


quest 46

<i>Indian Tradition and Modernity</i>	A. B. Shah
<i>Dichotomy in Hindu Life II</i>	Nirad C. Chaudhuri
<i>Nationalism and Regional Security in SEA</i>	M. R. Masani
<i>The Language Problem of India</i>	Annada Sankar Ray
<i>Is Hindustani Music Spiritual</i>	V. H. Deshpande
<i>Roots of the Dominican Crisis</i>	Theodore Draper
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
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


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ARTICLES

Tradition and Modernity in India	9	A. B. Shah
Dichotomy in Hindu Life II	20	Nirad C. Chaudhuri
Indian Democracy and Crisis of Leadership	29	Ranjit Chaudhuri
Administrative Reforms: An Attitude		
Analysis	35	Hiren J. Pandya
Racing Backwards	40	Annada Sankar Ray
Sorrows of Salinger	48	Sisir Kumar Ghose
Nietzsche's Idea of Social Progress	54	Dayal Saran Verma

CURRENT AFFAIRS

Nationalism and Regional Security		
in South & South-East Asia	58	M. R. Masani
The Roots of the Dominican Crisis	66	Theodore Draper

ARTS

Is Hindustani Music Spiritual?	85	V. H. Deshpande
--------------------------------	----	-----------------

POETRY

Spring	92	Subhash Mukhopadhyay
Poems in Winter	94	Gauri Deshpande
The Unspoken Word	19	Usha Rani
Love's Voice Waiting	39	Usha Rani

SHORT STORY

The Man Born to be King	96	Ka Naa Subramanyam
-------------------------	----	--------------------

BOOK-REVIEWS

Taken Care of	101	Neville Braybrooke
The Emerging World	103	Mahesh Pesai
Nehru: Sunlight and Shadow	104	A. G. Noorani
The Indian University	106	Suma Chitnis
Hemisphere: Asian-Australian		
View-points and Ideas	107	Sibnarayan Ray
Indian Literature: Vol. VII, No. 1		
— Shakespeare Number	109	D. McCutcheon
Technique in the Tales of Henry James	110	Foy Nissen

CORRESPONDENCE

Dichotomy in Hindu Life	114	K. C. Lalwani
-------------------------	-----	---------------

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Tradition and Modernity in India

A. B. SHAH

THIS paper attempts to evaluate the culture and society of India as background for the modernization process. Unlike its counterpart in many other countries of Asia and Africa, this process began in India nearly a hundred and fifty years ago with the appearance of the periodical press in Bengal and Western India. What we have, therefore, to consider is not the confrontation of tradition and modernity in India as though it were a recent phenomenon but their interaction during the preceding decades so as to understand the problems of modernization in the Indian situation. It is in this context, too, that we have to ask certain questions with a view to bringing out the nature of this problem.

Some of these questions are: What do 'tradition' and 'modernity' mean? In what sense does the confrontation of tradition and modernity pose a special problem today? To what extent is the Indian tradition reconcilable with modernity? In particular, is the Hindu religious tradition compatible with the spirit of modernity? If a synthesis is possible, which elements of the Indian tradition are capable of incorporation into the new outlook that modernity stands for? And, lastly, what are the measures that government and other agencies should undertake so as to facilitate the consummation of the process of modernization?

No attempt is made in this paper to answer all or any of these questions exhaustively. What follows is an exploration from the standpoint of the amateur

rather than an authoritative judgment by an expert. Secondly, though the Indian tradition is made up of a number of distinct strands, the paper deals with only one—namely, the Hindu component—with which the writer can claim some degree of personal acquaintance.

Before proceeding with the inquiry, I would suggest that what we need is not precise *definitions* of the key terms, 'tradition' and 'modernity'; rather, we have to be clear about the scope of their meanings and the characteristic elements of each in their bearing on the problem of transition from a traditional to a modern society. In particular, we have to consider three major aspects of both tradition and modernity before answers to the other questions can be attempted. These aspects together express the substance of each with sufficient precision for our purpose and may be stated somewhat as follows.

First, tradition as well as modernity is characterized by a system of thought with reference to which man can order his experience into a meaningful whole. Secondly, there is a system of values, including moral values, which enables man to decide 'which (things) are more to be esteemed, and which less'.¹ Finally, there is the network of institutions through which his search for the good life, as he understands it in the light of his ideas on man and the universe, expresses itself. Together, these three elements constitute the matrix within which man normally moves. They determine his attitudes and patterns of behaviour in relation to himself and to others. Logically, they need not be consistent. What matters is the fact that psychologically they form a single whole. In other words, they influence and to a

¹ Paper submitted to the seminar on *Problems of Modernization in Asia* convened by Korea University at Seoul on June 28—July 7, 1965.

large extent determine one another, but the interaction is not necessarily of the premiss-conclusion form, especially in a traditional culture. For instance, there is no logical relationship between philosophical materialism and hedonism, nor between idealism and a denial of sense pleasures.² More often than not, the role that a philosophical theory plays is determined by the hopes and fears of those who subscribe to it as much as by the strictly intellectual content of its assertions. The reason is not far to seek. All pre-scientific philosophy has embedded in it a number of elements of mythical thought and the latter is essentially pre-logical. 'The real substratum of myth is not a substratum of thought but of feeling',³ which is both a warning and a reassurance against excessive preoccupation with ideology!

The traditional and dominant Hindu world-view as operative for nearly two millennia now, differs from the modern one in all the three respects mentioned above. It is based on the doctrines of *maya*, *karma* and the transmigration of the soul. Its ethical values are essentially transcendental. Not that it disowns secular values; rather, it assigns to them a secondary place by subordinating morality to the supreme value of *moksha* or, at a lower level, to the obligations of *dharma* as traditionally defined for one's caste or professional group. In the former case, morality is denuded of its interpersonal character and the quality of compulsiveness that distinguishes moral from other values. In the latter, the source of values is transferred from the individual to an abstract collectivity. In either case, the ethics that emerges is incompatible with the moral sense of the modern man.

The social institutions of Hinduism are essentially authoritarian in spirit. They discount individuality, initiative and free inquiry, all of which are among the core elements of the modern outlook. The tolerance with which Hindu society is familiar is rooted in indifference rather

than in a recognition of the other man's right to be different. It therefore rarely promotes interaction of ideas, attitudes and practices with the possibility of an eventual synthesis. Within its own fold traditional Hinduism insists on extreme conformism in practice, while permitting considerable latitude in speculation in the philosophical field.

The intellectual and social foundations of traditional Hinduism explain why conceptions of individuality and justice as we understand them today are *essentially* foreign to it. In a sense, till contact with the West shook it up the Hindu mind never came out of its tribal frame. All that the development of culture made possible in the past was a transformation and sophistication, not a supersession of the tribal attitude. Instead of tribe, caste or sectarian religious group—in most cases they coincided—functioned as the organic whole of which the individual was a sentient part, but only a part, so far as the secular aspect of life was involved. The consciousness of individuality manifested itself on the spiritual level and compensated for its absence on the earthly one. Thus while the life of the worldly man is to be governed in every detail by the canons of *dharma*, the *Sanyasin* is free from the normal considerations of right and wrong. Since individuality is meaningful only in the spiritual sense, there is no concept of the rights of man or of social justice and an ethics based on it. Whatever notion of rights and duties there is in the traditional Hindu world-view is a consequence of the preoccupation with *moksha* and of the membership of a limited, divinely ordained group like caste or family. There is no concert of society as made up of individuals who may also belong to intermediate groups. Rather, it is that of a hierarchical complex of groups; the group, not the individual members constituting the group, being the proper unit of social organization. It is true that a somewhat similar view is to be found in some other past societies too. For instance, the

Aristotelian classification of men into citizens and slaves, or the feudal division of society into gentlemen, artisans and serfs had, for the concept of the individual, implications comparable to those of the Hindu classification of men into castes. However, there is an important difference here. In the Greek city all free men were equal and, besides, there already was an egalitarian view of man (advocated by the members of the Great Generation) that Aristotle, like his master, was trying to combat. Nor could medieval Christianity, in spite of its degradation, openly disown its original inspiration of the brotherhood of man. By contrast, the Hindu view of man, unlike the Greek, was practically unchallenged for centuries after it was once well established. Earlier, even Buddhism subscribed, albeit with a difference, to the doctrines of *maya*, *karma* and transmigration, and upheld the caste structure of society except as regards the relative importance of the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas. Thus neither philosophically nor socially was there in the Hindu tradition scope for the evolution, even at a later date, of the concept of the individual and the allied ones of justice and the rights of man. Ethics could only be a body of precepts whose observance would ensure the salvation of one's soul and the perpetuation of the social *status quo*. The characteristic feature of ethics as a system of norms of interpersonal behaviour appeared therefore merely as an incidental implication of its essentially transcendental motivation. It is evident that the claims of social justice as something more than the dictates of charity or humanitarianism could have no place in the Hindu mind. Whatever rights or duties a man had were, as stated earlier, derived from his membership of a particular caste or kinship group. The rights of man in virtue of his simple humanity and the rights and duties of the citizen as a member of society were out of the question in such a tradition.

An important consequence of all this has been that the traditional Hindu mind

is incapable of feeling a sense of civic responsibility or wider secular loyalties for any length of time beyond its own kinship group. It also shows an amazing capacity for harbouring beliefs which are mutually contradictory or at variance with practice. To the outsider this may appear as rank hypocrisy as, for example, it did when the Government of India 'liberated' Goa by force or decided to go in for modern, large-scale industrialization, without ceasing to swear in Gandhi's name every now and then. However, the Hindu does not consider it hypocrisy, and that for a reason which one should understand before passing judgment on him.

According to Hindu philosophy, cognitive and ethical judgments have practically no significance from the standpoint of the *sthitaprajna*. In the *Bhagavad-Gita* the Lord admonishes Arjuna not to worry over the death which his *dharma* requires him to inflict upon his kith and kin: He, the Lord, has already destroyed them in advance. Now it is true that not everyone is a *sthitaprajna*. But the assumption that on any particular occasion characterized by moral conflict one is acting in that spirit is too natural to cause uneasiness to anyone not given to frequent self-examination. In effect, therefore, the concept of *sthitaprajna* enables the Hindu to evade moral conflict and its normal offspring, neurosis, without sacrificing his worldly interests and without feeling humiliation in the face of defeat. The real weakness of the dominant Hindu tradition under consideration here lies, not in its apparent hypocrisy but in the fact that its world-negating philosophy is expected to provide guidance and justification for the pursuit of secular goals. This is bound to end in frustration and often in disaster, as the experience of the post-Independence period amply demonstrates.

The modern world-view is based on empirical, scientific knowledge and is incompatible with the traditional one on all essential points. It relates ethics to certain

basic human urges and looks upon it as a system of norms governing interpersonal relationships. Consequently, the morality it implies is rational, secular and relative, without necessarily losing its universal character. Being secular, it does not belittle worldly success, provided it is achieved by fair means. Being rational, it recognizes the necessity of relating means to ends and of integrating one's ends among themselves as also with those of others with the aid of knowledge and experience. It is relative because its source is to be found in the consciousness of man interacting with its *historical* environment rather than in a Divine Being or a metaphysical principle governing the universe.

The character of modern ethics is directly related to that of modern knowledge. By exhibiting the structure of synthetic knowledge and developing an empirical criterion for the testing of hypotheses, modern science has also brought out the inherent uncertainty of all theories of man and nature. The scientist knows that even the best established theory is liable to be refuted by future experience or subsumed under a more general one. However, while theories change, scientific method ensures that the knowledge it leads to and certifies has a self-correcting quality. An important consequence of this realization has been that the *method* of inquiry is in the modern approach as important as the *findings* of inquiry. This method rules out, besides other things, all talk of absolute or final truth and the intolerance associated with it. By its nature, therefore, modernity shuns dogma and the dogmatic attitude. On the contrary, it encourages criticism as a necessary corrective to those in authority and a precondition for the uninhibited flowering of human creativity.

The intellectual framework provided by modern knowledge and the new ethics to which it gave birth facilitated the rise of new institutions, better suited to the human urges and productive forces released by the spread of education and by

science and technology. More important still, it prepared men to live in dynamic equilibrium with an ever-changing environment. Men learnt to seek stability in a perspective of values, not, as before, in institutions or habits of thought and behaviour.

Industrialization, it should be remembered, came as a consequent of the cultural revolution signified by the term 'modernity', though once it had progressed far enough it accelerated the process of transformation referred to here. Indeed, some such transformation in the ideas and attitudes of a determined minority would seem indispensable for the success of the industrial revolution without recourse to force on a large scale. This is so because the conditions for rapid economic growth are not merely political stability and the availability of capital and technically trained personnel. They are also socio-cultural. A comparative study of the experience of the new states of Asia and Africa would show that though less obvious, these latter conditions are often more important.⁴ Again, it is through them that the spirit of modernity finds its authentic expression, with economic development as its most tangible but by no means its most important outcome.

A philosophical revolution accompanying, if not preceding the industrial revolution is important for another reason too. If the tremendous power that modern technology places at the disposal of the state is not to be used for forging instruments of slavery more hideous than the old, it is necessary that those who wield this power—politicians, technocrats, administrators—and those for whom it is ostensibly used, have imbibed the values of an open society. In the absence of such a value-orientation there is nothing to prevent the state from growing into a Leviathan, which would devour those whom it would claim to protect. The economic interests also of the common citizen are likely to find a very low place in the list of objectives of state policy. This is shown

by the example not only of Nazi Germany and the entire communist world but also of many of the new states governed by dictatorship of one type or other.

It was comparatively easy for the governments of these countries to push through their economic programmes irrespective of their cost in human or economic terms. They did not have to reckon with the revolution of expectations and a commitment to democracy. Their political and cultural backgrounds were authoritarian, even pre-Hitler Germany being no exception as Hans Kohn has shown in a different context.⁵ For them there was no problem of striking a balance between the contrary pulls of the need for rapid capital formation and higher productivity, on the one hand, and social justice and the inhibiting influence of cultural backwardness, on the other. In other words, the task that these countries had to accomplish was that of modernizing their economies, not their societies, and they were free to adopt any means, however inhuman, that seemed to them efficient from this limited standpoint. None of them had to face the problem summed up by 'Tradition and Modernity', in the sense in which India has to do.

There is another sense in which the confrontation of tradition and modernity poses a special problem to India. When the West began to modernize itself, it had certain advantages which are not available to developing societies today. For example, the West had nearly four hundred years to carry out its philosophical, scientific and industrial revolutions before being required to discover a new principle of life. Besides, while modernizing itself, it had the vast resources of colonial empires to enable it to meet, partly at least, the rising expectations of its own people. It could thereby create and sustain the myth of progress, as though it were a law of human society that had merely to be allowed to operate without interference from man and, therefore, also without worrying about the strains that its free

operation was bound to produce. Finally, the West could harness the Christian ethic to the task of cultivating new attitudes and value complexes in harmony with the needs of an industrializing society at a time when the hold of religion was still strong on the minds of men. Incidentally, this also means that there was then no threat of a secular totalitarian ideology backed by military power waiting to fill in, at the first opportunity that presented itself, the vacuum created by the breakdown of traditional values unaccompanied by the growth of a viable modern tradition.

The situation in India today is different from that in the West at the dawn of the modern age. She does not have the advantages that the West then had. Nor, however, does she have many of the handicaps that the West as the pioneer of modernity had to overcome. She can count on the co-operation and assistance of a number of advanced countries. She has also the advantage of a better understanding of the processes of social change, provided she has the will and the clarity of purpose to relate modern knowledge and techniques to her needs. More important still, she has a fairly well developed tradition of a functioning democracy which, though not indigenous, has been taking root in the cultural soil of the country for nearly a century now. The problem that India has to solve is therefore in many important respects different from that of the early West as also from that of most other developing societies of the contemporary world.

For example, the confrontation of tradition and modernity in India is not likely to generate such desperate bitterness as it once did in the West or as it is likely to do in many other countries of Asia. One reason has already been stated above: modernity is not altogether new in India. It is more than a hundred years old⁶ and has during this period been making steady headway. Secondly, the Hindu tradition itself is not homogeneous, as

many of its spokesmen and critics often seem to assume. It is true that the dominant Hindu tradition represented by Shankara is world-negating and therefore inherently incompatible with the modern spirit. But there have arisen at different times a number of protestant schools—including the atheistic and life-affirming one of Charvak—which for a number of centuries seem to have posed a serious intellectual challenge to orthodox Hinduism. The *Upanishads* and the *Mahabharat* contain enough statements to justify the inference that neither the doctrine of transmigration nor even that of a soul independent of the body was universally accepted.⁷ Earlier, the Vedas themselves, especially the *Rig Veda*, point to a society that was free from most of the inhibitions of later Hinduism. The Vedic Rishi as well as the layman relished beef and alcoholic drink. Nor is there in the *Rig Veda* any mention of child marriage, ban on the remarriage of widows, the caste system, *karma*, rebirth or *avatar*. In considering, therefore, the compatibility of the Hindu religious tradition with the spirit of modernity, one has to be clear as to which particular Hindu tradition one has in mind. If by 'Hindu tradition' is meant the framework of ideas, attitudes and institutions as codified by Manu, one has to recognize frankly that it is so much deadwood today. One must also recognize that it is this tradition that is still dominant in Hindu society, though its crudities are no longer prominent today. Sati has gone, widows remarry now and then, child marriages are on the wane, caste is being increasingly secularized and even Brahmins have started disowning Manu in matters of food and drink. But the values and attitudes characteristic of this tradition are very much with us. Some of them may be listed here, such as simplicity and *aparigraha* (non-possession of worldly goods), detachment, respect for the status and authority that go with power, caste, scholasticism, age or sex, and lack of civic concern. The supreme value of life is, of

course, *moksha*, the release from the bonds of *karma* and the cycle of births. All the other values and the attitudes that Hinduism commends have to be in harmony with this *summum bonum* even if some of them may not be deducible from it. All these are rooted in the religious outlook implied by the dominant Hindu tradition and, far from being useful in the modern age, are proving a drag on the development of the Indian society.

This, however, does not imply a complete break with the past. No society can do that, nor is it necessary for India. Her past is remarkably rich and varied, capable of providing a starting point for modernity. It may not contain certain elements of the latter, such as the ideas of free will in philosophy, evolution in science, and an open view of status, role and power allocation. But it offers numerous instances of the spirit of free and critical inquiry of the highest intellectual order, determination to pursue truth regardless of where it leads, a positive and secular approach to life and a tradition of abstract thought necessary for the growth of modern knowledge.⁸ Admittedly, most of these are not part of the dominant Hindu tradition today. The point, however, is that given the will to modernize herself, India does not have to seek inspiration solely from a culture which is not part of her own tradition. She can partly get it from her past and establish continuity with it. Indigenous symbols and myths are available, which can make the transition to modernity less traumatic than it would otherwise be.

However, such use of the past presupposes that there already is a body of men who share modern values and are determined to spread them in society. Their inspiration cannot come from the past. The past can provide a bridge for the masses between the present and the future, provided there is some group in society which knows how to select from among its many strands those which would be suitable for the purpose. The pioneers of the Western

renaissance too looked upon the past in the same spirit. They had no contemporary prototype of what they were seeking to create. And such use alone of the past as harnesses it in the service of modernity distinguishes renaissance from revivalism.

Except for a handful, Indian intellectuals do not yet seem ready for the task. Many of them give the impression of wishing for the impossible, for their approach to the past is characterized more by intellectual and emotional atavism than by critical selectivity. Their modernism does not extend beyond the narrow sphere of their own professional work. This leads to the spectacle of 'a number of people, very efficient and competent physicists, physicians, chemists, engineers and so on, who cling to traditional habits in their *private* life.' For example, 'when they fall ill they not only call in qualified physicians but also perform *pujas* to propitiate the gods, take talismans and consult holy men.'⁹ This is explained by the fact that the Hindus 'actually keep two opposing sets of habit patterns in two water-tight compartments and keep flitting from one to another.' In this respect, the Hindu mind differs significantly from the Western, which 'will feel and suffer (from) the stress of the contradiction.' The difference is probably due to the fact that the West has an organized church, which for centuries exercised complete control over both thought and practice. Hinduism has no church and leaves a wide margin for deviation in thought, provided one is conformist in practice. From this it is but a small step to the types of practice described above.

The problem with the other groups is at a different level. Their conservatism is more often grounded in immediate self-interest and the ignorance of what modernity really is than in any deliberate preference for the traditional way of life. Thus their indifference to social reforms, like the abolition of untouchability or the dowry system, is tied up with privilege and pecuniary gain in the present and

their inability to understand their own long-term interests. But if a departure from tradition or custom, such as women taking up employment, holds promise of easily visualizable benefits, their response, even in the countryside, is more encouraging than metropolitan intellectuals are likely to imagine. Whenever an imaginative leadership and enough facilities to inspire confidence have been available in recent times, people in the rural areas have shown commendable willingness to adopt new ideas and practices. Those who have watched the attitude of the agricultural community in Western Maharashtra to programmes of work in the fields of education, agriculture and even family planning would be inclined to believe that the lack of leadership and facilities, not irrational attachment to tradition, is the real problem that advocates of modernity have to solve.

The rise of the right type of leadership is inconceivable so long as an overwhelming majority of Indian intellectuals continue to live in two worlds, the traditional and the modern, at the same time. This would not have mattered much if their traditionalism were confined to the strictly private sphere of life. In point of fact, it is not so; nor would it be possible to keep traditionalism so confined unless it were to be reduced to mere form as in the West. As mentioned earlier, what seems to have happened with most of us is that we have accepted modernity in our professional work alone. In all other spheres of life, not necessarily personal, we continue to be traditional in our values and attitudes unless personal gain is involved. Consequently, even the Western liberal institutions—universities, for example, or the press—introduced in India, still function largely in an authoritarian way. To take only one illustration, a lecturer in political science in one of the Indian universities who wished to attend a conference of philosophy teachers in another town *during a vacation* had to pretend to be going to his native village in order to avoid obstruc-

tion or a black mark from the Head of his department. This is, no doubt, an extreme case but it exemplifies very well the authoritarian attitude that governs the organization and working of the Indian educational system. It points to the failure, for which there is no excuse, of this most important agency of modernity in a developing society. Ironically enough, the failure in the post-Independence period is greater than under British rule.

The heart of modernity has to be located in the universities, for the latter cannot be true to themselves unless they embody what distinguishes modernity from any of the pre-modern traditions: namely, the liberal spirit in its broadest sense and the restless search for truth which is science. Technology and the economic development that it makes possible are but a by-product of this 'basic engagement with truth'.¹⁰ This suggests a crucial distinction between modernity and modernization, which needs to be stressed in the climate of developing societies. Modernity has a wider connotation than modernization. The latter refers to civilization and mainly implies a high level of literacy and urbanization with vertical and geographical mobility, a high per capita income and a sophisticated economy that has gone beyond the take-off stage. Modernity, on the other hand, connotes a certain type of culture whose quality is determined by rationality, the liberal spirit in its broadest sense, plurality of opinion and centres of decision-making, autonomy of the various fields of experience, secular ethics, and respect for the private world of the individual.

In the light of this distinction between modernity and modernization it is difficult to share the economist's confidence regarding the role of industrialization in relation to modernity in a country whose universities are a failure and whose dominant tradition has little of the modern spirit in it. Of the processes that are generally mentioned as accompanying industrialization, operational rationality is the only one with any

direct bearing on the values and attitudes of the persons involved in it. The others are sociological (urbanization), or strictly technical (monetization, mechanization, specialization, and large-scale organization for production and distribution). They can only have an indirect influence on the non-professional aspects of personality. In other words, though modernity leads to industrialization and modernization as broadly defined above, there is very little in the latter to imply the growth of modernity as its necessary consequence. Confidence regarding the role of industrialization as regards the promotion of modernity would therefore be justified only on the assumption that it would be carried out without jeopardizing the democratic framework of the Indian polity. On this assumption, then, the major problem posed by the confrontation of tradition and modernity in India would be basically humanitarian: what steps should be taken so as to minimize the strains of the transition to modernity and thus avoid unnecessary suffering to the common man?

For two reasons this view of the problem seems unduly optimistic. First, it overlooks the possibility of industrialization without seriously weakening the authoritarian character of an inherited culture. That this possibility is not merely logical—like the one of the sun's failing to rise tomorrow—has been proved by the experience of Germany and Japan before the Second World War. Secondly, the view in question does not take into account the likelihood of the rise of a dictatorship in response to the call of modernization in an underdeveloped society in the contemporary world (Russia, Egypt, Ghana, Burma). Indeed, in modern times the socio-cultural factor would seem to be of crucial importance in enabling a developing society to modernize itself without disrupting its democratic framework.

This point gains in significance when one observes that in such societies not only the masses but also the elite, particularly those

sections of it which directly contribute to policy-making, often equate modernity with industrialization for all *practical* purposes. One consequence of this confusion is that in the preparation and implementation of programmes of economic development the human factor is generally neglected. Not only modernity but even the more limited aim of bringing about industrialization is likely to be defeated thereby. What makes this situation disturbing is the fact that very little work has been done by Indian economists, educationists and other social scientists on this aspect of the problem of economic development. As Gunnar Myrdal observes in a slightly different context, most of the literature one comes across in this field is by Western scholars interested in the problems of developing societies.¹¹

The failure to distinguish between modernity and modernization would also explain most of the heart-burning over certain aspects of contemporary life. For example, one comes across in India criticism of youth, who would not visit temples or uphold the traditional view of marriage. It loses much of its force if one accepts the definition of modernity given earlier. For if one agrees that 'the liberal spirit in its broadest sense and the restless pursuit of truth' are at the core of the modern outlook, one would be prepared for a dissolution of many of the traditional values and attitudes. Those who stand for modernity would not regret that this should be so. Indeed, they would perhaps feel that it is not happening fast enough.

This is not to suggest that religious feeling in the non-doctrinal sense is ruled out by modernity. Those who are anxious on this score are perhaps guilty of confusing the mystic with the theologic aspect of religion. The former is as old as man. It is an expression of the aesthetic¹² side of his personality and has nothing to fear from modernity. Einstein and Tagore, to take extreme examples from two different cultures, were religious in this sense. The theologic aspect of religion, on the other

hand, is historical in origin and essentially rational and normative in motivation. In this sense, 'religion from the first had to fulfil a theoretical and a practical function. It contains a cosmology and an anthropology; it answers the question of the origin of the world and the origin of human society. And from this origin it derives man's duties and obligations'.¹³

The mystic and theologic aspects of religion, though interacting with each other, are mutually independent. There is no reason to believe that the former is, either logically or psychologically, incompatible with science, although the development of knowledge would naturally influence its quality and mode of expression. The problem of the West does not lie in what some thinkers consider an excessive cultivation of rationality. It lies, rather, in an inadequate cultivation of it and in the consequent neglect of the non-theoretic¹⁴ or aesthetic needs of the human psyche. Perhaps the difference is merely verbal. The point to note is that what Dewey¹⁵ calls the method of intelligence is not merely compatible with but would rather demand a balanced as against a lop-sided development of personality.

The other aspect of religion, which we have termed 'theologic', lost its *raison d'être* after the rise of modern science and secular ethics. If it still lingers on, that only illustrates the capacity of the human mind for harbouring contradictions and the refusal of human habits and institutions to die as soon as their utility has been exhausted.

In the light of the discussion so far, it is obvious that very little of the dominant Hindu intellectual and social tradition is capable of co-existence, not to speak of integration, with the modern outlook. This does not preclude the possibility of much of this tradition being carried over into an industrial society that is not modern in spirit. However, there are other elements of the Hindu tradition to which modernity is not opposed. They

belong to what Dr Raj Krishna has happily called 'the area of indifference'¹⁶ in relation to modernity. Some of them are really complementary to it, for they are concerned with the aesthetic side of personality, with which modernity has little directly to do. Such are, for example, the Indian traditions in music, dance, painting, dress, handicrafts, and the like. Similarly, a number of festivals or celebrations, though religious in origin and name, are today primarily social in motivation and they are likely to continue with suitable modifications. All this may look insignificant in comparison with what will have to be banished. In fact, the opposite is the truth. What modernity can do is only to bury what has ceased to be viable in the modern context. What is living will easily come to terms with it.

The main problem, therefore, is not that of devising ways and means for the preservation of what is valuable in tradition; it is, rather, that of identifying such elements. A few of them have been mentioned earlier: music, dance, handicrafts, and the like. One may also seek to preserve a great deal of the colour and variety in certain aspects of Indian life such as food, dress, and festivals. However, this is not enough. It is also necessary to identify the elements that must go if the spirit of modernity is not to be crushed under their weight. This implies an inquiry into the structure and working of each of our major institutions—family, school, the university, to name only a few—and an insistent demand for their reform from the standpoint of modernity. What, for instance, should be the lines on which our universities and colleges may be reorganized so as to make them really vital centres of a modern culture? This is not a question, let it be remembered, of financial

resources alone. The national laboratories¹⁷ and other institutions of higher learning have, in spite of generous facilities, failed as miserably as the universities in this respect. The various Akademis and the National Book Trust, none of which can seek an alibi in the paucity of funds, have also failed to make a significantly better showing. What is involved here is something essentially non-financial: values and attitudes and the distribution of power among those who work in these institutions. It is these things which in the final analysis determine the quality of their life, smothering creativity and making even revolt appear as a gesture without meaning. The consequence, as is to be expected, has been the growth of frustration, opportunism and cynicism among those on whose work the transition to modernity depends.

As a precondition for the improvement of the situation, it is necessary to study and bring out how the operation of traditional values and attitudes distorts the functioning of modern institutions in India. This is a task that no official commission can perform. It requires a number of qualities in those who undertake it—technical competence and an eye for detail, a radical approach rooted in a commitment to modern values, experience, and the courage that comes out of *partial, not complete* failure in the attempt to realize them through work in these institutions. In other words, the task implies further inquiry by intellectuals. Their analyses and recommendations can form the basis of discussions in subsequent seminars and implementation by those who stand for modernity but are perhaps not sufficiently clear as to what it implies for the policies and modes of working of their own institutions.

¹ Ortega y Gasset, *Mission of the University*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1946, p. 64.

² Laxmanshastri Joshi, *Introduction to S. N. Athavale, Charvak — Itihas ani Tattvajnana* (in Marathi), Prajna Patha Shala, Wai, 1959, p. 13.

³ Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, Yale University Press, 1944, pp. 79, 81.

⁴ Cf. Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*, Gerald Duckworth, 1957; Adam Curle, *Educational Strategy for Developing Societies*, Tavistock Publications,

1963; Frederick Harbinson and Charles A. Meyers, *Education, Manpower and Economic Growth*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.

⁵ Hans Kohn, *Is the Liberal West in Decline?*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1959.

⁶ The First Indian-managed periodical was started in Calcutta in 1820, reportedly by Raja Ram Mohan Roy who died in 1833; the Elphinstone College was started at Bombay in 1834; *The Times of India* was started in 1838.

⁷ *Brihadaranyaka* 2/4/12, 3/2/12, 3/9/28, 4/5/13-14; *Katha* 1/1/20; *Chhandogya* 8/8/4-5, *Shanti Parva* 21/23-28, 186/14-15, 219/19, 219/40-41.

⁸ Curiously enough, however, the idea of proof is not present in Hindu mathematics, though deductive argument was not unknown.

⁹ M. K. Haldar, reported in the Discussion on *Tradition and Modernity* at the seminar convened by the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom and the Asian Office of the Congress for Cultural Freedom at New Delhi in November 1961.

¹⁰ Raj Krishna in the seminar referred to above.

¹¹ Gunnar Myrdal, *op. cit.* p. 99.

¹² 'Aesthetic' is used here in the sense in which F. S. C. Northrop uses it in his *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, Meridian Books 1959, chs V and XXIII.

¹³ Ernst Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 94. It may be mentioned that Cassirer does not make the distinction between the two aspects of religion adopted here.

¹⁴ The term is, again, Northrop's, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ John Dewey, *Philosophy of Education*, Littlefield Adams & Co. 1956, p. 105.

¹⁶ Raj Krishna, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Cf. *Indian Scientific Policy*, Memorandum submitted by the Institute of Political and Social Studies, Calcutta to the Review Committee of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research on National Research Laboratories, published in *Minerva*, Vol. II, No. 4.

THE UNSPOKEN WORD

Who can speak to me
 That word, I would have spoken?
 Had my eyes not failed to speak
 In the silence of unuttered love?
 Who will stand the chill
 Of life's unmeaning fire?
 Oh, I could know, what I once failed to see,
 To feel behind slow time's uncertain wing,
 A sigh that owns all mankind, and all
 Its unredeeming grief!

USHA RANI

(Translated from the Panjabi by SATYA DEV JAGGI)

Dichotomy in Hindu Life *Courage and Intelligence*

NIRAD C. CHAUDHURI

I WISH to follow up the discussion of the opposed traits of the Hindu character published in the previous issue of *Quest* by analysing two other dichotomies, namely:

Courage → ← Cowardice
Stupidity → ← Intelligence

But this time I shall not describe the four contrasted characters separately, because what I shall say about the nature of one in each pair will by implication make that of the other clear. It should also be noted that in discussing the second pair of traits I have not chosen the *dominant* one, i.e., stupidity, but the *recessive* attribute, intelligence. This has been done because Hindu intelligence in its contemporary form, whose specific colour is cleverness or cunning, is so suicidal that it can be looked upon as crass stupidity.

Physical Courage

In speaking about the courage of the Hindus, a clear distinction must be made between its physical and moral expressions. I begin with physical courage. The British, when they were ruling India, hardly saw any among the Hindus taken in the mass. They spoke only about the cowardice and timidity of the Hindus, especially in comparison with themselves and even the Indian Muslims. They were frankly contemptuous of any Hindu claim to be brave. This disdainful scepticism developed into ill-natured ridicule when

the nationalist Hindus challenged British power. The British showed themselves most prompt and eager to scout the idea that the nationalist leaders possessed any courage. It was even hinted that Mahatma Gandhi's claim to have served in an ambulance in the Boer War was dubious.

The Hindus, on their part, retorted by saying that the British Empire in India was won for the British by Hindu soldiers, both of the north and the south. The argument between the two sides never went further than the ventilation of pride and prejudice. The British in India forgot the distinction between truth and falsehood very easily when either race prejudice or the sense of national interest was roused, and the Hindus reacted typically to the criticism with only bad temper. They never offered an alternative rational explanation or interpretation. So, even now they have no clear or correct idea of the true nature of their courage and cowardice.

I shall offer an analysis and appraisal here, which though it cannot be exhaustive, will I hope be an advance on the nebosity that obtains. There is no doubt whatever that physical, as distinct from moral, courage exists to a very high degree among the Hindus. But it has some special features. For one thing, it is not easily roused. Even the Sikhs, whose soldierly qualities were never questioned, had to be 'blooded', according to their experienced English officers, before they were at their best. Secondly, the courage is always emotional, and not under the control of reason. A certain boiling point

of the emotions has to be reached before the Hindu will respond to any danger with courage. Thirdly, the courage does not seem to have any relation with the bodily strength and stature of a man. A very powerful man might be a rank poltroon. The British recruiting officers were perfectly aware of this.

But the most important feature of the Hindu physical courage is its uneven distribution among the different elements of the population. It varies not only from individual to individual, as it does everywhere, but also from group to group. There are a large number of ethnic or social groups in India which possess no courage at all. This is largely a matter of caste, breed, social status, and the traditions of the group.

The British military authorities in India were, of course, always conscious of these disparities, and they based their theory of the 'martial races' of India on them. At least one thing can be said for this theory: it worked and gave the Indian Army the best fighters available; and of the authorities it has to be said that they were fully convinced of the truth of their theory. Acting on it, they recruited their soldiers not only from specified classes, but even from certain clans and sects. I once wrote that the British military officer in India was as great a believer in the caste system as any Brahmin could be. They seemed to have read the Dharma Sastras. However that might be, when experimental departures were made from the military caste system they did not give satisfactory results. A Bengali regiment (the 49th) was raised during the first World War as a concession to Bengali sentiment, but its record in Mesopotamia was not very outstanding, though to Bengali literature it contributed Havildar Kazi Nazrul Islam.

So, General Sir George MacMunn, once Quartermaster-General in India and one of the most vocal preachers of the theory of the martial races, said that the Bengalis might beat a Scottish regiment at football (an allusion to Mohun Bagan's victory in

1911), but that did not mean that they would be equally good as soldiers. But he also consoled us Bengalis in the following words: 'However, they are making far more important contributions to world's science. Every man to his last, and Abul Huq Rafique (the Punjabi Mussalman) does not aim at tracing the nervous reactions of plant life: Mr. Bhose does.' (Here the allusion is to Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose.) But General MacMunn was fair enough to make an exception in respect of those Bengali officers of the 49th who came from good high-caste families.

We, nationalists in India, disputed the theory as a matter of course, and my own first serious military study was a full-blooded rebuttal of the theory, or rather an attack on it. I correct myself because by the time I had finished the articles (July, 1930 to February, 1931) I had become a convert to the theory. There can be no doubt that soldierly aptitudes, and the physical courage on which they are based, are very specialized in India in the genetic sense; that is, they depend more on nature than nurture. However, when it exists it is of the highest quality.

Moral Courage

I can leave the evaluation of Hindu physical courage at that. The Hindu moral courage hardly stands in need of evaluation, for it cannot be said to exist to any degree that can be effectual. It is in this, one might say, that the most serious weakness of the Hindu character lies. The Hindus have an abject fear of power, having been power worshippers and aspirants after power throughout their history. Therefore they will never resist power with any of the standard forms of moral courage: the assertion of principles, convictions, and ideals in the face of hostility from relatives, neighbours, society, or government; resistance to arbitrary interference with or suppression of personal rights and even honour; defence or cham-

pionship of those who are helpless against oppression; admission of a mistake or fault and readiness to make amends or suffer the consequences; even criticism of abuse of power and position. To do any of these things and to risk the displeasure of the powers that be, not to speak of courting persecution, is to be a fool in the eyes of most Hindus, and the minority which is capable of admiring the courage will not yet come forward with active support.

The aspect of this moral cowardice which is most regrettable and most injurious to society is that it is most pronounced in those from whom moral leadership is expected in every society, namely, the politicians, administrators, teachers, religious leaders, and intellectuals of the first rank. The higher one goes in the social and worldly scale and in the official hierarchy, the less does one meet with moral courage. In one sense this is natural, which is a pity: for to have more to lose, is to be less prepared to lose in the worldly way. Thus the British were right when they used to say in their day that the Indian nationalists were irresponsible agitators with no stake in the country, whereas those who had a stake were all on their side.

One could expect that the situation would change with political independence. Actually, it has worsened; which is also intelligible. Under *Swaraj*, let me recall the old word, the *Swa*, the Ego, has become infinitely more important, because for all classes of Indians the opportunities for worldly advancement have multiplied astronomically. Naturally, there is also greater readiness to compromise with principles, convictions, and ideals for the sake of rising in the world, or to retain the advantages.

However injurious to national welfare and national interests a popular clamour might be, a political leader will not resist it for fear of losing his popularity and votes. However harmful to the State the fads of a minister might appear to a civil servant he will be afraid to contradict his chief lest his prospects should suffer. In

fact, at present the worst cases of failure of moral courage are coming from the highest levels of public life. It is difficult to say which of the two wings of the political machinery is more lacking in it. If the officials as a class take precedence quantitatively, many of the ministers when they think it expedient to be cowards beat everybody else in the quality of the cowardice.

Perhaps there is one class of people who are more cowardly. They are the intellectuals of India. One does not indeed expect much from the intellectuals of the modern world. They are as regimented and prompted by *raison d'état* when they protest, say, on behalf of Hungarian freedom, as they are when they support Communist regimes. International hatreds have virtually snuffed out intellectual liberty. But the intellectuals of India have abandoned their independence in such a manner that it has become pointless to speak even of a *trahison des clercs* in connexion with them. They have become so subservient to the State and, incidentally, to their own main chance that they think it will be treason on their part if they stand up against the State and their worldly interests. The reason behind this surrender is not difficult to discover. Courage is ultimately a matter of faith, as Cicero pointed out long ago and the early Christians demonstrated. There is no living faith to sustain intellectuals in this country.

Courage of Life

A slightly better situation faces an observer when he considers that more general form of moral courage which is called courage of life, and which supports hope and effort in the face of failure, obstructions, and opposition. In this field, from one point of view one might say that the Hindus show no courage at all, and from another that they have it to an incredible degree. Courage of life in them does not take a positive form. If an in-

justice or deprivation or difficulty is so small that it can be removed by raising a little finger, the Hindus will not raise that finger. They will bear it with a martyr's fortitude, and through being worn down by the friction over a whole life-time, actually become martyrs. Thus their courage of life is exhibited in endurance.

So it is natural to find that the Hindu courage of life is fatalistic in private life, and apocalyptic in the national and the public. Even in their darkest days in the past the Hindus never lost faith in their final deliverance. They remained passively hopeful on a titanic scale. In my life I saw this illustrated in the course of the nationalist movement. Between 1905 and 1945 four upheavals were thoroughly crushed by the British without inflicting any heavy loss of life on the nationalists, but completely wiping out their hopes. After the very last of them, the 'Quit-India' movement of 1942 Churchill could report to the House of Commons that 'the outstanding fact which has so far emerged from the violent action of the Congress Party has been their non-representative character and their powerlessness to throw into confusion the normal peaceful life of India.'

He, a non-Hindu, had no means of knowing how far he was from the truth, for it is impossible for an outsider to see that it is of the very essence of Hindu behaviour to keep aloof from all risky acts and yet be heart and soul with the cause. Even in those dark days for Indian nationalism I heard people, and among them even those who were working for the British Government and making their contribution to the Allied victory, saying with a ring in their voice and fire in their eyes: 'We shall come into our own.'

There is unquestionable strength in this apocalyptic courage. It has enabled the Hindus to suffer their temporal injuries without loss of hope. In fact, this kind of

courage has been built up on a series of unmitigated defeats at the hands of the Muslims and the British. It has also helped the survival and continuance of the Hindu order after those defeats. On the other hand, it has also had very harmful effects on their responses and behaviour in all situations in the real and the present. It has prevented them, it is still preventing them, from fighting resolutely for what they have even when they can save it by fighting. It has also made them incapable of defending their interests in another way, by taking an alternative course—that is, by viewing a situation realistically and making compromises which do not call for substantial or permanent sacrifices. They consider both fighting and compromising to be foolish, because they believe that the Hindu Destiny will give everything back to the Hindus. The Kalki incarnation, the Hindu Imam Mahdi, *will* come.

This, in its turn, has created in the Hindus a faculty of passionate and utterly sterile defiance, which has been unvarying through the ages in Hindu private and public behaviour. In olden times when the Hindu defiance was a complement of their incorrigible militarism, the Hindus showed a remarkable similarity to the Red Indians in hurling abuse at their enemies when defeated in battle and dying. Duryodhana's abuse of Krishna after being struck down by Bhimasena (Salya Parvan, *Mahabharata*) is an early and typical example of this.¹ I shall give another from recent times, which is not less interesting. It is from an account given by Lord Roberts of a battle at Lucknow during the Mutiny of 1857. All the sepoys were dead or dying, and here is the description of the scene:

'There they lay in a heap as high as my head, a heaving, surging mass of dead and dying inextricably entangled. It was a sickening sight, one of those which even in the excitement of battle and the flush of victory make one feel strongly what a horrible side there is to war. The wretch-

¹ Quoted in translation in *The Continent of Circe* by Nirad C. Chaudhuri, p. 114.

ed wounded men could not get clear of their dead comrades, however great their struggles, and those near the top of this ghastly pile of writhing humanity vented their rage and disappointment on every British officer who approached by showering upon him abuse of the grossest description.⁷

In our time, when the defiance is not coupled with dying in the last ditch and is no longer the Hindu equivalent of the gladiator's *morituri te salutant*, it has inevitably lost whatever perverse strength and respectability it had, and has been degraded into an accompaniment of low civilian brawls, as it was bound to be, for nothing degrades a martial gesture more than its aping by a non-fighting rabble. So it has become quite a common experience today to hear the defiance at the end of a sordid personal quarrel, and the weaker the beaten man the grosser is his abuse.

It follows from this that ill-bred little boys who have been punished for some misbehaviour are the most desperate beasts of obscene defiance to be met with in India. After getting a fully deserved hiding they lie on their back, kick their legs, howl, and scream out the famous Hindu and Hindi expletive triad—'S...B...C...', and when given another hiding for it they run to a safer distance and verbally outrage the mother of the chastiser. It never occurs to these boys, and often not even to their parents, that a simple apology or even a little lying low might do something to lessen their discomfort and rehabilitate their character, and thus ensure their future well-being.

It is surprising to find that among the Hindus this behaviour is found also among adults, and now it has been transferred even to the public sphere. Whenever there is any reverse, check, or setback for India in the international sphere, the whole of Hindu India breaks out in a chorus of abuse for the country which has been responsible for these. This has been seen in Indo-Pakistan relations and even more

strikingly in Indo-Chinese relations. The undignified bad language against both the countries does not advance the cause of India, but, on the contrary, alienates third parties. This is not politics, but only an elevation of the Hindu childish defiance to the domain of international relations. Like abstract art, it can be called abstract abuse.

Intelligence

I come now to Hindu intelligence. I am fond of saying that the Hindus are *clever* but not *intelligent*. Some of my friends ask me, 'What is the difference?'—which in itself is significant. By way of making a purely debating point I reply: 'Intelligence lies in finding ways of making a success of life, cleverness in finding good excuses for failure.' But the question is much deeper and it does cut deep at the very foundations of the existence of the Hindus in the temporal. The intelligence which I am going to discuss in this article and which the Hindus in my opinion do not possess, is not intellectual ability in the various fields of knowledge, but a more practical faculty: the faculty which enables human beings to solve problems of life, tackle personal and national difficulties, meet crises successfully in individual as well as national life. I do not think that there is any human group in the world today which is so lacking in this basic requisite for survival as the modern Hindus are. They just *do not* possess the adaptability and resilience to respond to new and unexpected situations.

Thus they go invariably wrong in appraising situations in which they find themselves, and are almost uniformly wrong-headed in their choice of methods to deal with these. As a rule, they will take exactly the steps which will be rejected by truly intelligent men. If in spite of this they are not harmed beyond repair by their mistakes that is only because of two reasons: first, they have an inexhaustible capacity to undergo deprivations without

putting an end to their existence; secondly, they have a very highly evolved and rigid pattern of behaviour for all the common and elemental circumstances of their life. But as soon as they move out of this familiar world and find that their fixed pattern of behaviour is not adequate, they either fail to master the new conditions, or try to get round them by mere cleverness or cunning. This cunning is the strongest weapon of the Hindus in the battle of life, and they have an extraordinary faith in mere cunning. Therefore those who are adventurous among them are also adventurers. Of course, it is explained by the aphorism attributed by Plutarch to Lysander: 'Where the lion's skin falls short, it must be eked out with the fox's.'

At best, the Hindu intelligence is nimble-wittedness, an instrument made of common iron, normally kept very polished indeed, but whose edge folds up or gets notched as soon as it is applied to things which need steel for cutting. This weakness is nowadays most often seen in the field of public affairs, which are a material to which the Hindu mind is unaccustomed. I have been noticing this failure for something like fifty years, and, if anything, it has become more noticeable after independence. The persistent feature of this failure of intelligence is the incapacity to see a situation as and for what it is, and to envelope it with unfounded *idées fixes*, which most often are pure delusions. Let me give some examples from our recent history.

Examples of Failure

The Uniform formula for these failures may be put in the words of Rousseau: *denier ce qui est, et d'expliquer ce qui n'est pas*, to deny that which exists and to explain that which does not. The *locus classicus* of this is certainly the treatment of the Hindu-Muslim question by the Hindu mind. If there was any question which mattered for the political future

and welfare of India it was this. It was also the rock on which even the achievement of independence could founder. One may say that the worst has happened, and one must attribute the calamity to the incredible blindness of the Hindus to the seriousness of the Hindu-Muslim differences. A stupid French politician said about the Dreyfus affair, '*Il n'y a pas d'affaire Dreyfus*—There is no Dreyfus affair.' This catchword was repeated for forty years by the Hindu nationalist leaders: 'There is no Hindu-Muslim question. It is an artificial quarrel created by the British in India.' This was substantiated by such highly significant facts that the Muslims took Hindu wives or concubines, had Sanskrit erotic treatises written for themselves, pierced the ears, spoke the same languages as the Hindus in certain parts of India, so on and so forth. After accepting a partition whose only justification was that the Hindus and the Muslims constituted two nations, they are still crying out that they would never accept the two-nation theory. With Pakistan round the neck like a millstone, this is no doubt non-acceptance with a vengeance.

Again, the mistakes and failures of the Hindu nationalists in regard to Indo-British relations were not less serious. The following are the most outstanding instances: refusal to consider the offer of eventual Dominion Status made by Lord Irwin in October, 1929; the rejection of the Cripps offer on the hypothesis that Britain had already lost the war and was bound to leave India; the rejection, a second time, of the Cabinet Mission's proposals owing to mental reservations about grouping. At every stage it was a recapitulation of the story of the Sibylline Books, the offer diminishing in value and going up in price, till at last independence had to be bought at the cost of partition and massacres, which too were not foreseen.

My third instance is the failure of the Hindus even to admit the possibility that the Allies might come out victorious in the

second World War. One day an Englishman asked me how many Indians besides me believed in the ultimate possibility of an Allied victory. I could only reply that so far as my experience went there was besides me only one *half-believer*. I used to say to elderly persons then that I could understand young people who had not gone through the first World War saying that Germany was bound to win, judging by the dazzling initial successes; but that I could not understand those who had witnessed equally great successes of Germany in the first World War and also the final defeat talking in the same vein.

But it was no use arguing. A leading politician to whom I put the question answered me thus: 'I believe in luck, and the British people are down on their luck.' I replied: 'Had you been living between 1783, when England recognized the independence of the American colonies, and 1807, when the treaty of Tilsit was signed after Napoleon had smashed up the Third Coalition in battles like Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, would you not have employed the argument about luck even more confidently?' There was no answer, for belief in luck is not rational.

I shall give a fourth instance, and this from our post-independence existence. It is the mishandling of Indo-Chinese relations, which from being embraces between two saintly disciples of Buddha have become transformed, according to the Hindu view, into a fight between St George and the Dragon. The Hindu leaders failed to take into account, when they swore by Pancha Shila, that there was a border question, and when it arose they failed to calculate its gravity. After it had developed into a crisis they were taken by surprise in everything that followed.

Finespun Cleverness

Such instances of failure and inefficacy of intelligence might be given by the score from recent Hindu history. It is difficult to find even *one* instance in which their

calculation of any probability has been right. I have given only the most outstanding mistakes in grasping the nature of an actual situation, and those which have been the most harmful to the collective interest of the Hindus. These, taken with the others which will come to mind of all objective students, suggest one irresistible conclusion: that the Hindu intelligence has ceased to perform the primary function of the intellect, which, to put it in the words of Bergson, is 'an appendage of the faculty of acting, a more and more precise, more and more complex and supple adaptation of the consciousness of living beings to the conditions of existence that are made for them.' The Hindu intellect has abandoned even more completely the higher function which arises out of the primary—that of mastering the environment and circumstances, instead of being their slave or victim.

But even the brief account of the failures that I have given should serve to indicate that there is an active side of the Hindu intelligence. It works energetically enough when it is a question of maintaining the myths and illusions on which the Hindu mind feeds, of confuting the ideas and even facts which are unpleasant to it, and of justifying its mistakes. Then the Hindu intelligence is seen to possess a breath-taking virtuosity. I give a few examples of the finespun ingenuity.

During World War I, almost all nationalist Indians reckoned on a German victory, and they felt the shock of the German defeat almost as badly as the Germans themselves, and, unwilling to believe that there had been a military defeat, they swallowed the whole German story of the stab in the back. In the early twenties I was one day discussing this topic with a Bengali lawyer, the usual M.A., B.L., etc. When I told him that the Germans had been beaten in the field he asked me for proofs. Among other things, I referred to the telegram which Ludendorff had sent to the Chancellor of Germany insisting on an immediate opening of peace negotia-

tions on the ground that the German armies could not be expected to hold out any longer.

The lawyer was puzzled, and he asked me where I had learnt about the telegram. I replied that I had read the telegram itself in Ludendorff's memoirs. There was another puzzled pause, followed by another question, 'Did you read the telegram in the original German?' I explained that I had read it in the English translation of the book. Came the triumphant remark: 'How do you know that the English translator has not faked it and put it in the English edition?' It was no use telling him that Ludendorff was still living, and there could be no tampering with his text without his knowledge. I was crushed, but humbly asked what his authority was. He replied contemptuously, 'I do not depend on books, I speak from *common sense*.' Hindu common sense, of course.

My second instance is about the Quetta earthquake. Jawaharlal Nehru felt distressed that after the Bihar earthquake of 1934 Mahatma Gandhi had regarded it as a punishment for the sin of untouchability, and he wrote: 'Anything more opposed to the scientific outlook it would be difficult to imagine... To suggest that a human custom or failing had its reaction on the movements of the earth's crust is an astounding thing.' But he obviously had not heard what people in India were saying about the Quetta earthquake.

Ordinary people in Calcutta did not believe that there had been an earthquake at all. I heard them say that the city had been destroyed as a result of the blowing up of the minefields which had been laid before 1918 to protect India from a German invasion. A highly educated Bengali on the staff of an important newspaper did not go so far, but he told me that the munition factory in Quetta had exploded, and Quetta had the largest munition factory in Asia. I informed him that Quetta had only an arsenal, and the munition factories of India were the ammunition factories

of Dum Dum and Kirkee and the cordite factory at Aruvankadu. He knew that I had worked in the accounts department of the ordnance factories, but still he would not believe me. The hatred of the British made it necessary for the Hindu mind to attribute the loss of life in Quetta to them.

The last instance of ingenuity I give from very recent events. After the reverses in the N.E.F.A. it was argued that there had been no mistakes in strategy or tactics, the Chinese had won only through low ruses like outflanking movements, or brutal disregard of life which they showed by walking over our minefields. It was said that they were no soldiers but only robots with padded coats, and one of our officers was quoted as saying that the Chinese were a mere rabble. It was even disclosed that though we had to get automatic small arms from the West after Chinese attack, the .303 rifle was, according to the best experts, far better suited for mountain warfare than semi-automatic weapons. The newspapers carried big headlines: 'The Myth of Chinese Invincibility Exploded.' Was it necessary to manufacture the myth after a few skirmishes?

Something even more ingenious was to come. On September 2, 1963, the Defence Minister of India read from a carefully drafted nine-page document and asserted, basing himself on the report of Lt. General Henderson-Brooks, that the higher direction of the war was responsible for the reverses. The next day Jawaharlal Nehru himself told the Upper House of the Indian parliament that the reverses were due to the compulsion of events, and no other Government would have been able to do anything vastly different. Such is the effect of living in the atmosphere of irrationality on a man who was above everything else rational. But however rational Nehru might be, in Indian politics he could not save himself from irrationality.

A Clue

Any man who pins his faith on rationality and believes that reason is an instrument of knowledge is bound to be completely baffled by such conduct. Why the Hindus take this course is a line of inquiry worth pursuing elaborately. Here I offer only a clue.

The peculiar operations of the Hindu intelligence suggest that it is not a free agent working on the external environment and external circumstances, but that it is an instrument pre-set to serve another purpose. In simple words, it is like a lawyer engaged to argue a case for a client. In fact, it is the defence counsel for the Hindu way of life.

This way of life wants a defence counsel badly. It has become incapable of creative or emergent evolution. Even in respect of adaptive evolution it has a very narrow range of adaptation. It has set in its mould, and even the basic ideas which shaped it have now passed below the level of consciousness. But that cannot give it any immunity or protection from the ceaseless beating of changes in the

external circumstances due to the continuing force of evolution or history, or from experiences which, due to its staticity, are unpleasant or injurious to itself. The Hindu intelligence has to come to its rescue so far as it can, and it performs this rôle in two ways.

In the first place, it is trying to bring about such adaptations as cannot be avoided, and without which the Hindu way of life will disappear from the world. But its major function is different. It is to provide a cushion of insulation from all hard realities. In this the Hindu intelligence is more or less efficacious. On the one hand, it is providing the anaesthetic which is enabling the Hindus to absorb the shocks from outside without overmuch pain; and, so far as they retain consciousness, it is even providing good reasons to show that the Hindus are not suffering on account of any fault on their part, but owing simply to the evil-mindedness of the rest of the world. Thus semi-consciousness and a good conscience are the two effects generated by the exercise of the Hindu intelligence taken as a whole.

Indian Democracy and the Crisis of Leadership

RANJIT CHAUDHURI

Were the 'philosopher' king, I should be tempted to leave his kingdom; but when kings are without any 'philosophy', are they not incapable of responsible rule?

C. Wright Mills: *The Sociological Imagination*

I

LIVING in a democratic society under the 'rule of the people', Plato could not trust the people, so he wanted to escape from the 'rule of the people', and preferred the reign of a 'guardian class' specially trained and educated to rule. The actual ruler, the philosopher-king, whom Plato wanted to create, was not to be dictated to by the 'people'. For, he thought, rule of the people often happened to become an apology for the rule of the ignorant. In the democracy of Athens, before his eyes, the wisest man of the world, Socrates, had to embrace death under the tyranny of the majority. To Plato the incident was not something unconnected with the process of the democratic system. Rather he thought, as it appeared, democracy ultimately yielded place to mob rule, defeating wisdom and intellect.

Does democracy necessarily usher in the dominance of mediocrity and the mass? This question is often asked. A satisfactory answer can be given in the context of any country only when the peculiar conditions of the country concerned are fully taken into consideration. Karl Mannheim is quite confidently assertive in answering the above question when he says, 'Such judgments may have their partial justification, but they do not go beneath the surface'.¹ The basic problem is that democracy starts with the principle of the equality of all human beings, and that being so democratic structure is determined and conditioned by the people as the collective entity of equal individuals. Consequently the demo-

cratic process releases individual energies making each individual power-conscious and potentially equal in exercising power. But no order of government can bear the burden of too much power competition. That is why Mannheim argues, 'Democracy must mobilize the vital energies of every individual; but having done so, it must also find a way to dam up and in part neutralize these energies'.² But the question is, even when much of the energies are neutralized, does power go to the right persons? Does the process of democratization open the opportunity for the talented persons to rise to the rank of political leaders? We have made an attempt here to examine this from the Indian perspective by analysing the situation prevailing in India today.

II

In India in recent times a very significant trend can be observed in the process of political development. This trend lies in the gradual displacement of highly educated, intellectual and talented persons from the leadership of the Congress and other political parties and the rise of a 'plebeian' leadership. These plebeian leaders often come from the lower rung of the society, are not highly educated and in the category of talent they never come up to the first grade. The emergence of plebeian leadership marked the reaction against intellectualism in politics. The era of Gokhale-Gandhi-Das-Nehru-Jayaprakash has come to an end, leaving no

legacy in the political leadership of today.

In the pre-Independence period those who came to the top of political activities were highly educated, talented and specially endowed with charismatic quality. Their problem was to foster unity and instil national sentiment. The freedom movement, in the fitness of things, was deeply influenced by the romantic fervour and idealistic imagination of the leaders. They were mainly concerned with one goal, the attainment of freedom. So they had to transcend all particularistic attachments and became involved in romantic patriotism. The romantic exaltation and charismatic personalities of the leaders contributed enormously in binding together all particularistic sentiments and paved the way for the unity of the country. The charm of romantic politics with the spirit of dedication and sacrifice attracted the best talents to political participation. They left behind an almost inimitable heritage for the next generation.

Since Independence, the Congress which was more a political platform before, has assumed the character of a full-fledged disciplined party having mass membership. The process of democratization took place within the country and the Congress. This process of democratization and mass participation changed the whole party character and leadership pattern. Group and sectional interests in the form of organized demands began to influence the nature of political activity. The foundation of national leadership has been seriously weakened by the interplay of sectional and particularistic group rivalries. The introduction of universal adult franchise has opened opportunities for these groups to bring pressure on the authority for privilege. In fact, democracy can never ignore the pressure of numbers. And due to the weight of numbers, intellectuals left politics in India abandoning their positions to be occupied by plebeian leaders.

To account for this trend the following factors, though not exhaustive, call for attention.

1. With the achievement of Independence India adopted a wide programme of development in different directions; accordingly administrative activities have increased enormously. At the same time different types of organization have multiplied at a rapid rate. These administrative and organizational set-ups required qualified and competent personnel. Invariably this personnel was highly educated and technically trained. So the demand for the services of the educated middle class increased enormously at the initial stage, and they were absorbed in the different fields of administration. The first impact of Independence was, therefore, absorption of educated intellectuals in different service centres. This adoption of administrative services by the educated class corresponded to a shift of image of life-interest in their minds. This shift of image put administrative power in place of political leadership. For politics was then not considered a proper vocation for the educated class. The result was, the field of politics was left vacant for those who had none of the necessary qualifications for administrative services. Politics, to this emerging leadership, became a wholetime vocation, a business of collecting supporters and conducting organisation. In his study of 'Politics as a Vocation', Max Weber classified people who live 'for' politics and people who live 'off' politics. Those who live 'for' politics find pleasure in possessing power and feel their lives have meaning in the service of a 'cause'. Those who live 'off' politics make politics a permanent source of income. In India identification of these two categories of political staff is largely preconditioned by the plebeian character of the party members themselves. With the end of the romantic idealistic era of politics characterised by dedication to a 'cause', politicians in India today predominantly live 'off' politics. Moreover, due to the fact of underdevelopment, social and political processes run apart leaving a wide cleavage between the two. The formal meeting

ground of society and politics has remained thoroughly uncoordinated and inorganic. For a healthy society this is not at all satisfying. Prof. G. D. H. Cole could see the corruption of democracy in the separation of politics from the social organism. Thus he remarked, 'politics for the politicians! That is the last corruption of a democracy that has knocked the foundations from under its own feet'. He went on to argue, 'In such a society, politics is apt to be a rotten game. It is bound to be; for it has no roots in the real lives of the people. It easily comes to be either a vast make-believe or behind its pretences largely a sordid squabble of vested interests'.³

2. In India the introduction of universal adult franchise has put all the people politically on the basis of equality irrespective of caste and religion. Social distance between different caste groups has generated unbridled group rivalry and group competition in the political field, which is a corollary to this measure. Benefit or privilege for any group can be derived only through political power. So all the groups have become very active in order to be politically effective and powerful. Numerically the larger group by becoming well-organized could dominate local politics and the more articulated among them could assume political leadership. Politics in Southern India is largely conditioned by this characteristic feature of caste rivalry. Some political leaders have emerged in recent times from that part of India who merely represent certain castes, and caste was the only factor behind their rise to political power. Likewise different pressure groups have been successful in making headway for their representatives to rise to the status of political leaders. Obviously the importance of these leaders remains limited to a certain field or interest and can hardly go up to the national level. In India different communities still enjoy predominance in their respective areas. In the community way of life the character of leadership is influenced

by the community and caste sentiments. So elements of rustic quality in the leadership become almost unavoidable and inextricable.

3. Elites, the cream of all social leadership, are very important for any country. In a democratic society, formation of elites generally follows the *principle of achievement*. But in India the whole process of elite-formation has assumed a wrong direction. That is why political elites are not effective in giving direction to the political process. For, as Edward Shils observes, 'The effectiveness of the political elite depends in part on the acceptance of the legitimacy by a very substantial proportion of the population which is politically concerned. For its legitimacy to be accepted it must not only give an impression of a reasonable degree of *competence*, it must also give an impression of *integrity*'.⁴ Thus *competence* and *integrity* being the *prima facie* important factors for the political legitimacy of the governing section of the elite, India represents a poor example in this regard. The probity of the political leaders could not be tested. From the British period the whole administrative set up was thoroughly corrupted. Honesty has no tradition. Evidently, politicians having a very low degree of competence and integrity could not avoid the temptation of corrupt practices; for corruption has become so deeply rooted in the body politic of our country that it is very difficult to get a foothold in the party hierarchy without resorting to corruption. The whole process of corrupt practices has assumed such a massive volume that talents don't, in fact, cannot find a place in it. The elimination of talent from politics is, therefore, connected with the social process of elite formation.

4. The party system is one of the important attributes of democracy. Where the party system is developed, competition takes place on the basis of personal achievements and competence. The scope of talents is wide where political competition is sharp, fair and free. In most of the

democratic countries political development and the competitive process have taken place under two-party or multi-party systems. In India the democratic system has assumed a very peculiar character. As Prof. Rajni Kothari put it 'Today almost the whole of the political process is taking place within the folds of the Congress. The Congress is more than a party, it constitutes an entire party system'.⁵ The paradox of our democratic system lies in the complete dominance of one party. Gradually other opposition parties with faith in the constitutional procedure and democratic principles have been disintegrated. The people could not find any alternative to the Congress. This made the people to cling all the more to the Congress for stability. When competition is strong the opportunity for the mediocre and plebeian leaders to rise to the top becomes less easy. Where there is stagnancy in the political party system, democracy fails to respond to the demand for better and efficient personalities. Morally politics becomes bankrupt, Prof. Edward Shils also opines, 'While the Congress-like party is in the saddle, it impedes the emergence of an opposition responsive to the possibility of succeeding to power through constitutional means and made responsible by that idea. Opposition is either discouraged by the odds against which it must contend, or it is overwhelmed by coercion. Thus, the leadership of opposition either withdraws from politics or gravitates toward the extremist party'.⁶ In fact, the tradition of party politics in India is heading towards incorrigible irresponsibility. The Congress being the absolute ruling force tries to maintain power by mutually adjusting positions and privileges without conceding any to other responsible organisations which might work and grow. The result would be therefore to stagnate the process of elite formation. Intellectually politics is becoming sterile. The present poverty of talent in the leadership is, therefore, concomitant

with the ineffective political competition between the parties.

5. Social and political progress depends to a considerable extent on the general progress of education. Social mobility is also stimulated by the spread of education. The fact that India is still suffering from illiteracy and ignorance is acting as a drag on elite formation. So long as there is illiteracy and a pattern of rustic community life, the parochial sentiment and political imprudence will persist. Plebeian leadership cannot be dispensed with unless education improves the individual capacity for political knowledge. So long as caste and community sentiments prevail in the society to the discomfiture of the educated intelligentsia, they remain alienated from the political process.

6. The whole process of economic, political and social development has caused what Karl Mannheim calls 'proletarianization of the intelligentsia'.⁷ The educated class, depending as they do on their jobs, find security only in the maintenance of their respective jobs. Once they lose the means of livelihood they sink down into the drudgery of poverty and insignificance. The economic condition of the educated middle-class in India has deteriorated since Independence due to the rising cost of living. The economic condition being badly affected the middle-class intellectuals have become compelled to subserve the interests of the business community and politically influential section. During recent years in India the supply of educated persons has increased more than the jobs available for their gainful employment. Thus the balance is lost. The gap between economic development and social progress has created a tension in the society. This tension lies in the contradiction between the necessity of intellectual independence and the lack of economic security of the educated middle-class. Under these circumstances the 'commanding heights' in the economic field very easily control the politics of the country leaving only a narrow scope for

politics to be independent of vested interests. In this closed chamber game, talents have hardly any opportunity to enter and show their capacity.

III

Having considered the trend and the causes behind it, the question now arises: is this trend prejudicial to the growth of democracy in India? This is very important for us to investigate. But an understanding of the trend does not lead us to any conclusive opinion. For the success or failure of democracy does not depend much on the factors mentioned above. The Plebeian character of leadership is definitely a crisis in Indian democracy. Intensity of the crisis depends, however, not on the character of leadership but on the dynamism of the system. The continuity and sustenance of the democratic system in India depends on the effective solution of economic and political maladies together with the introduction of social change responsive to the growth of individuality. For any social transformation is conditioned by the transformation of individual personality.

In the wake of social transformation leadership cannot remain separated from the intellectual life of the country. Whatever be the real character and nature of leadership, the intellectual atmosphere of the country influences the ideas on which leadership really works. When the leadership fails to trail along the path of ideas generally accepted by the intelligentsia of the country, this leadership contracts and finally withdraws. In the post-Nehru politics this poverty of leadership with ideas and ideals has become so conspicuous that the Congress has to attract a man like Asoka Mehta to aid and advice the present leadership and fill the gap of intellectual poverty.

The leaders having a low capacity of political understanding fail to give direction to the country's development. As a consequence developments become loose and

uncoordinated and give rise to centrifugal forces which again create a social milieu unhealthy for a democratic tradition. The way Nanda's honest venture to remove corruption from politics has been throttled to death by high level conspiracy inside the Congress shows how the whole political atmosphere has become perverted due to the poverty of political knowledge and the absence of education in political conduct. Nanda's effort does not stand in isolation, for it marks a historical process of self-purification. The pressure of vested interests cannot continue for an unlimited period. Either the whole structure breaks down or one day the vested interests are challenged, and then the process of self-sustaining purification must ensue.

In this context, the present crisis of leadership is on the one hand, a problem created by the principle of political equality which, again, gradually turned into a crisis of personality. In a caste-ridden authoritative society with overtones of obscurantism, the introduction of secular politics seems to have caused replacement of old values; but it did not give birth to any other rational human values to ensure social cohesion and to maintain human integrity. Thus this problem of personality is to a great extent rooted in the social anomie. Social anomie is, in its final analysis, a problem of social ethics. So the intensity of the crisis of personality in the phase of social transformation depends on the genesis and nature of the social ethics that develops during the period of transformation. The conception of social ethics is not an indulgence in philosophical theorizing. It is not an imposition by an articulated clique. Neither is it the device of a political group to make the people conform to a certain code of conduct. But it becomes a self-imposed discipline in the form of an unwritten code of conduct that assumes a definite character and form sanctioned by human rationality. Social ethics is the basis of the overt behaviour of human beings in their public relations.

It is a social climate developed by personal behaviour and practices.

If social ethics is cultivated, the urge for virtue develops in the society. From the urge for virtue social upliftment follows. M. N. Roy rightly observes, 'Good

institutions cannot succeed in an atmosphere where men cannot be good or have to suffer for being good'.⁸ Mediocrity does not stupefy and becomes less stringent when probity and honesty constitute the basis of the conduct of political leaders.

¹ Karl Mannheim: *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, p. 175.

² Karl Mannheim, *Ibid*, p. 178.

³ G. D. H. Cole: *Essays in Social Theory*, p. 101

⁴ Edward Shils: *Political Development in the New States*, p.

⁵ Rajni Kothari: 'Form and Substance in Indian Politics -V- Party System', *The Economic Weekly*, June 3, 1961.

⁶ Edward Shils, *Op. cit*, p. 41.

⁷ Karl Mannheim: *Man and Society*, p. 99

⁸ M. N. Roy: *Politics, Power and Parties*, p. 194.

Administrative Reforms: An Attitude Analysis

HIREN J. PANDYA

OF late, the talk of reforming the administration and particularly of curbing corruption in administration, has been much in the air. It is heartening to note that the Government is seized of the problem at last. The fact that the Indian Institute of Public Administration has brought out a special issue of its journal devoted to this specific problem, is evidence of the growing interest in this direction.

This has been the subject of most of the speeches of Shri Nanda after he took over as Union Home Minister. In his numerous speeches he has given the impression that he has entered the Home Ministry with a Crusader's spirit for reforming the administration and that he has brought firmness and determination to bear on the problem. His enthusiasm and self-confidence were so great that he went to the extent of saying that if he failed in rooting out corruption from the public services within two years he would consider himself unfit for public life, and would retire—something which is usually not done by politicians in this country. As a first concrete step, Shri Nanda has announced the establishment of a Vigilance Commission, on the recommendation, in its modified form, of the Santhanam Committee.

Since this activated enthusiasm concerns one of the very vital institutions of modern civilisation, and since it has potentialities for leaving very far-reaching consequences—both of a good and evil nature—it is necessary to give some serious consideration to the question whether we are proceeding in the right direction with the right attitude and spirit. This, in its turn calls for an analysis of the attitude of the

people and the politicians in power towards the public services.

As the logical conclusion of the struggle for freedom, we adopted Democracy as the way of governing ourselves. Democracy, in underdeveloped countries, is of all forms of Government the most difficult to operate efficiently. Its long-term survival value and capacity are undoubtedly high but in its initial stages when conditions are not yet fully ripe for its successful functioning, it encounters a great many difficulties and is subject to severe strains and stresses. Among the many trials and tribulations it faces, is its relative inability to meet the economic urges of the people whose desire to secure a rapid economic development and a higher standard of living outruns their capacity to fulfil it. When we attained independence, the very forces that led us to throw off the yoke of the foreign power were released for attaining the aspirations of high living, full employment, a living wage, full opportunities for human development, reduction in the inequalities of income and wealth distribution, and many other welfare amenities.

As Gunaar Myrdal has pointed out, India, and Asian countries in general, have started their democratic setup on Initial Welfare. The Revolution of Rising Expectations, as some writers have described the new tide, has been reinforced by the 'demonstration effect' of the achievements of the West. Poverty and hunger are no longer regarded as either inevitable or to be tolerated. So the people have come to expect of the Government a level of performance and achievement for which the latter is just not ready, or which it is unable to fulfil. Promises and programmes

are announced with trumpets but without much seriousness at the time of the General Elections, and these are also responsible, in no small way, for these expectations.

The people have come to expect many things from the Government, and very soon; and for this they come in contact with the public services at many more points than they used to. This has an irritating effect. What is the kind of bureaucracy at all these points? A big bureaucracy which is the concomitant of the Active State, with many more levels of decision-making, with many centres of discretionary power; it is a bureaucracy which finds itself called upon to do things which it has never done before. The fields are new, the burden is great, there are no precedents to guide present decision-making. All this causes delay. This delay, coupled with the fact there are many levels of decision-making and discretionary powers, widens the scope for corruption to spread.

All these factors have conditioned the attitude of the people towards the public services. As agents whose duty it often is to prevent evasion by the citizen of his legal responsibilities, and particularly to obtain from him monies due in taxation, the public services have to stand the inevitable brunt of the citizen's dislike of officialdom. This age-old dislike is aggravated by the conditions above mentioned, and takes the form of antagonism and contempt. It is rather paradoxical that even in an age when almost everyone expects to receive some services from the State, the public servant is habitually regarded as a nuisance, as a bureaucrat or even a drone employed unproductively by those who do not much care how public money is spent.

This then, is the attitude that the people have towards the public services. We have examined the main features that are responsible for this attitude. Is this attitude justified? Or, to put it in clearer terms, to what extent are the public services res-

ponsible for this attitude? In a complex problem like this, it is difficult to apportion precisely the degree of responsibility of the various factors. Public criticism is often unfair, but understandable. There may be cases of lapses in the professional integrity and official morality of the public services. But such lapses could not justify the attitude of the people. The people have become very sensitive to any failure anywhere in the Governmental machinery; and their attitude towards the public services being what it is, they immediately assign the blame for any kind of failure to the public services. They do not have the inclination or the patience or the necessary mental sophistication to appreciate that all failures in the field of Government are not administrative and that some other lot of people may well be to blame. Thus the public attitude is not justifiable, but quite understandable.

Unfortunately, much of this misplaced antagonism tends seriously to undermine the confidence that the citizen, in his own interest, should conserve. In such a state of affairs one would expect the political executive, which provides the motivation to, and controls the administration, to have come forward to see that such a situation did not develop. However nothing seems to have been done. Why? This brings us to the analysis of the attitude of those in political authority, to the public services.

The political leaders, on coming to power, after Independence, found the machinery of Government in working order, and they decided to continue it almost untouched. On assuming power, not only did the new Government leave the public services undisturbed, and begin to use them forthwith as the instruments of their purpose, but they even took a decision to safeguard the existing rights¹ of the serving members of the key public services.

On the other hand, the national leaders had, on occasions, reviled the public services bitterly. They had seen little good in them. They had often called upon their

¹ Article 311, Constitution of India.

countrymen serving in them, especially in the higher ranks, to withdraw. What could then have been the considerations that led them to take a lenient attitude just after Independence? The fact that the late Sardar Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister, had to throw his whole weight on the side of the Civil Servants in order to get the provisions regarding their rights incorporated in the new Constitution, and had to go to the extent of saying that if it was not done he would resign, militates against the presumption that the new Government was favourably inclined towards the public services. The absence of any systematic, concrete plan to thoroughly overhaul and radically reshape the administrative machinery, together with Sardar Patel's forceful defence, seem to be the most plausible explanation for the acceptance of the public services then.

So it was an attitude characterised by misgivings, distrust and suspicion, that the political leaders brought with them when they entered the Government. Now we shall see if there is any evidence indicating any change in their attitude for the better, since then. Here we shall examine their various acts of omission and commission with regard to the problems of the public services.

The people's instinctive dislike for officialdom, is, in a way, a healthy factor. But what is disconcerting is that, at a point, it becomes more than dislike, it becomes antagonism. And then it becomes dangerous, and deserves immediate and serious consideration. In such conditions, it is impossible to expect pride in efficiency and good work to flourish, for it is a human failing to see at least an iota of truth in the image the mirror shows, even if the mirror distorts. It is not in the national interest to have an attitude of contempt and hostility towards the public services, for the prosperity of any state, and especially of a state wedded to the socialistic pattern of society, depends largely on the efficiency of its public servants.

What is the position taken by those in

political power in this very unfortunate predicament of the public services? It may well be said that they have not taken any position at all! At best they have connived at its development and at worst they have accentuated the situation consciously and unconsciously.

Quantitative and qualitative changes brought about by the acceptance of the Welfare State ideals and their realisation by huge developmental plans called for a new and planned approach, in the administration of the public services. It could well have been anticipated that the emerging many-fangled welfare bureaucracy because of its sheer magnitude would give rise to many new problems and would add to the magnitude and complexity of the existing ones.

The problem of corruption is one of the most glaring of these issues. This problem was always there even when the main task of the public services was of a regulative nature. But then the malady was not so alarming. Now this problem has assumed stupendous proportions because of the scope provided by the change in the nature of the work of the public services from the merely regulative to the rendering of services more personal and intimate; and further, because the change in the structure of the public services was characterised by many more levels of decision-making and many more centres of discretionary power. Was this phenomenon anticipated? It is difficult to answer this question. But unfortunately, it is not difficult to say that no serious and systematic attempt seems to have been made to meet these problems. Of course all the three Five Year Plan volumes contain chapters emphasising the importance of the administrative machinery being in fine fettle for the achievement of the Plan targets. And there the matter rested. When economic planning on a colossal scale is undertaken, a proportionately colossal administrative apparatus becomes a 'must' for the execution of the Plans. Thus the economic and administrative aspects of planning should

have been considered equally important. It cannot but be observed that there was hardly any administrative planning worth the name.

The unfortunate fact has to be admitted that we have failed to recognise the importance of an efficient administration manned by public servants with a high morale and spirit, with professional integrity and high morality.

During the last few months the Government has shown some awareness of the situation and some steps have been taken with a view to improving it. In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Shri Shamsu-uddin, the former Prime Minister of the State, just after he took over charge of the Government, announced that his Government had forced some hundred public servants to retire prematurely, on the suspicion that they were corrupt. No regular inquiry had been made, no charges framed nor cases filed. The only ground for this drastic action was the suspicion that these officers were corrupt! In taking such a step, all principles of justice and fairplay were thrown overboard. It was a rash action by any standard and it might well benumb the public services to inaction and dumbness. This was the result of misdirected enthusiasm and high-handedness, rather than of sternness or the determination to root out corruption.

The Union Government, in partial implementation of the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee, has appointed a one-man Vigilance Commission. This Vigilance Commission in its scope, functions and status is very much at variance with the one envisaged in the Santhanam Committee Report. To the extent of this variance, the effective functioning of the Commission and the fulfilment of its purpose viz: 1) Prevention of corruption in the public services, and 2) Ensuring just and fair exercise of administrative powers vested by law in various authorities, become doubtful. Here we may take note of one point very relevant to the present discussion, namely, the extent of the jurisdic-

tion of the Commission. The jurisdiction of the Commission is confined solely to Government employees. Those in political authority are outside the purview of the Commission. Is this to say that corruption is confined to Government employees only and that those who are in political authority are above it? Looking to the facts of public life in our country, this is incorrect and absurd. It is difficult to know the justification for this limitation on the jurisdiction of the Commission. This very significant omission gives room for doubt regarding the Government's earnestness, determination and sincerity in trying to root out corruption and setting right the lapses in the administration. More serious than this obvious conclusion is the harmful effect that this limitation will have on the morale of the public services. It will naturally create the feeling, and justifiably so, among the services, that the target of this drive is not corruption or other weakness, but the services themselves. We have seen that for reasons, most of which are not of their creation, the public services have lost the confidence and the trust of the people at large, and have fallen into disrepute. This is bound to have a telling effect on the morale and the spirit of the Services. To avert this situation, the political executive should have stepped in and played a positive role in restoring the public confidence in the public Services, in their own interest and in the interest of the country. It has failed to do so. Now it has become aware of the gravity of the situation and seems to be in a hurry to act. But the beginning it has made does not augur well. It has greater potentialities for harm than good. Even at the risk of sounding alarmist, it should be said that we have reached a moment of crisis. If the political executive does not change its policy of conniving at political antagonism of the services, and its dubious and high-handed approach to administrative lapses and weaknesses, it may well lead us into irrevocable decline. What is really needed both on the part of the public and the

political leaders is a shedding of the prejudices against and of the distrust and suspicion of the public services. Here the political authorities have a great role to play. After all it is they who provide the motivation to the Services and exercise control over them. It is the duty of good and efficient masters to project a good image of those working under their control. Of course if there is anything wrong with those who work under them, it is well within their authority to deal with it immediately and with a heavy hand. So

those who are in political authority cannot afford to join with the public in condemning the public services. They will have to change their attitude. It will have to be realised that they cannot find fault with their own instruments. If they do not do this, but continue with the present approach to administrative reform, we may get demoralised and crippled public services as a result.

So the task of reforming our attitude towards the public services will have to precede administrative reforms.

LOVE'S VOICE WAITING

I that have lost my world, have lost my pride
And will not listen to you. You will be mute;
Do not exist for me. This is the unborn bliss
I will bear forth—the flower-born agonies
Shall be the itches for a new desire;
A new, a pregnant world, one giving place
To all the universes, ministering
To the bright angels of love's lone creations.
I shall speak as the chaff
Through the unripe grain—It is love's voice
Waiting for the harsh wind to stop.

USHA RANI

(Translated from the Panjabi by SATYA DEV JAGGI)

The Language Problem of India

Racing Backwards

ANNADA SANKAR RAY

THE language of the Indian National Congress, in the beginning, was English. Gandhi changed it to Hindi but not entirely. He retained English for those who did not know Hindi. When he took up the editorship of *Young India* he explained that he had to write English because people in South India would not understand Hindi.

Later he clarified his concept of Hindi. At the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan held at Sitapur he said:

'Highly Sanskritized Hindi is as avoidable as highly Persianized Urdu. Both the speeches are not intelligible to the masses. I have accepted Hindustani as a common medium because it is understood by over twenty crores of people of India. This is not the artificial Lucknavi Urdu or the *Sammelani* Hindi. And one would expect at least a *Sammelan* address to be such as would be understood by both Hindus and Muslims of the common type' (vide MAHATMA by Tendulkar, vol. 2, p. 273).

This was in 1925. Because Muslims prefer Hindustani to Hindi he said ten years later:

'When I presided over the *Sammelan* once again in 1935, I had the word properly defined as a language that was spoken both by the Hindus and the Mussalmans and written in Devanagari or in Urdu script. My object in doing so was to include in Hindi the high-flown Urdu of Maulana Shibli and the high-flown Hindi of Pandit Shyamsundardas. Then came the Bharatiya Sahitya Parishad, also an offshoot of the *Sammelan*. At my suggestion the name Hindi-Hindustani was adopted, in the place of Hindi.' (ibid., vol. 4, p. 179)

Later the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan overruled the Mahatma's advice and dispensed with Urdu. Then he advised Seth Jamnalalji to start another organisation. It was called the Hindustani Prachar Sabha. Now it was no longer Hindi or even Hindi-Hindustani. It was plain Hindustani. And this Hindustani was written in either the Devanagari or the Urdu script. The language was the language of Hindus and Muslims alike. It was not wholly Hindi nor was it wholly Urdu. Two editions of the 'Harijan Sevak' were accordingly published, twin editions, one in Devanagari and the other in Urdu. It does not need to be pointed out that Punjabi Hindus were more familiar with the Urdu script than with the Devanagari. Once I looked up Lala Lajpat Rai's *Bande Mataram* and found it entirely written and printed in Urdu script.

Nobody imagined that the country would be partitioned overnight. If India had remained undivided and the Congress and the League administered it jointly, the question of the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan's undiluted Hindi and its Devanagari script would not have been settled by a majority of votes. It was too serious a question for that. Urdu and Hindi would both have been given equal status as official languages because of the Muslim minority. The Devanagari and the Urdu scripts would have received equal recognition. Or, in order to avoid the problems raised by these languages and their scripts, English might have been made the official language. Of course if Gandhi had been present he would have made every effort to bring about a compromise between

Hindi and Urdu. The language that would have become the official language would not have been Shibli's Urdu or Shyam-sundardas's Hindi. It would have been the daily speech of Abu Sheikh and Habu Dosad. Only the scripts would have differed. I don't know what Gandhiji would have done if that language had proved inadequate for official purposes.

The country was suddenly partitioned. The quarrel resolved itself. Urdu abandoned the field entirely to Hindi. It went closer to Mecca, settling down at Karachi. The new rulers of Delhi were left with an undiluted Hindi written in the Devanagari script, a Hindi in which there was no admixture of Persian or Arabic. Its only rival was English. At this time Gandhiji withdrew from publication the Urdu edition of the *Harijan Sevak*. The number of its readers had dropped almost to zero. He also, at the same time, discontinued the Hindi edition even though it still had many readers. When a reader asked him for an explanation he said that, as conceived by the Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Hindustani was a single language which was written in two scripts. To publish it in one script and not the other would be unfair. With deep despair he said:

'... Hindustani means a language which may be written in both the scripts equally. Consequently, a paper published in both the scripts should continue in both. This becomes all the more necessary, when the people clamour on all sides that the national language of India should be Hindi and that it should be written in the Nagari script only. It is my duty to show that this claim or demand is not right. If my reasoning is correct, a further duty devolves on me that I should either publish *Harijan Sevak* in both the scripts or stop both the editions.... I am, undoubtedly, an advocate of Hindustani. I believe that between the Nagari and the Urdu scripts, Nagari will prevail ultimately. But if we leave aside script and consider only the language, then I say that Hindustani will win in the

end, as the Sanskritized Hindi is entirely artificial, while Hindustani is quite natural. In the same way, the Persianized Urdu is artificial and unnatural. There are not many Persian words in my Hindustani. I find very little argument in favour of Hindi... To conclude, even if I was alone to say so, I am quite clear that, ultimately, neither the Sanskritized Hindi nor the Persianized Urdu will win the race; Hindustani alone can do so.' (ibid., vol. 8, pp. 294-6).

Gandhiji did not realise to what lengths the two parties concerned could go. One went back to the time of Aurangzeb; the other went even further, to the time of Prithviraj. The ideal of one was Persian classics and the Arabic Koran. The ideal of the other was Sanskrit classics and the Vedas and Puranas. Neither of them was in the least concerned with the progressive world of the twentieth century or the uneducated common people of India. They did not care for a language suited to the times or to the common people. Their object was a mandarin language suited to their new status as rulers, a language which can be called an official language. They were as eager as they could be, no doubt, but they were running, not in the direction of the sea but towards the mountains where their separate streams had their respective sources, where the one did not bear any resemblance to the other, nor to the age, nor with the awakening common people.

Now let us turn to English. It is not the language of our common people nor does it have any links with them. But English is the language of the Age. It is akin to the times in which we live. It connects us with these times. Marathi, Bengali, Tamil, Telugu and the other Indian languages are there to link us with the common people. Hindi is also such a language in its natural form. But if English is not added to any of them a hiatus occurs between the common people and the age they live in. Those who take exception to English may learn French or German or

Russian. But if one or another of the modern European languages is not cultivated the man of the soil stays on the ground. He will never be able to fly. The sons of men are like birds. What use is freedom to them if they are kept enclosed? There is freedom in a well for a frog who dwells there. But it cannot be a fitting epilogue to our freedom struggle to go back to the state we were in seven or eight hundred years ago and live as then without any knowledge of the developments taking place in countries across the seas, forbidden as we were to sail upon their waters.

We want to keep in touch both with our own and other countries. Those who have no opportunity to learn French or German have only to put out their hands to find English books and journals and newspapers. Why should they forego the opportunity? Our quarrel with the English nation is over. What good does it do anybody to prolong the conflict? Why this deep-seated aversion to English? If I knew that these people wanted to learn French or Russian or German I would know that, in one way or another, they favoured progress. Perhaps they wish to get rid of English because they consider it too backward and want something more progressive. But I have not heard that Russian, German or any other language is being substituted for English anywhere. Those who are studying these languages study English also.

We have seen how Mahatma Gandhi's ideas about Hindi changed and where they led him. In the same article he has this to say about English:

'Even as Tamil etc. are the languages of the different provinces, and Hindustani is the national language of the country, so is English the language of the world. Its international position cannot be disputed. The imperialist rule of the Englishman will go because it was and is an evil. But the superior role of the English language cannot go.' (ibid., pp. 296-7)

It was for this reason that Gandhiji did

not discontinue the English *Harijan*. It had readers throughout the world. He had to write in English for their sake. Side by side he maintained the publication in Gujarati of the *Harijan Bandhu*. Only the Hindi and the Urdu editions were stopped.

This action was his silent protest against Hindi orthodoxy. But the hearts of those he wished to appeal to by this gesture were hard as stone. They had pushed the Muslims out, they had pushed the British out, they would now push the English language out. Gandhiji's Hindustani, written in two scripts, was ignored when the Constitution of India was drafted. Congress members of the Constituent Assembly were evenly divided on the proposal that the official language of the Union should be Hindi in the Devanagari script. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who presided, had a casting vote. He voted for Hindi in the Devanagari script. But for his casting vote the issue might have been decided differently or left undecided in the hope of a future consensus.

Later it became clear that a highly Sanskritized Hindi is indissolubly associated with the Hindu religion or the Arya Samaj. It became the vehicle of Revivalism. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh also employs Hindi for its purposes. In the Congress itself there were some who were nearer to Godse than to Gandhi. They too were zealots for Hindi. Religion was more important to them than the country. It could not be stated bluntly that India was a Hindu State. A clash with the Sikhs would have been unavoidable and immediate. So the State was to be a Hindi State. This was more indirect and more subtle.

Must we sit down with a Sanskrit dictionary, become sanatan Hindus or Arya Samajists, revert a thousand years intellectually, just because we want to know and mingle freely with the cultivators and labourers in all parts of the country? Where does Gandhi enter into all this? India and Pakistan will never achieve unity or even amity if such reactionary forces get the upper hand. The Bengalis, with their feet

in two separate boats, are certain to drown in the Bay of Bengal as a people.

The Mahatma tried to change the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan's way of thinking for thirty years and then gave up in despair. It was a major defeat for him. Hindi writers insist on maintaining the purity of their language. That is all right. They are welcome to do so. Let them live in their part of the house undisturbed. We shall live in ours. Our tradition, the Bengali tradition, has always been different, with a distinction of its own. Our Bengali language and our literature is accepted by our Muslims. Bengali has not been rent apart like the language of North India, divided between Sanskrit and Persian, splitting into Hindi and Urdu. Bengali has retained its unity by accepting both Sanskrit and Persian. The Bengali language has not lost its unity, although the Bengali people now live in two separate States. It would have been lost if we had leaned too far towards Sanskrit and not far enough towards Persian and Arabic. It is our good fortune to have a script of our own, which is neither Devanagari nor Urdu. If we had not had it our Muslim neighbours might have started writing Bengali in the Urdu script and called it 'Turku'.

What is required is a formula like the Secular State formula, a formula which will not be a mask for a Hindi State. The State that has been established by our Constitution is a Hindi State. Its inauguration took place on the 26th January last. A little room has been mercifully left in it for English for a time. It is like the thin strip of white on the flag of Pakistan, representing the non-Muslim minorities. This white strip is at least permanent. The provision made for English is not so.

If, in a country of many religions, a single creed becomes the official creed all others, even though they may be well-treated, are not equally treated. No matter how wealthy or distinguished adherents of creeds other than the official creed may be, they are second-class citizens and are to be commiserated with as such. Believers

in the ruling creed are members of the ruling class. Nowadays creeds are less important than languages. When Alsace-Lorraine falls into German hands the inhabitants are taught German and grow up as Germans. When it falls into French hands they learn French and are brought up as Frenchmen. This is a law of Nationalism.

The same law works inside a country also. If there is more than one language and only one is given the status of an official language those persons who are lucky enough to have that language as their mother tongue become members of the ruling class. All others are second-class citizens. The official language of Belgium was French. As Nationalism grew strong in that country the Flemish began to clamour for the recognition of their language and demanded equal status for it. In Belgium today French and Flemish have equality. In Switzerland the French, German and Italian languages have equal status as official languages. If it had not been accorded to them there would have been serious trouble. German is spoken by more than 70 per cent of the Swiss population, yet no one claims for it a superior right as in the case of Hindi in India.

Because Persian was the State language under the Moghuls and English the State language under the British we should not suppose that a state can have only one official language, not more. The idea that Hindi is to succeed English just as the Congress took over as successor to the British is mistaken patriotism. *One* is to be replaced by *one*, we think, and trouble arises when there are many. All of us gave Hindi an extraordinary place for the sake of India's unity. What we did not foresee is that Hindi-speaking people would become privileged citizens when their language became the State language in place of English. We also had an idea that Urdu was to remain side by side with Hindi, and the monopoly of one would thereby be avoided. Dreamers like me also believed Gandhi would live forever and that his influence

would bring about political and economic decentralisation. Real power would not reside in the Central Government and money would also make its way down to lower levels. In such a set-up Hindi, as the State language, would have merely been a glorified figurehead.

But how does the dream accord with the reality of today? The Congress Government is far more centralised and the Centre has far more power and patronage than the British ever had. Neither the Moghuls nor the British had such a large army. The number of Central Government employees has grown enormously. The public sector was very small, almost negligible, in the past. Now it is very large indeed. What has happened to decentralisation? The capital of India, Calcutta, was removed to Delhi to escape the influence of the Bengalis. It was made a self-contained province to avoid the influence of the Punjabis. It has now become the Centre of Hindi literary activities and the influence of the Hindi-speaking areas over it is naturally increasing.

English is still current. That fact is a protection. Internecine linguistic strife would have already attained a critical acuteness otherwise. Hindi must come to an understanding with its sister languages: Bengali, Oriya, Tamil, Telgu etc. These cannot be assigned a subordinate role as merely 'regional'. The Nagas will never accept either Hindi or Devanagari. The educated tribes of Assam are more familiar with the Roman script and English. Kashmir Muslims prefer Urdu and the Persian script. All these conflicting trends have been kept in check by the currency of English. Latent antagonisms will spring into prominence when it is replaced. The trouble has already begun! What has happened in South India is a slight indication of the forces below the surface.

Pakistan, our neighbour, has become a bilingual State like Belgium, bowing to the storm aroused over Urdu as the sole official language. Our State will also become bilingual or multilingual, if our leaders

heed the warning of the self-immolations in South India. If they don't the conflict may be shelved temporarily but it will flare up inconveniently at some future date. A country of this size cannot be unilingual. Official work was conducted in a single language at the dictates of a foreign power when we were a subject nation. This cannot be imitated at the insistence of one of the parties. A majority of votes cannot decide language issues just as it cannot decide religious issues. Democracy does not turn any of its minorities into second-class citizens. If we try to do so we cannot pretend to be more just than Pakistan. We have avoided religious injustice. Can we not avoid this also?

Theoretically, it may be possible to give all our languages equal official status but in practice it will be found very difficult. No other country contains so many languages within its borders. There is no precedent to guide us. Switzerland has no more than three or four languages. Belgium has no more than two or three. And these are languages which are closely related. They are not so different as Hindi and Tamil or Urdu and Bengali. That is one reason why Pakistan has decided to retain English for another twenty-five years. It does not want to turn bilingual overnight and precipitate the discontinuance of English. We should not be surprised if Pakistan extends the term of English by another twenty-five years. And we, even if we discover a multilingual solution, should hold on to English to avoid the perils associated with its departure. Will we never realise the unreality of a single-language, a unilingual, solution?

Whatever way we may look at it, the elimination of English may bring trouble in its train. Hindi may be our formal official language but if it tries to assert itself in that capacity to the exclusion of all other tongues many things may be jeopardised — our unity, peace, friendly accord, freedom. The practical solution is to retain English as an associate of Hindi and at the same time to emancipate Hindi from the shackles

of medievalism and convert it into a language which answers their needs. English can never, for all anyone may say, be the language through which millions of Indians will communicate their thoughts and feelings. Hindi, on the other hand, is not likely to acquire the flexibility or the pliancy that will enable it to become the swift-paced bearer of modern scientific knowledge. It is not likely ever to become the means of communication used by educated Indians anywhere. The number of educated people in India is on the increase. They require a language that adequately answers their needs. That language is not Hindi, Bengali, Tamil or Marathi. Nationalism is of no assistance here. To tell the educated people of India to slow themselves down in order to keep in step with the uneducated is to force them to get out of step with the progressive minds of the world, to break their ranks. It is the uneducated who should be urged to quicken their pace. They must exert themselves to keep up and fall in line with the progressive forces of the world.

'Which language would you choose to learn as a second language, after your mother tongue? Tamil? Telgu? Bengali? English?' If this question were put in a plebiscite held in the Hindi-speaking areas I wonder whether a single student would be found who would answer, 'I'll refuse to learn English. I prefer to study Tamil or Telgu or Bengali.' If this be the true state of affairs in the North we have no reason to suppose it is otherwise in the South. South Indians, all Indians, will choose first their mother tongue, and English second. No one will refuse to learn English. Everywhere in India the mother tongue comes first and, after that, English. If the people of the country are given freedom of choice they will choose English as their second language, preferring it to Hindi. This is a sound, normal choice. The Motherland is represented by the mother tongue. The Living Age is represented by English. Two languages are sufficient for the average pupil. If a third language has to be studied

our students will, with the possible exception of the Tamil non-Brahmins, choose Sanskrit (or Persian) rather than Hindi. No one wishes to be loaded with a fourth language anywhere. There are so many other subjects to be studied in a rapidly changing world.

Non-Brahmins of the Tamil area dislike Sanskrit even more than they dislike Hindi because whom the Aryans could not conquer by the sword they won over by the word. One of the reasons why the Tamil opponents of Hindi are so bitter is that they are afraid Sanskrit will make its way back to its dominant position through Hindi. All the Sanskrit terms which they have painstakingly removed from Tamil will reappear in the guise of Hindi. Those protagonists of Hindi who went back on the sage advice of the Father of the nation did not foresee that their highly artificial Sanskritized Hindi would be fiercely resented by their anti-Sanskrit antagonists. To declare that Hindi in the Devanagari script is the official language of the Union is tantamount to its imposition on the conscientious objectors of the South. A good part of the Indian population is pre-Aryan. It is in favour of Indian unity but not in favour of Sanskrit or highly artificial Sanskritized Hindi as an instrument of unity. It is afraid of cultural domination or infiltration in the name of unity. Identification of Indian unity with Aryan superiority in any shape or form should be avoided. The Nagas and the other Christian or non-Christian tribes are equally opposed to unity through Hindi for the same basic reason.

Cognizance must be taken of the objection raised by the person who burnt himself to death on the first day Hindi came into force as the official language of India. Sivalingam's protest cannot go without a hearing. This movement is a movement of protest similar to the Protestant Movement of Europe. There is a fundamental principle involved even though the form the protest took was violent. Whether our State is based on Hindi or not is a matter

of principle just as much as whether it is based on Hinduism or not. If, for example, India were to be declared a Hindu State and the Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and others are assured that they will be subjected to no inconvenience, will they be satisfied? Non-Hindi-speaking people are not going to be satisfied with an assurance of that kind. Whether English is to be retained for some time or not is beside the point. If it is retained it will be retained for the convenience of both Hindi-speaking and non-Hindi-speaking areas where, as we have noted, it is universally preferred as a second language. On the other hand, the objections to English which are raised by nationalists in the Hindi-speaking areas are also raised by nationalists in the non-Hindi-speaking areas. If Hindi cannot thrive under the shade of English neither can Bengali. Why should we alone be held responsible for the retention of English for some time longer? Are we less patriotic or less fond of freedom?

Where the mother tongue of the people is also the official language of the government the people identify with the government. If the language of the people of Bihar is the official language of the government of Bihar the people of Bihar will feel at one with their government. Similarly, if the language of the people of Madras is the official language of the government of Madras the people there will feel at one with the government there. This is obvious. The agitation that was required to make it clear is long past. The present trouble is not over the official language of each constituent state but of the Union as a whole. If it is Hindi, two-fifths of the people of the country can identify with it. For them country and language are one. But that is not the case for the remaining three-fifths of the population. What are they to do? Are they to cling to English forever? Can they, by doing so, identify themselves with the Government of India? Or must they let English go entirely and adopt Hindi?

We are in a dilemma. If English is to be retained permanently the people of the

country as a whole must want it. If we non-Hindi-speakers are the only ones who want English we shall be accused of being deficient in patriotism, of not loving our country. It will be said we are in love with the West. We will lose face. We will lose our voices. We will not enjoy the affection nor the status accorded to a son of the family. 'That fellow is an opportunist', will be said of us. If, on the other hand, we replace English with Hindi we are in danger of losing our identity by merging with Hindi. This is the cause of the consternation that is driving Tamils to suicide. In the case of Bengalis their suicide will take place slowly, by degrees, not as dramatically.

A formula that will reconcile the conflicting claims is required. Such a formula would retain English permanently, by and for the whole country, for certain purposes. It will, for instance, be used for competitive examinations. Likewise Hindi will be required for certain purposes, in all parts of the country, if the country taken as a whole. For ceremonials, for foreign receptions, for similar formal occasions. Other Indian languages will be utilised for post offices, railways etc. If Hindi is used on postcards can Bengali not be used on 5 paise stamps, Tamil on 10 paise stamps, Urdu on 15 paise stamps and Gujarati on 20 paise stamps? If a Hindi postmark is used on letters posted in Uttar Pradesh a Bengali postmark should be used on letters posted in West Bengal, an Oriya postmark in Orissa, a Malayalam postmark in Kerala and so on. No single language should be used for all purposes, neither English nor Hindi. If a single language is used it will come to regard itself as paramount over all the rest. A language which is the mother tongue of four or five of the constituent states is certainly important and its importance must be recognised. But does that mean that it will be the sole successor language of English at the Centre, as between the Centre and the states, as between the states themselves and for all competitive examinations?

Let Hindi be our first official language, not the only one. Let English have the status of an Indian language by naturalisation and the idea of eliminating it be altogether dropped. Bengali, Tamil, Telugu etc. should have an equal status with Hindi. Let them be partners in certain enterprises. A division of labour can be evolved. No one will feel frustrated. Each language will be used for specified purposes.

The day will never come when Hindi can be used for all purposes. A peaceful and satisfactory solution cannot be reached by attempting to do so. The day will never come when all-India competitive examinations can be held in Hindi without being held in Tamil, Telgu, Bengali etc. as well. For this purpose at any rate English must be retained as an associate official language with the status of an Indian language. The frontiers between English and Hindi must be defined according to function, not geography. The frontiers of other Indian languages must be extended upwards to the Union level and similarly defined according to function.

The problem is how to change a unilingual pattern into a multilingual one. This will have to be done tomorrow, if not today. India will never be a Hindi State. If it tries to be so some of its constituent states will be alienated to the point of secession. Even after a contraction of its present boundaries it may continue to call

itself by the old name but such a consummation is wholly undesirable and inauspicious whether it is brought about by non-violent methods or violent methods. It is against the course of our history because India does not belong to the Hindus alone or to Hindi alone. At this 'seashore of great humanity' all streams will meet and mingle.

It is for those whose duty it is to take decisions to make up their minds. We do not know how they will decide but we should all be clear in our minds about one thing. Neither English nor Hindi should be the sole official language of a multilingual nation. There is no such thing as a 'regional language' because all our languages are national languages. The help of each and every one must be taken at all levels, though not for every purpose. English will still be needed for certain purposes even after fifty years because more than one language cannot be used for competitive examinations if they are to be fair and above board. The impossible cannot be made possible by any kind of moderation.

English is not identical with the British race. At the root of the entire confusion is this mistaken identification. It is like mistaking a rope for a snake and running away, running backwards in time.

(Translated from the Bengali by Lila Ray. Modified by the writer.)

Sorrows of Salinger

SISIR KUMAR GHOSE

IS Salinger well-known in India? they asked. It is hard to say, I had read one or two things by him and wondered at the accolade. But, as Whitman said, it is not what you read but where you read that makes the difference. Here I had to re-read him, 'the writer of the age', 'everybody's favourite', the best seller. In spite of, or perhaps because of, his studied secrecy and long spells of arid silence, he seems to be all over the place. Some time back the *Life* magazine came out with a longish article trying to track him down in his rural retreat. His love of privacy has led to its exact opposite and he has already become part of the American folklore. The 'Salinger myth' is an active industry, at least on many campuses.

To what is this craze of the 'crazy cliff' due to? Is he a new kind of fashionable writer, as some accuse, a passing fad, or is he a new archetype? Why or how had he become a sort of bogey, a Mystery Man, 'That Important'? Is it simply because of his style—one can hear it speaking, said Clifton Fadiman—or is it the eastern (N.Y.) regionalism, mirror of crises, that helps many a reader, especially the 'younger generation', to seek its identity with his characters? The talk of his characters is, to speak, righter than right. Young people today, they themselves tell us, have no spokesman. And here comes J. D. Salinger, 'catcher in the rye', catching the ethos, the very inner rhythm of many a maid and his wight. No wonder everyboy and everygirl now finds his or her allegory in Salinger's stories, dark with destiny's wings beating in the luminous void. He certainly has done something to 'the dream of innocence and the fact of guilt' which every one, old or young, recog-

nises, though all do not approve, the way he has done it. As Tom Davis, who is editing an anthology of Salinger criticism (one is already out), once pointed out: 'His pictures of the hauntingly nostalgic purity of childhood, of the tortured process of the adolescent groping for maturity, and of the young adult searching for integrity and love in a chaotic world, have touched an extremely wide range of readers'. But, again, why? Is it because of the relevance of his theme, the greatest theme, the relationship of man to God,—or lack of God,—and its 'awesome relevance to our collective civilized fate'? Is it the intensity of his vision, the economy of the art, always skilful and original, his own tragic involvement? What exactly has he done? What is the sum of his achievement? Or, as hostile critics have not been slow to perceive or emphasize, is it because he, a *New Yorker* writer, 'spokesman of the Ivy League Rebellion', 'flatters the very ignorance and shallowness of the young readers', all the time making 'a curning and somewhat shoddy use of Zen'? His opening theme, says another, is 'childhood lost, his conclusion a half-mystical half-sentimental resignation'. Is that all? Then why all this clapping?

What does he bring to modern fiction? What new or compelling note? In some ways it is of course all part of a tradition, one of the oldest, the tradition of the Quest, but in a disinherited age. Nearly everyone has noted the parallel with *Huckleberry Finn*. 'The Catcher in the Rye is a kind of *Huckleberry Finn* in modern dress,' says one. Yes, it is the *kind* that makes the difference! Among others, parallels with Joyce and Amis have been drawn. Lonely misfits are by now a familiar crowd

and almost as boring. The Death of the Hero has been announced from a number of rival platforms. (But what is death without birth or re-birth?) Nor is confessional literature much of a novelty. Is it then, one wonders, the heroic undertone, the translation of an age-old tradition into contemporary terms, the implication of another alchemy, the secret of a haunting vision, a Way, or Tao, lost and waiting to be recovered that is Salinger's ultimate secret? The secret that is as simple as life which resolves, rather than *will* resolve the ancient antagonism between the real and the ideal, between *samsara* and *nirvana*? Perhaps it is as a prelude to that epiphany, yet unachieved, that we must look at Salinger's lonely fight against phony culture. Maybe it is the agony and ecstasy of (in-) approximation, so coolly and colloquially faced, that supplies the sinews of Salinger's calculated commentaries on an ailing age.

His main characters, it does not take one long to find that out, are at heart dreamers and perfectionists—Holden Caulfield, Seymour Glass, Franny and Zooey (what's in a name). They all belong to the Ancient and Honourable Brotherhood of Seekers and the Maladjusted. Each has a private vision that symbolises or typifies reality: a field of rye, a cabin out west, the banana-fish, the Fat Lady. Each fails—Holden's passion to save the little children fades away into the unrealised dream of 'some place nice and wonderful'; Seymour's attempt to return to the auguries of innocence renewed through his love for Muriel ends in a suicide in a Florida hotel; after listening to a voice on the phone Franny sleeps peacefully, though her trouble, we feel, is far from being over; Zooey, who seems to possess all the wisdom that he or the world may ever need, is himself torn between an impersonal idealized image of love and a lot of personalized bitterness, too garrulous, to be the stuff of which Bodhisattvas are made. In most cases the dreamer, even Zooey, the 'verbal stunt pilot', survives but the dream is dead. It

is this which provides meaning to the rest, to what happens as well as what does not happen to all these young shattered characters who, in their own way, have joined the serried ranks of the inheritors of unfulfilled renown. What they have to offer is, briefly, a kind of disturbing entertainment.

The Catcher in the Rye, now recommended as compulsory reading on nearly every American campus, was Salinger's first and if you like only long-short novel. The story, told in the first person, deals, in picaresque fashion, with the wanderings of Holden Caulfield, a New York city lad, who has flunked from a prep school. Without anchorage, he goes about the city for three nights, which includes a stolen visit home. The last we see of him is in a psychiatric sanatorium in California. That, of course, is a very bare and rather banal account of things. The book, as we can see, is not the picture of a sordid universe, or not that alone. Also, it has little or nothing to do with naturalism as such. Holden, 'crazy mix up kid,' is really waging a lonely war against all that is wretched and phony, that is against the entire adult world. It is the teenager epic. Holden may not always articulate this, that is logically and intellectually, but each of his gesture is a criticism of the universe of the grown-up. It is not quite true to say that he is 'a rebel without a cause'. Perhaps he is not a rebel at all, but just 'longs to do good in a dream world'. But why is he so easily hurt or disgusted? Because he is intensely aware of other possibilities, of finer possibilities of being. He is the sensitive in a new key, a new mythos, of the Incarnate Adolescent, and not just another Bad Boy. (Or, as Fiedler has suggested, he is among the Good Bad Boys of American fiction.)

But he is already a divided character: divided between the heroic and the happy dream. This we find in the alternate images of the 'catcher in the rye' and the 'deaf mute in a cabin'. At the end of the novel

the division is not healed, the dilemma remains unsolved.

Also Holden is a sort of static character, swamped by sensations. That is both his strength and weakness. It, however, makes his statements more quick and convincing. For instance, the image of the catcher in the rye, which comes quite casually and unexpectedly. Asked by his sister, Phoebe, a figure of innocence and symbol of refuge in New York's desert universe, to 'Name something you would like to be' Holden says:

'I keep picturing all these little kids playing some game in this big field of rye and all. Thousands of little kids, and nobody around—nobody big, I mean—except me. And I'm standing on the edge of some crazy cliff. What I have to do, I have to catch everybody if they start to go over the cliff—I mean if they're running and they don't look where they're going I have to come out from somewhere and *catch* them. That's all I'd do all day. I'd just be the catcher in the rye and all. I know it's crazy, but that's the only thing I'd really like to be. I know it's crazy.'

But even our little saint knows the difficulty of keeping children 'stay the way they are'. He has only to look at himself!

As his first day in the city ends with a beating by a pimp, he lies in bed and goes over his experiences and the humiliation. 'What I really felt like, though, was committing suicide. I felt like jumping out the window. I probably would have done it too, if I'd been sure somebody'd cover me up as soon as I landed. I didn't want a bunch of rubbernecks looking at me when I was all gory'. The tortured little poet of pain knows the adult world through and through. Out of the mouth of the teenager has come the wisdom.

Later on he goes to see his former English teacher, Mr. Antolini. Probably a homo-sexual, the man is drunk but that does not prevent him from spinning theories. Holden is again frustrated. In other words, the adult world is unable to offer him anything. That is the theme, a

corrosive criticism of the American reality or malady. The Establishment has neither maturity nor does it command any respect. No one cares, no one understands. In spite of many crowded scenes and a constant moving about it is always a lonely crowd, each man alone, shut out, or adrift on the city's highways and subways. Little Holden's private dream fails to lift the general despair of the scene and even the dream in his young heart is beginning to wither.

When, on Monday morning, he sees 'millions of little kids' doing their Christmas shopping, his dream has already left him. Instead of the active role of a saviour, the catcher in the rye, he would now prefer to 'build me a little cabin—and live there the rest of my life... I thought what I'd do was, I'd pretend I was one of those deaf-mutes... wouldn't have any goddam stupid useless conversations with anybody'. In the nature of things such pathetic protests are futile. He has thought out his role carefully and a little later he explains further: 'I'd have this rule that nobody could do anything phony when they visited me. If anybody tried to do anything phony, they couldn't stay.' Such terrible self-consciousness in the young is the full measure of our hopelessness and decline in standards. The young idealist knows how hard it will be to apply this principle or even to try to save the young from being contaminated. For 'The things with kids is, if they want to grab for the gold ring, you have to let them do it, and not say anything. If they fall off, they fall off, but it's bad if you say anything to them'.

That is how the novel ends, a flight from mendacity rather than a search after truth. How a kid feels about other kids. But, in the end, neither the catcher in the rye nor the cabin out west is within the realm of possibility. In the end our hero, 'very wise sheep in lone wolf's clothing' finds himself on the couch of a psychoanalyst the ultimate refinement of a civilization and its discontents. Holden who sees things more clearly and is perhaps more sane than the

rest needs to be cured. The irony and the pathos are obvious but not conclusive. Doubts linger: Is Holden an upper-class aesthete or a Christboy? a runaway from respectability or a martyr in a world of insufficient love? It is difficult to decide. Perhaps Mr. Empson could help.

So much for the only novel. His short stories, which he wrote for the magazines, were collected as *Nine Stories*. These fill in the canvas, as it were. We are presented with the outlines of a family and relationships as exist in an atomic society. A 'mythic gang', the Glass family provides Salinger with the background for a saga of *sagesse* and possible martyrdom. 'Glass', by the way, is heavily ambiguous. See as through a glass darkly, Bible. Those who live in a glass house... *ibid.* Glass, in which you see your own image. The mirror up to nature. Magnifying glass, etc. The role of the Glass children stand in the centre of our dilemma.... 'The family now holds the key—becomes the place where self and society meet,' is one, friendly version. Another, less charitable, would have us believe that Salinger treats the family or prodigies (no doubt about it) as a safe foundation for fantasy'. Much might be said on both sides.

Without frills, the members of the Glass family, its younger members at any rate, are trying to be saints. That would be the simplest way to describe their antics and attitudes, their 'situation' if you like. The model is of course Seymour, 'notorious mystic', 'family saint and family guru'. But in the end he commits suicide, in fact he already has when we first encounter him, for we hear of him from others. Throughout he is presented as a kind of sketch for a *Jivanmukta*. These mystical words and ideas should not surprise any one, for those are common currency in the Glass family of talents. Seymour is at least 'touch'-y, he has some kind of extra-sensory perceptions. In an entry from his diary we read: 'I have scars on my hand from touching certain people... Charlotte once ran away from me... and I grabbed her yellow dress

to keep her near me.... I still have a lemon-yellow mark on the palm of my right hand'. He also dabbles in Zen and Buddhism, providing Salinger with an obvious mouth-piece. 'Followed purely,' he notes in the diary, their recommendations would lead to 'health and a kind of very real, enviable happiness' which, of course, is never his. The Tao emphasis on spontaneity, which children have, or are supposed to have, explains his preoccupation with children, with Muriel, whom he marries, though there is hardly anything in common between the two. Seymour loves Muriel not so much for herself as because she reminds him of a friend of earlier days, Charlotte Mayhew. But the transference does not work. Even from the start there are cracks in the relationship. To Seymour his marriage is like a re-birth. 'I feel as though I'm about to be born. Sacred, sacred day.' Yet, and characteristically, he fails to turn up at the wedding, to participate in the re-birth. The sequel of his hyper-sensitiveness is not hard to guess.

This comes six years later. The characters have changed, the author no less. Seymour's image of innocence has not come true. Childhood, he finds, is not necessarily idyllic. Sybil Carpenter, the young girl in her bathing costume, reminds him of Charlotte. But Sybil can be cruel, she strikes dogs as well as her playmates. Seymour's disillusionment is complete. (How easy!) And so why live? He has nothing to live for, nothing to hope for. He enters the hotel room, where his unsuspecting wife is resting. Taking a pistol he fires a bullet through the temple. As good a *harakiri* as one could expect from a Zen neophyte. 'Is Seymour never wrong?' asks one of his admiring younger brothers in a different context. One suspects the opposite might be nearer the truth.

The story, 'Zooey', brings us back to the old narrator, Buddy Glass. Something between a story and a drama, with its many dates and notes it looks so deliberate, while nothing much happens along

the whole length of it. But what is it all about? A critic has taken some pains to describe it as what can 'properly be called by no other name than the simple and profound name of love'. As it is, the story is in two parts: one is Zooey's conversation with his mother while he is having a bath, a kind of modern closet scene between Hamlet and his mother, the other is a conversation with his sister Franny. The second is more a monologue, for Franny speaks but little. It is Zooey that holds forth. But it is the conversation with his mother that seems better done, witty, bitter and utterly modern. 'He is so bitter about everything,' says Franny about the brother and she is right. But even bitterness is bliss. For it is on the waves of bitterness that the vision comes. He tells Franny: 'I started bitching one night before the broadcast. Seymour'd told me to shine my shoes just as I was going out... I just damn well wasn't going to shine my shoes for them, I told Seymour... He said to shine them *anyway*. He said to shine them for the Fat Lady... He never did tell me who the Fat Lady was...' But *he* will tell Franny. 'I'll tell you a terrible secret—*There isn't anyone out there who isn't Seymour's Fat Lady*... Don't you know that? And don't you know—don't you know who that Fat Lady really is? ... Ah, buddy. Ah, buddy. It's Christ himself. Christ himself, buddy.'

With this revelation Franny who has been going through a crisis, 'sick of egos, egos, egos everywhere', falls into a deep sleep. And there we may leave the family for a while, waiting for further elaboration or elucidation.

But how good is Zooey, the one-man MRA commentator? He *talks* of detachment. But the wisdom is unable to save the dispenser himself. 'The only thing that counts in religious life,' he has discovered, 'is detachment... Detachment, buddy, and only detachment.' But he is also given to judging people and when he judges he does not spare. Is that detachment, buddy, detachment? 'I sit in judgment on every

poor ulcerous b... I know.' To that extent—that he himself is more apt to be angry than to be detached, and more detached than loving—the image of the Fat Lady fails to be a genuine symbol. The parable is underweight, as *Time* said. It is not easy to equate this or him with the Pauline injunction: 'you are to be in the world but not of it.' Or with the Zen emphasis on emptiness and detachment, or the Indian formula of non-attached activity, the insistence on *Brahmi-sthiti* and *Nishkama Karma*, to live in Him and for Him, in all ways of one's being, *sarva-bhavana*. Purification of motive is a harder job than Salinger seems to imagine. Or is the whole thing a brilliant parody?

So far Zooey, like Salinger, can only talk about it, in a somewhat superior fashion. Or just try. As yet he cannot convince us of the reality of the experience, perhaps because there has been, so far, little to report. Zooey tells Franny: 'Act for God, if you want to—*be God's actress*, if you want to.' Excellent advice. But, physician heal thyself. For look at Seymour, Zooey's big brother. All his wisdom is unable to save him from suicide. From another point the question about the myth is: can Salinger resurrect Seymour? No one is saved without being re-born. It will be worth watching how he goes about this. All one can say is that for the present there is an imbalance between theory and action. The fact that he, cleverly and sensitively, includes chunks of contemporary reality prevents one from seeing how slender is the relationship between it and the ideal of an active, virtuous life that he so often evokes. He is probably doing his best, but in term of the ideal he himself evokes, he has yet a long way to go. 'The use of transcendental mysticism in satiric fiction' has not borne its ripest fruit yet. (As, for instance, it has not in the works of that mystic *manqué*, Aldous Huxley.) Neither Zooey nor Salinger can relate, 'for Chrissake'. It is perhaps too harsh to say, as Kazin has done, that the worst that Salinger characters can say about our

society is that 'They are too sensitive to live in it', but the criticism has point. But others, more sympathetic if not deferential to Salinger's art and appeal, have sincerely felt that without bowing to the public opiates of sex, violence and depravity, without assuming any of the popular poses of the 'beat' and the blasé, Salinger has quietly, and competently, managed to present, with humour and compassion, the most significant and complex moral problem that we are facing today—the simple truth that life without love is hell. Or, as one of his characters has it, he has written 'the history of human trouble and the poetry of love'. And it is easy to see that Salinger's struggles, which are bound to increase, are greater than other men's successes. It is exquisite tight-rope walking. Is he riding for a fall? driving the novel to extinction?

To sum up: the reality of the Zen experience which the novel hints or speaks of has not yet become a felt quality in the

action. It may be the controlling idea or image, but as yet it does not fully control. The action of no-action is yet to be. Obsessed with his adolescent mystique Salinger has still to write his Zen novel, if it is ever possible to do so. For how could one *wirte* it? It would have to write itself. Such a feat of spiritual automatism might bring us back to the age—or edge—of early prophets. If that ever happens, the novel will be something of a poem too, as it already in bits is. The Way Forward would be the Way Back. Are we heading towards that? The tranquil blossom on a tortured stem?

The pure integral form,
Austere and silver-dark,
Is balanced on the storm
In its predestined arc.

Five-petalled flame, be cold;
Be firm, dissolving star:
Accept the stricter mould
That makes you singular.

Nietzsche's Idea of Social Progress

DAYAL SARAN VERMA

'GOD is dead; let us create new gods', said Nietzsche, the poet-atheist. But why and how are we to create new gods? A search for Nietzsche's answer to this question would inevitably lead us to Nietzsche, the social philosopher; for new gods are created not in the metaphysician's arm-chair, but in the real social processes where values — and God is a value — are realized, socialized or rejected. If, however, we agree to create a new god, let us be careful, Nietzsche exhorts further, not to place it beyond our reach. 'Let it not fly away from the earthly and beat against eternal walls with its wings!... Remain true to the earth, my brethren, with the power of your virtue. Let your bestowing love and your knowledge be devoted to be the meaning of the earth. Thus do I pray and conjure you'.¹ Nothing otherworldly, trans-individual or trans-social, nothing logically or naturally inevitable, would he accept, because whether transcendental or inevitable, it would place god beyond man's 'creating will.' A new God has to be created, a god of this earth, a Superman equal to God minus otherworldliness. 'Dead are all gods, now do we desire the Superman to live' is the core of Nietzsche's philosophy of social progress.

Nietzsche died (1900) at the dead end of the 19th Century, after twelve years of complete insanity. But the idea of inevitable progress — which he fought, and which in itself was an outcome of blending such concepts as historical progress, biological evolution and economic development into one by the optimistic mind of the industrial era, had yet to wait for fourteen years to get its final shock in the first world war. It was the war which for

the first time gave a concrete proof of the complete lack of correlation between man's growing control over nature and his moral and social development. The increasing institutionalization of man under the 'sovereign' states, a source of Hegel's 'inevitable ought', and the steadily increasing power of man over natural forces through science and industry, resulted in identifying the actual with the ideal and in converting the so-called social laws — historical, dialectical or economic — into social values. The ideal was conceived not simply as desirable but as inevitable. The fact, however, remained that this increasing power of the state over nature lacked something essential, and therefore could never become the real panacea for social evils. What these factors lacked was control by the moral will, in the absence of which it was not possible to put them to right purpose. Nietzsche's search is the search of that 'will'. Unless man's control over nature and over man is placed under the proper direction of that 'will', a right use of these controls cannot be guaranteed. And what is the right use of the controls? To use them for the development of man, i.e., for the development of the individual's personality — would be Nietzsche's reply. 'With the help of favourable measures', says Nietzsche, 'great individuals might be reared who would be both different from and higher than those who heretofore have owed their existence to mere chance. Here we may still be hopeful: in the rearing of exceptional men'.²

The idea of progress implies a sense of history and that is why it germinated only with the Encyclopedists, quite late in the history of social philosophy. But then, it grew with the expansion of knowledge. It

provided thinkers with an impetus to analyse the chaotic mass of historical data in order to discover some laws of social evolution and to deduce from them some standards for future valuation. The search for a law of progress, however, could not succeed because five thousand years of human civilization, a comparatively smaller period in the evolution of human species, did not afford sufficient data to demonstrate it. Still, under the impact of revolutionary theories progress seemed natural and remained almost a religious faith. Nietzsche, whose concept of 'Will to Power' and whose ethical philosophy have been wrongly identified with Darwin's idea of the 'struggle for existence' and with naturalistic perfectionism by W. M. McGovern³ and by W. M. Urban⁴ respectively and whose general philosophy has been flippantly rejected by Santayana as 'fragmentary and immature',⁵ bitterly reacted against historicism and evolutionism. He declared that his purpose was 'to teach man to regard the future of humanity as his will, as depending on human will, and make preparation for vast hazardous enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and educating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful rule of folly and chance which has hitherto gone by the name of history'.⁶ . . . But the method of this teaching of 'the future of humanity as man's will' is still historical, comparative and genetical. He tries to trace the historical genesis of moral values by psychological analysis of history, and suggests standards of valuation on the basis of comparative ethics. As a method of evaluation this may be wrong, because information regarding facts cannot possibly tell us the qualitative difference among value.; but this suggests that his concept of 'will to power' is itself an information about a psychological fact. Schopenhauer's will to live becomes for Nietzsche the 'will to power' because 'a living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength, for which it must appropriate, exploit and assimilate'. The process of 'valuation' being a process

of life, is also determined by the processes of this will to power.

The will to power as a psychological and not as a metaphysical concept, ought to be regarded as basic in Nietzsche's philosophy, because then alone it would be possible to account for his irrationalism and existentialism. It does not seem that he is making any serious efforts to be consistent in propounding any of his doctrines. He is far more serious in striving to live in the light of his reflections; his aphorisms, as he says, are written with his 'life and blood'. But this makes his insight original, direct and deep, and enables him to unmask many hidden layers of the individual and the social mind.

Nietzsche's rejection of the law of social progress is proved by the fact that no such law has any place in his philosophy. All human knowledge is determined by human will to power, and therefore, has no objective validity. 'Granted that we want the truth. Why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance',⁷ asks he. Because, he replies, 'in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity'⁸ — in this process of becoming — man finds himself insecure. Through 'knowledge' man seeks to understand this reality as classified, schematized and arranged in a definite order, so as to make it calculable, predictable, and serviceable. 'It is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts and their impulses for and against'.⁹ Therefore, the forms of knowledge, scientific, moral, aesthetic or logical, and the great systems of metaphysics are valuable, not because they describe reality as it is, but because they are the revelations of man's will to power. In other words, this is creativism, which means that the world as conceived by science, philosophy and art is a 'world-arrangement' as effectuated by the creative elements of human will. The history of human civilization is the history of human adventures in making the universe serviceable to man. And so are the attempts which seek to systematize past facts as history, for they

also reveal that creative will which seeks to make history serviceable.

Progress, therefore, does not essentially consist in the expansion of knowledge, science and technology, but in increasing the 'quantum' of will to power, a process which can be accomplished only by 'rearing' higher individuals. It is impossible according to him to put forth any objective criterion of progress, because, not only is objectivity impossible, but also because it is not possible to predict the ways in which values in future would be interpreted by the higher men. It is only in creative accomplishments that the will effects a higher order; but creativity cannot be comprehended by laws.

To say that progress means the development of higher individuals would be a mere tautology unless we understand that Nietzsche's concept of higher individuals is more psychological than ethical. If values are a creation of man's will to power, higher values are those which are effectuated by an individual with a stronger will to power — will to power interpreted not in the crude sense of self-assertion or self-aggrandisement, but in the sense of richness of personality, that is, a personality which brings about a better 'arrangement' of material available, a better order of things, whether it is accomplished in the field of art, philosophy or science. This higher individual is not the propagator of higher values; it is not his function, nor does he live to lead the masses. He actually lives his values; his mode of living being the result of the inner richness of his personality, of his spontaneous urge for higher life and his vital exuberance. People follow him not because he represents in any way the values of the masses, but because the manifestation of his inner richness through his mode of living produces a sort of suggestive state of mind and generates in the masses the desire to be commanded by the higher man and thus preparing for a higher life of heroism — a life which they would never have attained by themselves. This is how we can state succinctly the

process of realization and socialization of higher values as suggested by Nietzsche.

In a metaphysically absurd world of Nietzsche's conception, man becomes not only the end but also the best means of realizing anything higher — man not as he is or as he ought to be, the ideal man, but man as a whole with his weaknesses and strength, as he reveals himself in his organic will to subliminate, to surpass and to excel himself. The stronger this will, the greater in the individual is the capacity of harnessing antagonistic multifarious qualities of his personality. The greater this capacity of harnessing antagonistic qualities, the richer would be his personality. Nietzsche conceives the psychological self of the individual in the form of an aristocracy, a hierarchy of contending forces. Every contending force should grow higher if this hierarchy as a whole is to grow higher. That is why in Nietzsche's philosophy such terms as discipline and spontaneity go together. It is only through disciplining these individual forces that the self as a whole can function spontaneously. This is not the proper place to go into the details of this psychology, but it must be noted here that many later psychological theories about personality development were clearly anticipated by Nietzsche.

'Caesar — with the heart of Christ', he once noted in his diary. Unless the higher man is the ruler of the race, 'the good' must crucify him who deviseth his own virtue⁹ Progress lies in determining values from the standpoint of the higher man, but the numerically stronger masses will accept his standpoint only when he is able to effectuate in them an order different from their present order. This led to the belief that Nietzsche supported the idea of State regimentation. But this has to be refuted, for Nietzsche is conceiving progress in terms of realization and socialization of new values. The Caesar, the higher man, is a creative leader rather than a ruler. Though he was originally a philosopher, Nietzsche's approach is an artist's approach.

and gives the idea of progress a broad and real foundation of public sanction. Values change, but they change in accordance with the psychological make-up of the society of the time. The state in itself has nothing to do with progress; it does not allow any scope for creative leaders; it is founded on demagoguery. 'The better the state is organised', he exclaimed, 'the duller will humanity be'.¹⁰ In 'Thus spake Zarathustra' he is more emphatic:

'A state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people'.

It is a lie. Creators were they who created people, and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life. Destroyers, are they who lay snares for many, and call it the state: they hang a sword and a hundred cravings over them'.

Nietzsche, therefore, conceives a progressive society in the form of an aristocracy – a moral aristocracy, and puts forth an analysis of the creatively heroic and moral element of human personality. His 'will to power' is to be interpreted as an urge for the higher life. It is because of this urge that man re-forms, re-interprets and re-evaluates his life and is prepared to make inconceivable sacrifices for it. The urge for the higher life, however, differs in its 'quanta of power' in different individuals, and, therefore, according to Nietzsche, a higher social life can emerge only when those who do not possess this urge strongly follow those who possess it. The more intense the drive for creative activity, the stronger the urge for moral uplift, the more enterprising the preparedness for heroic sacrifices, the higher, according to Nietzsche, will be the man and the richer will be his personality.

¹ 'Thus Spake Zarathustra', 22.

² *We Philologists*, 100.

³ 'From Luther To Hitler', (George G. Harrap & Co., London), p. 410.

⁴ 'Fundamentals of Ethics' (London, 1949), p. 153.

⁵ 'Egotism in German Philosophy', p. 98.

⁶ 'Beyond Good and Evil', 203.

⁷ 'Beyond Good and Evil', 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ 'Will to Power', 481.

¹⁰ 'Thus Spake Zarathustra', 56.

¹¹ 'We Philologists', 192.

CURRENT AFFAIRS

Problems of Nationalism and Regional Security in South and South East Asia

M. R. MASANI

ON November 21, the Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Swaran Singh, made certain remarks that provide a good starting point for a discussion on the problems of Nationalism and Regional Security in South and South East Asia. He said the concept of Asian unity, forged during the struggle against foreign domination, was being damaged by new ambitions and new conflicts which had arisen in Asia. He regretted that the Asian picture today was very different from what had been envisaged and he also dwelt on the dangerous new factor introduced by China's nuclear detonation.

How justified is the disappointment of the Indian Foreign Minister about the kind of Asia we had imagined before we got our freedom and the kind of Asia we are now engaged in creating? It might be worth while to start by having a quick look round the region.

Starting from the Middle East, we find during the past few years a series of inter-Arab rivalries and intrigues, the last phase of which is the civil war in the Yemen with direct Egyptian intervention. Then we have the unfortunate situation of the Arabs *versus* Israel. We find several members of the United Nations proclaiming publicly their intention of destroying another fellow member of the United Nations and of driving it into the sea! A

little further East, we find Pakistan and Afghanistan engaged in a quarrel over Pakhtoonistan. A little further East, we find Pakistan embroiled with India over Kashmir.

If we turn our faces further North, we find the heights of the Himalayas occupied by Chinese Communist troops, heights they occupied by military force after inflicting a decisive defeat in battle on the Indian Army in October-November 1962. That defeat was the consequence of the betrayal of Tibet by the Indian Government in 1950 and again in 1960. The supine standing aside and allowing a peaceful neighbour (a valuable buffer State) to be destroyed—for that act we are now paying in the occupation of our own territory and the strategic domination of the Himalayas by Chinese Communist forces.

Today our neighbours in Sikkim and Bhutan are being softened up for the final take-over. Our other Northern neighbour, Nepal is practising non-alignment against us, just as we have been pactising it against the rest these last fifteen years.

If we go a little further East, we find that we have been embroiled, till a few months ago, in military operations against the Nagas who claim independence for Nagaland. Since September, 1964, thanks to Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, Mr. Chaliha and the Rev. Michael Scott, who have

done a wonderful job as mediators, a cease fire has been achieved and negotiations are proceeding between the Indian Government and the Underground 'Naga Federal Republic,' as they call themselves.

Burma, our Eastern neighbour, is becoming less and less friendly. Their treatment of Indian nationals in Burma is disgraceful. They are being thrown out without a paisa to take out with them after spending generations in that country. In foreign policy, Burma looks like becoming more and more a Cuba of the East, more and more a satellite of Communist China.

Ceylon, which had Trotskyite participation in Government—probably the only country in the world to have Trotskyites in Government—has mercifully been liberated for the time being from that yoke and we may look forward to the United National Party winning the general elections which will take place after a few weeks. But Ceylon and India also have a dispute over people of Indian origin.

The only friendly neighbours India has today are perhaps Afghanistan on the one side and Malaysia on the other.

If we turn to South East Asia, we find that Laos has been two-thirds eaten up by Communist infiltration as a result of 'neutralisation'. General Kong Lee has been the leader of the neutralist forces. Four years ago, he refused to accept American help and arms on the grounds that he was a neutralist and would only take Soviet assistance. Early last year he found that when he needed replacements and ammunition, the tap was suddenly turned off by Mr. Khrushchev and he had to shout for American arms and assistance! On 24th May 1964, he made the following pregnant remark: 'I do not like the Communists. I like neutralism. But the Communists like to destroy the neutralists every time. So from now on I announce that I will support all who are against Communists, and my neutralist forces will join them in the fight.'

Vietnam has been a vacuum since the overthrow of President Diem. The war

there cannot possibly be won so long as the concept of a 'privileged sanctuary' in North Vietnam is tolerated. Either North Vietnam will have to be liberated or in the end the whole of Indo-China will fall to Communist imperialism.

Cambodia, which claims to be neutral, sees the only threat to its security from the United States, and not from Peking. It is engaged in a quarrel with the United States, with South Vietnam and with Thailand, its small neighbours, while professing to see nothing but good in the big neighbour further north. Prince Sihanouk Norodom, who has been breaking off relations all round, recently broke off relations with the last organisation, the International Boy Scout Organisation, as an imperialist agency.

Malaysia, a member of the Commonwealth along with India, is up against aggression from Indonesia, and it is good to remember that Indonesian aggression has two supporters, Communist China and Soviet Russia. Mr. Mikoyan visited Jakarta a few months ago and publicly boasted that they would give Indonesia arms superior to whatever the British might be able to deploy. It is with the instigation of these two incendiaries, Moscow and Peking, that Indonesia is launched on a career of aggression against its peaceful neighbour.

If Vietnam were to fall, if the Americans were to withdraw from Vietnam after a face-saving 'neutralisation' as in Laos, then the defence of Malaysia will become immensely more difficult because of the common frontier that will be established with Chinese communist forces. And if Malaysia falls, then, we shall have Chinese communist domination right down to Singapore. That would undoubtedly be a fearsome prospect for India—to be outflanked all the way from Karachi to Singapore, but it will also be a very dangerous situation for the free world as a whole.

The questions that arise are: How did this happen? What has gone wrong? I think it is necessary to analyse what is the

cause of this picture where there is a big threat from the North to the soft underbelly of Asia, but where the peoples of those countries and the governments, instead of facing up to the threat from the North and joining hands, are found to be quarrelling amongst themselves. Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan and India, Burma and India, Ceylon and India, Cambodia and Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, all natural allies, are squabbling among themselves and taking the help, sometimes, of the common enemy just to weaken their neighbours. What is the cause of this suicidal situation?

I think the basic answer is Nationalism—nationalism of a rather superficial and foolish kind—which is the cause of this failure to build up any kind of regional security against the major threat from outside.

What is the role of Nationalism in Asia today? We claim that we all live in a shrinking world, that this is One World, to use Wendell Wilkie's phrase. Undoubtedly, the objective situation calls for a world order. This is due to three factors: the elimination of distance, thanks to the supersonic jet; the elimination of distance in the way of communications, thanks to telecommunication; and the economic shrinking which makes the world a natural market. It is already potentially one market, but we divide it into bits and pieces and compartments. It has rightly been said that if someone sneezes in Peking, there is an influenza epidemic in Moscow or Washington as a result. Recently, Peking sneezed in a nuclear sense and Mr. Khrushchev was the first victim of the influenza epidemic in Moscow! This is therefore not a world of national sovereign States. Political boundaries have become, not yet meaningless, but much less meaningful than they were fifty or a hundred years ago. We find that Europe is trying to overcome these political boundaries which colour its map and become a community and a common market. The fact of interdependence is as real in Asia as in

Europe, though the readiness to see it may not yet be there.

A symptom of the fact that national sovereignty has lost real meaning was the resignation of an Iranian Prime Minister, Mr. Amini. When Mr. Amini resigned some time in 1964, the statement he made giving the reason for his resignation was most interesting. He said he had resigned because the United States was not giving his country enough economic aid! It will be agreed that this was the first time that a Prime Minister of a free country resigned as a protest against an act of another government. This shows that Iran—I mean no disrespect to Iran—has ceased to be a sovereign national state. Even the United States is no longer a sovereign national state. President Kennedy was big enough to say that the United States cannot survive alone. Neither can India.

The tragedy is that the new states of Asia and Africa have appeared on the scene as nation states too late in history. They have come into existence when the nation state is already on its way out. It is like a baby born after its time. This fact, which is becoming more and more clear as the years pass, was seen with great foresight by E. M. Forster, the British writer about India, several years ago. He wrote many years ago: 'India a nation. What an apotheosis. Last comer to the drab 19th Century sisterhood, waddling at this hour of the world to take her seat. She whose only peer was the Holy Roman Empire, she shall rank now with Guatemala and Belgium perhaps.'

This was the great insight of a novelist who saw many years ago what a tragic joke it was that a sub-continent which should really be part of a world order as a region was now professing to be a national state and joining the body of those who were about to stop being national states themselves, as Belgium is today, with Benelux on the one hand and the European community on the other.

In this context, what is the role of nationalism? I have been a nationalist

myself. I have been to British prisons more than once. I believe that Nationalism has a progressive role to play under imperialism, under foreign rule, but, as far as I can see, Nationalism has no major progressive role to play once a nation is free. Because then it is likely to become a disease, to turn into chauvinism, xenophobia. Mazzini's dream of nationalism as a stepping stone to internationalism was a very beautiful concept, but in the case of Asia or Africa today, it would be difficult to find much justification for that hope. Look at Ghana or Indonesia or Egypt. It would be very difficult to imagine these as stepping stones to real internationalism, as Mazzini had hoped. Nationalism in these countries appears to spring from a sense of inferiority. It means that the feeling that one is not free has endured. Gandhi, who was a great man, used to say under British rule: 'I feel free. Nobody can stop me from doing anything I want to. I take the consequences.' In other words, even under foreign rule, a man of courage and conscience can feel free because he is prepared to pay the price of what conscience and conviction decree. The reverse is also true—that you may get political freedom and that you may not feel free, you may not feel secure, because you still feel dominated. The result is manifest in various forms.

One of these is the thesis of Neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is nothing but a reflection of a subjective feeling of inferiority and insecurity that your newly won freedom will be snatched away again by some wicked person from outside. Economic aid, which should be welcome, becomes a symbol of neo-colonialism because the country receiving it is so frightened of losing its freedom that it cannot trust even its friends.

Non-alignment is another form of that sense of inferiority. Non-alignment or, as I prefer to call it, neutralism, is a moral evasion. It is a refusal to judge between freedom and tyranny, between right and wrong. It is an attempt to claim that grey

and black are the same. It is a theory of equidistance from both camps, the Democratic camp and the Communist camp. If you are equidistant between right and wrong, between freedom and tyranny, then inevitably you take the side of wrong and tyranny. Recently, the Prime Minister of India, replying to a suggestion that we should take the assistance of the American nuclear deterrent as a reply to the Chinese explosion, said: 'Yes, but we do not want to lose our sovereignty and our freedom,' as if the people of Germany, Britain, Turkey or Japan had lost their freedom by relying on the American nuclear deterrent.

A third manifestation of such a slogan of nationalism is, 'my country, right or wrong' which, as someone so aptly put it, is like saying 'my mother, drunk or sober.'

The result is described by Professor Dr. W. Salaam, an advisor to the Pakistan President, who recently wrote a series of articles on 'World Security—Poverty and Conflict.' I would like to quote a paragraph from this Pakistan thinker:

I wish to turn to the problem of local wars between the developing countries themselves. Unfortunately, the liquidation of colonial rule has introduced among us all the traditional diseases of Europe, excessive nationalism, territorial accretion, racial intolerance, and intolerance of minorities. We in our turn are as likely to flout the U.N. resolutions, as likely as any super power to go back on solemn pledges given, as likely to suppress unpopular political opinion and as likely to dishonour the obligations imposed on us by the Security Council. Most of our countries have embarked on expensive armaments programmes, directed principally against our neighbours. With what face can we go to the disarmament conferences of the world, with what face can we pass judgement on the super powers? Pakistan is spending nearly 3% of its national income on defence. I think India is currently devoting 2.5%, and this may increase to 5%. When we remember that the yearly investment rate in both

countries does not exceed 10 to 12 per cent, one can see what a tremendous difference a determined resolution of our conflicts could imply.'

These are words of wisdom coming from a Pakistani advisor to his government, and they are a fair summary of the phenomenon which I have been trying to describe.

We have talked a lot about 'anti-imperialism' all these years without really knowing what it meant. But genuine anti-imperialism includes opposition to the imperialism of one's own country. It is not good enough for us to be anti-imperialist about some other part of the world. That is very easy. It becomes very difficult to be anti-imperialist when what one is combating is a kind of incipient imperialism of one's own country. That very few people today are prepared to undertake.

Finally, there is economic nationalism—the erecting of economic boundaries to destroy that world market which should be the Liberal goal. Most of our countries are engaged in it, and our pattern of planning of course makes it inevitable, because the planning in which many of the States of Asia are engaged is basically Soviet-type planning. It is based on being self-sufficient within a number of years. Mr. Nehru, for instance, was very fond of saying that India should be free of foreign capital and assistance within ten years. I remember once when I said in Parliament in his presence that I thought that this would last over half a century, he got worked up and said: 'I am astonished that the honourable member should admit that we shall have the humiliation of being dependent on foreign capital for fifty more years.' As if something terrible were involved in accepting foreign capital! To this I pointed out that the United States takes more British Capital today than is invested by the United States in Britain without any shame or any disadvantage. This kind of resentment of foreign aid or foreign capital, which is typical of the half-baked Marxist thought which has

been dominating our countries for the last generation, this economic nationalism, leads to the desire that our Plans should be autarchic, that iron and steel plants machinery plants should eat up all the capital investment which should have gone to agriculture and the land, thereby creating a food shortage. This type of autarchic planning is economic nationalism run mad. An example of this was that some people in Nepal, I understand, have expressed the wish that Nepal should have a steel plant! It has been rightly said that a steel plant, a five year plan and supersonic jets are the status symbols of the new emerging nations!

Having analysed the role that nationalism is playing in the context of the world in which we live, we can now look forward and consider the outlook and the possible solutions to this situation. As far as I can see it, the choice before us in Asia is between taking our proper place in the world order or going in for Balkanisation. Do we want to become the Balkans of the Twentieth Century or do we want to take our proper place in the world community? This broadly is the choice. Now, the communists understand this choice. Wicked as they are in many wars, the communists are on this point more intelligent than the democrats. They realise that national sovereignty is increasingly becoming a myth. They realise that there is only one war to fight—the international cold war—an international war of ideas and ideologies where national boundaries do not count, where you either belong to one camp or the other. Therefore, to them the fight in Vietnam and the fight against India and the fight against Formosa are all sectors of the same war. There is only one war—these are sectors, but they never compartmentalise them as we do. We think that the fight in different parts of the world are different wars, but this is not so. It is one fight. The sad thing is that while the communists talk of Panchshila, the United States and the Western Democracies practise Panchshila and non-intervention,

at great cost to themselves and to their allies and friends.

What is needed is a policy of Inter-dependence. This means that we should shed neutralism, that we should be prepared to make moral judgements which we have evaded so far. It was a Turk, Emin Pasha, who said as far back as 1886: 'A neutral State is as Utopian a being as a neutral man.'

Now, I do not think that even genuine non-alignment has to be sacrificed. If non-alignment means, as it meant ten years ago, that a country does not rush in to take sides in the conflict between the NATO Powers and Soviet Russia, then Sweden Switzerland have been non-aligned. They are neutral. That kind of State neutrality is legitimate and understandable, and I have nothing against Swedish neutrality or Swiss neutrality. But the Swiss and the Swedes have not failed to distinguish between freedom and tyranny, between democracy and communist dictatorship. They have kept a very strong military establishment, and there is no doubt that they would use it if attacked by the Communist powers. So, I am not against State neutrality. I am against intellectual neutralism of the kind that our leaders in Asia have been preaching to us the last fifteen years.

We saw that kind of neutralism at the Cairo Conference in October. It was supposed to be a conference of non-aligned countries, in which case one might ask: What was Cuba doing at a non-aligned conference? What was Algeria doing at a non-aligned conference? And what was Indonesia doing at that Conference? On every single issue that came up, that Conference took the Soviet side against democracy, and the result was great rejoicing in Moscow at the end of the convention. For instance, the Cairo Conference sparked a declaration against Neo-colonialism and having done that it defined the fight against neo-colonialism as declaring war on Portugal and South Africa. There was not a word about Chinese colonialism in

Tibet, Vietnam or North Korea or Soviet Colonialism in the countries of Eastern Europe. Then there was a protest against the establishment of Anglo-American bases in the Indian Ocean, a thing which would be helpful to our defence. Thirdly, there was a commitment by all governments, including ours, to support the United Arab Republic against Israel on the Palestine issue and the Jordan waters issue. Is that being non-aligned between Israel and Egypt, to take sides in a domestic dispute between two countries about which we have neither any knowledge nor interest?

The so-called non-aligned Conference gave no support to India against Communist China and no support to Malaysia against Indonesia, thereby showing how much on the merits they were prepared to act. Finally, there was the treatment of Tshombe and more recently the so called horror against the rescue of innocent men, women and children in Stanleyville. If this is non-alignment, then I think the less there is of it, the better.

So far what we have considered is what we in Asia can do. Let us now consider what countries outside Asia can do, what role they have to play. I must confess that sometimes one wonders whether Europe is not turning away from Asia, whether Europe is not turning inwards and getting too preoccupied with its own internal problems. One feels that sometimes, attending conferences taking place in Europe. One finds that they are so much at sixes and sevens among themselves that the fight between the Six and Seven seems more important than the world fight against totalitarian tyranny.

Now, Liberals of course will accept the need for a helping hand from one side to the other. It can be mutual. Economic aid has been one of the expressions of that concern, and it has been very generous. The United States in particular and many other countries have given very generously of their economic treasure to help the underdeveloped countries.

Here I must enter a warning, which is

that economic aid, while generally helpful, can also harm; that the money can be well used or it can be wasted, and unfortunately a great deal is being wasted. Take for instance, the aid to India. The U.S. Government aid and British aid and West German aid is to some extent wasted because it is not given under proper conditions, because the right kind of strings are not attached, as they should be. If money is given for building a steel plant, as Germany and Britain have, that money is largely wasted, because that money does not give a quick return on the capital invested. So far, the German and the British plants have made colossal losses. This has saddled India with a big debt. If the money had been used for agriculture or road building or electric power, it would have given manifold returns and it would have been more productively used. It is good that the American Congress turned down, last year, the idea of another steel plant, which our Government unwisely wanted. That was the beginning of economic wisdom on the part of the United States. It is very important that the country that gives the money is satisfied that the purpose for which the money is used is the right purpose. This is not political interference and, if it is, it is sound interference because national sovereignty has become meaningless when you give and accept economic aid. I would say that one government should refuse to give another government economic aid except for legitimate purposes, and a Liberal would say that a legitimate purpose is the building of the infrastructure, the provision of irrigation, transport, communications, technical education and know-how, may be electric power. But to give money to another government to produce articles of manufacture, whether it is penicillin or steel, is wrong. It is wrong because it is unsound in principle, it is wrong because it is often wasteful, because these governments produce those articles at high cost, they mulct the consumer, and waste the money and incur

debt. For that kind of thing, these governments should be referred to the money market. The United States Government should give money for infrastructure, but, for anything else, they should ask them to raise equity capital.

Equity capital is in the interest of the developing country. If someone gives us a government to government loan, then we are bound to pay back the loan and the interest charges, however unwisely we use that money. If our government pours it down the drain, we still have to pay the capital and interest. This is not so with equity capital. When equity capital comes in, it comes in at its own risk. The man who brings in his money has to make a profit. If he does not make a profit, then he loses it and goes back empty handed. We lose nothing. Therefore, the insistence on the investment of equity capital is highly important from the viewpoint of the national interest of the backward countries.

A second factor is intellectual cooperation and aid. It would be fair to say that economic aid has outrun intellectual or ideological aid. True friendship requires frankness and not just politeness. Too many foreign experts, so called, and foreign politicians visit our countries and, without knowing what they are doing, they give a fine certificate to our governments, which are often engaged in doing something irresponsible. The result is that it becomes twice as difficult to open the eyes of our peoples and to educate our electorates about the mistakes of our Governments. They can always say, but look what Professor so and so from England or Mr. so and so from America said. *They* think we are all right, why are *you* bellyaching? Now this is something which has become very painful to Liberals and democrats in these countries. We find our position being continually eroded by well-meaning, starry-eyed gentlemen from abroad who think it is very good to tell the poor dears that they are doing very nicely. In other words, I do not think it is

a compliment to be so indulgent to the poor dears. The poor dears should be judged by the same strict standards by which they judge themselves and, if by those standards we are doing something wrong, we should be told that we are doing something wrong.

In a way we in Asia are where Europe was a generation back. Europe was involved in the Cold War and was threatened of being overrun in the years after World War II. Europe has some kind of a detente now and one hopes it continues

but, if Europe has entered 'the end of the age of ideology' Asia has not. The 'end of ideology' sounds very nice in Geneva or London, but the end of ideology has no meaning at the present time in Asia because we are very much engaged in the Cold War which has now become acute on our side. Partly, it is a shooting war. Asia's position is similar to that of Europe in the years after the War when NATO was formed, when there was Marshal Aid and the Truman Plan. It is in that age that we in Asia live today.

The Roots of the Dominican Crisis

THEODORE DRAPER

WHEN Dominican President Juan Bosch was overthrown in September 1963, President Kennedy publicly deplored the military coup, broke off diplomatic relations with the new self-appointed Dominican government, halted all economic and military aid, and withdrew U.S. personnel from Santo Domingo. Though diplomatic relations were re-established three months later, Bosch did not complain of the U.S. government's lack of sympathy. He recalled, on the contrary, that U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin had offered to call for the U.S. carrier *Boxer* to deter the military conspirators. But Bosch did not wish to owe his political survival to a show of U.S. force in Dominican waters, and refused the offer.

On May 2 of the present crisis, President Johnson declared that the pro-Bosch uprising had begun as 'a popular democratic revolution committed to democracy and social justice.' He also said: 'We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people.' On May 3, the chief U.S. spokesman at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, assured the world organization that the U.S. government had 'never' considered Bosch's political party to be 'extremist' and called attention to U.S. 'cooperation' with Bosch's regime in 1963.

From all this it would seem that the general line of U.S. policy in the present crisis should have been quite clear—firm support of the man who headed the only government freely chosen by the will of the Dominican people in this century. The last thing one would have expected, if words were deeds, was U.S. support of the militarists who overthrew him in 1963 and were fighting him two years later.

To understand how and why a mockery

was made of everything the United States supposedly stood for, it is necessary to go back at least as far as Bosch's term of office and its immediate antecedents. The present crisis is, in essence, merely a continuation of the process which led to Bosch's overthrow. If the military coup of 1963 was a crude political swindle, as U.S. official policy statements have implicitly agreed, the military cabal to prevent Juan Bosch's return to power in 1965 was exactly the same thing.

Nothing has changed, not even the names.

In December 1962, Bosch's *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD) won an overwhelming electoral victory. But it was an unexpected victory, at least for his conservative opposition, the *Unión Cívica Nacional* (UCN), which could not reconcile itself to defeat. Bosch took office on February 27 the following year, and he learned of a plot to overthrow him on March 9, ten days later. Another coup was scheduled for April, a very serious one barely failed to come off in July, a third miscarried in August, and the successful one was perpetrated in September.

In the atmosphere of Santo Domingo, these conspiracies were known to Bosch almost as soon as they were hatched. When Bosch heard of the last one, he called the military leaders to his office and decided to force a showdown by demanding the dismissal of one of the ringleaders. The officer he named was Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin of the San Isidro Air Base outside the capital. In reply, the military made Bosch a prisoner in his own office for four days and then put him on a boat to the island of Guadeloupe, from which he quickly made his way to Puerto Rico. Less

than two years later, Wessin y Wessin, now a Brigadier General, emerged as the leading military figure in the attack on the pro-Bosch forces.

Why was Bosch so vulnerable to the camarilla of generals and colonels at San Isidro? The question takes us close to the grandeur and fragility of Bosch's regime.

In the last years of the Trujillo dictatorship, the legendary tyrant no longer wholly trusted the regular police and Army to protect him. He tried to reinsure himself by adding tanks and infantry troops to the San Isidro Air Base under the command of his son, Ramfis. San Isidro thus became the military citadel of Trujilloism, and the commander of the tank corps, Colonel Wessin y Wessin, was one of the citadel's key chieftains.

When Bosch took office in February 1963, he inherited the old Trujillo armed forces intact. They continued to remain intact under Bosch because he knew that a much-needed purge of the top leadership would immediately trigger a military coup and plunge the country into civil war. He was determined to rule peacefully or not at all, and therefore deliberately took the calculated risk of leaving the Armed Forces alone. Thus Bosch survived in office seven months; otherwise, he might not have survived seven days or even seven hours.

Would a Communist or a Castroite have made such a decision? The very basis of Castro's power in 1959 had rested on the total destruction of the former Cuban Army and its replacement by the new 'Rebel Army'. Bosch did not have a 'Rebel Army' at his disposal because he had taken power peacefully and democratically. He might have used his Presidential power to organize a 'popular militia' or some form of personal military force. He refused to play this game because he made it clear at the outset that he would rather relinquish power than be forced by his enemies into adopting their own methods of rule.

Was this an evidence of his 'weakness'? I do not happen to think so. Only a man

of rare strength of character could have made such a compact with his conscience and remained true to it to the bitter end. But it is not the kind of strength that cynics of the Left or Right can understand. Above all, if it proves anything about him, it proves that Communist strategy and tactics are totally alien to him. The almost excruciating irony is the fact that, if he were more of a Communist, he might have held on to power more tenaciously.

Bosch was also faced with another delicate problem. By the time he returned to the Dominican Republic in October 1961, after 24 years of exile, he had to reckon with the presence of other revolutionary groups of a far more extremist nature than his own.

The oldest of them was the *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP), the oldline Communist party which had been organized in the early '40s. The Castroite influence was reflected in the formation of the *Movimiento 14 de Junio* (14th of June Movement) in 1959, when the old dictator was still alive. This group was made up largely of middle-class students and young professionals for whom Castro's 26th of July Movement was the model. It was followed by the *Movimiento Popular Dominicano* (MPD), which called itself "marxist-leninista-fidelista", before Castro and the Castroites were ready to avow their "Marxism-Leninism," and soon took on a Maoist coloration.

The PSP had, like most Communist parties, a checkered political past. For a time, in the mid-'40s, it had even entered into an alliance with Trujillo, and he rather than the Communists broke that alliance in 1947 when it no longer served his purposes. This short-lived collaboration later plagued the PSP as a somewhat different partnership with Batista in 1938-44 haunted the similarly-named Cuban Communists. After Trujillo's death, the PSP continued the policy of seeking power by working with or inside whatever groups seemed to have most power at the moment. As long as the conservative UCN was the most promising political force, the PSP gave it the benefit of its favors. Since its services were not rejected by the UCN, post-Trujillo Dominican politics was marked by some strange bed-fellows.

All three—PSP, 14th of June and MPD—considered themselves to be Communist groups. Each of them warred shrilly and incessantly against the others. The UCN was glad to accept the support of both the PSP and the 14th of June because the former furnished it with orga-

nizational cadres which it needed badly, and the latter gave it an opening to the radical youth. Since the UCN leaders later provided the main civilian cover for the military coup, they were truly in collusion with the Communists before they accused Bosch of having committed the same crime, which is why this part of the story is so curious.

Writing in *THE NEW LEADER* ("The Dominican Upheaval," May 10), Sam Halper, former head of *Time's* Caribbean Bureau, noted that the 14th of June's leader, Manuel Tavarez Justo, accompanied UCN representatives to Washington to plan the post-Trujillo government with the State Department. The pieces of the puzzle fit together neatly.

Meanwhile, Bosch and his party had to adapt themselves to these peculiar political alignments. They were not, however, confronting this problem for the first time. In exile, the Communist PSP had long concentrated its fire on Bosch's PRD, and scarcely an issue of the Communist organ, then published in Guatemala, had failed to carry some sort of scurrility about Bosch or his chief associates. In Cuba, where Bosch had spent almost 20 years of his exile, Bosch had been associated politically with former President Prío Socarras, the *bête noire* of the Cuban Communists, who had taken control of the Cuban labour movement away from them in 1947 and had even tried to shut down the official Communist organ, *Hoy*, in 1950. Not that Bosch necessarily approved of everything Prío did in power or that Prío later approved of everything that Bosch did in power. But after Bosch's overthrow in 1963, Prío said: "I know him well because he was at my side for 20 years. He's no Communist, and time will confirm it."

The political line adopted by Bosch after his return in 1961 was simple: complete independence and no entangling alliances. Since the PSP and the 14th of June were then working with the UCN against the PRD, the first two Communist groups did not constitute a problem. But the third one, the MPD, had tried to work inside Bosch's party. Before Bosch and the older PRD leaders had been able to get back in the country, the MPD had succeeded in entrenching itself in the PRD's youth section. As soon as the exile leadership was able to size up the situation, it disbanded the entire PRD youth section and thereby discouraged all further attempts at Communist infiltration of the party.

No one in Santo Domingo in his right mind would have thought of linking Bosch with Communism or Communists in the last months of 1961

or the first months of 1962. In fact, while other Dominican politicians opened their parties to one or the other Communist groups, Bosch seemed to have a positively quixotic, doctrinaire unwillingness to have anything to do with them. As long as Bosch and the PRD were not taken seriously as contenders for government power, the Communist issue simply did not arise.

But in 1962, the political alignments were reshuffled. As the conservative UCN began to groom itself to become the party in power, and as it sought to insure itself of U.S. support, it decided to sever its embarrassing ties with its Communist supporters. In January, it broke with the 14th of June Movement. In October, the UCN Executive Committee in Santo Domingo was rid of its Communists and the resignations revealed that they had numbered no less than 18 out of 24. About two dozen well-known Communists were expelled from the country. By the end of the year, the UCN leaders decided to ride to power on an anti-Communist program. And it suddenly occurred to them that Bosch's party was catching up and they might not win.

It should be kept in mind that we are not dealing with a man who began his political career in 1962. Bosch had been active in politics, Cuban and Dominican, for over a quarter of a century. For most of those years, the Communists had abused and reviled him, as they had abused and reviled Bosch's friends, Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico and Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela. Anyone who wishes seriously to look into the question of Bosch and Communism cannot ignore or neglect decades of political formation and conviction.

The first attack on Bosch as a Communist came from a Jesuit priest, Luitico García, just before the election of December 20, 1962. All the Communist groups had decided to boycott the election and were assailing Bosch's party furiously for taking part in the "electoral farce." Thus Bosch found himself in a crossfire of contradictory calumnies. Padre García's campaign boomeranged. Bosch confronted him in a famous television debate and made a shambles of the Jesuit's equivocations. When the votes were counted in the election, which was supervised by the Organization of American States (and, therefore, one of the few undeniably honest elections ever held in Latin America), Bosch's party came out ahead with over 60 per cent of the total vote. In a country with a total population of only about three million, the PRD gained about 650,000 votes, and the UCN, its nearest rival, less than half as many. The PRD elected 22 Senators and 52

Deputies, the UCN only 4 Senators and 13 Deputies, and the other parties shared a handful of both.

If the opposition was right, an overwhelming majority of the Dominican electorate had knowingly voted for a Communist. This was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the malodorous anti-Bosch campaign.

The real Communists and Castroites, of course, knew better. It is enlightening to see what the Cuban press was saying about Bosch at this time. Here is how the official organ of the Cuban Armed Forces, *Verde Olivo* of December 30, 1962, commented on a threat made by Bosch to withdraw from the elections if the Communist charges persisted:

"The gesture of Bosch, whose adherence to the policy of the United States, as well as his anti-Communist position, are most notorious, was interpreted in two ways: either as a last-minute act to enable his chief rival, Viriato Fiallo (the UCN candidate), whom the U.S. Embassy and the reactionary clergy support, to gain the victory in the electoral farce, or as a reflection of the pressure exerted by the masses of people so that he should not participate in the electoral trickery. A number of democratic (sic) organizations, as is known, have denounced the electoral farce and have appealed to the people not to take part in the elections."

When Bosch made a trip to Washington after the election, another Cuban magazine, *Bohemia*, of January 4, 1963, wrote: "Juan Bosch is propping himself up in the United States, personally affirming his submission to the White House, where he has solicited the blessings of Kennedy." *Bohemia* of January 11, 1963, scoffed at the "electoral farce, which was so completely within the inter-American system that whichever of the candidates were elected counted in advance on good terms with Washington. Viriato Fiallo and Juan Bosch wear the livery of lackeys with exactly the same aptitude and ease." *Verde Olivo* of February 17, 1963, published a photograph of Bosch under which appeared the following words: "Juan Bosch is the candidate chosen by Yankee imperialism to check the growing liberation movement of the Dominican people which surged forward after the assassination of the dictator

Trujillo." *Bohemia* of March 29, 1963, ran another photograph of Bosch, this time embracing Vice President Johnson, who was President Kennedy's chief representative at Bosch's inauguration. The accompanying caption read: "HE IS ONE OF US: This is what Yankee Vice President Lyndon Johnson appears to be saying as he was embraced by the new puppet of Uncle Sam, the slippery Juan Bosch of Santo Domingo."

(One wonders whether this Bosch-Johnson photograph will not be used one day to prove that Lyndon Johnson was the puppet of Uncle Juan. Stranger things have happened.)

Denounced by reactionaries as an 'agent of Moscow' and by the Communists-Castroites as an 'agent of Yankee imperialism', Bosch took office on February 27, 1963. The task before him seemed almost insuperable. He knew that the Armed Forces were plotting against him as soon as the election had been decided. He has said that he was aware of only one priest who was opposed to the conspiracies against him. The business interests had almost universally backed the conservative UCN. The middle-class youth and students were for the most part infected with Castroism. The press remained exactly the same as it had been under Trujillo. The civilian bureaucracy was virtually unchanged. Bosch's immediate predecessors, now among the most rabid anti-Communists in the country, had put Communists in key positions in various government agencies, the trade unions and elsewhere.

On the other hand, a popular landslide had put Bosch in power. For the first time in Dominican history, the 'masses' had become an active political force, and they were massively behind Bosch. The U.S. Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, and the head of the Alliance for Progress programme in the Dominican Republic, Newell F. Williams, were among Bosch's most ardent supporters. In his recent book on the 1963 crisis, Bosch has written: 'In truth, Martin and Williams did not appear to be agents of the U.S. government but rather two Dominicans as anxious as the best of Dominicans to accomplish the impossible for us.'¹

¹ Juan Bosch, *Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana* (Mexico: Centro de Estudios y Documentación, 1964), p. 155. This book, to be entitled *The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic*, is scheduled for publication in English next fall by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.

Bosch handled the Communist problem on the same principles that he applied to the military problem. Since the former has become uppermost in the present crisis, I am going to pursue it, for lack of space and time, to the exclusion of other important aspects of his regime.

In effect, Bosch refused to govern by the use of any other force than moral force, which was about all he had anyway. During the 31 years of Trujillo's reign of terror, anyone whom the tyrant had wished to destroy had been indiscriminately labeled a Communist, and Bosch himself had been one of the chief victims. Now he was determined to inaugurate an era of peace, tolerance, social reform and constitutional democracy. He ruled out, as beyond both his principles and his power, any course of action which risked incipient or outright civil war, whether by moving against the Armed Forces, carrying out a mass purge of Trujillistas, or conducting a repressive campaign against the Communists. In the crisis of July 1963, he actually told the seditious Army officers that he could not govern the country if they persisted in demanding repressive measures because 'I did not return here to shed blood.'

As we have seen, Bosch was accused of being a Communist, or little better than one, before he assumed power, and so the origin of the charge has little or nothing to do with anything he did in power. It is also untrue that once in power Bosch refused to make his views on Communism clear, though it must have been distasteful for a man whom the Communists had vilified most of his life to plead innocence of Communism. Only a few days after he had assumed office, one of the disappointed politicians, Horacio Julio Ornes, President of the Partido Vanguardia Revolucionaria, which had been particularly badly beaten in the elections, came out with a charge that Bosch was planning a programme of 'Communist indoctrination' in the Armed Forces. If Bosch had any such ideas, the Armed Forces would have been the last on his list of suitable places to try them

out; the story, duly published in the Dominican press, was merely a sample of the utterly unscrupulous slander that Bosch was up against from the outset. Nevertheless, at an Army ceremony, Bosch soon found an occasion to say that he considered the choice before Latin America to be 'one thing only and very clear; democracy or Communism. And Communism means death, war, destruction, and the loss of all our blessings.' (*La Nacion*, Santo Domingo, March 13, 1963).

None of this helped, of course. The campaign of defamation went on; if he was not called a Communist or a 'Communist agent,' he was accused of permitting or encouraging 'Communist infiltration' of the government. The UCN leader, Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo, raised a storm by declaring publicly that Communists were occupying 'key posts' in the government. Bosch dared him to name them; Fiallo refused to accept the challenge. An enterprising reporter was then with the *San Juan Star* of Puerto Rico, Norman Gall, soon examined a list of Dominicans who went to Cuba for the 26th of July celebration in 1963. In the *Star* of August 1, he did name names, and most of them turned out to have held leading positions in Fiallo's UCN until the previous October. Not a single one had ever belonged to Bosch's party.

Bosch took some practical steps to cut down Communist influence. Where-as a Communist-led trade union movement had been formed in 1961, when the Communists had enjoyed the patronage of Fiallo's UCN, a 'free' trade union center, affiliated with the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (which includes the AFL-CIO), was set up. Bosch broke the hold of the Communists on the electrical workers, the government employees and other unions. And in order to get around Communist entrenchment in the economic planning board, Bosch turned over most of the state planning activities to a private organization, *Centro Interamericano de*

Estudios Sociales (CIDES), supported mainly by U.S. foundations and headed by a Rumanian-born personal adviser, Sacha Volman. Scholarships for Dominicans to study in Soviet Russia and other Communist countries, through the United Nations, were prohibited.

But Bosch refused to be pushed into unnecessary and provocative reprisals. The pre-Bosch government, for example, had rented a school building to a well-known Communist leader, Dato Pagán, for an 'educational' center. When Bosch came in, a campaign was whipped up to make him evict Pagán and close down the center. Bosch opposed hastily breaking the existing contract and recommended taking back the school at the start of the school season on the reasonable ground that the Ministry of Education needed all its buildings for its own use. Yet, as the story was told in the United States after Bosch's overthrow, he had refused to close down 'an out-and-out school for Communists held in the classrooms of a Santo Domingo public school' (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 7, 1963).

In one respect, however, Bosch's enemies and critics were right. He held out unyieldingly against making martyrs of the local Communists. He turned his face sternly against all methods of repression and coercion as long as the Communists behaved within the law. He permitted the newly exiled Communists to return. He believed passionately that the worst way to handle the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic was through a policy of suppression.

For one thing, he did not think that the choice was between having and not having Communists in the Dominican Republic. The real choice was between having them in the open or underground, making political propaganda or waging guerrilla warfare. The experience of Venezuela disquieted him. 'In our countries,' he said on March 24, 1963, 'any attempt to suppress the native Communists by direct persecu-

tion only succeeds in turning them into guerrillas and terrorists, as has occurred in Venezuela.' It was, then, up to the Communists to choose to be guerrillas and terrorists, not for him to turn them into guerrillas and terrorists if he could help it. In any case, he could only have suppressed the Communists by making himself a prisoner of the Armed Forces, the same Armed Forces with which Trujillo had suppressed all those whom he had pleased to call Communists. The anti-Communist campaign, as it unfolded, was a not-too-subtle stratagem not only to make Bosch betray his principles but to commit political suicide.

Moreover, the Dominican Communists were just then fighting each other as hard as they were fighting everyone else. In 1963, during Bosch's term of office, the split in the Communist world had reached the point of open, escalating hostilities, and it was reflected in the internecine struggles of the Dominican Communist groups. In the middle of that year, Tavaréz Justo carried out a purge of both "moderates" and old-line Communists in his 14th of June Movement. An indiscriminate campaign of anti-Communist repression would only have solved the Communists' internal problems, driven them into each other's arms, and given the repressive agencies of the state the delicate responsibility of deciding who was and who was not a Communist.

But these practical considerations were not the main ones in Bosch's mind. He was primarily concerned with the problem of the middle-class youth who, as he put it in his latest book, "initiate and direct Latin American revolutions." In the Dominican Republic as elsewhere, their heads had been turned by the success of Castroism. Bosch himself did not feel that he could influence them personally; he mentions that he did not make a single visit to the University during his term of office. One reason for his estrangement, he sensed, was social; he was born into a poor family in a small town and was largely self-educated. Though he had won recognition as one of Latin America's foremost men of letters, he could never, even in power, cross over to the other side of the tracks. Paradoxically, the radical youth and the conservative adults came from the same social class, often from the same families, and Bosch, the exile, came home to become—for both of them—Bosch, the outsider.

Yet Bosch had lived long enough in Cuba to

understand something of the new revolutionary wave. He had not left Cuba until April 1958, eight months before Batista's downfall, and he had watched at close range as a constitutional government had been overthrown by a military coup and a military coup had drawn an entire generation into revolutionary terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the name of restoring constitutional government. Like two sides of the same coin, Batista and Castro had been related to each other, repression feeding on revolution and vice versa. In the Dominican Republic, these same forces were itching to break loose, to gain strength by devouring each other. Instead of Batista, there was no longer the far more evil and monstrous figure of Trujillo; there was only all that Trujillo had created and left behind. Instead of Castro, there were inexperienced and untried youths yearning to prove that the "violent way" was the right and only road to revolution.

Bosch and his movement interposed themselves between these two forces. Just as Bosch abhorred the living symbols of Trujilloism, so he rejected what Castroism had become, and yet he had to live with both in order not to be destroyed by both. In his book, he tells how he was living in Venezuela and his family was still living in Cuba at the beginning of 1959, when Castro came to power. His family wanted him to return to Cuba, but after watching the course of the Castro regime from afar for only three months, he decided in March of that year to bring his family to Venezuela rather than hold a reunion in Cuba.

What disturbed Bosch was not that he felt Castro had immediately set out to make a Communist revolution; he rather disapproved for the reason that Castro failed to take those measures which Bosch considered indispensable for a democratic revolution. And when Castro publicly declared that he was a 'Marxist-Leninist' in December 1961, and had been moving in that direction in the very years that he had claimed to be a constitutional democrat, Bosch realized that Castro had become a 'Typhoid Mary' of the democratic revolution in Latin America. Bosch's reflections on this score are so revealing of his own problem in the Dominican Republic that they are worth quoting:

'With this declaration (of December 2, 1961) Fidel Castro, who had been the leader of a fervently popular democratic

revolution, engraved in red one single word, 'Communist,' on every attempt to make a democratic revolution for a long time to come. It is hazardous to say whether he did so consciously or unconsciously, but there can be no doubt that by doing so he rendered an incalculable service to the cause of world Communism, since after his declaration it became virtually and even totally impossible to make a democratic revolution in this part of the world, and without a democratic revolution in Latin America there is no way out. The Latin American revolution, which is inevitable even if it takes 15, 20 or 25 years, should not be Communist, but the fear of the democratic revolution will make it sooner or later fall into the pattern of a Communist revolution.'

In another passage, Bosch adds prophetically:

'Anyone who does not demonstrate in a satisfactory manner that he respects and will continue to respect the established order in Latin America, that he will not touch a single hair on the head of the vested interests, and that, on the contrary, he will dedicate himself to defend them with body and soul, night and day, is transmuted into and suspected of being a secret Communist. A chorus of voices all over the Continent accuses him of being an agent of Moscow and of Fidel Castro. The pressure raised everywhere in response to this accusation is of such a defamatory nature that few can suffer it calmly. But there is an answer to this accusation: When the youth of Latin America becomes indignant at the injustice committed against honest democratic leaders, they react by shifting toward Communism. If the accusation comes from the most hated circles in the Hemisphere, the youth respond to it by taking a position against the accusers at precisely the opposite extreme. And so, day after day, the most audacious young people in Latin America, led by those from the upper middle strata of the middle class, have been swelling the Communist ranks in all our countries.'

In the Dominican Republic, the hardened, experienced, old-time Communists were relatively few. The greater danger came from the more amorphous, smoldering underground of existing and potential Castroite sympathizers. In 1962, the State Department's intelligence report, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, wrote off the total Communist strength in the Dominican Republic as 'negligible.' The 1964 edition of the same report, issued after Bosch's overthrow, noted that only the Castroite 14th of June Movement 'is reputed to have a mass following.' This report stated: 'Pro-Communist influence has been found among some university and secondary students, in a small segment of organized labour and, to a limited degree, among young professionals.' This rather sober assessment hardly suggests that the Communists in 1962-63 had found a way to gain the mass strength needed to make a bid for power.

In its formative and early stages, Castroism does not say that constitutional, democratic reform is undesirable; it says that such reform is impossible. That is why all variety of Dominican Communists, including the Castroites, considered the election of December 1962 to be a 'farce' and refused to take part in it. That a free, honest election was possible, that a dark-horse candidate like Bosch could come from behind to win it overwhelmingly, and that he could even gain the support of the United States—these indisputable facts constituted a defeat for Castroism in its deepest political essence and broadest popular appeal. The idea that a Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic was threatened by the 'infiltration' of a few individual Communists in mythical 'key position' in Bosch's government derives from an obsessively conspiratorial understanding of traditional Communism and an utterly grotesque misunderstanding of Castroism. If the Cuban experience proved anything, it proved that without a Batista there would have been no Castro. And where there is no Batista, the Castroites

have to invent one or live for the day when a reasonable facsimile gives them the right to say 'I told you so' by making his appearance.

The real Castroites always understood that Bosch had put up a constitutional wall between them and a successful struggle for power. The 14th of June leader, Tavaréz Justo, continued to attack Bosch after the election because Bosch would not attack the United States, just as the reactionaries continued to attack him because Bosch would not illegally repress the Communists. The Cuban organ, *Bohemia*, of May 10, 1963, wrote: 'Of course, Bosch's regime is least suspected of sympathy for the Cuban revolution.' At the same time, Bosch refused to permit the Dominican Republic to become a centre of anti-Castro exile activity or to make anti-Castroism a divisive issue at home. As a result, the anti-Castro exile leaders from Left to Right, with few exceptions, covered themselves with ignominy by applauding and justifying the military coup which overthrew him.

That military coup of September 1963 was a disaster; the propaganda that accompanied it was a disgrace. And it was no less a disaster and disgrace for the U.S. than for the Dominican Republic.

The anti-Bosch propaganda played variations on two themes. The main one was the charge of 'Communist infiltration' of his government. The minor one accused him of such crimes as 'stubbornness,' 'vanity,' and 'incompetence,' especially the latter.

The 'infiltration' charge proved to be a grim farce. Only one name was ever offered to back it up. It happened to be that of Sacha Volman, the director of CIDES, who was quickly hustled out of the country. It also happened that Volman had been, for years, a well-known anti-Communist whom Bosch had met in 1957 in Costa Rica at the Institute of Political Education, a training school set up with U.S. encouragement to give the Communists some sophisticated political competition in Latin America.

More recently, Volman has been secretary of the Institute of International Labour Research in New York City. Its chairman is Norman Thomas and its board of directors includes some of the most knowledgeable anti-Communists in the United States. Yet, incredibly, Volman was the *pièce de résistance* of the whole case that Bosch had been responsible for Communist 'infiltration' in high places. Countless news stories and editorials in the U.S. press repeated this word as if it were a superstitious incantation that was self-explanatory and self-enforcing.

I know that some of Bosch's friends and admirers did not consider him, as one of them put it at the time, 'the world's greatest public administrator.' Bosch was no more the ideal bureaucratic executive than is Charles de Gaulle; he was, above all, an inspirational force and a national conscience. But even a good bureaucrat needs a good bureaucracy, and Bosch had inherited one of the weakest and worst in Latin America, which is saying a good deal. In any case, if 'efficiency' or 'competence' or other personal characteristics are made the test of a democratic leader's right to remain in power, and his own opposition is given the privilege of deciding his fate according to such criteria, few if any democratic regimes could survive very long. Bosch was elected for four years, not for a lifetime, and the democratic process gives the electorate the right to decide on the relative 'competence' of candidates for office. Bosch was given only seven months to clean up the political stable left to him; and he had to live with the threat of a coup before he was able to get started and there could be any test of his competence. If the same rules had applied in the United States, John F. Kennedy would have been

through in April 1961, but Kennedy went on to learn and grow.

One would imagine that journalists and editorialists in the United States would consider it almost degrading to have to be told such things. Yet it is necessary. The U.S. press was full of precisely such apologies for the coup, with or without the Communist theme.² And the same leering references to Bosch's alleged 'incompetence' began to reappear in the past month to 'explain' why the United States did not want him back in power.

Only the Communist issue, however, could provide any serious political cover for the coup. For if Bosch were really turning over the Dominican Republic to the Communists, he could be held responsible for betraying the democratic order, and his enemies could appear to be saving the country, if not for democracy, at least from Communism.

A peculiar role was played by some U.S. journalists in the months before the 1963 coup. Of one of them, Bosch has written: 'There was a U.S. journalist, no less than a Pulitzer Prize winner, who dedicated all his energies to calling the government headed by me Communist. For seven months, he devoted his life to the task of destroying a democracy. He went so far as to say that CIDES, an institution established expressly to mould the democratic conscience in the Dominican Republic, had trained no fewer than 17,000 Communist guerrillas.'

The writer, Hal Hendrix, was able to give the Scripps-Howard Newspapers a scoop on the coming military coup 24 hours before it happened. The last words of this communique may seem familiar to readers of recent Dominican reports and editorials: 'Whatever develops in the next few months, the U.S. has made it plain that it will not let the Communists gain control in Santo Domingo. High ranking officials have stated emphatically there will not be another Cuba in the Caribbean' (New York *World Telegram*, September 24, 1963).

That night, Bosch received a telephone call from Rafael Molina Morillo, then exe-

² A typical example: "Bosch is accused of many things, including stubbornness, vanity, failure to halt Communist infiltration of his government. But the most damning indictment against him appears to be plain incompetence" (New York *World Telegram*, September 26, 1963).

cutive editor of *El Caribe*, one of the most virulent of the anti-Bosch newspapers in Santo Domingo, published by a brother of Horacio Ornes, the politician. As Molina Morillo later told the story, he informed the President that *El Caribe* had received the text of Hendrix's sensational article and intended to publish in the next morning. Bosch replied, in effect, that it did not merit any comment from him. Yet, according to Molina Morillo, the article which he read to Bosch on the phone was one of the key events of the day that alerted Bosch to the imminent coup (*Ahora*, Santo Domingo, November 1-15, 1963).

Another U.S. journalist, Jules Dubois, of the Chicago *Tribune*, provided the Dominicans with the first 'inside story' on the coup. On September 27, 1963, the Chicago *Tribune* published an interview with Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barreras, whom Dubois described as 'one of the leaders of yesterday's coup.' The banner headline on page one screamed: 'BOSCH'S RED PLOT BARED!' A three-column head over the story added: 'Dominican Revolt Head Tells Commie Plan for "Second Cuba."' Dubois quoted Imbert: 'Sure, we violated the Constitution by ousting Bosch, but I believe that it was absolutely necessary to place the constitution in recess in a desk drawer.'

It was necessary, according to Imbert, because as head of internal security he had given Bosch on September 19 a three-page document which claimed that the Dominican Communists were planned to stage an uprising the following January. The information allegedly came from an informer's account of a 'secret meeting of Communist leaders.' The military leaders used this ostensible report to demand that Bosch should give them orders to repress the Communists and 'crack their heads.' When Bosch reportedly told Imbert that he refused to make the Dominican Republic into another Venezuela 'because terrorist activities and anarchy would follow,' the military decided to get rid of Bosch and the Constitution.

The Santo Domingo paper, *Prensa Libre*, of October 1, 1963, ran the interview under the headline: 'Imbert Declares: Overthrow Prevents Second Cuba.' April 1965, then, was not the first time that the bloody shirt of a 'second Cuba' was waved to cover up an anti-Bosch policy. It had been successfully tried out in the dress rehearsal of 1963.

Imbert's revelations were, of course, anti-climactic. No reader of Dubois' story could have discovered a 'Red plot' by Bosch. If there was any Red plot, it was against Bosch. If Bosch were such a benefactor and protector of the Communists, it made no sense for them to want to overthrow him. The interview did not even mention 'Communist infiltration' of Bosch's government as an alibi of the military's action. But the cream of the jest was still to come—after Bosch was overthrown, the "triumvirate" that succeeded him in power outlawed the smaller PSP and MPD but not the much larger Castroite 14th of June Movement.

A few weeks later, General Imbert's intelligence report of September 19 was put to the test. Late in November, Tavarez Justo and a small band from the 14th of June took to the hills to wage guerrilla warfare against the new order. They were so badly armed and trained that they were no match for the government forces. Tavarez Justo was soon slain and his men gave up the struggle. Such was the gravity of the Communist plot which was supposed to have made the Dominican Republic into 'a bridgehead for subversive operations against Venezuela and Haiti.'

According to Sam Halper, in the article previously cited, the Dominican military, decided to oust Bosch 'as soon as they got a wink from the U.S. Pentagon.' Halper seems to have reason to believe that 'the Pentagon undercut the State Department' and Ambassador Martin, who was trying to help Bosch. The latter, however, does not go so far. In his book, Bosch states: 'I never had proof that the U.S. military in Santo Domingo conspired to overthrow my

democratic government, although I frequently heard rumors to this effect; but I am sure that if a captain in the mission would have said that the government should be overthrown, it would have been done in an hour because such a captain has more authority over the Dominican military high command than the people, the Constitution and the President.³

Whether or not the 'wink' came from the Pentagon, the U.S. military mission's responsibility for restraining the Dominican military was decisive for the success of U.S. official policy, since the military mission was much closer to the Dominican military than the diplomatic mission was. It is most disturbing that a responsible journalist, in close touch with Dominican affairs, should find it necessary to allude publicly to the Pentagon's complicity in the 1963 coup. One thing is certain: With all the dependence of the Dominican Armed Forces on the U.S. military establishment, the latter was singularly incapable of exercising a restraining influence.

In his May 2 speech, President Johnson inexplicably referred to Bosch's overthrow in 1963 as a 'revolution'. It was, of course, nothing of the sort; it was a plain, old-fashioned, conventional military coup. The slip, if it was a slip, might tell us much, if we knew who put that word in the speech.

On May 8, 1965, a new five-man junta was appointed to take the place of General Wessin y Wessin's three-man junta. And who was head of the new junta? None other than Brigadier General Antonio Imbert. And who, if we may trust press reports from Santo Domingo, chose General Imbert? None other than the U.S. Embassy.³

Meanwhile, in the 'first Cuba', few tears were wasted on what had happened in the country that had just been saved from be-

coming a 'second Cuba.' The Cuban Communist organ, *Hoy*, of September 27, 1963, devoted an editorial to the 'lesson' of the Dominican coup. 'It simply revealed,' stated the editorial, 'the degree of decomposition and the crisis through which so-called 'representative democracy' is passing.' Then, it taxed Bosch for having failed to nationalize any U.S. business enterprises, establish diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba, make a commercial pact with Soviet Russia or purge the Armed Forces. Bosch was gravely advised that his main error had consisted in 'not understanding that the middle way does not exist.' And, therefore, 'his overthrow was inevitable.'

The next day, Fidel Castro touched on the same subject. He also insisted that the coup had been 'predetermined' because no democracy could be based on Trujillo's Army. Bosch had been 'handcuffed' by that Army even though he had tried to pursue a more 'discreet policy.' Castro conceded that Bosch was a little different and merited a little more respect. 'Why? Perhaps because he defended us?' No. He had his great weaknesses; he came to power with the good will of the imperialists.' But Bosch was given some credit for not being a Betancourt in his policy towards Cuba; Bosch merely dedicated himself to the problems of his own country; he maintained a 'discreet attitude.'

The moral, said Castro, was that even such a man could not survive the 'Trujilista gorillas' who would not leave him alone even if he left them alone. The lesson for the Dominican people was that there was only one road. Castro's road, not Bosch's road — 'liquidate the gorillas, combat the gorillas, defeat the gorillas and execute the principal gorillas.' In short, Castro tried to make political capital of the Dominican coup by emphasizing the difference between his violent, revolutionary road and Bosch's peaceful, democratic road; Bosch's defeat was as much a victory for the Fidel Castros and Che Guevaras as for the Wessin y Wessins and Antonio Imberts.

³ "The psychological warfare resources of the United States Information Agency and of the military assist the national council, headed by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras, who was picked by the American Embassy" (Tad Szulc, *New York Times*, May 11, 1965).

I do not wish to suggest that Bosch's way of handling the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic was beyond questioning or criticism. I can well imagine that equally well-intentioned persons might differ in some respects with him. Should he speak out against Castro, whom he personally detested? When and how should Dato Pagan's 'school' be moved out of a public building? What are the constitutional or practical limits of freedom of speech and assembly? Bosch acted against the local Communists in some areas and not in others. Someone else in his place might have done some things differently.

But if Bosch's policies may be questioned, they must first be clearly understood and fairly presented. For most of his 31 years in power, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo had persecuted and tortured his opponents, most of them simple democrats, in the name of "anti-Communism." Bosch himself had lived with the great lie for decades. When I was in the Dominican Republic in 1950, in the heyday of Trujillo's power, even a member of the U.S. Embassy had been visibly afraid to talk to me outside the Embassy itself. Trujillo had so debased and debauched the very word, "Communism," that he had made anti-Trujilloism and Communism virtually synonymous. Less than two years after Trujillo's death, the political air was still so polluted that anti-Communism did not necessarily mean devotion to democracy; it could easily be turned into protective coloration for a Trujillista comeback.

The younger generation, which was Bosch's prime concern, had only begun to know what democracy in practice was or could be. The older politicians, who were Bosch's chief affliction, had not been nurtured in a democratic environment in which the limits of a democratic opposition were clearly recognized. For Bosch, every day that a legal, constitutional government survived was itself a victory over both the Trujillistas and the Communists. More than anything else, he needed time, and he was willing to buy it, but not at the cost of his principles. He did not wish to cut himself off from the radical youth, to give them up for lost, to take the initiative in drawing a line of blood between himself and them. He preferred to show them that the rule of law and freedom applied to everyone, and he could not start by taking it away from anyone.

Bosch has been dismissed as a "dreamer" and an "idealist". Those who do so might give some thought to the fact that Castro's predecessors, the practical politician, Carlos Prío, and the tough ex-sergeant, Fulgencio Batista, did not, in the

long run, come out too well. A little more idealism might have held off Communism in Cuba more effectively than anything else.

In any case, there is no one way to handle the Communist problem in a democracy. There are hardly two free countries in the world that manage it the same way. When Bosch was overthrown in 1963, I wrote: "It would wreak untold havoc in the democratic world, especially that part of it most like the Dominican Republic, if treatment of the local Communists or policy toward the anti-Castro exiles were made the determining factors in deciding whether one or another democratic government had a right to exist" ("Bosch and Communism" *NL*, October 14, 1963). Yet this is precisely what was presumed in the case of Bosch's government, and it is one reason why the Dominican precedent has caused such consternation in the most democratic countries of Latin America.

In a distorted fashion, the Imbert-Dubois interview had an essential element of truth in it, if not about the alleged Communist plot then about the military plotters. The interview made clear that the issue on which Bosch stood or fell was not his own sympathies for Communism or Communist infiltration of his government. Imbert's story rightly implied that the crucial question had been freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Bosch refused to deprive the Communists or anyone else of those freedoms as long as they did not commit illegal or violent acts. He declined to declare preventive war on the local Communists and 'clerk their heads' because he believed that the cure was worse than the disease.

There may be differences of opinion with Bosch or with his methods and tactics. But this was not enough. Juan Bosch had to be scurrilously tainted with Communism itself. He had to be presented as the perpetrator of a 'Red plot', a Communist stalking horse, a front for 'Communist infiltration.'

This was the infamy.

In 1963, Dominican Communism was not averted; Dominican democracy was suffocated. This is not merely my personal view. It is the official U.S. position. That is why, as I noted at the outset, President

Kennedy spoke out against the coup and temporarily broke off diplomatic relations with the new ruling group. That is why President Johnson was justified in characterizing the pro-Bosch uprising last month as 'a popular democratic revolution committed to democracy and social justice.' If Bosch had not been committed to democracy and social justice in 1963, how could the movement behind him be committed to them in 1965? That is why Adlai Stevenson was able to boast of U.S. 'cooperation' with Bosch's government in 1963. Why boast about it if that government was practically being turned over to the Communists?

Yet a strange thing happened between Saturday, April 24, and Wednesday, April 28. Instead of supporting the forces 'committed to democracy and social justice,' the U.S. decided to support the forces that had overthrown them in 1963 and were determined to prevent them from returning to power in 1965.

It appears, curiously enough, that the present crisis remarkably resembles the previous one in 1963, at least in its origin. A number of correspondents have intimated that the present struggle did not begin merely as a pro-Bosch revolt. It began, in part at least, as another military coup, this time against the post-Bosch junta headed by Donald Reid Cabral, a former automobile dealer.

At least five different reports seem to agree on this. In the New York Times of April 27, Tad Szulc mentioned an "unconfirmed report" that "an agreement among most of the military commanders, including General Wessin y Wessin, to form a military junta at once" forced Reid to resign as head of the ruling junta. But, Szulc added, a group of young pro-Bosch Army officers refused to go along with the plan to replace Reid with a military junta and insisted on restoring Bosch's constitutional rule.

Basically the same story was told in a UPI dispatch from Santo Domingo dated April 28. (I have seen it only in Spanish in the *El Diario-La Prensa*, New York, of April 29). In the Hearst papers of May 4, a former press officer of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Paul D. Bethel, reported from Santo Domingo that Reid Cabral's decision to fire two Army colonels for graft and disloyalty had set off the entire chain of events on Saturday. Another Santo Domingo story in the *U.S. News*

& World Report of May 17 attributed Reid Cabral's downfall to "enemies within the Armed Forces" who were out to get him because he wanted to eliminate "a contracts racket operated by top military men."

And on May 2, President Johnson seemed to confirm the essentials of Tad Szulc's unconfirmed report when he declared: "Elements of the military forces of that country overthrew their government. However, the rebels themselves were divided. Some wanted to restore former President Juan Bosch. Others opposed his restoration."

If this account, in essence, proves trustworthy, it will almost seem to be an echo of the story told by Bosch. About a week before the 1963 coup, he had made a short trip to Mexico with, among others, General Pablo Atila Luna, head of the Dominican Air Force. On the plane, Atila Luna had presented Bosch with a proposition to buy \$6 million worth of British war planes. The minimum rake-off or kickback on military purchases was 10 per cent, though it sometimes went as high as 15 per cent. In (his instance, Atila Luna apparently expected to get as much as \$1.2 million or 20 per cent. Bosch told him that a country as poor as the Dominican Republic, where people died of hunger, could not afford to spend so much on military planes. One wonders whether Bosch's regime would have lasted longer if he had agreed to the purchase. In Bosch's view, "corruption" was more responsible for the 1963 coup than any other cause.

From this point, however, the two coups tend to diverge. In 1963, there was no evidence of any effort by pro-Bosch forces in the Army to fight for him. In 1965, it appears clear that the pro-Bosch forces came close to winning a quick, easy and almost bloodless victory in the first two days. The tide was turned against them mainly by Air Force planes strafing Santo Domingo on Sunday and Monday, April 25 and 26. Wessin y Wessin sent his tanks from the San Isidro Air Base toward the capital. By Tuesday, April 27, some pro-Bosch leaders evidently faltered and considered their cause lost. They took refuge, the story goes, in foreign embassies and asked U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett Jr. to arrange a cease-fire.

The next 24 hours were crucial. As long as the forces 'committed to democracy and social justice' seemed to be winning — and,

according to one of our best Latin American observers, Tad Szulc, their victory was still expected as late as the morning of Tuesday, April 27 — no word of encouragement or sign of sympathy came from Washington. But on the morning of Wednesday, April 28, Washington officials became more loquacious. John W. Finney reported from Washington to the *New York Times* on April 29: 'Early yesterday Administration officials were expressing relief over the apparent collapse of the insurrection led by young Army officers supporting a return to former President Bosch.' We will be able to understand more about U.S. policy at this critical juncture when we know who these Administration officials were. In any event, their relief was premature.

On that same day, Wednesday, April 28, the seemingly victorious military commanders named a three-man junta to govern the country. According to Dom Bonafede and Douglas Kiker of the *New York Herald Tribune's* Washington Bureau, State Department officials discussed the possible recognition of this junta, controlled by General Wessin y Wessin, the San Isidro Air Base's strong man. But recognition was postponed as bad news began to come in that day.

The bad news was the virtual disintegration of Wessin y Wessin's fighting forces. Why they disintegrated from Tuesday to Wednesday is a question to which we will return. The fact that they did, however, appears to be indisputable. In his May 2 speech, President Johnson told that he had received an urgent cable from Ambassador Bennett at 5:14 P.M. on April 28 advising that the Dominican military and police had completely lost control of the situation and could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans there — as if they had been able to 'guarantee' their safety previously. Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann, whom all agree bears the brunt of the responsibility for working out U.S. policy in the crisis, informed Max Frankel of the *New York*

Times (May 9) that Wessin y Wessin's military forces had suffered a 'virtual collapse' and that 'almost complete chaos' had suddenly occurred by the afternoon of April 28.

In Puerto Rico, Juan Bosch seems to have known that Wessin y Wessin was getting much the worst of it as early as Tuesday, April 27. Bosch was in daily telephonic contact with his supporters and had apparently sized up the military situation correctly. He later told Homer Bigart of the *New York Times* (May 8) that he had spoken to the Dominican Republic's Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Emanuele Clarizio, who happened to be in San Juan on April 27, and had told him: 'Our forces were winning whereas the forces of General Wessin y Wessin are almost defeated.' Nevertheless, Bosch said, he had told the Papal Nuncio that he did not want more death and destruction and, therefore, approved of negotiations to call off the fighting.

Then Bosch gave this version of what had taken place on that fateful April 28: 'On Wednesday, the Papal Nuncio made contact with Wessin. But Wessin refused to deal with the Nuncio that day because he had received from the Americans the offer of Marines' support.'

On the television programme *Face the Nation*, Bosch summed up the situation as the U.S. Marines arrived in Santo Domingo on Wednesday evening: 'When they landed, Wessin y Wessin's forces were defeated. Twenty-four hours more and the Dominicans would have solved their own problems.'

Moreover, there is some reason to believe that there was more in Ambassador Bennett's cable of April 28 than President Johnson chose to reveal four days later. 'United States assistance in restoring law and order,' John W. Finney reported from Washington to the *New York Times*, 'was requested yesterday (April 28) by the provisional government of Brigadier General Wessin y Wessin and the police chief in Santo Domingo. This has not been made

public.' If this is confirmed, it would mean that Wessin y Wessin recognized that he was going down to defeat on April 28 and asked the United States to bail him out.

There are two interrelated questions about the reason for this sudden turn of events. One is the cause of Wessin y Wessin's 'virtual collapse.' Why did his apparent defeat follow so quickly on the heels of his apparent victory?

The official U.S. answer was given by President Johnson on May 2. After having conceded that the pro-Bosch struggle had started as 'a popular democratic revolution,' he claimed that it had been 'taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.' Curiously, Under Secretary of State Mann did not go so far in his statements to Max Frankel. Mann merely said that U.S. intelligence had 'from the very beginning' reported that 'the revolutionary movement itself was probably led by elements in the Dominican Revolutionary (pro-Bosch) party' but that it was clear 'very early that 'elements of the three Communist parties' had organized, armed and moved into the streets 'very sizable para-military forces.' Mann attributed the necessity for landing the Marines to the 'virtual collapse' of the 'regular forces.' At no time did he go so far as to assert that the Communists had succeeded in seizing control of the 'popular democratic revolution.' It might be assumed that Wessin y Wessin's disintegration could have given the Communists a free hand, but Mann was careful to stop short of crediting them with an accomplished fact.

Nevertheless, it was President Johnson's version which Administration sources increasingly pressed in the next few days. Thus arises the second question: What was the truth about a Communist 'take-over' of the pro-Bosch revolution around Wednesday, April 28? It is difficult to separate these two questions, and to some extent they must be examined together.

The official U.S. version suggests something like this: On Tuesday, the virtuous pro-Bosch revolution seemed to crack up.

At this point, 'a small group of well-known Communists,' as Adlai Stevenson was instructed to put it on May 3, 'quickly attempted to seize control of the revolution and of the armed bands in the streets.' Within 24 hours or less, these Communist-led 'armed bands' had so reorganized and revitalized the dying revolutionary movement that Wessin y Wessin's planes, tanks, naval vessels and infantrymen were thrown on the defensive and faced virtual defeat, and their commanders were forced to betake themselves to the U.S. Embassy to ask for help.

If this is going to remain the official story, then the United States is going to provide Castroism with one more myth of how Communist-led street fighters were able to defeat a 'regular army.' In Cuba, Castro's guerilla fighters had needed two years to defeat Batista's Army. In the Dominican Republic, Castro's disciples may be able to cite President Johnson as their authority that they had needed only 24 hours.

Was it really necessary to make revolutionary supermen of 'a small group of well-known Communists' in order to explain Wessin y Wessin's defeat and justify the landing of U.S. Marines?

Ironically, the key is probably in President Johnson's phrase, 'a popular democratic revolution'. The restoration of Juan Bosch was undoubtedly an overwhelmingly popular cause. Another outstanding U.S. Latin American correspondent, Barnard L. Collier, observed in the *New York Herald Tribune* of May 2 that Wessin's junta was 'highly unpopular,' 'despised by many Dominicans who call them corrupt.' He reported: 'The demoralized, dwindling group of perhaps 2,000 loyalist troops under strongman Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin have virtually given up.' A UPI report from Santo Domingo on May 2 said that Wessin's forces had lost 21 of their tanks. An Associated Press dispatch of May 10 took note of 'unverified reports that two-thirds of the military defected after the civil war started.'

On the basis of available information, we cannot, of course, be sure what caused Wessin y Wessin's troops to make such a poor showing. What appears to be quite clear is that his forces, not Bosch's, 'virtually collapsed,' as Under Secretary Mann put it. The pro-Bosch popular movement seems to have been hard hit on April 27, and some of its leaders suffered a temporary loss of morale, but the movement as a whole quickly caught its second wind the following day. Once Wessin y Wessin's men quit, they quit for good. They started with such an enormous advantage in arms that it is hard to believe that they could have been routed so easily unless two conditions obtained: first, that they fought half-heartedly and gave up easily, and second, that they were overwhelmingly outnumbered — which would be an indication that this was a 'popular revolution.'

There is, we should not forget, a precedent for this kind of collapse. When the tide turned against Batista in 1958, the bulk of his troops also refused to fight for him. Under stress, in the face of a popular movement, troops who have to fire on their own people cannot be expected to be loyal to generals whom they have seen use their positions mainly to enrich themselves. Batista still had an overwhelming advantage in troops, tanks and planes when he decided to give up and get out with the loot.

Now we have come to the point that will undoubtedly provide controversy for years to come — the alleged Communist 'take-over' of the pro-Bosch movement. And before we go further, it should be remembered that we are dealing with the decision of April 28. What evidence was there for President Johnson's assertion that 'a popular democratic revolution' was 'taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators'?

On April 29, John W. Finney sent a report from Washington to the *New York Times* which stated: 'The situation this evening was said to be just as confused as it was yesterday when President Johnson

ordered the Marines into Santo Domingo. Mr. Johnson had reports that at least two and perhaps seven or eight of the leaders active among the rebels were Communists.'

On the same day, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara discussed the Dominican situation with the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he was reported to have persuaded some of its members that 'an element' of the pro-Bosch forces was 'Communist-led'. But he did not suggest that the Communists had gained control (*New York Times*, April 30).

Yet, on April 29, the word went out from Washington that the landing of the Marines had not been ordered for humanitarian motives only. It had also been designed to prevent a 'Communist take-over.'

It was only on April 30, according to Max Frankel in the *New York Times* of May 6, that the number of 'prominent Communist and Castroist leaders' active in the struggle was increased from 'at least two and perhaps seven or eight' to as many as 55 or, according to another version, 58. The revised estimate was provided to the President by the CIA, Douglas Kiker was able to report in the *New York Herald Tribune* of May 2. Ironically, Kiker was also told that 'U.S. intelligence experts now trace the beginning of the Communist growth in the Dominican Republic' to the period after the overthrow of Bosch in 1963. It would be hard to think of a more devastating commentary on the legend that Bosch was overthrown to prevent a Communist takeover then and that the military coup was the best cure of Communism. It was not until May 5 that official Washington sources released a list of 5 'Communist and Castroist' names, duly published in the *New York Times* the following day.

We are now in the shadowy realm of 'intelligence.' The wonder is that the CIA could only scrape together 55 names from the combined PSP, MPD and 14th of June Movement. Evidently the list itself failed to impress the correspondents in Santo Domingo. Barnard L. Collier wrote on May

7: 'Correspondents were told that there were over 50 hard-core Communists directing the rebellion, and a list naming them was passed out by the Embassy. Up to now, no hard proof that the names are any more than names has been provided by any official sources here, although reporters who know the Dominican situation personally have found that several of the listed are Reds and active here.' *Newsweek* of May 17 blandly passed on this information: 'The embassy failed to convince the 156 foreign correspondents in Santo Domingo that 'the 58' were a menace.' And, to be sure, after May 5, not a single one of the 58 names was mentioned again in the press reports from Santo Domingo. The Communists who had 'taken over,' who should have been most active and prominent, mysteriously faded away. The U.S. intelligence services, which had just given the press the most secret, lurid details about the now open Communist ring-leaders, seemed to lose interest in them or at least made it necessary for the press to lose interest in them.

By chance, moreover, U.S. intelligence in the Dominican Republic was not exactly at its best just prior to the outbreak of April 24. Ambassador Bennett says that he knew trouble was brewing there. *Newsweek* of May 17 was permitted to divulge a sentence from a personal note to Under Secretary Mann: "We are almost on the ropes in the Dominican Republic." A message from the Ambassador early in April of this year contained these oracular words: "Little foxes some of them red are chewing at the grapes." But Bennett was not at his post in Santo Domingo on April 24, when the trouble broke out. He had left for Washington on "routine consultation" the day before, and he was not able to get back to the Embassy until April 27. To make matters worse, 11 of the 13 officers of the Military and Assistance Mission were off in Panama, and the resident head of the Agency for International Development was in Washington, all of them at routine conferences, in the first days of the crisis. For an Embassy that was so spectacularly out of touch with the immediate realities in the Dominican Republic on April 23, its outpouring only a week later of the most intimate revelations, all of them com-

promising Bosch or his men with Communism, was remarkable.

Whether U.S. intelligence in this instance was good or bad, however, it seems clear that intelligence did not fashion policy. As so often happens, policy fashioned intelligence — or at least the kind of intelligence made public.

For, as we have seen, on April 29 President Johnson apparently had reports of only two and perhaps seven or eight Communists active on the pro-Bosch side, and the ostensibly frightening figure of 55 or 58 was put before him on April 30. By then, U.S. policy had been decided for days, and the "small group of well-known Communists" had had little to do with it.

That is why "Administration officials" were so relieved early on April 28 that Bosch's forces had apparently collapsed. That is why the first contingent of Marines was ordered to patrol the streets of Santo Domingo in company with the military remnants of General Wessin y Wessin's junta — the first visible sign to the populace that, despite all protestations to the contrary, the United States Government was in fact supporting the junta. That is why Tad Szulc was able to write on April 29: "There was no question that the United States was fully supporting the three-man military junta even though it could not control the city." By May 1, Szulc called the junta "a fictional government" with which "there is no question that Washington is lined up." Other correspondents sent the same reports.

De facto support of the military junta on April 28 could only have meant a decision to prevent Juan Bosch from returning to office. At least one U.S. official said as much: 'We can't afford to let Wessin lose. We're not going to allow Bosch to come back and let the country drift into chaos so that the Communists and pro-Castro elements can take over.' This candid statement appeared in *Life* magazine (May 7, 1965). But at least this official did not say that the Communists and pro-Castro elements had already taken over. The line was now the old one of 1963 — Bosch led to Communism, and to prevent Communism, it was necessary to prevent Bosch from returning to power.

This devious policy could only be put across deviously. In Santo Domingo, some U.S. correspondents have been appalled at the lengths to which U.S. officials have

gone to mislead them. At least two, John MacCartney of the *Chicago Daily News* and Barnard L. Collier of the *New York Herald Tribune* have devoted entire dispatches to their disenchantment with the official briefings. Collier, on May 3, cited a number of concrete cases which give some notion of the kind of propaganda that has been emanating from an Embassy that was publicly protesting it was not 'taking sides.' A group of correspondents were told at the Embassy that 12 'anti-rebel' Dominicans had been lined up against a wall and personally machine-gunned to death by the anti-junta leader, Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno to the accompaniment of the Castroite cry, 'Paredon!' (To the wall!) 'Not a single reporter,' wrote Collier, 'has found concrete evidence of the episode, and there are now reports that one of the key men said to have been killed in that incident is alive, although wounded.' Embassy sources also assured correspondents that Caamano's forces had committed 'stomach-turning atrocities.' Collier simply states: 'Reporters have found no confirmation.' It is even to be feared that a campaign may be whipped up against some of our best Latin American correspondents on the ground that they have not followed the U.S. party line or, as it will probably be translated, shown too much sympathy for the 'rebels.'

Thus far, I have taken the various statements and reports, official and otherwise, at their face value. And I have tried to show that, even on this basis, words and deeds have been only distantly related. The contradictions, confusions and camouflages manufactured in Washington and in Santo Domingo for the past month have been so unconvincing that they forced me to come to the conclusion that, as John MacCartney put it, most of them were merely 'cover stories.' As I have indicated, the available evidence led me to suspect that the decision of Wednesday, April 28, was essentially made against Juan Bosch rather than against the Communists, or that it could be interpreted as directed against

the latter only if Bosch could be equated with Communism, as in the mummery of 1963.

But it may be worse.

In the *New York Times* of May 15, Tad Szulc conscientiously tried to reconstruct the first few days of the present crisis. According to him the crucial anti-Bosch decision was made in the State Department on April 25, the second day of the outbreak, not April 28. On the 25th, it seemed that the pro-Bosch revolt had triumphed and that Bosch was about to return to Santo Domingo from Puerto Rico. On that day, Szulc goes on, 'the State Department was said to have decided that such an event would pose a threat of Communism in the Dominican Republic 'within six months.' U.S. sources in Santo Domingo told Szulc that the man primarily responsible for this judgment was Under Secretary of State Mann. It was for this reason that the United States 'made no move to express interest in the pro-Bosch movement or sympathy for it' (at a stage to which, as I must again point out, President Johnson later paid lip service as 'a popular democratic revolution committed to democracy and social justice'). When other Embassy officials, in Ambassador Bennett's absence, recommended that official U.S. representatives should make contact with Bosch in Puerto Rico, the State Department is said to have 'vetoed the idea.'

I do not know how much truth there is in Tad Szulc's account. I do know that Szulc is a thoughtful, serious, hard-working correspondent. His informants may be the same 'top United States officials' who told Barnard Collier that they were not happy with the precipitancy of U. S. policy and that they were 'being ham-strung in trying to present a picture of what is going on in Santo Domingo militarily and diplomatically because of the possible effect of that information contradicting views coming out of Washington' (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 8, 1965). In my judgment, Szulc's time-table accords with the

facts, as we know them, but it does not change anything fundamentally whether the basic decision against Bosch's restoration was made on April 25 or April 28 or somewhere in between.

I have chosen to focus my attention on the decision to support Wessin y Wessin's junta and then Imbert's junta against the popular movement to restore Juan Bosch to the Dominican presidency because I believe that it was the decisive moment of the present crisis. Everything else—the build-up of a Communist 'takeover,' the doubletalk and deviousness, the cease-fire that proved to be merely another cover for regrouping the military junta's remaining forces for an all-out attack—flowed from it. Above all, the incalculable consequences of this adventure for years to come and in countries near and far will flow from it.

In those first days, it was not unreasonable for the policy-makers in Washington to be concerned about the opportunities which the outbreak would give the Communists for extending their influence and doing their mischief. But, if this was the over-riding consideration, the crucial moral and political question still was: with Bosch or with Wessin y Wessin, with the man who had represented the first constitutional democracy in over three decades or the man who had been chiefly responsible for overthrowing him, a man who had suffered from Trujillo's tyranny or a living military symbol of Trujilloism?

If the United States had acted quickly and firmly enough, Bosch would have returned to Santo Domingo with a minimum of bloodshed, Wessin y Wessin's junta would not have been formed, and the Communists would not have had time, even if we credit the official story, to take advantage of the temporary setback to the pro-Bosch cause on the fourth day, Tuesday, April 27. It was as if, after Adolf Hitler had committed suicide in 1945, the Allies had decided to back Air Force Marshall Hermann Goering as the man to save Germany from Communism. The analogy is not too inappropriate. Whether Wessin y Wessin was as big a crook as the other generals is beside the point. To the vast majority of Dominicans, he was the product and protagonist of the old system of torture, despotism and corruption. In effect, the decision against Bosch was a decision against democracy and decency as the bulwarks against Communism. The worst that could have happened under Bosch would have been a return to the conditions that had prevailed in 1963. The logic of the present decision is that the military conspirators had been right in 1963 and, therefore, it has again become necessary to defame him.

I venture to make a prediction: In the end we will need Juan Bosch far more than he ever needed us. When we betray the Juan Bosches of the world we must, in the final reckoning, betray ourselves.

A R T S

*Is Hindustani Music Spiritual? **

V. H. DESHPANDE

MOST of the English, American and Continental musicologists who attended the East and West Music Conference held in New Delhi in February 1964 have expressed the view that, unlike its Western counter-part, the Indian Classical Music is essentially spiritual. Mr. H. J. Koellreutter of Germany said: 'Western Music was concerned with emotional realisation whereas Indian music with spiritual realization. Mr. Manfred Junious thought, 'Western musicians aim at a kind of external expansion while the Indian musicians aim at inward concentration'. Mr. Ernest Meyer said in a similar vein, 'it is especially the inner beauty of the more quiet and contemplative examples of Indian music which could inspire musicians and music lovers in the occidental world'.

I have quoted above only a few of the visitors. Others, like Lord Harewood, Mr. Nicolas Nabokov, Mr. Yehudi Menuhin, Mr. R. Ashton, Mr. Hans Struckenschmidt, Mr. Lothar Lutz, and others who attended the conference also expressed more or less similar views. All this would appear to be very flattering to us, particularly as the views come from musicologists of repute who have expressed themselves after making a serious study or practice of Indian Music extending over years and it must be said to their credit that the range

of thought and the depth of study they have brought to bear on the subject is not only unsurpassed in our musical literature but not even equalled by any of the Indian scholars so far. Although, therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the dictum laid down by the visiting scholars and the extent, if any, of its applicability, I must do so with the utmost respect for their scholarship. I must also make it clear that it is quite possible that the visitors may have had something different in mind from what we usually understand by the word spiritual, viz., something connected with divine knowledge, self-realization, mysticism, etc. etc., or, that they may have had a very limited connotation of that word in their minds. It is also likely that they may have only described the general character of our music as it appealed to them in contrast to the character of their own music and that whatever was 'meditational', 'contemplative', 'improvisational', etc., was according to them 'spiritual'. And therefore, even if we disagree with them, we must make an allowance for this possibility and avoid any strong criticism of their views. I must also tell you that only one of them has used the words 'spiritual realization' and that other scholars have said different things in explanation of their individual points of view. For instance, Mr. Yehudi Menuhin has observed 'Indian music tried to express the inner, elusive element in the Individual, to go deep into consciousness,

* Talk given at the G. M. Vidyalyaya's All Indian Music Teachers Conference held at Jaipur on the 9th of October, 1964.

and Western Music evolved by bringing in more and more of the environment in terms of voices and the complications of putting these together'. Mr. R. Ashton has said, 'Indian Classical music was introvert in comparison with the Western Classical music which was extrovert'. Prof. Stukenschmidt has stated that Indian Classical Music reminds him of 'the endless unfolding of primordial being' and relates it to the aspect of improvisation. Mr. Manfred Junious has similarly explained, 'Indian music connotes search for subjective inner values, the expression of which is contemplation and meditation'. I must, therefore, put in a further reservation that it is possible that I may also have erred in including all these different connotations in one expression — viz. 'spiritual', as I am now doing.

I must therefore explain why I have selected this topic even if subject to such almost neutralizing reservations. In this context, the very first thing that strikes me as most unusual is that none of the visitors, except one, talked about the artistic values of our music as if none at all existed! And the one who did refer to them only said: 'the conflict of contrasts which leads to dramatic tension is alien to Indian music'. Besides, we, as Indians, are already fond of calling ourselves 'spiritual' in contrast to Westerners whom we dub as 'materialistic'. In the field of Indian music this is especially so because the great ones in us right from the ancient sages down to the present day politicians, also tell us that music is the only language in which one can pray and communicate with God. Even our own people have hardly been seen referring to the artistic values of our music! If our music was indeed spiritual, as all these personages have made it out to be, it would mean that all our musicians past and present were and are 'sadhakas' or aspirants for salvation! On top of all this, if even the learned foreign musicologists also tell us the same thing, we will be only too willing to treat that as the most

authentic opinion on the subject and mislead ourselves thoroughly. Let us therefore investigate into the matter if only for this reason and in so far as we can.

The various points of view I have quoted above all boil down to the one characteristic feature pointed out by the visitors viz. that our music is 'meditative', 'contemplative', that it expresses 'subjective inner values', is 'improvisational in character', that it 'brings out the inner elusive element', etc. etc. When we come to think about these matters the following questions immediately confront us, viz. :—

- (i) Whether Hindustani Music answers to the visitors' description of being spiritual at least in some part and if so, in which part; and,
- (ii) Whether to be spiritual, it is enough to be meditative, contemplative, improvisational, etc. etc.

Taking the first question first, viz., whether Indian Music answers to the description of being spiritual, one is faced with the further question namely to which of the two musical systems are we referring, the Hindustani or the Karnatic? The visitors seem to have included both these under the same label; but I shall confine myself only to Hindustani music with which I feel familiar.

While we consider this question, it is necessary to remember that all music, be it Eastern or Western, has grown under the protection of religion whether of the temple, or of the church. Music may have originated in folk art, but the very first office it was assigned to, was the religious one, viz., officiating as hand-maid in the various rituals such as yajnas, prayers, High Masses, or other religious ceremonies. While therefore religion provided the protective cover necessary for its growth in the early years, music naturally took on its colour, developed in a specific channel, was cut out to the required specifications and generally conformed to the so-called 'spiritual' or more correctly, the 'religious' pattern, consistent with the requirements of that holy office. But the first criterion

or index of the development of any art would naturally have to be, how far it has outgrown the requirements of its infantile stage and cast off its religious crutches so necessary in that stage. I suppose this is the acid test of the development of any art, and music cannot be an exception. In other words the test would be whether Hindustani music has come to stay for its own sake, i.e. whether it has established itself as a self-sufficient and an autonomous art and not been assigned a subsidiary role of handmaid to ecclesiastical or religious offices.

If, however, Hindustani music fails to satisfy this elementary condition, we must be bold enough to confess to its being still undeveloped and in a crawling infantile stage. Thus, if the word 'spiritual' is taken to mean 'religious', the description of our music as 'spiritual' would hardly be considered a compliment.

It is, of course, true that until about two hundred and fifty years ago, Hindustani music had not yet completely come out of its religious shell, and the classical style of *dhruwad* till then in vogue, was mainly, if not wholly, dominated by its literary content which was, to a sizeable extent, in praise of God or otherwise of a devotional character. The devotional import of the literary text obviously determined its form and fashioned its style and yet even during its entire career under the Mogul emperors, we find that it was trying to cast off its ecclesiastical robes and adapt itself to the demands of the Royal Courts. The form of *dhruwad* which had thus evolved out of the religious or temple environment was obviously unsuited to the atmosphere of the Royal Courts and ultimately in or about the early eighteenth century the *khyal*, which has obviously no religious or spiritual colouring, was evolved by the musician Sadarang attached to the Emperor Mohamedshah's Court (1719-1748). Although the *khyal* at first was looked down upon by the then traditionalists, it gradually came to stay as a full-fledged classical form of Hindustani music

and stands as its highest water-mark today.

What we have now to consider is, how far the form of this *khyal gayaki* can be described as being of a spiritual nature, having regard to the characteristics as quoted earlier, viz., that it must be meditative, contemplative, in search of subjective inner values etc. Now, as all students of music know, *khyal gayaki* is not a single homogeneous whole which can be described by one common label, but consists of various 'schools' of music or 'gharanas' functioning today such as, Gwalior, Agra, Jaipur, Patiala, Indore, Kirana, etc. each of which specializes in and elaborates or emphasises one or more of the constituent factors of music. We will, therefore, have to consider the question with reference to each one of these *gharanas* and ascertain for ourselves which of them satisfies the visitors' description.

Let us first of all be clear in our own minds which part of a *khyal* and which particular style of music of a *gharana* can be capable of satisfying this condition. Surely it is only the *alaap* part of a *khyal* which will be able to answer to the description. Naturally, therefore, whichever *gharana* specializes in this particular aspect of music will be the one to which any spiritual colour can at all be ascribed. Again, to be able to have any claim to spirituality, the *Alapchari* also must be such as will abandon itself to meditation and contemplation of the *raga* and engage itself in the unfolding of all its potentialities such as tonal varieties, with all the subtleties and nuances, both as to the accuracy of pitch and intonation and the use of grace notes etc. Further, the abandon will have to be so complete that it will almost be a total surrender and dedication to the tonal aspect of music with its natural anaesthetic effect not only on the audience but more so on the musician himself. It must be almost a tonal trance or a tonal 'samadhi', i.e., a profound ecstatic and exalted state of mind oblivious to all things in and around, including all aesthe-

tic or artistic considerations and rhythmic limitations.

The precise question now is which of the present day gharanas passes this test. One is tempted to name the Kirana House founded by the late Abdul Karim Khansaheb. But I for one would like to exclude even his gharana and confine my mention to the individual name of Abdul Karim Khansaheb, its founder, (one might also mention Amir Khansaheb of the present day for the reason that at least for the *alaap* part of his style he can said to have taken after Khansaheb Abdul Karim). But more of this later.

I have elsewhere* analysed the distinctive aesthetic characteristics of each of the gharanas in great detail but for the purpose of the present analysis which is limited to only one specific topic, I would like to divide all the Houses of Musicians into two groups namely (i) Spiritual and the (ii) Artistic. In the artistic group, I would include all the gharanas except the Kirana House to which as I said, reference will have to be made later. These are the Gwalior, Agra, Rampur, Jaipur, Patiala, Bhendibazar, etc. It is not possible in this short paper, nor is it necessary for our present purpose, to dwell upon the individual artistic merits or otherwise of all the gharanas here. But I am including them in one bracket only for the reason that all of them have a common denominator, viz., an awareness of structural beauty and an integrated form, a conception of melodic or linear design and its organisation and above all a sharp sense of 'drama'. The organisation of formal structure of an individual gharana may differ from that of another according to its aesthetic philosophy and ideals and therefore the way each one of them builds up its climax is bound to be essentially its own. But what matters here, and that I suppose is the crux of the problem, is that each one of them has a full sense of what is artisti-

cally a good musical piece. One might have one's own preferences in this matter, but one can hardly deny that each one of them has an acute sense of drama although the conception of what constitutes drama may vary from gharana to gharana. I may go a step further and say that in fact what distinguishes a performer trained under the traditional discipline, from a musical upstart having no traditional training or background is precisely this, that the latter lacks the sense of drama in that he is unable to highlight one musical note or phrase against its predecessor either by accent, rhythmic silence or pause, change in the pattern, either rhythmic or tonal, use of grace notes or by any other device open to him.

As said earlier, one of the learned visitors, who is also a thinker of great depth, has stated: 'the conflict of contrasts, which leads to dramatic tension is alien to Indian Music'. With great respect to that scholar, I must say I am unable to understand this statement. It may either mean that the conflict of contrasts or the degree of dramatic tension obtainable in Western music is far superior to that obtainable in ours or that the Western musicians have failed to appreciate the dramatic tension as operating in our system. Not being familiar with Western music, I am obviously unable to say whether the dramatic tension is superior or inferior to that obtainable in ours or whether it is of a different category altogether. But to say that the conflict of contrasts of the dramatic tension is alien to Hindustani Music is something that passes my comprehension. The fact of the matter is that all the gharanas of the artistic group have their own special methods of building up their individual tensions, although the degrees of such tension may vary from gharana to gharana. For instance, the tension of one may be very mild or sober and that of another may be of an intensive kind, and in between these there may be very many variants in other schools.

I may also refer to a very important

* See "Gharandaj Gayaki" (in Marathi) - "Mouj Prakashan", Bombay - 4.

feature of our music which is not obtainable in its Western counter-part viz. the concept of *sama*. As every one knows, Indian music is bound on the outside by the constant, regular or standard rhythm or *taal* which is of a cyclic order. The first and the most accented beat of a *taal* is always this 'sama' which is the point of 'resolution' of the 'tension' built up in the preceding cycle of that *tala*. The very meaning of the word 'sama' is 'samavastha' or the state of repose and tranquility. In other words, each cycle of the *taal* is so organised as to build up a gradual tension which rises upto a point placed generally a small duration before the *sama* beat and which is the precise point where the song commences. It is there that all the tension so meticulously built up resolves itself (Mr. Lothar Lutz has correctly said that the *sama* is the master-key to the aesthetic enjoyment of Indian music). Then again, each individual cycle so organised is placed one after the other in such a way that the rising tension of every succeeding cycle excels the one built up in an earlier one and so on, subject of course to an intermittent change of pattern employed for the purpose of variety. In other words, the whole piece of a given *khyal* is strewn with carefully built up tension occurring in every cycle followed by its resolution at the terminus, i.e., the *sama* beat.

Coming back to the Kirana School which we have left out as perhaps the only one in the spiritual group, we must now consider its artistic status. It is true that the founder of this House, the late Khansaheb Abdul Karim was given to tonal meditation and contemplation in the *alaap* part of his *khyal* which by far was his strongest point. I must repeat what I said earlier, that I would even exclude all his disciples and followers from this category as almost all of them (including the late Sawai Gandharva and Prof. Suresh Babu, or the present Behere Bua, Hirabai Barodekar, Gangubai Hangal, Bhimsen Joshi, etc.) have abandoned their founder's extravagant indulgence in the *alaap* part

and have taken to the artistic norms of form, structure and design. They, therefore, could now very well be included in the artistic group. But Khansaheb Abdul Karim's own case was very different in the sense that he had almost completely dedicated himself to tonal contemplation and meditation which even in his own times about thirty years ago was described, maybe even derisively, as a tonal 'trance' or a tonal 'Samadhi'. The Westerners could perhaps have been excused for treating his music as spiritual, because when he sang he used to forget everything including artistic considerations such as rhythm, proportion, balance, etc.

But his *alaapchari* had however one compelling virtue which compensated for his deficient form. It excelled in the accuracy of intonation and dazzled the listeners with its brilliance and lustre. It was this dominant factor which shaped and governed his singing style. The specialised effort which he put into his particular way of voice-training was not only enormous, but also became his creed. The delicate tissue-like golden threads giving a sharp point to his voice, the lustre of his polish the abundance of subtle tiny nuances of grace notes or 'kans' etc. had almost become his article of faith. The result was that he invariably succeeded in creating an atmosphere of tonal chastity and purity, something of the sanctity and holiness which comes of the pursuit of spiritual realization. Mr. Manfred Junious would have justified in calling this 'inward concentration' (as distinguished from 'external expansion') and a 'search for subjective values'. It did try to express the inner elusive element by going deep into consciousness' as Mr. Yehudi Menuhin put it. His music was certainly 'introvert' as Mr. Ashton said and it did appear, in Mr. Stukenschmidt's words as 'an endless unfolding' of tonal nuances if not of the 'primordial being'. In other words, it had all the characteristics of whatever one would like to group under the head 'spiritual'! He always had his eyes closed while

singing and insisted on saying that one can never 'see' the tone unless one shut his eyes. One almost wondered whether he saw Divinity in the form of Tone itself!

Given to tonal meditation and contemplation, he was obviously indifferent to the only other important factor in music viz., the temporal or the rhythmic. It must be borne in mind that it is the rhythm which gives music its form, shape and design and constitutes its artistic substance. (Of course, the existence of rich musicality in the performer is always assumed). But Abdul Karim Khansaheb insisted on covering all possible tonal nuances and refused to eliminate even the trivial variants which in themselves were again almost unconditioned by rhythm. The result was that the form of his music suffered and became lop-sided. The effect on the audience however was intensely lulling, soft and soothing. And yet one was tempted to say that it transcended the artistic norms because the listeners also were in a trance with their own eyes closed forgetting everything about the aesthetic considerations of form, structure, etc. It was as if the 'form' was trying to loose itself into the 'formless' and 'musical time' into the 'timeless'.

Perhaps this is too exaggerated a picture of his art and maybe I am myself sublimating his non-artistic deviations and giving them a spiritual colour. While I do not deny having lived under this magic spell for over twelve years until I was about thirty three years old, I must at the same time hasten to rectify the probable imbalance by stating that my emphasis has only been in contrast to the *gharanas* of the artistic group and that, if at all any concession is to be made to the view expressed by the learned visitors, this one style (which is also now almost extinct in the strict Abdul Karim sense) can alone lend itself to the description of being spiritual. I am only saying that Abdul Karim's music lacked the essential rigour of the rhythmic frame.

The substance of all my argument so far has been that Hindustani Music cannot be

called spiritual as is made out by the visiting scholars or our ancient sages, barring only one single exception. If our music were indeed spiritual as all these visitors tell us it would have remained confined to the four walls of the temple, or to the prayer grounds of pious devotees and seekers. It would never have found its way to and established itself in the Royal Courts of the Kings and Emperors, or found favour and patronage with hundreds of Indian princes under whom it developed and prospered. The very fact that our music including the Karnatic style, has survived to this day and has been satisfying the aesthetic cravings of a vast number of concert-goers, including connoisseurs, musicians, and other art-lovers, means that it has high artistic qualities.

This much with regard to the first question I raised in the opening part of this paper, viz., whether our music is spiritual. We have now to consider the other question, viz., whether to be spiritual, it is enough to be meditative, contemplative, etc. In this connection one might easily concede that our music is to a certain extent meditative and contemplative, but I do not think that the other epithets such as 'introvert', 'concerned with spiritual realization' and 'in search of subjective values', etc. etc. are at all applicable to the bulk of the classical music that is being heard today. All the houses of musicians are sufficiently extrovert. Perhaps far more than they need be. But the subject here is the spirituality of meditateness, and I do not think that meditateness or contemplativeness and spirituality need necessarily go together. One might meditate or contemplate about his lady-love for all the twenty four hours of the day and yet be far away from spirituality. The essence of the matter is that anything to be called spiritual has to be employed spiritually i.e. for the purpose of Divine Knowledge, self enlightenment, or spiritual realization, etc. as was the case for instance with the musician saints such as Haridas Swami (Tansen's Guru) Meerabai or

Thyagaraja. Then alone it may have any claim to spirituality. In other words if one is trying to worship Divinity through the contemplation of tone or if the tone itself in any given case has assumed the form of Divinity that music can certainly be described as spiritual.

This will incidentally also explain why the ancient sages said that our music was spiritual. The reason is that all music in those days consisted of *Saman* chants, religious prayers, devotional songs or songs in praise of God. It was certainly not the classical music of today. It is now many centuries since music cast off those crutches and came into its own as an art to be studied, heard and enjoyed for its own sake and not for any other purpose spiritual or otherwise.

Postscript:—

Perhaps the Westerners have gathered their impressions about the spirituality of

music from its instrumental aspect popularised in their countries by our eminent artistes such as Pt. Ravi Shankar, Ali Akbar and others. I have not referred to this aspect of our music as it is almost the same as its vocal counterpart. However, there is one small difference viz. that a substantial part of the instrumental performance is occupied by the *alaap* section which is essentially unconditioned by rhythm. Besides, only the other day I heard Pt. Ravi Shankar give a talk to the Music Critics' Club of Bombay telling them what, in his recent tour, he explained to his American audiences viz. that our very approach to music was almost spiritual etc. In fairness to him, however, I must say that he was speaking with reference to the *alaap* section of his performances and it is possible that the Westerners have taken this description of the part as the description of the whole.

POETRY

SPRING

Flowers or no,
it is spring today.

On the pavement,
digging its roots into the stone,
a sapless tree
through its split sides
laughs into fresh green leaves.

Flowers or no,
it is spring today.

The days which once put
black blinkers on light
and then took them off,
the days which placed men
in the lap of death
and picked them up again,
and then went away along the road
-- let those days never come back.

And that mimic-boy
who went about
in the yellow-smearing
afternoons,
playing the cuckoo for a penny or two
-- the days have taken him away.

The sky above
looks like a yellow letter

printed in red ink,*
 as the ugly, dark, unmarried girl
 who lives down the lane
 thinks of all these and things,
 her breast pressed against the rails.

Just then,
 a shameless butterfly*—oh, damn the wretched thing!
 alights blindly on her.

She bangs the door to.

But still that gnarled tree stands
 tittering in the dark.

SUBHASH MUKHOPADHYAY

(translated by Ashim Chowdhury)

* Among the Bengali Hindus, wedding invitations are usually printed in red ink on yellow paper. Prajapati is an ancient name of Brahmā who as the lord of creation is regarded as the presiding deity of marriage. Prajapati also means a butterfly, and the picture of a butterfly is commonly seen on wedding invitation letters.

POEMS IN WINTER

I

In the autumn of my life (is spring so far behind?)
 I can stand no more
 Anguish. The rusted heart
 No longer knows
 How to suffer.
 In these days chapped and wintry
 Of dried wood smoke, blackened grass,
 Should I not remember
 The crazed cracked vessel
 The shredded picture, or the mocking tawny eyes?
 And the spring when the Mimosa
 Blew and blew and blew
 Breath over white and blue and gold?
 The eucalyptus spoke smarting pungently?
 Should I not remember?
 But in her tiresome gyrations the earth has spun round many a summer
 And winter,
 They have sawed out little piles of
 Sawdust from my life
 Cutting away at the branch of memory.
 Now I can see only a face
 Perhaps a smile? That I feel I have met
 And again there's only that pungent smoke.
 Did I then love those?

II

When the vast barrenness of your presence confronts me
 I feel your absence fruitful.
 It brought me yearnings
 Unknown, images unseen,
 It took me through shadow
 Lines of desire I had left behind (I thought)

In you personified were all
 My loves unreached.
 The smokey blue eyes and the golden hair
 I wished upon my child
 That is born with her father's face.
 The laughter in the face upturned
 (against a white sky) with its sharp dog teeth.
 Some long dark hand.
 Some mood of an afternoon (yellow?).
 Some turn of phrase.
 Something withdrawn.
 A symbol do I mean?
 No. For there you are, close enough to kiss
 With only this vast
 Barrenness of your presence between.

III

I walked home that evening
 My shadow tossed back
 And forth between the lampposts.
 I reached home late, he waited anxiously.
 'What's the matter? Why do you look like that?'
 What 'that' was I never knew.
 Not, I am sure, what I would have looked like
 Had I met you.

GAURI DESHPANDE

SHORT STORY

The Man Born to be King

KA NAA SUBRAMANYAM

‘WHY, grandma, you will live to be a hundred for sure! We were just talking of you and here you are.’

My wife said ‘Grandma will live to be a hundred and two. Only yesterday the astrologer Valluvan was saying so.’

‘Oh! does granny consult Valluvan? Does she believe in him?’

My grandmother was emphatic about it. ‘If I belonged to the modern generation I might not be able to believe in anything. But luckily I belong to an earlier generation and I have faith in quite a number of things’.

‘Tell me, grandma, is it good to believe? Is it all too bad that we are not able to believe?’ I asked.

‘Sometimes it is good to believe; sometimes it is bad to believe’ said grandma Sundha cagily. She loved to mystify us.

‘You mean it depends on circumstances’.

‘I do not mean that. I mean that circumstances of belief and disbelief are made by us’.

My wife Rajee was definite. ‘I don’t make circumstances. I had nothing to do with now being here as daughter-in-law in this house. I was sold into this house. But I make the best of it. And talking of predictions and our general faith in them, it should be good or it should be bad to believe in astrology as in other things. I don’t understand how it can be good sometimes, and sometimes bad.’

Sundha laughed with superior wisdom. ‘So you think that everything is either good or bad. But you’ll live and learn — learn that nothing on earth is as simple as all that. Most things are betwixt and between — neither completely bad, nor completely

good. Here is Raja, your husband — is he good or bad?’

My wife laughed — to hide her embarrassment at being presented with the problem in such simple terms. ‘Of course it will please you if I say he is good — after all, he’s your grandson.’

‘Exactly,’ said granny Sundha clinching the argument.

‘Let Rajee be,’ I interposed in what might have developed into a lengthy and profitless argument. ‘She does not know the world as you do. Even the dishes she cooks are sometimes very peculiar. But tell us a story. You know so many — tell us a story about a prediction that came true’.

‘My grandchildren are good eaters even if they are nothing else!’ declared grandma with pride. The implication was that it was she who had made us the good eaters that we were.

‘Tell us a story, about belief, astrology, what you will, grandma,’ I pleaded.

My grandmother Sundha is a store-house of stories, fanciful, historical, real, naturalistic, purposeful, or anything else, as suited her. She had a manner all her own and she never repeated herself even in momentary forgetfulness. In all these thirty years of my life as a writer I have sighed in vain after her manner and her casualness, the artless art with which she can embellish a good story memorably.

‘I shall tell you the story of Govinda Iyan — a story of some three or four hundred years ago,’ began Sundha.

‘Tell us...’ I said.

And Sundha began her story.

In our Tanjore district on the banks of the Cauvery river, some four hundred

years ago, or maybe it was five hundred years ago even, there was born in a poor family a child who was named Govindan. He came of a Brahmin family and soon learned all the craft and wisdom of the Brahmins and by the time he was in his early teens he was already known as Govinda Iyan, Govindan the Brahmin.

He was a smart lad, a very promising fellow. Anything he heard once he could remember at will and repeat; and anything he took the trouble of studying he mastered with great ease and skill. His father was a vaidik, a man middlingly learned in the Vedas, and from him he imbibed all the sanatanic, traditional, orthodox lore of the Brahmins of his day. And from various other persons whom he chanced to meet or consciously sought out, Govinda Iyan learnt quite a lot of things. By the time he was eighteen and had shot up slim and tall, he had learnt the lore of palmistry from a wandering master, become more than an adept at it. His village was poor and could not contain him and his ambitions, so one day he set out, with his father's and mother's blessings, in search of fortune.

In those days the Tanjore principality had lost its ruler and its erstwhile prosperity and the big King of those days was at Vijayanagar more than a thousand miles away in the adjacent country of the Telugus. It was a difficult journey but nothing daunted, the young Brahmin set out to arrive at the court of the Vijayanagar Raya; it would take him months to reach Vijayanagar the capital but it would give him time to master the language of the ruler, the Telugu language. Govinda Iyan could have gone to the nearer court of the prince at Madurai but the ruler at Madurai was a vassal of Vijayanagar and the boy preferred to go to the source of royal patronage and not to any intermediary. The stars were propitious, the lines on his palm promised him not only safety but prosperity and happiness as well, and he set out with a brave heart and full of hope.

As a Brahmin, his daily rites were sacred to him and he was indeed hard put to it to observe them with the meticulous care to which he was accustomed. But he did the best he could. He pursued his way with dogged persistence and undimmed purpose, eating where he could and choosing what he could of the little he was offered. On the long way too he walked into many situations from which he could extricate himself only by his wits, and whoever he talked to could not help admiring the learning and cleverness of the youthful Brahmin. He won valuable presents like lace upper garments and the like by a demonstration of his learning where it would be properly appreciated. He stayed at a place for a long or short time as the whim took him.

It was in the fourth week of his padayatra towards Vijayanagar and he had covered more than a third of the way. He was following the royal road and passing through very dry, waterless country which was quite different from his own native Tanjore. There were no trees on the hilly road that he pursued now, and when he came suddenly on a clump of trees bordering a cool tank, he was tempted to take his ease, wait for sunset at that place and do his rites in royal fashion. He lay down to rest, though he was aware that soon he would have to seek the shelter of a kindly village for the night — and villages in the region he was going through were few and far between.

He had rested only a few minutes before he heard the clatter of horse hooves and hoped that he might fall in with soldiers. Some of the soldiers were well provided with money and Govinda Iyan knew from experience that one and all, the soldiers would like their palms read and would pay liberally for it. Govinda Iyan was sure that he could please the soldiers — at least some of them — with his art.

It was indeed a bunch of horse soldiers going their weary way to the Nayak Raya's capital after months of campaigning in the

deep south. They had been recalled and were going in small companies, taking their time, by slow stages. They had been hearing persistent rumours of a campaign to the north with the Moghuls from Delhi and once they reached the capital they might be forthwith sent on the other campaign. Like all men who live on violence they were superstitious, and when they dismounted to water their horses and take some rest and wash off their dust, Govinda Iyan interested them by telling them of his prowess in prognostication in modest terms. It did attract almost all of the company and they crowded round the boy with palms stretched out. And Govinda Iyan did read their palms — he told one that he was going back to his love, another that he would be involved in a battle on the way, yet another that the Raya intended rewarding him with a jaghir immediately he reached Vijayanagar. He was careful enough to tell them only what would please them, for part of the art of prognostication consists in pleasing the subject, else it might not be worthwhile.

The soldiers were pleased with the youthful Brahmin and contributed small amounts of silver and little gold for him and then enquired about his destination and purpose. Govinda Iyan had nothing to conceal and he confessed that he was bound to the great Raya's court at Vijayanagar to make his fortune.

One horseman laughed and said: 'I myself come from Chola Desa, the country round Tanjore, and I daresay that every poor Brahmin in Chola Desa with any pretensions to learning would, if he could, migrate to Vijayanagar and the Raya's court. Tanjore will be depopulated in no time'.

'It is not only soldiers that can conquer a land' said Govinda Iyan slyly.

The point of the observation took some time to sink into the thick heads of the soldiers and when it did, one of them slapped his thigh loudly, and said 'True enough young man. You can come and

conquer as much as you can of the Raya's country. I daresay you will bite off a large chunk — but not too large lest others prove envious of the poor Brahmin and his new wealth'.

'I shall remember your advice when the time comes and bite off no more than I can chew,' said Govinda Iyan graciously.

One soldier who was older than the others cautioned his friends: 'Don't make fun of the fellow thinking he is a helpless Brahmin of no means. He might be versed in mantras which will turn us all into scorpions or chameleons'.

'Or donkeys' added another, and they made ready to depart. The soldiers departed in good humour and Govinda Iyan himself made ready to leave the place; he would have to find a village for the night. And at that moment he became aware of a small boy of ten or eleven with a cowheard's bamboo pole in his hand. The fellow was in his loin cloth and he had evidently been there for some time waiting for the soldiers to clear off. His cows and calves were grazing placidly near by, and he now approached Govinda Iyan and said: 'Will you look at my palm, sir, and read my fate. Tell me if I shall ever be rid of the plague of this my native village and whether I shall see other parts of the world and come to something.'

Govinda Iyan looked up and was pleased with what he saw. The boy was good-looking and his words were modest but passionate. He was healthy with the health of those addicted to the open air and vigorous exercise. Govinda Iyan had stood up, the mood for reading palms had deserted him and what could he hope for from a cowheard except perhaps the information about the nearness of a nearby village and the direction to it? But the cowheard's face, attitude, and words intrigued him — he had a quiet self-possession that was far ahead of his station in life and his years.

Indifferently indeed Govinda Iyan looked into the palm of the cowheard. And jerked immediately to attention. He look-

ed closely. He called for the left hand and looked into it carefully. And confirmed for himself his observation. He was so absorbed that he said nothing to the boy.

'What Iyan, what do you see in my hand? Anything very bad or very good! Your silence leaves me guessing as to what it is you see.' The cowherd was wise beyond his years certainly.

'What I see is good. Good for you and good for me. Will you come with me?' asked Govinda Iyan eagerly.

'Well, why not? There's nothing to keep me at home in this God-forsaken village. I have only to leave these few cattle at their houses and I'm ready to come with you to the ends of the earth' said the boy. 'But tell me, where to?'

'To the Raya's court at Vijayanagar' said Govinda Iyan.

'That's always been a dream of mine, to go to Vijayanagar. I'll willingly come with you. That is, if you'll wait till I take these cattle to the village and leave them in their respective houses.'

'Better, I'll come with you to the village. I'll rest there for the night and we can leave early tomorrow morning,' said Govinda Iyan.

And so they did. Govinda Iyan had seen from the cowherd's palm that he was born to rule, and decided on the spot to go with him and make his fortune.

'That's all the significant part of the story,' said Sundha. 'And my conclusion is that when a fortune-teller is as competent as Govinda Iyan, it is worthwhile believing him. But when it's our local Valluvan, it's better not to believe.'

'But granny, did the cowherd become king? What country did he rule over?'

'All Govinda Iyan's predictions came true,' said Sundha and paused tantalisingly.

When I showed my impatience, she continued: 'It's a sad thing indeed, when we don't know the history of the country we live in, but know all about the various Louises of France. The cowherd became Sevvappa Nayaka of the Tanjore princi-

pality and he founded the Nayak dynasty which ruled first as vassals of the Vijayanagar Empire and later on as independent kings for over two centuries in the 16th and 17th centuries.'

'How did it happen?'

'Sevvappa found employment, thanks to Govinda Iyan, in the Vijayanagar Raya's palace and found favour in the eyes of the queen's unmarried sister. When the affair became well-known and Govinda Iyan had predicted that it was bound to happen, the Raya had his sister married off to Sevvappa and sent him off to Tanjore to rule over the country as his viceroy. And the cowherd turned king did well for himself and for others. His sons and his son's sons became rulers of Tanjore.'

'Good. But what happened to Govinda Iyan? Was Sevvappa grateful to him?'

'Again it is your ignorance that is at fault. Tanjore history is full of the deeds of that Govinda Iyan; even the tank opposite our house is named after Iyan. The bazaar at Tanjore is named after him. He came back to Tanjore as minister of Sevvappa. He outlived him and was minister to the son and grandson of Sevvappa and reorganised the country and was considered wise and great and learned and charitable in his day. The new principality of Tanjore recovered a part of its greatness in Govinda Iyan's days.'

'Historians will say that this is all a grandmother's story,' I said, nettled by my grandmother's insistence that I was ignorant of the local history of the land.

'Historians think they know all about everything; it's not worth arguing about, but it would have been better if the historians had taken time off from their researches to listen once in a while to their grandmothers.'

Sundha was definite. I did not pursue the matter any further. After all, my grandmother, though wise in her generation, is a poor ignorant unlettered person while I am a graduate in history of the University.

(Translated from the Tamil by the author)

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B O O K S

TAKEN CARE OF by Dame Edith Sitwell
(Hutchinson, 188 pp. 30s.)

'SAINTED', 'illuminated' and 'mad' are three adjectives with which Dame Edith Sitwell described the 18th century poet Christopher Smart. They could also apply to her own work. In *Taken Care Of*, her autobiography published four months after her death, these characteristics emerge frequently. What, for instance, is a reader to make of a mad phrase like 'Ghosts tall as the wind of silence on the wall'? This occurs in the first chapter which is called 'An Exceedingly Violent Child'.

But if there are absurdities, there are many more rewards. In the closing chapter, she can rise to this kind of sainted expression: 'Every time I see a poor man, I see the Starved man upon the Cross'. Or, looking back at her poetry, she can say with Christopher Smart, 'I, too, blessed Jesus Christ with the Rose'—a claim that only becomes fully illuminated when put beside two more sayings of Smart's: 'For there is no Height on which there are not flowers', and 'For flowers are peculiarly the poetry of Christ.'

From the age of four when she first learnt to read, 'little E' (as she was known by her family) was conscious that she was ordained by life to be a poet. She was convinced as well that she was a genius, and would tell this to grown-ups. These boasts, even as a child, illustrate the more tiresome side of Dame Edith's character. But if they are considered as compensations for a cold reception into the world—'I was unpopular with my parents from

the moment of my birth'—the lack of humility becomes more acceptable. With her, the need for a world of fantasy began early and lasted a lifetime. Looking back at the age of 77, she sees herself in one chapter as a clown-philosopher with a 'moon-round face', and in another as 'a very tall bird of remote elegance and distinction' preening her quills. Or, one moment she will see herself as a child 'who had witnessed... all the tragedy of the world' and the next as a literary nanny (giving, no doubt, as good as she got). She writes in the Preface: 'I have given Mr. Percy Wyndham Lewis and Mr. D. H. Lawrence some sharp slaps'. In the pages that follow there are many others who do not escape.

But these slaps, like the great baroque rings and exotic hats that she wore, had little to do with her authentic Sibylline voice. They were a part of her stage image—and probably accounted for much of the notoriety which she attracted at home and abroad. In 1950, New Yorkers paid three times the price of a ticket for *South Pacific* to hear her read.

Yet for those in search of scandal or gossipy tit-bits, *Taken Care Of* will be unrewarding. 'I have no memory and keep no diary,' she confesses—and though there are passing references to many who were her contemporaries such as Galsworthy, Wells, Gertrude Stein, Virginia Woolf and Aldous Huxley (a whole chapter is given over to Roy Campbell and Dylan Thomas), the main concern of her book is with the practice of her art. The early phases of her upbringing are recorded with much more

detail by her brother Osbert in his four-volume autobiography *Left Hand, Right Hand*.

In the spring of 1942, Dame Edith published *A Poet's Notebook*. In it, she applied a jeweller's lens to the work of her favourite poets. In her last book she does this again, and many of its pages are given over to an examination of the technical problems facing a poet of this century. It should not be forgotten that in her youth she was a pioneer of jazz poetry, just as later she was to be the first poet of any importance to write about the atomic bomb.

In one of her jazz poems, two girls

Walk by the shore of the wan grassy sea —

Talking once more 'neath a swan-bosomed tree.

Often questioned in the past about the exact meaning of these lines, she remonstrates (in Chapter 14) with these critics:

'A wan grassy sea'? Is not the sea often the colour of summer grass? 'A swan-bosomed tree'. Has nobody seen a tree covered with snow?

Much of her poetry was inspired by, and reveals, the close affection that she and her brothers must have had for those who waited upon them. Time and again in her autobiography it is the servants and retainers who draw from her the most vivid phrases. Her 'dear old nurse' is evoked lovingly as 'a white shadow and mountain.' Or, an old house-keeper in her grandmother Londesborough's house is said to have a face like 'a large red strawberry,' while a gardener in the service of her other grandmother is said to have resembled 'a dear great lumbering bear.'

The friendliness and warmth of these descriptions is immediate. They emphasize that she was not the first child of aristocratic parents who found herself more at home in the servants' hall than in the drawing-room of her parents.

Sir George and Lady Sitwell had hoped for a son as their firstborn, failing that a

beautiful daughter who would make a brilliant match. Edith, with the strongly marked features of a Plantaganet king, and such later frailties as a weak spine, was a constant reminder of their disappointment. Remedial attempts to iron out her defects included a brutal harness of steel to improve her posture (which subsequently had the effect of semi-paralysing for life the muscles of her back and legs), and a horrifying apparatus consisting of two upholstered pads clamped to each side of her nose (which had little result except to make normal breathing always an effort for her).

These appalling details expose what a torture her childhood must have been. Yet during her last months, in this last book, Dame Edith was able to write both about the tortures and her parents with complete understanding and charity. A few years previously when she had been received into the Catholic Church, she had said: 'I have taken this step because I want the discipline, the fire and the authority of the Church'. Certainly Catholicism offered her a means by which to overcome her personal sense of despair, and a framework in which to view the general sense of despair, or 'shadow of Cain', which had fallen across so many after Hiroshima. In her identification with these, she believed that it was the poet's role to restore hope to the frightened and 'to bring back sight to the blind'.

The final pages of *Taken Care Of* are concerned with a visit to Skid Row in Los Angeles. On this visit she was accompanied by Mrs Valma LeRoy, a coloured maid whose smile (she pauses to note) bloomed like a 'large yellow hothouse begonia.'

Her reaction to the poverty and squalor of these slums was, as always, one of shame and disgust, and she applies to them many of the terms—'sightless faces and people made of rags'—which she had used first over thirty years ago when (in her long poem *Gold Coast Customs*) she had described the last century slums of Ashantee. Her compassion for the under-

privileged did not alter. In Ashantee in the 1830's as in Los Angeles in the 1960's, the poor man, whether he was black or white, continued to represent for her the Starved Man upon the Cross.

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

The Visionary

THE EMERGING WORLD: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Volume (Asia Publishing House, 265 pp. Rs. 25.)

THIS is in many ways a sad book to review. It was intended as a tribute to Pandit Nehru on his reaching his 75th year. Instead it was issued as a memorial volume after his death. The title of the book felicitously expresses the idea which Panditji tirelessly expounded throughout his life. The contents of the book unfortunately lack the unity of theme implicit in the commemoration of the man to whom it is dedicated. Unlike the man to whom they pay tribute many among the contributors show themselves banal in thought and style. The narrow range of geography from which the contributions were invited and the undefined context in which each contribution is made fail to do justice to the greatness and catholicity of the man.

Dr. Radhakrishnan leads off the anthology with an eloquent essay on the need for creating the necessary conditions for the emerging world society. But thereafter it is difficult to see what aspect of the emerging world most of the authors have in mind. Dr. Suzuki very learnedly talks about the Zen language and Dr. Tan Yun-Shan assiduously sets down scores of references which prove contact between India and China in the past. C. Raj. gopalachari explains the essence of Hinduism in three pages to the ordinary good non-Hindus with the bland statement that 'All Hindus today understand, believe in and follow the Hindu religion faithfully.' Sri Sampurnanand bemoans the deterioration of secularism 'into contempt for religion and anti-religionism.'

Later on we have the treat of two diverse discourses on education. Vinoba Bhave wants to bend education to the task of leading us to a 'simple life of harmony with Nature.' Dr. Zakir Hussain, if you prefer, offers us education as 'anticipation of the future' in which educators must co-operate to realise 'the ideals that have been given constitutional form.' Dr. Malasekara has a vision of the future civilisation based on a spiritual religion which will express itself as 'an enlarged dialogue, the unity of an orderly conversation, a coincident unity.' Such are the thoughts uppermost in the minds of those who come from that part of the world which is struggling to emerge from destitution and underdevelopment. It is conceivable that the process of emergence in Asia and Africa might have occasioned more mundane thoughts from a Nigerian or an Indonesian.

Inquiries of an earthier kind and with more immediate bearing on the problems of emergence have come from the Western contributors. Lord Attlee enumerates, a little colourlessly, the significant changes brought about by the Labour Government in Great Britain in six years to prove that 'revolutionary changes in a democratic society' are possible under determined leadership. Escott Reid, speaking from his first hand experience of India, explains how difficult it is for any leadership in a poor country to stay determined in the face of pressures whose intensity and variety have no parallel in the developed societies of the affluent West. After a longish examination of the conflicts of our time Willy Brandt concludes that 'We simply have no choice other than to become revolutionaries for we will never master with recourse to old formulas or patent remedies the social problems which inevitably result from technological changes.'

A specially European appraisal of the emerging world is given by Mendes-France and Gunnar Myrdal. For Mendes-France the evolution of the European countries and the less favoured countries outside Europe on present lines is intolerable. He

maintains that a massive European effort, supported by educated public opinion, is necessary to bring about 'better distribution of wealth and rights' in favour of the economically weaker countries. The present imbalance is being greatly aggravated by the varying pace of technological advances in Europe and the weaker countries. Proceeding from this 'disturbing conclusion' Myrdal exhorts the 'rich countries to think through their aid policies and be prepared to give them entirely new directions and much larger dimensions.' Such desperate appeal to the altruism of the West is seldom sweet music to Asian ears.

Much of our anxiety for the emerging world is allayed by those who look at it in a contemplative mood. They do not write off mankind because it has not accepted an expert prescription. Discussing the role of Universities Lord Adrian has the humility to say 'We must teach the new generation to advance beyond us. We must not discourage the world's desire for knowledge.' Richard Gregg shows no respect for modern seers and cuts them down to size in the context of what he calls knowledge explosion. 'Nobody with even the largest vision and the most sensitive imagination could foresee the results; we can see how futile it would be to predict; one can offer neither prophecy nor advice.' It is quite obvious that there will be great perils for individuals and nations but it is a 'great time in which to live.' By far the most robust among the contemplatives is Sir Eric Ashby. 'Let us not assume that we are the first generation to live in fear; fear is no new thing. It is only the sophisticated who suffer from a sense of doom. Millions are happier because of the achievements of science'. Even in the realm of ethics science has contributed to the cohesion by substituting 'tyranny of dogmatic truth by a formula for tolerating error.' Pandit Nehru belonged to this emerging but unarrogant world of science and humanism. His vision of this world inspired his countrymen. His love for them sustained him. The compassionate visionary

comes out beautifully in the single photograph in this book.

MAHESH DESAI

Revision of a Portrait

NEHRU: SUNLIGHT AND SHADOW by Frank Moraes (Jaico, 208 pp. Rs. 16.)

MR. MORAES, who wrote Nehru's biography some years back, has written this fresh appraisal in an attempt 'to capture and assess the personality and achievements of Jawaharlal Nehru while the impact and impressions of the Nehru era are still fresh and vivid.' It is, thus, a cross between a biography of a living personality and one written with the advantage of distant memory. The advantages and the disadvantages of the attempt are obvious to the writer. Reading through its pages one cannot help wondering whether a more ambitious study would have arrived at different conclusions about the Nehru mind and its consequences. Mr. Moraes makes an effort to understand the mind and interpret it, but is often baffled. If Nehru does not emerge as great a figure as many would wish he was, the fault is not the author's. The book shows a scrupulous regard for facts.

'It is wrong to think of Jawaharlal as the Hamlet of Indian politics, as one noble but vacillating. His mind was made up on the questions which mattered to him, at least a decade before independence. He never altered his views on any vital political or economic matters after the publication of his autobiography in 1936, and his visit to Europe two years later on the eve of the second world war only confirmed and consolidated these opinions. For the next 25 years and more of his life Nehru's views remained virtually static.'

Gandhi, doubtless, was a great influence. But basically, the Mahatma and his heir were poles apart. One was a revivalist, the other a modernist. Their community of approach on the Muslim question was because of their humanity. For the rest, their vision of a free India differed com-

pletely. A later influence was Mr. Menon. Several factors account for this curious relationship, one of them perhaps being Nehru's gratitude to Menon for his understanding and assistance in London in the years before independence. Mr. Menon has also a sharply modern mind which in India was not conspicuous among Jawaharlal's colleagues. The more plausible explanation emerges in a shrewd sketch of the Nehru character which Mr. Moraes pens. 'He despised sycophants though he was susceptible to clever flattery. But those whose intellect he respected and who agreed with him could, if they were clever and calculating enough, influence him imperceptibly more than he would have liked to think or acknowledge.'

On Communism Nehru's stand is best summed up in his famous words which the author quotes. 'We are not opposed to Communism as an ideal in society ... It is the Communist technique of action that one rebels against'. Of a piece with this confused thinking was this: 'The Communist ideal and, I suppose, the Socialist ideal do not differ very much. I have no ideological aversion to the Communist ideal of Society'. This perhaps explains why while Nehru sought the help of the Menonites he never seriously cared to repeat the overture he made to the Praja Socialists, in 1953. One wishes Mr. Moraes had discussed this episode more fully.

Another omission is the impact of Indo-Pak relations on India's Foreign Policy. Mr. Moraes rightly criticises the late Prime Minister's rejection of President Ayub's offer of joint defence, a rejection due largely to the policy of appeasement of China. But the formative years were 1952-1954. U. S. arms aid explains this only partly. What stands out a mile is that in all the seventeen years not once did Mr. Nehru take a determined initiative for Indo-Pak harmony. The Pak statesmen all had a sneaking admiration for him. Here was an instance when generosity was good policy as well.

The reliance on the Soviet bloc was due

in no small extent to Kashmir. Mr. Moraes takes the reader through the record. The result is a telling indictment of a policy which has alienated us from the West, separated us from the travails and the friendship of S.E. Asia, made us dependent on Russia, and left us helpless *vis a vis* China. 'The test of the success of a country's foreign policy is its good relations with its neighbours', the author quotes Mr. Nehru's remark in a conversation. It is unnecessary to discuss how Mr. Nehru's policy stands up to the test.

'Kashmir was the greatest of his mistakes. Kashmir was a beam in India's eye to which Nehru's foreign critics were understandably and perhaps legitimately prone to draw attention and which undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of his plea for moderation and compromise in international affairs. Though Nehru regarded it as the symbol of a continuing conflict between his own insistence on a secular India and Pakistan's communal or religious approach to Indo-Pakistan problems, Kashmir persisted as a running sore which neither India nor Pakistan could ignore. A month before his death Nehru was privy to reopening the Kashmir issue by taking the initiative in releasing Sheikh Abdullah whose prolonged detention, it was well known, latterly weighed heavily on his personal and political conscience. In the last month of his life it seemed as if Nehru were groping for some solution to ease the poisonous impasse that had bedevilled relations between India and Pakistan for so long.'

This is not to say that it was a life without achievement. 'Nehru's golden years as Prime Minister were the first ten years after Independence.' This is not quite correct. The failures of the later years had their origin in the mistakes made earlier. The achievements all the same stand out—Indian unity, democracy, secularism, planned economy and the principle of non-alignment. All the greater pity that some of his own policies weakened what he had so devotedly built: linguistic reorganiza-

tion, ignoring the language question, condoning corruption, and, of course, the perversion of non-alignment that overtook India's foreign policy later.

Nehru was not a great intellect, but he was a man of noble impulse, civilized and humane. 'Nehru's constant reminder of the need for a democratic approach in the solution of economic, social and political problems undeniably helped to create a democratic climate of thought in India'. His failure is all the greater because it was in him to achieve a lot if only he willed it. An India reconciled with Pakistan would have spared both the necessity of alliance with rival power blocs, and non-alignment would have been preserved. A Congress-PSP alliance would have set the country firmly on the path of democratic socialism and the crypto-communists would not have had a chance. He could have trained a second line of leadership bearing in mind Laski's dictum that the success of a leader is measured by the extent to which he makes himself dispensable. But that was not to be. A great man chose wilfully to remain greater than his achievements.

A. G. NOORANI

Sham Education

THE INDIAN UNIVERSITY by Robert L. Gaudino (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 268 pp. Rs. 20.)

THIS book is an important contribution to the theme of University Education in India. It is well timed, and the Commission should find Dr. Gaudino's comments extremely relevant. The educated 'common man' will appreciate this study best. He knows enough about education in the country to be alarmed about the way things are going but not quite enough to be able to see a solution of the problem. Student indiscipline, the language controversy and other issues connected with education have each in turn invited comment on the Indian University but the statements made are usually casual, or

highly emotional, generalized platitudes. There are plenty of reports, but there is something forbidding about an official report and most of us shy away from them. Dr. Gaudino's book is uncluttered with figures, tables and technical details and makes lively reading. It is serious and well informed and gives a clear, complete picture of University Education in India. The author understands and sympathises with the many handicaps the educational system is burdened with, but he has none of the attitude of compromise or eagerness to condone that hamper constructive criticism. Actually most of what the author says is familiar; after all, he is talking about universities where most of us have spent some years but this analysis compels the reader to evaluate seriously an academic way of life which is accepted uncritically out of apathy and sheer habit. Although we know our Universities intimately, we do not think about them adequately, and this competent presentation of facts promises to stimulate just the kind of intelligent discussion among educated Indians that should inform and influence the educational policy of the country.

Dr. Gaudino believes that every university is 'of the earth, the winds, the people which nourish it' and so he begins by describing the setting of the Indian University — a society which esteems age, respects status, nourishes hierarchy and is still caste bound in many ways; a country where limited resources are faced by bulging demands and where lack of opportunity, prestige and simple material comforts damage dedication and initiative; a national temperament which is 'not prone to radical thought, though capable of spasmodic radical action'; and above all, a way of life which reduces the individual's personality to a bundle of the 'desires of persons dear to him'.

Of the fifty odd universities in India some teach graduates and undergraduates while others are merely affiliating authorities that conduct examinations and confer degrees. The author feels that the

character of these universities is established by the structure of the organization and the persons who belong to it. He analyses both these factors.

The educational institutions, colleges, private, missionary and Government, with their hostels and youth organizations and the structural factors such as the Senate, the Syndicate and Academic Council etc., that constitute the university, each of these is examined in turn; the mode of their meetings, the nature of their decisions, the rules and procedures, habits and conventions, pressures and considerations that restrict or liberate their activities, their rapport with each other and with the student and academic life which they represent, are studied carefully.

More important than the educational structure and institutions however, are the people that belong to it, the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, Principal, Head of the Department, teacher and student. Dr. Gaudino follows each one diligently through his routine as well as his more special functions, through the many hurdles of adjustment to each other and to the several unintegrated parts of the system to which they belong. He understands their aspirations, confusions and frustrations and dispassionately gauges the extent of their involvement or lack of involvement in the academic responsibilities they have undertaken.

At the end of this analysis the university does not emerge as an intellectual community at all. 'The purpose of the university is to promote study and research. All acts are agreed upon this'. This basic goal is faithfully reiterated on solemn occasions, in distinguished speeches, but most of the time it is lost sight of, smothered completely by the immediate and urgent demand to turn out more and more graduates. Lesser goals do find fulfilment within the system, but each of these goes its own separate way, dissipates energy and destroys cohesion. The university has none of the dynamism, will or animation that characterize a community bound by

strong convictions, the awareness of a single all-consuming purpose.

And yet the picture is not altogether gloomy. In the chapter on 'Government and the University' the University Grants Commission stands out as a fairy god-mother to colleges, teachers and students alike. Indian universities cannot be reduced to complete confusion as long as Commissions like this one have the courage to reject boldly the assertion that 'higher education is a right for all'. Moreover, though our universities are burdened by 'office seeking, patronage and partisan groups, seeking advantage' there is no attempt to control ideas and events, or to condition points of view and in this freedom of thought there is great hope.

On the first page of this book the author says firmly that 'a university is what the nation wants to make of it, what it is able to make of it, what it has made of it'. Has the Indian nation outlined the goals of higher education clearly, and is it going about their achievement in the proper manner? How do the new goals differ from the aims of the Indian universities of British India? Is the transition smooth? Statements here and there indicate the author's opinions, but he does not answer the questions explicitly at length anywhere. Is he silent on these points out of polite consideration for the feelings of Indians? That does not seem likely. Perhaps, Dr. Gaudino has seen too much of the lethargy of academic life here and therefore refuses to hand out ready made views. He is determined to draw Indians into a discussion of these vital issues.

SUMA CHITNIS

Forgotten Neighbours

HEMISPHERE: ASIAN-AUSTRALIAN VIEW-POINTS AND IDEAS. Edited by R. J. Maguire (Cheshire, 32s. 6d.)

THERE are many aspects to Australia's unique position in the modern world, but none possibly more significant than the fact that while ethnically, socially and

culturally this country is very much an extension of Europe, from a geo-political point of view its future is inexorably tied up with developments in South and South East Asia. Such an ambiguous situation is naturally fraught with alternative possibilities. Australia with her democratic policy and dynamic economy may prove to be an energising influence in tradition-bound Asia without bringing in those unhappy features which in the past generally characterised the West's relations with the East. This may in its turn touch off a cultural revolution in Australia and give it a creative identity which is neither European nor Asian, but draws vigorous nourishment from both. On the other hand, Australia may choose to pursue the traditionally myopic course of isolation, and find itself caught unprepared in the vortex of South East Asian political instability and economic chaos. This would, indeed, be most tragic, especially because, given enlightened leadership, Australia can provide a valuable bridge of understanding between Asia and the West, and thereby benefit both itself and its neighbours.

Until very recently few Australians seemed to be at all aware of the unique context in which their nation would presumably have to shape its future. Of late there are some hopeful signs, but even today Australian schools, colleges and universities pay but scant attention to the teaching of Asian languages, or to courses in oriental civilizations. Newspapers and other media of mass communication make little effort to provide reliable background information to news from Asia which keeps forcing itself into headlines. On the other hand, Asian countries, generally speaking, have a distorted and rather unflattering image of Australia. Little is known of its music, painting, or literature, or of its impressive achievements in social egalitarianism. The picture is largely made up of tit-bits of information about its curious birds and animals, its vast unoccupied spaces, its prosperous but semi-civilized wheat-and-wool growers, its segregated

and deprived aborigines, and its discriminatory immigration policy.

The editor and publishers of *Hemisphere* are, therefore, to be congratulated on their timely enterprise in bringing out this handsome volume of essays designed to promote mutual knowledge, understanding and good will between Asians and Australians. The essays originally appeared in the magazine, *Hemisphere*, which 'began publication in the Australian Commonwealth office of Education in March, 1957'. Forty-two contributors are represented, each by one essay—slightly over half of them from Australia, the rest from eight Asian countries, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. The essays vary in length and quality, but they are purposefully arranged in a thematic order. Intended for the common reader and pleasantly free of specialist jargon, most of the contributions are from persons of established reputation and competence in their particular disciplines.

The essays fall broadly into four categories. The first group which provides the key to the compilation is devoted to the need for greater cultural understanding between Australians and Asians. Unfortunately there is no Asian contributor in this group, and consequently the stress is almost exclusively on Australian initiative in promoting closer contact with Asia. The most persuasive essay comes from Professor H. F. Simon who presents a closely argued case for Asian languages in Australian schools. He rightly maintains that 'university programmes alone can hardly be expected to allow the Asian countries and their civilizations to make the kind of impact which will enable Australia to adjust itself with any ease to its geographical environment.' He suggests that at least two foreign languages should be taught in the schools, one Asian and the other European. Professor J. D. B. Miller supplements this with another set of constructive proposals. 'In the first place, we could bring more Asians to work in Australian universities

for higher degrees... Second, we could arrange for more Australians to teach in Asian universities... Third, ... our principal scholars ought to be persuaded to visit universities in Asia to explain developments in Australia and to serve as examples of Australian intellectual quality.' Although Miller's plea is somewhat spoiled by its patronizing overtones (unlike Simon he does not appear to see that Australia, in its turn, may have much to learn from Asia), his proposals, nevertheless, deserve serious consideration.

One way of better understanding is through learning languages, another is through good translations. The second group of essays is related to this problem. While the idiom of abstract thinking is in its nature universal, and therefore more readily translatable from one language into another, this is hardly true of pure or imaginative literature. And yet, as Professor A. H. Johns aptly points out, 'a story or poem can often communicate a more compact or vivid awareness of the predicaments, ideals and circumstances of a people in their own environment than any number of sociological treatises'. Several essays examine the problem of translation from Japanese and Bahasa Indonesia.

The third group (which is also the largest) consists of brief informative essays on various cultural aspects of the eight Asian nations—ranging from archaeology in Ceylon and Malaysia to Art and Architecture in Pakistan, Japan, Ceylon and Malaysia, Asian literary personalities (Jose Rizal and Muhammad Iqbal) and literatures (Thai indigenous literature and Indian writers in English), social and cultural problems (Indonesia and the Philippines), etc. These essays generally are more informative than analytical (except Miguel Bernad's 'The Filipino: a citizen of two worlds'); they are useful introductions, but rarely go below the surface.

The most thoughtful essays in this collection, however, belong to the fourth group and are devoted to critical examina-

tion of Australian society and culture. Australian art and architecture, prose, poetry and reading habits, music, family life, urban society and demographic structure are analysed and evaluated; the contributors are fortunately less inhibited by the editorial distrust of controversy and polemic. In fact, a comparison of this section with the rest of the volume indicates the real weakness of this otherwise laudable anthology. Whereas Australians writing about themselves can afford to be frank and critical, those writing about Asia (whether they are Asians or Australians) have perforce to refrain from even legitimate criticism since they are writing primarily for an Australian readership which knows little or nothing about Asia. As a result there is little real dialogue, despite all the good intentions of the editor and the contributors. It is significant that in this volume no Asian has written on Australia although that may possibly have been the most promising starting point.

In spite of this shortcoming, *Hemisphere* is a most welcome contribution to better understanding between the peoples of the two continents. One hopes it will inspire similar publishing efforts in Asian countries. This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees with Professor Berndt that the effort Australians make 'to understand Asia and Asians should not be a one-way process; Asians should help us to bridge the gap.'

SIBNARAYAN RAY

The Bard in Vernacular

INDIAN LITERATURE: Vol. VII, No. 1—
SHAKESPEARE NUMBER. (Sahitya Akademi
New Delhi, 141 pp. Rs. 2.)

THIS is a useful compilation: an essay on Shakespeare's influence on each of the fourteen national languages (two for Bengali), plus a covering essay by Professor Srinivasa Iyengar on Shakespearean scholarship in India. Nearly all have a similar tale to tell: early enthusiasm followed by a decline of interest. It is clear

that initially, on the stage, Shakespeare was taken more as melodrama than tragedy, and often travestied—not only may Romeo and Juliet 'rise from the dead and live happily ever after' (Kannada), even *King Lear* has been converted into 'a comedy with the usual farcical interludes and amorous songs' (Hindi). The Urdu Hamlet was 'prone to break into a popular song which is meticulously set to tune and often repeated on popular demand...' Other hostile forces operated in the colleges: on at least one occasion Mrs. Grundy stepped in to ban *Romeo and Juliet* for 'the over-boldness of its love-scenes and dialogues' (Sindhi).

The Indianisation is fascinating: in Punjabi Shylock becomes 'a blood-sucking Shamu Shah', in Sindhi 'Hariram, the Marwari usurer'. Dr. C. Narayana Menon has compared Hamlet with Mahatma Gandhi, and seen *Othello* as a 'tragedy of caste'. In Assam *Coriolanus* was renamed *Tara*, as the version of Ambika Goswami put more emphasis on Volumnia than her son. Hari Narayan Apte, 'the father of the modern Marathi novel', held up Ophelia as an image of the young Indian woman suffering from the tyranny of an unfeeling father. In general adaptation was preferred to translation, names and settings being frequently Indianised.

But if accuracy was lacking, enthusiasm was not. Shakespeare was taken from the academics and brought to the people—even 'semiliterate young men from the slums, the market place, and the netty labourers,' according to Mohammed Hasan (Sindhi). He was a liberating force, a 'symbol' M. V. Rajadhyaksha calls him, of an exciting new world. The discovery of Shakespeare coincided with the rediscovery of Sanskrit drama, and both inspired the revival of the modern Indian stage. Perhaps neither was entirely suitable, so that they have tended to be pushed out subsequently by the realistic prose play, especially dealing with social problems—Ibsen, Shaw, Galsworthy, Maugham... Shakespeare has re-

turned to the academics: translations steadily improve.

The essays are full of interesting facts, and raise more questions than they presume to answer. Occasionally the contributors reach opposite conclusions. Whereas R. K. Das Gupta, quoting Michael Madhusudan Datta in his support, contrasts the dream worlds of Sanskrit drama with the 'stern realities' of Shakespearean tragedy, A. N. Moorthy Rao declares that Shakespeare's 'sense of the tragic', of the 'destructive power of evil' and its 'ultimate futility', and 'the brooding mystery of life' etc. 'will not appear startlingly new to readers of Valmiki, Vyasa, Kalidasa, and Bhavabhuti.'

Most of the contributors give a straightforward survey from the earliest translations or adaptations, except Mayadhar Mansinha for Oriya, who retells at length the stories of two romantic poems by Radhanatha, who 'on his first contact with this great Western treasure house, that is Shakespeare, could not resist the temptation of picking up a gem here and a gem there...' The gems were Pyramus and Thisbe, and a remote connection with *Twelfth Night*. Each essay is followed by a bibliography of all translations and adaptations to date.

D. McCUTCHION

Our Omniscient Contemporary

TECHNIQUE IN THE TALES OF HENRY JAMES by Krishna Baldev Vaid (Harvard University Press, 275 pp. \$ 5.75)

IN American scholarship there is a tendency to classify James as a realist... But if the realist is one who aims to tell the plain truth about human nature under ordinary or typical circumstances, then James will hardly qualify. Letting the cat out of the critical bag in making this comment J. W. Beach draws particular attention to the Jamesian aim which was rather 'to tell the special truth about highly selected types under circumstances carefully arranged.' It is to this careful arrange-

ment that Dr. Vaid devotes his own, and draws his reader's, attention by a careful analysis of the internal evidence of the Tales themselves.

This is not to ignore the relevance of corroborative evidence available in the *Notebooks*; indeed Dr. Vaid clearly knows the anatomy of this corpus of literary territory well enough and implicit in his treatment is the judicious recognition of both the correlative importance of the *Notebooks* and their limits as a boundary for academic speculation. Beyond this the reader of James's fiction has no need to go.

Dr. Vaid himself delimits the nearer boundary by his application of textual criticism. As a method hitherto applied to poetic verse, a devotion to the text has revealed its uses as a lever to the isolation of meaning. Dr. Vaid reverses the significance of this procedure by using a close scrutiny of the text to isolate the technical methods by which James expressed his intention in each case. The validity of a strict textual approach to poetic verse is facilitated by the compression and precision that the medium imposes; in the case of prose fiction, though both criteria are not precluded, the form is necessarily more expansive. A textual approach to the shorter works of Henry James is vindicated instead by the existence of the outstanding constant factor underlying James's fiction—his preoccupation with and his conscious application of formal method. James' preoccupation with method, with technique, is the one firm fact that the critical investigator can rely on because, as Graham Hough recently put it to a BBC audience, 'it is always the formal problem that occupies most of his (James') attention.'

Dr. Vaid therefore wisely ignores the moral preoccupations that have bedevilled Jamesian criticism with the phoenix of psychological and less recondite speculation. His approach is a commonsense one governed by his own ingenuous identi-

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

* Caroline Gordon, "Notes on Faulkner and Flaubert" — Hudson Review-I.

fication with Ezra Pound's definition of the honest critic's limitations and occasional reach—posed by the answer to the question, 'what the deuce shall I read?'

It is to Dr. Vaid's credit that his answers to this question provide satisfaction to both the student and to the general reader. Guided by the felicity of James' own structural progressions in the plot, the reader's interest is sustained by Dr. Vaid's exposition of James' dramatic intention and achievement. Thus Dr. Vaid's textual analysis traces the right emphases from a didactic as well as from the 'common reader's point of view—for it bears repetition that 'everything in a James novel moves... for the very act of perceiving is made part of the drama.'*

Through a selection of twenty-two of James' tales—described by careful definition as tales, anecdotes, nouvelles and parables—Dr. Vaid brings the reader face to face with James' personae, first-person narrators (sometimes 'conscient', sometimes 'semi-conscient', and never fully 'inconscient') and omniscient-author narrators. The distinction between the functions of these personae provides a formal division in the book between the critical treatment of tales exemplifying James' two consistent narrative techniques. The critical treatment itself in no way obscures interest in the tales and Dr. Vaid will have succeeded amply if the only reaction of his reader is to put him down to read James instead.

But a critical discipline, however beguilingly disguised, will produce by-products of some value. One of the most interesting here is Dr. Vaid's discussion of *The Turn of the Screw* and the reliability of James' first-person narrator, the Governess ('...Her initiative faculty is more highly developed than that of any other Jamesian narrator, except perhaps the narrator of *The Sacred Fount*.') Dr. Vaid has done much to apply a cold compress to much



* G. Hough "The Novelist as Narrator-V" Listener — 25 March 1965.

of the critical delirium that has obscured James' intention in this tale.

Turning to the technique of the omniscient-narrator Dr. Vaid shows how this is refined by James through a shift of focus 'from external to internal reality', causing tonal and stylistic differences important to James' development of the narrative tradition; a tradition within which he willed a foreclosure on incident as an expression of events in favour of 'perceptions inwardly attained'—an exploration of individual loneliness, struggle,

torment and alienation in the Jamesian protagonist.

If the legacy of this succession was a density of style and structure, occasioning 'the end of the story as a simple story' the gain was not a mere technical one, in which 'the most elaborate indirections are employed with the purpose of presenting....all the implications of a given situation'.* For in doing this James propelled his reader along with English fiction towards a preoccupation that remains surprisingly current.

FOY NISSEN

OUR REVIEWERS

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE: British author and journalist, has just published a symposium on Teilhard de Chardin.

MAHESH DESAI works for the P.S.P. in Jharia, Bihar.

A. G. NOORANI is a Bombay lawyer and journalist.

SUMA CHITNIS has been a University teacher and now works for the Demographic Research Institute, Bombay.

SIBNARAYAN RAY: one of the editors of the *Radical Humanist*, is at present on a teaching assignment at Melbourne University.

D. McCUTCHION lectures in comparative literature at Jadavpur University, Calcutta.

FOY NISSEN works for the British Council in Bombay.

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,

While going through Mr. Nirad Chaudhuri's absorbing article in the *Statesman* (April 24) and its continuation in *Quest* (45), I stumbled on his use of the phrase 'the Hindu way of life' round which his whole thesis is centred and I looked in vain in the text to find an explanation of it. For I have always a feeling that there is no such thing as a set and uniform way of life called 'Hindu' and hence to launch an attack on it is like aiming a shot at an adversary who does not exist. In the course of his 'Quest' article, Mr. Chaudhuri analyses certain contradictory characteristics from contemporary every-day 'Hindu' life which if admitted would apply to the whole population in this country rather than to a portion of it. Mr. Chaudhuri is, however, highly specific and dogmatic in the use of the word 'Hindu' for which he presents a rather lengthy non-apologia in the form of a note preceding his article, but this does not convince us how the word 'Hindu' refers to "a simple definition of an ethnic group with all its outlooks and patterns of behaviour." For whatever might have been the connotation of the word in ethnic terms at the time of the Macedonian conquest, by the time it gained wider currency during the Muslim (Mughal) rule, it came to signify, as it still does, not a uniform ethnic group but people widely diverse in race, language, manners, and usages, food habits, even modes of worship, living in a land called Hindustan. Even Babar's assessment of the people of Hindustan is not directed against any particular ethnic group but against all infidels (= Hindus?) inhabiting this land.

The course of Indian history being what it is, the evolution of a single way of life as a model for the whole country by an ethnic group, however strong, would have been an impossibility. For, from prehistory we have had the Pamirians, the Dravidians, the Aryans, not to mention diverse indigenous groups, often so derogatively described by the Aryan authors, living in Anga, Banga, and Kalinga, beyond the Vindhya and high up in the Himalayas, and during the historic

period we have had the Persians, the Macedonians, the Bactrians, the Sakas, the Yuchis, the Kushans, the Huns, in fact all important ethnic groups known at the time and all these became Hinduised. Although in the present-day Hindu society these ethnic groups are no longer distinguishable as such, the division of this society along ethnic lines, like Semitic, Semitic-Aryan, mixed-Aryan, Aryan-Dravidian, Dravidian, Dravidian-Mongoloid, Mongoloid, attained perhaps in prehistory, remains intact to this day. If the Aryan caste system provided the vertical division of the Hindu society, the ethnic consciousness created a horizontal division, which is no less distinctive and compartmentalised, and even though in an industrial age the caste division may tend to be weaker, the ethnic division has already gained a fresh lease of life from 'self-determination' and from this stemmed the irresistible demand for linguistic states and a federal constitution. Obviously then Mr. Chaudhuri's thesis that the disunity in India is a "natural product of evolution of the same people which created differentiation in every field" does not stand. There are three facts behind this disunity. First, as a people the Aryans whether in India or in Greece were the least united and had preference for small states. Second, as fresh contingents from diverse ethnic groups were added and assimilated, the disunity deepened and widened. And third, and this perhaps happens to every ethnic group, homogeneous or heterogenous, it disintegrates as it grows in age and wisdom. Arnold Toynbee has written in his *study* that the Englishmen built an empire when they were stupid but lost it when they became intelligent. Perhaps such a process which started in India in prehistory is still alive and the long thralldom of her people to foreigners, the Kushans, the Huns, the Turko-Afghans, the Mughals, and the Europeans, was perhaps the outcome partly of a love for atomization which hampered national solidarity and partly of a sense of superiority (at times false) which prevented unity.

If disunity be recognized as the outcome of

historical circumstances rather than as a "natural product of evolution of the same people," then some of the characteristics of the Indian people attributed by Mr. Chaudhuri to the Hindu people become easily explicable; but surprisingly enough Mr. Chaudhuri puts up a curious thesis that Hindu "solidarity roused their sense of unity only when as a group the Hindu nations were collectively threatened by the non-Hindus". I do not know what episodes in history the author is really hinting at. Perhaps he was much impressed by the Indian response against Chinese aggression in 1962. But I do not understand how he would cover up such broad cases from history viz., the Aryan disunity in the face of Kushan

expansion, or the Rajput disunity at the time of Turko-Afghan aggression or the Marhata disunity at Panipat or the Indian disunity in 1857. Since then of course we had a forced semblance of unity during the British rule but I do not know how much of it was really the outcome of the strength of the British Raj and how much the outcome of our own willing submission under a notion of 'divine dispensation'. From the moment we started questioning the utility of the Raj, the facade of unity disappeared and our basic disunity came up which characterized the entire course of our freedom struggle as it characterises us to this day as a free and independent nation.

K. C. LALWANI

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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NIRAD C. CHAUDHURI, the widely known author of *Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, will be publishing his latest book *The Continent of Circe* (Chatto & Windus) in August this year.

RANJIT CHAUDHURI, principal of Seva-Bharati College (an institution situated in the heart of rural Bengal), has contributed articles to *Economic Weekly* and *The Radical Humanist*.

HIREN J. PANDYA teaches Public Administration and Political Science in the N & A Arts College, Vallabh Vidyanagar, Gujarat.

ANNADA SANKAR RAY, a distinguished and versatile writer in Bengali, retired from the I.C.S. in 1950 to devote all his time to creative writing.

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DAYAL SARAN VERMA teaches Logic at Queens College, Varanasi. His doctoral dissertation was on Nietzsche, Marx and Gandhi.

M. R. MASANI, once a leading member of the Congress Socialist Party is now the general secretary of the Swatantra Party and its deputy leader in the Lok Sabha. Author of *Our India*, *Our Growing Human Family* (Oxford University Press) and of numerous articles in Indian and foreign periodicals.

THEODORE DRAPER, sociologist and journalist, research associate at Harvard and Columbia Universities, is the author of *American Communism and Soviet Russia* and *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities*.

V. H. DESHPANDE, by profession a chartered accountant, is a musician and musicologist. Author of *Gharandaj Gayaki* (in Marathi, on various styles of Indian music.)

SUBHASH MUKHOPADHYAY'S talents as a poet were recognised by the best critics of Bengal when he was still in his teens. Since then he has published many books of verse (progressive as well as apogressive), the last of which earned him a Sahitya Akademi Award in 1964.

KA NAA SUBRAMANYAM, the renowned Tamil novelist and short story writer needs no introduction to our readers.



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