

India Quarterly, Jan - March 1965

(195)

THE CHALLENGE OF THE CHINESE BOMB-II*

By

M.R. MASANI

BEFORE I come to the subject proper of the challenge of the Chinese nuclear explosion, I suggest that we take just four or five minutes to consider what kind of situation India was in on the eve of the explosion on 15 October 1964, just a glance at our neighbourhood to see how we were placed *vis-a-vis* our neighbours.

Before the Chinese exploded their bomb, if you had cast your eyes around the horizon, starting with the West you would have found Pakistan rather estranged from us, with a dispute over Kashmir, and engaged in what I would call a flirtation with the Chinese communist regime. Up north in the Himalayas, you would have found the Chinese communist armies poised at the top of the Himalayas with their guns pointing down at us and in possession of territory obtained as a result of our military defeat during October-November 1962. You would also have recorded that we had done nothing in the last two years either to retrieve our lost territory or our lost honour. A little to the East, you would have found Nepal practising non-alignment against us. A little further to the East, you would have found Nagaland in revolt, still fighting but with a brief cease-fire, after 10 years of our attempts to suppress them militarily had failed to break their spirit or their resistance. Still further East, you would have found Burma cold and unfriendly to our nationals, treating them quite shabbily, with very little protest on our part. Burma in its international relations, is slowly being drawn into the Chinese communist orbit, creating the apprehension that she might some day become an Asian Cuba. Laos and Vietnam, further East, in flames. Two-thirds of Laos has been eaten up by the Chinese communist satellite—the Pathet Laos—because of the stupid attempt of ‘neutralising’ the country under a coalition government. South Vietnam is being nibbled at by the North Vietnamese—another communist Chinese satellite—sheltered behind a privileged sanctuary,—an amazing set of ground rules, by which the North Vietnamese communists may attack the South Vietnamese regime across the frontier, but South

*Text of a lecture delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs on 17 December 1964.

Vietnam, for some reason which is difficult to understand, may not cross the frontier and bomb and destroy the communist regime there. You would have found the United States single-handedly trying to help Laos and Vietnam, with no support from us or any other Asian country, who indeed keep on nagging the United States into a situation where they might well walk out and leave us to face the music. Further South, Malaysia, one friendly neighbour in the Commonwealth, being attacked by Soekarno of Indonesia with the support of both Communist China and Soviet Russia.

Perhaps, it would not be wrong to say that India has only two friendly neighbours, Afghanistan at one end and Malaysia at the other. If Laos and South Vietnam were to pass under Chinese communist control, as they well might, if the Americans were to withdraw their support and get tired of fighting alone and if Malaysia were to fall before the Indonesian aggression, then we would have Chinese or Chinese-inspired regimes all the way around us, from Karachi on one side down to Singapore on the other. Not a very attractive or pleasing picture. It must be conceded, of course, that the present Government of India is not responsible for this situation which is the legacy they have inherited from the previous government.

Now this is the background against which the Chinese exploded their bomb and Khrushchev was sacked on 15 October—two events, both of great importance to us and both related, because one cannot discuss one without taking note of the other.

On 15 October, China exploded its nuclear device and thereby Mao Tse Tung qualified to join, what he had till then called the 'Club of Paper Tigers'. The country for which this development has the most importance is obviously India. As was mentioned by a previous speaker, the Chinese bomb is not meant for strategic purposes across the Atlantic or the Pacific, it is meant for intimidating neighbours nearer home. And we are the country for which it has the most significance. So far as we are concerned, Peking has given notice that we might as well forget about any hopes of recovering our lost territory—leave aside liberating our neighbours in Tibet—because if anything of that kind were tried, nuclear force would be used against us.

I think it is fair to say that the immediate implications are political and diplomatic, rather than military. 'Nuclear blackmail' is a term that has been used. I think it is fairly accurate. Already after the victory in NEFA in 1962, China has been looked up to with awe and respect by what are called

the 'new countries' of Asia and Africa. Now, with the nuclear bomb at its disposal, Peking may be expected to exercise a freer and stronger hand in South and South-East Asia.

There are infinite possibilities of blackmail which one does not have to expand on, but there is no doubt that nuclear power will provide strong support to the Chinese communist diplomacy, which has already placed us in a very difficult position in Asia and Africa.

At the same time came Khrushchev's dismissal. Now, I never shared the view, widely held in this country and elsewhere, that Khrushchev was 'the great white hope of liberalism' in the Soviet Union. The picture of Khrushchev fighting the Stalinists always amused me considerably. Khrushchev was, in fact, the heir of Stalin, fighting a rear-guard action on behalf of the communist dictatorship, against the rising middle-class elements and 'elites' in Russia, who were making protests, just as the bourgeoisie used to protest against the absolute monarchy of the Czar, forcing the monarch to agree to some kind of limited constitutional government. So today, the new class in Russia, so well-described by Djilas—in his book 'The New Class'—as the State capitalists, are forcing the communist dictatorship to retreat inch by inch and give them some elbow room to express themselves, without any 'knock at the door at night', a little freedom of writing and expression, and so on. Khrushchev was fighting this retreating action on behalf of the communist dictatorship. As far as I can make out, and I had said this before the picture became a little clearer, the Kosygin regime will be better than Khrushchev's in so far as the internal situation is concerned, for Kosygin represents the managerial class more than Khrushchev and it is more than likely that the new elements in Russia will take Russia further along the path to liberalisation in its economic or political sense than Khrushchev would ever have cared or dared to do. You have evidence of that in the return of small plots to farmers which Khrushchev had snatched away from them and an increasing stress on the profit motive in industry, following Prof. Lieberman's theories.

But having said that, let me also say that, on the international plane, the picture will not be as pleasant. My own feeling is that the new regime in Russia will be much more capable of reaching some kind of accommodation or *detente* with the Chinese communist regime. I think Marshal Chen Yi put the thing very accurately when he said after Khrushchev's removal: 'Khrushchev's removal opens possibilities of re-establishing the unity of the socialist camp'.

Undoubtedly, Khrushchev and Mao Tse Tung hated each other in a very pathological sense. President Chiang Kai-shek said this to me last October in Formosa when I was talking to him. 'The Chinese Nationalists', he said, 'so long as Khrushchev and Mao are both in position, need not worry about a rapprochement. But as soon as one of them is removed, then we have to look out'. And I think that he has been proved right. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons why Khrushchev was removed was his desire to push China out of the communist family. I am not suggesting that the monolith will be restored; I am not even suggesting that the Axis will be completely resurrected. But I think that the quarrel will abate, that some kind of co-existence or accommodation will be reached, and that we may not any longer entertain illusions about getting Soviet support against Communist China. Unquestionably, the Indian Government will be among those who will suffer, because they have entertained this illusion that we can count on Khrushchev or on Kosygin to fight our battles, or pull our chestnuts out of the fire. I have always considered that to be an illusion and I think it is now perfectly clear that if anyone still has these illusions, he had better shed them. As Mr. Isaac Deutscher wrote: 'Mr. Shastri, at any rate, should not count on the increased supply of arms which Khrushchev had just promised him'. The rewriting of the communiqué after our President's visit, which was so well-described in one of our newspapers a couple of days ago, shows how the warmth will be taken out of our so-called friendship and correct relations will be established on the one hand with 'the brothers', and on the other with the 'friends', as Khrushchev had described China and India respectively.

To rely on Soviet Russia for military assistance against Peking, I consider a crowning folly. Others have tried it before. Gen. Kong Lee was the great neutralist of Laos. About four years ago, he declared that he would not touch American arms because they were tainted, but he would take Soviet arms to preserve the independence of his country. Well, he found out early in 1964 that when he was engaged in trying to stop the Pathet Laos from eating up the Plain of Jars, the Soviet supplies on which he relied suddenly stopped. The tap was turned off; no supplies, no ammunition. And then on 24 May, General Kong Lee confessed his mistake. I quote his words:

"I do not like the communists. I like neutralism. But the communists like to destroy neutralists every time. So from now on, every time I shall announce

that I will support all who are against communists and my neutralist forces will join them in the fight."

If anyone wants to repeat Gen. Kong Lee's mistakes and live to bewail his lot in 1968, he is, of course, most welcome to do so. But I, as an Indian, would be sorry if my country gambles on the broken reed of Soviet military support for its neutralism. So far as I am concerned, the situation is crystal clear that we may not count on Russia any more.

Now, against this background, what are the alternatives open to us to meet the challenge of the Bomb? I would say that we have three broad courses open to us. The first is that we should appeal to the United Nations and to world conscience and thus somehow force the Chinese communists to abandon the nuclear weapon. This was the policy initially adumbrated by our Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister immediately after the event. Now, is this a realistic policy? What does world opinion mean to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai? Did it stop them from attacking Tibet in 1950, or India in 1962? Did world opinion force China to sign the anti-nuclear Test Ban Treaty in spite of Soviet pressure? Has not Mao Tse-tung made clear repeatedly his contempt for world opinion? Has he not said that 'power grows out of the barrel of a gun'? World opinion is something that the Communist Powers exploit only when it suits them, but they have the utmost contempt for the so-called world opinion as expressed by the *London Times*, the *New York Times* and the *Times of India*. I think if our Government choose to rely on world opinion and the United Nations they will discover that it is a very brittle weapon.

It has been argued by some supporters of this view that we should sit pretty and do nothing in particular, that any nuclear attack on India would automatically lead to an international nuclear war—the third world war. As somebody has said, it makes no difference if India has the atom bomb or not. It has to be a world war. This was said by a Cabinet Minister last November. Now, I think this assumption needs to be examined a little carefully. I think, on examination, it would prove to be unsound and unjustifiable. Yes, it may precipitate a world war but there is no reason to think that a neutralist country, which refuses to enter into mutual arrangements, can then at the last moment suddenly expect the nuclear deterrent to be used on its behalf. So far as I can make out, today there is no nuclear deterrent upon which we can automatically rely. It can only exist if we enter into the necessary arrangements for it to be used at the right time. There are people who said after the Chinese explosion: 'We are not

frightened. Nobody can frighten India by his military strength or atom bombs.' Our Prime Minister said something like this early in November. I wish it were true. I wish it was true that human beings are not frightened by the atom bomb. But by now, we have found that there are millions of people all over the world, who are quite prepared to say 'better red than dead', which is a tangible expression of their fear of being destroyed. *Mysindia* of Bangalore put it very well when it said: 'We feel, every time we read in our daily papers the statement by some person in authority that India is not frightened by atom bombs, a cold shiver run down our back, for the statement is blatantly false. It is demoralising not only to the civilian population, but more especially to the armed forces.' So I wish I could share this feeling that we do not care about the atom bomb, but we do. Survival is something that human beings normally value. Therefore, the bomb becomes a potent weapon to brandish in support of diplomacy. It is not an accident that both the Communist Parties in India, the Peking and the Moscow variety, support this policy of our 'doing nothing' of sitting pretty. Only this morning, I think, we read the resolution of the Right-wing communists in Bombay, saying that we should do nothing: we should neither make the bomb nor ask for anyone else's help to protect us from the Chinese bomb. Naturally! This line is natural to them because it means conceding hegemony to Communist China in Asia. It leads to our gradually accepting satellite status. It would mean the utter failure of the Government to perform its first duty of assuring the defence of the territory of India and security of the lives of our people. I, therefore, must reject it as providing us any possible solution for our problem.

I come to the second alternative, making an Indian bomb. First, we should be quite clear about what the purpose of making such a bomb would be. Would it be to drop the bomb on Peking after we are bombed? Or would it be to stop a bomb being dropped on us? Would it be retaliation or deterrence? I think we should be clear on what our purpose is. Are we really interested in destroying Peking, after Delhi has been destroyed? I assume that there is no desire on our part to retaliate. What we really want is to be safe, to be protected. What we want, whether we make the bomb or not, is to have a deterrent which would stop the bomb being dropped on Delhi, Jamshedpur, Bengal, Bihar—the whole of our northern industrial belt.

Now, can we make a bomb that can act as a deterrent? That is the real problem. I am quite prepared to examine it

with an open mind because I have no moral objection to making the bomb. My objections are practical and political.

First of all, can we afford the cost? I am not an expert but I shall mention two or three estimates that have been made. I think a little research on the part of the Indian Council of World Affairs and like bodies would be very helpful to us. An American expert, Christopher Humpshire Hearn estimates the cost of capital investment on a militarily significant nuclear programme at Rs. 25 crores plus an annual operating cost of Rs. 4 crores. The United States Atomic Energy Commission estimates that we can establish enough plutonium production to manufacture one crude bomb at a cost of Rs. 25 crores. The cost of a diffusion plant for separating Uranium 235 involves a capital cost of Rs. 500 crores plus running costs. The French Cabinet approved a defence budget early in November, a large slice of which is for nuclear weapons costing 16 million francs which is, I believe, Rs. 1,600 crores? per year plus an equal amount to produce an airforce of Mirage IV planes to drop the bomb—the delivery system. Therefore, the total cost of making the bomb and delivering the bomb would come to Rs. 3,200 crores per year. Now in terms of our planning and development, this would mean that three-fourths of the entire outlay of the Fourth Five Year Plan as proposed would have to be diverted to this particular purpose, leaving one-fourth of the plan intact. What the rate of growth would thus be, you can work out for yourselves.

The second thing is this. Are we logistically or psychologically placed to drop a bomb as a deterrent? Take logistics first. Our targets are 300 miles from the Tibetan bases. Even an old bomber, if it could get through our lines could drop it on Delhi or Lucknow, Patna or Jamshedpur, without any difficulty. If we have to drop a bomb, we have to go to Peking or Shanghai, which is 2,500 miles away. The Manchurian complex, corresponding to Jamshedpur and Rourkela, is even further away. So we would require an entire supersonic jet airforce to be able to drop the bomb or even to make our threat to drop the bomb, creditable.

Then, do we have the psychology of dropping the bomb? When our former Prime Minister visited Peking, Mao Tse-tung told him that he did not particularly mind a nuclear war, because even if a couple of hundred million Chinese were killed, there would be still 2-3 hundred million left to carry on. Now, can we compete with people like that? We can believe that they will drop a bomb. But will they believe that we will drop it first? After the way we behaved, after what happened in 1962, can we really expect to convince

Mao Tse-tung that we have the mental make-up to drop the bomb? Can we imagine Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri doing it? He is a good man. He is like us. I would not do it either. You probably would not. Can we imagine any successor to Lal Bahadur Shastri who would cheerfully drop the bomb and destroy millions of people, because we wanted to stop a bomb being dropped on us? To ask the question is to answer it. Therefore, all that you would do in making a bomb or trying to make one would be to ruin our economy and nothing else.

Would you really create a deterrent? A deterrent does not consist of one bomb against one bomb. A deterrent consists of crushing superiority, say 10 to 1 superiority. If we had 10 to 1 superiority, then Mao Tse-tung might take us seriously. But what would that 10 to 1 superiority cost us? It would mean the destruction of our entire economy, agriculture and industry. It would mean seething discontent among our people who would be suffering miseries. And who would be the biggest beneficiary of the discontent? The Fifth Column of Peking and Moscow in India. So, we would have played Peking's game to perfection. We would have done just what they want us to do, to enter into an armaments race which ruins our economy. I think it was Chen Yi who said: 'Peking must have the bomb, whether we wear pants or not.' Can we expect our parliamentary democracy to tell our people that we must have the bomb whether we wear dhoties or not? Would our people put up with such nonsense? Therefore, I am afraid, if a deterrent is what we want, we would have to rule out our making own bomb as a practical proposition. I am not making any moral case. I am just saying on practical economic and political grounds that it is not possible for India to create a nuclear deterrent for itself.

That brings us to the third alternative of interdependence. We talk of One World. Our statesmen make speeches about World Government. The fact is that we are moving towards one world, a shrinking world, but while we talk of one world, our attitudes are those of national sovereignty and out-dated chauvinism. Today, the fact is that there are only two nuclear Powers who have the capacity to protect us if we want to be protected, who could deter Communist China from dropping a bomb on us, and these are the United States and the Soviet Union. Speaking in Parliament on 23 November, I had, therefore, said: 'Let us certainly invite both of them to enter into an agreement with us, separately or jointly, to guarantee to protect us from

nuclear attack, in case such an attack is made against us. Let us do so if we like, not by ourselves, but with other free countries, the freedom loving countries of Asia, like Iran, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Japan and tell these Governments, meaning the United States and the USSR: we want you to let the world know that if any one threatens to drop a bomb on one of these countries, you will see to it that it is prevented from doing so by the first strike. If both of them agree, let us welcome it. I think it would be right to ask both these Powers to give this assurance. But if one of them turns it down, and the other gives it, we should go ahead and accept that protection. There is no reason why we should give a veto to either of these Powers in regard to the protection of our people and their lives. I do not see any reason, in the few weeks that have since passed, to move from that position. It is possible that the Soviet Union will turn down our request. It is perhaps likely. As I have said, I think it would be foolish to expect Moscow to give any such assurance or to provide protection when Peking is involved. In fact, the American nuclear deterrent is partly operative even today. I think if the nuclear deterrent had not been there, Stalin would have overrun the whole of Europe and Mao Tse-tung would have overrun the whole of Asia long before today.

Therefore, we must face the fact that to day we are not moving in an era of national sovereignties. We are living in a world that is becoming increasingly interdependent. President Kennedy had said that America could not defend herself without allies. The British Prime Minister had said the same. If Britain and America cannot defend themselves alone, much less can India. The British Labour Government, for instance, as you know, proposes to surrender the Conservative's independent nuclear deterrent, which they describe as a myth and has turned to the United States for a joint multi-lateral defence agreement. Does this mean that Mr. Harold Wilson is going to surrender the independence and sovereignty of Britain there? I ask that because our Prime Minister speaking at Kanpur at the AICC meeting said, in referring to this idea, we must maintain our independence and sovereignty. So I must ask: does it mean that Mr. Harold Wilson does not want to protect the sovereignty and independence of Britain from America? The new Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato, on 11th November, said that (i) Japan would not make the bomb and (ii) that Japan would accept United States nuclear polaris submarines in Japanese ports under the Japanese-United States Internal

Security Treaty. Does this mean that Mr. Sato proposes to surrender Japanese sovereignty and independence to the United States?

Two other objections have been raised to this formula of interdependence. Some people say: but we already have the deterrent. So why ask for it? Have we not got the nuclear umbrella from America? And they quote President Johnson's statement of 18 October 1964. Let us see what President Johnson said. He said on 18 October: 'Nations that do not seek nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need United States support against the threat of nuclear blackmail, they will have it'. Now, mark the words carefully: it says 'if they need it'. It is a conditional offer. It is an invitation to those who want to be protected to say so. That is, we are free to ask for the American deterrent if we so desire. It is not enough to leave it in the air and pretend that it exists. An offer has to be accepted before there can be an understanding or a contract. It is not enough if after we are attacked, we shout and ask for retaliation. That is not the idea. The idea is to be protected from blackmail, that is, the nuclear protection is to act as a deterrent and not as retaliation. So, if we want the United States to provide a deterrent, we have to say so. It is very important that those who are to drop the bomb on us should be convinced, and not only we and the Americans. There are some Machiavellian persons who say: Why don't we go to the Americans and privately make a little deal and go on talking about non-alignment all the time? That will be very clever. But would it? If we do not publicly get the Americans to say that India is covered by their umbrella, what effect will it have on Mao Tse-tung? After all he has got to be convinced and not we and President Lyndon Johnson. We know that he is a good chap. He knows we are nice people. That does not help. It is the man with the finger on the trigger who has to know that if he dares to pull the trigger, he will be bombed first. And that can only be done by a public guarantee given by the United States or whoever wants to give it, saying: Take note that such and such countries are immune from attack, because we shall attack first.

Hence, I am driven to the conclusion that an openly arrived at security arrangement is the only deterrent that can save us. The idea of a deterrent is essentially that it must be unconditional and automatic. A deterrent is no deterrent if conditions or strings are attached to it. The aggressor has to know that it is going to operate automatically.

There is another objection. Would such an agreement not be contrary to non-alignment? Personally, I have never accepted non-alignment the way it was practised, although I had no objection to it in principle. But let us for the moment assume for the sake of the argument that we do not want to discard non-alignment, properly so-called.

What is non-alignment? Alignment, when first invented, meant that in the war between the power blocs, the fight between the power blocs—the United States and its friends on one side and the Soviet Union and its satellites on the other—India would not automatically take the side of one bloc. It would take an independent position on merit. In that form, I had myself supported that policy when it was enunciated, but I gave up supporting it when I saw the way it was practised.

Now, how does an acceptance of protection from somebody cut across the policy of non-alignment? Can it have any meaning or relevance when we are attacked; as we have been and may be again. If non-alignment meant that we must not accept assistance in our own defence, then I am afraid the man who betrayed non-alignment was Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, because he shouted for assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom and other democracies and took it with both hands to stop the Chinese attacking our country. All honour to him because he did the right thing from the point of view of non-alignment and the national interest. But if today it is claimed that Pandit Nehru's non-alignment means that India must be destroyed because we cannot take help from one side without the other coming in, then, of course, he was the man who betrayed non-alignment first in October-November 1962. I am on Pandit Nehru's side in this context. He did the right thing because he did not see any conflict between his basic policies and the need of the nation for defence.

Now, if it was right for him to ask for conventional weapons to defend us, is it wrong to ask for nuclear weapons? Are conventional weapons more non-aligned than nuclear weapons? Is that the argument? Or is it to be argued that non-alignment only means that you must shout for help after you have been attacked and not before? Does it mean that prevention is not better than cure any more but cure is better than prevention, that all the wisdom of the ages has to be discarded in the interests of non-alignment? Must we wait till Delhi is destroyed, before we say: Now we can ask for help. Is that what non-alignment means? I am sure you realise that this is quite illogical.

If non-alignment means that we may accept assistance to defend ourselves, then this is the time to ask for the deterrent and to get it publicly known. Of course, if non-alignment is of the kind that was preached in Cairo a few weeks ago, then it is another matter. As you know, the non-alignment gentlemen there, who shouted protests against the American bomb and the French bomb were significantly silent when it came to the Chinese bomb and, speaking in Calcutta on 15 December, the representative in India of the League of Arab States explained that the Arab States were not willing at the present moment to take a firm stand on the Chinese nuclear explosion, as it did not directly affect them. If this is the kind of non-alignment we have in mind, obviously what I have said has no relevance. But if it is honest non-alignment, as it was originally intended, then I see no conflict between taking the American umbrella and being non-aligned.

Now, since the matter was debated in Parliament, we have moved a little forward. After I spoke, the Prime Minister replied. He was good enough to say in his speech that he agreed with that part of my speech which was concerned with opposing the making of an Indian bomb, but he did not refer to the other part of interdependence. However, on 4 December, at a press conference in London, he expressed the view that what he considered to be one of the most important problems in the world was how big nuclear Powers could guarantee non-nuclear Powers against attack by atomic weapons. On 7 December the press quoted him again as saying in London:

Mr. Shastri believes that if the big nuclear Powers can concert measures to ensure freedom from nuclear attack on non-nuclear countries—he did not wish to use the word guarantee or umbrella—then the task of non-dissemination or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will become easier.

On the 7 December, again, the press reported from London: His plea was particularly directed towards the United States and the Soviet Union, the major nuclear Powers.

On 9 December, when he came back to India, the Prime Minister confirmed:

that he wanted India and other non-nuclear nations to have a guaranteed immunity against nuclear attack by China. He named the United States and Soviet Union as the two great nuclear Powers.

Now, if that is so, then I for one fail to understand the difference between what I stated in Parliament and what our Prime

Minister stated in London and on his return continued in Parliament. What is the difference? It is said that we must not call it an umbrella. Well, don't call it an umbrella. Call it a parasol, call it a sunshade, call it a *chhattri*, call it a shield, call it a blanket, call it a *tumboo*, an awning, a portico—whatever you like to call it. So long that it is something that protects us from something that drops on us, I do not mind what it is called. After all, a rose by any name smells as sweet. I particularly enjoyed Mr. Puri's cartoon in the *Hindustan Times*, if you remember it, where a gentleman with an umbrella in a rain storm tells another man who is getting wet: 'Would you like to share my shield?'

Mr. Nanporia, whose political line is well-known, writing on 14 December, said challengingly: 'Does this mean that even without Soviet participation, an nuclear umbrella exclusively sponsored by the Western Powers will be acceptable to New Delhi? This, in fact, is the logic of what has been said so far, and Mr. Minoo Masani very successfully discerned this when he proposed most unambiguously a western nuclear umbrella. Can it be that New Delhi is hinting at something which Mr. Masani said without evasion?'

Now, I think Mr. Nanporia is a clear thinker, he is a good analyst. He is right. It seems to be only a semantic difference. Of course, Mr. Nanporia would not like us to have that umbrella. He evidently wants to give the Soviet Union a veto. Just as the Soviet Union has a Great Power veto in the Security Council, Mr. Nanporia, following his line of thought, wants to give the Soviet Union a veto on our foreign policy. He wants to give the Soviet Union a veto on our security. He wants to give the Soviet Union a veto on our very survival. And this really is the issue. Is the guarantee good enough only if Soviet Russia joins in it? The Soviet Union for reasons of its own comradeship-in-communism with China, says 'no', then are we to do without the protection and expose our people in the whole of northern India, to utter annihilation and destruction? I am sure it would be agreed that we cannot tolerate a Soviet veto when our very existence is at stake. That is not what non-alignment means. Did Mr. Nehru give Mr. Khrushchev a Soviet veto in October-November 1962? We know that Mr. Khrushchev was neutral. We know that he advised us to make friends with the Chinese peacefully. Did that stop us from accepting British, American and other assistance? The answer is 'no'. Mr. Nehru never thought that, unless the Soviet Union also helps us, we cannot take Western arms.

So Mr. Nanporia's thesis that you cannot be non-aligned unless both Powers help us at the same time is a distortion of what non-alignment really means. It seems, therefore, that the ghost of non-alignment is brought up to frighten our Government from doing the patriotic and the right thing. It is time, I feel, that the dead hand of the past is discarded, that we live in today for the people of today and to morrow, and we do not let the past dominate us as we in this country are often accused of allowing it to dominate our entire make-up and our future.