

(704)

LOK SABHA

SYNOPSIS OF DEBATES

(Proceedings other than Questions & Answers)

Thursday, November 26, 1959/Agrahayana 5, 1881 (Saka)

MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT

IMPENDING TRANSFER OF FIVE ASSAM VILLAGES TO PAKISTAN

Mr. Speaker informed the House that he had received notice of an adjournment motion regarding the Indo-Pak border demarcation and the proposed handing over of five Assam villages to Pakistan on the 27th November, 1959.

Shri S. M. Banerjee: According to a telegram received by him, the five villages of Dumharai, Latitila, Karkhana Patni, Barapatni and Chutapathi with a population of 2,000 which were proposed to be handed over to Pakistan were not included in the agreement reached with that country and that the handing over was being done without informing anybody. The question was whether any approval had been sought from the West Bengal or Assam Assemblies.

The Minister of Home Affairs (Shri G. B. Pant): The proposed handing over was in pursuance of an agreement reached with Pakistan for the settlement of disputes on the eastern border. Whatever was being done was in pursuance of the agreement laid on the Table of the House on the 16th November, 1959.

Mr. Speaker: The matter was a serious one and, whether the villages formed part of the agreement or not, the approval of the State Assemblies and the Parliament had to be sought.

Shri Tyagi: The matter was serious enough for an adjournment motion being admitted. Government might collect information and then the House might discuss the situation.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Agreement reached with Pakistan included the question of Patharia forests which were not normally inhabited. He knew nothing about those villages. Information would, however, be obtained from the Assam Government by tomorrow and placed before the House.

The adjournment motion was held over till the following day

STATEMENT BY MINISTER

LOCATION OF SECOND SHIPYARD

The Minister of Transport and Communications (Dr. P. Subbarayan): The Inter-Departmental Committee appointed to examine the report of the U.K. Shipyard Mission who had recommended that a new shipyard be located at Ernakulam at Cochin, had come to the conclusion that the shipyard should be located at the site recommended by the Mission.

The Government had decided to accept the recommendation of the Committee.

MOTION

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS—Contd.

Seth Govind Das: For the first time, after Independence, a dangerous situation had arisen and people should co-operate with the Government to meet the emergency.

Support extended to Government's policy by parties other than Communists was due to patriotic sentiments but the latter had supported it because they were faithful to China. They were in favour of non-alignment because the other party in the present dispute happened to be a Communist State.

The question was whether or not the Communists considered China as the aggressor. History showed that whereas in India people were generally patriotic, the land had unfortunately bred some traitors also; King Ambi, Jaichand and Mir Jafar were some of the cases in point. He was afraid that the Communists might play a similar role.

Prime Minister's determination to curb anti-national elements was welcome but steps should be taken in time.

The suggestion that foreign aid should be sought in spite of our policy of non-alignment was worth considering.

The U.N.O. should be prepared to help India even if she did not ask for it, as she was in danger from a country who was not a member of that Organisation.

It was true that two wrongs did not make one right, the right might become wrong in certain circumstances. The letting off of Mohammed Ghauri was an example. Over-confidence was harmful as it might lead to some blunder.

Shri Asoka Mehta: He was disappointed with the Prime Minister's speech because instead of addressing himself to the millions of his countrymen who were with him in the matter of foreign policy, he had bothered about the few who had at any time challenged the basic formulation of his foreign policy.

It would be foolish to throw away the policy of non-alignment at the present juncture when countries from both power blocks were supporting India.

China should be isolated and countries of South East Asia assured that their rights would be protected. The policy towards China should be changed in order to help her to overcome her instinctive expansionism, which was further aggravated by the fact that the country was ruled by Communists who had mobilised the energies of the people for building up an industrial and military power.

The Defence Minister had said that though our frontiers had been violated, there had been no military invasion. He had also asked if there was any country in the world whose frontiers had not been violated. It appeared that he was making it out to be a routine matter which it was not.

The Prime Minister should rally the whole nation behind him when the integrity of the country had been challenged. There should be an urgency in our approach to the problem and any hesitation in the matter was anti-national and detrimental to our independence.

It was true that arrangements had been made to check further penetration on our borders but every effort should be made to get the occupied area vacated.

The Prime Minister had talked about increasing our industrial potential. In view of the fact that the Chinese industrial potential had been increasing at the rate of 20 per cent a year, greater effort was necessary to rally the people to meet the challenge posed to our manhood.

There was no point in withdrawing our forces from Ladakh as there was no guarantee that the Chinese would not move into the vacuum thus created. In case the Chinese accepted our interim proposals, we must be sure that the traditional borders of India were maintained, barring minor adjustments by negotiation.

The country should beware of Communists as the real danger was from them.

Shri Frank Anthony: The situation was grave and transcended the security of India, having in it the potentiality of a world conflagration. But there was basic unity in the country. Nobody questioned the policy of peaceful approach.

It was only in September this year that the Chinese Prime Minister had claimed certain Indian territories but the border incidents should not generate any war psychosis.

The Prime Minister had said that no violation of Indian territory would be tolerated and on that there was a basic unity of approach. The Chinese had torn the agreement on Tibet to shreds and maltreated Indian policemen captured by them in Ladakh.

The possibility of aid from friendly countries in time of crisis could not be ruled out.

Indian people would not tolerate any appeasement of China as appeasement only whetted the appetite of the expansionist powers.

There appeared to be carefully calculated plan of expansionism by China in concert with Indian Communists, with India as the prize. Communists did not call China an aggressor and thus wanted to induce a false sense of security.

They had designs on Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal and their plan seemed to be three-pronged: (i) creating unrest and insurrection in Bhutan, (ii) creating trouble with the Nagas and (iii) subversion of the border areas. It was that threat which the Government should be aware of and deal with effectively.

Shrimati Subhadra Joshi: Though Acharya Kripalani and Mr. Masani did not disagree with the policy of non-alignment, they would like to have their own interpretation for that expression.

The Defence Minister alone was not responsible for the defence or foreign policies; the responsibility lay with the entire Cabinet. The Prime Minister wanted to find a peaceful solution to every problem including the present one and the whole country was with him.

Dr. Ram Subhag Singh: The situation had deteriorated since the previous debate on the subject held in September last.

It was wrong to say that it was not possible to have check posts all along our border with Tibet. A sum of Rs. 25 crores only would suffice for establishing and maintaining the check posts with lines of communication with the rear.

The policy of non-alignment could not be given up; nor could we ask for military help from foreign countries. Some persons talked of avoiding a war psychosis, but they were guilty of creating a surrender psychosis in the country which had to be avoided.

The Prime Minister should call upon the Chinese to vacate all the areas under their occupation.

Ordnance factories should be geared up to meet our requirements and efforts should be made to develop NEFA, Ladakh, Spiti and other Himalayan areas and to build up our lines of communications.

Shri Manaen: The concept of friendship between India and China had been exploded by the Chinese incursions.

Kalimpong was full of spies and propagandists, some of whom worked for the Chinese. The spies should be ousted from there, but every foreigner should not be supposed to be a spy.

Tibetan refugees should be properly screened so that spies and agents provocateurs did not infiltrate. Heavy concentrations of refugees should also not be allowed in the border areas.

India's trade agencies in Tibet and Chinese trade agencies in Kalimpong and Calcutta should be closed down.

There should be a definite policy regarding Bhutan; it should be helped to develop and means of communication should be speedily improved. A few contingents of the Indian Army might be stationed there; if necessary, a Military Mission might also be sent there.

Shri Dinesh Singh: The problem under discussion was not the problem of a border violation but a much deeper problem of conflict of ideology, which would not be resolved so easily.

The border problem had not arisen suddenly. It had not arisen just because the Chinese were enraged over the asylum given to the Dalai Lama or to the Tibetan refugees. The trouble had started much earlier. There could be no doubt that in the minds of the Chinese there had been a definite feeling of expansionism.

The Chinese were trying to consolidate their position. They would later turn their attention to other Himalayan States and, in fact, to the whole of South and South East Asia. India should meet that challenge.

The House should realise the difficulties that the Government had to face in defending India's borders. Since Independence, the Government had built from scrap the present vast machinery for defending the 2,600-mile long border in the north. Besides, there were the other borders also. The geographical situation should also be taken into consideration. But because of that there should be no reason for panic or for a feeling that the Chinese would come and occupy India. Indians were strong enough to defend the borders in the event of an invasion. The Government had handed over the border areas to the armed forces, who were competent enough to defend it.

India's foreign policy had won universal acclaim. One could not agree with those who wanted that policy to be abandoned.

Shri Siva Raj: The Republican party had no intention of making political capital out of the national crisis. They would assist the Government in any step to resolve the border problem.

During the past, India had been subjected to the largest number of foreign invasions, as a result of which the people in the border areas had developed a fear of invasion. In view of that, it was natural for them to feel indignant at the handling of the present border issue by the Government. Hence, amendments to the motion.

India's policy of non-alignment and *Panchsheel* had been accepted by the world at large. But China had given it a go-by. The fact that India believed in *Panchsheel* did not mean that she should not get prepared for any contingency. It was the duty of the Government to see that it afforded adequate protection against external aggression. Besides developing the industrial potential and strengthening the armed forces of the country and providing them with necessary equipment, the Government should also keep up the morale of the people, which was of the utmost importance in a national crisis.

Shri Mahanty: The Ganatantra Parishad stood solidly behind the policy of non-alignment enunciated by the Prime Minister. No political capital was sought to be made out of the present national danger. Their amendment to the motion was meant to bring to the

notice of the Government certain inconsistencies between the principles enunciated in the White Paper and the action of the External Affairs Ministry which had followed subsequently.

The Government had, in one of their notes, told the Chinese that they were prepared to vacate Tamadem if it was on the north of the MacMahon line provided the Chinese also withdraw from Longju and Khinzemane. But, despite the fact that the Chinese were sticking to the two outposts, India had withdrawn from Tamadem.

Barahoti was an Indian territory. In a map it looked insignificant but it was of strategic importance, because many important passes converged there, which led from India to Tibet. The Government should not have withdrawn their civil personnel from there.

The Government had, in the name of India-China friendship and under the facade of non-alignment and *Panchsheel*, been all along appeasing the aggressor.

The Government should not have given an undertaking to the Chinese that they would not re-occupy Longju, in case the latter vacated the outpost. Longju was Indian territory.

In the case of Ladakh, the Government had accepted the Chinese frontier as it had been drawn on the Chinese maps, although India had earlier told the Chinese that there could be no negotiation with them, so long as they insisted on the maps that they had drawn and on the basis of which they had committed aggression.

He realised that war would serve no purpose, if India could settle the matter peacefully.

The latest proposals of the Prime Minister to the Chinese Premier envisaged the creation of a neutralised area, at particular points about 100 miles deep. The Government should state what machinery they had got to supervise the neutrality of that area.

Shri Karni Singhji: The Government should give a definite assurance that the Chinese would be pushed out of the Indian territory and that, in future, no important information would be kept secret from the Parliament.

The Government should arrange for aerial reconnaissance of India's borders.

The Chinese had, in the past, misinterpreted India's hand of friendship as her weakness. The Chinese were a ruthless and expansionist people. The only language they understood was that of strength. Everyone in the country should be up and defend the borders gallantly.

The Government, on their part, should look out for friends who thought like us and who were prepared to help us in case of emergency, with men and material, provided no strings were attached.

The Government should have more schools for imparting training to the defence personnel necessary for fighting in difficult terrain. The Government should also have helicopters to be used in such difficult areas.

The Government had, in their latest proposals to the Chinese Government, agreed to create a no-man's land on Indian territory. That would mean that if the proposals were accepted by China, India would have already surrendered her own territory. On the contrary, the Chinese should have been asked to withdraw from the Indian territory.

The Minister of Defence (Shri Krishna Menon): The policy of the Government was not to deploy troops on the international frontiers. So far as China was concerned there had been check-posts, which were of a defensive or a military character. Their main purpose was to guard the trade routes.

When the present border problem arose the Government ordered the taking over of the entire northern border by the Army. But that taking over did not mean deployment of all the bodies. It meant simply overall directions. Necessary adjustments in regard to the border defences were being made by the Government.

It was not the policy of the Government either to surrender territory or to take action which in the short run or in the long run it could not continue. The Government could not lock up too many troops in places where they might be wasteful nor could they take risks; a balance had to be struck.

The Government's China policy at the United Nations was governed by world considerations. China could not be called to answer for her actions before the world body unless she was represented thereon. The Government had not in any way felt intimidated by the Chinese; they would maintain the sovereignty and integrity of India's territory. The morale of our forces had never been higher than what it was at present.

Dr. M. S. Aney: The Chinese profession of *Panchsheel* was merely a lip service to that ideal, for they had definitely and deliberately violated our territory.

Apart from the solicitude we had been showing for the feelings and susceptibilities of the Chinese, another mistake that we had made during the past few years was our inability to take proper steps for the defence of our frontiers. The unprotected border of India meant a danger not only to India, but also to Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

The reduction of Rs. 25 crores in our military budget was an indication of the fact that our Defence Ministry was not sufficiently vigilant.

We must not forget one important point. What would be the effect of our conduct in withdrawing our forces from the disputed area on the people of Jammu and Kashmir?

Shri J. B.S. Bist: The proposals made by our Prime Minister to Premier Chou En-Lai were practical and realistic. While the initiative now rested with China, the Government should carefully think of reorientating our border policy. While the Chinese had, on their side of the border, constructed roads and made other preparations, our areas on the border were still inaccessible. Construction of roads

in our border areas should be entrusted to the military. The civilian district officers in the NEFA and Naga areas should develop direct contact with the people.

With the establishment of the Communist rule in Tibet, unless the economic development of the border people was promoted, the Chinese agents would find good ground for sowing seeds of disaffection.

Garbyang, the last village towards the Lipulake pass, was a flat piece of land which was fit for an airfield. Let the military authorities examine the matter and see whether it could be put to any use.

Shri A. M. Tariq: The policy pursued by our Prime Minister was the only policy that could be in the interest of the country. Some interested parties had raised the cry of war against China for meeting their political ends. It was easy to talk of war but difficult to imagine its consequences. The need of the hour was to rally round the Prime Minister as one man.

Any acceptance of military aid by our country would be an invitation to foreign powers to destroy our hard won freedom.

Shri P. C. Borooah: Of the 9,000 miles of frontier that India had to maintain, nearly one-third lay in Assam. Assam's entire boundary was a frontier except for a small stretch of land, measuring about 40 miles, through which she was keeping connection with the rest of India. As such, Assam's importance from the defence point of view needed no emphasis.

The Government should split up the question of border defence into two parts: firstly, the immediate steps that were required to be taken for meeting the challenge of the Chinese aggression and, secondly, the long-term arrangements that should be made for the protection of our borders as a whole.

Too much repetition of the principles of **Panchsheel** might be misconstrued by others as weakness.

Mr. Mao-Tse-Tung, in one of his communications in 1948 to Shri Randive, the then Secretary of the Communist Party of India, wrote that the Chinese liberation forces were always ready to liberate the people of India. We had now seen what was going on in our border area.

Shri Braj Raj Singh: Our Government was responsible for the falling of Tibet into the hands of China, which had brought the Chinese to our borders. Even then there was no change in our policy of appeasement. It was that policy which was responsible for the danger we were now faced with on our borders.

It was evident from the correspondence that whereas China had stated some specific and basic things, our replies had generally been vague about our own boundaries. In our own country, the Government had placed the problem before the people in a perverted form by describing the border dispute as a petty affair. Important information had been withheld even from the Parliament. A weak policy had been pursued and the nation had not been taken into confidence. We wanted peace, but not the peace of the grave.

When we were prepared to demilitarise and open talks about 9000 square miles of our own land, the question of some places in Tibet such as Mansarovar and Kailash should also be opened. From every point of view those places should belong to India.

Shri Vajpayee: The Prime Minister should have waited for two more days in sending his reply to Premier Chou En-lai. The Lok Sabha was to meet then and he should have heard the views of the Members on the Chinese Prime Minister's proposal. If that had been done, the reply would, perhaps, have been different.

It had been emphatically stated by the Prime Minister himself that the territory claimed by the Chinese belonged to us historically, geographically, culturally and traditionally. He had said that there could only be minor adjustments. But the counter-proposals sent to China involving 9000 miles of our territory, where even our own men could not enter, was a complete reversal of that stand.

In his letter, our Prime Minister had shown readiness to consider the use of Aksai Chin-Sinkiang road for civilian purposes. But who would decide what use it was being put to? If the Chinese used it for military purposes, what would we do? Also, in many cases it was difficult to distinguish between the civil and military use.

The language in which the note of the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi to our Foreign Secretary was couched, unambiguously indicated that China cared for India's friendship only so long as she was busy on another front. Being not busy there for the present, she had turned on this front. We had depended more on the friendship of China than on our own strength.

The country's defence should be in the hands of a person completely free from any bias and ambition. There was a strong feeling in the country that a clique was being formed in the Army.

We did not know what would be the attitude of our Government if the proposals made by our Prime Minister to China were rejected.

Shri H. N. Mukerjee: The policy of non-alignment and co-existence which in the name of *Panchsheel* was redolent of India's history had won the plaudits of the world. It was necessary on an occasion like the present one to reiterate it in this House.

The man-hunt against our Defence Minister was deplorable.

The proposals made by our Prime Minister in his latest letter to Premier Chou En-lai laid down an approach that was reasonable and honourable and aimed, above all, at the avoidance of war and the kind of psychosis which was being readily exploited by certain elements in the country.

The report about anti-Indian slogans having been raised in a Communist-sponsored meeting in Calcutta was completely baseless.

The cheap gibes thrown at the Communists were vulgar and unworthy. They had worked for the country and were impelled by patriotic motives.

Shri Ansar Harvani: There were three alternatives in the difficult situation being faced today: (i) surrender, (ii) war and (iii) negotiation.

The Prime Minister, staunch fighter for freedom that he was, could not agree to surrender, and in this the entire country was behind him. No country would willingly engage in war and the only alternative left was to have negotiations, which was the right course.

Shri Brij Narayan "Brijesh": Strength was the main element in politics but because the Prime Minister had been following a gentle policy, it had been misunderstood by the Chinese for weakness.

India's traditional policy had been one of universal brotherhood; she never had any designs on any nation.

Full consciousness of the present situation was not present in the country, though everybody and every party supported the Prime Minister where the integrity of the country was concerned.

India would not beg for help from either the U.S.A. or Russia. We should strengthen ourselves, fight for our rights and maintain our self-respect.

The main task before the Government was to avoid demoralisation in the country. Dissent in the ruling party was also a danger to be avoided. The problem should be dealt with on a non-party basis.

Raja Mahendra Pratap: The Prime Minister should have accepted his proposal for talks with the Chinese Premier.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: War with China would have serious consequences as it might invite intervention by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. peaceful settlement of the dispute was inevitable.

If negotiations with China failed, the dispute should be referred to Russia for arbitration.

Debate not concluded.

M. N. KAUL,
Secretary.

LOK SABHA

SUPPLEMENT TO THE SYNOPSIS OF DEBATES

(Proceedings other than Questions & Answers)

Wednesday, November 25, 1959/Agrahayana 4, 1881 (Saka)

MOTION

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS—*contd.*

Shri A. C. Guha (contd.): We should take steps to see that any national of India, whether he was kidnapped from India or was residing in Tibet, was not subjected to humiliating interrogation and third-degree methods under Chinese detention.

Free entry should not be allowed in Kalimpong, to all categories of foreigners even for 7 days, as had been done under the recent Government notification. Certain nationals of certain countries should be debarred completely.

There was a wellknown observation by Lenin that the road from Moscow to London would lie via Peking and Calcutta. They had got Peking and now they were trying to get Calcutta. There was a surreptitious move to create a North Korea in West Bengal. Government should not be too complacent about such a move.

It had been said that China became aggressive and angry at us because of our giving asylum to Dalai Lama. But, in fact, the Chinese aggression started long before that. As for Dalai Lama, the giving of political asylum was just an obligation of a civilised nation. Under Article 14 of the Charter of Human Rights laid down by the United Nations everyone has the right to seek asylum in any other country.

Shri D. S. Raju: We must make every effort to resolve our differences with China peacefully. There was still a chance and a possibility. At the same time, we must be prepared for any eventuality. Every effort should be made to strengthen our defence and to keep up the morale of our people.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: The present conflict with China was something more than merely an ordinary border dispute. It was a stab in the back by China under the garb of friendship, which must be strongly condemned. Panchsheel had been used by them as a camouflage for military expansion inside our borders.

China had designs on Pakistan also. However, she dared not attack Pakistan as she feared that Pakistan would hit back and would be supported by the U.S.A.

The Chinese had not only built a highway in our territory in Ladakh but, what was more dangerous, branch routes had been built. It was an indication of their military preparations for aggression on our territory in future.

We had shown requisite firmness over Tibet in our letters of 1950. But our tone changed in 1951 when we adopted a weaker policy and Tibet was thus liquidated. While we had taken the stand that Tibet was not China and that she should remain an autonomous State, every clause of the 1954 agreement described Tibet as the territory of China. Tibet was liquidated with our connivance.

The defence of our borders should not be ignored merely in the interest of accelerating our defence production.

Our military intelligence should cooperate with the civilian intelligence in order to locate the people trespassing into our territory.

Our defence forces did not have the required type of equipment and weapons for defence at high altitude and in snowbound terrain.

There should be a thorough screening of the purchase of our military supplies so that unnecessary items might not be purchased as happened in 1948 when we were at war with Pakistan.

Shri Khadilkar: It was not a question of so much importance whether some of our territory had been occupied by the Chinese; the basic issue was that here was a neighbour who never kept the plighted word. Throughout history, they had been claiming other people's territory. They had not changed even under the Communist rule.

When a healthy atmosphere of peace was coming up in the world, nothing should be done by anybody to spoil it. The policy that China had adopted would lead to a breach of peace. It was regrettable that except for the statement of Mr. Khrushchov, no other socialist country in the world had the courage to condemn the Chinese aggression on our borders. Even the Communist Party of India had, in their Meerut Resolution, put up some kind of defence in respect of the Chinese aggression.

The non-alignment policy that we had adopted was the only practical policy in the interests of the country's development. It would prepare us for better defence on our own strength. We could not just think in terms of deployment of troops; we would have to think in terms of creating a mighty industrial base that would sustain the army. Without such a base, any talk of war was meaningless.

It was very difficult for two big nations, like India and China, to live in peace without a small territory like Tibet having autonomy. That fact was fully recognised by the British rulers in India and in the Simla Conference they entered into a convention to that effect.

In 1895 there was a general agreement between the Britishers, the Russians, the Chinese and the Afghans. It laid down certain rules of guidance for determining the boundaries. When the demarcation of boundaries between Afghanistan and Russia was undertaken, that rule was followed. That should be a precedent for the settlement of our northern borders. If it was followed, the Northern range of the Himalayas would be our border and not the southern part of it.

Shrimati Renuka Ray: It would not have brought any credit to the country or the Government if we had suddenly changed our accepted policy of non-alignment because, for the moment, it had become difficult for us to pursue it.

The recent proposals made to the Chinese Government provided a way for the peaceful settlement of the dispute—the only way to avoid war.

Particular stress must be laid on the development of our defence industry.

We must be on guard against the fifth column activities carried on by a certain party in the country. Its recent demonstration in Calcutta was a sufficient testimony as to its loyalties.

Shri Joachim A'va: The Prime Minister's letter to the Chinese Prime Minister was a sincerely worded letter and it would depend upon the statemanship of Chou-en-Lai to reply in similar terms. It was possible that he might make alternative proposals. Such proposals and counter proposals should be continued till a settlement of the dispute was arrived at.

The Chinese leaders could not have had any direct hand in or knowledge of the Ladakh incident in view of the difficult terrain. But once having come to know of the incident, it would have been graceful on their part to have acknowledged that they had made a mistake and then to have released our prisoners. Instead of doing that, they had charged India with having committed aggression.

If India now sent her troops into the area in dispute, it might lead to war. We were strong and ready. The defence forces of India were in good form. They were watching the frontiers. But India should conserve her energy. She should keep calm and carry on with her efforts for a negotiated settlement. The people must stand behind the Prime Minister in the present national crisis.

Dr. Krishnaswamy: It would be an error to consider what was happening at the Sino-Indian border as a border dispute between two nations, for the area involved was too large. Even more important was the fact that the whole course and pattern of recent development had tended to underline the need for a reappraisal of our political attitudes towards China. The nature of the reappraisal would depend upon the manner in which the question of the MacMahon line was settled and the arrangements regarding the security of our borders made.

It was not known how was it to be ensured that there would in reality remain a noman's land if our proposals were accepted.

There was serious objection to permitting it to be a no man's land for any length of time. If the proposals were not accepted, it would become necessary to use force to eject the aggressors.

While the non-alignment policy was the most desirable policy for us, a more rational approach was called for. A policy of non-alignment should not prevent our taking appropriate action. It should be our aim, in the present circumstances, to evolve a workable arrangement with other powers without sacrificing our principles or giving up our stand on international issues.

The settlement of our problem with Pakistan should be hurried through as quickly as possible. It would, firstly, enable us to divert more resources for our defence arrangements and, secondly, give a sensation of our strength to the outside world, particularly to those who were aggressing against our country.

Even if the border issue was settled, China could no longer be accepted as a good neighbour. One lesson for the future was that we would have to devote much greater attention, diplomatically, politically and economically, to our areas which bordered on China.

Debate not concluded.

M. N. KAUL,
Secretary.