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LOK SABHA

SYNOPSIS OF DEBATES

(Proceedings other than Questions & Answers)

Wednesday, November 25, 1959/Agrahayana 4, 1881 (Saka)

CALLING ATTENTION TO MATTER OF URGENT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

LAWLESSNESS AND INSECURITY IN DELHI

Shri L. Achaw Singh called the attention of the Minister of Home Affairs to the growing state of lawlessness and insecurity in Delhi as a result of violent activities of the anti-social elements.

The Minister of Home Affairs (Shri G. B. Pant): There was no feeling of insecurity in Delhi and although the population of the city was on the increase, crime was declining. Except for murders which had shown some increase, there was marked decrease in serious crime.

Three Flying Squads, Missing Persons Squad, Explosives Squad, Narcotics Squad, Anti-Smuggling Squad and Anti-Cheating Squad had been organised.

Energetic action had been taken to curb the activities of anti-social elements and the campaign against bad characters had been intensified.

GOVERNMENT BILL

DELHI LAND HOLDINGS (CEILING) BILL

Introduced

MOTION

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru) moving that White Paper II on India-China relations be taken into consideration said: A great responsibility rested upon Government which could only be discharged if the House shouldered that responsibility in a large measure. It was intended to keep the House informed and to take counsel with Members about the policy that should be adopted.

The House had to deal with the proposals made by the Chinese Prime Minister and the reply sent to him containing alternative

proposals but the approach to them should be conditioned and controlled by our basic policies and objectives, which should not be lost sight of.

The Government had functioned in the past under the direction of Parliament. Our basic policies were being put to the test of experience and danger and it was not right merely to take them for granted; they should be examined and accepted or rejected.

Though there was no immediate danger of any magnitude, the problem was of much wider significance and transcended all party issues. It was the issue of war peace in the world. The House should shoulder the responsibility of deciding as to what the Government should do in the circumstances.

Some sources condemned the policy of non-alignment and of Panchsheel. We had been following that policy even before the word Panchsheel came into use and that was colouring and conditioning the activities of great nations. An effort was being made to avoid cold war which ultimately led to hot war.

The world was moving away from the brink of war and it was strange that India which stood for peace was faced by the possibility even of war.

It was distorted thinking to imagine that the policy of Panchsheel or non-alignment had led to the present situation. Any other policy would have resulted in greater dangers and would have brought them sooner.

Friendship between nations did not mean military alliances. India did not want to be bound by any such chains.

In 1950, India had informed China that the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate. In 1951 the Chinese Premier expressed a desire that the stabilisation of the Tibetan frontier, which was a matter of common interest to India, Nepal and China, should be accomplished. The Government of India welcomed the suggestion and in 1952, on receiving a statement of Indian rights in Tibet, the Chinese Premier replied that there was no difficulty in safeguarding the economic and cultural interests of India in Tibet.

At the time of the discussions about the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet seven subjects were discussed with the Chinese Government and agreement was reached in regard thereto. The question of frontier did not arise at that time and when exception was taken to some maps published in China (showing some Indian areas as Chinese territories), the Government of that country replied that they would be revised later. And, then, the revolution in Tibet in March, 1959, resulted in a large number of refugees coming over to India.

It was on the 8th September, 1959 that the Chinese Premier claimed the Indian areas which had been shown in the Chinese maps and offered to discuss the boundary dispute with the Indian Government.

In September, 1957, we learnt of a road having been constructed in Aksai Chin area. In the summer of 1958, two reconnaissance parties were sent to that area. It was learnt that a part of the road was in Indian territory. A formal protest note was sent to the Chinese about it. Further correspondence continued with that Government.

It was wrong to say that Government had not been quick enough to inform the country about the Ladakh incident. It was borne out by the facts that information about the incident which happened on the 21st October, 1959, was given to the Press on the 23rd October, 1959.

The difficulty in dealing with China was that she had a single-track mind and it seemed natural to her that other countries should pay tribute to her. It was difficult for us to explain to the Chinese that India had a democratic system of Government and no action could be taken against people, even if they did objectionable things, unless they went beyond the pale of law.

It was wrong to condemn individuals, especially heads of Governments, as they were symbols; the whole thing should be considered calmly.

The situation being faced at the moment was partly political and partly military. Our Defence Forces were capable of looking after the security of the country and there should be no fears regarding that. It was wrong to suppose that the forces should be dispersed all over our long frontiers where they could be of little use as it would reduce the capacity to hit out at the proper place.

The real strength of defence forces lay in the industrial potential of the country; the question of defence had, therefore, to be considered in the light of industrial production.

Defence estimates had been reduced last year only because the real strength lay in the development of the country. The country was faced with a dangerous position but she had to make the best of it with whatever she had.

From the White Paper it was clear that our approach was reasonable and honourable for both India and China. It was wrong to use strong language. We would try to avoid war with all the means at our command. War was a dangerous policy but if it was thrust on us, we would fight with all our might. India would never degrade herself by shouting for help. The strength of a country was associated not with the beating of drums of war or the shouting of slogans but with its industrial potential and morale. The honour and self-respect of the country or her integrity could not be bartered away.

The treatment meted out to people of Ladakhi origin in Tibet by the Chinese authorities was very harsh and unreasonable. It was in contrast with the treatment claimed by that Government for the people of Chinese origin in Indonesia. They had also maltreated the prisoners taken by them in the Ladakh incident; they were repeatedly and constantly interrogated.

Though every border dispute raised passions in a country the peculiar feature of the dispute with China was that it involved the Himalayas, which were intimately tied up with India's history.

We should have a constructive approach to the whole problem and the greatest defence was a united country.

If a group behaved in a national crisis in an anti-national manner it had to be dealt with.

A tremendous responsibility rested with the House who should give a lead to the country in the present situation.

Shri S. A. Dange: The shocking Ladakh incident had spoiled the atmosphere for a friendly and peaceful approach to the problem. The proposals contained in the Prime Minister's letter to the Chinese Premier were commendable as they were based on the principle of peaceful negotiation.

It would be difficult for a layman to judge the practicability or otherwise of the proposals. But it would be fruitful even if the Prime Ministers met without a preliminary meeting of officials as suggested by the Prime Minister.

The question before the House was of the basic policies of the Government in the matter of foreign relations. Government had made it clear that though there were incursions on the borders, conditions of war were not there. An atmosphere of war should be avoided because the first casualty in a war was democracy and the development of a nation's economy. The integrity of the country must be upheld.

Some parties had been campaigning for a change in the basic policy of the country, i.e., *Panchsheel*. The Communists supported the Government on that policy but did not agree with those who wanted to develop a war psychosis. The Communists were not anti-national. Though they had been slow in coming to a decision on the subject of India-China border problems, it was a patriotic decision.

The approach of the Prime Minister that the right way to have a strong defence was to have heavy industries was correct. The democratic principle and the development of the country should not be side-tracked; that would be the inevitable outcome of a war hysteria.

Acharya Kripalani: No responsible public man talked of war with China. But the Chinese aggression against India must be stopped and the pockets occupied cleared. The assertion of India's sovereign rights to her own territory did not amount to war.

Any effective action to defend India's borders would not mean the extension of cold war to India and the end of our neutrality. The principal parties to the cold war were Russia and the United States. If they had taken no sides, the question of extension of the cold war did not arise. In fact, the Chinese wanted, by their aggression on our borders, to counter the thawing of the cold war and to sabotage the possibility of the Summit Conference. Therefore, the talk of extension of cold war to India was meant to cloud the clear

issue of effective action against China, whose claims, legitimate and even illegitimate, India had been supporting day in and day out.

The critics of the Government's non-alliance and non-resistance policy contended not for the abandonment of neutrality but for the abandonment of passivity. People wanted an assurance that the defence of India's borders would not be neglected.

Our military strength should be sufficient to defend the borders and to clear the occupied pockets. The Government should make a declaration of readiness to accept foreign military aid in an emergency. Help might be had on an honourable basis not impairing the sovereignty or independence of India. Nobody suggested that India should allow foreign military bases in India. Such a declaration did not minimise the present strength of India to deal with the limited problem that had arisen. It would also convince the Chinese that India had no intention to stand alone, if the area of conflict was enlarged by their perversity.

The Government had not so far tried to explain India's case to nations who were friendly to her. The acts of omission and commission of the Government and its various vacillating, uncertain and confusing utterances gave advantage to India's enemies inside and outside the country. Also, such utterances confused India's friends in other countries.

Panchsheel was not a moral imperative. It was a question of mutuality. India could not co-exist with herself. She could co-exist with China only if China co-existed with her. Three months after the Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet, the Chinese had committed aggression and violated the treaty. And the fact had been kept secret from the people and their representatives. Ignorant of the fact of aggression by the Chinese the people in India had been shouting for India-China friendship.

The Chinese had been constructing roads in the border areas, some of them also directed towards our Himalayan borders. But our communications with our own borders were so neglected that the Government had declared that our own territories were not easy of approach to our own people, they were easy of approach to the Chinese armies. That was culpable negligence of the security of the country.

The Government had always been giving evasive answers to questions in Parliament seeking to elicit information about border troubles. On the other hand, the answers tried to minimise the danger. When things could no longer be concealed because of persistent aggression in spite of the protest notes, the Government issued its White Papers. They made very painful reading. The Chinese notes were arrogant and bullying. On the other hand, the Indian notes were apologetic or mildly protesting.

The Government had misconceived the Chinese designs. They had been saying that they did not expect any fresh aggression. The Government's attitude to their aggression had been one of appeasement, despite the fact that the Chinese had constructed a motor road in the Indian territory, committed aggression on our

borders, shot dead 9 Indian police guards, kidnapped ten others and extorted confessions from them by third degree methods.

The Government should be bold and tolerant enough to give a patient hearing to the criticism of their policies.

The Defence Minister had lost public trust and confidence because of his silence about Chinese aggression. There was nothing wrong in the idea of joint defence with Pakistan in the face of Chinese aggression in spite of differences in the foreign and other policies of the two countries.

The information and publicity in the Foreign Department had generally been very poor. In the matter of Chinese aggression, it had greatly harmed India's cause. Reports of happenings on our borders sometimes reached us *via* Peking.

The Government should use proper phraseology in their declarations. The Indian police guards in Ladakh were kidnapped and not arrested, as stated by the Government.

The Government should keep a strict watch over the Chinese representatives in India, against their anti-India propaganda. They should reciprocate the treatment meted out to Indian representatives in China.

The counter-proposals made by the Government in reply to the latest letter from Mr. Chou-en-lai contained a strange reciprocity and maintenance of the *status quo*, which amounted to telling that country that India was leaving her own territory provided the Chinese also left India's territory.

If there was no just and honourable solution of the problem through negotiations, the Government must consider Chinese aggression as a serious challenge to India, which should be met to save the integrity and the honour of our country.

Shri M. R. Masani: Since the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, the Chinese had shown a design. On the other hand, there had been failure on the part of India to react to that design.

The Government had neglected to raise the boundary issue with China in time. While signing the 1954 agreement, the Government handed over to the Chinese Government the valuable buffer State of Tibet, without at the same time taking necessary precautions to defend the frontiers of the country. At that time, the Government should have asked for a guarantee of the MacMahon Line and the Ladakh border.

China had been violating agreements with India. Even if she agreed to withdraw her forces from India's borders, where was the guarantee that she would actually implement the agreement?

China was also trying to destroy the morale of the Indian armed forces. She was also trying to destroy the morale of India's small neighbours in the Himalayas, i.e., Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

The Chinese attack on India was a beginning and an attempt at demilitarising the countries of South and South East Asia. She

had chosen India because she was the strongest and when the strongest could not fight, everyone else must surrender.

The policy of non-alignment was good, but the way in which it was being carried out was to be questioned. Non-alignment did not mean that India could not repel an attack on her own territory. It did not mean that India could not equip her forces adequately.

The Government should appoint a Defence Minister in whom the armed forces of the country should have confidence.

The Government should construct roads and airfields and obtain equipment from wherever it could be found and put our forces at parity with the Chinese army.

The Chinese should be made to withdraw from the Indian territory now occupied by them.

Shri Kasliwal: The stand taken by the Communist party of India on the Sino-Indian relations was highly objectionable. They had called the Chinese aggression 'a false cry' and termed their proposals as 'constructive'.

There should be no objection to our own proposals in regard to Ladakh. We would not surrender our territory to the Chinese. The proposals would only lay the foundations for a peaceful, negotiated settlement.

It was but natural that the disposition of our military forces could not be made public in the very interest of the defence of the country.

The policy of non-alignment was now well recognised all over the world. Even in the U. N. there was a group of countries subscribing to that policy.

It was amazing that our nationals had been insulted and our trade agents subjected to uncivilised and inhuman behaviour. But we should not lose temper.

Dr. Sushila Nayar: There was no need to make a declaration that in case of an attack on our country we would accept arms from whatever quarters they were available, because the Prime Minister had already said that a war between India and China would develop into a world war.

The advantage of the counter-proposals made by our Prime Minister was that it gave the Chinese a reasonable chance to keep face and withdraw from our territory.

We must not leave our areas just lying open where the Chinese could enter. According to reports, Pakistan had sealed her northern border in Ladakh completely. In our Plans, we should make sufficient provision for the betterment of the people living in the border areas.

It was surprising why in our own maps published in our country, the north of the Himalayas had been shown as China and there was no mention of Tibet, when in our agreement with China we

had recognised an autonomous state of Tibet under Chinese suzerainty.

Our pleading the cause of Chinese entry into the United Nations, in spite of what had happened, was fully justified as that would exercise a check on her wrong actions.

Shri A. C. Guha: China had violated all the conventions and treaty obligations in respect of Tibet, and the Indian nationals residing there. Even the courier privileges that were granted under the 1954 agreement to our trade agents had been withdrawn. Indian traders had been reduced to paupers. They had been asked to send their money through the Bank of China. That was an impracticable suggestion. The Bank of China had got only one branch in India and that was in Calcutta. Thus, in effect, that would mean that all those thousands of traders who had been doing business in Tibet for about a century or more would lose everything.

There must be some kind of reciprocity between India and other countries about their banks operating in India and about Indian banks getting similar privileges for operating in those countries. But there was no Indian bank operating in the Chinese State. One did not know why the Bank of China was being allowed to operate in India. The Reserve Bank should make a careful scrutiny into its working. There was a feeling that it had been serving as an agent for transferring foreign money into India for subversive and anti-social activities.

When Indian traders were being denied their traditional trade facilities in Tibet, why were the Chinese being accorded similar facilities in Calcutta and other places, particularly near about the border areas? During the last two or three years, about 500 to 600 luxuriously furnished laundry shops had cropped up in Calcutta. The business that those shops were doing would not justify such a luxurious establishment. The Intelligence Section of the Government of India should look into the working of those laundry shops.

Under the treaty of 1954, our pilgrims were assured certain facilities to visit Manasarover and Kailash. That treaty was being violated by China. Manasarover and Kailash were traditionally a part of India and they should be included within the Indian border in any settlement about the boundary between India and China.

Debate not concluded.

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M. N. KAUL,
Secretary.

*****A Supplementary covering the rest of the proceedings is being issued separately.

Price 10 nP.

Future of Democracy

of Burma & Pak
~~League~~

Two dangers -

Primarily external -

Communism.

Ind. Com. Movement - very
much alive

C.P. - Most
welcome.
Doubtless

C.C. aggression
Attempt to nationalize

Miscalculation - ^{and in} ^{Home-fights}
- ^{and in} ^{Home-fights}

Common border - of Vietnam
& Laotia
Yenan.

Ban C.S. ? Right in
principle
Dublin

Pragmatic issue in peace -
of War.

Internal -

Quality of citizenship
Understand - Literacy
Absence of
Democratization
Indivisionism

Good: "Lean to say No."

Compatible with discipline -

2 sides of same coin.

Grass roots initiative

Voluntary com.

1. Combat drift to
Communism.

Double Endurance
Polarisation.

- Will drive non-Communist
out
of K & W.

2. Voluntaryism -
Σ 1 Pts.

Free expression
Faith in people
Quota D. Lincoln

The lecture notes
on "Why Swatantra"
are with Me Masani.

B.M.

5/2/60.