves. It may be that before that happens we shall have to wait for a new generation of leaders at the kremlin. But it is certain that the policy of rapprochement with the West and conciliation in Central Europe will at every turn come up against the problem of revision of the Hungarian revolution.

All the more so when we see how easy it is, with a few common sense questions, to unmask the absurdity, the contradictions and the temporary nature of the present official line.

If it is true that the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and the execution of Imre Nagy were demanded by the Chinese Communists, men, in fact, who have since been shown to be 'adventurers', 'madmen', 'abettors of atomic warfare', aiming at 'the deaths of millions of men', isn't it possible to suggest that even at the time of the Hungarian revolution they were bad counsellors for the Soviet Union? And if the Yugoslavs gave Imre

Nagy asylum and protested against his execution—the same Yugoslavs who have since been declared 'true Communists', 'responsible peace-lovers', 'constructors of socialism'—would it be beyond the realms of possibility that on this question also they were right, even five years ago?

One of the chief accusations brought against the Hungarian revolution was that 'it had liquidated the organs directing the economy and set up in their place the so-called workers' councils in order to deceive the working class.' (Extract from the reasons adduced in the condemnation of Imre Nagy). A few weeks ago, during his visit to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev admitted before the workers' council at Rakovica factory that 'the Soviet economy's system of management had become a little antiquated.' He adjudged the workers' councils 'a progressivist institution', and he added: 'This institution will have to be closely studied to see if it may not be in accord with the principles of Soviet labour organization.' Is it still possible to maintain, after such a declaration, that the Hungarian workers' councils were set up in order to deceive the working class?

One of the capital charges brought against Imre Nagy was that in January 1956 (i.e. well before the outbreak of revolution) he had written an article in which he had advocated the renunciation of the 'bloc' policy. The accusation was well-founded. In an essay entitled 'The five Principles of International Relations', Imre Nagy had in fact written the following sentences: 'For a little country like Hungary, it is vital that her situation with regard to international relations be correctly defined. The country should hold fast by every possible means to the preservation of peace. She should avoid taking active part in the conflicts between the great power blocs, being forced into war or becoming a theatre of war or military base, and the country should be assured of her sovereign right to make her own decisions upon all these matters. Peaceful coexistence between states demands the liquidation of power blocs.'

It so happens that during his recent visit to Belgrade, Khrushchev recognized the right of socialist Yugoslavia to remain outside the 'blocs', which are only, as he declared before international press representatives at Brioni, 'passing phenomena'. How much longer will they continue to call what is now considered the official point of view in Moscow a crime when expressed by Imre Nagy?

It is scarcely seven years since the Hungarian revolution, but the charges

brought against it by its enemies are being knocked down one after the other. No one denies that faults, mistakes and excesses were committed during the revolution; but what event throughout history was ever without any? It is not the people of Hungary who must make the great revision, but those who suppressed her struggle for independence and executed her leaders. Will this revision be painful and even humiliating? Possibly. Can it be postponed? Perhaps. But in the long run it is inevitable.

China and South-East Asia

SUDHANSU BIMAL MOOKHERJI

A STRONG and United China has always been a curse to South-East Asia. Quite early in the Ming period (1368-1644) a series of seven large expeditions between 1405 and 1433 'explored the shores and islands of South-East Asia, penetrated the Indian Ocean, and even went as far west as the Red Sea, trading and enrolling local rulers in the ranks of nominal vassals of the Chinese Emperor'.¹

The Philippines still remembers Limahang, the notorious Chinese pirate king, who tried to seize Manila and intended to use it as a springboard for sweeping upon the coasts of mainland Asia and the Pacific islands.

Other countries of South-East Asia too felt the impact of Chinese expansionism in the past. Chenghiz Khan's grandson Kublai Khan, the first Mongol Emperor and founder of the Yuan Dynasty of China (1273-1368 A.D.), invaded Burma, Cambodia and Champa (in Vietnam). He also sent a punitive expedition to Java because one of its kings had helped Champa in its war against China. Emperor Yung Lo (1403-1424 A.D.) of the Ming Dynasty strengthened China's economic and political relations with her neighbours, specially to the south and the east. Nepal agreed to pay an annual tribute. Three kingdoms in Upper Burma were reduced to vassalage. Annam in modern Vietnam, which had driven out the Chinese in 939 A.D., was re-conquered. A number of tribute-seeking expeditions were sent to the south.

No South-East Asian country has, however, suffered so much and so frequently at the hands of China as Annam, which together with Tonkin in the north and Cochinchina in the south forms the

modern State of Vietnam. The Annamese, constituting 80% of the total Vietnamese population of more or less twenty-six million, are the most important, active, energetic and intelligent racial group in Vietnam. Annam, a 'second Korea' in its historical relations with China, was affiliated to it in one form or another from pre-Christian centuries almost to the end of the 19th century. The earliest Chinese invasion of Annam took place in the closing years of the 3rd century B. C. China conquered Annam in 111 B.C. when the Hans ruled over China. The conquerors re-named Annam and called it An-Nam Do-Ho-Phu, i.e., the Protectorate of the Pacified South. The miseries of the Annamese under the Chinese rule beggar description. The day-to-day administration was left in the hands of overzealous local chiefs, who, in their eagerness to please their Chinese bosses, fleeced the helpless peasantry. Annam was bled white. A systematic campaign of sinicization sought to kill the Annamese soul by destroying the national identity of Annam. The people were cajoled and coerced to study Chinese language and literature and imitate Chinese manners and customs.

The oppression did not long go unchallenged and the first notable Annamese revolt against Chinese rule broke out in 39 A.D. Led by the Trung Tac sisters, the rebels stormed most of the Chinese strongholds in the country. The revolution was put down by the Han general Ma Yuan in 43 A.D. The Trung Tac sisters, who preferred death to dishonour, committed suicide by drowning themselves. China ruled over Annam for the nine hundred years that followed and did everything in her power to wipe out the Annamese

national culture and substitute the Chinese culture for it. The oppressed Annamese again struck in 939 A.D. in what was a full-scale war of national liberation. The Chinese were beaten squarely and fairly on land and on water and forced out of the country. A Chinese attempt to reconquer Annam shortly afterwards was beaten back.

Annam, as noted above, was reconquered by China in 1407 during the reign of the Han Emperor Yung Lo. This was the beginning of one of the darkest periods in the annals of Annam. Ruthless exploitation of the people was the order of the day. Taxes were heavy. Living in abysmal poverty, the people were reduced to helotry. Forced labour in mines and forests and under the sea was their lot. Metals, rare timbers, spices, pearls, precious stones, ivory—everything valuable on the surface of the earth and beneath it and under water—were shipped to China. A well-thought out campaign of sinicization sought to denationalize the people. Chinese became the medium of instruction in schools. Time-honoured customs and religious rites were tabooed. Bonfires were made of books written by Annamese authors. All Annamese national literature was forfeited and sent to China. Thought was regimented. The chewing of betel, a national habit of the Annamese, was made illegal. The Annamese had to carry identity cards.

Chinese rule in Annam came to an end in the 1880's when the French took steps to make it a French protectorate. By the Franco-Chinese Convention of Tientsin, 1885, China agreed to withdraw her troops from Annam and to recognize the French protectorate over it. But no subsequent Chinese government has reconciled itself to the loss of Annam.

Centuries of Chinese rule have left their impress upon Annam. Annamese civilization is essentially Chinese in character and expression. The life of the Annamese people in almost all aspects—architecture, language, family system, political institutions and handicrafts—is influenced by the

traditional culture of the Celestial Kingdom.

If Chinese influence in South-East Asia was great in the past, it is no less so, if not greater, today. Not a few, Prof. Toynbee among them, have declared that the Chinese will one day become the arbiters of the destinies of more or less two hundred million South-East Asians. Others do not agree. That China has economic and perhaps political designs as well on South-East Asia will be readily admitted. That she will ever realize her ambition of hegemony over the region is not so certain. If there are some factors which help Chinese designs on South-East Asia, there are others, and very powerful ones at that, to hinder them.

The prestige of China stands high among the small nations of South-East Asia as 'Asia's only great power and the dispenser of a superior and exemplary civilization'. How small these nations are in comparison with the Chinese becomes clear when it is remembered that even Indonesia, the largest of the countries of South-East Asia, has a population of less than a hundred million as against China's more than six hundred million. The poor performance of India against the Chinese invader in the fall of 1962 has raised Chinese prestige still higher among the nations of South-East Asia. A few of them have been demoralized by the successful demonstration of China's might against the largest democracy in the world. The recent shifts in the foreign policy of Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia and also of Ceylon to some extent, show how afraid they are of China. South-East Asia divided into small states with little love lost among them lacks the racial and religious cohesion of the Arab countries as well as the cultural solidarity of the countries of Latin America. 'Small nations pitted against each other, un-co-ordinated economies, and cultural diversity are all factors which provide opportunities for the type of political manoeuvring in which the Communists are experts'.² Economic factors too are almost sure to

play into the hands of China. The industrially advanced countries of the West are today not so dependant on the surplus primary products of South-East Asia—rice, tin, teak, mineral, oil, lead, wolfram, chromium and spices—as they were in the past. They now use in many cases synthetic products or substitutes which are available more easily nearer home and at lower cost. China, which is advancing into the industrial age with rapid strides, has a serious shortage of these commodities and of many others too. The shortage will grow more and more acute with the increased tempo of China's industrialization. She will be only too glad to take up the whole stock of South-East Asia's exportable surplus of raw materials and utilize the opportunity to tighten her trade relations and strengthen her economic ties with the producer-countries.

It may be noted here that the growth of a free enterprise system is not congenial to South-East Asian tradition and social culture. South-East Asia's small entrepreneurial class is by and large foreign—Chinese, Indian, Japanese and Western. Indigenous small-holders believe—and not without good reasons—that more capitalism will swell the pockets of the bloated landlords and the accursed moneylenders. Communists have successfully exploited the anti-landlord and anti-moneylender sentiments of the South-East Asian small-holders, 'filtering their propaganda through Communist congresses, labour unions and (during World War II) anti-Japanese guerilla movements'. Communists fought as guerillas first against the Japanese invaders and later against the returning Westerners. Thousands have come to look upon them in consequence as the staunchest enemies of political oppression and economic exploitation and as the most genuine friends of nationalism and liberalism.

Last but not least, the presence of large numbers of Chinese in South-East Asia, as noted above, is a trump card in China's hands. About 5.5% of the total population of South-East Asia are of Chinese origin.

Malaya and Singapore with a total population of 7,270,000 (Malaya 6,058,000 and Singapore 1,212,000) have 2,750,000 Chinese residents (45.8% of the total; they account for a little more or less than 80% of the total population of Singapore). About 1,20,000 or 0.6% of the total Filipino population of nearly 22,000,000 are of Chinese origin. Of Thailand 15.5%, Indonesia 3.0%, North and South Vietnam 10%, Cambodia 1.8%, British Borneo and Sarawak 24.4% are Chinese emigrants or their descendants. The figures, the reader will please note, are only approximate.

The Chinese residents provide a direct link between Peking on the one hand and the countries of South-East Asia on the other. They are Peking's potential fifth-column in most of these countries. They are, like the Chinese at home, proud of their race and culture. They stick to the Chinese language and the Chinese way of life even after generations in foreign lands. They are everywhere a well-knit and well-organized community and maintain their own schools, churches and cemeteries. In many places they have their own newspapers as well. Some of them marry native women. But many more perhaps have legally married wives at home and concubines abroad. Substantial funds are regularly remitted home by them—by legal means if possible, illegal if necessary—for their relatives at home. Remittances by overseas Chinese have always been a very important source of foreign exchange for China. This fact alone is reason enough for China's interest in them. The Kuomintang in its revolutionary days depended not a little on financial aid from the Chinese residents overseas. When it came to power, it recognized the latter as a part of the Chinese nation and provided for their representation in the national congresses.

The resident Chinese are strongly entrenched in the economic life of more than one South-East Asian nation. There are very rich rubber and tin magnates, bankers and merchants among them. But

the vast majority are either petty retailers, ill-paid miners or plantation labourers. Smuggling, running bawdy houses, gambling dens, liquor shops and pawn houses and the manufacture of spurious commodities on a large scale are attributed to them in many countries. Industrious in habits, they are thrifty by nature. Their loyalty to China which many of them have never seen is unimpeachable. They act as 'groups in flawless solidarity'.

Discriminatory legislation against foreigners by the nationalist governments of South-East Asian countries in recent years has strengthened their solidarity. The Thailand and the Philippines governments have passed stiff economic measures against middle-men and money-lenders and the resident Chinese are the worst sufferers under these laws as till very recent years they had a virtual monopoly in these fields in both countries. Political disabilities too have been imposed upon them by the above governments. Indonesian legislation against foreign retailers in the late 'fifties has hit the resident Chinese hard. It was intended primarily to force Chinese small traders out of rural areas, townships and small towns.

Chinese residents overseas believe that a strong Chinese government at home and that alone can effectively safeguard their adoption. They are, therefore, willing supporters of such a government and its policies. Red Chinese propaganda exploits this attitude of the Chinese abroad. It has come out with assurances and even solemn promises that Peking will protect their interests. South-East Asian Governments have been warned against the persecution of their Chinese minorities by political and economic discrimination. The Overseas Chinese Committee of the People's Republic of China has organized a 'return to China movement' and offers travel to China, tuition, board and bed and vacations at home—everything free—and many other inducements to Chinese children and youths overseas to return to the fatherland for education. The bait is

alluring, if not irresistible. It offers to the Chinese students overseas the only opportunity of higher education through the Chinese medium—unobtainable anywhere outside China. Little wonder, thousands are eager to return to China either for education or for opportunities to serve the socialist fatherland.

Red China spares no pains to capture the minds of Chinese students in South-East Asian countries. Pro-Communist Chinese teachers in Chinese schools all over South-East Asia receive regular subsidies—as high as 25% of their basic salaries—from Peking. Leftist literature and literature with a pro-China bias are supplied liberally free of cost to Chinese libraries overseas.

The size of Communist groups or cells in the overseas Chinese communities is not by itself of much importance. The very fact of their existence is enough for Peking's political objectives. To quote Levi Werner, 'They can be used to foment unrest and civil strife as in Malaya. . . . They can be used as pioneers for Communist movements as in Thailand. They can be used as contact men with local native Communists as in Burma, Indo-China (Vietnam) and elsewhere. They can always and everywhere be used as the pretext for the interference of the Chinese Government in the affairs of the countries of South-East Asia'.²

Peking has been particularly careful so far to maintain diplomatic etiquette and propriety. Time and again it has proclaimed its willingness to urge the Chinese residents of South-East Asia to respect the laws and customs of the countries of their residence. It has further declared that it does not regard the Chinese abroad as Chinese nationals. The declaration is in fact a propaganda stunt. Red China does not bother about the legal problem of the citizenship of the Chinese overseas. All she cares for is their indoctrination with the Chinese brand of Communism, or Maoism as it is generally called. She also wants to bind them to the Peking regime, which is never tired of its 'propaganda

efforts to bind the overseas Chinese to its Red Star'. They (the Chinese overseas) are intended to be used as agents of the interests of Red China. That they are an insignificant minority—a bare 5.5% of the total South-East Asian population—does not matter much. A well-knit, well-organized, disciplined and determined minority is capable of much greater good or evil than an unorganized or ill-organized majority.

But there are some very real difficulties in the path of Chinese expansion in South-East Asia. Knowledge of past history makes China suspect in its eyes. Besides, the not very old South-East Asian nationalism has all the sensitiveness of adolescence, and is very suspicious of foreigners at the same time. Western imperialism in modern times has done not a little to strengthen the South-East Asian nationalist's suspicion and dislike of foreigners and to heighten his sensitiveness. South-East Asian nationalists look upon Chinese moves with suspicion. The rapprochement between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines over the Malayasian Federation, short-lived as it was, after a lot of sabre-rattling by the first named showed that even the island republic, which been hobnobbing with Red China for a considerable time, had awakened at least for a time to the realities of the situation. China, on her part, however, has spared no pains to allay South-East Asia's fears and suspicions. It was not for nothing that Premier Chou En-lai sought to reassure the small Asian nations assembled at Bandung in 1955 by declaring that Red China would respect their sovereignty.

Non-Communist South-East Asian nationalism 'is underpinned and kept alive by the widespread animosity' against Chinese residents, who, as noted above, are a very powerful factor in the life of South-East Asia. The recent anti-Chinese riots in Java (Indonesia), its large and well-organized Communist party notwithstanding, show that the average Indonesian is no friend of the Chinese. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Communist Party of Indonesia), it may be noted in passing, is the second largest Communist Party in Asia, China alone among the Asian countries having a larger Communist Party than Indonesia. The Indonesian Party is also larger than the Communist Party in any other non-Communist country in the world. Ceylon's recent quit notice on Chinese nationals is perhaps an indication of her dislike and fear of the Chinese colossus.

Islam and Buddhism, the two principal religions of South-East Asia, are both fundamentally opposed to the Marxism of China and are sure to offer stubborn resistance to Marxist Chinese aggression against the region. The S.E.A.T.O. membership of Thailand and the Philippines, two of the South-East Asian countries, is another serious obstacle in the path of Chinese expansion in South-East Asia.

The Free World, however, should note that South-East Asia's malignant poverty offers an ideal opportunity to Communists. This poverty must be removed, for the best and most effective guarantee of the poverty-stricken nations of South-East Asia against China 'lies in the removal of the difficulties barring their transition from an obsolescent to a modern life.'

¹ *Major Governments of Asia* Edited by M. T. Kahin, p. 10.

² *China: Confucian and Communist* by Helmut C. Callis, p. 435.

³ *Modern China's Foreign Policy*.

A R T S

Problems of Contemporary Indian Art

HERMANN GOETZ

ART is the expression of its time — of the taste and ideals, the wordly as well as religious dreams and anxieties both of the artists and their public, the patrons and buyers. For this reason the present economic, social and political upheaval in contemporary Asia has led to a revolution in art and culture no less far-reaching than in the West. And as in the West it has taken the form of a succession of revolutionary and reactionary tendencies, each sustained by a new phase of the social and political development, until overtaken by another, and then sinking down to a shadow existence before finally disappearing.

India too has not been able to escape this fate. Her art was of course never so rigidly fixed as we are often prone to imagine it. It is true that the Indian Middle Ages had championed the thesis that the luxurious art of their massive cathedrals had been established from eternity by the gods. But this canon had only been valid for about a thousand years (i.e. for about as long as Greco-Roman art), had arisen with the feudal system and collapsed with it. On the whole India in the course of the centuries, in spite of many basic common themes determined by the milieu, has known more fundamentally different styles of art than Europe.

The art of the Islamic period had already cut free from the mediaeval tradition. In spite of all the political and religious tensions between the Mohammedan conquer-

ors and the subjugated Hindus, the ways of life of the two classes, at first so completely different from each other, finally became much the same. Whereas Indo-Islamic art began by taking over countless forms and types from Hindu art before becoming gradually Indianised in sensibility and aesthetics, the Hindus on the other hand, after the decline of the artificial court art of the Middle Ages, thrown back on popular tradition and the religious feeling of the people, assimilated Mohammedan manners, forms of architecture and techniques of painting without being clearly aware of it. When in the eighteenth century the Mughul empire fell apart into a confusion of warring states, the differences between rulers and ruled became more pronounced than ever, but they were no longer differences between religions but between successful adventurers and their victims, so that this alone would have brought about the later collapse of feudalism.

The art of that time persisted right up to the end of the nineteenth century—even achieving a second blossoming at the courts of the Indian vassal princes of England. For the less these really had to say, the more they lived out their lives in ceremony, splendour and luxury. For this they naturally drew upon the traditional art, although it was hardly understood any longer, and soon degenerated into empty imitation, effeminate and inexpressive. At the same time European luxury imposed

itself: Western-style castles, oil paintings, enormous mirrors and chandeliers, chiming and grandfather clocks, bronze statuettes. Many of these castles were in a mixed style, essentially based on the outgoing rococo taste of the eighteenth century brought in by French adventurers (above all in Lucknow, Murshidabad, Bhopal, Baroda, Gwalior).

Classicism and 'Babu' Gothic

The English first brought classicism to the country. Its monuments, in thoroughly good taste if not exactly original, mostly commissioned from English and other European artists, are nevertheless almost entirely restricted to the three 'Presidency' capitals – Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Similarly, the earlier Renaissance and Baroque creations of the Portuguese were chiefly to be found in their coastal towns, above all Goa and Bassein. All the same, classicism was imitated at a few Indian courts, above all in Lucknow and Murshidabad. In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the influence of European art became more widespread, now embracing all the other styles since become academic i.e. historically acceptable – even Gothic (e.g. Bombay University). Yet it still remained restricted to English official circles and small groups of princes and merchants closely associated with the English. Hardly a single one of these buildings can be characterised as more than a feeble and for the most part badly proportioned imitation of Western art. Even the Victoria Memorial built out of white marble by Sir William Emerson in Calcutta between 1906 and 1921, has a christmas cake effect, and the same is true of the once often praised Victoria Terminus in Bombay. For most public buildings the so-called 'babu' Gothic was evolved – a dreadful misunderstanding of early English Gothic (which on account of its simpler forms was easier to imitate than Perpendicular).

Of course European sculpture and painting were also taught in the newly founded

schools of art, but found no understanding either. To make matters worse, at that time the Indians knew the masterpieces of European art at best from imperfect reproductions; nor was the time yet ripe to explain these with understanding. The few Indian sculptures of the late nineteenth century are all adaptations of British and French models. Among painters, the Parsee Pestonji Bomanji pictured intimate scenes from the world of his actually Iranian but strongly Europeanised community – scenes which are pleasantly touching even today – but outside Bombay he is as good as unknown.

The fame – and later, consequently, criticism all the sharper – went to Raja Ravivarman, a near relative of the ruling house of Travancore. Ravivarman was an industrious self-taught artist, whose drawing was often uncertain enough, if not downright faulty, but who spared no efforts in adapting to his needs everything he could use in the European models to which he had access. He was not a bad portrait painter, however conventional, and a very productive although seldom attractive painter of historical subjects. When he painted scenes from the life of the Indian people, you could sense his understanding love for this rather narrow world, steeped in ritual and myth but warm and sensual – where the European painters could see nothing beyond the exotic colourful surface, tinged occasionally with a sinister feeling. Ravivarman also painted great cycles of pictures from Hindu mythology and the national epics. Thereby he won his greatest success; for these pictures, reproduced in millions of oleographs, large and small, soon found a place of honour in every Indian home, restaurant, shop, office, bus and railway. And at the same time Ravivarman suffered his greatest defeat. For his gods and heroes remain no more than well-fed bourgeois dressed up for the theatre, soft, effeminate, given to merely toy gestures. Their effect is ludicrous on anyone who has once outgrown such a narrow milieu. And so he became an object of scorn to

the next generation which dictated Indian art in the early twentieth century, the so-called Bengal School.

Even this new national Indian orientation was inspired from Europe, where in the nineteenth century from mere imitation of the styles of all peoples and periods, understanding had slowly grown and it was realized that every style is the expression of a particular cultural form. So too Indian art, previously dismissed as barbarian, was discovered in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Indian Archaeological Survey was established, which restored old buildings disfigured for practical ends, and dug out the early ruins. From the end of the nineteenth century Indian art began to be recognised even in the West as one of the great achievements of mankind thanks to the tireless efforts of E.B. Havell and A. K. Coomaraswamy, as well as to the authoritative support of Sir William Rothenstein and Auguste Rodin. Whereupon the attempt to educate India to follow European art was revealed as absurd.

It was the English themselves who reversed the current, in spite of the opposition not only of the English colonials, but also of the Indians under their influence. From about the 1880s new administrative buildings and palaces began to arise which sought to adapt the moribund architecture of Rajputana to modern ends (F. S. Growse, Sir Swinton Jacob, R. F. Chisholm, etc.). But soon the study of the old buildings led to a preference for the less overlaid architecture of the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries (G. Wittet in Bombay, H. Irvin in Madras, F. C. Oertel in the North Gangetic Plain, Sirdar Ram Singh in the Panjab). The last phase of this style is represented by the administrative palaces of New Delhi constructed between 1911 and 1930 by Sir Edwin Lutyens and Sir Edward Baker; they also incorporate older motifs — for example, the dome of the viceregal palace recalls a Buddhist stupa, and stone balustrades at various places recall the railings

round such stupas. From late in the nineteenth century the habit of collecting Indian miniatures began again (in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they had been brought to Europe like picture postcards), but it was not until 1909 that the Bombay School of Art under E. Gladstone Solomon exhibited a pavilion decorated with 'Indian' paintings, and around 1917 Fyzee Rahamin (S. Samuel, a convert to Islam, and student of Sir John Singer Sargent) painted a few cupolas of the new ministries in New Delhi in a *Jugendstil* interpretation of ancient Indian paintings. Finally the still surviving indigenous arts and crafts — inevitably much contaminated by European influences — were collected in museums, and an attempt was made to revive them by finding new uses for the old designs. The attempt proved as unsatisfactory as most Western arts and crafts of the late nineteenth century.

Romanticism and Tagore

A new phase was brought in by the rise of Indian nationalism, above all by the *swadeshi* movement at the beginning of our century. Passionately the nationalists preached the boycott of foreign goods and the promotion of home industry, the return to national dress and the old customs. But the previous efforts at reform appeared too much bound-up with British imperialism and princely submission. As the German middle classes after the French Revolution turned to the classicism of the old Greek city states and the Roman republic, so the Indian nationalists to the art of their own past before it had been afflicted by foreign domination, or to the genuine folk art as yet undefiled by Europe. As most of the nationalists were poor, and used the money which they managed to raise by collections almost exclusively for politics, education and social work, the new movement applied itself above all to cheap painting in water colours.

The starting point and focus of this new movement was the circle round Rabindra-

nath Tagore, — above all Abanindranath, Goganendranath, then Nanda Lal Bose the Principal of the Art School at Santiniketan. And yet the new current again had an enthusiastic promoter in an Englishman, E. B. Havell, Director of the Calcutta School of Art, who was not only the most important propagandist for the rehabilitation of ancient Indian art, but also knew how to rouse an interest in authoritative circles in Europe for living Indian art. To this personal connection may also be attributed the fact that the painters of the 'Bengal' school remained far more dependent on English taste than they themselves suspected. Above all the old master Abanindranath modelled himself on the vague mistiness of Turner's landscapes as well as on the minute naturalism and the attitude of exalted romantic feeling of the Pre-Raphaelites, while Goganendranath experimented with cubism, and finally Rabindranath developed an expressionism reminiscent of, although not actually influenced by Odilon Redon, Munch and Ensor. Consciously however, the Bengal school sought to return to ancient Indian painting, taking its models now from the Gupta period, now from Mughul and Rajput miniatures of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and finally also from East Asian wash painting. Their very eclectic subjects were highly sentimental, because they confused soulfulness with inspiration, hysteria with piety. It was a typical art of romantic amateurs, projected far from reality into the dream world of an idealised Indian past.

Yet it received its essential form only through acquaintance with the art of Ajanta. For modern India the revelation of the fresco cycles from the fifth (Gupta period) to the eighth centuries in the Buddhist cave monasteries near the village of Ajanta was as revolutionary as the diggings at Pompeii or in Etruria for European art at the time of Winckelmann. It is true that they had actually been discovered almost half a century before, but — difficult of access — had passed unregarded. Only their thoroughgoing publica-

tion by J. Griffiths, Director of the Bombay School of Art, and subsequently by Lady Herringham for the newly founded Royal India Society in London on the basis of colour copies by a whole crowd of young Indian painters revealed to the world the wealth and beauty of this classical art and aroused a storm of enthusiasm, such as had not been experienced since the revelation of European classicism.

Abanindranath Tagore got up a complete set of 'prescriptions' of classical aspects of the body, limb by limb, and Nanda Lal Bose, more skilfully, experimented with pictures constructed out of them. Their pupils again won the leadership of almost all the art schools in the country, and there soon developed a mass production of national painting. Its strength was a harmonious linear rhythm and a romanticism related to the German 'Nazarenes' (Overbeck, Pforr, Schnorr von Carolsfeld, Veit), which finds a deep mystical meaning in all life. Its weakness, as already mentioned, was an often hysterical sentimentality, and an affectation in the drawing equally often pushed to the absurd. But the public was insufficiently trained to take offence at a technique of clumsy juxtaposition, or to distinguish these highly mannered imitations from the earlier masterpieces of classical Indian art. On the contrary, pride was taken in unreality and soulfulness, which were supposed to be oriental and mystical-religious, as opposed to Western naturalism.

The best-known artists of the younger generation were A. K. Haldar, K. N. Mazumdar, Roy Choudhury, Mukul Dey, Sarada Ukil, Promode Chatterjee and M. A. Chughtai. Although a Muslim, Chughtai prefers to paint themes from Hindu mysticism. A related school arose in Gujarat, founded by Ravishankar Raval, but best known through the works of Kanu Desai. As Bengal classicism gradually lost its authority, it sank to the level of greetings-card art and to stage and film décor. In this late phase a similar kind of sculpture also emerged, but this has attained no importance and only produces rubbishy do-

mestic images and stage props. An equivalent architecture emerged even later, and was above all propagated by Sirish Chandra Chatterjee. This supposed that a modern bank building for example could be planned by copying an ancient Buddhist chaitya hall and decorating it with a picture of Lakshmi, goddess of wealth. However naive that may appear, it is no worse than the ideas of Western classicists, who used the facade of a Greek temple in a similar way for the entrance to a Stock Exchange or Parliament House. Apart from the buildings of the Buddhist Mahabodhi Society and the various Birla foundations, above all the huge and tasteless Lakshmi-Narayan temple ('Birla Temple') in New Delhi, this classicism has not made its way. Instead, the more usual practice has been the combination of ancient Indian architectural forms with an otherwise modern style, mostly innocuous enough, but sometimes downright painful, when modern functional architecture in steel and concrete is coated with whole facades of the fundamentally different early Indian style, as for example in the Vigyan Bhavan originally built for UNESCO and other administrative buildings in New Delhi.

Present day themes

But the basic idea of a return to classicism already contained the seed of its own destruction. As in Europe Classicism was followed by Romanticism, and finally by the imitation of all imaginable styles, so in India attention soon turned to other styles like the early Buddhist, the Pallava and Chola art of South India, or the imposing temple architecture and sculpture of Kharjuraho. As ancient art was increasingly investigated, and the original classicism degenerated into uninteresting mass production, individual artists turned more and more to these new styles. Furthermore, with advancing emancipation and finally national independence, the cultural climate completely changed. Instead of the half legendary past, the living present became the centre of interest; instead of mystic

dreams, constructive work; instead of princesses and gods, the people. Now the real folk art was discovered, the appeal of its simple, naive, generous forms and colours, as against the luxurious excess of the former courtly art. Even where the principles of classical style were still acknowledged, they were gradually transformed into a kind of popular illustrative style extensively inspired by local folk art — wall paintings on mud huts, dolls of clay and wood — resulting finally in a decorative poster style sometimes more or less conventional, sometimes original. The best-known representative of this trend is Jamini Roy in Calcutta, who took as his models the devotional pictures and painted dolls sold at the Kali temple. In this way he created pictures of an enchanting naivety, confident sweeping lines, and bright earth colours — milkmaids, women on the way to the temple, etc. But his later works, some of them on Christian themes, give an effect of artificiality. In Bengal mention must also be made of Kalyan Sen, Paritosh Sen, Naresh Sen Gupta, Sunil Kumar Paul and Arup Das. In North India: Jagdish Mittal and charming Devayani Krishna. In Bombay: A. A. Almelkar, whose themes are much richer than Jamini Roy's and his drawing more ponderous Angelo da Fonseca and Angela Trindade (recently with touches of Cubism), in whose Christian paintings Joseph and Mary appear as Indian peasants and Christ as a sadhu; Laxman Pai from Goa, who changed his style again in Paris; and Madhav Satawalekar with his grandly calm portrayals of popular life in Maharashtra and Africa. In Madras K. Sreenivasulu must above all be mentioned, whose composition often degenerates into the unnatural, but is precisely thereby enabled sometimes to bring out charmingly the artificiality of such subjects as a dancer or a courtesan.

Now too the way lay open once more to Western art. Impressionism corresponded to a traditional Indian way of seeing if not of painting: the world as a dream-like illusion is after all an ancient concept

of Indian philosophy, favoured by the landscape and the climate. Its chief representatives are D. J. Joshi, L. M. Sen, Madan-Lal Nagar, D. K. Warrior, K.C.S. Panikar, Kanwal Krishna, S. H. Raza (who later became a Parisian), and K. H. Ara (who went over to Expressionism). N. S. Bendre and others also originally belonged with them. A special note is sounded by Kiron Sinha in his sombre canvases of social criticism in the technique of Seurat. Expressionism again, with its simplified forms, strong colours and exaggerated emphasis, corresponded to an Indian technique of painting, especially the Rajput style. The musicality of many modern Western artists, as for example Hodler, Gauguin, Matisse, Modigliani, Laurencin, Picasso, corresponded to the basic principle of Hindu art, which derives all figurative art from dancing, and this from music. For this very reason Expressionism found few direct adherents (e.g. Biren De or Rathin Moitra), but merged with a section of the 'Bengal School'. Only Satish Gujral, the pupil and at first the imitator of the Mexican Orozko, has gradually developed a very original style of his own, while Santosh was inclined towards the dreamy-allusive before he went over to the New York School. Finally, the symbolism of the unconscious exploited by the Surrealists corresponded to an impulse which goes right through Indian religion and art, and which found its expression above all in tantricism (today in modern form in Husain).

All these Western trends were particularly acceptable because of their revolutionary character. For the Indians therefore they did not stand so much for Western colonialism and its supporting technological 'materialism', as for the revolution precisely against all this. The young artists, inclined towards socialism, felt themselves brothers in this sense of their fellow creators in the West.

Of course this triumphant advance of modern art is far from being accepted unconditionally in wider circles. As in Germany during the formative years of the

second empire, most of the Indian new-rich do not see that with the modernisation and industrialisation of their country a break with the past in every other respect has also set in. As in Germany they took refuge in a romantic mediaevalism, decorating barracks, factories and villas as old-time fortresses, or hanging pictures of 'drawing-room Tyrolese' or tipsy monks of the 'good old days' in their 'German Renaissance' room, so in present-day India a romanticism of peasant life has arisen, which refuses to see the endlessly hard struggle for existence of the people, but instead a sentimental idyll in which young ladies from the city dolled up as peasant girls and milkmaids file to the well with brass pots on their heads, or dance with a filmstar in the costume of the charming shepherd god Krishna. Needless to say, the rich do not buy the creations of the modern artists — even supposing they buy art at all, rather than display their wealth in jewelry or wedding celebrations costing hundreds of thousands. Of course they talk a great deal about the spirituality of their national art, but all they understand is the crudest naturalism.

The younger generation on the other hand, alienated from such dreams and well aware of the disintegration of the old traditions, is revolutionary — in all degrees, from approval of the present regime and its five year plans to supporting communism — but above all uprooted, and so inclined to the same pessimism as the majority of contemporary European artists. And the number of the uprooted grows alarmingly, especially as the colleges yearly turn out more and more half-educated young men, and daily life under the five-year plans assumes the character of an unscrupulous race to get rich quick. The life of an artist is hard, and success comes for the most part only after long years of a distressing fight for existence — as a school or college teacher, scene-painter or set-designer in films, decorator for exhibitions and political meetings — always struggling against the intervention of ignorant Maecenas, often in the bitterest

misery, which for want of stimulating opportunities may well be spiritual misery as well. Paintings often bring in no more than 50 to 100 rupees. All the same, in recent years the most successful have been able to command thousands for each picture, have received marvellous — by Indian standards — commissions from the government, and have been selling abroad. Some even emigrate. Many have been first discovered by European and American embassies and consulates, which first acquired their works, thereby legitimising their talent in the eyes of the Indian government. But in the process pessimism has become part of their personality, and only thaws out with difficulty. The most extreme case is Francis (Newton-) Souza, who has achieved great success in England; but his pictures were the images of anxiety produced by drunkenness, from which he has finally taken refuge in a Christian art stylistically related to Rouault. Ramkumar on the other hand, for long a socialist painter of restrained scenes from the new proletariat, has slowly won through to a balanced view of life and an art appropriate to it.

Amrita Sher-Gil and her successors

When its attention has once been drawn to an artist, the Indian government does a great deal to help him, above all by scholarships abroad. It thereby lays great stress on learning new techniques, and widening the narrow horizon (alas, so narrow!) of the homeland. Poster technique (represented above all by J. B. Dasgupta, M. Dutta Gupta), graphic art (above all Satyen Ghosal, Haren Das, Y. K. Shukla), and Japanese pottery methods have been introduced in this way, while at the same time knowledge of non-Indian art has been greatly extended. On the whole however, the artists soon find their way back to the Indian milieu, but now with sharpened judgement and greater sensibility.

This was above all the case with Amrita Sher-Gil. As the daughter of a rich Sikh

and a Hungarian mother, she had grown up in Italy, studied in France, where she came under the influence of Gauguin, Marie Laurencin and Modigliani, and only reintegrated herself into the Indian milieu after her return to Simla and then her marriage on a sugar plantation in Gorakhpur District. The paintings of the Simla period are still Western in technique, but reveal a deep understanding for the soul of the people. After a number of journeys about the country, she then evolved a most original style, as finely sensitive as sweeping and generous, the draughtsmanship far removed from Ajanta and Rajput painting, influenced in its juxtaposition of broad simple surfaces by the great Japanese lacquer artists Korin, Koetsu, among others, and full of the melancholy combined with joy in life of Indian people. In her own lifetime (she died in childbirth in 1942) she was not taken seriously, but is acknowledged today as one of the greatest painters of modern India, and her works form the most wonderful treasure of the National Gallery of Modern Art in New Delhi, built up by the author in 1953-55.

Beside her even the best contemporary artists appear a falling off. Indeed they can hardly be classified. Again and again their style threatens to end in a decorative mannerism, and then they take refuge in new experiments and fashions, above all painters as gifted yet unstable as N. S. Bendre or B. Sanyal. On the other hand Sailoz Mookherjee, Manishi Dey, H. A. Ara, K. S. Kulkarni, or K. K. Hebbar, for example, have developed characteristic personalities. S. D. Chavda is a brilliant draughtsman, especially of dance motifs. H. A. Gade produces highly stylized scenes with deep glowing jewel-like colours. George Keyt has been called the 'Indian Picasso' for his obsession with figures resolved into geometrical compositions of straight or curved lines. Rasik D. Raval began with highly stylized fairy-tale motifs of delightful charm, but stiffened more and more into hard, rhythmic composition. B. Samant, and above all M. F. Husain — the most successful living painter — have

intensified their figures to glowing visions of archetypal symbols called up from the collective unconscious.

Sculpture, for technical as well as financial reasons, has shown much less development. Here too the influence of Impressionism, especially of Rodin and Epstein, has been great, above all in the works of Sudhir Khastgir (unfortunately too sentimental), Ramkinkar Baij, and Prodosh Das Gupta—but today already superseded. Yet the struggle for new forms has not yet found any satisfactory solution, unless exception is made of the creations of Shankho Chaudhuri, which in their flattened simplification recall ancient Egyptian but also ancient Indian Pallava statues.

The promotion of arts and crafts was a pressing concern of the national movement to rescue popular handicrafts. From a purely economic point of view, this has succeeded, if only to a limited extent. The efforts of the Indian government have indeed rescued the old crafts by means of considerable subsidies, handicraft centres, and a large-scale sales organisation (Khadi Bhandars and Emporiums), but in practice this amounts to no more than a provisional supplement to the as yet insufficiently extended factory production and a measure against unemployment, until the hand-workers can be absorbed by industry; or it may be regarded as a tourist industry working essentially for export, the quality of which in general sinks steadily lower. For any form, any motif is only living so long as it is anchored in the total life of the community. And taste is a product of long education, discrimination and sensibility. But for this all the preconditions are

lacking in a time of social and cultural disintegration. Folk art is degenerating because the attempt is made to 'beautify' it, and courtly art because the work is much too painstaking to be economical. And when all forms and motifs are mixed up together, they lose their value and become mere interchangeable models without significance or reference—tourist souvenirs.

Architecture has turned more and more to the modern functional style. Le Corbusier and Maxwell Fry with their buildings in Chandigarh and Ahmedabad, O. Konigsberger in the South, and the Americans in Delhi with their beautiful embassy, have provided good examples. A number of good Indian architects, above all with their private houses in Delhi and Bombay, have successfully followed in their footsteps. And yet still today the majority of new buildings are not only bad in their execution, but with their bad proportions and tasteless ornamentation fall back into all the sins of 'babu' Gothic.

But these are the growing pains of a world in transformation. It is already something to have moved beyond the mere imitation of a dead past. Inevitably much remains experimental. The main thing is that there are once more artists true to their function and material, creating out of a genuine vision and a real understanding of form and colour. For any art, however much it may learn from its own or foreign traditions, must ultimately rest in itself, the living expression of the life and aspirations of its time.

Translated by David McCutcheon from
Indo-Asia, April 1963.

Santiniketan
Nov. 10, 1918

My dear Rudra

You have seen me work but you haven't seen my immense capacity for doing nothing. That spell of laziness is upon me, and I should like nothing better than abjure all responsibilities of life and sit perfectly still in the heart of these sunny days. I have my standing invitation from them, but alas my reputation is playing tricks with me. The Congress must have me for its President and also your All India Musical Conference. Then there are institutions innumerable in Modern India from Students' Debating Society to Organisations for industrial regeneration of our country, and they all think that they must have a living poet to do their public advertisement till he is dead. I should very much like to ask them to quote a single ~~line~~ ^{line} from my ~~selected~~ voluminous poems which can justify their choice. I feel rather hurt that you haven't yet asked ^{me} to preside at any of the committee meetings of your St Stephen's College ~~where~~ ^{when} expert auditor's help is specially needed. Evidently you do not share the rest of your countrymen's admiring confidence in my practical sagacity. Please think upon this point and lose no time in contributing your quota in making ~~the~~ my cup of misery overflowing.

Yours affectionately
Rabindranath Tagore

Rabindranath Tagore's letter to Mr. Sushil Kumar Rudra, Principal of St. Stephen's College, Delhi, in the poet's handwriting.

Rabindranath Tagore

Dear Sir, —

I have read your letter with pleasure. I have only one thing to say — it is this: do not be always trying to preach your doctrine, but give yourself in love.

Your western mind is too obsessed with the idea of conquest and possession. Your inveterate habit of proselytism is another form of it. Christ never preached himself or any doctrine or dogma, he preached the love of God. The object of a Christian should be to be like Christ — never to be like a coolie. Meanwhile trying to bring coolies to his Master the garden. Preaching your doctrine is no sacrifice for you at all — it is indulging in a luxury, far more dangerous than all the luxuries of material living. It breeds an illusion in your mind that you are doing your duty — that you are wiser & better than your fellow beings. But the real preaching is in being perfect, which is through meekness, love & self-dedication.

If you have in you pride of race, pride of sect, pride of personal superiority strong, then it is no use to try to do good to others. They will reject your gift, or even if they do accept it they will not be morally benefited by it — instances of which can be seen in India every day. On the spiritual plane you cannot do good until you be good. You cannot preach Xty until you be like Christ, & then you do not preach Christianity of the Xty sect but the love of God even as Christ did.

You have repeatedly told me that your standard of living is not likely to be different from that of the "natives" — but one thing I ask you — will you be able to make yourself one with those whom you call "natives", — not merely in habits but in love. For it is utterly degrading to accept any benefit except that which is being offered in the spirit of love.

God is Love — and all that we receive at His hands comes from Him. But when a man tries to usurp God's place & assume the role of a giver of gifts, & does not come as a mere purveyor of God's love, — then all is vanity.

I am faithfully

Rabindranath Tagore

POETRY

THE DREAM-GULL

My dreams are a mist white sea gull
ghost-gull caught in a white cloud;
frantic-winged honking for help
on a dead sea and empty sky;
hooded and groping, a blind instinct on wings
a little white scream
on the wind's red cry!

Weary wing'd solitaire
hunting for dreams,
the coming night is a grey hollow
and beneath the dead fish of the tideless sea
there is no aequorial paradise
slumbering in unconsciousness;
only the flat white sea
and the white gull on a pale sky.

Will the day come
beyond the mating time and the mating call
when a flight of nesting gulls
will rise revenant
borne upon the shrill laughter of a mad moon,
across forgotten trails,
a flying mist tremulous
with wing-beats and yearning?

Much rather be torn
wing from shredded wing
caught in the cross-mesh of sidereal winds
and be blinded by a windful of stardust
than this dull, hooded trek
from nothingness to nothingness.

KEKI N. DARUWALA

SPRING SAP

Reawakening in your body
 Christ-blood in spring sap
 ramifying in twigs winter-scorched.
 Across the prickly blue void of nostalgia,
 come memories bird-like
 spearing through the senses!
 O! let me bathe my wounds in your river
 and faint into the dreams
 of your sad eyes
 and hear the mute song
 of the night bird in your breasts,
 reawakening into pain
 in the forest of your limbs,
 in the wet rain of your kisses!

KEKI N. DARUWALA

CHURCH RUINS

Voices of the last choir no longer hold
 An audible dimension, the loft has long
 Discarded its persistence. If a song
 Of dedication shows itself in the gold
 Of some unsteady dusk thrown on an old
 And lonely saint, rather let it belong
 To us the witnesses of war. The throng
 That perished sang their own, so we are told
 By all these concrete tongues that loudly speak
 Of how each held a cross into the fire
 That scorched the flesh. The hymn that lingers here
 Around these sacred stones is not a weak
 Persuasion. Let us seek lost pews and sire
 A faith for this an age that totters on a fear.

BURCE BUNAO

IN THE WAKE

Ah, the spit of it
 The dead tobacco taste on the tongue
 Curled bitterly in the mouth
 In my mind, a lump of sugar is formed
 The sweetness licked steadily
 By tired thoughts, and others
 Stacked or scattered
 Familiar ever.

Sunk in my chair
 I watch the dry wisps of air
 Leave by the window

And with this dryness like ash covering
 All
 I am shocked to find
 I can see blue crystal in her eyes
 And, as on coconut days by the sea
 Feel a rush among the leaves,
 A brittle glow on the waves.

She does not
 And of course cannot offer me
 Stale cakes and loaves of bread
 For those I know
 Too well
 But instead hands, bangleless
 To draw near in a lost moment.

My head swimming like a flute song
 This is when I return,
 Running barefoot
 Face washed with blue breezes
 And my full heart with a laugh finds
 I do not care.

SUDHIR SONALKAR

SHORT STORY

Bing and the Chicken

BONOMALI GOSWAMI

THE jeep came to a dead-stop with a shrill, screeching sound. The driver looked around apprehensively. No sooner had the squawking chicken run across the road than some villagers screamed aloud, throwing up their hands. In a moment a group of men rushed in from the road-side bazar and stood about the car. The rest of the roosters ran in all directions, fluttering. The driver was now standing on the road, staring down mournfully and vacantly at the dead chicken. He looked sorry. His sad eyes moved slowly from one dumb face to another, and he sighed.

'Well, I'm going to pay for it. How much?' He demanded.

The poor, shabbily dressed villagers studied the middle-aged up-country man with grave silence. A burly youth shouldered his way through the thick crowd and confronted the offender. 'You've killed my pet. Give me fifty rupees. Quick!' He held out his muscular hand and fixed steadily his cool sharp gaze on the stranger's eyes.

'Fifty!' The driver's eyes were enormous with vexation. He looked as though he had been slapped.

'Fifty. Yes.' The young man stiffened. His face grew dark and his voice sharpened. A chorus of voices echoed him from the group: 'Yes.'

'My God!' The man cried out. 'I killed only one chicken, didn't I? Why, now I'm going to pay for fifteen!'

There was an uncomfortable silence. The crowd went on swelling; the group of men regarded him with sinister silence, all expression suddenly gone from their sun-tanned brown faces. Some of the men squatted on the road in front of the car

and watched a group of boys playing football with green oranges in a field nearby. The driver leaned against the side of the car and lit a cigarette. The villagers chuckled, looked at his pensive face and lit their pipes. A sturdy pony, jingling bells round his neck, passed by breaking the strange silence. Thick smoke from innumerable pipes curled up in the fresh air. It was late in the morning. The sun shone brilliantly on the piney hills and deep green paddy fields. Birdsong rippled through the quietude. The men went on smoking. The sound of many shrill voices floated from across the football field. All activities in the road-side bazar had ceased as though by a magic.

Suddenly, not far away, the report of a gun was heard and a flock of birds, scared and fluttering, flew by overhead. The silent men raised their eyes and smiled to themselves. They nodded knowingly. A few minutes later an old man in the group turned around and called aloud, 'Ko Bing!'

A figure emerged from the sun-gold forest and came with slow dignified steps towards the crowd. The men murmured in low indistinct voices and stole a joyous glance at the sombre-looking driver. 'Ko Bing!' The crowd shouted cheerfully. The old man with the gun walked majestically up to the melancholy stranger and saluted him. He was all politeness, all smiles. He was wearing a pair of worn-out trousers and a tight jacket. He shook his grey head and grinned in satisfaction. His teeth had been blackened by betel and tobacco chewing, but his small blinking eyes were alert and intelligent. An old gun hung on his thin drooping back. His left hand

carelessly held a bleeding bird by its leg. 'Don't mind, Saheb. We won't detain you long. Pay him off and get on your way. Eah!' the old man with the gun declared solemnly with a polite gesture that seemed very natural to him.

The silent men all nodded and smiled approvingly. The gentle-looking driver flushed with renewed anger and his eyes blazed with resentment.

'Take me to the police, please.' He breathed heavily and his jaws tightened.

'Police?' Bing, the old man with the gun, roared with laughter. The group of men laughed aloud. 'You'll find nothing of the sort round here. You see, as a matter of fact, one has to abide by our village custom over here.' He laughed his melodramatic laugh and winked at the villagers.

'But I killed only one poor chicken!' The offender pleaded angrily.

'You're lucky, very lucky indeed, I must say.' Bing rolled up his eye-balls and grinned, showing his betel-blackened uneven teeth. 'Thank God you didn't kill a goat. A hundred rupees for that. And two hundred for a calf. Eah! Hundreds of eggs and chickens could have come out of this poor golden hen! Just imagine what you've done!' He looked down at the dead chicken, a bloody mess, and made a grimace. 'Ah, what a loss! imagine! You've killed a great race of fine roosters! Fifty rupees is only a nominal price. Can you see my point?'

'Suppose I killed a man. What then?' The culprit's gaze hardened. He demanded curtly.

'A man?' Bing plucked thoughtfully at his nose with his thumb and forefinger. He hesitated a long time. 'That'd be a new situation to think over. All right,' he shrugged briskly, 'we would have charged you twenty rupees, in that case.'

'I see. You folks sell cheaper than a chicken!' The stranger exclaimed sarcastically, his eyes shiny with disdainful amusement.

Bing sounded offended. A harassed look came into his restless eyes. The villagers looked on, smoking their pipes, smiling

nonchalantly. Bing raised his head proudly and opened into explanations. 'What if I die? You can save the food and clothes and tobacco for better purposes. What if all people around here die now?' His wrinkled face flushed with excitement and he swung his lean hands vigorously. 'That's no loss, I tell you. But a chicken or a calf—ooh! that makes a difference. That's a real treasure. Don't you relish a fried chicken? Well, you've killed a race of fine chickens, so to speak. You see my point?' He subsided, breathing heavily.

'I see your point very clearly.' The driver nodded, still smiling sarcastically. He reached into his side pocket, pulled out a bundle of notes, counted them and growled, 'Here you are. Satisfied?' He got into the car. 'I almost wish I had killed a man and saved thirty rupees.'

The men immediately roared with hilarious laughter, dancing and waving their hands triumphantly, drowning the voice of the culprit. The next moment the engine hissed and the gear clicked. Bing wheeled around and gripped the driver's arm. He implored.

'Don't go away, Saheb! Take all this as a joke. Please, please. We'll eat and drink and dance together. Come, come.'

The driver reached to snatch the hand away. He was furious. 'A joke! You call it a joke? How nice of you.'

'Why, you've got plenty to spend, and yet you won't. Come on, let's enjoy ourselves. Don't get cross, Saheb.' He looked incredulous, offended.

'Sorry. I'm busy.' The Saheb said in a cold, calm tone of voice. And then after a pause: 'Do you mind showing me the way to Ka Marylibon's house?'

'Why? What takes you there?' The old man looked startled. His alert eyes kept blinking nervously.

'That's none of your business.' He retorted, a painful feeling of insult and helplessness gnawing at him. 'This is the village she lives in, I suppose.'

The old man nodded mechanically. There was the look of a beaten animal in his dull, timid eyes, and he apologised in

a weak hasty voice. 'Can't you take it all as a joke? Why, all the other fellows coming down from Shillong drink and dance with us on an occasion like this. Why won't you? Look!'

He pointed. The driver turned his gloomy face, his repugnant eyes moved up to the men, waiting for him to join them and the old man went on like a beggar: 'Come on Saheb. We'll all eat and drink together with the money, and then—'

The engine roared furiously, drowning his trembling voice. He stared after the speeding car, his mouth open, his eyes clouded with a certain fear. The jeep raised a cloud of dust, turned a bend, and disappeared. The old man shrugged with a gesture of hopelessness. He spat vehemently and turned around. The crowd stirred and rolled and shrieked. Excited voices called him: 'Ko Bing!'

Later, in the night, the village in a remote corner of the Khasi Hills was quiet and asleep, plunged in darkness. The silence was deep, insinuating as a drug. In Ka Marylibon's house, the honoured guest had retired early. He was still awake, smoking meditatively. Suddenly he strained his ears to hear clearly. A whimpering voice came from across the wide courtyard. It slowly approached the house. Presently the queer visitor's feet sounded heavily on the court-yard and he laughed his melodramatic, almost hysterical laugh. The whimpering man tumbled up the wooden stairs and hiccupped. A door opened with a bang and Ka Marylibon stood in the doorway, the lantern light striking her large, rugged face, revealing anger and hatred.

'Get out of my house! How dare you insult my guest? You, you good-for-nothing filthy drunkard—you get out of my house. Do you hear?'

The mysterious visitor hiccupped. His clumsy indistinct voice sounded miserably. 'What has come over you, woman? Aren't I your husband? Remember the day we were married! Everybody was drunk that

night. Eah! You're not going to be cruel, are you?'

He started giggling hysterically and then stopped as suddenly as he had begun. The short, plump woman hissed out. 'Shut up. What have you done to my guest? How can I show him my face, all because of what you worthless good-for-nothing fellows did this morning.'

'This morning? What we good-for-nothing fellows did in the morning?' The drunkard tried hard to recall and then declared boisterously, his words coming in gusts. 'Oh? a poor chicken was run over by a car, you see? And the noble Saheb from Shillong paid us fifty rupees. Ah! that's very decent of him. And as always happens in this village, I did most of the talking. Later we ate and drank and gambled with the money. And, well, I remember now, he wanted me to show him the way to this house!' His meak voice quivered with the knowledge of an impending danger. 'Yes, he found out the house all right.' She flared up. Her low voice was plaintive, full of reproach. 'He's sleeping in that room. Don't shout. You've insulted Shingji, the greatest ever guest in this house. He's the man who helps me run my business and feed a worthless creature like you. Am I clear? So, please get out of my house. Quick! I don't want to set my eyes on you tomorrow morning—never, never!' She wheeled her whole heavy frame around and closed the door behind her with a bang.

The whole house trembled for a few moments and then once again everything was quiet. Slow footsteps trailed back again. In his bed Shingji held his breath and stared into the pitch-black dark. An intense feeling of shame and remorse took hold of him. He almost despised himself. Why couldn't he have taken it all as a mere joke? A funny local custom? Had it been wise of him to narrate the unpleasant incident in all its details to this proud, self-respecting, powerful woman? Her venomous words reverberated in his memory and made him restless. He

thought of going out and begging Bing's forgiveness.

He lay awake late till finally sleep came upon him. Suddenly the sound of some one tapping on the thin door startled him. He sat up quickly. A low, hesitating voice called from behind the door, 'Shingji, are you awake? Ko Shingji!'

Shingji tumbled out of bed, fumbled for the slippers under the bedstead, and then tiptoed across the grave-dark room in the direction of the whispering voice. A thought flashed across his agitated mind and he knew who it was. Like a blind man he fumbled frantically for the chain, found it, and opened the door. A dark form was standing before him on the veranda. He must be Ka Marylibon's husband, Shingji told himself with conviction. Yes, but who was he? The two men stood face to face, each expecting the other to start the talking. The stranger sighed pathetically and lowered his head. And it was then that Shingji got a glimpse of the gun projecting behind his head.

'Ko Bing!' He exclaimed.

'Let me in, please. It's so cold out here. And I'm no longer young.' Bing giggled softly. 'My turbulent wife won't let me into her house till I can propitiate you, my dear Saheb.'

Shingji crept back and fumbled for the match beside the lantern. He lit the wick and turned around, smiling. Bing was standing in the doorway, staring at him vaguely, licking dry lips. He shivered and rubbed his hands together. 'Excuse me, Shingji. I swear I didn't know it was you. Believe me, it was all a joke. We didn't mean any harm.' He ended his speech with a sigh and bit his underlip.

Shingji sat down on the edge of his bed and looked the old man up and down. 'Won't you sit down?' He pointed to the only chair in the room. Bing dragged the chair up to the lantern, sat down, and rubbed his hands together. He was drunk no longer. But the honoured guest sniffed the air and thought that he still exhaled an unpleasant smell of cheap country liquor. Suddenly the haggard-looking old

man raised his head and grinned, showing betel-blackened teeth; his small alert eyes sparkled in the lantern light.

'What do you think of my wife, Shingji?'

'Well,' Shingji proceeded cautiously, scratching his back, 'why, she understands business perfectly well. I'm a wholesale dealer in vegetables and oranges and I find her the best supplier. Very intelligent, honest, and—' He searched his mind for the proper, harmless phrase.

'And very tough.' Bing supplied him with the word and grinned. 'Very tough and ruthless. She's turned me out of her house, you know.'

Shingji nodded, forcing a rueful smile to his lips. 'Have a cigarette?' A fresh wave of uneasiness swept over him. He found it hard to meet those alert, friendly eyes of the pathetically haggard man.

'No, thanks, I prefer my Khasi tobacco to this expensive stuff.' He pressed down the red woollen cap on his head and lit his pipe. 'Now, what was I going to say?' He winked at his wife's respectable guest and leaned over the bed. 'Look here, I'm an old man and I'm good for nothing. Where could I go at this hour of night? And she's my wife—just imagine! I wish you'd seen how she loved me when I was a young man, a proud father of six lovely children.' The warmth of the room and presence of a patient, generous listener made him self-confident. His deep, aggressive voice went on, 'It's a pity she despises me now. I'm worthless. Well, well, am I to blame for that? Look at my gun. By the way, this is a gift from my son-in-law.' His eyes lit up with pride. 'I'm the only Government-authorized shikari in this area. See?'

'I see.' Shingji yawned and smiled at him warmly, appeasing him as though he were a child.

'I'm damn' unlucky, though. Ever since I got the licence, not an elephant went mad. If I had killed one of those wild tuskers, I would have earned a lot. But—oh! what a misfortune.' He made a grimace and shook his head repeatedly, quickly, despairingly. Then he looked up slowly and his tearful eyes glittered in the pale light.

'Don't weep. No, no, you mustn't. Please.' Shingji reached out and grabbed his cold rough hand. He said softly, caressingly, 'I'm so sorry I told her all about that chicken episode. I had no idea things would take such a nasty turn. I'm sorry, Bing. I wonder what I can do for you.' He stroked the dry cold hand tenderly.

Bing dropped his fluttering eyelids. Silent, he shook his head despairingly. At last he spoke: 'You can do nothing for me. I never earned anything in my life. Can you imagine that? The day I got my licence, all those wild elephants turned into monks as though by magic. Conspiracy, I call it. What filthy luck: I wish I had something to give you by way of compensation.'

'Never mind. Take it easy,' Shingji thumped him on the knee. He felt exceedingly sleepy and miserable at the same time, for he did not know how to get rid of this wretched man and the trouble associated with him.

'No. I've got to do something to please you.' The old man's voice was harsh, arrogant. Gazing down at the lantern, he soliloquized on, 'When she knows I've done her guest a favour, a real and great favour at that, she'll be pleased with me. Things will be all right again. I shan't have to get out of the house. An old man can't last long without food, without warmth or tobacco—'

A dreamy look came into his watery eyes; he stared straight into Shingji's eyes, an enigmatic smile twisting his withered lips. He whispered clumsily, agitatedly, lifting his body a little, his eyes shiny with endless satisfaction. 'Listen! Come along with me! You're a lucky man, who knows we might bag one or two mountain deer tonight. You'll take them. I give you my word. Come on!' He insisted, stamping his foot, a wild dream haunting his imagination, distorting his wrinkled face.

'Sh-sh!' Shingji applied his forefinger to his lips. 'You'll wake the whole house.'

'Oh, you must come. You're a lucky chap. Earning a lot, driving a car. Eah!' He quivered all over with a certain

pleasure and his glossy eyes shone brilliantly. 'Why, you can carry the deer off to Shillong in your car. And she'll be so glad, you see, when she knows you're no longer cross with me.'

'Who says I'm cross with you?' He protested eagerly. 'All I want is to be left alone. I'm sleepy. I'll have to set out very early in the morning. I've done my job and taken leave of your wife. You understand?'

'Fine.' Bing rose to his feet and swung the gun heroically. 'So you're at liberty now to look for some game. Get ready, man. Here you are. Fine pair of shoes.' He reached down and picked up Shingji's shoes. 'You like it or not, I must compensate you in some way. She's furious. And I'm homeless. See?'

Shingji looked down at his watch beside the pillow. It would be about two hours more before the roosters crowed. He frowned on the rollicking old man. 'Don't you think you're being childish?'

'Not at all. Here you are.' He laid the pair of shoes in front of his feet. 'Those lovely mountain deer come down into the paddy fields at this time of night. I'm damn' unlucky. But you're different. Eah! Hurry up.'

The jeep ran through the sleeping village, shaking the great quiet, making the dogs bark after them. Ka Marylibon awakened with a start, walked to the window and stood looking out. The buzzing sound died away before long and she crept back and got into the warm bed, mumbling to herself irritably. The jeep ran along the twisting dirt road, its yellow light playing on the wooded hill-sides. Bing shivered in the cool wind and pointed to the south. Far away, in the soft starlight Shingji could discern a narrow valley in between two steep, thickly wooded hills. They got there after some time and the two of them got out of the car. A narrow stream cut across the paddy field and beside it ran a raised muddy track. The half-ripened corn brushed their legs tenderly. A soft breeze was blowing down

the valley. The woods sighed deeply and the stream whispered melodiously, mysteriously. The jewellery-laden sky was exquisitely beautiful. In the height of the sky a few milk-white cloudlets appeared and playfully started changing their shapes. Shingji stopped with a start and looked paralysed.

'A snake!'

'Scared again?' Bing turned round and asked in bewilderment. The next moment he was all excitement. 'Sh-sh! Look!' He pointed. Far, far in the distance, two dark forms were standing on the crest of a bald hillock overlooking the valley, silhouetted against the wondrous, pale blue sky. They remained there a long time, caressing each other, stroking each other with the crooked horns. Then they started moving down the hillock; the darkness and the thick corn swallowed them.

'Deer! You're lucky, Shingji, I know. I know.' His words bubbled out, his eyes opened wide. He grabbed Shingji's arm and shook him violently. 'What's come over you? Come on, like this!' He stooped low and dashed off, the gun in his hand. Shingji stood there quite still, staring after his drooping back till he was out of sight. Shingji shuddered all over and a strange sense of fear and helplessness filled him. His first impulse was to turn round and run back to the car. But the thought of the snake he had seen a little while ago sent a cold shiver down his spine and he stood there motionless, as though pinned to the earth. The vastness of the silent starry sky overhead, the dark mountains all around him, the rustling pines, the whispering stream and corn, and above all the great loneliness made him feel like an ignorant child lost in wilderness. He was scared. It was with difficulty that he prevented himself screaming. The moments passed dismally. He stood there as motionless and lifeless as the straw effigy the peasants install in the paddy field to scare away the birds and beasts. Then suddenly he started awake as though from a nightmare. The roosters crowed, far away, and the morning star flashed

splendidly low in the east. The sky was lightening slowly above the mountain ridges. Then he heard the booming sound of a gun. Again. Again. The sounds rolled up the sides of the brooding mountains. Ah, he sighed with relief and pleasure. He was no longer lonely, anyway.

A jovial, hoarse voice called him from across the field. He shook off the uneasy feeling and ran along the track, through the dewy corn. 'Ko Bing!' His cheerful voice filled the soft darkness.

Bing responded with a shrill whistle. The chirruping birds circled overhead. Bing was sitting on the bulging belly of a huge deer, smoking his pipe. He watched the approaching man with obvious amusement. He looked up, narrowing his eyes, and giggled. Not scared any longer, Shingji?

Shingji stood over him and patted his lean shoulder. His admiring eyes ran over the dead animals. 'You've been wonderful, old man.'

'The credit is all yours, Shingji. The moment I saw you I knew you're very lucky. I'm so happy, you know. Why, I bet these two will fetch you a hundred rupees in Shillong.'

'Really? I wonder you don't sell them yourself.'

'Here? Nobody would buy them. And how on earth could I take them to Shillong and sell them? My wife could, but she wouldn't.' He sighed and thumped himself on the knee. 'Moreover, I'm so unlucky. This is the first occasion I could bag two deers together. Look, I got them both, husband and wife.' He grinned with great satisfaction, the first light of dawn revealing his happy wrinkled face clearly. 'So I owe you nothing at the moment. Right? You just tell my wife that and help me get back into the house. Will you?'

'By all means.' Shingji smiled down at him affectionately. 'Why, I think I'm more than compensated. I should have liked to tell her what a wonderful old fellow you are.'

'Even though I've not earned a single coin in a lifetime.' Bing raised his head

and roared with laughter. 'Isn't that strange?'

Never mind. You may still earn something one of these days.' He tried to solace him. It was no use.

'Those bastard elephants!' Bing gnashed with sudden anger and spat. He went on with a violent gesture, his eyes blazing as though with madness. 'If only one of them had turned violent and come down on these houses and fields, like a curse of God, killing people, trampling and smashing and thundering. Bastards! Bastards!' He shuddered all over, struggling with his inner fury. 'God made me damn' unlucky. God!' He burst out vehemently, his eyes glowing in the morning light, an expression of soul-stirring pain crossing his face.

Shingji listened to him, stupefied. Speechless, he stared down into his agonizing face. Bing sprang to his feet and grinned as though nothing had happened. He yelled for joy, swinging his body. 'Deer! Deer! Eah! Let's go, Shingji.' He reached down and caught a deer by its horn. 'You take charge of the bridegroom, Shingji. Now let's get them into the car. Hurry up.'

His shrill yells and boisterous laughter filled the morning air. By now the earth had awakened. All around them nature was fresh and beautiful. They seized the animals by their horns and dragged them away through the wet corn. A quarter of a mile away, the jeep stood by the side of a green hillock. Bing walked towards the vehicle, almost ran, panting, dragging the female deer behind him. They lifted the heavy carcasses and laid them on the floor of the vehicle. Shingji turned his flushed and perspiring face and smiled at him timidly.

'Take one of them to your wife. He said, 'she'll be very glad.'

Being stretched out his hands. He looked magnanimous. Something stirred inside him. An intense feeling of happiness, the like of which he had never felt before, took hold of him. 'Oh, it's good to be lucky. Very good!' He muttered as though

to himself. 'Aren't you coming with me?' He turned a pair of flashing, smiling eyes on Shingji and grinned, quite unable to control the great wave of ecstasy that had invaded him. 'She just won't believe I could do this myself. You don't know her. She won't.'

'Sorry. I must get off right away.' Without another word he got into the car. The engine growled. Bing sat beside him and lit his pipe, smiling to himself.

Low in the east the sky reddened quickly and then the sun leaped over the mountain ridges, painting enormous golden patches on the green hillsides. The green-gold pine needles waved at them, whistling merrily. The car ran along the twisting, ascending, winding road. By now the morning sun was shining magnificently on the green fields and boisterous forests and glinting on the whispering streams. Far-away, across the rolling grassy valley, the bazar and villages with their shimmering tin roofs looked like a fresh painting against a bright blue sky. Bing kept talking and giggling. Shingji was looking ahead of him through the wind-shield, wondering what childish whim had made him wander about the hills and fields in the night. He smiled inwardly and yawned. He longed for a cup of tea and felt exceedingly sleepy. He could no longer bear to listen to the old chatterbox sitting beside him.

Then suddenly Bing screamed under his breath and clutched Shingji's arm. The speeding car wavered and tilted. 'Stop! stop, I tell you. Stop that bloody car!' He commanded frantically.

Shingji looked startled. A puzzled look came into his eyes. The next moment his bewilderment flared up into violent ferocity. His eyes were huge, glowing with anger. The engine roared on. His hands grasped the steering wheel firmly. He boomed, 'Don't dance like that, silly fool. You'll be thrown out of the car.'

Bing moved his trembling hand away, his dreary face flushed with excitement. He breathed heavily. He appealed desperately, hoarsely, beggingly. 'Please stop the

car, please, please. What a lucky chap you are! Look, just take a look at her.' He pointed, heaving. 'The day of good luck comes to a man only once in his lifetime.'

Shingji turned his head and looked across the rolling green field in the direction of a swamp. A fine young deer was limping away hurriedly through the spongy bushes towards the deep jungle. The golden sunlight glinted marvellously on its smooth dark brown skin. What a breath-taking, incredibly beautiful, deeply moving experience it was to behold it hastening away across that wondrous valley.

That flash of skin and graceful head! The sound of the approaching car made it look back in terror for a moment. Shingji exclaimed: 'My God, what a pair of eyes! Lovely! Lovely!'

Bing raised his gun and took aim. Shingji's left hand instantly reached out and gripped the gun. He said bitterly, 'No! You don't have to shoot her, old man. Just look at her. Open your eyes wide and take a good look at her. My God!' The car began to slow down. The yearling was limping away desperately towards the jungle. Bing lowered his gun and looked Shingji in the face. His eyes were opaque with cold anger. He shook his head. 'The day of good luck will never come back. This is my first and last chance.' He cried out like a beaten child that had been denied his due. 'I'll get her. Stop the car!'

The thing of beauty was now quite close to the jungle. Bing shrieked and jumped out of the car, the gun in his raised hand. He spun, stumbled, whirled around and in a moment his rolling body went under the rear wheel of the vehicle. The jeep came to a halt a few feet ahead. Shingji got out of the car. The yearling once again turned its graceful neck, gave him a final look and disappeared.

Shingji knelt beside the old man. His fleshy hand passed slowly over Bing's body. He lay quite still on his back on the red gravelled road. It looked as though he was sleeping.

'Ko Bing!' He whispered. Not my fault,

anyway, Shingji reflected mournfully, fixing his dark eyes on the old man's serene face washed with golden sunlight. The chicken got itself killed under my vehicle, that wasn't my fault, either. He shrugged irritably. Then an idea flashed across his gloomy mind. Yes, he understood perfectly well what was to be done now. Sure.

He lifted his sad eyes and looked across the smiling valley in the direction of the village. Tiny forms of villagers came out of the huts and moved about the fields, working, gossiping. Shingji saw them all clearly. He hesitated a long time; he picked up the gun and laid it on the corpse's chest. He trudged along towards the car. He trailed back dragging the female deer behind him.

The old man and the deer lay side by side on the sunny road. He stared down at Bing and his face was ugly with a rueful smile. They would know what it was all about, he reflected. How often did a vehicle pass by this village? He wondered.

No matter. For knocking down a chicken, fifty rupees. For a sheep? A hundred rupees. And for a man? Twenty rupees only. Very cheap. Very reasonable.

The inarticulate noise of many voices and faraway laughter came across the enchanting valley. The bazar was already crowded. Shingji dipped his hand into his pocket, pulled out two ten-rupee notes, folded them neatly and bent down.

'You've earned something at last.' He smiled down at the dead old man. The tears came into his eyes and blurred his vision. 'I'm sorry, Bing. Here you are.' He tucked the folded notes in the dead man's pocket and got up. The next moment the engine roared, the jeep ran madly towards Shillong, past the peaceful village, up the winding road.

The scared hens squawked, running away in all directions, flapping their wings. The boys yelled for joy and waved at the speeding vehicle. The quiet villagers looked up leisurely and chuckled to themselves. Everything was fine.

B O O K S

FUTURIBLES. STUDIES IN CONJECTURE.
Edited by Bertrand de Jouvenal (Droz, Geneva.
318 pp.)

THOUGH forecasts about the future are usually frowned upon, it is a habit which is becoming increasingly popular as the present grows more and more uncertain. As it acquires a colour of 'science', it assumes respectability. No nation can resist the attractions of economic planning where the element of guesswork often comes in because not all the details regarding the starting point are known. To see the growing interest of economists in 'projections' is enough to convince one that astrologers, palmists and soothsayers have given place to graph-plotters.

In politics, we have seen the gloomy tribe of journalists speculating on 'After Nehru, Who?', with readings varying with assessments of the nation and of heirs presumptive. The idea behind 'Futuribles' is to initiate 'speculation on a large front, narrowed down by constraints of coherence between the various aspects of the future, weeded out by critical discussion and gradually disciplined by slowly developed standards of reasoned surmising.' With one exception, the seven essays in this first volume are political though they take other aspects into consideration.

It is remarkable that the writers are able to speak with greater certainty as they move farther off from their own country. From Max Beloff's tentative conclusions, the political framework in Britain is likely to be unchanged by 1970 — the 'guessing' has been kept to 10 years — but the relationship between the different institutions is likely to vary. Mr. Beloff appears to anti-

cipate closer ties between Britain and Europe and a virtual break-up of the Commonwealth, but at some later date; he envisages either continuance of the Conservative domination or coalitions, with British Labour losing to the Liberals; he anticipates detailed control by Parliament over public sector industries; and he expects greater centralization of authority. All this, however, is so tentatively advanced that only fanatics for some cause will be drawn into controversy which is not the purpose of the 'futuribles.'

If by a not quite impossible chance Britain shakes free from her pessimistic reliance on the U. S. A. and throws up an effective leadership, there is no reason why the Commonwealth should not be developed as a multi-racial group with politically equal units in different stages of industrial development. After all, if Britain has to deal with other nations not from a position of strength and domination but on a footing of equality, it is reasonable to believe that she could do so better with nations familiar with her institutions and basically influenced by British political thought than with nations with different traditions and ideals. Though such a re-invigorated Commonwealth would be different from that which Britain has known, it will still be better than a merger with Europe which could accentuate racial antagonisms and impair British standards of public life.

The other 'regional' studies evoke some obvious objections, though the study of Africa has a commendable thoroughness. Edmund Leach carries optimistic analogy beyond the point of credence when he

asks us to accept that post-Independence Burma has remained 'remarkably loyal to the British model of administration', and observes that 'the powers assumed by the military junta are virtually identical to those assumed by the British Governor and his military advisers during times of political emergency.' The British Governor was, after all, accountable to the home government and to British Parliament, while the military junta is naked autocracy. Mr. Leach, however, has a warning for India which deserves serious attention at New Delhi. Failure to establish healthy relations with Burma, internal disputes and a weak China policy have made India a negligible factor in the calculations of observers of the political future of Asian countries.

Leicester Webb makes two basic errors in his assumptions about Pakistan. 'There is little reason to doubt,' he writes, 'that the central objective of Ayub's Government is now what it has always been — to reach a comprehensive settlement with India.' There is enough in Mr. Webb's own study to raise the gravest doubts. It is a sign of his disjointed thinking that he sets forth all the facts — not excluding Pakistan's overtures to China — and writes glibly of India's assuming regional leadership only after coming to terms with Pakistan but yet fails to appreciate that the central objective of all Pakistan governments is just this, to obstruct India's regional leadership. That India has missed several opportunities does not make any difference to Pakistan's bid for parity with India. It is only after India has settled with China that there can be any serious hope of Pakistan coming to terms. The second error Mr. Webb makes is to expect that Gen. Ayub Khan will be able to restore any kind of democratic government to Pakistan, however sincerely he might wish to do so. The significance attached by Mr. Webb to the 'many admirers, including Jaya Prakash Narain', in India of Ayub's basic democracies, eludes one. If anything, this should be a warning to many Indians including Jaya Prakash Narain to be a little restrained

in their political reactions to lapses from parliamentary democracy.

Rene Servoisie's discussion of the political and economic trends in Africa are by far the most studied contribution in this volume. Much of what he says has a wider application, specially on the subject of political independence and reliance on economic aid. He makes the point that, whether allied to the West or to the Communists, the new African States will all tend to assert themselves while countries extending aid to them will attempt to secure some return for their financial assistance. Many problems touched on by M. Servoisie are not unfamiliar to us in Asia though they present themselves here in a somewhat rawer form. What M. Servoisie does not mention is the effect of greater candour in one part of the world on persons experiencing similar conditions in another. In fact, he is somewhat optimistic when he observes that 'the situation in Asia is quite different.'

Bertrand de Jouvenal and Jacques Ellul complete this survey with some exceedingly gloomy predictions for the future, and both of them are looking farther afield than 1970. To feel that your political institutions are superannuated but to be unable to see anything better is far from satisfying. The danger of this loss of faith can be measured by the fact that the struggle for power between the two blocs takes place on neutral territory. 'I may be wrong, I hope I am wrong,' writes M. de Jouvenal, 'but I feel that a wise man coming to us from a new State, earnestly searching for political institutions which, on being transplanted to his country, would fully guarantee it against arbitrary power and the invasion of personal freedom, would not find in our countries any definite institutions sure to procure such results.' This problem does not confront the Communist who, whether he believes in the Communist State as it exists or not, always suggests that the defects are transitory, and very often believes it too.

This brings me back to the start of my argument: The British 'imperialist' at his

best envisaged his mission as building up British institutions and seeing them flourish among non-British peoples. It was by no means an unworthy object. There is no reason why the creation of communities of free men should not continue to be an ideal which draws together the different members of the Commonwealth. But here we come up against M. Ellul's portrait of Western Man in 1970 as a man without bearings, living a life drained of all meaning. To this, there is no answer — or only one, which is not something outside the possible, the hydrogen bomb — a meaningless end to a meaningless world. Happily, it is a thought beyond the practical acceptance of human beings. M. Ellul's projection, like the sharebroker's trend chart, has assumed too much and too little.

S. NATARAJAN

Religion and Prosperity

HINDU CULTURE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PLANNING IN INDIA by William K. Kapp (Asia Publishing House, 228 pp. Rs. 20.)

AFTER so many years of effort no single under-developed country has 'taken off,' in the Rostovian sense, in the last decade or two. Economic development there has been, but it has been confined to those portions of the world that are already prosperous; Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and, of course, Japan. These countries are now plunged in the problems of affluent societies while other parts of the world still remain imprisoned in poverty, ignorance and disease.

This raises a very basic question: Why do some countries become rich and why do others remain poor?

There is an increasing realisation that capital plus manpower is not enough for economic development. Many other factors play a role; climate, resources and so on. But none of them provide a complete answer.

In recent years social scientists have been paying increasing attention to the

influence of social and cultural factors on economic development. It is in the study of such factors that some satisfactory — or perhaps one should say less unsatisfactory — answers have been provided to questions like: Why does Switzerland, with no natural resources whatsoever, attain such a high standard of living while Brazil, richly endowed with resources, remains in poverty? Or, to take another pair of contrasts: Why does Denmark prosper and Indonesia not do so?

If Max Weber's association of the rise of Protestantism and the rise of capitalism has any validity, — and surely it does — then it would seem to follow that other ethics have other influences. It is surprising that so little attention has been paid to the influence of Hindu culture and values on economic development. Would these help to explain the unsatisfactory nature of economic growth in India during the last decade and a half? Professor Kapp's collection of essays is an excellent beginning in the study of this subject.

To whatever extent we accept Weber's thesis of the Protestant ethic, there is no doubt that the transition of Europe from a traditional to a modern industrial society was greatly helped by the process of secularisation which began with the Renaissance. It was the religious reinterpretation which followed which gave special authority to hard work and thrift, and what values could have been more useful for economic development?

Prof. Kapp points out that no such religious, political, scientific, intellectual or technological reorientation has taken place in India. Is such a reorientation a prerequisite of economic growth? Or to what extent will it be a consequence of it?

Professor Kapp's analysis of Hindu culture and the social system, in collaboration with his wife Lore L. Kapp, is a convincingly competent summary of a vast and difficult area. They point out that though Hinduism has not altogether been opposed to the pursuit of material objectives, these have always been subordinate to the overruling value-orientation of the Hindu reli-

gion: the basic religious purpose have remained liberation and release. It is therefore the saint and not the practical man who occupies the place of honour in society. Renunciation, austerity, sacrifice, and not the accumulation of wealth or political power, gain the full respect and admiration of the Hindu.

Most of us Indians at some time or another say, in an apologetically aggressive manner, that we are of course more interested in 'spiritual' values than people in the West, who are more wholly dedicated to 'material' values. If this means that Indians do not like money or the good things of life it is manifestly untrue; but if it means that self-realisation and contemplation are emphasized at the cost of practical affairs and hard work then it is probably true.

'Cyclical time', writes Professor Kapp 'and cosmological causation belong to those basic categories of Hinduism which stand in the way of the emergence of one basic prerequisite of economic development, namely, the conviction that man does make his own history and that, while the conditions under which he makes history are given, social and economic progress are not a matter of blind destiny but depend upon human choices and social action'.

Non-attachment has been another Indian ideal. The Gita says, as Professor Kapp points out, that 'to action alone has one a right and never at all to its fruits.' 'Let not the fruits of action be thy motive,' it demands. And if this ideal has been inculcated in the people over many centuries, is it not possible that some reorientation is necessary before we can expect people to act purposively and productively in the economic or, indeed, in other spheres?

Mahatma Gandhi perhaps made a beginning in this effort by reinterpreting the ideal of disinterested action as any act of service, including particularly bodily labour. His effort in this sphere, as in others, has not been pushed particularly far by his successors.

The effect of the extended family system on society has often been pointed out. It

encourages high birth rates, stresses traditions and discourages innovation or change. The patriarchal and authoritarian structure of society also helps to create a 'dependency' complex. People come to rely on outside help rather than on themselves and their aspirations tend to remain static. Every society is subject to change and in fact is continually changing. No society can, or should, remain stagnant. It is not only the societies in the underdeveloped countries striving for development which must change and adapt themselves to meet modern economic needs. Even highly industrialised societies have to be continually adapting themselves to note new forms of political, economic and social organisation. Witness the adaptations made necessary by increasing European integration.

As Professor Kapp says, 'Hindu culture and society are caught between conflicting and contradictory forces: the forces of tradition and the forces of modernisation. The former manifest themselves in such basic thought patterns as cyclical time and cosmic causation, the doctrine of rebirth and *karma*, the ethical ideals of selfless action, sacrifice and renunciation, the interpenetration of the supernatural, the temporal and social, the continued strength of the caste system and the disability of the untouchables, the role of the joint family and the traditional personality structure. The forces of modernisation are represented by the introduction of universal suffrage, policies of land reform, the channelling of investment funds into industrial production, the creation of social overhead capital, such as the provision of educational facilities, the construction of dams and irrigation facilities, administrative reforms, special treatment of backward castes and classes and a host of similar measures. The critical question remains as to which of these forces are likely to prove stronger in the long run'.

There are many modern, large economic enterprises in India; some have been established in recent years, others have had over 50 years of history. Men and women from

the villages have taken to modern urban industrial life with seemingly little disruption. There has never been any scarcity of people willing to work in modern enterprises. If some entrepreneurs have brought business and commercial attitudes rather than entrepreneurial and industrial ones, there have been others fully committed to the building up of an industry. There are innumerable examples amongst entrepreneurs and workers alike of full commitment to the industrial way of life. And yet the total picture remains one of frustration rather than fulfilment. Could it be that some of our traditional, historical, cultural and religious attitudes influence our economic development, planning and implementation as much as the accumulation of capital, the acquisition of foreign exchange and the learning of modern technical skills? This is a fascinating area which needs exploration and it must be hoped that Professor Kapp's interesting work will be followed up by many others.

AAMIR ALI

Apparent Reality

A NEW LOOK AT COMMUNISM Edited by A. B. Shah and Nissim Ezekiel. (Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, Bombay. 68 pp. Rs. 3.)

A NEW LOOK AT COMMUNISM' though an edited work is largely the product of one man—Professor A. B. Shah who is now Executive Secretary of the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom. Convinced of the need to clarify the nature of Communism and explain its appeal to intellectuals in Asia he called together a seminar at Madras in April 1963 to discuss different aspects of the Communist ideology. Among the papers presented to the seminar were two which need special mention: a paper by Professor Shah himself on 'The Myths of Communism' and another on 'The Indian Intellectual and Communism' by Professor R. Bhaskaran of Madras University. The latter was reprinted in *Quest* (No. 38, July-Sept. 1963). Not

quite satisfied with this adventure in Madras, Professor Shah held a second seminar at Bombay in August-September, 1963. The papers discussed at this second 'session' are brought together in the brochure under review. Some of the papers present an unfinished look and it is possible that Professor Shah might give them to us in a better garb later.

Of the seven papers here reprinted three are by foreigners, Philip Spratt being regarded as Indian by the reviewer. Two of the articles in this group—Zbigniew Brzezinski's 'Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism' and Robert A. Scalapino's 'Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia' are reprints from *Foreign Affairs* and it is possible that most students of International Affairs have already read them on their first appearance. It is therefore perhaps unnecessary for the reviewer to comment on these. The third foreigner in this group is Janet Chapman, Consultant to the Economics Division of the Rand Corporation, who is now in India.

Mrs. Chapman specialises in Soviet economic history and in her paper she discusses the place of the consumer in Soviet economic planning. Mrs. Chapman concedes that Soviet living standards are now at a respectable level but she seeks to examine these standards within the perspective of Soviet economic history. People in the developing countries believe that if Communism has done nothing it has at least been able to give the masses a better economic deal. A close and careful study of the Soviet economic system will serve to dispel these beliefs. Even if economic transformation is speedily possible under Communism the basic question for the developing countries is whether the price that is paid for it in human terms is not too high. In this context, Mrs Chapman's paper touches one of the central strands in the discussion of Communism.

The four remaining papers by Indians are most important. Professor Shah discusses four myths of Communism—the myth of scientific socialism, the myth of the revo-

lution, the myth of social justice and the myth of proletarian internationalism. Professor Shah writes with great confidence and it is evident that he knows a great deal of Marxist literature at first hand.

If Communism is built on these myths, as Professor Shah asserts, how is it that it makes so powerful an appeal to intellectuals in Asia? Philip Spratt devotes himself to this question. Spratt argues that among the several reasons are: the appeal to general rebelliousness and the urge to break away from the past; the general envy and hostility to the West which communism successfully exploits; the preference of the Hindu mind for a 'complete' philosophy—a philosophy which seems to provide a final answer to all questions. The underlying argument seems to be that just as the Vedanta seeks to offer the final answer to the mystery of the cosmos, so Marxism has the final solution to the nature of human history and the key to social development. This is an interesting hypothesis but perhaps it needs further exploration. The appeal of Communism is also dealt with by R. Srinivasan of Bombay University. Communism is effective he suggests, 'not because of its promised Utopias but because it fills the vacuum left by the breakdown of traditional religions and attitudes. As is only to be expected, Communism with all its authoritarianism, its dogmas and texts, and its definite obligations is admirably suited to fill the breach.' There is much to this 'vacuum hypothesis' which has been put forward by other scholars as well.

Finally, there is an account of the Communist Party in India by Aloo Dastur, who heads the Department of Politics of Bombay University. Central to her discussion is the extra-territorial loyalty of the Party. She focuses attention, too, on the ineffective handling of the Communists within the country. She speaks of the infiltration, 'in a large way' of the public services and the defence establishments by Communists during the last fifteen years, and she describes this infiltration as an 'open secret'. One wishes at this point that the writer

had elaborated the comment and provided whatever documentation was possible.

'A New Look at Communism' may not perhaps come up to the expectations of the expert, but it is necessary to remember that the brochure is not really addressed to the expert and that there are not many 'experts' in this field in the country. It serves a useful purpose in clarifying some of the issues of Communism. The very fact that Indian intellectuals got together to clarify the nature of Communism and ask the right questions regarding the appeal of the ideology is an encouraging sign. Finally it must be said that the 'new look' was possible only because most intellectuals in this country had not really looked at the problem at all.

S. P. AIYAR

The Subcontinent Papers

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 1858-1947 Select Documents edited by C. H. Philips with the cooperation of Prof. H. L. Singh and Dr. B. N. Pandey (Oxford University Press, 773pp. 90s.)

THIS is the fourth volume in a series of collections of documents which brings together source materials on the history of the Indian and Pakistani peoples from the earliest times up to 1947. The aim is 'to illustrate the political, administrative, military, economic, social and constitutional aspects of their growth'. The first three volumes will cover *Early India*, *The Era of Muslim Rule*, and *India under the East India Company*. The present one deals with the Raj proper.

The object is as competently executed as it is happily conceived. Extensive use has been made of the voluminous State papers of the Governments of Britain and India and of the numerous private papers of eminent statesmen and soldiers. The very vastness of the material makes selection a difficult undertaking. The editor has chosen 'significant nuclear themes through which the processes of history may best be illustrated and understood'. These are

divided into three parts. The first traces the establishment and growth of representative institutions and ends with the great divide, 1917; the second with the culmination, 1947; the last covers the defence, economic, social and administrative problems and policies of the Indo-British empire.

A collection of documents must reflect not only the trends but also the mood and the spirit of the times. This volume amply fulfils that test. There are all the important statutes from the Government of India Act, 1858 to the Indian Independence Act, 1947; the state papers, from the Queen's Proclamation, on which she bestowed so much attention ('The Queen would be glad if Lord Derby would write it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female Sovereign who speaks to more than 100,000,000 of Eastern people...'), right down to the proposal of June 6, 1947, which paved the way to partition. Included, too, are some of those speeches and statements which echo the period. Gandhiji on satyagraha, Gokhale on the swadeshi movement and Iqbal's Presidential address to the 1930 League Session in which he mooted the Pakistan idea. Even in so comprehensive a work omissions are inevitable and it is perhaps captious to point them out. Nonetheless, this reviewer wishes that Gokhale's Political Testament, 1915, the famous Memorandum of the nineteen elected Members of the Indian Legislative Council, 1916 and the terms offered by Maulana Azad to Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman for a coalition ministry in U.P. after the 1937 elections had been included. The latter particularly, for it marked the parting of ways between the Congress and the League.

But these are minor faults. Against them must be set the large number of documents, seldom found even in standard works, which are reproduced in this volume; the text of the Muslim address to Lord Minto, for instance.

The editors have sought to illustrate not only the course and nature of policy-making

at the centres of government but what was stirring in Indian society; and to show the process of action and interaction between the forces. In this they have eminently succeeded. Unlike most writers they have not concentrated on British activity to the neglect of Indian development, or on politics at the expense of social and economic problems. No other book gives as judicious a selection or as clear and balanced a picture of Indian history.

A. G. NOORANI

Breathing-Space

THE PLAN UNDER PRESSURE by Barbara Ward (Asia Publishing House, 60 pp. Rs. 5.)

THIS small book consists of the two lectures that Lady Jackson, better known as Barbara Ward, delivered in Bombay in December 1962 at the invitation of the Council for Economic Education. Lady Jackson has for many years been an unofficial spokesman for India's plans of economic development and her views have therefore a special claim on our attention. Also, coming soon after the Chinese invasion, when the emergency created by it was taken seriously by the Government and the people, her analysis of our planning is all the more significant. These lectures are perhaps the first systematic attempt at such an analysis outside the office of the Planning Commission. In view of the fact that the core of the thinking about the Fourth Plan will start and probably be completed during 1964, the criticism and suggestions she makes gain in importance.

Pointing out the basic fact that 'the Chinese have the power to come and go as they choose', and this is true even a year after she made the statement, Lady Jackson discusses how the breathing space provided by the unilateral Chinese cease-fire may be utilized to build up the military and economic strength of India. She mentions the weaknesses—low rate of growth, neglect of agriculture, bottlenecks in

transport, unending red tape—from which the plan was already suffering when the invasion broke on India. These strains are bound to be aggravated by the need to spend nearly Rs. 450 crores more on defence every year. The suggestions she makes are, if not all novel, no less important, especially in view of the ideological bias of the Planning Commission combined with its tendency to function like one more department of the administration. More specifically, one hopes that Lady Jackson's plea for greater emphasis on agriculture, a more rational system for allocating foreign exchange, and recognition of the value of a sensible pricing system for capital in deciding priorities of investment will weigh with the planners in formulating the Fourth Plan.

Lady Jackson is clear that non-alignment is *not* an issue with the West in determining the quantum of its aid to India. What really comes in the way of adequate aid is the continuing deadlock between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. An understanding between the two countries is indispensable for organizing effective defence against China. The alternative is a huge additional but avoidable strain on our economy and, though perhaps out of delicacy Lady Jackson does not mention it, the postponement of the recovery of the territory already seized by China. She avoids the temptation to guess whether such an understanding will materialize in the near future; being an Indian, the reviewer cannot. One has to confess that until the present leadership in either country is succeeded by one that is more sober and far-sighted, the chances of an understanding are bleak indeed.

A. B. SHAH

Invention or Research

INVENTING THE FUTURE by Dennis Gabor
(Secker & Warburg, 231 pp. 21s.)

PROFESSOR GABOR is one of those rare individuals who are gifted with an understanding of practically the whole

gamut of human knowledge, and every chapter of this book is turned out in resplendent scholarship. In a sense it resembles very much a report from a committee of senior scientists, economists and sociologists who—meeting in a spirit of 'Come now, and let us reason together'—have issued a penetrating exposition of the state of the world and suggested remedies for inventing a future in which tensions and problems tend to fade away. That the report is marked by sanity and undeviating commonsense—a reverberating moral intelligence which refuses to accept catastrophe and shies away from pessimism—is at once its greatest strength and its greatest limitation.

The first part of the book is devoted to a stock-taking of the technological, economic, social and political condition of civilization in the year 1963—of the imbalances and dangers created by (i) the suspicions of conflicting political ideologies, and (ii) the different stages of development and the consequent variation in the standards of living, thinking and education in different parts of the world. Though none of it is very striking or new, there is a formidable array of data which, having been processed through the mind of an eminent physicist, is presented with a rare degree of lucidity. The layman will find that it contains much food for thought together with some sound reasons for the sober optimism which marks the mood of nations today.

Professor Gabor's basic thesis is that our civilization faces three great dangers. The first is destruction by nuclear war, the second is being crippled by overpopulation, and the third is being overtaken by the Age of Leisure before we are psychologically prepared for it. As far as the first danger is concerned he makes out a convincing case that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have already reached a state of nuclear armament where the 'Dead Man's Revenge' would be terrible enough to prevent either of them risking aggression. But, even in the unlikely event of either country becoming mad enough to unleash

a nuclear war, it would only create a situation for which man is already psychologically prepared through the centuries—of rebuilding civilization from the debris of war.

It is then to avoid being struck down by the second and the third danger that man must immediately start working to create the correct climate. In an underdeveloped country like India, where the fight is for improving the standards of living only, we tend to think of population growth as a national rather than a world problem. But the seriousness of it is put into perspective by Professor Gabor's careful analysis of the growing depletion of raw materials and also the limited chances of fresh sources of cheap energy becoming available or of the remoteness of the chance of Man being able to extend his domain to other planets.

The problem of how we shall tackle it when the Age of Leisure comes upon us has been bandied about by thinkers for a long time but has had little serious attention paid to it so far, (though undoubtedly its partial advent has already become a prolific source of income to psychiatrists in the West). As a matter of fact Lord Keynes, writing in as far back as 1930, said: 'I think with dread of the readjustments of the habits and instincts of the ordinary man, bred into him for countless generations, which he may be asked to discard within a few decades... must we not expect a general 'nervous breakdown'? We already have a little experience of what I mean—a nervous breakdown of the sort which is already common enough in England and the United States amongst the women of the well-to-do classes, unfortunate women, many of them, who have been deprived by their wealth of the traditional occupations—who cannot find it sufficiently amusing, when deprived of the spur of economic necessity, to cook and clean and mend, yet are quite unable to find anything more amusing...'

The value of Professor Gabor's thesis lies in his concise restatement of these pro-

blems as much as it does in a vivid picture of the world in which they will have to be faced. 'Till now', he says, 'Man has been up against Nature; from now on he will be up against his own nature.'

Beyond this, however, the book is a disappointment. In the solutions he has to offer, commonsense over-reaches itself. For the common man the central happiness will be in the family unit; education aimed at creating 'maturity' will break down all barriers so that the next unit of loyalty will be the world itself. The uncommon man—the one with his IQ in the top bracket—will find happiness in *true* science which will provide congenial work for him as far as thought can reach; he will find happiness in living and working for others. 'Hardship courses' will give the young an outlet for their energies and a chance to prove their heroism; population will be kept stationary with voluntary submission to eugenics. In short, there would be an enlightened welfare state on a world scale. I wonder how we can expect to make a start in this direction in the present state of great national differences—and whether any attempt, beyond the one which all thinking men are already putting in, can be made at all.

This kind of solution cannot be gradually injected; it will, one somehow feels, be found automatically when the problems are actually with us. For who can tell, what fundamental changes may have taken place by then; or who, again, can discount the possibility of Religion suddenly gathering strength and rushing in with a solution all its own... If the future is to be consciously 'invented', Professor Gabor, who is an inventor should have applied himself to the problem with the single-mindedness and zeal of an inventor; he has contented himself by dealing with it in the method and style of a research worker... the problem is too big and too complicated for that.

IQBAL LUKMANI

Devotional and Carnal Love

LOVE SONGS OF VIDYAPATI Edited by W. G. Archer (Allen & Unwin, 139 pp. 30s.)

'A ROSE is a rose is a rose', but the moon is... well the moon is a breast or a face or a tyrant or a lover or his beloved and a beautiful woman is, of all things incomprehensible to the western mind, a she-elephant!

This is a book which must be read at least three times by the honest western reader if he is to get anything out of it. At the first reading one is tempted to dismiss it as just another addition to the volume of 'Erotica Indica' which has, over the years, been presented to the English reader. One can picture the staid English 'pater familias' putting it somewhere where, he hopes, the youngsters will not get hold of it. Well, if that's the way his mind runs, one cannot exactly blame him.

But let us go through the book again; this time to search for literary merit and to find out whether it does, in fact, add to the westerner's understanding of a particular phase of Indian verse and cultural thought. The first step in our second approach must be a careful study of the translator's note and Mr. W. G. Archer's introduction.

'Love poems', says Delen Bhattacharya, 'in particular lyrics, do not translate well.' He goes on to add, 'The poems, in their original versions, are often concerned with rhyme, internal echoes and play on meaning. None of these can be reproduced in word for word translation.' The translator is, therefore, compelled to take liberties with the original in order to produce something which, he trusts, the reader of the translation will understand and appreciate. I, for one, cannot help regretting the unfortunate loss of the inter-play of words and meaning and rhyme. To me, half the beauty of Indian, or for that matter any, poetry lies in just these things. There have been translators who, having decided that liberties must, in any case, be taken, have gone one step further and have rendered the gist of the original in verse in the

language of translation. Probably the greatest and most successful of these translators was Fitzgerald. He was not the only one and I can call to mind an English translation of what is claimed to be one of the finest descriptions of the eyes of the beloved to be found in Hindi verse.

*'Ami, halahal, madh-bhare,
Shwet, shyam, ratnar.
Jiyat, marat, jhuk jhuk parat,
Jehi chit-vat ik bar.'*

This has been rendered into English thus:-

*'Life-giving nectar, white;
Poison as black as night,
And blood-red wine.
Within thine eyes I see,
From time to time, all three,
Beloved mine.
And life or death for me,
Or love's mad ecstasy,
Come not by chance;
For, every mood of mine
Is but what I divine
Within thy glance.'*

That, I believe, reads well in English and is, at the same time, a fairly accurate rendering of the real meaning of the Hindi verse. But...and it is a very big But, would it be an understandable translation to the average English reader unless somebody explained to him that, in Indian thought and usage, the elixir of life is traditionally white, that poison is traditionally black and wine traditionally red and that these have, in turn, been linked with the white of the eye, the black of the pupil and the red of the small veins running across the eye?

Let us, therefore, admit that Mr. Bhattacharya has, within the limits naturally imposed by translation, done a very good job. Had he tried to render his translations in verse, which he could undoubtedly have done, the poems might have been more pleasantly readable in English, but the resulting work, instead of being a slim volume, would have become a mighty tome

consisting, mainly, of explanatory footnotes.

Mr. Archer's introduction is meant for the serious reader and student. As we are entering upon our second reading in a spirit of earnest seeking, we may consider ourselves to fall within this category. The introduction falls naturally into two parts. One part gives us the historical and cultural background against which Vidyapati wrote. The second part deals with the traditional attitude towards love poetry at the time, the accepted symbols and similes,—amongst which we find the explanation for the 'she-elephant',—and the manner, not entirely restricted to the East, in which the carnal and the devotional were interlinked. It does not lie within my province to quote extensively from the introduction; rather, let the reader study it carefully himself.

Now for our second reading. In the light of what has gone before, it will be clear, except perhaps to the puritanical or prurient reader, that what, at first reading, seemed to verge on the pornographic, in fact represents a mode of thought and expression that was not only acceptable to but appreciated by both the courtier and commoner of that time. Let us remember that Shakespeare was, long after his time, 'Bowdlerised'.

One is struck by the way poets who could not, one imagines, have read each other's works, have expressed the same emotion in almost the same way. Reading Vidyapati's poems many examples come to mind. Let me quote just one. In the poem, 'Honey is Life' (no. 20), the last two lines read:

*'Whom can you blame for his death
If you are the murderer?'*

Compare this with the words of the Persian poet who says:

*'Be-jurm-o-Khata qatalam az naaz-i-
butan kardi.
Khud tegh-zadi bar man, nam-i-
digaran kardi.'*

This may be rendered into English thus:-

*'I did no wrong but you killed me.
It was you yourself who smote me
with the sword (of your beauty)
Then you blame another (for having
reduced me to this state of)
lovelornness.'*

Our second reading, then, has taught us a number of things. We have found that the epithet 'indecent' cannot be applied in a haphazard manner but must be restricted only to very narrow limits of period and forms of society. We have learnt that imagination, simile and modes of expression are not limited to one language or one country. Finally we have, I trust, added to our store of picturesque language and the knowledge of how people, other than ourselves, feel when in love.

Now we come to the third and, probably, most difficult reading. This time we shall endeavour to find the religious or metaphysical significance of the Radha-Krishna theme as dealt with by Vidyapati. Westerners tend to shrug off the Oriental contention that there can be, and often is, a very close association between carnal expression and metaphysical thought, as a specious excuse for getting doubtful literature past the watchful eye of the moral censor. Yet, when you come to think of it, the 'Song of Solomon', is found in a *most respectable* Book and the verses of Omar Khayyam are accepted by people to whom wine is anathema, as having definitely 'Sufistic' connotations.

On pages 30 and 31 Mr. Archer compares Jayadeva's treatment of the Radha-Krishna theme (the absolute male superiority and demand) with Vidyapati's approach, wherein, at times, Krishna is chidden because of his neglect of Radha. We find, too, in the verses that Krishna cries, 'I cannot do without you.' How shall we interpret this?

We might well read into it an indication of a change of trend in religious thought. A change from the conception of a God demanding slavish, unthinking obedience and adulation, to the idea of a God who

not only desires to be loved but is, Himself, capable of loving and who is sad rather than wroth when His creatures fall away from Him.

At an even higher metaphysical level Krishna's cry, 'I cannot do without you' reminds me of the last two lines of a quatrain attributed to Omar Khayyam wherein the God says to his worshipper:-

*'Bar ma ba-jamal-i-khud tajalli kard ast
'An kas ke ze tust nazir-o-shahid-i-ma.'*

Which means, roughly, 'I am glorified only by the lustre of him amongst you who worships and bears witness to Me.' This thought, in turn, brings us a step nearer to the concept of the latent Godhead in each individual, the 'Tat twam asi', 'That thou art' of Vedantic philosophy.

It seems that we have come a long way from breasts like moons to the latent Godhead in man and from maidens like she-elephants to the fusion of Radha-Krishna into that Divine Love that 'makes the world go round'. There may be those who look askance at the concept of 'the God within' and 'Tat twam asi'; yet wasn't it St. Paul who said, 'It is not I but the Lord Jesus Christ that dwelleth in me.' It was, I believe, Sant Kabir who wrote:-

*'Tun Tun kar ke Tun bhiya,
Raha na mujh men hun.
Jad apa parka mit gaya,
Jit vekhan, tit Tun.'*

*'I thought of Thee, and nothing else
beside,
Until the 'Me' that was within me
died.
No more of 'Thou' and 'I', at one with
Thee,
Thyself in all things, everywhere, I
see.'*

In any case, we have been trying to arrive at some idea of what Vidyapati *probably* thought in the light of the ideology of the times and the society in which he lived. We should not, in the arrogance of our modern 'advancement', try to foist upon him what *we* think he *should* have thought.

Anyhow, read the book yourself and see what *you* think.

A. H. MORTIMER

Suburbia

MR. STONE & THE KNIGHTS COMPANION
by V. S. Naipaul (Andre Deutsch, 160 pp. \$16.)

THE recent immigration laws in England would be quickly rendered obsolete if Mr. V. S. Naipaul's latest novel, *Mr. Stone and the Knights Companion*, were to be widely read over here. It really is a most depressing book, though amusing and acute. My heart sinks when I think that I am shortly to depart for England's green and pleasant etc. peopled by all the poor harmless sad lifeless Mr. Stones, getting off buses in bowler hats, rolling up their lives tidily like umbrellas, feeling the approaching chill of age and emptiness, hating the next-door cat for intruding on their gardens, making feeble jokes at parties where one glass of wine is served 'as though it were a liqueur'.

Mr. Stone's only non-quantitative contact with life is in a dream of flying effortlessly through the streets and round the office, to the amazement of his colleagues (Mr. Stone works in Excal, a monolithic concern); then suddenly he finds himself married to a bright widow called Margaret. Going into the bathroom, he now finds two pairs of false teeth mocking him from the window ledge. Old age still advances; only comfortable solitude is gone. Worse, Margaret's statutory Feminine Touch edges him unwillingly into the position of Lord and Master; she and his dodderly housekeeper Miss Millington now hang around like submissive parasites, eating heartily at his expense, expecting things of him. All women begin to look like leeches — there is a fearsome encounter in a Cornish tea-shoppe with another man who has already crossed the line of retirement, even more horribly looked-after by two females: the resulting feeling of caged fear pushes Mr. Stone into a first and last burst of

creative energy. He conceives a plan for 'helping the poor old people', commits it fervently to paper, night after night in the hitherto unused 'study' — Margaret and Miss M. tiptoeing exultantly about with hot drinks — and sends it up to Head Office.

To his staggerment, this is pounced on, and in less time than it takes to say Parkinson's Law is set up under the joint supervision of Mr. Stone and Excal's PRO, Whymper. Whymper is a nice study indeed, and Mr. Naipaul is to be congratulated for picking on a type so temptingly caricaturable. Brash, slick, sexy in idiom, Whymper intends to 'lick' Mr. Stone's idea 'into shape'. In his junior-executive jargon the department is now, snazzily, a 'unit' for promoting a new Company project.

"This is interesting," Whymper would say intently, his eyes narrowing. "You are holding me. This is what I want." And the swoony, unsurprised felicity of Mr. Stone, the realisation of his flying dreams, the newly-enjoyed deference from colleagues, the tender glory of creation, fades under the onslaught of Whymper. He is one of the New Men. Mr. Stone is just an old man, and his contribution, once made, is now being used by Whymper for his own professional, vulgar ends. The whole treatment of the scheme of Mr. Stone is delicious. When they discuss the name of the scheme: 'We want something really inspiring,' Whymper said. 'Something that will actually get the old boys out on the road and up to the various front doors.' Mr. Stone had not thought of a name at all. He feared a further cheapening of his idea. 'Luncheon Vouchers are big business,' Whymper said. 'And you know why? The name. Luncheon voucher. In those words you have lunch, crunch, much mouth, rich. You even have belch. Why, the words are like a rich meal. That's what we want. Something that would explain. Something that would inspire. Something memorable.' 'Veterans,' Mr. Stone said.

So Mr. Stone diminishes again to a faceless office worker on the edge of retirement. A sad story; and Mr. Naipaul to-

wards the end, attempts to assert the undoubted tragic element more fully. He doesn't succeed in this, though this is certainly a good book, mainly I think because he has established the ludicrous so firmly to begin with. The mixture of absurd and pathetic in Whymper comes off very well indeed; and this is also true of Margaret (poor thing, she comes off much the worse, in spite of being a less obnoxious 'character' — I suspect Mr. Naipaul of working off some anti-female feeling here, with signal success). But Mr. Stone is one of those ordinary men so difficult to give life to, a near automaton at the beginning, perfect for Mr. Naipaul's particular, immensely detached, faintly horrific comic manner, but awkward in the part he is intended to fill at the end. I don't mean that I want each and every novelist to purge us with p. and t., and still less that the novel is a failure, I think it's great success. But Mr. Naipaul is a skilled and mature writer enough to be trying for more than this — at least, that is what I fondly imagine all serious writers to be trying for — and unless he brings himself to write his heart out, he might — with his already slightly mannered elegance — swerve along that barren path that Iris Murdoch and Muriel Spark are already following. Which would be three novelists too many for a country whose literary glory used to reside in being, according to Dr. Johnson and Voltaire big and bad.

JILL HUGH-JONES

Rigid Spontaneity

FOLKSONGS OF INDIA by Hem Barua (Indian Council for Cultural Relations; Distributed by Allied Publishers, 88 pp. Rs. 6.50.)

'FOLKSONGS', says Hem Barua in the Preface, 'are a natural flowering of the rural landscape'. Therein lies the futility of collections like this one. Songs particular to a region, a tribe, a village have no more chance of surviving by translation into a language as foreign to them as English than buds picked from a variety of soils,

cultures and climates would have of blooming in a city warehouse. To place a folk-song on a printed page accompanied not by music but with copious notes and comments is to deprive it of its life-breath. The repetitive refrains of many of them, so dependent on rhythm, which make for a feeling of fellowship and camaraderie in community singing seem monotonous and stilted out of their context, as in this Bhojpuri song:

*'In one forest wanders an ant
In one forest wanders a cow
In one forest wanders the daughter of the
Ahir's mother,
With bells fastened on her breasts.'*

Imagery and direct metaphor, which abound in folksongs, and which flow from the character and sounds of a language as well as from the natural environment, are painfully forced in translation. The lover as a bumble bee or a girl's hair as a tamarind tree are common enough images in Indian song yet they just don't come off in English. Sometimes too exact paraphrasing can be embarrassing:

*'Layers of fresh cream appear on your
bosom
O drinker of fresh milk.'*

No matter how rich and various, robust, tender, melodious, imaginative or philosophical these songs really are, our attitude to them is self-conscious. So is the author's with his painstaking commentary, and self-consciousness is the ruination of any spontaneous art.

It is true that 'urban life is, slowly but surely, making a rude inroad into folk-life'. Our music is played to us by records, on the radio, in concert halls. Whether we like it or not the spontaneity and participation of group singing are lost to most of us. A tinge of guilt accompanies the uneasy fear that we are inexorably growing away from a joyful tradition. Perhaps this is what prompts such anthologies. But what is left in them is neither poetry nor song but a mixture of elementary sociology and nature study. If one pays a great deal of

attention to detail one may get an inkling of the flora and fauna and some of the customs prevailing in different parts of the country. As an effort to put a bit of rural life within our grasp the book is as depressing and unsound as the mentality which awards prizes for city artists painting with folk motifs or factories, like Jamini Roy's, specialising in tradition. The fault is not the author's alone but the institutions' which sponsor sterile and thoughtless transcribing of tradition into textbook.

LINA MAYADAS

SHORTER REVIEWS

Lack of space prevents us giving full-length reviews to all the books we receive. Those we think are likely to have some interest for our readers are briefly noticed in these columns.

BY LAEEQ FUTEHALLY

THE PHYSICIAN AND THE FLAG by Norah Richards (Alpha - Beta Publications, 66 pp. Rs. 5.50)

FOR SOMETHING like forty years Mrs. Norah Richards has been a familiar name to whoever claims any interest in the theatre. She has been active in every facet of theatre work, as producer, actor, playwright, lecturer on drama; and now even in retirement continues to be avidly interested in the work of others.

The present volume consists of two plays which are in a sense parts of the same play. *The Physicians* was written in 1918, but due to some accident, was published only last year, when it once more seemed to have regained a certain topicality. The Sick Man of play drifts towards his death in spite of the ministrations of the doctors gathered about his bedside — the eminent Drs. Steam, Whistle, Whitehall, Delhi and Montagu Ford — leaving his affairs in the hands of his young and active son Bharata. The hopeful note on which the play ends is turned to bitterness in its sequel, *The Flag*. This sequel was written thirty years later at the time of the Independence and partition of the country. Mrs. Richards reflects in it the disappointment of Bharata and his brother who find that after years of effort they have achieved the kind of independence which neither of them really wanted.

Mrs. Richard's characters in both plays are

meant to symbolize institutions, and indeed they do so very faithfully. After reading the play it is possible to write an accurate political dissertation on the exact situation which obtained when Mr. Curtis, the constitutional expert visited Delhi in 1918. At that time, the play would surely have aroused great interest. Still, it is of some satisfaction to know that the unfortunate episode which stopped its publication forty years ago did not prevent it from ever appearing in print at all.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN WORLD
by John Ferguson (Cambridge University Press,
181 pp. 25s.)

IN EXACTLY one hundred and eighty pages (and on most pages half the space is taken up by a picture) Prof. Ferguson has attempted to give a description of all the different civilizations, religions and movements whose forces have played a part in shaping the Europe which we see to-day. Even though he leaves out Asia — except for a small section on Islam — this means that a formidable amount of material has to be squeezed into a minute space. The text is — as indeed it has to be — a little sketchy; but it is not

superficial. Mr. Ferguson has achieved a careful balance; and if his tightly rationed words do not allow him to go deeply into any subject, he makes up for it by touching only those points which are the real highlights. Mr. Ferguson's views are always sound standard rather than inspired unconventional. For him the watershed between the medieval and modern worlds, for instance, continues to be the Renaissance rather than the Scientific Revolution which is stressed by Butterfield and some other modern historians.

The purpose of so swift a survey of Western history can only be to give a few bearings, as it were, to young minds which might help them to get a perspective of the currents which have created the world which surrounds them. The large print, thick paper and excellent production makes this the kind of book which is easy to read and handle. The liberal use of beautiful and apt photographs liven the book without turning it into a luxury article. They will enable the intelligent child to absorb much sophisticated information without effort. The child will become truly educated without departing from G. K. Chesterton's solemn warning to all children

"...and don't believe in anything, That can't be told in coloured pictures."



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POSSESSION by Kamala Markandaya (Putnam
224 pp. 18s.)

THE *possession* of the title means, naturally, the possession of one person by another, the type of possession which cannot be forgiven by the one and which leaves no feeling of guilt in the other. Lady Caroline Bell is a young and beautiful English lady who discovers, in a South Indian village a goatherd lad who has painted very good pictures in a cave. She compensates his father with five thousand rupees, and takes the boy off to London and where she begins to live off him emotionally. The 'inevitable' things happen, the boy has a couple of other love affairs as well, he has a brief *success fou* in the world of art, and finally, one way and other, he fights his way back to his village, his cave, and his Swamy who has always, even from a distance, been a force for good in his life.

There is nothing intrinsically improbable about the story. Miss Markandaya is a competent manipulator of the English language. She is obviously familiar with the two worlds of Madras and London between which her tale moves. The slight predilection for overwriting should not seriously detract from the plausibility of the story. In complaining that her book fails to grip or to arouse even a faint excitement, one is paying her the compliment of being surprised that she has not yet become a writer who can catch and sustain the attention of her reader. It is true that none of her other novels have managed to induce any suspension of disbelief either. But in the

present case the failure is not the obvious one of an unlikely plot, as it sometimes has been before. Perhaps it is the contrived details that our credulity refuses to swallow. Is it possible, for instance, that an unlettered village boy, however gifted, who has not had any kind of guidance should take the art world of London and Boston by storm? Is it possible for someone even as egoistic as Lady Caroline to refuse to allow the boy she had picked up to be taught to read and write? The very relationship between Lady Caroline and Ansuya — who tells the story — is improbable. They have met formally and there is neither warmth nor mutual liking between them. Caroline always speaks to Ansuya with veiled rudeness, Ansuya thinks that Caroline is a selfish cheat, and yet they continue to seek each others' company as if they were the most intimate of friends. How else could the story be told, how else could Ansuya report all that went on in Caroline's house?

'Dear Jumbo. He came like a buffer between Caroline and me, . . . , at a time when our emotions were being sharpened and abraded to wounding point, to whatever ugly climax came of the friction.'

This intense kind of writing is wasted on the reader who has not stopped wondering what reason compels the two to continue meeting at all. And in a sense this typifies the whole book. The dramatic self-consciousness of the writing widens, rather than bridges, the gap between the reader and the writer.

Our Reviewers

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LINA MAYADAS is a free-lance writer.

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,

Frankly speaking, I find it difficult to take serious notice of Dr. P. S. Ray's letter from Chicago (Quest 39) for the simple reason that most of it is irrelevant to the theme of my article. To remind Dr. Ray, since it has escaped him, the aim of my article was to explain why Democracy was finding it hard to prosper in India. All the points raised were discussed only from that angle, and only so far as they had a bearing on the subject. Nowhere in my article was any reference made to the adequacy or otherwise of the price exacted by our ruling class for their gifted talent for political organisation. The introduction of such an extraneous and irrelevant point is a trick of distortion and misrepresentation. The background of the ruling class had to be emphasised since it determined to a great extent their performance in authority. The article makes it quite clear that they are of the masses, and, as such, cannot be any different. They are frustrated failures who found refuge in politics, and, who, very naturally, dislike the idea of going into the wilderness again. Such a leadership cannot but prove to be an effective barrier in the way of healthy development of Democracy.

Some of the statements made by Dr. Ray in his short letter are truly amazing and lead on to queer logical conclusions. According to him our political leadership failed in other vocations because it had a one track mind and only one talent, that for political organisation. A logical conclusion would be: all those who fail to make good in other vocations have talent for political organisation, or, at least should try their hand at politics to enable them to discover their hidden talent. Unless Dr. Ray proves that the Indian political leadership, though a failure in other vocations, has given remarkable proof of its talent for political organisation, his statement would lack the support of logic. Yet such a proof he carefully avoids putting forward.

Some more quaint conclusions can be drawn from his assertion: in the country, all political talent resides in those who fail to take to a vocation; also, those who make a success of other

vocations have either no or poor political talent. Following from the latter, if he is a success at linguistics and philosophy (minus logic), he should not pontificate on such political subjects as Democracy. In fact, he and I are in the same boat: if I am an amateur, so is he. To illustrate further, his assertion would lead us to the conclusion that no successful lawyer should take to politics — a manifestly ridiculous proposition, since successful lawyers take to politics like fish to water.

His assertion that too few of our elite are better fitted to rule than the peasants has no direct bearing on the subject of my article. Nevertheless, since he has brought the subject up, his own admission later in the article, that a few are more fit to rule than the peasants, should have led him, on more deliberation, to different conclusions.

In his affluence, Dr. Ray may assert that the price exacted by our ruling class is low, but, perhaps, he would be gracious enough to permit others to hold a precisely opposite view. Such an attitude of tolerance is the essence of democracy, I can assure him.

Dr. Ray's belief that a physician can only make a mediocre political being need not be controverted for fear of being accused of self-vindication. Nevertheless, might one ask Dr. Ray how high a calibre of political genius is required to discover that Democracy in India has some hurdles to cross before it can establish itself? Apparently, Dr. Ray has not yet emancipated himself from the shackles of the caste system.

The analogy of the Weimer Republic is clearly brought out in the article, which may be re-read. It does not need a Versailles Treaty or a financial collapse to realise that certain drawbacks are common to both constitutions: the biggest drawback being that both were erected upon a substratum of absolutism and feudalism. Some people having little foresight can only learn from disasters. It is also well known that certain minds labour under the handicap that they are incapable of discovering the basic similarity of figure between two triangles unless they are absolutely congruent.

Yours truly,
H. R. PASRICHA

REPLY

Sir,

Mr. Pasricha's thesis is that the transition to democracy in India has been rushed along at an unsafe speed so that its future has become uncertain. He presupposes, but does not discuss, that democracy is worth having, and that an evident poor quality of the ruling class will encourage an end to democracy, either by external aggression or by internal coup. If his reference to the Weimar republic is any guide, he senses the danger from the direction of the armed forces and the extreme right wing.

Why is democracy worth having anyway? Not because it is the respectable thing. It is a sheer necessity if we are to survive and prosper as a nation. Policy decisions are not likely to be correct without adequate information, and adequate information does not come in proper channels without free inquiry and free speech. National independence was not won until the masses rose from their traditional apathy and fought along with the other classes, and will not be maintained in this modern world if they do not choose to help again. The miserable illiterate peasant who knew only how to keep his place and wanted only to be left alone would not make the best kind of worker in a factory or the best kind of customer for modern products. Freedom, wealth, knowledge, and power are rapidly changing their traditional character of things that decrease if divided to become things that multiply when shared.

Slowing down democracy can therefore be justified only if the speed of its development is proved to be unsafe for its success or continuity. This is what Mr. Pasricha maintains on the ground that the ruling class is deteriorating because of admission into it of too many who are unfit. He does not, however, consider several possibilities in this connection. Becoming a member of the ruling class does not mean exactly the same thing for all persons. Unfitness, too, may be of different kinds, and one who is not fit to talk to Premier Khrushchev may still be fit enough to say who is. The unfit may be quite aware of their unfitness and so not try too much to exercise their newly acquired power. The unfit may be eased into positions of largely symbolic power. The same mechanisms which operate to slow down the diffusion of power from out of the ruling class also operate within the ruling class itself to differentiate kinds of members. The question is not whether the ruling class contains inferior men or in what numeric proportion, but how useful and economical to the nation is the actual total performance of the ruling class as a whole.

Another way of making the same point is to compare with the situation before national independence, when the country was effectively ruled by fewer than a couple of thousand men, most of whom were individually of outstanding integrity, superior intellect and exceptional impartiality as between castes or religions or races. But the government they administered placed the interests of another country ahead of India's, in spite of all the considerable good done to India. The quality of the ruling class is relevant only when it affects the cost and the speed of implementing chosen policies, or the choosing of these policies.

There is another thing one should note in this connection. There are in every society a number of not so good men who are in a position to do great harm. One technique for minimizing the evil they do is to give them restricted but legitimate occasions and scopes to exercise their power. This is the proverbial injunction to "join 'em if you can't lick 'em", and is practiced by the best democratic parties everywhere.

The upsurge of the masses has not been understood properly yet. There is no single distinct uncrossable barrier between the rulers and the ruled in present day India. There is thus no psychologically real solidarity in today's India to be called without qualifications or reservations, 'the masses.' There was under the British occupation. The uncrossable barriers which do exist in India now are of caste, religion, and to a very large extent, of language, region or vocation. The cold wars internal to the society are not focussed into one great cold war, but are diffused into many overlapping and criss-cross cold wars. This diffusion is certainly one effective and healthy way to hold mutual distrusts within the limits of safety. It is a weakness in much political thinking that abolishing conflict is taken as the aim instead of civilizing it. No living society has ever been free from internal conflicts. They have differed, however, in the manner of conducting these conflicts, and in consequence in the amount of good or bad new goods that have come out of them. It is precisely the absence of a firm line between the rulers and the ruled which gives India today a chance to evolve patterns that will turn these internal conflicts into the production of objectively good things.

It is true that power is being given to people faster than they are learning to use it. This is characteristic of all democracies, and is uncomfortable more often than unsafe. One cannot live in the USA for some time without becoming alarmed how much power is being thrust into the hands of even children. Persons not considered

fit yet to cast votes are nevertheless allowed and encouraged to drive lethal weapons like sports cars. There are limits to the extent and the rate of the distribution of power.

But these limits do not include a 'laziness' including climate or a 'vain and egotistical' national genius, which would be conditions impossible to change in any foreseeable time, and would stop democracy rather than slow it. Fortunately, such identifications are neither proven nor provable.

Restricted franchise is not a solution to any of the real problems. It makes sense as an innovation only as preparation towards a partition, as the South Africans are beginning to discover, and as the Malays were wise enough to understand and counteract in time. Further, it can be enforced only if the armed forces intervene in politics. Any political intervention by the army will presuppose a continued political dominance by it. But a continued dominance will require more than a restricted franchise, also such other things as curtailment of press freedom, large-scale preventive detentions, etc. Furthermore, an army that governs does not win wars. Continued acceptance of a different role will make it no longer serviceable as a fighting machine, and India will have to become more completely dependent on external protection. An intervention by the armed forces can be justified only if the civilian government has already suspended freely and fairly elective representation, if there is *de facto* no democracy.

If, however, restricted franchise can be enforced without intervention of the armed forces through the present system of adult franchise, then the Indian people are assumed to be capable of a most extraordinary act of self-denial. That Mr. Pasricha might so think of them, in spite of his harsher words elsewhere, is reassuring. But then a people with such moral potentiality might as well be asked to actualize it in another direction, namely to learn how to use the power instead of giving it up, to risk less being a traitor to science or nation and more often a traitor to ego, caste or family.

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

Dear Sir,

Despite Mr. K. K. Sinha's love for mixed metaphors, his discussion of the Sino-Soviet conflict (QUEST, 39) shows a far-ranging grasp of the problem. However, his reading of the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute so far as India's armed strength is concerned seems to be open to question.

Mr. Sinha is probably offering here a philo-

sophical base for thinking on India's defence. 'The essence of the Indian position', he tells us, 'should now be to work out, in cooperation with other south-east Asian countries, both a short term and a long term defence strategy not only for India, but for South and East Asia as a whole, (query: is south-east Asia the same as South and East Asia?) as an integral but semi-autonomous part of the worldwide Western defence system, and any Soviet aid should be supplementary to and a further strengthening of that system in the region'. He does not explain why he thinks that the solution of India's defence problems will be easier if these are merged in the problems of the defence of 'South and East Asia as a whole'. Indeed, the Europeans have found NATO a convenient, if rickety, structure; but this can hardly be said for those who erected CENTO and SEATO. Mr. Sinha might well assert that these alliances have languished for lack of a leader of India's stature, and this could be debated; but does he have any evidence for suggesting that Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Japan are eager for India's cooperation — let alone leadership — in this matter?

Advising us not to worry unduly about Russian reactions to India joining 'the worldwide Western defence system', Mr. Sinha expresses the view that 'the Russians will still cooperate with India to the extent India wishes them to cooperate'. It would be unkind to accuse him of wishful thinking. One can only assume that he has special sources of information which lead him to predict such Russian behaviour. I would have liked to know a little more about the nature of this information.

Sincerely yours,

SATISH C. SABERWAL

REPLY

Sir,

Mr. Saberwal's questions are quite pertinent but it will be difficult to deal with them here as each of them requires some discussion. However, I will briefly touch some of my arguments and considerations.


For a proper defence strategy in this part of Asia, Japan has, in my view, an important role to play. Therefore, not merely South-East Asia but also East Asia or Far East Asia has to be taken into account.

The political situation has been considerably changed since the establishment of CENTO and SEATO. But it is also noteworthy that none of the SEATO powers in Asia have been militarily attacked by Communist China while India, out-

standing for its non-alignment policy, was the object of aggression. Even so, nobody would disagree that the SEATO-approach needs revision. Of course India's coming into the picture of a concerted regional defence arrangement would substantially alter the situation still further. If today Thailand, South Viet-Nam, Japan, Taiwan, Burma, Ceylon or even Nepal do not show any overt inclination for India's cooperation in this regard, it has been mainly due to India's persistence in not caring to cultivate these 'smaller' neighbours (as Sm. Lakshmi Menon recently admitted after her tour of these areas) and because of her dreamy insistence that no threat from China was implied. It will naturally take some time before these self-inflicted scars will be healed by positive diplomacy in these countries by India. Only then will it be possible to evaluate the reactions of these countries towards India in the matter of a regional defence effort. But India must have a perspective and a policy towards that end, now it has seen its past perspective crash with tragic results. I am not discussing Pakistan's attitude as this will require a separate treatment. But *in the long run* the same argument holds, namely, that India has not cared all these years to develop a regional defence policy and has even behaved in a way that has created a gulf between these neighbours and India.

I have had occasion to discuss the Russian strategic and military considerations in its attitude towards India elsewhere. Briefly, Russia would be interested in having a strong India vis-a-vis China primarily because otherwise Russia's eastern flank would have to be guarded heavily against Chinese aggression. Russia may under certain circumstances even be interested in egging India on to be active in the North in order to keep a large proportion of the Chinese forces locked up there. This is irrespective of ideology. While Russia would welcome a pro-Soviet India so that the former would manipulate, or at least greatly influence, Indian defence-cum-foreign policy, it will still cooperate with India even if the latter is not very much influenced by Russia in the framing of its foreign policy. For Russia's strategic considerations remain unaltered and Russia has no alternative. It cannot afford to be pro-China in order to balance the scales against India even if India is not eager to exhibit friendship and maintains a correct distance. While India cannot be, as at present situated, a threat to the Soviet Union, China already is and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a historical situation that has become alive again. Thus my statement is based on the internal logic of the situation and not on special information.

K. K. SINHA



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A. P. BARNABAS, member of the staff of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, has published numerous articles in various magazines in India and abroad; his first book *Social Change in a North Indian Village* is to be published shortly.

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BASUDHA CHAKRAVARTY is a journalist. Among his publications is *Manavatabad*, a study of humanism in Bengali.

TIBOR MERAY, journalist, novelist, winner of the Kossuth Prize (Communist Hungary's highest literary award), broke with the party, and, upon the collapse of the Revolution, escaped to Paris. Amongst his publications in English are *The Revolt of the Mind* and *The Enemy*.

SUDHANSU BIMAL MOOKHERJI, formerly of the Gadjah Mada State University, Indonesia, and of the University College, Mandalay, is author of *Indian Minority in South Africa*, *The Indenture System in Mauritius*, etc.

KEKI N. DARUWALA is a member of the Indian Police Service. This is his first publication outside College magazines.

G. BURCE BUNAO, one of the editors of *COMMENT* (Manila), has written a play and several short stories and is expecting to have two volumes of his poems published next year.

SUDHIR SONALKAR has just passed his B.Sc. examination; this would be his maiden publication.

BONOMALI GOSWAMI has published several short stories in English and two books of short stories in Bengali.


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
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


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
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


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
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
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Here are shoes for those who want solid comfort. Strongly constructed of top grade leathers and long-wearing soles, these shoes hold to their shapes longer and give extra seasons of wear. Slip into a pair, and feel the comfort of fine leather craftsmanship.

Bata



Longlife Newcut 14.95



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Suchitra 13.50



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how much energy from 750,000 tons of oil

Enough to keep all the cars in India going for weeks—or to make one of them run non-stop for centuries! Seems a lot of energy? It is. 750,000 tons of oil is the annual capacity of the Noonmati refinery. But it is only a part of India's requirements! One reason why crores are spent to find new wells, set up new refineries, enlarge the distribution network. It is a gigantic enterprise—one in which L&T* with its drilling rigs and bits, valves, petrol pumps and geophysical process and telemetering instruments play an important role.

When you next stop at a petrol pump, consider —

How long does it take to drill a hole — minutes? hours? days?

Depends. If it's drilling for oil, it could be anything!

Minutes through soft soil, hours through hard rock. And the drill can go several thousand feet into the earth! Not any drill—only those special L&T drills and bits designed for the job!



How much petrol to fill the tank?

Say, 50 litres. And, imagine, all over the country thousands of such tanks are being filled. A round-the-clock job for petrol pumps—an important product backed by a famous name: Gilbarco!



It's no child's play to stop the flow...

Not when it is inflammable petrol! And that, too, in an emergency—say, a fire at an oil refinery! When lives

are in danger, seconds count—and seconds are what it takes to close an Audco Valve. One reason why it is an important component at oil wells, refineries and pipe plants.



Is there oil down below?

Perhaps. But how does one find out! Experts drill a hole, fill it with charge and explode it. They record the shock-waves—but not with a stethoscope! Highly sensitive geophysical instruments are used to discover oil-bearing strata far, far below the earth surface—instruments like the ones made by the world-renowned Texas Instruments Incorporated.



Larsen & Toubro Limited



Divisions: Drilling & Mining · Dairy & Refrigeration · Earthmoving & Agricultural Equipment · Heavy Plant · Industrial Appliances · Electrical Equipment & Switchgear · Instruments · Civil Engineering · Erection · Manufacture · Servicing.

*The complete mechanical construction and erection, including instrumentation of the Noonmati refinery was carried out by L&T