Dear Sri Raju,

I am happy to note that you have taken the publication of the Dissertation.

I understand your anxiety about the "too academic" nature of the same. In this connection, please allow me to point out that if you have in mind the omission of the theoretical discussion chapter: Frame work of Analysis

a) This kind of inclusion of theoretical base for research 'book' publication is widely followed by both foreign & Indian authors, for example, by Bipan Chandra- "Communalism Combated" and I am quoting a couple of Professors comments"
b) The scholarly commentary of the late Professor Dr. Iqbal Narain that: the Doctoral Dissertation has a good grasp of the "theoretical concerns," informing her enquiry which does not usually hold good of many theses of political science in India", has "a balanced blending of the traditional (particularly historical) and modern (particularly Survey research) yielded good dividends in terms of meaningful insights", has "an excellent theoretical discussion and sheds new lights not merely on intra-party tensions but also on the techniques-conflict of resolutions...the thesis is a valuable contribution to the existing research work on opposition political parties particularly by Indian Authors which is sound both from substantive and methodological angles" and " the author combines good analytical capacities with competence of balanced evaluation", and "an excellent theoretical discussion ",clearly shows the Introductory Chapter cannot be dismissed with. Dr. Sita Srivastava, Delhi University stated that "in the present complexity of economic, social and political situation has posed serious challenges for these two Rightist Parties" the comprehensive study " throws a new light and brings a better perspective" to a "total assessment of the future role of the J.S. and Swatantra Parties", the "empirical research may help in determining their future role and present participation in the political process in India." Dr. Asharam, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, stated that the thesis has brought many new facts specially in regard to inner and intra-party life to light which "is all absolutely new and original". Professor Radhakrishnan of Madras University, stated that "it is a pioneering study" that "when researchers take up the study of political parties after 1991,would be of great interest", it has not dated" and "future researchers can learn a lot from her scholarly analysis"
c) I suggest that we can change the titles of the Chapters, omit the list of persons interviewed, omit the questionnaire and /or election tables, retaining the "Structural Charts". I suggest that the "chart on Swatantra", was "approved by Sri. Raju, subsequently" may be added or leave them as they are.
d) The present "Preface" can be deleted completely replacing with a new one.
e) I request Sri Raju to write the same.
f) If you have any other suggestion, please inform me so that I may be able to help you further.
g) The title of the Chapter "Structural-Functional " analysis may be renamed as "An Organizational Profile", if you desire.
h)

Thank you,
Lalitha.

Lalitha

THE RIGHTIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDIA– JAN SANGH AND SWATANTRA

By

LALITHA VENKATARAMAN

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PREFACE

Democracy, especially parliamentary democracy, is a government by compromise and consent. It is explicable that public opinion - on socio-economic, religious and political matters, in short, which concerns the people individually as well as in their collective approach - differs considerably. And by implication, it means the acceptance of parties with differing ideologies. Alternative patterns have been adopted in studying the political parties in the West. And this becomes all the more essential to explain them in the context of the developing areas.

The political party as one of the agencies for giving coherance and direction to what otherwise would be only of separate and discordant individuals, has to translate an ascertained collective will, as Ogg and Ray explain, into governmental action.[1] As such, political parties as Schattschneider says, create democracy,[2] and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties. The parties are, therefore, not merely appendages of government. They are in the centre of it and play a determinative and creative role in it.

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1. See Ogg and Ray, Essentials of American Government, Appleton-Century-Crofts, INC, New York, 6th edition.
2. See Schattschneider, E.E., Party Government, Farratt and Rinehart, INC, New York, 1942.

However, parties are not and must not, as Maurice Duverger explains, be primarily doctrinal bodies.[1] This doctrinal unity, however, may be only one of the factors that accounts for the party's existance and efficacy. At the most, it may largely rest on historical tradition that may not have any great relevance to the problems facing the country. Thus a typology of political formations that can be used in the study of the political development of other countries, becomes possible.

The historical comparison, as Samuel Beer says, reveals not only what is new but what is old.[2] It lays stress on political culture as one of the main variables of a political system. And it acts as a major factor in explaining the political behaviour of individuals, groups and parties. For, a lack of integration in political culture may be a main source of conflict in the practical politics of the day. And this evolution of the party system, its basic philosophy, political principles and other problems to which the system gives rise to, as S.D. Bailey discusses, leads to a study of party organisation, its finance, its formulation of public policy, personnel of the Party winning of people's mandate etc.[3] Thus seen, an objective study of the

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1. See Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties - Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, Methuen Co., Ltd., London, 1955.
2. Beer, Samuel, Modern British Politics, A study of Parties and Pressure Groups, Faber and Faber, London, 1965.
3. See Bailey, S.D., The British Party System, The Hansard Society, London.

organization and behaviour of political parties, as Merriam and Gosnell believe, shows the party process as an integral part of the larger social process.[1] And more important, the foundations of the party are to be traced in the social and political mores of the community itself.

One of the persistent qualities of the party system is the way in which one of the major parties moves, as Clinton Rossister says, almost instinctively to absorb (and thus somewhat reshaped by) the most challenging third party of the time. Third Parties, in the US, for example, are not especially in their own right but only in terms of their influence on the major parties.[2] Or else, as James Bryce examines, will be superseded till they adjust themselves to new issues.[3] To this end, according to J.A. Corry, the party politicians as brokers, strive to find compromises that settle the difference, and always arrange deals between different sections of opinions.[4] To make most of the possibilities, thus, parties are organised on permanent footing with central and constituency units. One of the cases on

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1. Merriam, C. and Gosnell, The American Party System, MacMillan, New York, 4th (ed.), 1947.

2. Rossister, Clinton., Party Politics in America, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962.

3. Bryce, James., The American Commonwealth, MacMillan, New York, 1st American Edition.

4. Corry, J.A., Democratic Government and Politics, Canadian Series, University of Toronto Press, 1957.

Party Organisation analyses under what circumstances Republicanism becomes attractive to Democratic voters,[1] whereas in the other extreme, as R.T. Mekenzie argues, that if the party accepts the conventions of cabinet or parliamentary government, then the prospect of office is of far greater importance in determining the distribution of power within the party, than are any of the party's internal constitutional arrangements.[2] Thus, the credit for a study of a political party in all its ramifications, belongs to the west in general and to the United States in particular.

The differences in cultural and social background between the different societies do not permit the adaptation of these studies to developing nations, especially India. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, however, tried to mitigate the difficulties in the process by making a comparative study of the political systems of Asia, Africa and Latin America.[3] Significantly, this was made possible by a construction of an analytical framework by Gabriel Almond.

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1. Tillet Paul, Cases on Party Organisation, (ed) Eagleton Institute of Practical Politics, The State University, New Burnwick, New Jersey, McGraw Hill Book Co., INC, New York, 1963.

2. Mekenzie, R.T., British Political Parties, W. Heinemann Ltd., 1955.

3. Almond, Gabriel., and Coleman, James., S., The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, 1960.

In India, studies abound on the Indian National Congress attempted by both members of the Party and researchers. Studies of Pattabhi Sitaramayya and Stanley A. Kochaneck, before[1] and after independence,[2] represent such attempts. Pattabhi adopted historical approach while Kochaneck based his study on its leadership with socio-economic components. Indra Prakesh studied the History of Hindu Mahasabha, again having the historical method as the basis.[3] Myron Weiner broke fresh grounds in tracing the development of a Multi-Party system in India. His Party Politics in India, a limited attempt though, enables a comparative study of the Indian political parties.[4] His subsequent study, a Party Building in a New Nation, presents the leadership of the Congress Party from the point of view of its party-building efforts.

A study of the Rightist Parties by Motilal Jhangiani on Jan Sangh and Swatantra, a profile, analyses the reasons for their genesis, their organisational structure and ideology, and attaches much importance to the socio-political connotations of the parties.[5] Howard L. Erdman's study on Swatantra Party

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1. Sitaramayya, Pattabhi., The History of the Indian National Congress, Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay, 2 Vols., 1947.
2. Kochaneck, Stanley, A., The Congress Party of India : The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy, Princeton University Press, 1968.
3. Indra Prakesh, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha, The Akil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi, 1938.
4. Weiner, Myron., Party Politics in India, Princeton University Press, 1957; Weiner, Myron., Party Building in a New Nation : The Indian National Congress, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
5. Jhangiani, Motilal, A., Jan Sangh and Swatantra : A Profile of the Rightist Parties, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1967.

provides a typology of political formations that can be used in the study of the development of political parties, and has laid stress on the doctrinal aspects of the Party.[1] Craig Baxter's book on Jan Sangh studies the growth of the party organisation and its role in between the four General Elections.[2]

All this notwithstanding, the field was left open for the researcher for a comprehensive research in regard to the electoral support for these parties, in determining the distribution of power within them, and their internal constitutional arrangements etc. Most important of all, a more careful inquiry into the foundations of the parties seemed missing in the social and political mores of the community rather than having discontent, divine or otherwise as the basis. The present study has been undertaken to analyse these aspects in detail.

II

Approaches to the study of a political party are many and varied. In planning this research, the structural-functional approach was followed and methodology was a combination of the traditional and modern empirical research with questionnaires,[3]

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1. Erdman, Howard, L., The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge South Asian Studies, 1967.
2. Baxter, Craig., Jana Sangh : A Biography of an Indian Political Party, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1969.
3. The questionnaire on Survey of Leadership was prepared jointly by the Researcher and Smt. Saraswathi Srivastav, BHU, who had submitted her dissertation earlier.

interviews, and by observation. In other words, the study deals with the functioning of the social structure through a process of social life, of the activities and interactions of the 'actors' and the behaviour patterns that unite them in a group.

Methodology presented many difficulties. The initial attempts to study the national parties with rightist trends both from their national stature and as to their representation in various States proved abortive, for one thing, the scanty material available and for another, the response received was far from satisfaction for research purposes, in the cases of both Ram Rajya Parishad and Hindu Mahasabha. In contrast, Bharatiya Jan Sangh and Swatantra endeared themselves for a thorough and schematic analysis, because of their freshness as post-independent parties and the researcher was able to delineate from a study of them a historical continuity of the Indian political culture, per force.

With the response the mailed questionnaires elicited from the leaders, barring a few, and from the units of the two parties at various levels proving inadequate, the plan of studying the parties as to their representation in the various States was given up. The reliance on personal interviews and attendance at various meetings of the parties, right from the unit level to their National Conventions, together with the

correspondence maintained with the leaders, enabled the researcher to complete the study. In consequence, certain disadvantages accrued to the researcher, in both limiting the scope of the study and in presenting itself as a time consuming process.

Chapter One entitled 'Framework of Analysis' discusses the problem of definition of rightism and its identification with conservatism. In fact, the Indian political culture poses difficulties which are many and varied, thus resulting in the interchangeable usage of the terms conservatism, liberalism and rightism in regard to these parties. Broadly, this Chapter presents a birds-eye view of these Parties.

Chapter Two, "Indian Conservatism - Early Manifestations" seeks to establish an identification of a common conservative response of these parties even in pre-independent India.

Chapter Three and Four examine the genesis of the two parties and the factors that are responsible for the same.

Chapter Five presents the structural-functional analysis of these parties and comes to the conclusion that the strength and weaknesses of these parties lie in their respective party constitutional arrangements, in addition to the rapport available or otherwise between the different level leadership.

Chapter Six analyses the parties attempt to build their political image by presenting their different ideological postures. The conclusion that is arrived at is that this attempt at image-building got watered down by their presentation of programmes and the strategies they adopted in winning the support of the masses.

Chapter Seven, an analysis of the General Elections and the results thereof, presents the pinnacle of glory that they attained in 1967 General Election. It also presents the area of support that these parties attained within the political context. The 1971 and 1972 Lok Sabha and Assembly Elections, respectively, present these Parties fortunes Vs. their common Political opponent the Congress Party.

Chapter Eight deals with the internal tussles that these parties face and the concomittant loss of cohesion.

Our investigation has brought us to the conclusion that the mid-term 1971 Lok Sabha elections and the 1972 Assembly Elections question the political existence of these parties. It is realised that parties and party labels are empty dressings and what counts in the ultimate analysis is the basis of the parties and their future. The inevitable conclusion is that election successes and failures do not wipe out the parties because of the sectional strength and retention of monopoly of opposition.

It is the privilege of the researcher to have Dr. (Mrs.) Sita Srivastav, Department of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, as her guide and supervisor, whose analytical mind has sharpened her views on the subject. The researcher acknowledges her extreme indebtedness to her without whose guidance and help the dissertation would not have been completed.

The researcher offers thanks to those leaders who responded favourably to the mailed questionnaires and endeared the barrage of questions posed to them in the interviews with patience. The researcher's thanks are also due to the party officials, of whom a special mention may be made of Shri S.V.Raju, Executive Secretary (Swatantra), Shri J.P.Mathur (Jan Sangh), Shri Harish Chandra Srivastav (Jan Sangh) and Shri K.R.Malkani, The Editor, (The Organiser). The researcher's especial thanks are due to Mr. R.D.Milne, The Bureau Secretary, (Conservative Party, United Kingdom) for his timely response and valuable suggestions. The researcher is compelled to record here that the responses from the Swatantra party with party literature, party files and the like could not equally be met with from the Jan Sangh. Thus the paucity of records available with the Jan Sangh resulted in slightly tilting the scale in favour of Swatantra.

Second, to underscore the relevance of the argument that ideological concepts, viz., conservatism, liberalism, rightism and reactionary, are more identical propositions. In brief. Etimologically, conservatism means 'to conserve' that which is present, and in general, a conservative is seen to prefer stability and advocate a gradual change, if essential, to maintain that continuity. The political interpretation of conservatism then follows as an: "ideological justification of established social and political institutions". and this justification arises in response to "a clear and present danger" to these institutions.[1] Thus, by its very definition, conservatism underscores these institutions in "very diverse forms, in different countries and at different times".[2] And again, by implication, this time perspective of conservatism allows the doctrine "to be revolutionary and without any change of theoretical position" that "they become technically conservative on the successful completion of revolution".[3] In the defence of these established institutions, conservatism, when necessitated (as in the case of the French middle classes who had to face in two directions), expounds "liberal ideas against the aristocrats and conservative ideas against the masses".[4] Thus, as a whole and across time, conservatism solidifies its power by an inversion of its usual policy-making roles.

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1. Huntington, Samuel, P., Conservatism as an Ideology, American Political Science Review, June 1957, p. 459.

2. Friedrich, Carl, J., Constitutional Government and Democracy, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, Revised Edition, 1964, pp. 426-[illegible].

3. Michels, Roberto, Conservatism, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. IV, 1937, p. 230.

4. Huntington, op. cit., p. 466.

The researcher's thanks are due to the Librarian, Banaras Hindu University, for his ungrudging help in lending books and making available whatever literature needed at short notice. The researcher is especially thankful to Shri P.S.V. Narayan, for typing the thesis in record time.

VARANASI,
DATED: 28.6.74

Lalitha Venkataraman

Mrs. Lalitha Venkataraman.

CHAPTER I

FRAME WORK OF ANALYSIS

I

Political Parties are integral components of modern democracies, and if any generalization can be made, a three-fold typology becomes possible. Some idealise the ancient past, thus paraphrasing Emerson's aphorism, "nothing new, nothing sure and nothing matters". Some others believe in the legitimate stuff of politics i.e., presentism - "More in plenty",[1] while the rest look to futurism, awaiting sufficient manna from heaven. Added to these, the fundamental difference in approach in the concept of ideology is confounded further by the Marxian class differentiation and the consequent historical incidence of anti-Statism.

Western philosophers differ widely in interpreting this change - in the interpretation of these political principles - as "End of Ideology"[2] and the "exhaustion of political ideas",[3] whereas some others denied and advanced a different connotation of the term 'ideology', both in its meaning and presentation.

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1. Blackshaw, R.J., Political Discipline in a Free Society George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1961, p. 179.

2. Bell, Daniel., The End of Ideology, The Free Press Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, pp. 370-71. Also, Bell, Daniel and Aiken, Henry D., Ideology : A Debate, Commentary, Oct. 1964, p. 71.

3. La Polambara, J., Decline of Ideology : A Dissent and an Interpretation, The American Political Science Review, March 1966.

Whatever the answers be to these questions in the West, ideology and ideological orientation of the political parties become the touch-stone in defining the national goals and to the process of politico-economic development in the developing countries.[1] And more important, ideology provides a useful frame of reference for analysing and categorising the political parties in the developing areas. This is notwithstanding the fact that ideology is not a reliable indicator for a study of the nation-building processes, especially in the sphere of economic development. For, the basic political community becomes more important with the periodical shift in the power structure of a nation.

With these ends stated, certain observations are in order. First, the term ideology itself is riddled with contradictions allowing the extremities to converge at a mid-point, i.e., "to maintain the State or a system and to act within it",[2] though the line between the acceptable and unacceptable alternatives is very sharp. In this sense, ideology "is essentially conservative and have a primary function in preserving the status quo in a totalitarian society through the befuddlement of the masses and the paralysis of their will to resist the powers that be".[3]

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1. Krause, Elliot A., Social Problems, Fall, The American Political Science Review, 1968, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 129.

2. Nettle, Political Mobilization, Faber & Faber, London, 1967, p. 101.

3. Bell, Daniel and Aiken, Henry D., op. cit., p. 72. Karl Mannheim, in his classic study Ideology and Utopia, analyses the reasons for such a stabilizing character of the term ideology. Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia, Harvest Books, New York, (n.d.).

Third, the confusing strands of conservatism, however, results in identification with reaction and liberalism. For, the principle of 'conservation' differentiates conservatism from that of reaction. And by 'tradition', a conservatist means "all the lessons of the past but only ethically acceptable events, whereas the reactionary means all the events. Thereby he misses all the lessons".[1] Similarly, when liberalism, (as in France, after challenging the ancien regime), finds that "the more radical socialist elements" becoming "the effective opposition", adopts "a defensive attitude and in so far as it does, it becomes conservative". Also, the scope and range of contemporary liberalism does not advocate the abolition of the structure that which is conserved by conservatism. Rather, it desires the abolition of the rigidity of the conservative structure. And in France, "aristocratic thought, once conservative rapidly became radical".[2] which shows considerable difficulties in defining "radical right" and in relating it to conservatism and reaction.[3]

The political metamorphosis of conservatism, thus, as a liberating influence on the one extreme and relating it to reactionary and right radical on the other, presents a nice paradox. This not only amply demonstrates the ambiguity

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1. Viereck, Peter, Conservatism Revisited, Quoted in Raison, Timothy, Why Conservative? Penguin Books, 1964, p. 32.

2. Huntington, American Political Science Review, op. cit., p. 466

3. Rogger, H., & Weber, Eugen, The European Right, (eu). Berkeley University, 1965, Introduction.

concerning the doctrinal and polemical interpretations of the concept of conservatism. Equally problematical is its procedural limitations, in determining the possibility of divergent approaches in answering the "ifs", "ends", "provisos" and "conditions" of conservatism.

To round off now the accentuated edge of conservatism or rightism, from the academic torpor. Implicit in many of these preceding remarks, there remains other numerous queries of which the basic must be posed in a preliminary fashion. For, what is important are questions, not names. Shorn of verbiage, and given the interpretation that leftism and rightism are mere relative terms, i.e., if rightism also means "individualism", of individual's equality and liberty, where then lies the fallacy? In other words, is it merely a difference between Tweedledom and Tweedledee? Second, just because leftism is radical in all its views,[1] does rightism has to profess conservatism in matters of socio-economic and religious? And finally, what of the active principles of rightism which ultimately may mean considering economic and the consequent State basis?

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1. This assumption itself becomes questionable. For, interestingly, both schools of thought are in accord, that in a perfect economic system - if it could be found - all other matters would automatically fit themselves in, in their respective spheres of action. To both, State is a necessary and mitigated evil and hence could not be done away with, thus the areas of controversy between them has narrowed down to a minimum, or, shall we say, to an artificial periphery?

The fecundity of conservatism thus allows itself in the interchangeable usage of the terms "liberalism", "rightism" etc., emphasizing "a spirit, an attitude, a temper and not a set of dogmas".[1] This becomes all the more pertinent in the Indian context. For, the Indian political culture poses difficulties, which are varied and numerous, and especially in regard to the parties of the right, Jan Sangh and Swatantra.

II

To go on now to establish an identification of a common conservative response of Jan Sangh and Swatantra, even in pre-independent India. The rise and growth of Indian Conservatism, at a time when the twentieth century had subjected the countries of the world over to the touch-stone of traditional concepts versus the challenges of new situations and responses, is by itself an interesting phenomenon. Its operational significance becomes all the more pertinent considering the fact that Indian Conservatism had projected itself into two distinct varieties within a decade in post-Independent India. What is more enigmatic is that the concept of conservatism in India presented itself as capable of propagating "traditional nationalism" and

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1. Hearnshaw, Conservatism in England, MacMillan & Co., p. 22.

"conservative, economic and secularism", as represented by the Jan Sangh and Swatantra, respectively. In all this, a common factor more worthy of attention was that at that time the fortunes of their common opponent, the Indian National Congress, were not at a low ebb. In fact, these parties have, of necessity, not of choice, arose in response to the challenge that "the pre-requisite for the development of any political ideology is the existence of some concrete opponent or enemy."[1]

To demarcate the place and functions of the conservative forces, which these parties represent in the contemporary Indian political setting, would involve examining them through their respective earlier manifestations in pre-Independent India. For, notwithstanding the shifts in the political centre of gravity, i.e., from the post to pre-Independent India, a continuity in the essential cultural and economic pattern becomes discernible. A word of caution, however, is in order. The differences between the Jan Sangh and Swatantra, in regard to their background, genesis and ideology, invite their own appropriate methodology in dealing with them. For, social factors, become significant in relation to their social settings. Though to draw a demarcation line between one set of social factors from another would seem a futile exercise, such an attempt becomes worthwhile.

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1. Morris, I.I., Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, a study of post-war trends. Oxford University Press, London, 1960, Introduction, p. xx.

In examining the course of pre-Independent Indian Conservatism, however, one should make a clear distinction between the development of "nationalist feelings" in the country based on religious foundations and that based on organised "national movements" with or without such manifestations. Here again, a dilemma is posed by the philosophy of the Indian National Congress, an organised "national movement", at one time or the other as a doctrine of politico-social change. Correspondingly, the development of conservative, economic and secular "feelings" were latent in the early Indian Society and thereafter became quite apparent in the philosophy of the Indian National Congress. Thus, the Congress Party justifies Viereck's remarks that "conservatives and liberals may join hands for certain purposes", while "they continue to differ about human nature, history, tradition and the tempo of the change".[1]

The foundations of the Jan Sangh had their genesis in the "nationalist feelings" with religious over-tones. The "conservative economic and secular feelings" which were latent in the pre-Independent Indian Society became, at a later date, the corner-stone in the formation of the Swatantra Party. And, quite understandably, these "feelings" within the organised "national movement", viz., the "Indian National Congress",

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1. Viereck, Peter, (ed) Conservatism, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1956, p. 15.

both latent and manifest, ran most parallel to the secular and socialist trends of thoughts.[1] If necessity, therefore, we identify these "feelings" in the Indian National Congress into separate categories for focussing greater attention, though at the same time we must be wary of the approaches.

In the field of political science, the concept of State is substituted with good logic by the term 'political system'. Viewed thus, political parties, parliament, civil services etc., become the units of the 'political system' instead of remaining as isolated units and performing 'political socialisation', 'rule-making', 'rule adjudication', etc., respectively. A political party, interpreted within this new framework, would have to build an organisational set-up and maintain its viability so as to perform its varied functions[2] of political socialisation[3] etc.

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1. Viewed against this background, a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the resolutions passed and the speeches made by the leaders of the Indian National Congress abound with their conservative and secular "feelings".

2. The important functions that a political party performs may be listed as follows: (a) Membership recruitment in a mass scale, whether it follows; (b) Membership identification in ideological, social, psychological attachment and last, political identification with the party; (c) To function as a government agency and also as a channel of access to decision-making process. The last mentioned one automatically involves the leadership recruitment to political offices.

3. The need for a modernising system to develop the "capacity to assimilate into the system the social forces which result from modernization", was realized by Huntington, Samuel, in his "The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies", (Mimeographed), p. 8. Quoted in "Party Building in a New Nation", The Indian National Congress, by Weiner, Myron, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, p. 3.

Inspite of such manifest importance exhibited, the internal processes of political parties have not generally received the attention they deserve. For instance, the party structure, if efficient, responds to, as well as influences, the social condition.[1] Naturally, strategy and character of adaptive contacts become varied greatly. These may be manifested in the multiple group membership of party activists, in the formal and informal processes by which social interests are given a "hearing", in the acceptance of "deviant outsiders" into the structure, and also in the subtle techniques by which party and other group activists mutually "infiltrate" into each other's organizations. These 'intelligence' and 'support' mobilization interaction become, in turn, crucial to efficiency; and efficiency "is crucial to structural viability".[2] Thus, this study leads us directly to the conceptual cohesive skeleton of commands and obedience between the central and local party units, which are, doubtless, the most significant data concerning a party. For, the balance of these relations determines the nature of the party system. The same power relations are not exhibited, however, in these parties inspite of wide structural similarities. To some extent, their ideological pretensions played an effective role as regards their organizational set-up.

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1. Pye, Lucian W., Aspects of Political Development, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966, p. 100. Pye argues, "political development is related to an increased ability to organize associations of people and to manage complex structures", i.e., the need for a human organization for the achievement of goals which individuals, by themselves, are unable to achieve.

2. Eldersveld, Samuel J., Political Parties, A Behavioral Analysis, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1964, p. 334.

to the satisfaction of a functional prerequisite of the social system at the societal level. And with no scheme of operative causes by which it is to be realised, ideas and ideologies of the party are to be tested in the crucible of practicability. An inescapable effect of this simplification is the presentation of the party's ideological postures as its precise formulae. Such a pure and unequivocal power orientation, however, is at once frightening in its scope and intensity.[1] For one thing, the problem of social balance is ubiquitous and frequently obtrusive. For another, public policies are too broad, intricate and dynamic, and third, electoral politics presents several dimensions of involvement of the individuals.[2] And here, ideology, as the philosophical problem, proves an inadequate scale of values.

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structures, viz., legislature, executive, government, bureaucracy, political parties, interest groups etc.

1. Jan Sangh ideology is based on Bharatiya Maryada and Swatantra on Western Liberalism. This well reflects in the type of Society they wish to create, viz., authoritarian regimented Society with its twin angularities, traditionalism and nationalism, and Swatantra's Libertarian variety. The contrasts between them, however, are more extreme in their very image of the Society.

2. Whereas democracy wisely avers that the government is everybody's business, the individuals, even in a democratic society (who find themselves within the boundaries of a political system), are by no means equally concerned with the political life. Dahl, for instance, identifies four groups of individuals in a political system as political strata, apolitical strata, the power-seekers and the powerful. Dahl, Robert, Modern Political Analysis, Foundations of Modern Political Science Series, Prentice-Hall of India (Private) Ltd., 1965, p. 58. In the several dimensions of involvement, each more or less continuous, Dahl argues, even the political stratum shades off gradually into a apolitical strata.

At best, ideology presents an over-view of theoretical problems as involved in a comparative political analysis.

Second and related to the first conceptualisation is, that the procedures of such a contribution deals with the manner in which they are prescribed, and the decisions to be arrived at by the party is by democratic practices. The difficulty of democracy itself, however, is that it demands compromise, and especially, among and between the amorphousness of the Society, the rise of new and threatening interest groups, the emergence of social movements, and of their differing ideologies. Since the function of politics is to react to real situations more so than to realistic ones, the party adopts and adapts its ideological postures in its political declarations, i.e., election manifestos. The party tries to cover up its omissions and commissions in its manifestos. This schism between thought and action, though marked in all subtlelities, thus presents changes in the subject-matter, emphasis and techniques of presentation, which are, indeed, sweeping. For, the difficulty lies, for instance, in determining the illusion of redistribution of wealth among the inmividuals and/or in the moral claims of statism in such an action. Shorn of verbiage, the election manifestos of the parties preclude any awareness of the magnitude and complexity of the problems they are confronted with. Indeed, couched in vociferous generalities and simplifying little, an election manifesto is a prototype, or extension of, and supplement, to the party's ideological stances.

And in fact, the preparation of an election manifesto by a party becomes at once "an educative and humbling process" as the "eventual product reflects not only political aspirations, but the interests, hesitations and foibles of a composite authorship".[1]

And the third conceptualisation focuses attention upon the procedural characteristics of different strategem which a party may adopt in pursuance of such a contribution. Building up of a consensus among the electorates for a particular strategic programme, inspite of all its promises in its political declaration, is as complex and subtle as it is for each party. For one, the competitive conditions of political life inevitably lead to a conflict system of competing interests. And second, divergencies between the parties in doctrines and tendencies open up a vast horizon of political alternatives. Despite these qualifications, the theory of equidistance between the parties, however, narrows down the gap between their respective political declarations. Indeed, though comparisons are odious, the manifestos show that they have no differences worth the name in principles.[2]

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1. Macloid, said to be one of the veterns of Manifesto drafting for Conservative Party in 1955 and 1959 in England, wrote thus in Punch, Sep. 20, 1964, vide Political Quarterly, April-June, 1965.

2. For a fuller account of this line of reasoning, Venkataraman, Lalitha, Quest for Political Alternatives - Dimensions and Dialectics of Election Manifestos of 1971, Journal of the Society for Study of State Governments, April-June 1971.

Balancing the unbalanced thus leads to the poser that may be answered in two ways. First, can they (the different political parties) and will they deliver the goods individually? Alternatively, would a modus vivendi between the parties possible? Here, one discerns elements of bargaining among and between them. Rather, the interaction of special circumstances raises the query as to what general factors are involved in the political behaviour of the electorate. And, to meet this difficulty, the parties find the answer in coming to an agreement in principle, by attuning themselves where necessary to changing conditions. Thus, the party has to create a proper synthesis between its duty to its ideological postures and its obligations to its voters by the presentation of its election manifestos and in an 'alliance of convenience'. Indeed, the failure of the party on any of these counts results in presenting itself, outwardly, as "a victim of its mistakes and of its blunders". And internally, the stresses and strains that a party encounters in its body politic undermines its strength.

The dynamics of democracy, at the first glance, presents a party system which appears to be homogeneous. But on a closer examination, the conflict has been and is endemic among, between and, more important, within a given party. In fact, the scale, the scope and the nature of the conflict within a party justifies Michel's assertion that "in all modern popular parties, a spirit of genuine fraternity is conspicuously lacking, we do not see

sincere and cordial mutual trust; there is a continual latent struggle, a spirit of irritation determined by the reciprocal mistrust of the leaders, and this spirit has become one of the most essential characteristics of every democracy".[1] This political principle, when repeated *ad infinitum* assumes special significance in a plural society[2] with a federal system of polity like India.[3]

What then are the contributory factors? Leaving aside the analysis of the material basis of national power, "the leaders of the political parties are only broadly representatives of the general aspirations of the members and electors of the parties".[4] And more specifically, every leader is a contender for power vis-a-vis the others, thus believing in Jacsonian sentiments: "to the victor belong the spoils". The question

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1. Michels, Roberts, "Political Parties - A sociological Study of the Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy", The Free Press, Glenco, Illinois, 1958, p. 179.

2. Because in such a Society, the tendency of interests and parochial feelings will take place in local political groupings to resist central party discipline. These, however, could be somewhat adjustible with a rudimentary party organization to provide a framework within which local influentials also could function. This, in turn, would enable the party organization to survive even after a major defection occurs from its ranks.

3. In a federal system, the parties' decentralized internal relations parallel and reflect the decentralization of the political system.

4. Blondel, J., "Voters, Parties and Leaders - The Social Fabric of British Politics", Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, USA, 1963, p. 233.

now invariably arises as to how far the 'process of consent' to come together modifies the equilibrium of constant conflicts. Adherence to this viewpoint naturally leads us to the starting point of the formation of these parties. By way of simplification however, the conflicting elements present in the two parties, though there are some striking differences, may be grouped.

As a consequence of this and other related factors, the core of this phase of analysis is given the term intra-party conflict, and for convenience, this could be sub-divided into two broad components - ideological and organizational. Surely, these do not need extensive elaboration, only the most consequential would pin-point the issues at stake. A word of caution, however, is in order. The logic of competetive success juxtaposes these two factors (ideological and organizational), rather they get amalgamated, thus presenting a nice paradox. Projection of these factors separately, then, becomes at best a function of the ambiguity of the situation. The ambiguity which characterises this connection can, of course, be demonstrated in a number of ways.

Any such discussion, on the motivation per se of such conflicts, would involve in emphasising the assumptions by a few preliminary observations, and from three different angles. First, the hypothesis that social bases and party organizations are inter-related in the case of every party which becomes all the more significant in the case of both the rightist parties,

especially the Swatantra. For, the competative conditions of political life with a particular set of social complexion of the area react on the party system under certain circumstances, which are in a sense structural responses to environmental demands.[1] Second, and closely related to the first is, that these demands automatically lead the party to adopt and adapt itself with widely varying local influences, power of local leaders, their opinions etc. These local groups, due to their heterogenity, to use Duverger's interpretation, are thus forced to become "electoral machine .... not ideological groups, nor class communities .... teams of men expert in the winning of votes".[2] These, in turn, affect the disciplinary rules of the party also as the central directives are no longer obeyed. This gets aggravated when the party becomes inevitably a conflict system of competing interests, in which case, the central authority becomes more explicit in deference and not in resolving such conflicts.

And third, and this brings the analysis to a new phase. Viewed retrospectively, the British Indian Provinces and the former Princely States were not politicised and democratised

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1. For instance, if we hypothesise that the social bases influence and determine the politics, a study of these political parties in various States had to be made with special reference to social bases. Here again, a comparative study of the same Party in different States becomes essential with social similarities, if any, among them.

2. Duverger, Maurice, "Political Parties : Their Organization and Activity in the Modern States", Methunn & Co. Ltd., London, 1964, pp. 21-22.

uniformally in the wake of independence. In fact, in the Princely States, even the Congress Party Organization, an important vehicle of political communication and propagation, was not developed till the time of Independence. And the presence or absence of a tradition of democratic struggle and mass movement consequently differentiated the States. This fact, should be kept in view in studying the politics of the present States of U.P., Bihar and Gujarat on the one hand and Orissa, Rajasthan and M.P. on the other. For, the States of the first category participated in the national movement intensely and thus had trained party organizations also, whereas, the States of the second variety suffered as a consequence of organizational lag in the development of a Party organization.

III

Approaches to the study of a political party are many and varied, and to name a few: biographical, sociological, historical, comparative, structural-functional, content analysis and aggragate-data analysis. The biographical approach depends on the biographical notes of the leaders of the party. The historical approach reveals the stress on the political culture as one of the political system and a major factor in explaining the political behaviour of individual actors and groups within the parties. The sociological approach focusses the attention

on the 'actors' in recruitment, leadership-interaction etc. in consonance with their socio-psychological background.

Recent studies developed in comparative politics base themselves into four categories: structural-functional, comparative analysis, content analysis and aggregate-data analysis. Structural-functional analysis[1] locates the functions common to all politics and then explains the differing structures which perform these functions in various political systems.[2] Comparative analysis approach deals with attitudes or other individual characteristics on a cross-national basis.[3]

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1. Initially developed by Talcott Parsons, the structural-functionalist mode of analysis formulated the functional requisites as including pattern maintenance (controlling tensions and adherence to social norms); goal attainment (achieving systems goals); adaptation (adapting the system to its environment); and integration (co-ordinating the inter-dependent parts of the system). Gabriel Almond's application of this approach originally embraced both "political" (input) functions, viz. political socialization, political recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication; and "governmental" functions, viz. rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication. Thus, the structural-functional analysis may be applied to the society as a whole, in which case, "the political system is viewed as a structural sub-system that performs one or more of the functions necessary to the maintenance of the larger social system". And, alternatively, the political system may become the focus of analysis as an entity with its own structures and functions.
Plano, Jack C., and Riggs, Robert E., Dictionary of Political Analysis, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

2. Almond, G. and Coleman, J.S., The Politics of the Developing Areas, (ed) Princeton University Press, 1960, presents the best example of this approach. Also see Amitai, Etzioni, Complex Organizations - A sociological Reader, Holt, Rine-hart and Winston, New York, 1961, p. 25, for an interpretation of this approach.

3. Almond, G. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, deals with this approach.

Content analysis is one which determines the values of a political culture and sub-culture.[1] Whereas, in the aggregate-data analysis the quantifiable attributes of geographical units or transactions among them are compared satisfactorily.

In planning this research, the structural-functional approach, as developed by Radcliff-Brown in his book, 'Structure and Function in a Primitive Society'[2] is depended upon largely, to study the parties as institutions of political order.

Radcliff-Brown argues that, "it is through and by the continuity of the functioning that the structure is preserved .... The continuity of the structure is maintained by the process of a social life, which consists of the activities and interactions of the individual human beings and of the organised groups into which they are united. The social life of the continuity is defined here as the functioning of the social structure. The function of any recurrent activity .... is the part it plays in social life as a whole and therefore the constitution it makes to the maintenance of the structural continuity. The concept of function as here defined thus involves the notion of a structure consisting of a set of relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the structure being maintained by a life process made up of the activities of the constituent units".

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1. McClelland, D.C., The Achieving Society, Von Nostrand, New York, 1961, evaluates of a political culture and sub-culture by this approach.

2. Radcliff-Brown, A.R., Structure and Function in a Primitive Society, English Language Book Society & Cohen & West Ltd., London, 1964, Pp. 179-180.

Thus, a 'structure' refers to both formal and informal relationships within the organization. It also means that structure is deemed to have needs which are related, and the fulfilment of these needs is determined by its day to day functions.

Since each organization represents a resultant of complex forces which no single approach can explain appropriately, the problem of analysis, then becomes a selection from among the possible. A comprehensive science, on the other hand, of comparative politics, needs all of these approaches. Hence an attempt has been made to utilise these various approaches to the extent practicable.

IV

In fine, The focus of this research centered round the study of these two parties as dynamic structures in a democratic society. Within this broad spectrum, however, the specific points of interest that drew the attention of the researcher were:

1. The interactions, in general, between the structural condition of the party and the ideological connotations of the same and whether the motivation of the party leaders at different levels of the party hierarchy has any saliency with its ideology. For, the structural properties as outlined in the party constitution show

that to some extent ideology played an effective role in regard to the organisation and role perception of the leaders of Jan Sangh;[1]

2. As regards the patterns of internal organizational relationships that reflect these structural properties, specifically in what respects and in what areas the communication system is defective;

3. The structural properties of these two parties made apparent both similarities and dissimilarities. For, Jan Sangh possesses the bureaucratic prerequisites as Elderseld[2] observed, of impermeability, depersonalized human relationships, strict adherance to regulations and rules enforcement, low circulation of personnel etc., which are conspicuous by their absence in Swatantra;

4. Whether communication between the leaders at all levels is a critical factor in explaining goal perspectives. And specifically, does frequent contact leads to power-consciousness about party goals? and;

5. The party structure must be viewed as a decisional group (a great many decisions are taken, concerning the operation of the party structure, tactics to be employed at a given time in pursuance of these goals, and the opportunities given for the activists in all these aspects) with special reference to finding out the intra-party conflicts.

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1. See the researcher's constructed charts of these Parties, pp. 405-6.
2. See Elderseld, op. cit., p. 4.

The data concerned in this study was secured by a number of testable hypotheses, based on personal observation, interview with the leaders and utilising a schedule of questions and respondents were assigned numerical scores from low participation to high participation depending on whether they answered "seldom", "sometimes", "often", respectively. On an average score for each respondent, the index of participation in decision-making was based.

V

A study of the political futurism of these Right-wing Parties would involve examining them in the context of their electoral successes or otherwise versus the fortunes of their common political opponent, the Congress Party. For, the political 'Health' of these parties are inseparable from that of the Indian democratic polity as a whole. An alternate plan would be examining them in terms of their failures, in probable defects within their 'societies', in faulty emphases, and inadequate scales of values. This brings the analysis to a new phase, i.e., their inter-relationship to a sharp focus. Here again, the factors responsible for such efforts may be grouped as fundamental, programmatical and methodological.

Projections of all these factors separately, however, would prove inadequate. For one, these conditions are inseparable as they are a variety of aspects of a single reality. In fact, one could never leave this context of ideas, resources and nerve-centers of these parties. And second, while these might, indeed, by themselves, have provided the last straw that broke the "Political camel's" back, these excruciating internal problems of the parties were, of necessity, determined by a far more decisive external determinant, viz., the 'Constitutional' problem.[1] Indeed, at the first glance, the problem seems to be 'political', the real problem is constitutional. And to deny this as a consequence and not a cause, one ought to be either naively dogmatic or blissfully ignorant. And, the present provides the foretaste of the future. What is more enigmatic is, that the concept of Indian democracy experienced traumatic changes.[2] Hence, the dilemma is posed that we move in the predictible direction. The plan, then, and indeed, the study of the continued existence of these parties, separate or unified, is predicated upon the assumption that they have arrived at some such moment of choice.

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1. The right to property was the fundamental issue at stake in the 1971 Elections and the need to amend the Constitution for the removal of impediments through democratic process. The election manifestos of all parties revealed a large area of agreement in principle but each differed on emphasis.

2. The massive mandate secured by the Congress(R) in 1971 elections against both the Right and Left parties, (when compared with earlier elections results) reveals the significant trends that swung the political pendulum by the masses and the perspicacity of the Common Man as well.

Intelligible in terms of the preceding analysis, certain negative conclusions initially remain to be demonstrated. As a first promise, would a political system without parties be more satisfactory?[1] An examination of such a complex and harsh control system, however, ought not to blur our view of the fact as the dilemma behind this poser is a central one. For, by implication, democracy means the acceptance of parties with differing ideologies, and it is explicable, that political parties are integral components of modern democracies. And second, equivocal, if not, as pejorative, as the first, is the simple truism that "if there is a Left, there must obviously be a Right". This sweeping generalisation, however, would prove inadequate as there are a few assumptions behind this suggestion as well: what are some of the historical facts behind this speculation? And, are they susceptible of measurement? Or, of isolation?

What prescription, then, can be extracted from the preceding analysis? Predicting the future development of any political system is hazardous. For, one can forecast the variables, not prophesy the results. Flatly stated, then, the basic question is

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1. Jayaprakash Narayan championed the cause of a partyless democracy as the panacea for the ills of the Indian democratic polity. The serialised article, "Towards a Fuller Democracy" in The Radical Humanist, June 15 and 22, 1958. He elaborated this theme in his circulated paper entitled "A plea for Reconstruction of Indian Polity".

the perpetual task of reconciling personal freedom and social justice, and the logic of competetive success juxtaposes these two factors often. For, "the merits of democracy are negative; it does not ensure good government, but it prevents certain evils". (Russell). And what of the cultural and political environment? Without our becoming prisoners, then, of concepts, to start at the beginning would help to define operationally, and with the argumentation prefaced.

Conceivably, an analysis of the data facilitates the examination of several questions regarding their political functions. For instance, what are the purposes of the political parties? Under what conditions is one type of party, rather than another, likely to perform certain political functions? More particularly, how do they fit into the over-all purposes, and into the specific conditions under which they must operate? By answering these and similar questions, the building up of a political typology becomes possible.

As a partial consequence of this, let us pose the problem. The definition dilemma of ends and means presents the parties winning of seats in the political assemblies as one of the elements in their general activity to realize their political ends. For one, the qualities necessary to acquire power and to exercise the same are not the same as essential to resolve the

problems of a modern Society. In fact, the promotion of certain spiritual and moral values in political life lays equal, if not more, stress as these would tip the scales between the successes and failures of the parties.

To put it differently, it is neither enough to debate the legitimacy of the parties (both Right or left) in terms of the dichotomy between unified and structuralised authority and divided parliamentary responsibility, nor for the opposition parties to appear as if they might be more stable, politically, if voted to power. They must also be sufficiently pragmatic in approach. For, in the developing countries, groups tend to be ill-defined, diffused and fluid in membership, function and in relation to one another, and most important, to governmental policies. Hether religious, ethenic and commercial groups overlap with groups of economic interests and politico-religious orientation. In fine, a comprehensive and schematic process of analysis shows the perpetuation of "Right" in its variety of manifestations and on different lines of intersection within any given Society.

II

CHAPTER ~~II~~

INDIAN CONSERVATISM - ITS EARLY MANIFESTATIONS.

Nationalist feelings.

The foundations of Jan Sangh had their genesis in 'nationalist feelings' with religious overtones. The widespread prevalence of religious nationalism in pre-Independent India was the fundamental factor which determined both its strength and weaknesses. For, the need for and the possibility of, the early conservative reaction was ostensibly to the British approach to Indian problems. The issues which gave impetus to these groups were both positive and negative. And, commensurate with the slow and steady all-pervasiveness of the British domination over India, the reaction to it also became all-comprehensive. Most important of them all, the needs of the new Society which was developing in India since the British advent were different from those of the early Indian Society.

As long as the basic factors remained inviolate,[1] India continued essentially unchanged; but in the nineteenth century the economic foundations of the Society underwent a gradual change under the impact of the British rule and consectaneous to Industrial Revolution in Britain. This led to a disintegration of beliefs and structures in India. The process of modernization that the early Indian Society thus underwent accounted for changes in norms, values, and attitudes to life etc. This process was ushered more profitably by the British Indian Government with the introduction of English language which opened up a new vista to the thought-processes and culture of the West etc., especially to the ideas of the French Revolution with its concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity, and to English romanticism and liberty as enunciated by the Benthamite School. Educated thus in the liberal foundations of the West, the new Indian intelligentsia turned this new light of knowledge to advantage and attempted a penetrating analysis of the ills of their own tradition-bound religious Society.[2]

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1. Krishna Rao, M.V., enumerates three factors on which the stability of the Indian Society had rested:
   a) "the village community which insured the adequate exploitation of land,
   b) the institution of caste by which society was organized on a Co-operative basis with specific and complementary functions attached to each unit of which the society was composed, and
   c) the joint-family system, with a set of beliefs embodying sociological and transcendental values which gave meaning and direction to the life of individual in his relation to both society and the universe."

   Vide his The Growth of Indian Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, K. Venkataramiah & Sons, Mysore, 1951, p. 1.

2. For Krishna Rao, "the intellectual progress of a people has always a tendency to act upon their religion, whilst religion in its turn influences progress". Ibid., p. 4.

Such an intellectual inquiry, however, raised a hornet's nest and resulted in contradictory findings[1] - on the one hand, a desire for social and religious reforms in repudiation of superstition-ridden Hinduism, and, on the other, an anxiety to justify Hinduism and its principles (as they were practised) with little or no modification. In fine, the argument centred round the Alpha and Omega of Hinduism, i.e. on the concept of the organic Hindu Society and the place of the individual in it.

To go on now to the more important questions delineated below: what is Hinduism and, more important, what is the purpose of life of the individual according to Hinduism? Leaving aside the historical justification of the use of the terms 'Hindu', 'Hinduism', etc., we can say that, in a wider sense, Hinduism determines the social relationships of the individuals inter se in specific terms, where life itself is considered transient. The end of and object of life according to Hinduism is the salvation of the individual "soul" after death and realization of oneness with the eternal "Being". The identification of the "Becoming" with the "Being" is conditioned by Dharma, the moral law, but the individual is permitted the right to develop his/her capacity to select the path of advancement towards the "Being". To wit, Hinduism sanctions the existing social order of the individual,

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1. Bajpeyi, J.N., notes that "... it may be said that the political movement of India was a by-product of both Western and Indian philosophy and the movement as a whole was a queer mixture of the East and the West, and where both met, they produced a mighty and glorious revolution".

   Bajpeyi, J.N., The Political Movement in India, Vol. I, Ravi Prakashan, Allahabad, 1958, p. 26.

and sanctifies his station-in-life etc.; and every action of his in life, in all the spheres whether political, economic or social, this becomes a command of the Hindu religion, an all-absorbing entity. The Hindu philosophy applauds renunciation on the part of the individual, because according to its fundamentals, true happiness rests not on the individual's materialistic advance but of pilgrims' progress on the path of spiritualism towards attaining Oneness with the Being. By realising these principles inherent in "self", in the Society, and in his quest for the ultimate "Reality", the individual identifies himself with the Society; and thus Hinduism had made possible the cultural and religious unity of all the Hindus in the past; and to a larger extent it still does, and forms the basis of the "Hindu Indian Society".

The individual's station in life, a pre-ordained one at that, led to its crystallisation into four Varnas, thus representing the various interests of the Society as a whole. The social and economic divisions also came to be regarded as divinely ordained, and hence inevitable and immutable. This excruciating factor of the "Karma" theory got further strengthened by the hierarchically-graded authoritarian caste system based on social and economic inequalities; and conformity to caste rules was demanded in the name of the individual's salvation. The process of development in its wake was responsible for many rituals, beliefs, and emergence of sub-castes etc. Though belonging to the Hindu Society, the untouchables became its outcastes and women became its second class citizens. Thus,

Hinduism and the stratified caste system worked at cross purposes, i.e. while Hinduism stood for cultural unity, the caste system disintegrated Society into various groups and sub-groups. The Hindu Society was thus a "non-competitive and non-acquisitive society. It was a system of organized inequality but of inequality so adjusted as not to press very severely upon the classes affected by it";[1] and its emphasis was on "duties and not on rights". The life of the individual was "one of continuous service in ever-widening circles to the family, to the group, to the community and to the wider community".[2] Thus, Hinduism and its caste system became both the bane and the blessing of that Society.

A section of the intelligentsia, imbued with liberal principles of the West including appreciation of the value of individual personality, felt stifled by the religious and social beliefs which manifested in the tradition-bound superstition-ridden Hindu Society. This section refused to believe in the fatalastic concept of the 'Karma' theory and argued that the individual's station-in-life within the Society was not a pre-ordained one based on 'Karma' but based on his social and economic activities. It asserted that caste differentiations and social customs like Suttee, child marriage, for instance, were not ordained by God but were man made institutions to preserve the hegemony of a group/groups. This section, therefore, vehemently advocated change in outlook and in social customs based on rational principles.

1. Krishna Rao, M.V., op. cit., p. 18.
2. Ibid., p. 19.

This section was best represented by the Brahmo Samaj and Prarthana Samaj. The Brahmo Samaj and its founder Raja Rammohan Roy were greatly influenced by Christian and Islamic thought and tried to bring in the teachings of the Upanishads, Islam, and Christianity, a synthesis of what was the best. They preached the idea of one God and brotherhood of man. Likewise, Prarthana Samaj and its founder Ranade were reformists in their orientations and advocated widow re-marriage, inter-dining etc. Though, unlike Brahmo Samaj, Prarthana Samaj based its philosophy more on Hinduism, it was equally influenced by the Christian faith.

By contrast, such reformist movements gave rise to a growing suspicion among the conservative section who apprehended danger to their religion both from the British Government as well as from Westernized Indians represented by Brahmo Samaj and Prarthana Samaj.[3] Though passive acceptance of authority

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1. Tracing the various movements of a reformist as well as of revivalist character, B.B. Misra states: "Hinduism was indeed faced with a crisis of culture.... It was difficult for Indians to make a choice. The acceptance of the western concept of social mobility constituted a real challenge to Brahminism and the exclusive concept of its caste order. Its rejection, on the other hand, involved the negation of British rule and a reversal of what that rule had achieved over a period of more than hundred years. The aim of revivalism was to restore Brahmanism in a modified form by an exclusion of British rule and the influence operated under it. To revivalists, political liberty was essential for cultural and religious freedom".

   See Misra, B.B., The Indian Middle Classes, Oxford University Press, New York, 1961, p. 377.

2. Social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy strove for ending the evil practice of Suttee and it was abolished by Lord Bentink. Due to the efforts of Iswar Chander Vidhyasagar, the Act of 1860 raising the age of consent for marriage was passed. In 1929, the Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed.

3. See Krishna Rao, M.V., op. cit., passim and especially p. 31.

was a confirmed habit of the Indian people, the increase in the pressure of the alien philosophy on India - "the fear that the distinct racial and cultural elements of the old would be obliterated" - naturally nourished "unrest which found outward activity in strengthening the defences of the traditional customs and beliefs and in a sullen defiance of the belligerent forces of the Western civilization".[1] Getting rid of the British became essential so as to lessen the influence of the Westernized Indians on the Hindu way of life. Thus, "the rehabilitation of Hindu belief and customs proceeded pari passu with the growth of political dis-affection".[2] And, the desire for political change became a curious admixture of long historical elements, of racial feeling, of social consciousness and most importantly, a definite and pointed opposition to anything 'alien'.[3]

The peaceful religious disposition of the people based on spiritualism inspired many individuals "to set up structures within the Society that are a reflection of the characteristic integrity of that Society itself", thus emphasizing "the characteristic elements in Indian culture that are worth preserving".[4] Consequently, the social and religious movements which were influenced by Western philosophy invoked a new spirit

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1. 'Mind' Journal, 1896; Fraser : Indian thought Past and Present, p. 2, vide Krishna Rao, M.V., op. cit., p. 144.
2. Chirol, Valentine., The Indian Unrest, Macmillan and Co., London, 1910, pp. 26-7.
3. Smith, R.A., Divided India, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, p.3.
4. Ibid.

of Indianism in the name of Arya Samaj with its slogans, "Back to Vedas" and "Aryastan for Aryans".[1] Thus as B.C. Pal observes: "the revivalist was equally dominated by the alien ideas the only difference being that whereas the reformer was trying to consciously control and regulate his social evolution after the manner of Europe, the reactionary is unconscious of the domination of these alien ideals".[2] Rather, as Lajpat Rai says, while the reformers "are bent on relying more upon reason and experience of European Society", the revivalists "are disposed to primarily look at their shastras and the past history, and the traditions of their people and the ancient institutions of the land which were in vogue when the nation was in the zenith of its glory".[3]

The conservative 'nationalist feeling' based on religious foundations attained its water-mark with the founding of the Arya Samaj by Swami Dayanand. Accepting the challenge of reconstruction of the Hindu Society in the best traditions of Indian philosophy, viz. the relationship of the individual with individual and the individual with the Society, Dayanand tried to solve the dilemma on the lines similar to those of Brahmo Samaj and the Prarthana Samaj. He accepted their contention that caste resulted in inequities and denounced the same as well as the "Karma" theory which proclaimed caste as pre-ordained. He advocated

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1. The latter slogan had invited the remark from Sir Valentine Chirol that "it was sometimes barely disguised a more than a mere platonic desire to see the British quit India" as its "influence on the movement for throwing off the shakles from India's .... was also considerable".
   See Chirol, Sir Valentine., <u>op. cit.</u>

2. Pal, B.C., Soul of India, Chaudhry & Chaudhry, 1911, Calcutta, p. 76.

3. Lala Lajpat Rai, <u>The Man in His own Words</u>, The Maharashtra State Lajpatrai Centenary Committee, 1965, p. 135.

freedom of the individual to choose his station in life for his development. Dayanand's individualism, however, was tempered to some extent by a concern for, and a sense of obligation of the individual to, the community. The sharp contrast between the philosophy of the Arya Samaj on the one hand and the Brahmo Samaj and Prarthana Samaj together on the other, became apparent with Dayanand's acceptance of the Vedic Varnashram Dharma as the basis of the Society. This contradiction between thought and manifestatio (dharma and caste), he tried to reconcile by advocating changes within the ambit of the traditional Hindu Society.

He advocated that one's Varna should be determined in accordance with one's psychological dispositions and qualities with corresponding actions.[1] Dayanand preached not the repudiation of the caste system but the revival of the Hindu Society of the Vedic period based only on four castes. The logical political corollary[2] to the above concepts of individualism

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1. V.P. Varma terms this as 'democratic idealism' and considers this as revolutionary in the social life of India. But he "is doubtful of the efficacy of the Varna theory as a principle of social stratification in modern India since it is suffused with centuries-old historical conservatism and traditionalism". For, "in practice, it will be immensely difficult to prevent the four Varnas from degenerating into four castes".
   See Varma, V.P., Modern Indian Political Thought, Lakshmi Narayan Agarwal, Agra, 1967, pp. 41-2.

2. Zacharias notes: "to end the distressing disunion of India and to make India socially one, Dayananda wanted to eliminate the differences of caste and class; to make it religiously one, he wanted to substitute his Aryan for all other religions; to make it nationally one, he was led to emancipate it from foreign rule. The modern Sangathan tone given to Hinduism is undoubtedly largely due to his influence".
   See Zacharias, H.C.E., Renascent India from Mohan Roy to Mohandas Gandhi, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1933, p. 38.

based on Vedic Varnashrama Dharma and a harmonious social order, justified the slogans of "Aryasthan to Aryans" and "Back to Vedas" But it was partly a counterpoise to Islam and to Christianity.[1]

Paradoxically, the emphasis on the country's proud past, undoubtedly on Hindu basis, created rivalry, this time, from the Muslims. This uncompromising ideological struggle, excepting for a brief period, was based on a desire for the revival of the glorious Muslim period. As things turned out, the conflict between these two political cultures[2] became the nucleus for the modern communalism. Curiously enough, the introduction of English education and the economic background again became the bone of contention between these two political cultures. Henceforth, the conservative "nationalist feeling" more or less turned itself into another organized 'nationalist movement' thus presenting a politics triangle with the British Government in the role of an arbiter. Radical nationalism found a place in the Indian National Congress in 1905. The Muslim League took its birth a year later and the Hindu Sabhas in Punjab and elsewhere closely followed.

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1. Nehru observes: "The Arya Samaj was a reaction to the influence of Islam and Christianity, more especially the former. It was a crusading and reforming movement from within as well as a defensive organization for protection against external attacks" Nehru, J., The Discovery of India, Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1960, pp. 378-79.

2. Political Culture is the pattern of orientations towards government and politics within a Society. Political culture generally connotes the psychological dimension of political behavior - beliefs, feelings, and evaluative orientations. A political culture is the product of the historical experience of the whole Society as well as the personal experience that contribute to the socialization of each individual. Plano, Jack C., and Riggs, Robert E., Dictionary of Political Analysis, The Dryden Press, INC., Illinois, 1973, p. 64.

II

The conservative "economic and secular feelings" which were latent in the pre-independent Indian Society became, at a later date, the corner-stone in the formation of the Swatantra Party. Quite understandably, these "feelings" within the organized "national movement" viz., the Indian National Congress, both latent and manifest, ran almost parallel to the Socialist trends of thought. Here again, in line with our earlier argument, we may say, the British approach to Indian problems became more than a determining factor. For, political problems arise out of "the values, the institutions and circumstances of a people". And the issues which gave impetus to them were both positive and negative.

The need for and the possibility of moulding the Indian nation into a homogeneous entity, posed a dilemma before the British Government. This made it imperative to devise a scheme for the governance of the country by which the earlier Indian administrative devices had to be deliberately set aside.[1] And the British Government set the pattern by introducing certain changes which were far from negligible. For, basically, the scheme and

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1. Mallick, B.K., The Individual and the Group, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1939, p. 32.

the changes advocated by the British Government threatened "the basic factors" which remained inviolate and on which the stability of the Indian Society had rested, all along.

To go on now to the more important problems. The pre-British Indian Society presented a unique structural pattern, unparalled in history, for, this society was not based on contract but on custom and status, yet the family, the caste and the village community "maintained ideological control over the individual who was bound to conform to their standards".[1] In consequence, self-determination was only possible within the limits which the latter imposed. Such a Society existed in village republics "having nearly everything they want within themselves; and almost independent of foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts .... revolution succeeds revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Moghul, Maratha, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn, but the village communities remain the same".[2]

These autonomous village republics were based on an agricultural economy except for some minor modifications, and most important of them all, they recognised no private ownership on land. For "in Hindu period, the land belonged to the village community, and was never regarded as the property of the King".

1. O'Malley (Ed) Modern India and the West, 1941, p. 355, Quoted in, Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism, p. 13.

2. Sir Meteaffe, Charles., quoted by Guruye, G.S., in Caste and Race in India, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1932, p. 302.

And the State, merely had "a right to a share always paid in kind. Under the Moslems, the existing tenures and tax system were adopted with some modifications".[1] This, the British Government, sought to disturb by introducing "enforced individualism of the British system",[2] within the ambit of the societal structure. The three-fold characteristics of this system were: first, it had created the pre-requisite for the capitalist development by introducing individual ownership on land, (either peasant proprietorship or large-scale land-lord ownership); second, the village was no longer to be the owner of the land; and third, the individual owner's loyalty to the British Government was ensured (to which he owned his proprietorship rights and in consequence had the obligation to pay land revenue direct).

This interference from the British Government in the village economy created a class conflict, more or less, on the Marxian lines, whereas the prevalent pre-British Indian system recognised only struggles "for the exercise of rights over the village" and "not the exercise of rights within the village" as they were conflicts between over lords of various grades for the right or power to get a payment from the peasant and not to seize his land. "European history" on the contrary, revealed "a conflict between the peasantry and manorial lords because the latter

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1. Wadia, P.A., & Merchant, K.T., Our Economic Problem, New Book Co. Ltd., Bombay, 1950, p. 234.

2. Brailsford, H.N., Subject India, Vora & Co., Publishers Ltd., Bombay, 1946, p. 174.

not only demanded a share of the produce, but desired to retain a particular method of cultivation - by forced labour - or to introduce new methods of cultivation (enclosures, large-scale farming). The Indian conflict was one between lords who were concerned not at all with methods of cultivation, but to draw an income from the peasantry .... the village and peasantry remaining throughout the passive subject of conflict".[1]

This "enforced individualism of the British system" sought to replace the self-sufficient village economy by an unified national economy. This "commercialization of agriculture" - a questionable change from cultivation for home consumption to cultivation for the market - together with the commercial and other economic forces which invaded and penetrated the villages undermined both the agrarian economy and the autarchic village India of the pre-British period.[2]

Apart from such direct effects, the same theme which when carried to the logical conclusion, caught the British Government in the vicious circle of its own creation. For, its policy of preventing and restricting the growth of industry and killing the handicrafts led to over-crowding on agriculture, even though it permitted whatever industrialization was dictated by its strategic

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1. Shelvanker, K.S., The Problem of India, London 1940, p. 102.
2. Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966, p. 46.

and economic interests. This, along with the consequent drain of the peasantry, was at the root of the low purchasing power of the people, which, no doubt, the British Government were very much interested in raising, for the benefit of their manufacturers. To extricate themselves from this hornet's nest, it was essential to industralise the country, which in turn, would have meant at hitting the manufacturers and financiers of Britain. It also demanded that the burdens imposed by the British created landlords on the peasantry should be brought to an end.

The British Government's desire to weld the Indian Society into an homogeneous whole and not only its consequent educational policy,[1] and administration, had created a literate which was expected to build up the tradition of liberty and right in the country. To be sure, with the spread of English education, some form of representative government suggested itself to the educated community as the remedy for evils which was incidental to the

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1. Macaulay wanted to civilize - that is, anglicise - the Indians so that they would buy British goods; but he and others also saw the possibility that the Indians would come to demand British Institutions too, as if British Institutions were the right of any really civilized man. The British, then, began to 'civilize' India and to reform her society in what they believed to be the best way possible, by introducing English education and an English sense of values. See Krishna Rao, M.V., The Growth of Indian Liberalism, op. cit., p. 286.

British rule.[1] More so, the consequent development of towns was a factor for the growth of a modern, critical and individualistic outlook based on calculation of the economic gains and losses.

The dimensions and dialectics of the multi-faceted attack on the Indian Society, thus seen, the chief characteristic of the British rule, became, however, both the bane and blessing of that Society. For one, it portended the danger of British expansionism. And for another, in contra-distinction, it projected a moral dimension insofar as the growth of what could be termed as an individualistic philosophy. In fact, this "sanctioning" of the individual freedom from the clutches of the "closed society" and help identify him with the nation as a whole, had far-reaching repercussions.

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1. Writing as early as 1838 (after the establishment of the first English school in Bengal), Charles Trevelyan recognized in the educated youth of the Province a strong desire for the representative form of Government. Coming from the North-West Province to Bengal, he was struck by the remarkable difference in the political attitude of better class of people in the two provinces. In the former, where British education has scarcely penetrated as yet, the people had no other idea of political betterment than the absolute expulsion of the British in Bengal, on the other hand, where English education had made some progress, some form of representative national assembly was held up as the idea. He says "No doubt both the schemes of national improvement suppose the termination of the British rule; but while that event is the beginning of the one, it is only the conclusion of the other. In one, the sudden and violent overthrow of our government is a necessary preliminary, in the other, a long continuance of our administration, and the gradual withdrawal of it as the people became fit to govern themselves are equally indispensable".
   See, The Indian Review, 1907.

A section of the intelligentsia, imbued with the liberal principles of the West,[1] including appreciation of the value of the individual personality, attempted a penetrating analysis of the Indian economy. The problem of economic development was viewed under different perspectives. They took a positive and constructiv attitude of the economic doctrines, on modern lines. As a consequence, they laid stress on the need for increasing productio 'the first and the fundamental question', and whether the total production of India could meet the multiple wants of the people,[2]

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1. The early leaders of Indian Nationalism educated as they were in the westernised ideals, imbibed the spirit of Victorian Liberalism. Although some of them had contacts with the Socialists of Europe, their liberalism was too strong to be influenced by such Socialists (Among these were Dadabhai Naoroji, Tilak, Lajpat Rai and others. A strikingly typical example is Dadabhai's contacts with Hyndman, Keir Hardie and Sydney Webb). They also derived their ideas from different, yet sometimes antagonistic sources. They were equally influenced by the western thought and writers like Hegal, Kant, Spencer, Burke, Mill, Bentham and others.

2. Naoroji, Dadabhai, Poverty and Un British Rule in India, Swen Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1901, p. 188.

   A study of the resolutions passed and of the speeches made in the early sessions of the Congress reveals that there was discontentment with regard to the policies followed by the British rulers in India. They made a number of complaints concerning the poverty, mination of indigenous industries, export of the essential raw materials of the country, adoption of currency standards to the detriment of Indian industry and peasantry, labour enslavement in foreign-owned plantations, burden of heavy taxation etc. Their chief concern was the poverty of the "bulk of our country men, whose economic condition is the point at issue". (Gokhale, G.K., Speeches and Writings, G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras, 1916, p. 16). It was the condition of the "middle and lower classes of our community", of the "agricultural classes", of "the starving, shrunken, shrivelled up Indian ryot, toiling and moiling from dawn to dark to earn his scanty meal", of "the millions of poor classes, who, in normal periods, poor and underfed, in times of famine die like flies" and of "the lower strata of the population which was taken as the real test of the poverty or prosperity of the country". (Joshi, G.V., Writings and Speeches Poona, 1912, p. 783. Also see, Gokhale, G.K., Speeches and Writings, Vol. I, Poona, Deccan Sabha, 1962, pp. 934, 150.

though more important was the question of distribution of the national product. Thus, their anxiety reflected on two tangible counts: lack of investment of Indian capital and inflow of foreign capital; on the one hand, and lack of technical know-how and the backwardness of the country, on the other. Thus, poverty became the only national issue which helped to unite the different sections of the Indian Society but not on ideological niceties, as one of them argued: "The problem with us is not a socialist problem, admitting of the application of any socialistic remedies.-- The evil of poverty is not confined to any particular classes.... We have here no unjust inequalities in the distribution of wealth to rectify and no chasms to bridge over, dividing off class from class; we have no "Claims of labour" to urge, no "Duties of Capital to enforce, and no 'Rights of Property' to plead".[1]

Thus, the early national leaders attempted a penetrating analysis of the Indian economy and raised the sins of omissions and commissions of the political authority, this time the British way of the governance of the country. Though readily accepted that Indian poverty had historical roots, 'an old, a very old inheritance',[2] still they blamed the British rule as "the greatest curse with which India has ever been afflicted".[3]

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1. Joshi, G.V., Writings and Speeches, op. cit., p. 753 & 819

2. Ranade, M.G., Essays on Indian Economics, G.A. Natesan & Co., p. 182.

3. Naoroji, Dadabhai., Poverty and Un British Rule in India, op. cit., p. 579.

The eradication of poverty and the enrichment of the national income were their anxiety, and they had to play "mercy-petition-faith-and prayers" role in the political atmosphere prevailing then. They placed their faith not only in India's justice, but in the justice and fair play of the British people. Gradually, however, they realised that poverty was the concomittance of the British rule rooted in a desire to exploit the resources economically, for its own advantage. The leaders introduced the theory of Indian "exceptionalism", that Indian economic development must have different path in the peculiar and disadvantageous political system from any followed by the other under-developed and colonial countries.

The present talk of private and public sector was not a new phenomenan. The early national leaders demanded State intervention[1] in the industrial development but the Government of India of the 18th century was wedded to laissez-faire doctrine. They (the leaders) held that the Government was ill-qualified to further industrial development by direct action, and that all such matters should be left to the private enterprise'.[2] Their leaders' anxiety

1. Ranade was an ardent advocate of State intervention and control of economic life. According to Ranade "the State is now more and more recognised, as the national organ for taking care of national needs in all matters in which individual and co-operative efforts are not likely to be so effective and economic as national effort. This is the correct view to take of the true functions of the State. To relegate them to the simple duty of maintaining peace and order is really to deprive the community of many of the advantages of the social union".

2. Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-18, p. 2.

was, in fact, for the development of Indian industries and for the prevention of decay of India's cottage and hand-loom industry, under-production, under-employment and un-employment.[1]

In fact, the Congress did not adopt any resolution in favour of the workers.[2] Their sincere and undivided devotion to the cause of rapid industrialisation blinded them altogether to the miseries that were being perpetuated in the wake of such industrialisation processes. In their anxiety for rapid industrial development, which they sought as a panacea for the impoverishment of the masses, they interpreted the every move of the Government for factory legislation in the light of the interest it served, i.e. Manchester of England but not the interest of the working class either for or against. They viewed it from the point of view of the Indian industries competing with foreign countries, and reducing the cost of production to the minimum with low wages, longer hours of work, etc. (The Indian Factories Act of 1881 drew adverse political comments especially from the Indian Commentators). However, this is not to suggest that they neglected any conscious study of the labour problems. In fact, enough attention was given to both peasantry and the working class, especially, the plantation labour. Peasantry and the Agrarian problem occupied their attention continuously in their agitation for the lowering of land revenue and for its permanent settlement, and many of them pleaded for safeguards against tenants by land-lords, from demanding high rents.

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1. Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics, G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras, pp. 119-20.

2. Banerjee, Surendranath., The Indian National Congress, G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras, pp. 264-65.

Inspite of it, the economic life they visualized and championed for, may be termed as pro-capitalists. But it should be remembered that their attention was guided by their firm belief in the dire needs of the economic development of the country. In fact, the Indian leadership was more or less unanimous in strongly advocating State help in the process of industrialization of the country. In this respect the earlier Congress leaders[1] drew pointed attention of the then government about the role of the Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration in developing the modern industry.

On the assumption that the national leaders wanted better land revenue Administration and the extension of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal to other parts of the country, they were criticised of being the spokesman of the Zamindars against the oppressed ryots.[2] R.C. Dutt, in particular, was accused as the champion of landlords since he insisted for the Permanent Settlement of revenue. There was acute controversy about the Zamindari tenure of Bengal and a permanent settlement of land revenue.[3] B.B. Misra observed, that in 1888, the Congress

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1. Report of the Seventeenth Indian National Congress, 1901, Calcutta, Wellingdon Printing Works, 1902, p. 123.

2. Joshi, op. cit., p. 870.

3. For instance, K.T. Shah stated, "if, however, we accept the writings of the late Mr. R.C. Dutt as indicative of the Indian public opinion in the last century on this point, it would seem that there was a large consensus of opinion among the Indian publicists in favour of extending the Permanent Settlement of Bengal to other provinces with a view to create exclusive property in land under the land-lords of the English type". Shah, K.T., Sixty Years of Indian Finance, pp. 196, 200.

insisted on "the introduction of the Bengal pattern of the Permanent Settlement in all parts of the country, which, as has been seen, operated to the great hardship and disadvantage of tenants".[1]

In fact, the overwhelming majority of Indian National leaders drew a distinction between the permanent ryotwari settlement in some provinces and the Permanent Settlement in Benga The issue for them was not with the system of tenure or the forms of revenue collection, as such, but with the principles governing its assessment. For, in 1879, Lal Mohan Ghose, observed "I do not think a greater boon can be conferred upon the country than the extension of the perpetual settlement throughout India in a somewhat modified form to that which obtains in Bengal. We should like to see the settlement made with the cultivating classes themselves, and not with a class of middlemen such as Zamindars of Bengal. We should live to see a system somewhat similar to that which prevails in Switzerland and other parts of the continent of Europe".[2] Tilak, while speaking on the resolution on Permanent Settlement in 1893, had said that he was not speaking for the Zamindars but only for the tenants. He remarked that the Government might deal with the land-lords or with owners of the villages or with the ryots in different parts of the country.[3]

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1. Misra, B.B., The Indian Middle Classes, London, 1961, p. 350.
2. Ghose, L.M., Speeches, 2 Parts, Calcutta, 1883, 1884, p. 6.
3. Report of the Indian National Congress, 1893, Calcutta, The Bharti Press, 1894, p. 114.

Thus, the earlier National Leaders sought the help of the employers and employees, Zamindars and agriculturists, land-lords and landless to fight the Britishers. Dr. Pattabi Sitaramayya had observed that the "Congress had fairly early recognized indeed so early as in 1920-21, that in fighting the British for power, the Congress had also to take on hand a constructive programme in order to reconquer India from the British who had through a century's conscious and deliberate striving, effected a moral and spiritual, economic and social conquest as well not merely a political and territorial conquest".[1] The leaders were conscious of the criticisms levelled against their policies. For instance, Naoroji admitted that there was 'discontent and impatience' against the Congress which was termed as 'slow and non-progressive'. But he defended it by saying that it was a healthy sign in the sense that it would lead to revolution. Of course, "the character of the revolution will depend upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the British Government and sanction of the British people".

In time, this economic agitation led them to put forward political demands with the realisation that the economic policies could best be influenced by wielding a share in political power. They agitated for a reform of administration. As a matter of fact, a share in political power was demanded as the people's right, since it was felt that the British Indian bureaucracy was responsible for the maladministration of the country.

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1. Sitaramayya, Pattabhi, B., The History of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1935, Vol. I, Bombay, 1946, p. 6.

Their ultimate desire was to educate the people politically-minded and conscious of their economic development. In fact, the leaders fully recognized that their work as preparator to that consciousness and active interest of the people. Naoroji wrote to Wacha[1] as: "The very discontent and impatience it (the Congress) has evoked against itself as slow and non-progressive among the rising generation are among its best results or fruits. It is its own evolution and progress .... (the task is) to evolve the required revolution - whether it would be peaceful or violent. The character of the revolution will depend upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the British Government and action of the British people". Similarly, Ranade stated (he wrote to Gokhale in 1891 when the latter expressed his disappointment at the two-line reply of the Government to a carefully prepared memorial by the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha): "You don't realise our place in the history of our country. These memorials are nominally addressed to Government, in reality they are addressed to the people, so that they may learn how to think in these matters. This work must be done for many years, without expecting any other results, because politics of this kind is altogether new in this land".[2]

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1. 12th January 1905 & quoted in Masani, R.P., Dadabhai Naoroji, The Grand Old Man of India, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1939, p. 441.

2. Quoted in Gokhale's Speeches, on. cit., p. 929.

Thus, exploring the problems of economic growth as a whole received greater attention, from the early Indian national leaders. And in the final analysis, many of the problems that concerned the Congress till 1920s approximated the general frame-work that the early leaders propounded.

The process of transformation of the Congress into a middle class movement commenced with the launching of Champaran and Kaira Satyagrahas, by Gandhi in 1917 and there were some alarming aspects. For one, the Congress established contacts with the rural masses and industrial workers. For another, this raised a hornet's nest for the Congress, viz., it raised the fundamental question of the exploitation of the masses at the hands of the Indian capitalists and land-lords, and the Congress began to plead for revolutionary changes. Given the magnitude of the problem, Nehru in the Jhansi Conference of the Congress, 1928, posed the dilemma and the gravity of the situation as: "How are we to abolish the big estates? Some advocate confiscation and others full compensation. The latter is on the face of it impossible .... confiscation, on the other hand, though equitably perfectly justifiable, may lead to many cases of hardship".

The same theme, of increasing the wealth and prosperity of the peasants found an echo in the Bardoli Congress resolution which exhorted the peasants to pay land revenue and other taxes to the land-lords and the Government. And, "the Working Committee"

advised the Congress workers and Organizations to inform ryots (peasants) that the withholding of rent payment of zamindars (land-lords) is contrary to the Congress resolutions and injurious to the best interests of the country". In the same vein, it assured the zamindars that "the Congress movement is in no way intended to attack their legal rights and that even where ryots have grievances, the Committee desires that redress be sought by mutual consultation and arbitration".[1] In contradiction, "revolutionary changes in the present social and economic structure of Society and to remove the gross inequalities" which were advocated elsewhere,[2] came to be adopted by the 1929 Congress. This economic resolution, the first with a socialist colouring, asked for revolutionary changes in the economic and social structure of the Society.[3]

The Karachi Congress 1931, gave a signal call to the nation on various issues, social, economic, religious etc. Gandhiji's eleven-points programme, a carefully assorted planks provided an agitational platform for "the classes and the masses".[4] Most of these points, to be more specific, reflected the demands of the FICCI,[5] and there was, however, no substance of socialism.

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1. Sitaramayya, B.P., The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol I p. 392.
2. The U.P. Provincial Congress Committee's Resolution, April 1928.
3. Indian National Congress, Resolutions on Economic Policy, Programme and Allied Matters, 1924-1969, AICC, New Delhi, p. 3.
4. Indian Annual Register, Calcutta, 1930, Vol. I, p. 24.
5. ibid., p. 390.

The Karachi Resolution 1931, included among other things, the right of a living wage, the introduction of an inheritance tax and of a graduated income tax on agriculture income, rent reduction, a state ownership or control of basic industries, reflected socialistic influence, and these were amalgamated with the list of the Nehru Committee Report, 1928 and Gandhiji's eleven-point programme, 1929.[1] The emphasis on Fundamental Rights was proposed to assuage the minorities and act as an antidote to communal apprehensions, and this became the basis of the Congress Election Manifesto, 1936.[2]

The "No tax, No rent" campaign of the U.P. Congress perturbed the Zamindars and this the Congress Working Committee sought to assuage by its resolution of 1932.[3] The Congress Working Committee met on June 18, 1934 and passed the resolution re-assuring the propertied class not to be scared by the loose talk of confiscation of private property and class war cry.[4] This resolution of the Working Committee emphasising on the socialist programme and indirectly disassociating the congressmen from the socialist movement was resented by leading members of the Socialist movement like Narendra Deva, J.P. Narayan and Sampurnanand as a 'deliberate offensive'.[5]

1. Motilal Nehru et al., Report of the All Parties Conference Committee, Allahabad, 1928, pp. 101-3. The report which outlined a scheme of the new Constitution for India based on that of a self-governing dominion, recognized "all titles in private and personal property".
2. Indian Annual Register, Calcutta, 1934, Vol. II, pp. 220-1.
3. Indian National Congress, Resolutions on Economic Policy, Programme and Allied Matters, op. cit., p. 9.
4. ibid., pp. 9-10.
5. The Indian Annual Register, 1934, Vol. I, p. 344.

The Congress Working Committee's resolution adopted in 1934 about the "confiscation of private property without compensation and class war" contrary to the creed of "Non-violence" was condemned by Nehru: ".... the resolution was loosely worded and exhibited a certain amount of ignorance on the part of the framers as to what class war was. It was obviously aimed at the newly-formed Congress Socialist Party. There had, as a matter of fact, been no talk of confiscation on the part of any responsible member of this group; there had, however, been frequent reference to the existence of class war under present conditions. The Working Committee's resolution seemed to hint that any person believing in the existence of this class conflict could not even be an ordinary member of the Congress. Nobody had ever accused the Congress of having turned Socialist or of being against private property. Some members of it held those opinions, but now it appeared that they had no place even in the rank and file of the all-embracing national organization ...."[1] Nehru went on: ".... the Congress aiming at gaining the support of men of property in the coming elections to the Legislative Assembly. At their instance the Congress was looking more and more to the Right and trying to win over the moderate and conservative elements in the country. Soothing words were being addressed even to those who had been hostile to the Congress movement in the past and had sided with the government during the continuance of the Civil Disobedience. A clamorous and critical Left-wing was felt to be a handicap in this process of conciliation and 'conversion', and the Working Committee's resolution as well as many other individual utterances,

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1. Nehru, An Auto-biography, The Bodley Head, London, 1955, p. 557

made it clear that the Congress Executive were not going to be moved from their new path by this nibbling from the Left. If the Left did not behave it would be sat upon and eliminated from the Congress ranks ...."[1]

Two years later, the Right-Left confrontation within the Congress was simmering to outburst. This could be judged from the Presidential Address which Pandit Nehru delivered in 1936 at the Lucknow Congress which was "out of tune with the majority of the Working Committee", and it pleaded for "pure communism".[2] "... The President was out of tune with the majority of the Working Committee. The three new friends taken into it would, with him make a good four or more than a fourth of the Committee but generally speaking the deliberations and decisions of the Congress were not conditioned or conducted by majorities and minorities. Jawaharlal had offered his resignation at the very outset but he was persuaded to remain and continue. Continue he did but with qualms of conscience whichcreated uneasy feelings in his breast. On the one hand there was his presidential address which was not meant to be a mere thesis but a programme of action. On the other, there was Gandhi with his following of ten members in the Working Committee thinking and acting as a solid block .... The address pleaded for pure communism in a country which had had its own traditions built up through at least a hundred and thirty centuries of progress, and a social structure which had through these long

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1. ibid., p. 558.
2. Sitaramayya, Pattabhi., "The History of the Indian National Congress" Vol II op. cit., p. 13.

ages, withstood the buffets of time and circumstance and which had worked itself into the life of the nation, - religious economic and ethical ...."

Thus, the national movement's definition of the concept of freedom underwent drastic changes. Freedom from foreign rule was the main concern. Concentration of wealth in Indian hands was not the main issue then in the pre-independence days. The Lucknow Congress which met in 1936 took note of the appalling conditions of landless labour. It also took note of the different systems of land tenure and revenue systems in various provinces and called upon the provincial congress committees to make recommendations in detail to the Congress Working Committee by 31.8.1936.[1]

Nehru wanted socialism but "all this was to be attempted in the context of democratic freedom and with a large measure of co-operation of some at least of the groups who were nominally opposed to socialistic doctrine". He is even prepared for "toning down or weakening the Plan in some respects" in orderto secure "that co-operation".[2]

Gandhiji, on the other hand, was not prepared to sacrifice the individual at the altar of equality and looked upon "an increase of the power of the State with the greatest fear, because although

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1. Indian National Congress Resolutions, AICC, New Delhi, 1969, Lucknow Congress 1936, A Party Publication, p. 10.
2. Nehru J., The Discovery of India, op. cit., p. 406.

while apparently doing good by minimizing exploitation, it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress. We know of so many cases wher men have adopted trusteeship, but none where the State has really lived for the poor".[1]

According to the doctrine of Trusteeship the rich are to be left in possession of their wealth but they must regard themselves not owners but trustees of their wealth and use it for the service of society, taking for themselves no more than a fair return for service rendered. Gandhi assumed honesty on the part of the trustee, but if the rich do not become trustees of their wealth then Gandhi advised non-violent, non-co-operation and C.D. as the right and infallible remedy, because "The rich cannot accumulate wealth without the co-operation of the poor in society".[2] The Faizpur Congress again carried seeds of Right and Left controversy to its extreme. This time it centred round the office acceptance or not of Congress ministries under the new 1935 Constitution and the struggle of the working class and peasantry.[3] Nehru's election as President meant a vote for Socialism.[4]

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1. The Modern Review, Oct. 1935, p. 413.
2. The Harijan, 1940.
3. Sitaramayya, Pattabhi, B., The History of the Indian National Congress, op. cit., p. 31.
4. ibid., p. 33.

The Congress visualised by Alan Hume to discuss social matters did not do so because, as Dadabhai said it was felt that: "how a cosmopolitan gathering like the Congress discuss to any purpose the reforms needed in any one class? Only the members of that class can effectively deal with the reforms therein needed. And National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the entire nation has a direct participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social reforms and other class question to class congresses."[1] It was also because, as he said, that "for everything there are proper times, proper circumstances and proper places". What it needed was "to create unity and not fresh divisions", and hence it was "inadvisable to involve ourselves in activities that tended to add to our difficulties and resulted in conflict".[2]

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1. Naoroji, Dadabhai, Presidential address, Calcutta Congress, 1886, quoted in The Indian National Congress, G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras, 1917, p.11.

2. ibid.

And, Congress till 1893, not only worked in unison and concord with all classes and creeds but took care to provide that such harmony was provided in the future, as the Congress had no concern whatever with religion and religious convictions of its members. More important, a secular organisation, having no authority to recommend, let alone sanction any religious or social reforms, it could at best, suggest social reforms to the Government and pray for legislation. The first important sign of sectionalism in the Congress however, surfaced during the preparations for its eleventh session in Poona, 1895. And the conflict centered on the issue whether or not the Congress be concerned with social and religious reforms. For, Congress men who felt stifled by the social institutionsthat imposed tyranny were consciously aware of the urgent need.

As early as in the Congress at Allahabad 1888, Resolution XIII stated: That no subject shall be passed for discussion by the Subjects Committee, or allowed to be discussed at any congress by the President thereof, to the introduction of which the Hindu or Mohammadan delegates as a body object unanimously or nearly unanimously; and that if, after the discussion of any subject which has been admitted for discussion, it shall appear that all the Hindu or all the Mohammadan delegates as a body are unanimously or nearly unanimously opposed to the resolution which it is proposed to pass thereon, such resolution shall be dropped; provided that this rule shall refer only to subjects in regard to which the Congress has not already definitely pronounced an opinion".

In the Congress Constitution of 1908, the number of members of the AICC was raised from 45 to 97 and it was recommended that one-fifth of this number should be Muslims. Further in Article XXVI it was laid down that the interests of the minorities would be fully safeguarded in case of any political demands that the Congress might make, showing thereby its anxiety to get the co-operation of all elements in the country. (Development of the Congress Constitution, M.V.Ramana Rao, AICC, New Delhi, 1958, p.11)

The Congress leaders had never been sectarian and the greatest political movement had been national from the beginning, and they had always been the staunchest opponents of the separatist policy in any shape or form.

CHAPTER III

BIRTH OF JAN SANGH

The Hindu Mahasabha:

The year 1905 saw the partition of Bengal, which became the vortex of various discontents, and thus began in the country a new era of Swadeshi Movements, which revised the intensity of Hinduism involved in these movements and gave them a communal colouring[1]. These were branded by British Officialdom as communal and thus the Government indirectly blessed the founding of the Muslim League. Muslims were grateful to the Government and expressed their gratitude to the core by adopting the following aims and objects while establishing the Muslim League[2]:

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1. The beginning of the end of British rule started apace with the Congress splitting into two parts, Moderates and Extremists, on the question of these Swadeshi Movements - Boycott, Swadeshi, Swaraj. The people celebrated these Swadeshi movements with characteristic Hindu festivals, (Rakhibandan) the vow of Swadeshi administered in the Kali Temple, Shivaji and Ganesh festivals, which gave a religious stamp of Hindu revivalism. The British Government and Muslims against whom these were intended, took the cue and protested against the communal despotism of the majority community.

2. Rajput, A.B., The Muslim League, Yesterday and Today, Lahore, Ashraf, 1948, pp. 19-20. See also Kabir, Humayun, Muslim Politics in India 1906 - 47 and Other Essays, Firma K.L.Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1969, p.18. Kabir notes that the Muslim League, "founded in 1906 by a group of well-to-do aristocratic Musalmans, was intended to keep the Moslem intelligentsia and middle classes away from the dangerous politics into which the Indian National Congress were just then embarking. It raised the cry of special Moslem interests and pleased that these could not be safeguarded except by cooperation with the British, as in its opinion, Musalmans were as yet educationally, economically and politically incapable of defending their own interests".

a) to promote among the Musalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of Government with regard to any of the measures;

b) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India and to respectfully present their need and aspirations to the Government; and

c) to prevent rise among the Musalmans of India of any feelings of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the aforementioned objects of the League.

However, the "inhuman activities" of the Muslims during the communal riots which followed the partition of Bengal gave impetus to the Bengali Hindu Youth to form "Anushilan Samity" for the purpose of self-defence. And the United Bengal Hindu Movement, 1907, according to the Hindu Mahasabha historian, Indra Prakash, was a direct response to the founding of the Muslim League as well as a result of the turmoil in Bengal resulting from the partition of the Province during the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon.[1] Elsewhere in Punjab also the Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded in the same year, 1907, which was to

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1. Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement, 2nd ed., Akil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 1962, p. 11.

spearhead the Indu movement till it led to the establishment of Akil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha. The Punjab Hindu Sabha in its first meeting adopted a resolution stating that:

> "the Sabha is not sectarian for a denominational but an all-embracing movement, and, while meaning no offence to any other movement whether Hindu or non-Hindu, it aims to be ardent and watchful in safeguarding the interests of the entire Hindu community in all respects"[1]

Thus, the self-appointed guardian of Hindu interests, the Punjab Hindu Sabha, in 1909 compiled a list of grievances of the Hindu community[2]. The most important of them was the disadvantageous position in which the Hindus would be placed in the matter of representation under the proposed Minto-Morley Scheme, 1909. For the first time in the history of India, these reforms granted communal representation through statutory

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1. Prakash Indra, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha (The Akil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi, 1938) p.ii.

2. "With regard to the second grievances it was said that the grievances of the Hindu community of the Punjab were represented under three different heads - (i) the differential treatment in the distribution of government patronage; (ii) the disabilities imposed upon the Hindus by the Punjab Alienation of Land Act and the Punjab Pre-emption Act; and (iii) the disadvantageous position in which the Hindus would be placed in the matter of representation under the proposed Reform Scheme....The practical working of the Act has been extremely detrimental to the Hindus.....while almost all the Mohammedan castes have been notified as agricultural tribes, the high class Hindus have been scrupulously kept out even where they have held land and followed agriculture as a profession for several generations. ibid.

enactment to the Muslims. This paved the way for the utter disregard of Hindu interests by the Government and the disappearence of the feeling of unity on the part of Muslims with their Hindu brethren. Added to this, the Lucknow Pact, 1916, between the Congress and the Muslim League, which recognised the existence of "various separate communities whose interests could only be safeguarded by proposing communal electorate and weightage in representation to Muslims in their minority Provinces with acceptance of permanent statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal", was viewed by staunch Hindus with alarm.

Rules permitted in those days for the members of the Congress to be simultaneously members of the Arya Samaj and th Punjab Hindu Sabha, and some prominent leaders who thus held simultaneous membership were Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, Shadi Lal, Lal Chand et al. Presiding over the 1909 session of the Indian National Congress was Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a staunch Hindu, who like Lajpat Rai, was to preside over the Hindu Mahasabha as well. Also, the annual sessions of both the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha were generally held at the same time and at the same place. These contacts among Hindu leaders of various provinces led to the feeling that an all-India body should be formed to counteract the growing influence of the Muslim League. Thus, the All-India Hindu Sabha was founded in 1917 at Lucknow. In April 1921 at its meeting at Hardwar it changed its name to All-India Hindu Mahasabha.

This suspicious attitude of the Hindu leaders as stated above towards Muslims was the result of a recognition on both sides that there was a fundamental and irremovable cause for religious antagonism between the two communities. This antagonism, the Hindu leaders viewed, was due to the method of proselytization adopted by the Muslims. For, as even Nehru has admitted, in earlier days, "conversions to Islam .... whether individual or group probably aroused no particular opposition, except when force or some kind of compulsion was used. Friends and relatives or neighbours might disapprove, but the Hindu community as such apparently attached little importance to this. In contrast, with this indifferent attitude, conversions today attract widespread attention and are resented whether they are to Islam or Christianity. This is largely due to political factors and especially to the introduction of separate religious electorates. Each convert is supposed to be a gain to the communal group leading ultimately to greater representation and more political power".[1] Thus, when the Muslim League tried to stretch its aims and objects as quoted above, 'to advance political rights', the Punjab Hindu Sabha declared its aims to be "ardent and watchful in safeguarding the interests of the entire Hindu community in all respects". The year 1920 saw th Non-co-operation Movement and also the Khilafat agitation alongside the introduction of the Montford Reforms. The Khilafat Movement was meant to preach to the Mohammedan community in India

1. Nehru, J., The Discovery of India, Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1960, p. 263.

that the destruction of the Caliphate at Turkey meant the destruction of Islam in India and that the British Government was responsible for this. The Congress found itself juxtapositioned on the one hand with its non-co-operation movement and on the other with the Montford Reforms of the Government. In its anxiety to win Muslim support on both the counts if possible, or negatively, to place the Muslims at least in a compromising position, as both Hindu and Muslim leaders suspected,[1] the Congress supported the Khilafat Movement of the Muslims.

This attitude of the Congress and the active help it rendered to the Khilafat Movement made a good number of Muslims join the Congress which was interpreted by a majority of the Congressmen as the long desired consummation of the two communities. However, all Congressmen did not share this secular view. This friendly or rather secular attitude of the Congress towards the Muslims, though considered by the orthodox Hindu leaders as a product of political expediency, made them (the Hindu leaders) conclude that this would result in "racial and

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1. See Munshi, K.M., Pilgrimage to India (1902-1950), Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1967, p. 22. Munshi notes that e . Jinnah warned Gandhiji not to encourage the fanaticism of the Muslim religious leaders and their followers. Jinnah was not the only person who foresaw danger in the Khilafat Movement. Rt. Hon. Srinivasa Sastri in his letter to Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyar wrote: "... I fear the Khilafat Movement is going to lead us into disaster".

national self-immolation of the Hindus if they did not realise the danger before it is too late." [1]

The intensification of the Khilafat Movement led to forceful mass Hindu conversions to Islam and its resultant communal riots[2] at Malabar in 1920-21, in Multan in 1921-22 and in other places. The proselytisation inflicted by the Muslim community led to a searching of hearts by the Hindus. They envisaged Shuddhi[3] or reconversion of the converts. In th

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1. Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and the work of the Hindu Mahasabha, The Akil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi, 1938, Foreword of Bhai Parmananda, pp. xxi.

2. Ibid, p. xviii.

3. According to the Punjab Census Report, 1911, Shuddhi is "a Sanskrit word which means purification. In religious terminology it is now applied to (1) conversion to Hinduism of persons belong to foreign religions; (2) reconversion of those who have recently, or at some remote period, adopted one of the foreign religions; and (3) reclamation, i.e. raising the status of the depressed classes".

last week of December 1922, the All India Kshatriya Mahasabha passed a resolution approving the taking back of those four and a half lakh Rajputs who were converted to Islam and who applied for reconversion to Hinduism.[1] At its Banaras session in 1923, the All India Hindu Mahasabha endorsed a programme of 'Shuddhi'. Thus 'Shuddhi' was formally and finally sanctioned by this assemblage of the Hindus which received a great impetus throughout the country[2].

This official endorsement of the Shuddhi Movement by the All-India Hindu Mahasabha provoked the Muslims further, which resulted in a series of communal violences, three of which deserve mention - one at Calcutta on May 23rd, the second at Delhi on July 15th (both in 1923), and the third and most serious of them was at Kohat on September 9, 1924. The series of violent outbreaks and particularly the Kohat tragedy greatly affected the Hindu leaders.[3]

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1. Indra Prakash, op. cit., P.27.
2. Ibid., p. 32.
3. The Most Rev. Foss Westcott writes:

   "During the spring and summer of that year (1924), Hindu-Muslim tension had grown in an alarming degree, partly as a result of the Shuddhi movement which had been led by Swami Shradhanand, among the (Muslims in the neighbourhood of Delhi. This communal friction was a cause of the deepest distress to Mr.Gandhi, with whom, as he said, Hindu-Muslim unity had been his chief concern for thirty years. As one riot succeeded another his distress increased, till on the 17th of September he felt himself called to undertake a fast for twenty-one days". See in Mahatma Gandhi, Essays And Reflections, ed. S.Radhakrishnan, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1957, p.238.

Anak (sic)

In a special session held at Belgaon in December 1924, the Hindu Mahasabha under the chairmanship of Malaviya, passed a number of resolutions especially for the removal of untouchability[1] and about the growing dissatisfaction among the Hindus against the Congress policy with regard to the demands of the Moslems for separate electorates. A committee was appointed "to ascertain and formulate Hindu opinion on the subject of Hindu-Moslem problem in their relation to the question of further constitutional reforms".

The rapidity with which the political developments took place witnessed the submission of the Nehru Committee Report, 1928, outlining the basic concepts of a constitution[2] for the country. This, inter alia, envisaged joint electorates instead of

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1 ~~lay in the fact that~~ "in the former case, conversion was always a voluntary one and a matter of actual change of faith, while in the latter case conversions were in most cases involuntary and brought about by force or fraud". See The Indian Annual Register, 1929, p. 334.

At a later date the Sankaracharya of Puri in his address to the Lahore Session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1936, pointed out that though forcible conversion to Hinduism was unknown to Hinduism, the early Hindus and Aryans slowly absorbed the aborigines and outcastes into their fold as "they reached the then prevailing standard of culture and polish". And he explained that "forgetting this underlying principle of segregation by later generations gave rise to the institution of untouchability". See The Indian Annual Register, 1936, p. 253.

2 ~~1.~~ See the Nehru Committee Report for a full text of the Constitution. Popularly known as Nehru Report, this is the Report of the Committee appointed by the All Parties Conference, 1928 providing a fair outline of the constitutional advance envisaged by the Indian leaders for the country. It was "a rare feat of statesmanship", for it included members representing the Liberals, Hindu Mahasabhites, Muslims, Non-Brahmins, the Sikh League and Labour". See Munshi, K.M., op. cit., p. 24.

separate electorates. The rejection by the Congress of amendments brought by the Muslim League, led to Jinnah's enunciation of his famous Fourteen Points in 1929; and the prospect of an alliance between Congress and League was thrown overboard. The Hindu Mahasabha endorsed the Congress idea of joint electorates in its potency "to further the cause of evolution of India as one united nation", but if Muslims believed that "they cannot without separate electorates, the Hindu Mahasabha will be reluctantly obliged to agree to it, provided that the Muslims adhere to the Lucknow Pact, and its provisions are not contravened or exceeded ... (for) it would be unfair to allow the Muslims to take all the benefits given to them under that agreement for separate electorates and also to claim for concessions".[1] As regards the Muslim demand for the separation of Sind, the Hindu Mahasabha felt that "the creation of new provinces in which a particular community is in a majority is fraught with danger to the growth of sound nationalism in the country and will divide India into Hindu India and Muslim India".[2] By contrast, the Muslim Conference, 1930, held that "the demand for the creation of Muslim India" was "perfectly justified", since the principle of European democracy could not be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups.[3]

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1. See the Extracts of All India Hindu Mahasabha on Muslim demands as placed before the Round Table Conference by Dr. Moonje, Working President of the Hindu Mahasabha, vide The Quarterly Review, July-Dec., 1930, p. 324.
2. Resolution of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, Jabbalpore, 1928, quoted in The Quarterly Review, 1928, p. 426.
3. The Quarterly Review, July-Dec., 1930, p. 337.

The Muslim League condemned the Federal Scheme envisaged under the 1935 Act, and Jinnah[1] accused the Congress of alienating the Muslims of India for the past decade by pursuing a policy which was exclusively Hindu, and added: "since they have formed governments in six provinces where they are in majority they have by their words, deeds and performance have shown that th Mussalmans cannot expect justice of fair play at their hands. On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan for the Hindus".[2] From then on the dichotomy between ideology and politics as the basis of Muslim League underwent a drastic transformation, as the League travelled long way from the demand for separate electorates to the

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1. See Jinnah, M.A., Presidential Address, Lucknow Session of the Muslim League, 1937.

   Kabir had listed the charges of the Muslim League against the Congress which may be enumerated under the following heads:

   > (a) interference with religious rights; (b) tampering with cultural traditions; (c) attempts to curtail sha in services and representation; & (d) social snobbery.
   >
   > Besides these, Kabir notes that the Wardha Scheme of education sponsored by Congress Governments under the inspiration of Gandhi, the question of a common language for India also proved a cause for dissension; the attitude of the Hindus in social matters towards all non-Hindus in general and the Moslem in particular has been one of the most potent causes of Hindu-Muslim misunderstanding and ill-feeling. The most important cause of conflict between the two communities is however based upon the question of ratio in services and representation, between the period of 1906-42.
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   > See Kabir, Humayun, op. cit., pp. 27-31.

enunciation of the two-nation theory[1] in 1940 at its Lahore Session.[2] Thus, politics had simplified down to the Congress versus the League. The Congress still claimed to speak for all India, and dismissed the League as a British-created faction. Jinnah now demanded a separate Muslim State and insisted on negotiating on terms of equality. The Muslims had once been satisfied with one-fourth of the seats in legislatures; then they had required one-third of the representation; now they demanded equality with the Congress. Such was the position of strength they had acquired that this was conceded by the British and only ineffectively opposed by the Congress.[3] As was natural,

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1. See Jinnah's article written for "Time and Tide", 19th Jan. 1940, vide p. 23, quoted in the Resolution on future Constitution of India, at the 27th Conference of the All India Muslim League, held at Lahore, March 1940, vide India's problem of her Future Constitution, M.H. Saiyid, Bombay, 1940. Preface by Jinnah, pp. 16-17. Jinnah stated that the British people must realize that Hinduism and Islam "represent two distinct and separate civilizations", and moreover, are "as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nations of Europe".

2. Kabir notes that the term Pakistan does not actually find a place in the Lahore Resolution of the League. In fact, Jinnah at first resented the application of the term to the scheme he had sponsored. In his opinion, the use of the term created confusion by identifying his scheme with the religio-theological state of Rahmat Ali. The term was not officially used by the League till almost a year after the Lahore Resolution, and even then it was used more in umbrage than otherwise. The position of the League, at least as expressed in the Lahore Resolution, was different. It also sought to divide India but on political, not religious or cultural grounds.... Kabir remarks that Jinnah had stated more than once that he was essentially a politician and visualised a State that would be modern and secular.

   See Kabir, Humayun., op. cit., p. 105. Actually Jinnah himself traced the origin of Pakistan to Iqbal, the great Muslim poet. See, India's Problem of Her Future Constitution, op. cit.

3. See Kabir, Humayun., op. cit., pp. 27-28.

the Hindu Mahasabha feared that such "talks of Pakistans in different parts ... would break up the unity of the country". The Hindu Mahasabha leaders declared that "in India the Hindus constituted the nation, the bedrock of the nation, and that the non-Hindus are and will remain as equal citizens enjoying equal protection and equal rights".[1]

Rajaji was almost alone in realising the need for an agreement between the Congress and the League and recommended to the Congress that it should acknowledge the League's claim for separation and that negotiations be started immediately with the same for "the purpose of arriving at an agreement and securing the installation of a national government to meet the present emergency", in order to establish "that united and common front which the British would then no longer be abl to resist".[2]

As a result, even before Independence, with Pakistan in the offing, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee felt the necessity for a broader political vision. With the possible abolition of separate electorates, Dr. Mookerjee argued, the Hindu Mahasabha

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1. See Savarkar, D., Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Dec. 1939, vide Indian Annual Register, Dec. 1939, p. 80.

2. Dr. Sitaramayya, B.P., The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. II, Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay, 1947, p. 336.

"must broaden its base, admit members of all religious communities into it and play its proper role as the national organization of all the Hindus".[1] Again later he reasoned that the Hindu Mahasabha had outlived its political life due to its failure in the elections held before Independence and suggested the giving up of politics by the Hindu Mahasabha and confining itself to religious-cultural activities. This later suggestion, however, was not acceptable to the party. It is interesting to recall Dr. Mookerjee's earlier views on the subject. He had said:

> "If a time comes when religious and communal considerations disappear from the field of Indian administration and all parties are swayed by one common national ideal, there may be no need for separate political organization for Hindus as such. But let us not forget what we really are today. Politics detached from realities is not only meaningless but dangerous".

On the other hand, the other Hindu Mahasabha leaders, embittered by the Congress policy of appeasement towards Muslims, wanted to capitalise on the anti-Congress and anti-Muslim feeling.

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1. Even before the assassination of Gandhi, Dr. Mookerjee had advised the Hindu Mahasabha to leave politics and devote itself to social work. See (Mookerjee, Umaprasad, ed.) "Shyama Prasad Mookerjee...." 2nd Edition, A. Mukherjee & Co., Calcutta, 1953, Appendix III, p. 98. Indra Prakash writes: Dr. Mookerjee did not oppose the Party's return to politics when the pressure due to the assassination of Gandhi eased a bit. But he advocated to drop its communal membership requirement and open its rolls to members of all communities. Indra Prakash, op. cit.

Thus, started to counter the demand of the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha throughout its existence kept up its attack on the League, including on its later 'pernicious doctrine'[1] of Pakistan, and on Pakistan itself after it was created, as well as on those Indians who were 'soft' towards Muslims. Its attacks were especially turned towards Rajaji, because of his views as well as of his earlier suggestion with regard to Muslim demands that came to be known later as the 'C.R. Formula'.[2]

As is natural, the Hindu Mahasabha specifically restricted itself to the Hindu interests. It castigated the Congress for its failure to help the Hindu cause by not supporting the religious institutions and Shuddhi movement. Its rancour against Muslim communalism and Congress secularism led to its

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1. See Dr. Mookerjee's address to the United Provinces Hindu Conference, Gorakhpur, 7th and 8th Oct. 1944, quoted in 'Awake Hindustan' by S.P. Mookerjee, Calcutta, Ramesh Chandra Banerjee, Hindustan Office, 1944, p. 178.

2. See Indian Annual Register, July-Dec. 1943, for the attack on C.R. and 'man of his way of thinking' by Kunwar Guru Narain, and Prof. Deshpande, especially pp. 206-209.
On July 10, 1944, C. Rajagopalachari published the formula which had been approved by Gandhiji during the latter's fast in 1943. This was intended to serve as a basis for settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League and envisaged Pakistan with transfer of population. See the Indian Annual Register, 1944, pp. 60-61 and Dr. Pattabi's The History of Indian National Congress, Vol. II, p. 632. For the controversy over the similarities that exist in the C.R. Formula and the one which was to have been given to Raja Maheswar Dayal Seth, the then Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, from Jinnah by a common friend, and for Rajaji's claim about the originality of his formula, see C.R's letter dated June 17, 1966 to Munshi. Vide Munshi, K.M., Pilgrimage to India, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1967, p. 84.

3. for P 76

adopting a policy of militant Hindu nationalism[1] that had generated amongst the people at this period so as to make the party an effective political force. The party was not even prepared to agree with Mookerjee's suggestion to open its doors to all communities.[2]

It is important to note here that Dr. Mookerjee, prior to formation of the Jan Sangh, was invited by Nehru to join the Central Cabinet, which he did. In spite of the creation of a separate state for Muslims, and after three years of the ugly turn of politics on the morrow of partition, the year 1950 witnessed an increase in the arrival of refugees from East Bengal. The loss of lives and property of the Hindus in East Bengal created a delicate problem for the Government of India. The subsequent Liaquat-Nehru Pact[3] signed on April 8, 1950 tried to solve the problem of minorities.[3]

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1. Myron Weiner includes in this category of militant Hindu nationalism Jan Sangh and Ram Rajya Parishad, in their communal aspect and in their concern for cultural matters such as religion, language and education as of best understood in terms of the history of the Hindu reaction to the Western impact. See Weiner, Myron, Party Politics in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, passim and especially p. 156.

2. The Working Committee of the All India Hindu Mahasabha which met on August 8, 1948 recommended to consider the open membership policy of Dr. Mookerjee, but it was rejected by the General Body.

3. The pact contained a pledge to maintain equal rights for the minorities in each country. It also provided for the return of refugees without any hindrance to their birth place. Also, the refugees were permitted to carry with them all movable property and to dispose of all immovable property and carry the proceeds with them.

Dr. Mookerjee, enraged by the terms of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, resigned on April 8, 1950 from the Central Cabinet along with K.C. Neogy. In a statement[1] in the Union Parliament at a later date giving reasons for his resignation, Dr. Mookerjee recalled his assurances[2] given to the Hindus of East Bengal at the time of Partition and before his becoming a Central Minister. He had assured them that:

> "... if suffered at the hands of the future Pakistan Government, ... if they were denied elementary rights of citizenship, if their lives and honour were jeopardized or attacked, Free India would not remain an idle spectator and their just cause would be boldly taken up by the Government and people of India..."

Then he extensively quoted[3] the Prime Minister of Pakistan who, while moving the Objective Resolution, said:

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1. See Dr. Mookerjee's statement before Parliament after his resignation as a Minister, on April 19, 1950, Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Vol. IV, pp. 3017-19.

2. The necessity for giving such assurances was that as a result of Radcliffe Boundary Commission's report, a very large tract of land with a Hindu population of over 2 million went to East Bengal. The Hindu minorities felt nervous about the Muslim dominated administration of which they had bitt r experience. The leaders of East Bengal Hindus had supported the demand for partition of Bengal in the hope and on th understanding that their co-patriots of West Bengal and the rest of India will look to their welfare. They wanted to be assured that they would not be left at the sweet mercy of Pakistan. Dr. Mookerjee undertook a tour of East Bengal and persuaded Patel, Gandhiji and others to visit East Bengal and authoritatively reassure its Hindu population. On his part, he assured them that he would watch their interests and stand by them in all their difficulties.

   Madhok, Balraj., Portrait of a Martyr, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1969, p. 67.

3. See Dr. Mookerjee's statement, op. cit., pp. 3017-19.

> "... the State will create such conditions as are conducive to the building up of the truely Islamic Society[1] which means that the State will have to play a positive part in this effort."

Dr. Mookerjee felt this speech as highly provocative and also pointed out that:

> "it is not the ideology preached by Pakistan which is the only disturbing factor. Its performances have been in full accord with its ideology and the minorities have had bitter experiences in times without number of the true character and functioning of an Islamic State."

He termed that the lives of the minorities in Pakistan have become "nasty, brutish and short". He recalled the futility of signing any number of agreements with Pakistan regarding the question of minorities.

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1. Sri Prakasa interprets and distinguishes the difference between 'Muslim State' and 'Islamic State' thus:

> "..... a Muslim State is one that has a preponderant proportion of the population following the Muslim religion, as such; and all power in such a State is in the hands of those who followed that particular faith. An Islamic State, on the other hand, would mean that the State was being governed in accordance with the dictates of Islam; and that in principles of governance enunciated in the religions and sacred book or books of the particular religion are being actually implemented in practice. A State could thus be Islamic even if the majority of the population therein was non-Muslim".

See Sri Prakasa, Pakistan, Birth and Early days, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1965, pp. 58-59.

Dr. Mookerjee was not the only person to give vent to his feelings thus. Earlier, even Nehru had observed in Parliament on February 23, 1950, that:

> "many parts of East Bengal had witnessed the tragedy on a considerable scale. A very large number, if not all, of the members of the minority of Pakistan had lost all sense of security and lived in fear and apprehension."[1]

It was Patel's influence which suffered a setback due to the circumstances under which the assassination of Gandhiji took place. In fact, it was suggested that he had had a hand in not providing adequate protection for Gandhiji.[2] This, however, was soon countered in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) by the facts given by him in answer to a question by Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.[3] To note in the same breath, a remarkable factor was that no one said at that time or afterwards

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1. Statement made by Prime Minister Nehru before Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., p.

2. Abdul Kalam Azad says "some people openly accused Sardar Patel for inefficiency. J.P. Narain showed considerable courage in raising this issue. In the meeting which was held in Delhi to express our sense of horror and sorrow at Gandhiji's death, he said clearly that the Home Minister of the Government of India could not escape the responsibility for this assassination. He demanded an explanation from Sardar Patel as to why no special measures had been taken where there was open propaganda inciting people to murder Gandhiji and a bomb had actually been thrown at him".
   See Azad, Abdul Kalam, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1959, p. 223.

3. Constituent Assembly Debates, Feb. 6, 1948.

that Dr. Mookerjee might have had the knowledge, if not a hand in this crime, in spite of the fact that he was one of the prominent leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha at that time and also a Cabinet Minister. Veer Savarkar, Deshpande and others were imprisoned and other Hindu Mahasabha leaders were subjected to severe restrictions.

Dr. N.B. Khare, a member from the Princely State of Alwar, of the Constituent Assembly and a later President of the Hindu Mahasabha, was detained for complicity in the assassination. Thus the political aspirations of the Hindu Mahasabha leaders suffered a great deal due to popular sentiment and unofficial indictment because of its alleged association with the assassination of Gandhiji. Dr. Mookerjee's failure to influence the Mahasabha on both counts of his suggestions of open m sbershi and of giving up of politics[1] by the Hindu Mahasabha, compelled him to resign from the party a little later.[2]

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1. The Working Committee of the All India Hindu Mahasabha meeting at New Delhi on August 8, decided to rescind its decision of February 15 by which it confined itself only to social and cultural work, and to resume political activiti The Hindu, quoted in Keesings Contemporary Archives, Dec. 11-18, 1948, p. 9456.

2. Dr. Mookerjee, the Minister for Industries & Supply, announced on Nov. 23, that he had resigned from the Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha, since its recent decision to renew the Mahasabha's political activities was against the principles which he had urged the Mahasabha to accept. Passions and prejudices based on communal differences, he stated, must be eliminated if India was to "emerge as a great and mighty nation". It was stated in New Delhi that Dr. Mookerjee's membership of the Mahasabha would lapse s from the New Year. The Hindu, Madras, ibid., p. 9676.

With the resignation of Dr. Mookerjee from the Hindu Mahasabha, he was in search of a political platform the like of which was provided by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.[1]

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh:

Now, coming to the organization requiring political leadership. The Hindu-Muslim unity of the Khilafat Movement and the resultant riots were responsible for the birth of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh also. In fact, it was formed to protect the interests of the Hindus, by Dr. K.B. Hedgewar, in Nagpur when communal riots swept that city in 1925.[2] Hedgewar and his associates were led to believe that the freedom of India could only be won by the Hindus, and to do so the Hindus needed character-building and cultural and physical strengthening. He set himself the task[3] of

> "this work of character building within the Hindu Society ... (since) Hindu life has been the basic unit of the centuries long nationhood of Bharat... by believing that all are but the children of the Mother Earth ... Hindu philosophy lifts the man

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1. Lambert, Richard D., "Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics" in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker (eds.) Leadership and Political Institutions in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, p. 211.

2. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was born on Vijayadasami Day in 1925, formed by a body of those persons who had voluntarily dedicated themselves to the service of the motherland.
   Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, A Brief Introduction, an R.S.S. Publication, p. 10 (n.d.)

3. ibid.

about the various difference of religious sects and persuasions ... the word Hindu does not denote a particular religion ... but indicates nationshood. The work of organizing Hindu society and building up character among Hindus is beyond doubt the most constructive work."[1]

Hedgewar however realised that the entering into politics by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh would corrupt its membership and there is

"no place for political rivalry or bitterness in the Sangh because the Sangh has kept itself scrupulously aloof from the day to day political activities. It does not believe that national oneness can be achie through elections, or political propaganda. It does not believe that legislations can infuse the spirit of patriotism, devotion, character, amity and sacrifice in the people .... in fact, the Sangh keeps to purify and vivify all walks of national life, political, economic, social, cultural, religious, educational, scientific or military by instilling in our people sterling loyalty and burning love for the mother-land and her heritage."

Thus seen, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh had, in those days, a great deal of political influence, no doubt, but not a political party in the true meaning of the term.[2] However, the

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1. Sangh Darshan, an R.S.S. Publication, (n.d.), p. 24.
2. Weiner notes that this idea compelled Dr. Hedgewar to resist the suggestion of Veer Savarkar of Hindu Mahasabha to make the R.S.S. the political appendage of the Hindu Mahasabha, though the individual Swayamsevak is allowed to join a political party of his choice which of course is a limited one. See Weiner, Myron., Party Politics in India, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

Swayamsevaks could become members of any political party of their choice except the Communist Party of India, and to work in the party they are subject to only on one condition, that the office-holders of that Party could not be office-bearers in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh also simultaneously. It expected its members to believe and work for the cultural unity of the Hindus and strive to mould themselves to establish on abiding fraternity of the people on the solid basis of the one cultural heritage. If the utterances of the leaders like Hedgewar and Golwalkar[1] mean anything, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was and still is an organisation solely for the Hindus including all its denominations, Sikhs, Jains and Buddists, "to establish within its own group a model of revitalised Hindu Society and eventually to secure the adoption of this cultural form in the whole country[2]".

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1. According to Golwalkar the non-Hindu people in Hindustan must either adopt Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion....in a word they must cease to be foreigners or may stay in this country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no priveleges, far less any preferential treatment - not even citizens' rights.

   See Golwalkar, M.S., "We or our Nationhood defined, Bharat Prakashan, Nagpur, 1947, pp. 55-56. See also Golwalkar's Why Hindu Rashtra, Kesari Press, Bangalore, 1962, p. 8.

2. See Lambert, Richard D., Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, Leadership and Political Institutions in India, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 215.

Christians, Muslims, Jews and Parsis cannot become its members but are 'guests' as they are not children of this soil.[1]

The assassination of Gandhiji by Godse who had been associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh for some time and also with Hindu Mahasabha, resulted in the banning of the Organization by the Government of India on February 4, 1948.[2] Golwalkar condemned the crime before his arrest and termed it as "a tragedy of unparalled magnitude", the more so because "the evil genius is his countryman and a Hindu".[3]

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1. Golwalkar, M.S., Bunch of Thoughts, Vikrama Prakashan, Bangalore, 1966, pp. . On the other hand, all that is expected of Muslim and Christians "is the shedding of the notions of their 'religious minorities' as also their foreign mental complexion and merging themselves in the common national stream of the soil". If, however, "the Muslims and Christians feel that they are habituated to pray God in the manner of Islam or Christianity for a long time, and that those ways of worship strike a sympathetic chord in their hearts, then certainly they are welcome to continue in those paths". See Hindu Rashtra and 'Minorities', an R.S.S. publication, 1969, p. 7.

2. Godse joined R.S.S. in about 1930 but resigned in 1934, when Hedgewar refused to take the R.S.S. into direct political activity. See Curran Jr. J.A., Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics - Study of the R.S.S., Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1951, p. 13.

3. See, for his statement, Feb. 1, 1948 in the collection of the Historic document between Shri Guruji - Government Correspondence, 1948-49, Justice on Trial, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Prakashan Vibhag, Karnatak, 1968, p. 65. Godse was one of those who accompanied Hedgewar on the latter's tour for founding of R.S.S. Sakhas in various provinces. This and the other related correspondence quoted herein have been confirmed by the Ministry of Home Affairs in its correspondence with the Researcher.

Nehru's opposition to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was consistant with his secularism and his anti-communalism. Sardar Patel, the then Home Minister, tried to be a mediator between the Congress and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and to soften the edges of Congress criticism, he admonished those in the Congress who were in power and who felt "that by virtue of authority they will be able to crush the R.S.S". He plainly told them:

> "By danda (force) you cannot suppress any organization. Moreover, danda is meant for thieves ... Its use will not help much. After all, R.S.S. men are not thieves and dacoits. They love their country. Only their trend of thought is diverted. They are to be won over by Congressmen with love."[1]

He appealed to the R.S.S. to use their wisdom and work in a proper way and not be rash and tactless.

Patel, appreciated the services rendered by the R.S.S. to the Hindu Society and said that "no person of understanding could have a word of objection regarding that", but "the objectionable part arose when they, burning with revenge, began attacking Musalmans", because he felt that "organizing the Hindus and helping them is one thing, but going in for revenge for its sufferings on innocent and helpless men, women and children is quite another thing".[2]

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1. See Justice on Trial, op. cit., p. 26.

2. Ibid

To dispel this stigma of the R.S.S., Patel indicated a way out in his speeches in Lucknow and Jaipur.[1] The suggested way out was "that the R.S.S. men can carry on their patriotic endeavour only by joining the Congress and not by keeping separate or by opposing",[2] and "the Sangh should be brought to adopt fresh lines of technique and policy. That new technique and the new policy can be only according to the rules of the Congress". This suggestion, coming as it did from a man of the stature of Patel, requires here more than a passing reference. Patel accepted the fundamental position that everyone had 'a duty, from the highest to the lowest, to contribute his mite in whatever way possible' and there could be no place for party conflicts and quarrels. In spite of this, his suggestion, according to him, stemmed from the consideration of the good of the country at a delicate hour it was passing through. It also showed his appreciation of the services of the R.S.S. What was not understandable was that he could have advised the R.S.S. to discard the revengeful attitudes instead of a suggestion like this. For, it is inconceivable to think that by joining the Congress, the R.S.S. men would have totally discarded these revengeful attitudes, if any, overnight. He reiterated his suggestion a couple of times more in his correspondence with Golwalkar when the latter was interned in connection with the assassination of Gandhiji.

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1. Patel in his letter dated September 11, 1948 drew the attention of Golwalkar to his speeches at Lucknow and Jaipur.
2. See Justice on Trial, op. cit., pp. 28-29. Patel reiterated his suggestion in his letter to Golwalkar dated September 26, 1948.

Golwalkar did not oblige Patel in this; he thought differently, though the appreciation of Patel was reciprocated,[1] on his part he recognised the capability of the Congress as the ruling party to deliver goods in the political field. He stressed, at the same time, the supremacy of the R.S.S. in the cultural field 'in creating a matchless spirit of patriotism, brotherhood and selflessness among the people'. He did not agree to the consummation of R.S.S. and Congress but desired that 'there be no bad blood, there be only everlasting mutual love, one supplementing and complementing the other, both meeting in a sacred confluence'.

Golwalkar, while denying the allegations of the Government for banning the R.S.S. organization, requested Sardar Patel to consider the lifting of the ban from the point of view of the national situation arising from two new developments. One was the need for 'effective check-mating' of the evil of communalism arising out of the Hyderabad[2] problem created by the Government. The other was the spread of communism and the need to stop it as well as to prevent the students leaning more and more towards it. He felt confident to say that the R.S.S., if allowed to function without any stigma attached, would be able to counteract this 'Ism' and the youth could still be saved to a large extent.

1. See Justice on Trial, op. cit., pp. 30-34. See Golwalkar's rejoinder to Patel, on Nov. 5, 1948.
2. See Golwalkar's correspondence with Patel, dated September 24, 1948.

He ended his argument with an emphatic declaration of hope and confidence:

> "I for one feel that if you with Government power and we with organised cultural force combine, we can soon eliminate this menace. I am intensely worried at the waves of the victory of that foreign 'ism', which are sweeping over our neighbouring countries."

To this, Patel replied that the ban could not be removed in view of the expressed opinion of the Provinces[1] against lifting the ban, and said:

> "you are aware that our own men are there in all th Provincial Ministries - there must be some defect in the organization itself. No one has any animosity against the organization. If even then their opinion is like this, there must surely be some real basis for it."

The Government, however, indicated that they would lift the ban if the R.S.S. fulfilled the following:

1. Declaration in the R.S.S. constitution for the abjuration of violence;

2. Allegiance to the Constitution of India and National Flag;

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1. See letter dated September 26, 1948, quoted in Justice on Trial, op. cit., p. 29.

3. Written constitution and publication of annual audited accounts;

4. Functions of Sarsanghchalak to be precisely defined;

5. Local autonomy in regard to office-bearers;

6. Withdrawal of the pledge of life obligation in connection with membership;

7. Written consent of the parents or guardians of the minors.[1]

A written constitution of the R.S.S. was adopted on February 4, 1948 for the first time since its inception,[2] but the ban on the R.S.S. was not lifted by the Government till July 11, 1949. However, the lifting of the ban was unconditional, in spite of the fact that no undertaking was given by the R.S.S.[3]

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1. Letter No. 28/23/49 POL dated May 3, 1949 from the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs to M.S. Golwalkar, signed by H.V.R. Iyengar, Secretary to the Government of India, vide Justice on Trial, pp. 42-43.

2. R.S.S. had never before a constitution because, "one does not need a constitution to preach nationalism and to advance individual and national character". See Organiser, August 22, 1949. The Preamble of the Constitution adopted by the R.S.S. mentions this among other things that: "... whereas the Sangh had till now no written constitution; and whereas in the present changed conditions, it is deemed expedient to reduce to writing the constitution as also the aims and objects of the Sangh and its methods of work ...." See the R.S.S. Constitution, p.1. printed in 1949.

3. Golwalkar was emphatic about it. Asked on July 22, 1949 in what respects has the R.S.S. Sangh changed from what it was in the past, Golwalkar replied that they had "given up nothing". See the Extract of the report of the Press Conference of Shri Guruji at Madras, The Hindu, July 22, 1949. Vide Justice on Trial, op. cit., p. 102.

Today the Sangh is devoted purely to cultural work and by no means can it be called a political party. According to its constitution, individual swayamsevaks may join any political party, excepting those parties as do believe in or resort to violent and secret methods to achieve their ends. Persons owing allegiance to such parties or believing in such methods have no place in the Sangh.

Thus, though the hands of co-operation were extended by both of them, their hands did not meet. And Golwalkar was to take "a different path",[1] of extending R.S.S. co-operation later to the Jan Sangh.

The utter reluctance to direct participation in politics by the R.S.S. was due to the belief of Golwalkar expressed even earlier that "the concept of total national reorganisation that the R.S.S. has been striving to bring about into reality naturally implies the non-political nature of its work.... Political techniques - and even political power for that matter - can hardly infuse the spirit of devotion, heroism, character, amity and sacrifice in the people".[2]

Articles appearing in the 'Organiser', the seemingly semi-official organ of the R.S.S. (and later also of the Jan Sangh), show that individual swayamsevaks continued, as

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1. Justice on Trial, op. cit., p. 34.
2. ibid.

permitted by the constitution, to dabble in politics. Balraj Madhok of the R.S.S., who was to take an active part later on in the formation of the Jan Sangh, had called on the R.S.S. in 1949 to give a lead to the country by entering and taking a direct part in active politics.[1]

Thus leaders of the R.S.S. like Madhok wanted the Sangh to go ahead with politics. Madhok recalled the social and cultural activities of the R.S.S. and stressed that "there are other problems whose proper handling and solution is as vital to the national health as unity and character". According to him, these were political and economic in nature 'which the Sangh has decided not to touch'. He argued "that it is necessary that the Sangh must give lead to the country in regard to the political and economic problems of the country. It is very essential for the very existence of the Sangh itself. Any institution or organisation which fails to guide its component parts about the vital questions influencing their lives is bound to lose the driving force which keeps any organisation alive".

Merely by joining other parties and trying to influence from within was no good, for two reasons. For one thing, all existing parties had fundamental defects and none of them

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1. Vide Organiser, Sept. 6, 1949. Thus there was a strong faction in the R.S.S. who were anxious for direct participation of the R.S.S. in politics, in spite of Golwalkar.

could deliver the goods from the R.S.S. point of view, thus said Dada Paramarth, an R.S.S. leader, for instance. He dismissed the Congress as one which "does not have the country's cause at heart....retention of power is the only thing they have in mind". The communists were not acceptable because they believe "in coercion and force of all types", while the socialists "lack leadership of the kind which could advance and enhance the confidence of the people". This, according to him had left the Hindu Mahasabha in the arena and for which he had a kind word to say, because "it has something fundamental, essential and vital to say". But, in this "a leadership of conviction and realism with a nucleus of followers has failed to emerge".[1]

Second, entrenched parties could not be influenced so easily. Thus analysing the situation in India after Independence, Balraj Madhok mentions the frustration of the attempts of the R.S.S. workers in influencing the Congress from within. He wrote, "they (the leaders of R.S.S.) had also begun to realise that it was not very easy for ordinary members to influence the policies of well organised and well entrenched parties like the Congress from within".[2] K.R.Malkani, the editor of the "Organiser", saw no hope in the Congress under the sole

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1. Madhok, Balraj., Portrait of a Martyr, p. 153.

2. Ibid.

leadership of Nehru because, he commented, "gone is the Hinduising influence of Gandhiji. And now gone too is the moderating influence of Sardar".[1] It would be quite in order to mention at this juncture that Deendayal Upadhyaya had to say at a much later date.[2] He referred to the closeness of views between Purushothamdas Tandon, the President of the Congress in 1950-51, and the Jan Sangh. He averred that Tandon was the last influential member of the Congress who represented the Bharatiya elements within that party; and he said that after a showdown with Nehru, which led to Tandon's[3] exit from the Congress Presidency, the Congress had been ideologically drifting farther from Bharatiya nationalist sentiments. Had Tandon continued to be the Congress President and had the Congress accepted his views, there would probably not have been any need for founding the Jan Sangh.

Naturally, the need for a political organisation to reflect the ideas and ideals of the R.S.S. in the political sphere and thus able to command the willing allegiance of th R.S.S. workers and sympathisers, was felt essential. It was realised that this need would "become more pressing after th

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1. K.R. Malkani, Principles for a new Political Party, Vijay Pusthak Bhandar, 1951, p. 11.
2. Some leaders felt that the Congress was, however, nearest to their approach. But the Congress was rapidly drifting away. Also see The Organiser, April 6, 1963.
3. It may be mentioned here that Tandon's views were based on more orthodox thinking on religious, social and economic matters. He stood for the regeneration of Hinduism and propagation of Hindi, and advocated a stricter policy towards Pakistan.

introduction of adult franchise.The growing influence and scope of politics also pointed to the need for shaping it according to the ideals which the R.S.S. cherished because the truth of Morley's dictum that 'what cuts deep in politics cuts deep all round' had begun to face them as a bitter reality".[1]

The association of Dr. Mookerjee with the yet to be launched Jan Sangh[2] was also due to his 'fullest approval' of the R.S.S. approach. As Madhok writes: "His (Mookerjee's) eyes then fell on the R.S.S. the only other organised, though non-political, force in the country. He would have liked the R.S.S. with its well-knit organisational structure and well-trained and disciplined cadre of workers, to take to politics and become such a platform. But the R.S.S. leadership was not prepared to change the character of the organisation and give up its role of honest critic of all the political parties in the interest of national solidarity and cohesion. It, however, permitted its workers to co-operate and collaborate with Dr. Mookerjee for the formation of a party which might reflect their view point on national questions". Mookerjee was in fact keeping in touch with the R.S.S. and some of its leaders, Golwalkar recalled at a later date,[3] and this had a great effect

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1. Madhok, Balraj., The Portrait of a Martyr, op. cit., p. 97.
2. Madhok, Balraj., Political Trends in India, S. Chand & Co., Delhi, 1959, p. 45.
3. Organiser, May 26, 1956.

in influencing some of the Swaymasevaks. For instance, Vasantrao Krishna Oke "developed a liking for political work to a degree uncommon and undesirable for a Swayamsevak".

Giving his own version of the origin of the Jan Sangh, Golwalkar stated, "one of my old colleagues, who had developed a liking for political work to a degree uncommon and undesirable for a Swayamsevak" of the R.S.S. Shri Vasant Rao Oke, "was in close contact with him" (Dr.Shyam Prasad Mookerjee) "for a long time and his association seems to have prompted Dr. Mookerjee to seek my co-operation and help in this matter".[1] Dr.Mookherjee's suggestion of bringing R.S.S. into politics was unpalatable to Golwalkar, however, Golwalkar chose some of the "staunch and tried workers (of the R.S.S.), who could selflessly and unflinchingly shoulder the burden of founding the new party".[2]

Preparations were made to draw up tentative plans for starting a new political party for Punjab, PEPSU, H.P. and Delhi to begin with, in early January 1951. Dr. Mookerjee, who attended the meeting, stressed the need for the formation of an all India Party at an early date.[3] For, he felt that such provincial or

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1. See Organiser, May 25, 1956, for the article "How Jan Sangh was born" by M.S.Golwalkar.

2. ibid. Weiner notes, that the urge for political activity was not universally felt in the R.S.S. And many of the R.S.S. members felt, however, the contrast between the mass strength of the R.S.S. and their political weakness, "forcibly presented to them by the Government team", activated the R.S.S. members in North India to enter politics. Weiner, Myron., Party Politics in India, op. cit., p. 185.

3. See Organiser, April 16, 1961.

regional parties would not gain proper status and impetus to be able to make much of an impact on the national politics. In consequence, it was decided to have a new party with All India character.

The Jan Sangh, however, was organised first in a number of Provinces before transforming itself into all India Party. Accordingly while Dr. Mookerjee announced at Calcutta on 5th May, his 'People's Party' with an 8-point programme,[1] the Delhi group of both R.S.S. and non-R.S.S. members met at a convention at Jullundar on 23rd May 1951.[2] In September 1951, Jan Sangh was formed in U.P., M.P., Karnatak and Ajmer-Merwar,[3] while in Rajasthan, Rewa and Bihar Jan Sangh took its shape in October 1951.

The decision to integrate the province-wide Jan Sangh into a nation-wide unity and extent its activities to every nook and corner of the country was taken by the Jan Sangh Presidents and Secretaries of Punjab, PEPSU, H.P. & Delhi in

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1. See Organiser, May 7, 1951.
2. ibid., June 11, 1951. Madhok notes however that the party formed by Dr. Mookerjee "with the same name and similar objective", in Bengal, "has no connection, direct or indirect, with the Jan Sangh of Punjab. It is, however, possible that Jan Sangh may extend its field of activity to cover the whole of the country in the near future. Then it would be prepared to co-operate or amalgamate with other organisations having objectives and programmes similar to its own".
3. Organiser, Sept. 24, 1951.

association with Dr. Mookerjee and Rao Krishna Pal Singh - Bengal and U.P. Presidents respectively - while Deendayal Upadhyaya, Manohar Rao Moghe, Secretaries of UP and MP also attended.

It was decided to call an Akhil Bharat convention in Delhi by the first week of October. The Working Committee of Punjab constituted itself into Reception Committee. The Jan Sangh manifesto was circulated earlier to elicit public opinion.

The Akil Bharatiya Jan Sangh was formed on 21st October, by a resolution of over 400 delegates from 14 Provinces of the country who met at a convention held at Delhi for the purpose which elected Dr. Mookerjee as its first President.

Twelve Provincial Political Parties of Bombay which had earlier informally decided to merge themselves in the propo All Bharat Organisation under the leadership of Dr. Mookerjee, the leader of the newly constituted people's party in Bengal. The decision was taken at the conclusion of the 2-day informal conference of the parties other than the Congress, the Socialist and the Communist Party in the State of Bombay under the auspices of the Democratic Swaraj Party. Addressing th concluding session of the conference, Dr. Mookerjee said that the proposed all-Bharat Party would come but the provincial units should be organised first so as to lay a strong foundation for the all India Party.

Jamnadas M. Mehta, President of the Democratic Swaraj Party assured Dr. Mookerjee that his party would become th state branch of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh started by Dr. Mookerjee subject to the adoption of programme discussed at the two-day session.[1] The Kshatriya Mahasabha of Rajasthan was the first to politically merge with the Jan Sangh, while confined its activities to social and cultural work in future.[2] The national party took roots in Assam and Gujarat on 28th October and 4th November respectively.[3]

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1. Organiser, July 2, 1951. This merger proposal, however, did not fructify in the end because of differences in their ideological overtones. Based on an interview with Shri Rajendra Sharma, MP, with the Researcher sometime during December 1971.
2. See Organiser, Oct. 22, 1951.
3. ibid., Nov. 5, 1951.

CHAPTER IV

BIRTH OF SWATANTRA

A discussion on the motivation behind the formation of the Swatantra Party, invites as well a few preliminary observations. It is evident that certain sections of the conservative elements of the Indian society were averse to joining the Jan Sangh,[1] the other national Rightist Party.[2] For one thing, Jan Sangh's concept of Hinduism and the like was anathema to the sense of "altruistic self-interest of the autonomous social forces".[3] Another, and closely related to the first factor is, that

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1. Madhok, Balraj., Political Trends in India, S. Chand & Co., Delhi, 1959, pp. 142-43, for his comments on the proposed 'middle-of-the-road' party of Masani and the role visualised for the 'brake' party of his conception by C. Rajagopalachari, which in his opinion, was not much different ideologically from the Jan Sangh, "except that it will provide a new platform to the intellectual and economic aristocracy which is finding itself out of tune with the new rhyme of the ruling party but considers it below its dignity to join the ranks of the Jan Sangh".

2. An analysis of the first two General Elections results of 1952 and 1957 revealed an "almost complete eclipse of our so-called rightist parties". For the citation see, Economic Weekly, Special Number, July 1959, p. 893.

3. Masani interpreted this as "businessmen, the factory owners, the shop-keepers, the peasants who own the land, the artisans who create with their own hands, the self-employed people, the professionals in short, who stand on their own legs." See Masani, M.R., Congress Misrule and the Swatantra Alternative, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1966. See Ranga's interpretation of pluralistic liberal democracy versus monolithic society, in Freedom in Peril, The Indian Peasant Institute, New Delhi, 1961, p. 64.

these groups could prefer only a secular, diffused, "open society"[1] to the 'integrated society'[2] of the Jan Sangh variety. And these and other related factors, at the same time, could not allow these elements to join the Congress also, as they felt threatened by its policies which they thought would lead the country to the totalitarian State of a communist variety. For, "such a climate is conducive to the growth of a democracy that is collectivist than one that is liberal-democracy".[3] Thus, Nobeon's choice presented itself for an effective mobilization of these traditional and modern "autonomous social forces" into a cohesive force and to have their own platform to protect their interests. In fact, the Swatantra became "a balancing factor between conservatism and radicalism".[4]

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1. Swatantra believes in the philosophy that the union between the "democratic freedoms and the varied types of free institutions are different but complimentary classes of toilers can be and are generally the distinctive features of a society of many classes of people which can be helped to be and are often complementary to each other". See Ranga's interpretation of "Pluralistic Liberal Democracy versus Monolithic Society", in Freedom in Peril, the Indian Peasant Institute, New Delhi, 1961, p. 64. Infra p. Ch. VI. for a full interpretation of Swatantra philosophy.

2. Jan Sangh's philosophy of integral humanism means that the individual forms the unit of the whole society and consequently both are inter-related and integrated. The Society is an indivisible organic whole thereby acknowledging both Hegelian and Rousseaunian concepts - of course, in different degrees. Thus, the union between the monolithic society and its dictatorship is indivisible and indestructible. For further explanation see Chapter. VI.

3. Infra., p.

4. Kothari, Rajni., Economic Weekly, May 20, 1961.

5. Jayaprakash Narain welcomed the Swatantra Party and appeared on the same platform with Swatantra leaders, although he had no intention of joining the party. See Palmer, Norman D., The Indian Political System, George Allen & Unwin, 1961, p. 200. for the citation and the above comments. See also, Swarajya, Special Number, 1962, pp. 113-14, for J.P's favourable comments on the 'Conservative' Swatantra Party. C.D. Deshmukh also regretted to join the Party as its President. See infra., p. for further details.

The conservative "autonomous social forces"[1] which felt the need for 'a party' to espouse 'their cause' in fact, they never forgot their conservative nature even earlier, were discernible during the 1920s and 30s and later also, though at intermittant periods, whenever their interests were felt threatened by existing political forces. A few instances are given below.

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1. Masani in his "Call for a New Party" speech at Bangalore on May 29, 1959, said that "an opposition to the government of the day can only exist if there are in society 'autonomous social forces'." Masani referred with approval to the "autonomous social forces" of the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, of the second half of the 19th century, who said that in any country where there were no "autonomous social forces", liberty was bound to disappear. Croce, by "autonomous social forces", meant "people who own their factories, people who own their shops, people who own their land, people who practice independent professions like lawyers, doctors, engineers and accountants". See Masani's article 'Will Liberalism Survive Socialism?' in Swarajya Annual Number, January 1966.

   Masani, interpreted "autonomous social forces", as "business men, the factory owners, the shop-keepers, the peasants who own the land, the artisan who create with their hands, the self-employed people, the professionals (the lawyers, the doctors, the architects, the auditors etc.), those that stand on their own legs. They are not beholden to the Government of the day for their bread and butter. The professional man, the business man in a free economy, the landed peasants, the artisan and the self-employed man stand on their own legs and they can say to Government that they do not agree. They are the classes who can possibly go into opposition. They are the classes who can maintain a free press. They are the classes who can have any kind of voluntary society or organisation which is not dependant on government patronage. Abolish these classes by nationalisation of private property and land and industry, and you will destroy every autonomous social force."

   For Masani's interpretation, See his address to the Management Training Course, Dec. 17, 1960. See Masani, M.R., Congress Misrule and the Swatantra Alternative, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1966, pp. 5-6, 192 and 173 respectively for all the above three citations.

Earlier, throughout the deliberations at the Indian Round Table Conference, these conservative elements felt the necessity for a conservative party, as seen from comments made by the Maharaja of Rewa, for instance, that "it must seem strange to some that in a country whose ways of life are so ruled by custom and tradition in India, there should be no political party which calls itself 'Conservative'." Events moved so fast that his prophesy, that "when once power is given to India to shape her destinies, a strong party of experienced and responsible politicians will emerge", which will call itself the Conservative party"; for, "the chief ingredient in conservatism is, in my view, a sense of responsibility",[1] eventually had come true within three decades. He insisted that "we wish to preserve the individual and historical identity of our States which our forefathers carved out for themselves and handed down to us". One defender of the faith stated that "our Order is supposed in certain respects at least, conservatism ... we are the conservators of a great tradition of an ancient civilization and of Princes we do not cease to be Indians".[2]

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1. See Proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference, Nov. 12, 1930 to Jan. 19, 1931, Government of India, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 51-52, hereinafter referred to as IRTC. See incidentally, Plenary Session, Proceedings, IRTC, p. 117, for the self-styled conservative party consisting of "intelligentsia, countryside agriculturists, traders and small landholders - all clas who had a stake in the country".

   Sir A.P. Patro of the Justice Party, Madras had stated that as a conservative party "we hold fast to the traditions of the past, and as a nationalist party we want political progre with all other progressive political parties of India".

   ibid., p. 85.

2. See Plenary Session, Proceedings of IRTC, Nov. 12, 1930 to Jan. 19, 1931, Government of India Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 71-72.

And for the Maharaja of Nawanagar, "we have the example of England before us to follow. England preserves even in her wonderful progress a sober conservative outlook, and yet takes rapid strides, without losing grip of the essentials of stability".[1]

Many Rulers, at the time of the 1935 Act, were explicit in their declaration that "we and our people will never submit to being governed by British India, over many parts of which our States in former times held sway".[2] When the question arose as to who should represent the States in the constitution-making body while the Congress insisted that only popular representatives could represent them, one important ruler[3] asserted that

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1. See Proceedings of IRTC, Nov. 12, 1930 to Jan. 19, 1931, Government of India, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1931, p. 65.

2. Panikkar notes that the constitutional writings of the time, especially of such eminent British-Indian leaders as Sir Sivaswamy Aiyar, would show that they were looking forward to the day when the British-Indian Central Government would inherit from the Crown the full armoury of paramountcy and would be able to exercise its prerogative powers in the same way as does the cabinet in England - a position totally inacceptable to the Princes and the States. He quoted Maharaja of Patiala, Chancellor who said in a statement on a later occasion as above. At another time, the Chancellor said: "In fact, they (British-Indian leaders) seem to assume that British India would absorb or at least have full authority over the Indian States. Such an idea, we of the States, peoples and Rulers alike, are bound to oppose with all our strength". See Panikkar, K.M., The Indian Princes in Council, Oxford University Press, London, 1936, p. 13.

   Menon, V.P., notes that on April 2, 1946, the Nawab of Bhopal in his interview with the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy, made it clear that the Indian States wished to continue their existence with the maximum degree of sovereignty. They desired no interference in their internal affairs by British India. Menon, V.P., The Story of the Integration of Indian States, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1961, p. 59.

3. See Menon, V.P., op. cit., p. 57.

"we fought and sacrificed our blood to win power and we mean to hold it. If Congress wants to rob us, if the British should let us down, we will fight". Their attitude towards the Congress thus was slightly different.[1] The Princes were and still are dependent on the Congress for the continuation of their privy purses, which, although constitutionally guaranteed could be

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1. See Menon for the reason for slight differences in the treatment of the Princes by the British Government. Lord Pethick-Lawrence of the Cabinet Mission at a Press Conference held on 25.3.46, declared, when asked whether the representatives of the states would be representatives of the rulers of the people, that the Mission would take the position as it was. "We cannot create new structures. We have to take the position as we find it". To a question whether the co-operation of the States was essential or mandatory, he replied: "What we plan is to invite Indian States to take part in discussions for the setting up of machinery for framing the further constitutional structure. If we invite you to dinner, it is not obligatory for you to come". Quoted in Menon, V.P., op. cit., p. 59. And for their attitude towards Congress, Gandhiji advised the princes to come to terms with his 'legal heir', because they would be more rigorously treated after his death, not by the Congress as a whole and not even by the Working Committee, but by Nehru. For, he was reported to have said, "when I am gone, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will have no patience with you". Vide Coupland, Reginald., Indian Politics, 1936-42, Oxford University Press, Madras, 1944, p. 93. And Nehru asserted: "there are about six hundred States in India - big ones and small ones and tiny ones, which one cannot even place on the map. They differ greatly among themselves and some ha advanced industrially and educationally, and some have had competent Rulers or Ministers. The majority of them, however, are sinks of reaction and incompetence and unrestrained autocratic power .... But in spite of its manifest decay and stagnation, it has been propped up and artificially maintained by British Imperialism .... that system has in its reality been one of the facets of imperialism ... when conflict comes, we must recognise who our opponent is". See The Indian Annual Register, 1939, Vol. I, pp. 437-44, Emphasis added. The Indian States and Nationalist India: Presidential Address of Nehru at the Annual Session of the All India States' People's Conference, Feb. 15, 1939.

reduced or dispensed with at any time. The 'Rulers Union', formed in February 1951 with Maharaja Pratap Singh of Baroda as its President, aimed "to work up an agitation amongst the rulers as well as the Jagirdars and Zamindars against the merger of the States".[1]

Similar was the argument of the class of Zamindars and landed aristocracy, and their principal organisation, the British Indian Association, which was "more or less a conservative body headed by the Maharaja of Burdwan, the best type of Conservative Indian ..."[2] While a few enlightened Zamindars supported and assisted the crusade against the caste system and fought for

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1. Menon, V.P., op. cit., p. 140.
Menon notes that one of the Maharajas reported to him that in the event of a war breaking out between India and Pakistan, it was the ambition of some of the rulers to get back their States .... Maharaja Pratap Singh of Baroda, was derecognised - derecognition implied the stoppage of the privy purse and other privileges which Sir Pratap Singh enjoyed as the Maharaja of Baroda. His son would get Rs. 10 lakhs under the general agreement and not Rs. 26.5 lakhs which was being paid to Sir Pratap Singh. Earlier, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Indian States, Nov. 22, 1918 desired for "a permanent consultative body", a "council of Princes". Indian Statutory Commission Report details the establishment of the Chamber of Princes and delineated the relationship between the Crown and the States, "for it involves a definite breach of an earlier principle of policy according to which it was rather the aim of the Crown to discourage joint action and joint consultation between the Indian States and to treat each State as an isolated unit apart from its neighbours. That principle, indeed, had already been giving place to the idea of conference and co-operation amongst the Ruling Princes of India, but this latter conception was not embodied in permanent shape until the Chamber of Princes was established". See for the citations, Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (1918), paras 302-11 and Indian Statutory Commission Report, Vol. I, paras 108-10.

2. Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966, pp. 182-4.

democratic and social progress, as a class they took an attitude of reactionary opposition to it. The Maharaja of Mymensingh and Raja Sahib of Kollengode felt "the potentialiti of the Zamindars were great, but the lack of unity among them was responsible for their not making "themselves felt".[1] And, it was tragic that Zamindars should (so) lag behind", when "even the ruling chiefs found the necessity of a joint action. The Muslim League had got an all-India association. The Congress wielded influence because it had an organisation of an all-India character. Even workmen had got an all-India association".[2] It was on account of this that "their interests were in danger in various provinces. No other community was so affected by legislatures in different provinces as Zamindars". The formation of the All India Landholders Federation was considered as an "epoch-making" event in the history of the land-holders of India as "they were not meeting there not a day too soon", and "that the federation of that kind should have been formed long ago".[3] Its status, however, was like that of a trade union of landholders and not of a political party.

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1. See Indian Annual Register, April 1939, p. 400.
2. ibid.
3. ibid. The object of the All India Land-Holders Federation was, as explained by Nawab Sir Muhammad Yusuf, "to create a federation of various units of Zamindars in provinces and districts and organize Zamindars on a wider basis so that they could make their existence felt and other political parties could take note of them".

However, when several Bills were brought out by Congress Governments, for Zamindari Abolition, in spite of all their protests, the Zamindars felt the necessity of an organized party which should take up their cause.[1] Rani Pritam Kunwar of Sahaspur Bilari warned that "the political situation in India is drifting towards revolution" and appealed to the "stable elements" to join hands on a common political platform, to check the "forward tendencies of the Congress Forward Bloc". And her appeal was pertinent to the "land-holders, the liberals, the Independents, the capitalists and the progressive forces of the country" to unite "into a single party fighting their political battles for the political and economic growth of the country through peaceful means". She pointed out to the possibilities of fluctuations of political fortunes in elections and declared that "the Congress is placed in power today and might be supposed to have fifty years of power before them, but the rise of the

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1. Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth appealed to the Zamindars to organize, and if their demands were not conceded "they should refuse to pay revenue". See Indian Annual Register, July-Dec. 1939, p. 364. Emphasis added.

   In contrast, the All India Kisan Sabha reiterated (Ranga - Secretary's Report to the All India Kisan Conference) the resolution, passed at its Comilla Session that "the Zamindari system which has proved to be such an economic waste and which has brought about the ruin of millions of peasants must be abolished without paying any compensation to the Zamindars and other intermediate land-lords. And the Premier of Madras has admitted that the Zamindar was a public servant, who could be dismissed without paying any compensation". See, ibid., April 1939, p. 413.

Zamindars to power is not a foolish hope".[1] And the Fifth Session of Agra Zamindars' Conference resolved that "in order to save the Province from impending chaotic conditions and to safeguard and protect the right of private property, a political party should be organized which should be open to all organisations having similar views with a network of branches throughout these provinces ...".[2] Thus, 1939 saw a great political awakening among the Zamindars.

The socialist policies of the Congress, in a way, dissatisfied the industrial and business houses as well. Confronted as they were thus with innumerable laws starting with the attempts at abolishing the Managing Agency System, they resented the top-heavy taxation measures, nationalisation of heavy industries, expansion of public sector to the detriment of the private enterprise,[3] reformation of Hindu Family Law of Inheritance and such other measures of the Government.

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1. See Pritam Kunwar of Sahaspur Bilari, Presidential Addr s, quoted in Indian Annual Register, July-Dec. 1939, p. 364. Emphasis added. Sampurnanand notes that the 1936 General Elections, however, under the 1935 Act, the Zamindars of U.P. who put up a united front against the Congress "were simply routed". See Sampurnanand, Memories and Reflections, Asia Publishing House, Madras, 1962, p. 95.

2. Indian Annual Register, July-Dec. 1939, p. 365. Emphasis added.

3. See Chairman Tata's, J.R.D., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the TISCO. Vide Commerce, Sept. 8, 1956, p. 442, for such prejudices against the Private Sector. See also Commerce, March 31, 1956, p. 698, for the discrimination shown against the free enterprise as noted by Shantilal Mangaldas, FICCI, K.G. Milne, the outgoing President of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry and J.F. Sinclair, the incoming President of the Bombay Chamber, especially of Milne.

Their resentment, however, did not carry much weight with the Congress, and these people also were in search of a political platform.

As was natural, a section of the people believing in free enterprise gave vent to their feelings of irritation and declared these Congress policies as "inimical to the democratic way of life voluntarily chosen by the people". They deplored the tendency among the vast majority of business men - industrialists, big and small traders, bankers, financiers etc. - to accept these changes as 'something inevitable', accused the Government of playing the game of divide et impera, and asserted that one had every right to ventilate one's reactions to such policies and programmes and to form opposition on constitutional lines.[1]

And, out of these dissatisfied people was born in 1956 the Forum of Free Enterprise which was responsible at a later stage for the formation of the Swatantra Party. This Forum was/is a non-political organisation, formed with the "laudable object of educating the public opinion about the merits of free enterprise and the danger of excessive State domination

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1. See Commerce, July 21, 1956, for the Government's divide and rule policy.

and State control over the citizen's activities".[1] The Forum felt the urgency of "educating the educated" about 'free enterprise and economic development and policies' and how the "case for free enterprise is going by default". However it declared itself against complete laissez faire, because 19th century capitalism had "no place in contemporary life"; and this was not due to feeling of sheer expediency, but buttressed by considerations for rapid economic growth and for the maintenance of political democracy". In its decided view, 19th century capitalism is "as dead as dodo and can make no contribution to the industrial, social and economic development we seek".[2]

In an advertisement under the title "what the Forum stands for?", it said:

> "The Forum unreservedly accepts the concept of a fuller and better life for all, equality of opportunity, eradication of unjust privileges; in fine, the establishment of a welfare State. Indeed we hold that these objectives will be attained more rapidly, more effectively, and with a

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1. Editorial, Commerce, July 21, 1956.
   It was Masani who brought together A.D. Shroff of Tatas and Murarji Vaidya of the Indian Rayon Corporation and the All India Manufacturers' Association, who thus founded the Forum of the Free Enterprise. Based on interview. See for the Forum's Manifesto, with twelve paragraphs, ibid., p. 119.
2. See Shroff, A.D., Free Enterprise and Democracy, a Forum pamphlet, Bombay, p. 2. A.D. Shroff along with N.C. Chatterjee, Anand Chand, M.P., Ranga Reddi, Shankar Reddi and Hari Hara Das, M.L.A., were co-opted in the General Council of the Swatantra Party. See Swatantra Newsletter, hereinafter referred to as S.N., March 1960.

> greater degree of enthusiastic co-operation of the people, through Free Enterprise, than through any other system. Inherent in our acceptance of these social aims is also that of a planned economy, and the common existence and mutual inter-dependence of a State-controlled and Free Enterprise Sector. What we do not accept is the theory that this State-owned sector should continuously expand until it dominates the national economy, for then ... will there be a regimentation of life, totally at variance with India's outlook and traditions, which have always recognised the place and worth of the individual in Society."[1]

In short, it involved all to join hands together.

Despite such an urgency felt by the Forum, and even by some sections of business men, the response from business men to such an effort was, however, only partial and as the Commerce pointed out a "section of the business community .... even views the activities of the Forum with disfavour, apparently because it is afraid that they will rouse the ire of the authorities further and bring more restrictions on free enterprise".[2] Thus, the logic of competitive conditions juxtaposed these elements. Though couched in general terms, the plea was unambiguous that the "country needs political opposition,[3] which must make the Congress Party feel that

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1. Quoted by Vaidya, Murarji., in his Introduction to Socialism in India, a Commentary, ed. Pai, M.R., Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1967. Murarji Vaidya later became the Chairman of the Bombay Unit of Swatantra Party, See S.N. 7, June 1960.
2. Commerce, Jan. 19, 1957, p. 109.
3. Commerce, July 21, 1956, p. 106.

"its opponents in elections, are found not only in the left but also in the right". After dismissing the communists and socialists as unworthy of lending its support, it (the weekly) resigned itself to the idea, that "in the absence of any other realistic party, the Congress is the only party worthy of support and seems to be fully assured of a resounding victory in the forthcoming elections".[1]

A year later, however, Commerce wondered, whether support to the Congress by business interests was worthwhile. For, "actually, the private sector has little to be thankful for in the Government's private economic policy. It is idle to suggest that they have in any way tried to influence political parties. Indeed, it could be more justly argued that they could and should develop a genuine rightist party, wedded to democratic and welfare ideals".[2] And how best and in what manner such a 'genuine rightist party' could be organised by free enterprise became apparent shortly thereafter with the emergence of Swatantra and the Forum's role in the same.

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1. See Commerce, Jan. 12, Feb. 14 and April 1957 for comments on 1957 elections. Emphasis not found in the original.

   See also Nadhok, Balraj., Political Trends in India, S. Chand & Co., Lucknow, 1959, p. 141. Nadhok states "... there are a number of industrialists and intellectuals who, though very much scared by the new economic policies and pro-communist proclivities of the ruling Congress party do not like to break with it completely. Their opposition to it is confined to economic policies alone which affect their special interests. They share or pose to share many of the fads and shibboleths of the Congress on most other questions. They want to hit but not to destroy the Congress, which, with all its professions about socialism, is still the best guardian of the vested interests in India".

2. See Commerce, Dec. 6, 1958, p. 906. Emphasis added.

Rajaji, "the most astute intellectual among the elite of Indian nationalists",[1] and one who always disliked communism,[2] had advocated earlier, "for our body politic" and "to save parliamentary democracy", "not an ultra or outer Left, since the Congress Party has swung to the Left", "but a strong and articulate Right".[3] For, he continued, "a party of the Right", "gives expression to distresses and disturbances, which are not less real or important than the need for change and progress" He emphasized that the Right Party in a parliamentary democracy, "by testing and measuring both proposed legislation and day-to-day administration, would challenge the wisdom of the governing party and compel modification when those in power act in a way which would produce more pain than profit to the community ..." He exhorted that those who were interested in the "conservative aspect of progress should therefore exert themselves to build up such an opposition". He was to repeat this appeal a few years later, this time for founding a conservative party "a party that openly and boldly stands for

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1. Brecher, Michael, Nehru, A Political Biography, abridged edition, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1969, p. 59.

2. Rajaji's animosity to communism well ante-dated this plea for a Right Party. For, rejecting the plea of the Communist Party to withdraw Preventive Detention Act, as the Home Minister he remarked in Parliament on March 10, 1951:

> "... if the men who have grouped themselves and practised terrorism and sabotage in the name of communism, will not merely issue challenges and make conditional offers of adopting peaceful and open political life, but will back profession with practise, we could take the risks involved in trusting them. Past conduct cannot be just wiped out by the simple press statement..."

3. Rajagopalachari, C., Our Democracy and other Essays, S.G. Paul & Co., Madras, 1957, pp. 3-4, Emphasis added.

and guided by the principle of conserving what we have and what is good, before proceeding to change or disturb the status quo. Change should not come for mere compliance with untested unrealistic slogans of revolution. The Congress has thrown to the winds this principle of conservation of what is good and rooted in the soil and has been acting more or less as a prisoner of its own slogans".[1]

Masani (a former founder-member of the CSP) had been criticising the Congress long before the Nagpur Resolution of 1959.[2] In fact, in his book published in 1954, he drew attention to the 'dangerous polarization'[3] of Indian political forces between the Congress and the Communist Party since "consistent ideological opposition to communism has hitherto been negligible".[4] He realized the possible role of religion

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1. In his article in The Hindu, Jan. 6, 1959, quoted in Satyam Eva Jayate, Bharatan Publications, Madras, Vol. I, 1961, p. 239.

2. This refers to the Congress Party Resolution at Nagpur on Co-operative Farming. See later.

3. See Masani, M.R., The Communist Party of India, a Short History, Macmillan, New York, 1954, p. 240. He was to repeat later also of such a "dangerous polarization" as possible in India if a broad-based political party in opposition to the drift towards State capitalism was not established. See Masani M.R., Congress Misrule and the Swatantra Alternative, op. cit., p. 10.

4. ibid., p. 229.

to keep India immunized from the threat of communism; in short, he argued that "much more significant in the long run than purely intellectual anti-totalitarianism in a country such as India is likely to be opposition based on religion".[1] Though at the same time he deplored the fact that "even parties based on religion such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh, which constantly warn against the menace that Pakistan offers to Hinduism, are remarkably silent on this threat". And he added, "by and large, the Hindu mind does not yet appear to have awakened to the seriousness of the challenge which it now encounters, but it is unlikely that, given the leadership, it will in time fail to do so".

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1. Masani, M.R., The Communist Party of India, a Short History, op. cit., p. 196.

   Masani, the Asian writer, recalled his opposition to communism as dated back to the Great Purges of 1936 and the years that followed. By 1938, he pleaded that "the sooner the ideals of socialism were disentangled from the practice of Soviet Communism the more likely were those ideals to be preserved".

   "For some of us" he stated, "there is something worse than World War III and even the hydrogen ... the pulverisation of the human mind and the degradation of the human spirit which are the very essence of the practice of communism would - if given the opportunity to be perpetrated on a global scale - be the worst of all possible inflictions on humanity", in Why I oppose Communism : a Symposium with an Introduction By H.R. Trevorroper, Phoenix House Ltd., London, 1956, pp. 36-37.

   Tinker notes that Asok Mehta, the Indian Socialist leader, had resolved his own frustration by accepting the post of deputy chairman of the National Planning Commission. Some years ago, he observed that "the main function of opposition is to exercise vigilance", and that "opposition, if confined to the political plane, remains anaemic". Significantly, he added: "Opposition, to become strong, often utilises the deeply felt loyalties of religion, language, tribe or caste: and so does a government, driven into a corner".

   See Tinker, Hugh, India and Pakistan - a Political Analysis, Pall Mall Press, London, 1967, pp. 123-4.

As was natural, later, Masani as an independent member of Parliament,[1] made pointed reference to the 'lop-sided' ideological balance in the Indian Parliament, three major[2] parties, "Congress, PSP and the Communist" - all claim to be socialist. "We do not have a single party which takes what I would broadly call a liberal stand - a stand based on enlightened individualism ... The fact that no liberal or conservative or centre party exists which is non-socialist is, in my view, a great weakness of our democracy". Masani and Jaipal Singh, members of the Independent group in Parliament on March 17, 1959 proposed their intention of this group becoming the precursor for a new middle-of-the-road political party which would "stand for mixed economy and oppose co-operative farming and ceilings on income".[3]

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1. See Palmer, Norman D., The Indian Political System, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1961, p. 199. Palmer notes, Masani, "a smooth, polished Western educated man of the world; an important public relations official of Tata Industrial Enterprises, was elected to the Lok Sabha and in the elections of 1957 as a candidate of the leading tribal party, the Jarkhand Party".
   Jaipal Singh, a tribal leader, an Oxonian, a member of the cabinet of the Maharaja of Bikaner, founder-President of the Jharkhand Party since 1945. See Palmer, op. cit., p.212.

2. Tinker asserts that Masani and Rajagopalachari have every right to call themselves Liberals.
   Tinker, Hugh, op. cit., p. 122.

3. See Medhok, Balaraj., Political Trends in India, S. Chand & Co., Delhi, 1959, p. 142. See also Masani's "Call for a New Party", in his speech in Bangalore, on May 20, 1959, in a collection of his articles and speeches, Congress Misrule and the Swatantra Alternative, op. cit., pp. 10-12. According to Masani, this party, what may be broadly called a middle-of-the-road or centre party, would eschew dogma and extremes of any kind. It should take a practical and pragmatic view of our problems and support solutions which are demonstrated to be in the country's interests.

Many things in the Congress rule were disturbing Masani. For instance, the Congress adventures in joint-farming, land ceiling and state monopoly in food-grains etc. were calculated seriously to injure food production and the harmony of rural life. The evils of interference by political bosses in the administration of the country and the pressure they brought to bear on officials in regard to such things as licences, demoralised the officials and destroyed public confidence in the Government of the day. The middle class felt pulverized by the inevitable consequences of excessive taxation which affected not only those direct tax payers but every consumer below and by an inflation which steadily crept over them. Th. investors were taxed out of their investible surplus. The poor were made to pay more for the necessities of life through heavy excise duties.[1]

The immediate provocation, the proverbial last straw, for the formation of the Swatantra Party, was, however, the adoption of Nagpur Resolution, 1959, by the Congress Party. The attempt to commit the country to collective farming, State Monopoly in food grains and to ceilings would reduce the peasant permanently to economic helotage by denying him a monthly income of more than 300/- for himself and his family. This resolution, it was noted, produced "a lively reaction which shows that the

1. Masani, M.R., Opening Remarks, Swatantra Party, Preparatory Convention, Bombay, August 1959, p. 7.

peasantry of India is aware of its interests and is not prepared to be liquidated in a fit of absentmindedness."[1]

All earlier decisions of land reforms of the Congress Party thus came to a climax at the Nagpur Resolution in 1959. This resolution, coupled with the resolution on planning, came to be so interpreted by a section of the society, that co-operativisation of agriculture and nationalisation of basic industries would before long create the necessary conditions to squeeze out the private sector from the national economy, while another section hailed it as a bold step forward towards socialism. In fact, the Nagpur decision on co-operative farming was, and is the corner-stone of radical reorganization of the agrarian economy along socialist lines.

That the Nagpur resolution of July 7, 1959 had not said anything new but the amplification of what had already been stated in the Congress election manifestoes, could be seen from what the Congress had adopted and adapted as its policies regarding co-operative farming even earlier.[2] For instance, the Congress Election Manifesto, 1945, in an attempt to reform the

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1. Ibid., p. 9.
2. Nehru at his Vigyan Bhawan Press Conference on August 7, 1959 stressed that in the 3 Congress election manifestos - 1945, 1951 and 1957 - the Congress policy of co-operative farming was given adequate preference. Quoted from the 'Extract from the Transcript of the Press Conference', Fortnightly News Digest, 1959, Vol. VI.

prevalent land system which involved the removal of intermediaries between the State and the peasants, suggested the acquiring of these intermediary rights with equitable compensation. While individualist farming or peasant proprietorship should continue, it argued that "progressive agriculture as well as the creation of new social values and incentives require some system of co-operative farming suited to Indian conditions .... with the goodwill and agreement of the peasantry concerned, and it is desirable therefore, "that experimental co-operative farms should be organized with State help ... and also large State farms for demonstrative and experimental purposes".[1]

The Kumarappa Committee which was to examine and make recommendations about agrarian reforms arising out of the abolition of zamindari system also considered co-operative farming. The Committee submitted its report in July 1949 and recommended inter alia co-operative farming for holdings below the basic size. Prof. Ranga and O.P. Ramaswamy Reddiar as members of the Kumarappa Committee submitted a minority report and objected to the use of compulsion in any form as well as to the pooling of lands for co-operative farming and insisted

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1. The Indian National Congress Resolution on Economic Policy, Programme and Allied Matters, 1924-1969, AICC Publications, New Delhi, 1969, p. 16.

upon the "indispensability of the government and co-operators making experiments with co-operative joint-farming only on government lands before recommending it to the peasants".[1]

The 1961 Congress Manifesto continued the argument: "uneconomic and inefficient units of cultivation stand in the way of economic as well as social progress. Large co-operative farms are therefore necessary and agricultural and agrarian economy should be reorganized on the lines of co-operative village management. Until (such a unity) ..... is fully developed and organized, substantial individual farms should, as an interim measure, be brought under State direction and control".

Ranga warned the government against "its dangerous moves" (in his speech in Rajya Sabha on Dec. 10, 1962, on "the so-called land reforms" in the First Plan) and declared, "I am not able to associate the farmers and the artisans whom we (KLP) represent with the collectivist plans that are suggested in the Plan".[2]

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1. See Ranga, N.G., Freedom in Peril, The Indian Peasant Institute, Hyderabad, 1961, pp. 152-3, for the dissenting minute.

2. "Only three leaders in India believed in the gospel of the farmer - the three leaders that came from rural India - Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Vallabhai Patel and Professor Ranga", observed Dr. Munshi, while presiding over the Shashty abdapurti celebrations of Professor Ranga, on Nov. 12, 1960. Quoted in Freedom in Peril, The Indian Peasant Institute, Hyderabad, 1961, p. iii.

The Planning Commission,[1] originated to help assure just remuneration through the non-exploitative re-oriented farms, factories, shops and offices, instead, preferred the ever increasing participation of the State in the industry, trade, commerce and even agriculture[2] and handicrafts, with the aim of helping the State to gain totalitarian control over the whole gamut of the social and economic life.

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1. G.L. Mehta notes that "when Prime Minister Nehru decided to set up the Planning Commission early in 1950, the first person to whom the chairmanship of the Commission was offered by him was Rajaji but he declined". Soon after Rajaji's joining the Union Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, he used to preside over the meetings of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet which "we attended in our capacity as members of the Planning Commission". See Rajaji Ninety Three Souvenir - Madras, Dec. 1971, p. 98. Dr. Deshmukh, as Finance Minister used to be the Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. When Rajaji joined, the Prime Minister requested him to be the Vice Chairman and Rajaji as Chairman. ibid., p. 116.

   Ranga resigned from the membership of the National Advisory Committee on Public Co-operation since the Government "is bent upon pursuing its unwise and reactionary policies of subverting the economy of the self-employed peoples, that is, kisans, kaisanrs and dukandars ... and weaken, if not subvert the existing strands of decentralised economic means of living of our masses". Masani earlier similarly declined to join the all-Party MP's Informal Committee on Planning constituted by the Government, since "acceptance of the ... principles of planning on which the present Government has embarked" was a pre-condition. See S.M. 10 September 1960.

2. The Hindustan Times, Dec. 20, 1956, editorially commented on Dec. 25, 1956 under the caption 'A bold lead', and commended the warning sounded by the Federation of Rural People's Organizations against the "initiation of hasty campaigns against small holders in order to mislead th and induce them to join the co-operative farms".

The Avadi Congress session of 1955, took a 'fateful decision'[1] to take the nation, if permitted, in the direction of socialism. And then came the Nagpur Resolution, the last straw.

Rajaji condemned the Nagpur resolution and made a pointed query: "has land been ever put under co-operative cultivation anywhere - anywhere except in countries where private personal liberty is absent and forced labour is commandeered under communist regimes?"[2] On January 31, 1959, the Punjab Agriculturist Convention was called at Daroga to protest against the Nagpur resolution and Congress campaigns for co-operativisation of agriculture. The protest was no against the Congress policy which, in the words of Ranga,

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1. The Second Five Year Plan Document, though not a party programme, declared that "the socialistic pattern of society is not to be regarded as some fixed or rigid pattern, it is not rooted in any doctrine or dogma". It interpreted th Socialistic Pattern of Society as "the basic criterion for determining the lines of advance must not be private profit but social gain ... The benefits of economic development must accrue more and more to the relatively less privileged classes of society, and there should be progressive reduction of the concentration of incomes, wealth and economic power.... For creating the appropriate conditions, the State has to take on heavy responsibilities as the principal agency speaking for and acting on behalf of the Community as a whole".

2. Quoted in The Hindustan Times, Jan. 26, 1959. He was to repeat the warning and accuse the Congress Government "of committing a sin of promoting class hatred among the people" after at a public meeting on July 14, 1959 at Madras under the auspices of the Council of World Affairs.

   See The Hindustan Times, July 16, 1959. Madhok notes that the first and the last Indian Governor General, Rajaji had the "courage of conviction to speak out ... and give a call for revolt". See Madhok, Balraj., Political Trends in India, S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1959, p. 143.

wanted "all to become the politico-economic slaves of their (Congress) Soviet-oriented State Socialism".[1] Ranga, the then Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party, the late Sardar Uddham Singh Nagoke, a leader of the Punjab Kisans and Dehati Janata Party, General K.M. Cariappa and the Maharaja of Patiala, all shared the same platform.[2] Ranga, Masani and others spoke against the Nagpur resolution elsewhere also at the request of prominent leaders and groups.[3] Masani condemned the government for the "insidious attempts to bring in collective farming of the communist pattern by the back door".[4] Masani said that the Nagpur resolution was "both a challenge and an opportunity. If properly explained it brings to the landed peasant in the villages who constitute 63.7 per cent of our greater population, and to the middle classes in the city, an awareness of their common interests and their common peril".[5] The Gujarat Khedut Sangh was the first organized group[6] to protest against joint co-operative farming, while Munshi[7] made "a scathing criticism of the idea of co-operative farming", and

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1. Ranga, N.G., Freedom in Peril, op. cit., p. 104.
2. Vide Ranga, N.G., The Story in Souvenir, 1960.
3. ibid. Ranga notes that on Feb. 23, 1959, he and Masani spoke at Belgaum. On May 16, 1959, S.K.D. Paliwal of U.P. invited Ranga and others to their respective States to address meetings on the Nagpur resolution.
4. See Masani's speech on the debate on the President's Address, in Lok Sabha on Feb. 16, 1959.
5. Times of India, June 4, 1959.
6. Times of India, June 23, 1959.
7. See for Munshi's warning on Despotism - Old and New at a meeting organized by the Delhi Historical Society on Jan. 29, 1959, on class conflict, as the co-operative farming processes "will lead us through hatred and violence to naked totalitarianism".
   See foot-note 5 above for similar views of Masani.

warned that if an attempt was made to force it on the people, "it will lead to class conflict and civil war". Nagoke and Paliwal organised State-wide protest meetings aimed at the Nagpur resolution.[1] Munshi warned that co-operative farming business was a "vast make-believe" and added that the Government of India was at present forcing on the country "unicentrality or totalitarianism".[2]

If still any doubt was left on this part, Nehru put it beyond all doubt. Defending the land reforms, he stated that he had no doubt that they were going to be "the future policy of India",[3] and that "the National Development Council was thinking on these lines", and since ninety per cent of the villagers had agricultural holdings in India which were very small, "there was no other way than co-operative farming".[4] He was relentless in his advocacy of the Nagpur resolution and suggested that "our thoughts should be regimented". He told the Congress Parliamentary Party that those who did not believe

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1. See Ranga, N.G., The Story in Souvenir, 1960.
2. The Hindustan Times, June 26, 1959.
3. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 5, 1959.
4. The Hindustan Times, March 8, 1959.

in the Nagpur Resolutions were "welcome to leave the Congress".[1] Thus a perusal of the numerous speeches made by Nehru revealed a "medley of objectives",[2] and "one almost sensed a Hegelian tinge when he said that co-operative farming meant a higher form of social organisation".[3]

Another group, which was responsible later for the birth of the Swatantra Party was the All India Agricultural Federation founded in Bangalore in 1958. Its leaders includ i Prof. N.G. Ranga and Sardar Bahadur Lal Singh, an agricultural economist. It strongly deprecated the government's policy

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1. See Prime Minister's Press Conference on March 6, 1959, quoted in Capital, April 2, 1959. Madhok also notes that Nehru, speaking to the Congress Parliamentary Party on Feb. 24, 1959, was reported to have stated that "hitherto most of those opposed to these ideals thought that the Congress was only talking of Socialism in theory. Consequently they were not vociferous in their condemnation of the Avadi Resolution. But after the passing of the Nagpur resolutions they have realised that Congress meant business. These threats have now become more vocal in their opposition". Reverting to the same subject, Madhok quotes Nehru as having told the Congress Parliamentary Party, on March 14, 1959, "I do not mind if the Congress splits on this issue; if some people want to leave the organisation, I do not mind that either for we will know where we are". See Madhok, Political Trends in India, op. cit., p. 128.

2. See Commerce, April 4, 1959, p. 530.

3. See the Economic Weekly, May 16, 1959. The Weekly wondered whether Nehru had any conclusive answer to the question that after anyone had joined a joint cultivation co-operative, he would be allowed to leave it. Nehru thought that one should not be allowed to leave before one had been there for a minimum of three years. This apart, Nehru said that the Rural Credit Survey Committee was wrong in its assumption about the characters of Indian peasants that he was quarrelsome and incapable of working in a co-operative way, being thus led to recommend bigger societies. See also Commerce, April 25, 1959, p. 674.

with regard to some tenancy legislation, individual peasant proprietorship as being utopian, and opposed the land ceiling legislation and denounced joint co-operative farming.[1]

In May 1959, M.A. Sreenivasan, Secretary of the Forum of Free Enterprise requested Masani and Rajaji to address a meeting at the Town Hall in Bangalore. While Masani attacked (in his speech at the meeting) Nehru's disastrous economic and foreign policies and accused him of taking the Soviet line, Rajaji was strong in his criticism of Nehru and described Nehru's policies as those of a "megalomaniac" and agreed that "the time has come for the formation of a new party".[2] The few individuals who met at Madras on June 4, 1959, "to form th basis of a political freedom movement leading to the formation of the Swatantra Party", presented a South Indian composition of leadership.[3] This group was criticised as too much of a

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1. See Karunakaran, in Porlai (Ed.) 1962 General Elections, p.16.
2. See Masani's article in the Rajaji - Ninety Three Souvenir, Dec. 1971, p. 122 for both the request of Sreenivasan and also the citations.
3. Shri Rajaji, Ranga, Masani, H. Kanoongo, Ramachandra, J. Amin, Dadumbai M. Amin, Bhailal Bhai Patel, Krishnaraj, P. Medappa, Prof. T.K. Duraiswamy Iyer, V. Rajagopalachari, P. Rajagopala Naidu, Ruthnaswamy, V.P. Menon, Khasa Subba Rao, Prof. M.A. Venkat Rao, K. Muthuswami Gounder, M.V. Naidu, Krishna Deva Rayulu, R.N. Seshadri, M.A. Sreenivasan, Kanabhai Trivedi, G.S. Subbarathnam, B.V. Hanumantha Rao, P.K. Sarangapani Mudaliar, S. Narayanaswamy, B. Ramachandra Reddy and Jinaraja Hegde. J.P. Narain attended by special invitation.
   Vide Swatantra Party Preparatory Convention, Bombay, 1959, p. 5.

'South Indian Brahmin' clique.[1] This feeling, in fact, was felt by Rajaji himself who made serious efforts to have Jayaprakash Narain assume the leadership.[2] On Jayaprakash Narain's refusal[3] who gave his reasons for not undertaking any such responsibility, Rajaji was requested to assume the leadership of the party.

Rajaji was quite conscious of his old age, his long service in the Congress party and his personal attachment to Nehru which prevented his assuming the leadership of these autonomous forces. Instead, he suggested Prof. Ranga to take up the presidentship of the Swatantra Party. Rajaji proposed the name of the party as Conservative Party and it was to act as a 'brake' on the Congress. However, within hours of drafting its manifesto on June 4, 1959, he announced the change in name

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1. Out of 30 members, 22 were South Indians and out of this 22, 13 were Brahmins.

2. Supra page [illegible] of this chapter.

3. Supra page of this chapter for Jayaprakash Narain's refusal. Rajaji was to take a similar refusal from C.D. Deshmukh as well. In April 1959, Rajaji thought that Dr. Deshmukh would make a good leader for the conservative opposition party that he had decided to create. He wrote to Deshmukh "if you after considering the matter from all points of view agree to place yourself at the head of this movement, it will be my duty to get young and do all in my power to make it a success; many top men in all the provinces will eagerly and wholeheartedly come forward and help. We shall see great things achieved". Dr. Deshmukh expressed his inability because of his political conviction at that period "lent towards socialism and not conservatism". See for both Rajaji's letter and Dr. Deshmukh's reply reproduced in Rajaji - Ninety Three Souvenir, Dec. 1971, Madras, p. 116.

and said that if people do not like the word 'conservative', he would let the name be given as 'Swatantra', which would "stand for the freedom of man and the freedom of the farm and family as against the attack of totalitarianism".[1]

Personally he asserted that the same 'Conservative' party endeared itself to him all the more because Nehru had not liked it, if "he abhors the word conservative, I abhor his socialistic slogans".[2] Thus the Gladstonian Liberal heeded to the call of the conservative autonomous social forces and presented an alternative on the right side of the Congress thus counter-balancing the lop-sidedness of the political spectrum from leaning more and more to the leftist side.[3]

On June 9, 1959 at a conference in Madras, Prof. Ranga "came to be installed" in the party presidentship.[4]

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1. See The Hindustan Times, June 5, 1959.
2. See Economic Weekly, June 6, 1959 for the citation and the reported interpretation.
3. Tinker notes Rajaji as the Gladstonian Liberal and "is almost the arch-type of the pre-independence political leaders; a man of vision, of breadth of experience; whose mind moves in national and international terms".
   Tinker, Hugh., India and Pakistan, a Political Analysis, Pall Mall Press, London, 1967, p. 137.
4. Ranga, N.G., Freedom in Peril, op. cit., p. 15.

Masani emphasised that "it is not an accident that the move for the establishment of the Swatantra Party should have taken place at a meeting convened ... by the All India Agriculturalists Federation and Prof. Ranga should be nominated as its leader. This is as it should be. India is, and will remain, for many generations to come a peasant country".[1] Yet, generally it was said that the party was, in fact, the Forum's political arm.[2] Ranga, in reply to Nehru's criticism[3] argued that: "the Swatantra Party stands pre-eminently for the freedom of these broad masses and not merely of the few millions of enterpreneurs whose claim for freedom is also precious to the nation".

Nehru was, however, characteristic in his welcome to the new party who said, "I wish it success - not wish it success in the final sense I mean, but because I think it will introduce a new element in our politics, will enliven our politics and that is something to be glad of".[4]

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1. See Masani, 'Opening remarks', in Preparatory Convention, p.9.
2. See Weiner, Myron., Politics of Scarcity, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, p. 106.
3. "... He (Nehru) complained that the Swatantra Party is a projection of the F.F.E. He forgot that the peasant-proprietors who form 167 millions (47 per cent) of our population and the self-employed tenants who form 31 million (8.8 per cent) are free entrepreneurs who exploit none and who need exploit none to eke out their earnings which are in most cases far less than the professional incomes which are exempted from income tax".
   See Ranga, N.G., Freedom in Peril, op. cit., p. 26.
4. See The Hindustan Times, June 11, 1959, for the Prime Minister's Press Conference at Vigyan Bhawan on June 10, 1959.

The party that was to merge first with the Swatantra was the Indian National Democratic Congress of Madras which itself was formed to fight the Congress in 1957 elections. It contested "46 seats and we managed to capture 23 seats. Our party is now functioning in the local legislature as the major official Opposition Party. When the news came that Rajaji had started this Party all the members of the Party unanimously agreed to join hands with the newly formed Swatantra Party".[1]

Another party which merged[2] with the Swatantra Party was the Janata Party of Bihar, the third largest party in that State then, and its Raja Kamakya Narain Singh of Ramgarh attended the Preparatory Convention at Bombay on August 1-2, 1959 and pledged[3] his support to the Swatantra Party. Addressing the gathering the Raja of Ramgarh said:

> "We feel that the Congress rule has been a tyrannical rule, to grab power and to harass the common man. It has been a Government with the sole intention, in the name of poor people, to take away whatever is left with them and to bother them in all sphere of life", ...

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1. See Swatantra Party Preparatory Convention, Bombay, 1959, p.27. Times of India, July 28, 1959 reported unanimous vote of merger of the INDC into the Swatantra. Among those who joined Swatantra Party from Madras, were K.S. Venkatakrishna Reddiar and S. Ramaswami Padayachi. For Padayachi's joining the P rty see S.N. 6, April-May, 1960. And U.M. Thevar, leader of the Madras Forward Bloc, became an associate member of the Swatantra Parliamentary Party. Based on interview. P.T. Rajan, of the former Justice Party also joined the Party at about this time. See S.N. 3, Jan. 1960.
2. See The Hindu, Sept. 22, 1959. Janata Party formally voted to merge into Swatantra on Sept. 20, 1959. See also S.N. 2, Nov. 1959.
3. Preparatory Convention, Bombay, August 1959, p. 28.

> and felt happy "that the day has now come for an unified opposition, not only in one State but throughout the country".

The merger of the Janata Party had the immediate effect of adding to the Swatantra Party a small group of four members in the Lok Sabha and 23 in the Bihar Assembly.

Another party from Bihar which merged at a later date, was the Jan Congress,[1] a group of dissident Congressmen with a small contingent in the legislature, under the leadership of Jankinandan Singh, uncle of the Raja of Ramgarh.

In U.P., the Independent Progressive Legislature Party and the Gram Raj Party merged with the Swatantra.[2] The Raja of Mankapur, a Congressman from 1930 to 1955 had served in the U.P. Legislative Assembly continuously from 1937 joined Swatantra from its incipient stages.

In Rajasthan, Raja of Bhinai and the Maharajkumar of Jaisalmer took the lead, with the former as convener of the State Unit. He was followed by Maharawal of Dungarpur,

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1. For the Jan Congress, see Souvenir, 1960, p. 112, and also S.N. 3, Jan. 1960.

2. See The Hindustan Times, June 28, 1959. Paliwal, the leader of the Independent Progressive Legislature Party was co-opted to the Swatantra executive bodies. See also S.N. 6, April-May, 1960. For the Gram Raj merger, see S.N. 1, Oct. 1959.

Maharawal of Banswara, and Raja of Bharatpur. The major Rajput Houses, however, did not join at this time.[1]

In Punjab, Sardar Uddam Singh Nagoke formed the Dehati Janata Party (Rural People's Party), to oppose the Nagpur Resolution, without contesting the elections by itself or giving support to any one political party.[2] President Nagoke said, "we consider ourselves morally bound to announce our disapproval of this policy by resigning from the Congress, before the country is actually driven to economic disaster".[3]

Similar was the case in other States. The Kshatriya Mahasabha and Bhooswami Sangh in Madhya Pradesh; the Rajput Brotherhood of Pathankot and the Zamindara League in Punjab; and the Kutch Rajput Sabha, the Saurashtra Girasdars' Association, and the Kshatriya Mahasabha in Gujarat pledged their support to the Swatantra at one time or another.[4] The All-India Kshatriya Mahasabha Conference in May 1960 also pledged support to th

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1. See S.N. 3, Jan. 1960, for the joining of Bhinai and S.N. 7, June 1960, for Dungarpur. For Banswara see S.N. 21, August 1961.
2. See Ranga, The Story, Souvenir, 1960.
3. Nagoke resigned from the Congress, see S.N. 1, Oct. 1959. When this Dehati Janata Party joined Swatantra, its leaders Nagoke and Basant Singh, were appointed as State President and General Secretary respectively. Nagoke also served as Vice President at the National level.
4. S.N. 8, July 1960; S.N. 11, Oct. 1960; S.N. 21, August 1961 and S.N. 17, April 1961.

Swatantra Party, and its President, the Maharawal of Dungarpur (Rajasthan) became an active leader of the Swatantra Party.[1] Thus it is noteworthy that, by and large, in Northern India, the Swatantra Party got a strong backing of the Rajputs and the Kshatriya Associations since its inception.

And in Andhra, the Andhra Democratic Party[2] which was formed in February 1959, merged with the Andhra Socialist Party which became the Andhra Socialist Democratic Party. Later on it became the nucleus of the Swatantra Party in that State.[3]

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1. See S.N. 7, June 1960.

2. See Times of India, July 10, 1959 and The Hindu, August 1, 1959.

3. Prof. Ranga recalled that some of the leaders of his Party - Krishikar Lok Paksh - joined the Andhra Democratic Party and they requested Rajaji to preside over its inaugural convention. Based on interview with Prof. Ranga.

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF JAN SANGH AND SWATANTRA

The functions of the party organization would depend on the span of control and responsibility at different levels in the hierarchy. In addition, since the maximal relations between the spans, their control and responsibility over one another and between any two, are variables and not constant, they depend on functional specialization and qualities of personnel. Hence, the main task here is to take up those bodies at the hierarchial level which well reflect the role complexion of the organization, in full.[1]

The President of the Jan Sangh:

A perusal of the party constitution enables one to appreciate the mode of selection of the Party President and the power vested in the office to constitute the Bharatiya Karya Samiti by a simple process of nomination,[2] i.e. he nominates

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1. The office of the President of the parties, their highest executive bodies, the middle-tier as represented by both the parties, viz: the State Units and their Central Parliamentary Boards are taken for purposes of our study for obvious reasons. These two bodies act as the link between the party organization and parliamentary wing, and in the case of Jan Sangh the additional tier of bureaucratic type of organising secretaries and the lack of a similar type in Swatantra.

2. This method is in total contrast to the one that exists at the lower levels of the party hierarchy wherein both elective and nomination principles are adopted. That is, excepting the office-bearers who are elected by the Presidents of the respective Prathinidhi Sabhas or Samitis as the case may be, the other members of the Karya Samiti at that level are nominated. See Article 14 of BJS constitution.

all the 31 members of the Karya Samiti out of which the other office-bearers are appointed by him. This vesting of power generates two conflicting trends of thought about the President's powers. For, an autocratic illusion is created by the vesting of this power in the President in relation to Bharatiya Karya Samiti on the one hand. In contrast, the principle of democratic decentralisation would become operative in full, and in support of this, the mode of his election is cited,[1] i.e., since he is elected by the districts, his support is broad-based in the party. Evaluation of these claims, however, poses difficult problems. For one thing, it is neither desirable nor realistic enough to accept these assertions on their face value. And for another, these two factors that help explain the distinguishing characteristics of the party's highest post, viz. first, the mode of his election, and second, his power of nomination of the Karya Samiti members, stand nullified on a closer analysis.

Article 16 of the party constitution deals with the mode of election to the highest post of the party. It describes the electoral college, the procedure to be followed in processing the elections, and finally the declaration of the result thereof. In all this, the General Secretary of the Bharatiya Karya Samiti plays a key-role. The Bharatiya Karya Samiti members, however,

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1. Based on interview with Sunder Singh Bandari, General Secretary at the National level.

being persons nominated by the President are naturally kept out of the elections of the President. The Presidents and Secretaries of the District Committees constitute the electoral college, besides those delegates to the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha from the respective districts.[1] The omission of each of the district committees and their Karya Samitis in their entirety from participating in this election, becomes significant. This significance centres round the assumption that as members of the party elite at the grass-root level, the elected district presidents and secretaries wield considerable power. They direct party activities in their districts and are responsible for the party-building of the organization and function as the basic organic link between the provincial and the primary levels. Their situational position commands a hearing at the party meetings before any formal action is taken together with the presence and electoral rights of the delegates of the districts to the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha. Thus, only elective principle has been gi .. due weightage at all levels, yet the inadequacy proves the non-existance of the principle of democratic decentralization in full.

To prove this from a different angle. The Pradesh Units have been given a say in the election of this President and

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1. Art. 13(a)(1 to 3) of the Party Constitution consists mainly of three major groups, and there are other members as set out in Clause 4 to 7. But as stated, the important members come within Clauses 1 to 3. Based on interview.

each Pradesh Karya Samiti (here again each Pradesh Prathinidhi Sabha, even in its totality has no voice) in its individual capacity is entitled to propose only one name as a prospective candidate. Their function of participating in the election ends with such a 'proposal' with participative rights of voting having been denied. Most important of all, the delegates of the party at various points except at the District levels of its hierarchical structure are in no way associated with the election. Though conducive to the maintenance of the principle of 'unity of command',[1] this factor testifies to the existence of "oligarchical tendencies" of Michel's interpretation, more fully.[2] Since the State President and State Secretary have the opportunity of attending the Central Executive and also of observing the leadership at the National level, they are placed in a better position than the District President and District Secretary, to assess the worth of persons to whom the Presidentship of the Party can be entrusted. Hence the State President and State Secretary by placing their views before the State Executive and by inviting it to discuss on the merits of persons who are contenders for the post of the Party Presidentship, enable the State Working Committee to make its choice. Inasmuch as the persons who head State Executive are members of the Central Executive and inasmuch as the Central Executive is a nominated body of the President, the Party Constitution has rightly denied the right to vote to the State Executive. Thus allowing one set of persons to propose and

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1. Based on interview with Sunder Singh Bandari, General Secretary of the Party.

2.

another set to elect is a very healthy method to prevent undesirable trends entering into the election of the Party President. This method of bicameral arrangement in Jan Sangh is a speciality of a party and it adds to its strength and contributes to its cohesion.[1]

And third, the numerical majority of the districts by their representatives could decide the issue in favour of one or the other candidate. Though ordinarily, this may be true, yet under extreme circumstances, if any, the Pradesh Prathinidhi Sabhas, by virtue of their organizational independence from the national control and also by virtue of their power over the Districts units, for instance, by threatening the boundaries of the districts, of suspending the district units and of dissolving them, could bring the recalcitrant districts under control. Hence, if a majority of Pradesh units so desire, they can tilt the balance in favour of their candidate.

A comprehension of all these factors is essential for an understanding of the President's relationship vs. the Karya Samiti, whether the President has enough powers to bring about

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1. ibid.

a change in the system of the party or carry the Karya Samiti along with him.[1] For one thing, this would depend on the individual standing of the President within the party organization. For another, the President would not become an autocrat by merely wishing him so, nor justify the statement that the Karya Samiti is equal to that of a rubber stamp to justify his appointing authority. The recognition of the office thus has many advantages, especially, his leadership, by paving the way for a compact Karya Samiti and ensure collective thinking. In other words, when once the President is elected, a mandate is given by his electors for the membership of Bharatiya Karya Samiti. ~~Thus, the most peculiar aspect of the Jan Sangh is this divided responsibility for the chief executive's election.~~ However, the control over the source of power by the party High Command on his electors and on the members the President has chosen for the Karya Samiti, are enormous to prevent any such contingency. In fact, the majority of the leaders are dedicated men to develop

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1. Art. 12(e) of the original Jan Sangh Constitution vested in the Bharatiya Karya Samiti alone the authority to call the meeting of the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha. Recall here the 'Sharma episode' in 1954 when the Working Committee refused to consider the request of President Sharma for convening the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha for considering his resignation letter. See Organiser, Nov. 8, 1954. Also see Organiser, Nov. 15, 1954, when the Working Committee felt that Sharma's (Press statement) regarding his resignation letter was "to say the least, undemocratic and unfair to the members of this Committee who had not been given the opportunity to discuss the reasons", and for its endorsement of the General Secretary's reply to Sharma and for the statement that "we, therefore, hereby relieve" Pt. Sharma of his office.

an efficient organization. They are not merely resting on their laurels after a long career in politics, which for a few, had earned a patronage position. Most top echelon leaders had attained that position because they were conscious of the need for effective organizational leadership and spent a great deal of time in the performance of organizational tasks. Thus, the most peculiar aspect of the Jan Sangh is his divided responsibility for the chief executive's election.

Bharatiya Karya Samiti:

Normally, the annual conventions of the mass gathering of the party is its life, but this mass character cripples its power of assuming this superior role. Consequently, this power is delegated to the supreme executive body of the party which remains most active in performing all the duties and responsibilities of the party life. This supreme executive, however, (in the case of Jan Sangh, the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha and the General Council of the Swatantra) is by itself unwieldly in character; hence, a further delegation of power takes place to an Executive Committee. This 'stable executive' in certain emergent cases, has been empowered to even convene the annual convention of the party, and help formulate policies. In the intermittant periods of the annual conferences this 'stable executive' is empowered to attend to all the important affairs of the party, ideological, financial, policy formulations and/or tactical lines for adaptation in pursuance of the ideological overtones of the party. This fact

further reduces the annual conventions to act as a reviewing body of the activities of the executive, in short, to sit in judgment over the omissions and commissions of the bureaucratic executive of the party. The annual conventions, however, act as a mere rubber stamp, endorsing the activities of the executive.

Jan Sangh has adopted the Congress Party's method of calling its executive by the name of Karya Samiti (this bureaucratic executive of the Swatantra is known as the National Executive). Whatever may be the nomenclature and in the mode of selection, both these executive, are supreme authorities in their respective party organisations.

The Bharatiya Karya Samiti, constituted as it is by the President on nomination principle, is the highest executive organ of the Jan Sangh. (It can, as a body, co-opt certain other members). It carries into effect the policy and programmes laid down by the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha and is responsible to it. In practice, the Karya Samiti formulates all policy decisions and resolutions, and presents them for discussion and approval of the Prathinidhi Sabha. It issues directives for the proper working of the Jan Sangh constitution. It superintends, directs and controls all Pradesh Karya Samitis and takes such disciplinary action as it may deem fit against any individual samiti other than the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha. It takes all the steps required for implementing the objectives of the party. The meeting of the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha is convened whenever found

necessary by the Karya Samiti or on a joint demand addressed to the President by at least 50 members of the Prathinidhi Sabha specifying the purpose for which it is required. The Karya Samiti approves to affiliate to the Jan Sangh Party organization, any other organization or association and give it such representation as it deems fit.

The Jan Sangh party constitution can be amended[1] by a two thirds majority of the members present and voting at any session of the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha. Bharatiya Karya Samiti can as well change or amend any part of constitution, in case of difficulty in the working of the Jan Sangh constitution, though the ratification by Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha, is required. Quorum for the Karya Samiti has been fixed at one fourth and one tenth membership[2] of the Prathinidhi Sabha. The object of including the provision of co-option in the constitution is to strengthen the party organisation area-wise which by itself raises two points: whether co-option is essential at all and if need be to strengthen the respective units at the same time to become more representative. The aim of co-option, it is explained, is to bring into the directing councils of the party various people (intellectuals, political experts, etc.) who take no active part in the day-to-day political life of the parties, but who can be useful because of their experiences.[3] Naturally, the question of

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1. Art. 20.
2. Art. 18.
3. Based on interview with Rajendra Sharma, MP (JS).

co-option would arise only after the elections at appropriate levels are finalised and at a subsequent date. At any rate, the respective executive committees would assess the need and make recommendations in this regard.

Pradesh Karya Samiti.

The Pradesh Prathinidhi Sabha elect the office-bearers of the State Karya Samiti including its President, the other members of the State Karya Samiti being nominated by the State President. But neither the election of the office-bearers nor the nomination of the members by the President requires ratification from the Bharatiya Karya Samiti. Thus, the Pradesh Prathinidhi Sabha is assured of its organisational independence from central control unlike Swatantra. This gives scope for the Pradesh Sabha to formulate policies and to supervise the lower bodies in th State, the only limitation being that the Pradesh Prathinidhi Sabha should not contravene the basic principles of the party in initiating policies. Besides, Bharatiya Karya Samiti has no superseding power over the Pradesh Sabha, which gives the appearance of complete autonomy of the Pradesh Units; yet th issuing of directives by the Bharatiya Karya Samiti may result in controlling the working of the Pradesh Units.[1] Neither does the

1. The constitution is silent as to what happens if such directions are ignored. When confronted with this question, the Jan Sangh respondents all unanimously remarked that the question of such disobedience had never arisen.

communication process flow unidirectionally. The Pradesh Secretary attends the meetings of the Bharatiya Karya Samiti and has a hand in policy-making. The Pradesh Karya Samiti offers suggestions and sends resolutions concerning the State to the Bharatiya Karya Samiti. The degree of effectiveness of the State Secretaries at decision-making on national, State and individual State's matters, depends naturally on the interests of the Party at large.[1]

To return to the semi-autonomous character of the Pradeshik Karya Samiti. The success or failure of the party under a federal polity depends much on its functioning at this level, it is because of the inter-related nature of decision-making and party apparatus at this level. For instance, winning the elections requires careful planning of strategy, finance, candidate selection, allocation of resources both in men and money, etc. These, in turn, would depend much on the adaptive contacts of the party, which the Pradesh Unit would be able to muster due to its closer proximity to the situational demands. And, in such vital concerns of provincial matters, the Bharatiya Karya Samiti takes into consideration the views of the Pradesh Karya Samiti. Besides, the Pradesh Karya Samiti has a greater say in the case of the working of both Sthaniya Samitis and Mandal Samitis. Whereas it provides ideological guidance to

1. The secretary submits his oral report about the Party work and political developments in his State to the Bharatiya Karya Samiti whenever it meets. Once a year, the State Secretary submits a written report to the All India Secretary who, in turn, submits his report before the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha. The State Secretary is not called upon to submit his report

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the Sthaniya Samitis, in the case of Mandal Samiti, its approval deals with organizational problems. The Mandal Samiti elects a representative to the Pradeshik Prathinidhi Sabha.

The Swatantra:

In spite of the structural resemblance between the set-ups of Jan Sangh and Swatantra, at all levels, the entire election procedure followed by Swatantra to the highest post of Presidentship of the party as well as at other levels, differs greatly with that of the Jan Sangh by the direct participation by rank and file. For, in Swatantra, each unit committee at whatever hierarchical level it is placed, is elected by the elected members of the immediate lower units within its area, by the method of proportional representation. And the office bearers as well as members constituting the executive at that particular level, are elected by the elected members of the Unit. The General Council thus elected, in turn, elects its National Executive, and the President and other office-bearers. The President of the National Executive, ~~who is~~ also the President of the Party, is empowered to nominate not more than seven members to give representation to unrepresented State/Regions in the General Council. The National Executive also includes co-opted members

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before the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha. On the other hand, the State Secretary submits his report to his State Prathinidhi Sabha. Some times these reports are submitted extempore and at other times as a written statement. Based on interview with Shri Krishnamurthy, Secretary, Tamil Nadu Unit.

to the extent of not more than one tenth of the elected member to the General Council. Thus, all the three methods, election, nomination and co-option are used by the party in constituting its National Executive.[1] 13

The membership of the General Council is fixed, in which case the States/Regions are represented in the proportion of not less than 3 and not more than 20 from each State. And this minimal and maximal numbers are in proportion to the number of Workers/Life Workers as enrolled in the State/Region. MPs, Leaders, Deputy Leaders and Whips of the party groups of each of the State Legislatures are invited to attend the meetings of the General Council and they participate in its deliberations together with the Presidents and Secretaries of the States/Regional Units, but they are denied the right to vote at such meetings. On the other hand, the past Presidents of the Party become full time members and have voting rights as well.

The State/Regional Executive Committee has a greater say in the organisational problems of the lower units constituted within their areas. The Executive at this level, by virtue of these powers, could alter the boundaries, etc. as well as the total number of members constituting such units. This, however,

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1. There is a lacuna in the constitution. Whereas clause speaks of co-options to the National Executive, there is in fact no provision for co-options to the National Executive.

does not mean that these powers could be used arbitrarily and often, for, it would not be in the interest of the party itself, for instance, to alter the boundaries according to its choice since this may adversely affect the party's chances in nursing the constituencies for electoral purposes. Also, the power of the National Executive over the States/Regions in regard to their formation, boundary alterations, etc., would act as a check on the States/Regions arbitrary actions. Even in the case of rules and regulations commensurate with its functions, the State/Regional Council has been subjected to two conditions: (a) that they shall not contravene the powers of both the General Council and the National Executive in this regard; and (b) the State/Regional Council has been empowered to hold a convention of the Party as the State level so as to make recommendations both in regard to the policy of the party in general and in respect of matters pertaining to them in particular.

All disputes relating to elections at the National level or those from State/Regional level to the National level shall be referred by the General Secretary to the National Election Tribunal. Even here, appeals from the decisions of the National Election Tribunal lie with the National Executive whose decision is final. In fact, the National Executive is also the final arbiter when appeals against the State Election Tribunals' decisions disposed of by the National Election Tribunal still do not satisfy the appellants. It is the General Council

which has the power to make amendments to the constitution according to the rules, viz. (a) on being given notice of by two hundred members of the party and by a three fourths majority of the delegates present and voting, provided thirty days clear notice thereof had been given to the National Executive; or (b) on the recommendation of the General Council by a majority of the delegates present and voting at such annual conventions.

Co-option is provided on the following lines: (a) The General Council shall be entitled to co-opt members who shall be not more than one tenth of the number of its elected members; (b) The President has the power to nominate not more than seven members elected for giving representation to unrepresented States or Regions or for other reasons; (c) Similarly, the State or Regional Councils also have been entitled to co-opt a number of members not more than one tenth of the respective numbers of their elected members; and (d) In the case of the lower units, a State or Regional Council authorises as the case may be, to co-opt members in number not more than one tenth of the number of elected members of such bodies. Thus, the principle has been adopted by the Swatantra party at all its levels.

Central Parliamentary Boards
of both Jan Sangh and Swatantra.[1]

The Central Parliamentary Board in either case is a sub-committee of the Central Executive entrusted with the tasks of attending to Parliamentary and Legislative matters. Though not connected with any decisions on issues relating to Party's organisation outside Parliament and the State Legislatures, it can, when necessary, recommend measures generally relating to Party organisation if the Party's legislators have suggestions which can usefully contribute to strengthening the organisation.

The functions of the Central Parliamentary Board can be broadly divided into two: (1) Policy matters; and (2) Electoral matters.

1. The policy matters include -

a) at Parliament level - To deal with all matters concerning the functioning of the Party's group in both Houses of Parliament,

(i) in regard to the attitude towards other parties and groups;

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1. The Jan Sangh Party has given (Party) constitutional recognition to its Central Parliamentary Board whereas Swatantra has not mentioned. In fact, Jan Sangh constitution has dismissed the Central Parliamentary Board with a cryptic sentence or two. In respect of functions and powers, however, both Parties have accorded similar treatment. In order to avoid repetition, they are treated as one with specific functions, if any, as enumerated. The information so gathered for both the parties is largely from interviews with their respective leaders.

(ii) interpretation and application of the general, political, economic and social policies of th Party within the ambit of the basic principles of the Party;

(iii) relating to general political strategy and consideration of specific legislation; and

(iv) in general to supervise, guide and co-ordinate the activities of the Party's groups in both Houses of Parliament.

b) at the State Legislature level - To deal with such matters of policy concerning the functioning of the Party's groups in State Legislatures as may be referred to it by the State/Regional Parliamentary Board or on its own initiative when necessary to deal with matters concerning State Legislatures when it is in the Party's interests to do so. This includes:

(i) the attitude towards other parties and groups;

(ii) interpretation and application of the general, political, economic and social policies of the Party within the ambit of the basic principles of the Party;

(iii) the general political strategy and consideration of specific legislation; and

(iv) leadership of the Party's groups in the State Legislatures.

2. In regard to electoral matters, it deals with and decides upon all matters (including the selection of candidates) concerning: (a) Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections; (b) General Elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies; (c) Mid-term Elections to State Assemblies; (d) By-elections to Lok Sabha, State Assemblies, Rajya Sabha and Vidhan Parishads; (e) Bienniel elections to the Rajya Sabha; and (f) Bienniel elections to the Vidhan Parishads.

Excepting the matters in (a), all the other matters are decided on the recommendations of the State/Regional Parliamentary Board, or on its own initiative in the absence of such recommendations.

Thus the control exercised by the Central Parliamentary Board covers all aspects of the functioning of the Party's groups in Parliament and through the State/Regional Parliamentary Board on the functioning of the Party's groups in various State Legislatures.

Besides, its control over the Parliamentary members of the Party in regard to their functioning in Parliament can be explained under two headings, viz. organizational matters and legislative matters.

In organisational matters, it decides whether: (a) there should be one group for both the Houses of Parliament; (b) there should be one Chairman to preside over meetings of this

common group; and (c) there should be a leader for the Lok Sabha and a leader for the Rajya Sabha; and in addition, it decides, the term of office[1] of the Chairman of the Common group and of the leaders of the groups in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha; recommends the names of office-bearers particularly at the beginning of a new Parliament; and recommends whether there should be Deputy leader/s.

On legislative matters, Central Parliamentary Board decides on its own or on the recommendations of the Party's Parliamentary group the attitude to be taken by the Party's group in Parliament in regard to measures before Parliament particularly in regard to matters concerning economic, social, political or foreign policy; accord or decline permission to members of the Party's group to move unofficial bills; prescribe the procedure to be followed by members who wish to move unofficial bills; and decides on other allied and consequential matters.

Regarding its control over the State Legislature, through State/Regional Parliamentary Boards, it decides on all aspects concerning the functioning of the Party's Legislature groups,

1. The Central Parliamentary Board may decide that the Chairman of the Common Group by convention holds office for the entire term of Parliament, viz., five years. Similarly, the term of office of the leader of the Party's group in the Lok Sabha would also be for the entire term of five years. The term of office of the leader of the Group in the Rajya Sabha would be for two years. Based on interview with Rajendra Sharma, MP(JS).

on both organisational matters and legislative matters. On organisational matters, the Central Parliamentary Board do not normally give advice or take decisions unless called upon to do so on matters concerning the organisation of the groups by the State Legislature group, for instance, who should be the office-bearers, and matters concerned thereto.

On legislative matters, all legislation that has national implications needs its approval; the State Parliamentary Board can no doubt recommend the line of action to be taken in all such legislation but it is for the Central Parliamentary Board to decide whether or not such legislation should be supported. In all other legislative matters concerning State policies, the State Parliamentary Board is free to advise its legislative group (without reference to the Central Parliamentary Board) or decide when necessary, subject of course, to such policies being in consonance with the Party's principles and policies. Subject to the overall supervision of the Central Parliamentary Board, the State/Regional Parliamentary Boards are competent to deal with all matters that concern the functioning of the Party's group in the respective State Assemblies and Councils.

The Central Parliamentary Board has left the following matters to the discretion of the Parliamentary group: (a) the number of members of the Executive Committee of each group in

Parliament; (b) mode of election of the office-bearers and members of the Executive Committee; (c) powers and functions of the Leader/Chief Whip, etc.[1]

The Central Board can, on the recommendations of the Party's Parliamentary group, recommend appropriate action to be taken by the National Executive. It can, at the same time, take the records of the MPs concerned into account when considering recommendations of candidatures during elections and decline nomination to those whose record in its view is not satisfactory.[2] In general, while the Central Parliamentary Board's proceedings are confidential, the National Executive has the right to be kept informed of the former's conclusions. The National Executive's proceedings are also confidential. The Central Parliamentary Board members who are not members of the National Executive are generally invited as special invitees. The Central Parliamentary Board generally meets once in two or three months (usually immediately preceeding the meeting of the Central Executive). On specific matters, the Board often functions through sub-Committees constituted as and when necessary.

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1. All this information, as already stated, is gathered from personal interviews with the Executive Secretary of the Party, Sri S.V. Raju and leaders of the Party, especially Prof. Ranga and Prof. Amin.

2. The Swatantra Central Parliamentary Board does not enjoy powers of sanctionagainst members who fail to comply with the group's directives for not paying their dues to the group.

Thus, the parties of the right are organised mainly on a commingling of all the three principles - Democratic decentralism, checks and balances with different organs to cope with each other and Democratic centralism.[1] The first principle would go well together with more autonomy and power to the local units, the second with organs having well-defined functional limits while the third resulting in the weakening of the lower units by gradually tapering towards the top with units above having more power and command over the lower units, thus bringing about uniformity and unity. But these three principles are mixed up in their organisms with different modes and at different levels. Their uniqueness lies in the fact that at no stage they present a clear picture as to the proportion at any level.

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1. Jan Sangh fulfils to a large extent these three principles. Based on interviews and observation.

   Duverger notes that the Communist Party understands by this term as: first, to make known to the Centre with the greatest possible accuracy the point of the view of the rank and file, so as to allow it to make valid decisions; second, to ensure that the decision taken by the Centre is applied at all levels, strictly and exactly and with understanding, that is to say with the agreement of the rank and file. On the other hand, the term presupposes that very discussion takes place at the base before decisions are taken, in order to enlighten the Centre, but that the strictest of discipline is observed by all after the decision has been reached. Duverger, Maurice., Political Parties : Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, op. cit., pp. 56-58.

II

The State Units.[1]

A discussion on the Party Organisation would be pertinent only if it is conducted in terms of certain standard . And, the focus on this phase of analysis raises certain specific points of interest. They are: first, the interactions between the structural conditions of the party and its ideological connotation - whether the motivation of party leaders at different levels of the party hierarchy has any saliency with its ideology. For, the structural properties as outlined in the respective Party constitution show that to some extent ideology plays an effective role in regard to the organisation and role perception of the leaders. Second, the patterns of internal organisational relationships reflect these structural properties. In other words, in what respects and specifically, in what areas, the communication system is defective. Third, whether communication between leaders at all levels is a critical factor in explaining goal perspectives. And specifically, does frequent contact among them leads to power consciousness about party goals? And the party structure must be viewed as a decisional group - a great many decisions are taken concerning the operation of the party structure, tactics to be

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1. The material for this sub-section was gathered jointly by the Researcher and Smt. Saraswathi Srivastav, BHU on the basis of joint questionnaires and interviews.

employed at a given time, in pursuance of the goals, and opportunities given for the activists in all these aspects. Most important of all, the success of a party in the indoctrination of individuals on party objectives, lies on its ability to shape the activities of the individual and his perceptions of group goals and tactics to be adopted in achieving them.

These can be investigated partially through the communication processes within the party. In such an analysis, it becomes necessary to study which parts of the structure are communicating with the other parts. This includes the extensiveness of contacts and the degree of reciprocity in the relationships on organisational aspects about which contacts and involvement occur, and also in the process and contact in which they occur. The flow of information in the party structure will determine whether group goals are comprehended, or whether they are gradually displaced by private motives.

A number of testable hypothesis were posed to the respondents. And, in brief, the index of participation in decision-making was based on questions mainly to elicit information regarding the decision-making process and the level of co-ordination that exist among the different levels of the organisations of the parties. The questions were: (1) How frequently do you

usually participate in the decisions in general? (2) How frequently do you usually participate in the decisions on the promotion of party interests? (3) How frequently do you participate in decisions on the adoption of new policies? (4) How frequently do you participate in decisions on the adoption of new programmes?

Respondents were assigned numerical scores from (1) low participation to (5) high participation depending on whether they answered "never", "seldom", "sometimes", "often", or "always" respectively, to these questions.

Jan Sangh:

Broadly speaking, the expectations of the party President at the State level leads him to perform three types of duties, interconnected and integrated, viz. (a) to speak whenever invited; (b) to project the image of the party; i.e. by looking into the organisational problems of the party; and (c) to look into internal problems, which means reconciliation of differences of opinions among the party members. These role expectations of the party and also his own ideological and emotional affinities enjoin him to play the role of a party-builder and 'ideological mentor' of the party, thus enlisting him as the Chief Spokesman[1] of the party at that level. He plays "the duel role of organizer

1. Based on interview with Pitambar Das, President of the U.P. State Unit of the Party.

and the captain of the team" he leads at this level, though he need not be a very good organizer, only to be able to put 'right people in the right place'. For one thing, policies are decided by the national level, and the State leader is left with little discretion in this regard, and for another, he is concerned more with the implementation than with the formulation part of the policies. His role expects him to contact other leaders both at national and local. Whereas the contacts with the national leadership would enable him to put forth his views in the formulation of policies at the national level keeping in view his State problems. His contact with other State leaders centre round organisational matters such as setting up party units in different parts of the State; different issues connected and steps to be taken; and setting matters of indiscipline. He acts as a liaison between the district units and other lower units and settle a number of party disputes.

The organisational problems of the party poses challenging situations and responses to the State Secretary.[1] For, his duties in this regard are numerous and varied, like running the party machine, collecting funds for the party and maintaining frequent contact with other workers, to mobilize the entire constituency. For, the party is "a service organisation - disseminating propaganda for electoral successes and enrolling people for party's work". He addresses several "workers' meetings",

1. Based on interview with K. Krishnamurthy, Secretary of the Tamil Nadu State Unit.

explains the party ideology, sanctity of Hindu religion and dharma, etc., a time consuming process.

The members of the State Working Committees perceived their role to be quite different from the other provincial leaders. As each one represented a different district, they would listen to their leaders - both at the national level and especially their provincial President and Secretary, and carry their messages to their respective district headquarters. They, in turn, place the grievances of their local units before their leaders and ask for their redressal. The trends prevalent in their constituencies and the swing of the masses to the different party ideologies are closely watched and discussed in the party meetings, especially at their meeting with the State leaders.[1]

In the decision-making process within the party, the leaders denied consulting their friends[2] or persons outside their party. And the greatest amount of consultation[3] centred

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1. Based on questionnaires.

2. Madhav Prasad Tripathi, a Jan Sangh leader said:

> "I have a number of friends in other parties including the Congress but never do I consult them with regard to my party affairs. We take it as a breach of discipline and against our conscience. Even with the representatives of the press, we have to be very cautious and we guard ourselves especially when we meet certain pressmen who are hostile to Jan Sangh. As regards family, the question does not arise."

3. The Party Constitution has provided that for these purposes the State Executive should meet once in three months.

with the office-bearers at their own level and at the higher level and limited at the lower level. For the national issues guidelines are laid down; and to effect any change, including in the manifesto, the lower level bodies can pass resolutions and send them to the Bharatiya Karya Samiti, it is left to the discretion of the Bharatiya Karya Samiti to accept them or otherwise.

The leaders' discussions with the party workers centre round mostly on organizational matters. In regard to the selection of the party candidates, both the Chairman and the secretary keep four points in view:[1] (1) loyalty to the party; (2) popularity among masses; (3) service to the party and to the constituency; and (4) status in party leadership.

The District Presidents visualise the role of the State leaders to be mainly one of formulating the policies of the party, while the implementation part of it was their responsibility. The selection of candidates for electoral purposes "was the responsibility of the State leaders". Jan Sangh leadership gave their fullest possible freedom to express their opinions on the suitability of candidates but once the decision is taken they abide by it.

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1. Based on interview with Jagdish Prasad Mathur, Executive Secretary of the Party at the National level.

Swatantra:

The role perception of the Swatantra Party leaders though similar in its approach with Jan Sangh differed in certain features. For, the Swantra leaders approached the issues more on 'economic and bureaucratic grounds than on organizational aspects'. The National and State leaders felt their job to be to educate the people on the ideology of the Swatantra Party and on the ill-effects of Statism. The leaders felt in expressing this ideology an herculean task. And, in general, they expressed their role to be to distribute party literature, conduct meetings, pass resolutions and to take actions on such resolutions, to tudy harmful legislations, excessive taxation laws of the government, to pick up candidates to contest the elections, to campaign the electioneering and to mobilize voters.[1]

The State President and the State Secretary, however, felt that the major task is to organize the party and to perfect it, to enrol members, to maintain contact with the district level leaders, from district committees, to appoint Ad Hoc Committees wherever there are no district committees. "The responsibility to organize the party became mine",[2] said the former President of the State Unit. The role perception of the General Secretary[3] of the State Unit are: (1) to preside over

1. Based on questionnaires.
2. Based on interview with Bhanu Pratap Singh, U.P.
3. Based on interview with Aliyar Singh, U.P.

and speak at all meetings organized by the Primary Unit of which I also happen to be President; (2) to attend meetings of the Executive Committee; (3) to propagate party philosophy; (4) to enrol members; (5) to collect funds for running the party, for relief work etc. (flood, famine, etc.); (6) to attend to public grievances in the constituency; (7) providing link between the different units of the party; (8) presenting interests of different units in the party; and (9) to bring harmony to various party factions.

The State President often had direct contact with the national level leaders and discuss all aspects pertaining to the party. Similar is the case with the State level leaders - office-bearers, higher-ups and with those who man the party offices at the lower levels. He was satisfied that he had a great deal of say in running the State Party Organisation. His future plans about the party were - "To develop the party from below, raise devoted and dedicated workers, etc." "Ordinary and fortnightly meetings were there, both formal and informal Emergency meetings were also several", he felt. However, he did not feel that adequate co-ordination exist amongst the various party organizations.[1]

The State Secretary's contact with national leaders were often and discussed matters generally "pertaining to the party

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1. Based on interview.

such as membership, whether the party is functioning actively or is dormant, and of financial position".

Similarly with other State level leaders - day-to-day business of the party every month and with District level. "At meetings once in 3 months to discuss programmes, for meetings, co-option of members for the District Unit, if need be, and to discuss party build up generally, and consult office-bearers at his level, with higher-ups and with those at the lower level".

The role perception of the Swatantra District President revealed the contrast in the tasks expected of him.

a) As the chairman of the party, he has to preside over the District Executive Committee meetings of the party; hold public meetings; educating the educated and educating the masses on the right policies of the party; setting up of candidates at all levels of elections; besides producing literature, collection of funds, etc. for the party.

b) As joint secretary of the State Party organising the party in the districts, pass resolutions, take action on them, study the harmful legislation and excessive taxation and take suitable action to rectify them; and

c) As all-India member of the General Council, attending its meetings; sending on policy resolutions at the national and at the party level.[1]

1. Based on questionnaire from Ganapaiah, Mysore.

The District Secretary expressed his role of exposing the anti-national activities of the Communist activities. He said, "whenever I find that anything done by Russia, China is favouring the Communists, I make it a point to criticise such acts. I organize public meetings and bring to light the heavy losses incurred by the public sector undertakings like Bokaro".[1]

The membership of the District Committee entails no hard work as it gives the member only an opportunity to reflect the difficulties of the primary committee at the district level. The District Committee decides/gives policy instructions to primary committees, regarding day-to-day party work and also instructs the primary committee regarding celebration of important functions. The type of discussion pertain to the levels of contact. People outside the party are contacted at times only, associating often in consultation with the other like parties. The District Secretary's contact with the National level leaders is not possible.[2] The State leaders are contacted often and the discussions center round organisational matters.

The leaders of the Swatantra Party were very critical about their role vis-a-vis other parties, as they are not for agitations for capturing the general masses and for demonstrations,

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1. Based on interview with Dharm Sheel Chaturvedi, Varanasi.
2. Based on interview with A. Duraiswamy Nadar, Tamil Nadu.

but "appeal to the commonsense of the people".[1] They do not take up individual causes and run to police officers or other state government officers for redressal of grievances of the house-holders or applicants. General issues affecting the common men always attracted their attention and they take up such causes and many leaders expressed this as the main reason for lack of mass support to their party.

Thus, on an average, the Jan Sangh's scores on both the counts were high whereas many instances were quoted (both in replying the questionnaires and in interviews and by observations in the various meetings attended by the researcher) in the case of Swatantra which resulted in the drop out in the scores.

Organising Secretaries of the Jan Sangh and activists of Swatantra as Party Builders.

A study of the institution of the Organising Secretary of the Jan Sangh as party builders in a new nation leads to a study of its philosophy also, in however brief a manner possible. For, it has a value more than formal words, in the sense that

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1. Based on interviews with Lt. Col. Pasricha, President, Delhi Unit; Prof. Amin, M.P., Member of both the General Council and Bombay State Council, et al.

no other political party in India has such an unique institutional set-up.[1] Also, the general picture which emerges is one of considerable importance with a marked trend, as a key structural pattern emerges in a party according to the type of social organisation it requires to build. And, how important the political organisation is in the process of political development of this party can be studied from a closer look at this institution. At the same time, the consequences of an organisational lag as an impediment to development of a party on the other hand, are quite apparent in Swatantra, which shall be discussed presently.

To recapitulate briefly the philosophy of the Jan Sangh,[2] what it stands for and with what type of mechanism the objectives are to be achieved. Jan Sangh declares its aim to be to constitute India under its culture and 'Maryada' boundaries, a real political, economic and social democracy.

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1. Though Swatantra has also created a post of Organising Secretary, since 1960, it is nowhere near that of its counterpart of the Jan Sangh. In Swatantra they are the paid workers, of course, subscribing to the ideology of the Party. Whatever training they get from the party is only after becoming as the Organising Secretary, similar to that available in a bureaucracy - 'Recruitment and Training'. In direct contrast is the case of the Organising Secretary of the Jan Sangh. They are trained from their childhood with a singular ideological background, thus dedicating their lives to the Party. Unlike Swatantra, the Jan Sangh Organising Secretary remains unpaid. Thus, the similarity is only in name. However, the Swatantra's Organising Secretary can be favourably compared with that of the Constituency Agent of the Conservative Party of England, more of which will be dealt with presently.

2. See for a full explanation of the Party's ideology, Chapter

This desire to wield India into a strong united nation (which evoked the criticism time and anon of the party of having reactionary norms and values), has compelled the Party to the introduction of an additional parallel office, more so to have direct access to the members of the party and the public. This office is constituted almost parallel to the hierarchical order of the party structure in the middle, and thus biologically speaking, strengthens the backbone of the party in more than one way.

The Jan Sangh tries to build this effective cadre of Organising Secretaries with the object of establishing clearer lines of authority from the National level to the Village and responses from Village level to the National level. With this end in view, Art. 12(f) of the party constitution provides for the appointment of and delegation of powers to an Organising Secretary in a State or any part thereof, by the State Working Committee. These full-time active workers are shifted from one place to another and they are maintained[1] by the Party. These special characteristics lead us to the assumption that this forms the bureaucratic wing of the Party.

On a closer analysis we find that it fulfils a number of conventional prerequisites[2] of a bureaucratic wing. To elaborate,

1. Based on interview with Gopala Rao Thakur, Organising Secretary, Andhra Pradesh.

2. Eldersveld says that the conventional prerequisites of the bureaucratic system are found wanting in most of the party structures because, parties do not possess many of them. Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties : A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago, Ill., Rand McNally, 1964, p. 182.

if bureaucratic tendency means the 'impermiability' of the same, the institution of the Organising Secretary of the Jan Sangh fulfils this admirably. This is in the sense that it is the appointed core of active workers; it consists of workers who have dedicated their lives to the service of the party; and good majority of them have undergone a rigorous training in the R.S.S. which is their parent organisation as Pracharaks[1] or Organisers, for a number of years; and the exceptions prove the rule. This incidentally proves the other criterion of 'low circulation of personnel' also. The other requisites, viz. strict devotion to regulations, rule enforcement, discipline and sanctions are also fulfilled. The bureaucratic role requires the institution ~~set~~ to maintain depersonalized human regulations and allots precise obligations, i.e., of roles and duties, and here this institution deviates very much. This is because any attempt of having depersonalized human regulations by this institution would defeat the very purpose of its creation. And, even precise allocation of obligations, duties and rules of an organising secretary would undermine the strength of the party organisation itself. For, an insistance on the fulfilling of these criteria

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1. Art. 17 of the R.S.S. Constitution describes the office of the Pracharak: "He is to be a full-time unpaid worker; and .... selected from amongst those devoted workers of high integrity, whose mission is to serve the Society through the Sangh, and who, of their own free will, dedicate themselves to the cause". This leads us to the conclusion that the idea of having "Organising Secretaries" by the Jan Sangh Party itself has originated with this 'Organiser' of the R.S.S. The leaders whom we interviewed had also concurred with us upon our mentioning them about this idea. They readily admitted that it did not occur to them about this origin.

would turn the institution of the Organising Secretary dysfunctional, (to use the sociological interpretation), both from the point of view of the Party organisation in its totality and of this institution in particular.


The post of the Organising Secretary fulfils the criteria as laid down in the beginning of this chapter for studying the functional properties of the party, viz., authority, communication-response and decision-making of the various unit entities of the party. It also fulfils the second criterion, that of role perception and motivation of the players in a more systematic manner.

This additional tier, the constitutionally recognized bureaucratic wing of the party at various levels, is designated, naturally, with appropriate status. And this is also developed as a 3-tier system viz., District Organising Secretary, Divisional Organising Secretary and finally, the Zonal Organising Secretary.[1] The following diagram would indicate this.[2]

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1. The following were the Zonal Organising Secretaries;
   West Bengal, Assam, Manipur, Tripura & Orissa - R.B. Godbole.
   Bihar & Uttar Pradesh - J.P. Mathur.
   Madhya Pradesh - K.B. Thakre.
   Andhra Pradesh & Mysore - G.R. Takore.
   Tamil Nadu & Kerala - P. Parameswaran.

2. The detailed structural charts of both the Jan Sangh and Swatantra parties are given in the Annexure.



The Organising Secretaries at the District and Divisional levels are associated with the State Council and its Working Committee as ex-officio members, although they are not entitled to vote. While the Divisional Organising Secretaries are responsible to the State Working Committee, the District Organising Secretary is answerable to the District Working Committee. The Zonal Secretary's post was inserted in 1958[1] between the General Secretary at the National level and the State Jan Sangh Units. Unlike the District and Divisional Organising Secretaries, the Zonal Secretary is appointed by the Bharatiya Karya Samiti of the party, and he is entrusted with the task of stimulating the

1. Based on interview with K. Krishnamurthy, Organising Secretary as well as State Secretary of the Madras State Jan Sangh Unit.

organisation at the lower levels. Accordingly the country is divided into four zones, of course, with flexible boundaries according to the personality of the President of the party at the national level. Each Zone have as their core States wherein the Jan Sangh party is well entrenched with a reasonable number of membership and a development of organisation tl remaining non-developed areas from the party's organisational point of view, having been attached with the developed ones.[1]

These Organising Secretaries form the esprit de corps of the leadership of the Party. For, the greatest congruence of goal perspectives is found in these cadres. This dedication and emotional attachment to the party principles for quite a good number of them, are not surprising because of various reasons. The main being their earlier rigorous training in the R.S.S. for a number of years. The training itself is impressive in the sense that R.S.S., apart from physical training etc. inculcates in them the ideological intensity and the necessity of saving Hindu nationalism against the domination of foreign 'isms'. The remaining non-R.S.S. Organising Secretaries, a microscopic minority, also get influenced thus by their close association of the R.S.S. trained organising secretaries. Apart from dedication to the party and belief in its ideology, the nature of the tasks allotted to them is a

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1. Based on interview.

time consuming process. Hence, the recruitment of Organising Secretaries is mostly from the cadre of R.S.S. Organisers.[1] Thus they have sufficient experience also as Pracharaks or Organisers in the present body itself.

The Organising Secretary, and as a matter of fact, every worker of the party is to choose appropriate psychological opportunities of a non-member of his area, and by helping him to solve his problems and difficulties recruit him as a member. Naturally, the non-member impressed by the devotion and selfless service of the party worker either gets himself attracted towards the party's principles and join the party membership or is under an obligation to vote for the party in the elections.

A political party derives its strength from its roots in the local community and the neighbourhood. As is natural, the Organising Secretary does not regard the electorate as a mass of voters. And with a keen perception, he recognises in the voter a person living in the neighbourhood with specific problems and requirements. This understanding of him is due to

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1. For instance in U.P., all the 11 Divisional Organising Secretaries were recruited from the R.S.S. In Tamil Nadu, out of 10 full-time workers there were 8 Organising Secretaries. All the 10 full-time workers belonged to the R.S.S. In Kerala, out of 20 full-time workers, 16 are Organising Secretaries and all of them were recruited from R.S.S. Based on interview with K. Krishnamurthy of Madras, U.R. Rajagopalan of Kerala and Gopal Mehrotra of U.P.

his realization that public issues are abstract whereas private problems are immediate and concrete since politics is transformed into personal ties. Here he acts as a friend in need. To assess this function of him, it is imperative to study the help that is rendered and the manner in which it is provided.

The organising secretary's skill is at the disposal of his unit of the party at the level in which he is employed as his MPs, MLAs and prospective candidates. He works in close co-operation with the workers and elected office-bearers of th party, and offers technical assistance to them. He has to keep in touch with the life of the community and be informed of all matters of local importance. He must study the problems and opinions of the people who form the constituency. This requires of him to have a good knowledge of current political affairs.

At General Elections he assumes enormous responsibilities in organising the campaign. Thus he serves as the functional linkage between party structure and the socio-political system.

The Organising Secretary is invited to almost all the party conferences and local meetings of the party workers so as to ensure that he is well informed about the policy, the plan of action etc. and to offer in turn, his sound advice. For, without a complete knowledge of such information which is normally available to the individual workers of the area concerned,

he would not be in a position to render assistance to the workers as well as the prospective candidate before an assembly/parliament election of the concerned area. He is available right from the preparation of leaflets, posters etc., for local propaganda and publicity to that end.[1] He is assisted in this task by the active workers of that area. Since elections are won and lost at the local levels, he moulds the public opinion by constant touch with the public.

Moreover, the States and District Units constitute a link between the national and local level leadership. At the national level, the leadership knows by name and personally also these local leaders. They even ask for the views and take note of the warnings of them. Thus, as one leader put it, the Divisional Organising Secretary is "a hyphen between the District and the State level leadership of the Party".[2]

The conflicts-avoidance principle of the party between elected leaders (President & Secretary) and appointed leaders (Organising Secretaries) has led to evolving a convention by which the Organising Secretary recruits the members, collects party funds, organizes party units and work in all other ways for the building of the party. But he does not enjoy

1. Based on interview with Gopal Mehrotra, Divisional Organising Secretary, Gorakhpur Division. Interview at Lucknow at the Emergency meeting of the Working Committee from Dec. 30, 1968 to Jan. 1, 1969.
2. ibid.

any formal powers. For instance, though he collects money for the party, he cannot spend it without the sanction of the elected President and the Secretary. This is the secret of success of the Jan Sangh party organisation and unique as such.[1]

It is always the elected leadership which is brought into public focus. The organising secretary is like the manager of the drama[2] who never comes to the stage. This, however, does not mean that the organising secretary has no influence as such. On the contrary, by virtue of their work, experience and devotion to the party, he wields enormous influence in the Party's decision-making.[3]

This conflict-avoidance principle has led to another convention, i.e. the organising Secretaries are prohibited from contesting elections, party or parliamentary, unless directed by the party itself. In such a contingency, he is first relieved of his post as Organising Secretary by th Party, before allowing him to contest. However, there are exceptions also. One of the Zonal Secretary, Jagannatharao Joshi, is one such exception, he is at the same time an MP in the Lok Sabha.

1. Based on interview with Harish Chandra Srivastava, State Secretary, U.P. State Unit. The following Ten Divisional Organising Secretaries were interviewed at the Lucknow Emergency meeting held from Dec. 30, 1968 to Jan. 1, 1969.
   1. Anand Pal
   2. Raghav Ram Mishra
   3. Rajendra Kumar Gupta
   4. Shiv Kumar
   5. Jitendra Agarwal
   6. Gopal Mehrotra
   7. Mahesh Chandra Sharma
   8. Kalaraj Misra
   9. Devendra Shashtri
   10. Sabapat Singh
2. ibid.
3. ibid.

Activists of Swatantra:

The consequences of an organisational lag as impediments to the development of a party are quite apparent in Swatantra. For, the nature of the party-building has resulted in the close liaison that exists within the Party between social base and party organization. And, the conglomeration of aristocratic and non-aristocratic groups and individuals, some of them more parochial, have had an aversion to any discipline, either from the apex or from below. Swatantra faced the dilemma, thus of presenting itself in Eldersveld's conceptualization of the party as "an alliance of sub-structures or sub-coalitions", in its true form.[1] These groups elicited the loyalty of the rank and file to a greater extent than the party organisation at the National level through their control over the distribution of tickets. All along, Swatantra operated as a cadre party, though not spelt out apparently, since its incipient stages.[2]

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1. Eldersveld, Samuel., Political Parties : A Behavioral Analysis, op. cit., p. 6.

2. As a cadre party aims at the political education of the people and at picking out from it an elite capable of heading the government, the members are the very substance of the party. Also, it corresponds to a different conception financially, that is, the grouping of the notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns, and maintaining contacts with the candidates. Thus, quality of members such as prestige, wealth etc. is stressed. When compared with the mass party, the cadre party is not based on the dimensions, upon the number of members - i.e., the difference involved is not one of size and structure, but on political and financial considerations.
Duverger, Maurice., Political Parties : Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, op. cit., p. 64.

This significant weakness in its organisational stability led Swatantra to change its character in an 'inverse proportion',[1] i.e., from a mass party to a cadre party, officially since 1964. This felt need was also due to the fact as Dwaine Marvick and Charles Nixon observed that "active workers are essential components in modern election processes ... they form the link by which the political process is integrated with other social or community worlds".[2]

Here again, as in Jan Sangh, the impediments to the Party development lead to a study of the Party's philosophy also in however brief a manner possible. The general picture that emerges is of considerable importance, for, the Swatantra philosophy enunciated for a specific purpose of building up of a 'freedom movement', proves the sociological interpretation of things becoming dysfunctional.

To recapitulate briefly, Swatantra exists for the maximum freedom for the individual with minimum interference by the State. This, when juxtaposed against Congress Party's

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1. Duverger argues that "under the electoral and parliamentary system cadre parties have generally been found sufficient by the Right". Duverger, Maurice., Political Parties : Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, op. cit., p. 67. The post 1962 election period affected the Swatantra party organization in certain areas compelling it to take a different course of action to escape the multi-faceted impasse. First, the party declared its intention to become a 'cadre' rather than a 'mass' party, a decision carried out by 47 to 6 votes, which in part, reflects the feeling that its message could not be effectively communicated to the masses. Based on interview with Shri S.V. Raju, Executive Secretary.

2. Quoted in Eldersveld, Samuel., Political Parties : A Behavioral Analysis, op. cit., p. 16.

fundamentalist belief that the State or Government as the main instrument of economic and social advance, becomes an irksome task for the Swatantra Party worker to explain to the masses, on three counts: first, for a variety of reasons, 'socialism of some variety' has become a byword in India. Second, formulating sound policies is one thing and to secure support for the same is another. And third, to convert such support into votes is something infinitely more difficult.[1] To overcome this Herculean task of educating the people on the facts of economic life, the party required what Masani had frequently termed as a 'conveyor belt' of articulate and dedicated workers.[2]

In the light of experience thus gained, the problem of party functioning, sorted itself into facets. The concentration of Swatantra in the process of support mobilization for its 'prospective candidate' in parliamentary elections, led to the establishment of a 3-man Committee and a full time Organizer on the one hand and District and Constituency Committee on the other, at the constituency level.[3] For, the existance of

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1. Masani, M.R., S.N. March 1965.
2. ibid. Also, in Masani, M.R., Congress Misrule and the Swatantra Alternative, Introduction, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1966, pp. xiii-xiv. "The conveyor belt in politics" according to Masani, "consists of vocal men and women ready to work for the party and carry its message, equipped with literature and made mobile by being provided with vehicles to carry them round. This means men and money and it is a matter of regret that the Swatantra Party is still denied of both".
3. S.N. 59, June 1966. Masani had recommended even earlier the recruitment of full-time Organizers at the constituency level. S.N. March 1965.

a party unit at the State level, is undoubtedly an administrative necessity.[1] This full-time Organizer was placed under the direct supervision and control of the 'prospective candidate'. This placement of the full-time Organizer under the prospective candidates and 3-man Committees helped to secure a better co-ordination among them. Despite the similarity that exists in the naming of such a dedicated worker as Organising Secretary by both Jan Sangh and Swatantra, a gulf of difference exists between the functions of the two offices. The dissimilarity mainly centres round two aspects: Swatantra Organising Secretary is neither trained since his childhood in an atmosphere of singular ideological background and he is a paid official unlike his counterpart in Jan Sangh.

The stress for the appointment of a cadre of paid Organising Secretaries by Swatantra at the constituency level corresponds well with the Constituency Agents appointed by each of the three parties in Britain, here again with a difference. This difference mainly lies in the agent being a full-time, salaried official, who hold certificates of examinations (issued by the respective Party headquarters) which guarantee their knowledge of electoral law and allied matters.[2] Especially, in the Conservative Party, the

1. S.N. 51, April-May, 1965.
2. The Organisation of Political Parties in Britain, prepared by Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, 1965, p. 4.

Constituency Agent acts "as its Secretary" and "as the responsible executive of the Party in the Constituency, he must deserve and cherish the highest reputation for integrity, industry and reliability". His duties include "the checking and revision of the register of electors, the preparation for and conduct of Parliamentary and Local Government Elections, and the maintenance of effective publicity and propaganda. The Agent is also called upon to assist the Conservative Member of Parliament or prospective candidate in his political work in the constituency, to organise meetings, visits etc., and also help with the investigation of constituents' difficulties and problems".

These political careers are open to those men and women between the ages of 21 to 45 who are devoted to the cause of Conservatism. These Conservative Agents undergo twelve months' training before taking the agent's final examination and gaining their agent's certificate.[1] The Conservative Party maintains a Conservative College at Swinton. A wide variety of lecture courses and discussion weekends on all aspects of Party Policy are conducted.[2]

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1. Careers in the Conservative Party Organisation as Constituency Agents and Women Organisers, issued by the Organisation Department, Conservative Central Office, London, 1969.

2. Block, Geoffrey, D.M., About the Conservative Party, Conservative Political Centre, London, 1965, p. 41.

The proposal to enlist youth in the Swatantra movement, by designating them as State Organiser and National Organiser, on a salary of Rs. 150 plus Rs. 150 as Travelling allowances, and Rs. 250 plus Rs. 250 as Travelling allowances respectively had been submitted by the sub-Committee appointed by the National Executive.[1]

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1. S.N. 61, July 1967. This proposal had since been deferred. Based on interview with the Executive Secretary of the Party.

CHAPTER VI

INDIAN RIGHTIST IDEOLOGY - POLICY, PROGRAMME AND STRATEGY.

I

What does Rightism hold for India and promise for the future? Since the subject is complex, it would be appropriate to begin by setting forth some of the characteristics that this political force manifests.

As a first premise, it is evident that while both Jan Sangh and Swatantra are characterised as right parties, they stand poles apart on many issues, as they had altogether different and almost irreconcilable sources of inspiration. Swatantra ideology is based upon Western Liberalism, while that of Jan Sangh on Bharatiya Maryada, which is essentially Indian. And this well reflects in the type of society they wish to create, viz., the authoritarian regimented society of Jan Sangh with its twin angularities, traditionalism and nationalism, and Swatantra's libertarian variety. Stated somewhat differently, the problem centres round the eternal conflict between the individual and society, i.e. the individual craving for more and more freedom (in Swatantra's liberalism), with the society constantly trying to interfere on the pretext of bringing about a harmonious balance within itself (of Jan Sangh).

With a view to a correct understanding of the philosophy of Jan Sangh, this phase of the analysis could be conveniently divided into two parts, viz., pre- and post-1965 periods, though the second phase is the elucidation of the first, the documentary evidence being the interpretation of "Integral Humanism".[1]

Jan Sangh's projection of an interpretation of the two age-old concepts, 'Bharatiya Sanskriti' and 'Maryada' is due to its necessity to focus the attention of the people on its own special position within the total context of the Indian conditions. This, naturally, expected Jan Sangh to give an interpretation of its ideology, both from positive and negative angles. Negatively, declaring Congress as its enemy - "the prerequisite for the development of any political ideology demands the existence of some concrete opponent or enemy"[2] - Jan Sangh traced

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1. The Vijayawada Session, 1965, of the Party adopted a statement on 'Principles and Policy' for which a general approval was given at an earlier session at Gwalior. This is more than a compendium of Jan Sangh policies as enunciated earlier, a philosophical statement was prefixed relating to a modern interpretation of Hindu traditional democracy. For the discussions and debate that took place on "important nature of this document", views of those unconnected with the Party were also sought. See, for this and other related views, Upadhyaya, Deendayal, Political Diary, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1968, pp. 134-5.

2. See Dr. Morris, I.I., "Nationalism and Right Wing in Japan - A Study in Post War Trends", Oxford University Press, London, 1960, p. xx.

most of the ills[1] of the country to the "mistaken policies" and "an unrealistic approach to the problems" followed by the Congress. And these omissions and commissions, it explained, are due to Congress's anxiety to make Bharat a carbon copy of the West, ignoring the best in the Bharatiya life and its ideals. These policies, if allowed to grow unchecked, would spell disaster to the country.[2] To avert such a disaster, Jan Sangh offered the positive interpretation of its ideology.

Thus, equalising its conception of the integrated society with undivided India, Jan Sangh enunciated its fundamentals, which by themselves are 'unique conceptions', with its stress on 'oneness' - 'one country', 'one nation' and 'one culture'. This stress on 'oneness' is due to its consideration that Bharat had always been one and indivisible organic whole from the point of view of its geography, culture and history. This conclusion it draws from the people's expression of their great adoration for the country as Bharatmata.[3]

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1. "Bharatvarsha has become free after a long centuries of struggle but still there is suffering among the masses. The glow of independence is fast disappearing from the hearts of her people and the country is beset with a hoarde of problems - external and internal, old and new, and social and economic. Instead of nearing solution, after independence, these problems have become a major part of the present day government."
   The Bharatiya Jan Sangh Manifesto, 1951.

2. Ibid.

3. 1958 Manifesto, Principles and Policy of the BJS.

Jan Sangh, however, is not dogmatic in its assertions; it accepts 'unity in diversity' as the characteristic feature of Bharatiya culture which it claims as a "synthesis of different regional, local and tribal growths". The existent diversities are neither the "sign of disintegration nor of perversity. On the contrary, they are in evidence[1] of natural growth and enrichment of our cultural heritage, and all these cultures remained integrated in 'one culture', i.e., Bharatiya Sanskriti. Hence, Bharatiya culture, is like Bharatvarsha one and indivisible whole, and any talk of 'composite culture', therefore, would not only be 'illogical', but also 'dangerous', since it tended to weaken the national unity by encouraging fissiporous tendencies".[2]

Nehru, the chief opponent of Jan Sangh, rejected the above interpretation to this 'composite culture'. One of the most distinctive characteristics, however, on which both Jan Sangh and Nehru, one would discern, were in agreement, was in regard to the basic cultural outlook of India. Also,

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1. The non-recognition of the aliens as a separate class was due partly to the catholic spirit of Hinduism and partly to its confidence of completely absorbing the foreigners in its body politic by means of its superior culture. The Greeks, the Scythians, the Kushanas and the Hunas were all absorbed into Hinduism, though they first came into the country as conquerors. Altekar, Dr. A.S., State and Government in Ancient India, 2nd ed., Motilal Banarsidas, Banaras, 1955, p. 62.

2. 1958 Manifesto and Principles and Policy of the BJS, op. cit.

there was agreement[1] on the point that in spite of the variety and diversity prevalent in India, "the tremendous fundamental fact of India is her essential unity throughout the ages". Nehru observed that foreigners had invaded India and influenced her life, yet they have been always "absorbed and assimilated". Especially, "political unity persisted from the earliest times within the cultural unity". Thus, on these lines, it was hard for them both to quarrel.

This naive belief, however, when juxtaposed against an analysis of both of their interpretations of the terms 'Indian culture' and the allied problem of 'who constitutes India', exposes their weakness for a jugglery of words. Nehru, arguing that the word 'Hindu' as used in connection with a particular religion as 'of late occurrence', felt that it was "incorrect and undesirable to use 'Hindu' or 'Hinduism' for Indian culture even with reference to the distant past", although the various aspects of thought as embodied in ancient writings, were the dominant expression of that culture. Because, "so long as the old faith and philosophy were chiefly a way of life and an outlook on the world, they were largely synonymous with Indian culture; but

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1. See Nehru, J., The Unity of India, Lindsay Drummond, London, 1941, pp. 11-26.

   On the problem of Indian Unity, Prof. Srinivas states: 'The concept of the unity of India finds expression in Hinduism from very early period, but it is obvious that in a multi-religious country this is not enough. In fact, any symbol or idea that binds together the members of a particular religion divides them at the same time from the members of other religions".

   See Srinivas, M.N., Caste in Modern India, p. 12.

2. Ibid.

when a more rigid religion developed, with all manner of ritual and ceremonial, it became something more and at the same time much less than that composite culture", he observed.[1] In contrast, for Jan Sangh, "political vissisitudes instead of weakening only strengthened the feeling of unity till Mr. Jinnah introduced the two-nation theory to which the Congress succumbed. It was for the first time that a political unit based on religion was established on the soil of this country. Otherwise, diversities of faith and creed had never undermined our national unity".[2]

Also, the apparent stalemate in the ideas between Nehru and Jan Sangh became aggravated with an understanding of their idea of "who constitutes India". To Nehru "a Buddhist or a Jain in India is a hundred per cent product of Indian thought and culture since both are integral parts of Indian life, culture and philosophy, yet neither is a Hindu by faith. It is, therefore, entirely, misleading to refer to Indian culture as Hindu culture. In later ages, this culture was greatly influenced by the impact of Islam, and yet it remained basically and distinctively Indian". Consequently, "a Christian or a Moslem could, and often did,

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1. Nehru, J., The Discovery of India, Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1960, pp. 62-64. Emphasis added.

2. See Rama Rao, A., Presidential Address, Ninth Annual Convention, Lucknow, Dec. 31, 1960, p. 2.

   Nambudaripad notes that Prof. Srinivas thus negates the whole idea of India having "its own soul". This 'Indian soul', Namboodaripad observes that "it appears, is the soul of Hinduism". It is, therefore, not surprising that those who champion this theory slip into the chauvenistic Hindu idea that non-Hindus are aliens - a variant of Jinnaha's two-nation theory'. See E.M.S. Namboodaripad, Economics and Policies of India's Socialist Pattern, Phoenix Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, p. 295.

adapt himself to the Indian way of life and culture, and yet remained in faith an orthodox Christian or Moslem. He had Indianized himself and become an Indian without changing his religion".[1] In an almost similar vein, Jan Sangh adumberated[2] that "one may remain a good Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Christian or even a Muslim and yet be a staunch Indian devoted to the highest national cause .... the growth of Bharatiya culture and civilization has been due to many factors arising out of clashes and conflicts, harmony and synthesis, between different ideologies, both native and foreign. Let all .... Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Muslim or Buddhist pride themselves in the thought that the heritage is something noble and enduring that it must not be allowed to stagnate and degenerate and that free India's future must be closely linked up with Bharatiya ideals, which must, if necessary, undergo changes from time to time so as to make them respond to the needs of modern and scientific age".

Jan Sangh, however, made clear its objections to the "very recognition of majorities and minorities based on religion in the political life of the country as a negation of true nationalism and democracy".[3] Since its concept was

1. Nehru, J., The Discovery of India, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

2. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Presidential Address, First convention, All India Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Delhi, Oct. 21, 1951, p. 4.

3. See Pandit Premnath Dogra, Presidential Address, Jodhpur, Dec. 1954, p. 8. Also for Vajpayee's statement that "To accept Muslims or Christians as minorities, would tantamount to making religion a permanent devisive line in politics, in economics, in fact, in every walk of social life. Indirectly, this would mean upholding the pernicious t-o- ation or multi-nation theory". Vajpayee, A.B., "National [illegible]", note submitted to the National Integration [illegible], [illegible] Delhi, Sept. 28-30, 1961, p. 3.

basically one, indivisible and an organic whole with a common culture, Jan Sangh asserted that "all those who own first and foremost allegiance, to this one and indivisible country and its common cultural heritage, are nationals of India irrespective of their caste, creed or province, whereas all those whose loyalty lies somewhere outside cannot be treated as nationalists".[1] Convinced as it was that the "generality of Muslims would own India as their mother land and cherish her culture as their own",[2] Jan Sangh accused Congress of 'arousing and appeasing' Muslim separatist tendencies for its own political ends.

Jan Sangh stood for democracy and as a democratic nationalist party declared that this democracy was to be to "rebuild India on the basis of Bharatiya Sanskriti and Maryada", because of its belief that the Bharatiya Sanskriti is a universal Sanskriti, a culture which united mankind. This the Jan Sangh foresaw as an evolutionary change in the minds of the people of India, and this change, the party promised to bring about, in a democratic way.

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1. Madhok dreaded those muslims as dangerous that have not owned this land and its culture. He said "the only way to check those tendencies is to educate the Bharatiya Muslims and to disabuse their minds of the Islamic exclusiveness which was exploited by the British and the Muslim League for their selfish ends .... That is the only way that can make muslims a part and parcel of the Bharatiya nation ...." See the Organizer, Dec. 10, 1951.

2. See Nandit Pramath Jogta, op. cit., p. 8.

The claim of the party thus for espousing the cause of democracy, however, appears to be impressive on its face, but questionable when viewed critically of its interpretation of secularism as practised by the Congress party.[1]

In fact, the bone of contention between the Jan Sangh and the Congress was their interpretation of the word 'secularism'.[2] That is, the secular principles of the Congress party was characterized as 'communalism' by the Jan Sangh and the

1. In spite of this declaration of faith in secularism with its particular intonation by the Congress and its exponent, Nehru, even earlier, it would be well to recall that neither Jinnah, nor Savarkar or for that matter the Pirpur Report, put faith in Congress's secularism. Jinnah, the Muslim leader, was far from satisfied. And Savarkar quoted him with approval that "the Congress has been since its inception down to this day a Hindu body .... The few Moslems .... are kept there merely as figure heads to run the poor show of a 'United Indian Nation'. See Veer Savarkar, "Hindu Sangathan, its Ideology and Immediate Programme", ed. N.V. Gadle, Bombay, 1940. Quoted in Coupland, R., Indian Politics, 1936-42, Oxford University Press, 1944, p. 194. Coupland notes with regard to the conduct of the Congress Governments, the Pirpur Report said: it seemed "to substantiate the theory that there is something like identity of purpose between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha .... The Muslims feel that, notwithstanding the non-communal professions of the Congress and the desire of a few Congressmen to follow a truly national policy, a vast majority of the Congress members are Hindus who look forward, after many centuries of British and Muslim rule, to the re-establishment of a purely Hindu Raj".

2. "It is open to anyone to criticise another party's programme freely and unequivocally but such criticisms should not amount to misrepresentation of facts. The main charge amongst us is that we are a communal party with retrograde ideas. A bare examination of our programme will convince any right-thinking man that this is a perversion of truth. The change of pandering to communalism really lies at the door of the Congress and specially against Mr. Nehru himself.

Mr. Mookerjee, S.P., Presidential Address, First convention of the BJS, Delhi, Oct. 21, 1951, pp. 8-9.

Also see, Pandit Dogra, Prannath., Presidential Address, 1954, for similar views.

Congress Government was accused of keeping the Muslims always in the forefront of political life.[1] The views of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh would be in order at this juncture on this since there exists a close association between the moral inspiration of the RSS and the ideology of Jan Sangh. For, the matrix of Hinduism according to Golwalkar is the best basis for secularism. And the spirit of democracy at its best, which confers the right of speech, thought and action on the individual is nowhere more fully recognised and practised than in the age-old Hindu tradition.[2]

Jan Sangh felt that a Government based on religion could as well be a secular[3] one, by offering protection to the minorities,

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1. See Pitamber Das, Presidential Address, Eighth Annual Convention, Nagpur, Jan. 23-25, 1960, p. 11.

2. Golwalkar, M.S., Bunch of Thoughts, Vikrama Prakashan, Bangalore, 1966, p.324

3. BJS Resolutions, Patna.

   Bharatiya Jan Sangh Working Committee made the following concrete suggestions to meet the evil of communalism:

   a) The conception of 'majority' and 'minority' based on religion is basically opposed to nationalism and should have no place in democratic politics. It is wrong to make any distinction in the matter of services, trade and education etc. on the basis of differences in the ways of worship. Every effort should be made to prevent stabilisation of any kind of separatism in the name of protecting the rights of minorities.

   b) All major political parties should affirm that they will not make any compromise with communalism nor will they give any quarter to such tendencies while making selection of their candidates for the elections.

   c) Organisations whose membership is not open to all Indians and whose activities are confined to the protection and advancement of the rights and interests of the people following any particular way of worship, should not be given recognition from the political point of view nor should any heed be paid to the demands and demands of political nature coming from them. This will force them to shed their communal character and help in de-communalising the national politics.

since every nation had its own religion having at the same time the protection of the minorities in its mind. A Hindu State, thus, could be a secular State as well. And so long as the goal of Bharatiya culture remained the goal of one and all, the spirit of tolerance of India would protect them. Madhok asserted: "the roots of secularism, along with that of tolerance in India, are not in Gandhi or Nehru or Congress .... The roots lie in Indian culture and philosophy as set out in the Vedas".[1] There was, however, a middle-of-the-road policy which the party advocated "wherein men and women of various faiths, speaking different languages and residing in different parts of the country will live in an atmosphere of unity, freedom and goodwill", under the law of the land.[2]

The party is open to all citizens[3] of Bharat irrespective of caste, creed or community. The Jan Sangh leaders took exception to Nehru's calling them communal. When he called the Jan Sangh a communal body, the BJS leaders said they were not communal. Nehru observed:

> "But people had to see what the leaders of the communal organizations stood for, all these years, what their traditions were, and what their work was like. By merely saying that the doors of the Jan Sangh .... were open to all, the communal character of this organization could not be hidden".[4]

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1. Organiser, Oct. 29, 1951.
2. Ibid.
3. The Statesman, Delhi, Oct. 15, 1951.
4. [illegible].

Jan Sangh does not support the "dangerous encouragement" to the growth of the political minorities based on caste and religion, and it gives unreserved assurance to the vast majority of Bharat's population consisting of all classes of people who are truly loyal to their country. It also assures them full protection under the law and complete equality of treatment in all matters - social, economic, and political. Jan Sangh claiming itself as a "party based on the freedom of the individual and the rule of law", would resort only to peaceful and democratic measures for the realization of its objectives. It does not believe in "totalitarian politics", and it is opposed to the use of violent methods.

Thus, the political nuances bade Nehru and Jan Sangh to take up cudgels against each other inasmuch as presenting their view points. The reason for this is not far to seek, for as Nehru himself had argued earlier[1] in regard to the differences that existed among the Indian political scenes, that, today, "the forces working for Indian unity are formidable and over-whelming, and it is difficult to conceive of any separatist tendency which can break up this unity. And this applies not only to local or sectional, but also to communal interests. There is no religious or cultural problem in India. What is called the religious or communal problem is really a dispute among upper-class people for the division of the spoils of office or representation in a legislature. This will surely be

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1. Nehru, J., The Unity of India, vide Foreign Affairs, 1938, pp. 231-43.

settled amicably wherever it arises .... In India today no one, whatever his political views or religious persuasions, thinks in terms other than those of national unity".

In fine, the ideal of the Jan Sangh is to establish a Hindu Raj in India; it believes that a government based on religion could as well be a secular one, by offering protection to the minorities; that every nation has its own religion and every nation protects the minorities; and a Hindu State, thus, could be a secular State. All these go in the name of "Integralism",[1] and elaborately discussed in 1965.

Jan Sangh's grappling with the problem of political obligation of the individual, has led to an analysis of what kind of obedience is good or what bad. This it tried to find out by applying the test of both subjectivity and objectivity in the inter-relations of the individual and Society. In this, one is confronted, in short, by the same dilemmas as faced by the Western political philosophers,[2] of the origin of the Society and the State and the place of the individual in it from time to time.

1. As is natural, the studies of 'Integral Humanism' by Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, and the 'Principles and Policy' adopted by the Vijayawada Session 1965, etc. are quoted in extenso wherever applicable and interpreted accordingly.

2. The study of the origin of the Society under the concept of Social Contract Theory of Western philosophers contains three essential factors: (a) The State of Nature; (b) The Social Contract; and (c) The Governmental Contract. In other words, Society is a group of individuals brought into being by the individuals by an agreement among themselves. Thus, the individual is given greater importance in this view. It is seldom that all these three elements were clearly present in any of the theories of these social contracters.

With a view to a correct understanding of this philosophy of Jan Sangh, one would discern, that in its anxiety to construct a theory with "Integralism" as its core, it argues, that in the conflict between Individual and Society, the argument centres round the supremacy of neither of them. The prefixed philosophical statement, viz., "Integral Humanism", edifies an ideology which landed itself in an unenviable position of reconstructing the Indian ideology;[1] and the party begins to argue that this "Integral Humanism" is a synthesis of both socialism and individualism of the world order and hence superior to both.[2] Its arguments are that the relationship between an individual and Society in which he lives is always the most exciting problem of social philosophy which is now posed as a problem of determining the extent of individual liberty as consistent with social progress. This leads us to an analytical interpretation of "Integral Humanism", of the individual, the Society and the State, of Jan Sangh's conception.

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1. "Integral Humanism must necessarily make a balanced appraisal of both Bharatiya as well as Western ideologies. On the basis of this evaluation, it seeks to show a way which would make man progress further from his present position of thought, experience and achievement". See Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Principles and Policy, adopted by Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha, Vijayawada, Jan. 25-26, 1965, p. 13, hereinafter mentioned as BJS 'Principles and Policy', 1965.

2. "Integral Humanism is the name we have given to the sum total of various features of Bharatiya Sanskriti, abiding, dynamic, synthesising and sublime". (Emphasis added). Ibid., p. 14.

In fact, the Jan Sangh accepts some ancient Indian theories[1] while rejecting many, to construct its ideology. Thus analysing, one would discern, without accepting all the theories of the institutionalisation of the Society of the ancient Indians, it has accepted only the ingredients of that Society, viz., Dharma, Varna and four Purusharthas. Indeed, it could as well have argued the case of democratic principles with all the traditional and modern values intact by accepting the traditional concept of Hindu democracy.[2] This contradiction, rather confusion, becomes worse confounded when Jan Sangh presents its Society as one indivisible organic whole, thereby acknowledging both Hegelian and Rousseaunian concepts; of course, in different degrees.

The pivotal position is accorded to the individual in Jan Sangh's philosophy. This individual's life is an integrated one by itself, "the aggregate of body, mind, intellect and soul".

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1. Dr. Bhandarkar, D.R., "Some Aspects of Ancient Hindu Polity", published by the Banaras Hindu University, 1929, especially pp. 130-168 for an interpretation of different theories of origins of the Society and the State and also the place of the individual along the continuum.

2. For a description of ancient Indian democracy, ibid., pp. 191-92. Also Madhok, Balraj., Political Trends in India, op. cit., pp. 1-4. Madhok notes that with a long record of experimentation in political, economic and social thought and behaviour, Indian politics "never visualised an omnipotent State seeking to guide and control every aspect of man's life nor was it divorced from ethical and moral values that governed the life of the people in Society .... not a theocratic State .... a truly secular State".

Apart from the conception of 'self' of the individual, the consequent interests, self improvement and happiness, he attains through the four Purusharthas. Since the claim of one's rights is subject to the fulfilment of one's duties[1] and responsibilities as well as respect for the other individual, the foundation of the Society rests on the individual's self in relationship with the Society. Thus, the individual forms the unit of the whole and consequently, both are inter-related and integrated as well.

In the Society of Jan Sangh's concept, the argument on the conflict between the Individual and the Society, centres round the supremacy of neither of them. The denial of any such conflict between the individual and the Society by Jan Sangh, is because, the visible entity, the individual, is also a representative of the invisible, the Society.[2] And, it is through him the Society manifests itself. As such, respect and happiness for each individual should be recognised as the key-note of the Society. In its view, however, the idea, that the individuals brought the Society into being, is fundamentally erroneous. It is true that the Society "is being composed of by a number of individuals, ... is self-born like an individual, Society comes into existence in an organic way. People do not produce Society. It is not a sort of club, or joint-stock, co-operative or a registered co-operative Society. In reality, the Society is an entity

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1. BJS Principles and Policies, 1965, p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 4. Emphasis added.

with its own SELF, its own life; it is a sovereign being like an individual. It is an organic entity. We have not accepted the view that society is some arbitrary association. It has its own life. Society too has its body, mind, intellect and soul".[1]

Since the individual's life is integrated, material wealth is only a means, not an end by itself; the spiritual progress of the individual also is the characteristic feature of "integralism". Here, the material concepts, Artha and Kama and the spiritual desiderata, Dharma and Moksha, sustain one another and are complementary. In order to help the individual achieve 'self advancement and social welfare' and thereby manifest itself, Society "gives birth to a variety of institutions such as marriage, family, property, caste, clan, community, guild, panchayat, State etc."[2] Of these, the "State is important but not supreme". Society has also its four Purusharthas, for the right ordering of the individual's life, and the State helps the Society manifest these through Dharma Rajya, which is "duty oriented".[3]

Within the cultural bindings of Bharatiya Sanskriti, the Jan Sangh believes in the establishment of Dharma Rajya. Religion and Dharma are two different things. While religion means a creed or a sect, it is not same thing as Dharma.

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1. Pt. Upadhyaya, Deen Dayal, Integral Humanism, A BJS Publication, New Delhi, pp. 32-33. Emphasis is not found in the original.
2. BJS Principles and Policies, 1965, p. 5.
3. ibid., p. 6. Emphasis added.

Dharma is a very wide concept as it is concerned with all aspects of life. It sustains the Society and most importantly, it sustains the world; its implementation may differ according to time, place and circumstances.[1] Consequently, it does not mean a theocratic State, and there is freedom of worship according to one's religion. In a theocratic State one religion has all the rights and advantages and there are direct and indirect restrictions on all other religions. Dharma Rajya accepts the importance of religion in the peace, happiness and progress of individual. Jan Sangh recalls and reiterates time and again, that the ideal of the State has always been Dharma Rajya. In this Dharma Rajya of the Indian State, "tolerance and respect for all faiths and creed is an essential feature .... Freedom of worship and conscience is guaranteed to all and the State does not discriminate against anyone on grounds of religion either in the formation of policy or in its implementation. It is a non-sectarian State and not a theocracy".[2] Thus it accepts the seeming differences among the various entities and aspects of life; but it seeks at the same time to discover the unity underlying them and takes an integrated view of the whole scene.

Jan Sangh projects this view of "Integral Humanism" beyond the conception of the country. According to it, a balanced appraisal of both Bharatiya and Western ideologies

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1. Ibid., Emphasis added.

2. BJS Principles and Policies, 1965, p. 6.

would help resolve the conflicting 'isms' of the world over. Since Bharatiya Sanskriti offers the philosophical substratum, the inter-related concepts of democracy, equality, independence and world peace can be harmonised and provide a direction for the world's progress as well.[1]

Thus, the spirit of 'Integralism' based on 'Bharatiya Sanskriti' and 'Maryada', permeates the entire ideological conception of the Party, "the name given to the sum total of various features of Bharatiya Sanskriti, abiding, dynamic, synthesising and sublime. This is the ideal which determines our direction. But our idealism does not mean any doctrinaire obtuseness. An ideal has to be translated into practice. Our programme, therefore has to be grounded in realism. Indeed realism is the forte of our programme, the measure of our achievements and the touch-stone of our ideal. Keeping in mind this background and the conditions prevailing in India today, the Jan Sangh lays down the policies and programmes".[2]

II

By using the same factors and modes of analysis, as of Jan Sangh, one would discern what constitutes the basis of the philosophy of Swatantra, by a study of the Society and the State with the individual, from time to time. A logical omission

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1. Ibid., p. 3.
2. BJS Principles and Policy, [illegible], p. 14.

in the Swatantra ideology is the specific mention, rather a deliberate interpretation of the term 'Society' as a cohesive force, with its own Self, of the Jan Sangh variety. This difference, in the initial premises and stand-point, shows that Swatantra's arguments stand in inverse proportion to that of Jan Sangh. In other words, Jan Sangh's "integrated Society" is in dire contrast to that of the "Open Society" of Swatantra, with liberal democracy as its core and "autonomous social forces" as its components. The second major difference but closely related to the first rests on their cultural outlook. Restated in these terms, Swatantra is more concerned with the ever present different faiths and the consequential cultural affinities, unlike that of Jan Sangh, the one with what is and the other with what ought to be. The logical corollary then becomes that Swatantra agrees to disagree within itself.

Secularism rather a negative attitude towards all religions, was not enough, and Swatantra felt that the new ideology be so defined as to suit the modern world. For, the political compulsion of modernity underlined the transition from an inter-dependent and religiously motivated Society into an individualistic and secular one. But, projections of these changes, in the subject-matter, emphasis and techniques to be adopted, suggested the all pervasive socialist atmosphere as a way out. On the other hand, the leverage exercised by the problems of political modernization, again offered a struggle between two opposing ideals. Swatantra accepted the challenge to supply the lack of a restraining force in the

present socialist ideology-ridden political climate of the country. Indeed, Swatantra presented itself as the secular rightist party, the first to be formed in India.

This sort of a corrective procedure is, however, not to be entirely in the conceptual conception of conservatism with its twin propositions, reaction and laissez faire. For, Swatantra, realising that conservatism might not be the[1] answer to the Congress creed of socialism and the like, accepted conservatism with certain reservations. In other words, it accepted conservatism to the extent that it implies respect for individuals' rights and obligations and for the rest, liberalism starts asserting itself in the Swatantrite philosophy. And it tried to steer clear from the dilemmas posed by the political nuances created by both Jan Sangh and Congress and its like with a middle-of-the-road philosophy.

Swatantra laid the foundations of its ideology with "economism" as its core, and interpreted the same both from positive and negative angles. Negatively, it analysed the ill-effects of both Socialism and Communism of the World order. And equalising Congress Socialism with that of Socialism in general, and accusing the same as of heading towards Communism, in particular, Swatantra proceeded to evolve a positive theory as a rival system by countering their theoretical dispositions, thus meeting them on their own grounds.

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1. Based on interviews.

The pivotal position was accorded to the individual in its philosophy, to the individual and his individuality in respect of his civil and economic rights. And Swatantra argued that "the dominent conception of Socialism is irreconcilable with individual's freedom and independence", and also with their capacity to develop their personality and prosperity through varied and myriad types of groups, for, there can be no compromise. In contrast, Swatantra predicated its thesis upon the fact that social democracy is quite compatible with the individual and his rights. Though, in accord with the Socialists that social justice and welfare are objectives of good government, Swatantra differed from them in holding that these could be best realised by encouraging private initiative, thus rejecting merely the socialistic rhetoric. In other words, Swatantra's interpretation of the term "Socialism" differed from that of the Socialists themselves which rests only on the difference, of using the term as denoting the aims and means. It agrees with the ideology of Socialism but not as a means of achieving certain ends, which "if rightly interpreted and adopted, we can have a Socialistic Society with economic as the principal means". This justifies its self-analysis, as a party "which will eschew dogma" and "take a pragmatic view". Shorn of verbiage, "an arrogant declaration of opinion" is anathema rather than a principle with the Swatantra, and the presumption seems to be that its "intention is to accept the doctrine that estimates any position solely by its practical bearing upon human interests".

Positively and consistent with its manifest rightist tendencies of our interpretation, the party's slogan 'Family, Farm and Freedom' denoted the party's faith in the freedom of the individual. Accordingly, the development - both spiritualistic and materialistic aspirations - should be the result of the endeavours of the individual himself. It should be an evolutionary revolution, neither thrust by the State in its role as consistent in Fascist or Nazist philosophies or by the Society in the name of Socialism or Communism. It was because it felt that the change in the outlook of man as in the nature of a dynamic system and this change in its continuity, would become inevitable, since man was both a means and an end, and could not live by bread alone. As a natural corollary, the party stood opposed to the materialistic conception of the Socialists (1) who rejected the moral and spiritual inclinations of a person. The party also wanted 'to foster and maintain spiritual values and preserve what is good in our culture and tradition'. However, these could allow interpretations of a more conservative variety to include virtually anything.

The party emphasised on the 'dignity of the Individual' - individual initiative and freedom of enterprise, i.e. maximum freedom for the individual with minimum State interference. But it was not to be construed that Swatantra stood for laissez faire or pre-19th or 20th century economics. It did realise that individual freedom without any binding will mean opportunity for exploitation and oppression of the 'have nots'.

The Swatantra did not subscribe to the view that, in a Secular State, it is not necessary to seek in religion a sanction for moral values. To say that religion is of vital concern to the State is not to minimise the rule of law either. The Swatantra Party realised that the rule of law "is an absolute essential for democracy". The Swatantra also recognises the role of Dharma, a God-oriented inner law.

In commanding the role of Dharma even to the Government and in promising to do everything possible to restore religion to its legitimate place, therefore, the Swatantra Party made a unique contribution to political thought.

Each individual has an ethical self, and the Government's task is to hinder the hindrances in the way of the realisation and development for the individual self. It is the foremost duty of the Government, specially in a democratic State to make every individual to be conscious of his importance in the set up he is living. This can be only achieved when the Government is realistic towards the factional set up of the Society (the factional society of the Indian Society is very clear from the ages long. It has been divided by many counts, namely, religions, caste, sub-caste, sects etc. Each has its own traditionally grown culture, civilization etc., both socially and educationally) over which it is functioning.

The essence of Swatantra's appeal: not just free enterprise and peasant proprietorship, not just limited Government, and anti-communism, but the things within a Society within which individualism and liberal democracy can flourish in the long run.

But what are the sociological innerpinnings of a liberal democratic Society? Autonomous social groups larger than the family but smaller than the State are crucial to the existence of the our Open Society. Individuals must belong to several such groups, and in these, in turn, must influence only a part of the individual's life. Such groups prevent the individual from becoming massmen. They preserve cultural and social differentiation within the Society. They prevent the social alienation of the individual, thus making him immune to manipulation by mass opinion.

In the economic sphere, Swatantra denied consistently that it opposed all planning. Swatantrites also denied and quoted the words of Shroff, that 'It should be clear .... that Free Enterprise .... is not advocated today in terms of the outmoded doctrine of laissez faire .... The laissez faire is as dead as dodo. It is a singular triumph of the dynamic urge of democratic ideals to have developed a new awareness of social justice and equality'.[1]

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1. Cf. Shroff's comment that the Congress had been put in office by an illiterate electorate with these remarks about 'the dynamic urge of democratic ideals'.

The Swatantra Party approached economic planning in India on the premise that human nature should be taken as it was and not as it ought to be. In other words individual initiative and enterprise and not the ideological slogans and shibboleths should be given great importance.[1] Rajaji argued that 'Government is best which governs least' and that 'the business of the State is not business but government'. Rajaji had asserted in the same vein that "the Swatantra Party stands for the protection of the individual against the increasing trespasses of the State. It is an answer to the Challenge of the so-called Socialism of the Indian Congress Party".[2]

Thus, the Swatantra Party considered the role of the State as something sacrosant. The State had many functions: "the first is to act as an umpire or referee, to hold the ring, to blow the whistle, to see that the game is played fair. The second is to provide the infra-structure, the foundation on which the economic structure can be reared ...."[3]

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1. 'Communist Techniques in Indian Planning', by A.D. Shroff, Swarajya, Jan. 21, 1961.
   See 'A Developing Crisis in Collectivism' by C. Rajagopalachari, Swarajya, Jan. 16, 1965.
2. See Rajaji, 'To Save Freedom', in Why Swatantra? (Bombay, Swatantra Party), p. 3. This also contains statements besides Ranga, Munshi, and Masani of general nature of 'Why Swatantra?' See also 'To Prosperity Through Freedom'.
3. Masani's speech to the Swatantra Forum, Calcutta, Jan. 9, 1965.

The party was vociferous in its attack on government on the proposed Seventeenth amendment to the Constitution, by which, it interpreted that the meaning of the word 'estate' would include to ryotwari tenures also. This violated the fundamental principle of property rights of an individual, the party contended, by removing questions of 'public purpose' and compensation from the purview of the courts, and, as the first step towards collectivization of agriculture. The Gandhian principle of trusteeship reflecting 'the sense of moral obligation, the pride, satisfaction, and fulfilment felt by individuals in serving others, which are inherent in our tradition' was developed by the party. In general, this implied an abandonment of coercion, including legislative 'coercion', as an instrument of policy and a reliance on voluntary use of such property by the rich, for the good of society as a whole.

Virtually the only specific Gandhian item which is developed is 'the principle of trusteeship adumbrated by Gandhi' which reflects 'the sense of moral obligation, the pride, satisfaction, and fulfilment felt by individuals in serving others, which are inherent in our tradition'. In general, this concept implies an abandonment of coercion, including legislative 'coercion', as an instrument of policy and a reliance on voluntary use of advantages by the rich, the wise and the well-born in particular, for the good of society as a whole. Rajaji makes this explicit

in his assertion that 'the new party does not believe that legislative compulsion, any more than violence .... can contribute to true or lasting human happiness. We must depend on the moral sense of the people in order to equalise without destroying freedom'.[1]

Rajaji stated that "the straight and easy path to understand our Party is to read what has been said in the twenty-one short articles of the Party's foundation document. There is no ambiguity or prolixity in it".[2] Still it is permissible to evaluate this argument as unsatisfactory. For, viewed in its entirety, the conclusion appears inescapable that these twenty-one principles are couched in such general terms, and necessarily vague because of their brevity. And as such, they are not as unambiguous as Rajaji had asserted. More important, it presents itself as an inadequate scale of values. At this level, the "ideological hypothesis" of this 'document' could be scrutinized from two distinct angles:

a) Fundamental; and
b) Non-Fundamental.

Though the major premise of the 'fundamental' is 'economism', it does not maintain that the economic function is the whole of human nature; and the conditions under which it operates determine

1. 'To Preserve Freedom', Why Swatantra, p. 5.

2. Rajagopalachari, C., Towards Power, A Swatantra Party Publication, Bombay, pp. 7-8.

the totality of accomplishment. And with its stress on the promotion of social justice based on equality of opportunity, the pertinent question becomes how best the general welfare might be secured with the minimum of sacrifice of individual[1] freedom. Thus seen, liberalism starts asserting itself from the very first principle. Thereupon, the subsequent articles at best describe the minimum of State interference which the Swatantra party adumberates, though at the same breath, the State has been sanctioned functions of a positive character, "consistent with the obligation to prevent and punish social activities; to protect the weaker elements of the society; and to create conditions in which the individual initiative will thrive and be fruitful". And how best and in what manner "the State should foster and utilise the sense of moral obligation, the pride, satisfaction, and fulfilment felt by the individual in serving others, which are inherent in our tradition", the 'fundamentals' have not made clear. Nor is this all; the 'fundamentals' vehemently oppose "adopting legislative or other forms of compulsion which commence with want of faith in the people - under the official machine, in an omnipotent State controlled by a political party voted to power".

Of the many contrasts which separate Swatantra from other parties, rather which overshadow them all, the most glaring is its acceptance of the Gandhian principle of Trusteeship. There is

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1. To Rajaji, "the individual is the only reality. The State is a non-living entity. The Leviathan has no soul. If the individual is wiped out we reduce the nation to a soul-less existence". Swarajya, March 14, 1959.

nothing new in this principle, however, rather it is 'inherent in our tradition', of "the sense of moral obligation, the pride, satisfaction, and fulfilment felt by individual in serving others", thus the impact is to be both internal and external.[1] Thus for Society at large, the 'fundamental' desires the reconstruction neither from above[2] nor an explosion from underneath but from "the moral sense of the people in order to equalize without destroying freedom",[3] "which alone raises Swatantra conservatism to a respectable level".[4]

That the 'fundamental' in general and the principle of 'Trusteeship' in particular, does not rest on sheer expediency but were buttressed by ideal considerations often derived from religious conviction is proved by the emphasis on 'decentralized distribution of industries' with a Gandhian approach. Here again, the

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1. Rajaji made this assertion rather explicit by saying that "Trusteeship imposes a duty to act according to high standards which a man of the most delicate conscience and the nicest sense of honour might impose upon himself".
   See Satyam Eva Jayate, Bharatan Publications, Vol. I, p. 340. Munshi is one with Rajaji on the Trusteeship principle. See Munshi's 'Reconstruction of Society', Bharatiya Vidhya Bhavan Bombay, 1960.
   add

2. The "fundamentals hold that 'legislative or other forms of compulsion which commence with want of faith in the people .... in an omnipotent State controlled by a political party voted to power". Statement of Principles, op. cit., p. 1.

3. See for Rajaji's view, "To Preserve Freedom", in Why Swatantra? p. 5.

4. J.P. Narain noted that the principle of Trusteeship was a key notion to Rajaji "which I am afraid is not shared by his colleagues" but "the Swatantra Party was reconciled itself to that idea only as a token of regard for its great leader", and this alone "raises Swatantra conservatism to a respectable level". "On Rajaji", Swarajya Special Number, 1962, p. 114.

inherent contradictions are replete. Granting the possibility of such a peaceful transformation and admitting that it offers certain attractive features, the questions would eternally remain. Would it solve the basic economic problem of distribution? Or would it successfully meet the challenge of maintaining prosperity and full employment under an economy of Trusteeship?

The 'fundamental' "believes in a balanced development of capital-goods industries, organized consumer-goods industries, and rural industries that afford supplementary employment in the small-scale processing of the products of agriculture". Thus, it aims at a modern urban industrialised capital economy which is in dire variance with some of the party leaders' opinions. Thus for Munshi "a country like India can have no salvation without the village economy being revitalised by the self-employed peasants".[1] And again, as a critique of the Congress party's industrial approach, Ranga lamented that "they wish to draw millions of our artisans into the embraces of the small factories, tied up, however loosely, to the growing large scale money economy .... through sugar-coated weavers' powerloom co-operatives" and "replace crores of small shop-keepers and their family economy .... by introducing state/controlled, regulated or owned grain-shops".[2] Rajaji, realising that one almost inevitable trend would be for standards of value and judgment to become increasingly materialistic, preferred khadi and village industries, and asserted that "we cannot allow the capitalist mill industry to create unemployment

1. Munshi in his forward, in Ranga, N.G., 'Freedom in Peril'

2. 'To Preserve Family Economy' in Why Swatantra? A Party Publication, pp. 11-12.

on a monstrous scale .... no measures are too harsh if we find that by such measures we can avert the disaster that is slowly but surely advancing towards us".[1]

The conflict between individual conscience and the requirements of party discipline had often led to the disruption of political parties resulting in the members playing lip sympathy to its policies. The Swatantra Party claiming itself to be 'a party with a difference' laid down a set of what they called twenty "fundamental principles" constituting the raison d'etre of the party and as such inviolable. Having thus laid down the inner ideological loyalty of its members, the 21st principle stated:

> "that democracy is best served if every political party allows freedom of opinion to its members, on all matters outside the fundamental principles of the Party. It therefore gives its members full liberty on all questions not falling within the scope of the principles stated above".

Thus this is a new concept in the working of India's Party politics. Explaining this, Rajaji said: "This party of freedom is further making a noval experiment in restricting disciplinary control over party members to essential issues, giving freedom in all other matters to vote according to individual opinion. This is not mere strategy to "net in" discordent miscellaneous elements as first might appear".

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1. Rajaji's Speeches, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1961, Vol. I, p. 11.

Thus this 21st principle, also called 'conscience clause', preserves individual freedom but at the same time without sacrificing party discipline. In this way, the party tried to solve every controversial problem onwhich individual members have been given freedom to hold contrary and even diametrically opposite views.

The adoption of this conscience clause, in its fundamental philosophy, laid the party open to the criticism as to how a national party which aspires to acquire power could conveniently avoid taking a firm stand on important national problems such as the 'Official Language'. There had been occasions in the past when even the national leadership differed on issues like 'Prohibition', 'Punjabi Suba' etc. as all these issues fell outside the fundamental principles of the Party. In other words, by adopting this 21st principle, its members "agreed to disagree" among themselves and carry on with the business of the party which was to protect individual liberty, oppose statism and prescribe the kind of economic policy which would lead the country to prosperity.

These policy projections apart, what general factors are involved in the political behaviour of these parties? For, the competitive conditions in political life presents a semblance of the stresses and strains that a party must face. And in a more immediate sense, a party, in proportion to its involvement with the concrete problems of the Society in which it exists, a party underlines its political behaviour in its election manifesto in a modified variety. Here ideology and election manifesto amount to a set of beliefs, values and preferences, expectations and perceptions regarding the Society. And in achieving and maintaining these values, public authority has to play an important role. Thus, both consist of a set of goals as well as a means to achieve the same. That is, in presenting the futurity, they are comprehensive in characters and moral in their approaches, in short, an election manifesto is a tabloid of the other. Here end the similarities. The reason for the compatibility or otherwise of these phases of documentary evidences of a party lie in the ultimate aim of increasing its influences among the people. In other words, it involves a process of helping in the decision-making of the people to consent to vote for a particular party. This process of consent among the people and the interaction of the factors of perception, emotion and motivation of both the party leadership and the "uncommitted" and "apathetic" voters, on one another, determine the success or otherwise of the party.

The appeal to these categories of voters, the party focusses through its election manifesto since its other political declaration would have carried but little weight. In this, an election manifesto become "a sort of art - the unique and exasperating art of presenting the major items of contemporary politics while several dozen variations of "we must say something about white fish". That is why, the parties, especially, the opposition parties, do not feel the need to spell out their programmes in concrete detail, and hence their manifestos are profuse with vague promises, ambiguity and contradictions.

Thus viewed, all the election manifestos of Jan Sangh and Swatantra, besides their structural aspects, elucidate the three dimensions of economic concentration, social distinctiveness and political competitiveness of them elaborately. The result is the presentation of a conceptual scheme allowing us to distinguish the specific patterns in detail at the same time enabling us to compare and generalise. So much for the generalities, the spectrum gets wider when we consider the theory of equidistance between these parties, and here lies the anomaly and a sense of contradiction.

Though comparisons are odius, the manifestos have no difference worth the name in principles. For, parties in their manifestos, try to maintain a balance between

individual freedom on the one hand, and avoid on the other, the clutches of our affluent and acquisitive society. They speak solicitiously of the 'common man' and appeal to the people of all ranks. The extent of direct responsibility to be assumed by the State for the progress of the people, however, varies from party to party. But, broadly speaking, the parties have adopted policies which include some sort of planning.

What then, are the main and relevant issues they adopt to mould the image of the State from within and project it without? Quantitative limitations aside, it is not every question that deserve an answer. But employment and development policies become complementary to each other. And, the twin problems of defence and foreign policy, in their turn, have an impact on economic planning, especially because of the need to extend its scope to include new defence committments. Also, there is a lot of rigmarole of socialism, the collosal problem of narrowing the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'. Ironic as it may sound, the more the parties speak about them, the wider becomes the gap. For, the one thing that is never arrived at is the "equality". Shorn of verbiage, the election manifestos of the parties perclude any awareness of the magnitude and complexities of the problems they are confronted with.

Defence should be viewed as all-comprehensive, a wide spectrum of national security[1]. On foreign policy and

alliances with other countries, Swatantra, short of any direct mention, made adequate references indicating its preferences, while Jan Sangh showed wider appreciation in regard to this. It fell to the lot of Jan Sangh to take both super powers to tasks for arming Pakistan and thereby harassing India "and strain our resources and delay our economic development". "We are committed", it adds, to an India strong enough to be a major world power in the next few years". This India would have nuclear armoury.

Elucidation of their respective policies towards territorial integrity speaks about a greater awareness. Jan Sangh's pledge to free the country of "double aggression" on the part of China and Pakistan.

The dimensions and dialectics of the 1971 election manifestos of these parties presented a precise formulae of their economic issues and politico-social determinants. And of all the specious arguments, the citizen's right to property and the role of the Supreme Court as his 'sentinel' invited numerous queries with far-reaching consequences. Thus, for one thing, the trends in these directions do not give a carte blanche to the parties to create their respective Great Society. For another, political principles are involved in their conflicts. And if we exclude the above, what remains is a simple proposition, their likes and dislikes for stability and authoritariarism.

At any rate, can stability be attained under these conditions?

Strategy, a plan of action to defeat a person or opponent to achieve some other goal, usually refers to a comprehensive or long-range plan. This involves a series of moves for the attainment of certain over-all objectives. Tactics, by contrast, consist of simple moves or limited sequences of steps toward intermediate goals within a larger strategic plan. Although, discussions of strategy ordinarily assume conditions of conflict or competition, its dimensions include almost any kind of schematic plan for achieving the desired goals. Considered thus, the strategy and tactics of adaptive contacts of these parties had compelled them to adopt and adapt themselves as suited to their exigencies.

Viewed retrospectively and given the above interpretation, the tactics and strategy adopted by the parties ranged from tactical moves of electoral alliances and understandings to the numerous attempts made, though proved abortive, for the unification of these parties. And more important, the strategy stretches itself, even ideologically. For instance, these parties forged alliances in spite of their ideological protestations vs the leftists and more so, the communists, though in a round-about manner. Again, political expediency compelled them to enter into coalitional politics after the Fourth General Elections.

Contrary to expectations, the strategy compelled the Jan Sangh to oppose every issue of the Congress if only for tactical reasons, and thus proved that parties do not and need not be strongly ideological or even strongly programmatic.[1]

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1. A glaring instance in this regard, was that Madhok was asked to prove that the leadership had taken to a leftist line in its economic approach; in fact, it was pointed out to him that the leadership had never deviated from the line laid down by Dr.Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and that the Ghaziabad resolution on ceiling on urban and rural properties was less radical than what the party had decided at its Patna Session earlier. The Statesman, March 3, 1973.

CHAPTER VII

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE RIGHTIST CHALLENGES.

In converting public sympathy into party preferences and voting decisions, parties contest the General Elections. In so doing, elections surface all the conflicting elements and interests that compose a party. For one, the competetive conditions of political life facilitates the examination of several questions, internally, regarding the party objectives and the perspectives of the party components.[1] And for another, elections set in motion forces which, outwardly have far-reaching implications, for the competing parties.[2] The logic of competetive success

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1. Among other things, the selection process of candidates by a Party indicates the prevalence of such congruences between the party objectives and perspectives of its components, and second, this brings into sharp relief the authority-structure-communication response within the party hierarchy, are significant.

2. First, the hypothesis, that social bases and Party organisations are inter-related in the case of every party, especially Swatantra and Jan Sangh is tested in the crucible of electoral politics, nicely. Second, one discerns elements of bargaining among and between the parties. For, the posers, can they (the different political parties) and will they deliver the goods individually? Or, alternatively, would a modus vivendi between the parties possible? raises a further and more important question as to what general factors are involved in the political behaviour of the electorate. For, democracy, though, wisely avers that Government is everybody's business, electoral politics presents several dimensions of involvement of the individuals. To meet such a contingency, parties find the answer in coming to an agreement, in principle, by attuning themselves were necessary to changing conditions, in short, in 'an alliance of convenience'. Yet, a party becomes "a victim of its mistakes and of its blunders", rather in its failure to create a proper synthesis among these various facets of its functions.

juxtaposes these two factors, rather they get amalgamated, thus presenting as complex and subtle a picture as it is for each party.

Conceivably, an analysis of the data facilitates the examination of several questions as regards the structural viability of the rightist parties, especially, Jan Sangh and Swatantra vis-a-vis the political vissicitudes they met with. Since each of these vissicitudes represents a resultant of complex forces, the problem of analysis then becomes a selection among the possible and to the extent practicable.

The period between 1951-52 and 1957 Elections witnessed the successful completion of the First Five Year Plan, the launching of the Second, and the introduction of nation-wide Community Development Programmes. Jan Sangh, born only three months earlier and new to the election rigours could secure only 3 seats in Lok Sabha and 34 in State Assemblies in 1951-52 Elections. And for a few years, it had improvised its organisational and electoral politics.

By 1957, Jan Sangh tried to concentrate its efforts in Northern India, especially, the Hindi Speaking areas of UP and MP principally and to a lesser extant in Rajasthan and Punjab. Though, prepared to alliances in other States and adjustments in Northern States, it preferred 'to go it alone' and maintain the independence of its organisation and that of its policies and programmes. Though recognised as a national Party by the

Election Commission, Jan Sangh made no attempt to contest seats in the four States in Southern region, viz., Andhra, Kerala, Madras and Orissa. Nevertheless, an increased representation both in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies (3 to 4 seats and 34 to 46 respectively), established Jan Sangh as the party of the right. For, both Ram Rajya Parishad and Hindu Mahasabha were involved in the loss of faith of the people in them. In 1957, in Lok Sabha, while RRP failed to secure even a single seat, Hindu Mahasabha's representation was reduced from 4 to 2. Of the State Assemblies, Hindu Mahasabha secured 9 seats whereas RRP won 22 seats, 10 less than in 1952.

The failure of the Congress measures, notably, the C.D. Programmes and of the Second Five Year Plan, the infamous Mundhra deal, the introduction of Co-operative Farming in its Nagpur Resolution to counter the imbalance in the field of agriculture, the consequent emergence of Swatantra as a Party of economic conservatism etc. marked the pre-1962 election period.

To avoid a contingency wherein multi-cornered contests had contributed largely to Congress victories in 1951-52 and 1957, in 1962, Swatantra supplemented its efforts to build a strong organisation through mergers with other parties. This led to adjustments with CPI directly as well as indirectly in some cases.

Rajaji listed acceptable allies as including the Jan Sangh, RSP, DMK, and Akali Dal, but did not mention the CPI. Rajaji termed the CPI his 'enemy number one' earlier. Rajaji remarked that he would ally with the devil himself if this would help defeat the Congress.[1] Commenting upon these adjustments, electorally, Rajaji argued that "over and above the desire of every party to maintain its own importance, there is considerable difficulty in appraising the strength of the parties in order to reach electoral adjustments. It is these difficulties that have stood in the way of coming to agreed adjustments so far",[2] and hoped that "in the course of time, necessary accommodations will be made and triangular contests avoided".[3] This view of Rajaji encouraged the Andhra State and Madras Swatantra candidates to come to explicit understandings with local CPI units. Masani, 'painfully aware' that 'a policy of electoral understandings and adjustments' was indispensable, if the Congress majority were to be weakened,[4] expressed that adjustments with PSP and Socialist Party would be sought. Masani, however, made a distinction between an 'alliance' and an 'understanding'. The policy adopted was that of electoral 'reciprocal courtesy', where Swatantra and other 'democratic' opposition parties would defer to one another according to local strength, without financial support or

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1. See Link, July 9, 1961.
2. Hindustan Times, Nov. 23, 1961.
3. Ibid.
4. Times of India, July 29, 1961.

canvassing for the other.[1] This, automatically left the Swatantra Party free to set up its candidates irrespective of its allies and their understandings with the CPI.

The strength of the parties were often underestimated,[2] as Swatantra proved much stronger than imagined in some areas, while in some others, other opposition groups proved strong.

A determined effort made by Swatantra in Madras, was to woo the DMK, the principal opposition group, and Rajaji tried to make the DMK a respectable party, in the eyes of the nationalists who looked upon its 'Dravidistan' demand as a menace to the integrity of India.[3] It was asserted, however, that Swatantra asked too much of the DMK, particularly in the case of Lok Sabha seats in which the DMK felt it could make a much better showing. Annadorai insisted on reconsidering both Assembly and Lok Sabha lists afresh, and the talks broke down on a State-wide basis. Rajaji philosophised that "the Swatantra Party will have to face the elections without the advantage which we had hoped to secure. Perhaps it is all for the good that we are forced to stand on our own legs".[4] The over-optimism of the Swatantra was proved

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1. Hindu Weekly Review, May 22, 1961. Based on interview.
2. See Hindustan Times, Jan. 31, 1962 for the DMK, and Statesman, May 10, 1960, for the Jan Sangh in U.P.
3. For details on negotiations, see Hindustan Times, June 26, 1961; Times of India, August 5, 1961.
4. Statesman, Jan. 4, 1961.

as the Sangh candidate was victorious and was widely used as an example of Swatantra over-confidence, when the Sangh was approached in connection with electoral understandings.[1] They agreed, however, to an "area of agreement wherein there will be no contest between the DMK and Swatantra Party will naturally be fairly large, and triangular contests will be only for a small number of places".[2] Swatantra made a serious effort to reach an agreement with Jan Sangh in Rajasthan. The Sangh was by no means a great power in the State and did not contain any great local notables upon whom it could count for its organization and its dedicated workers. Jan Sangh, on its part, realised the Jaipur Maharani's entrance into politics convinced that Swatantra was a potential power in the State. Swatantra felt to avoid all multi-cornered fights which could help the advantage of the Congress.[3]

The State unit of Swatantra tried to come to some understanding with the Jan Sangh, and "an electoral adjustment between the Swatantra Party and the Jan Sangh is now almost certain" as a result of the labours of Dungarpur and both the Maharaja and Maharani of Jaipur, with Bhairon Singh.[4]

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1. Times of India, August 3, 1961.
2. Statesman, Jan. 4, 1962.
3. Masani held a number of meetings with the late Dr. Raghuvira, Jan Sangh President, at one stage, concerning both nation-wide and State-by-State adjustments. Dungarpur and the Jaipur family for Swatantra and Bhairon Singh for Jan Sangh, in addition to the National leaders of both parties, had discussions. Based on interview.
4. Times of India, Nov. 20, 1961, noted that the Maharaja met twice Bhairon Singh, leader of the Jan Sangh group in the State Assembly; and they had arrived 'at some sort of a working arrangement on the distribution of assembly constituencies to avert a direct clash between the two parties'; and final arrangements would be made in discussion between Masani and Bhairon Singh.

Agreement though reached 'in principle', Swatantra refused to concede Bhairon Singh's demands for seats, which were to be a '50-50' split.[1]

Commenting on the failure of a complete agreement, Swatantra leaders said (that with only eighty-eight seats to clai as their own and to use in bargaining with the other opposition groups, under the Jan Sangh formula) that they were forced to announce that 'an overall settlement with the Jan Sangh is something we do not approve of'. However, it was kept 'wide open for local adjustments',[2] for it was felt that 'the breakdown of talks .... has destroyed the image, sought to be built up, of these Opposition parties as an alternative to the Congress'. As a result, many local adjustments were, in fact, worked out, but in Jaipur City in some assembly contests, Jan Sangh and Swatantra candidates opposed each other.[3]

The results of the election in Rajasthan proved fatal for the Congress, as most of the State ministers were defeated and Congress percentage of assembly seats dropped to 50 per cent. With all the limitations on the part of the Swatantra, Jan Sangh, and other rightist forces, they accounted for fifty seats, as compared to eighty-seven of the Congress.

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1. The Statesman, Dec. 13, 1961.
2. The Statesman, Dec. 13, 1961; also The Statesman, Jan. 4, 1962
3. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 19, 1962.

In Punjab, committed to the CPI, the Akalis themselves had to reduce the number of candidates they would put up, and, as a result, they had little chance of bargaining with Swatantra.[1] Swatantra was thus forced to settle for only a scattering of seats, unless it decided to 'go it alone'. Some Swatantra candidates chose to contest on the Akali 'hand' symbol or jointly under the 'hand' and the Swatantra 'star', rather than with the Swatantra 'star' alone.[2] Masani's desire to build a strong and disciplined Swatantra Party, using its own symbol and its own programme, as opposed to the tendencies toward parochialism and uncertain commitment implicit in the federal scheme were again frustrated by such moves of the local parties elsewhere.[3]

Swatantra Party emerged next to Congress and the Communists, as the third largest group in the Lok Sabha. It had set up 173 candidates and gained 18 seats polling 90,85,252 votes or 7.89% of the total votes polled. Its 18 member Lok Sabha team was from:

Andhra	- 1
Bihar	- 7
Gujarat	- 4
Rajasthan	- 3
U.P.	- 3
Total:	18

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1. The Statesman, Jan. 2, 1962.
2. Based on interviews. For instance, Basant Singh, the State General Secretary, was reported to have used the Akali symbol alone. Similar to the Akali move, Ramgarh retained the bicycle symbol of his Janata Party for the 1962 elections, though his party merged with Swatantra. The Ganatantra Parishad when denied the right to use its bow-and-arrow, if it merged with Swatantra before the elections (1962) decided to postpone the merger until after the general elections.
3. Based on interviews.

It polled the highest percentage of 25% in Gujarat, in Bihar with 18.21%, 18.10% in Rajasthan, 14.91% in Andhra. Jan Sangh on the other hand had set up 196 candidates and gained 14 seats in the Lok Sabha election. In Andhra, all the 8 candidates lost their deposits. In Gujarat and Kerala Orissa and West Bengal, all its 5 candidates forfeited their deposits. In Maharashtra 13 out of 17 and 6 out of 7 from Mysore also lost their security deposits.

As regards the Assembly constituencies of the Swatantra Party, the position was no better, for 39 out of 43 candidates from M.P., 19 out of 24 from West Bengal and 30 out of 42 from Punjab lost their deposits. Jan Sangh on the other hand set up 196 candidates and gained 14 seats. The number of candidates they nominated came next only to Congress. While 75 Swatantra candidates lost their deposits, Jan Sangh lost in 114 constituencies. The performance of Swatantra was remarkably good compared to Jan Sangh. Jan Sangh increased, however, its poll percentage as follows:

	Lok Sabha	Legislative Assemblies
1952	3.1%	2.76%
1957	5.93%	4.03%
1962	6.44%	6.07%

and its Lok Sabha and Assembly members came from the following States in 1962 elections:

	Lok Sabha	Legislative Assemblies
M.P.	3	41
Punjab	3	8
Rajasthan	1	15
U.P.	7	49
Bihar	-	3
	14	116

Swatantra won 207 seats in the State Assemblies as against 153 won by the Communists and thus emerged as the second biggest party. Jan Sangh secured 115 seats and the PSP 140. The break-up of Swatantra representation in the State Assemblies were: Bihar 50, Rajasthan 36, Orissa 36, Gujarat 26, Andhra 19, U.P. 15, Madras 6, Mysore 9, Punjab 4 and M.P. 3. It became official opposition in four State Assemblies - Bihar, Rajasthan, Orissa and Gujarat.

The voting trend indicated that where the Swatantra is stronger, Jan Sangh was weak and vice versa. M.D. Malaviya says: ".... A significant point about the Right-Wing Parties is that where the Jan Sangh emerged as a powerful force, the Swatantra had had to give place to it, while in the Swatantra strong-holds the Jan Sangh could not make a mark. Thus, in M.P., Jan Sangh has 41 Assembly seats, but the Swatantra only 2. In Bihar where the Swatantra got 50 seats, the Jan Sangh has only 3. Again while in Gujarat the Swatantra emerged as the main opposition with 26 seats, the Jan Sangh failed to get a single seat. And in Rajasthan

the Swatantra score is 36, but the Jan Sangh trails behind with 15. Conversely, in U.P. Swatantra has 15 while Jan Sangh has 48 ...."[1] Commenting on the success of the Jan Sangh in the 1962 elections, the Eastern Economist stated that because of its militant and disciplined character, Jan Sangh turned out as a far greater opposition to the Congress in the years to come.[2] The emergence of the Swatantra Party in 1962 elections brought a rival to the Jan Sangh. The RRP and Hindu Mahasabha's popularity was waning rapidly.

Thus Jan Sangh and Swatantra could make common cause only in certain pockets, as they both failed to realise the significant trends that were undermining the Congress successes. For the loss of Congress was a gain, on the one hand to Left Parties, Communists and Socialists, but on the other, more to right-wing parties Swatantra and Jan Sangh.

The highlights of the next intermittant electoral period, 1962-67 were, the Kamaraj Plan and the voluntary resignation of Chief Ministers, Nehru's demise and Lal Bahadur Sashtri's Prime Ministership, Pakistan's 1965 Aggression, Tashkent declaration and Mrs. Gandhi's assumption of Prime Minister's Office, Opposition indictment, especially from the right-wing of Congress misrule. Electoral pacts were concluded on an all-State scales, the Congress could not rely on Opposition pragmentation, defection galore and formation of Jana Congress in several States.

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1. Malaviya, H.D., The Danger of Right Reaction, A. Socialist Congratulations Publication, New Delhi, 1967, P.15.
2. The Eastern Economist, March 2, 1962.

The 1967 electoral politics demanded unity among the opposition and a policy of how best to corner the ruling party in straight fights. The avoidance of triangular and multi-angular contests thus was the sine-qua-non of the opposition strategy. But the party politics did not always comprehend this profound wisdom. For one thing, the internal convulsions of the parties rose to the surface with their ugly pattern over the nomination process. And for another, the parties approached the elections with a business-like proposition, viz. to secure the maximum number of seats for themselves.

And Andhra proved no exception. For, in Andhra, as elsewhere, the ruling party was a house divided against itself. The main opposition party, the Communist, was torn asunder into two belligerent parties, in 40 constituencies both Right and Left Communists were pitted. The Swatantra Party faced internal tussles, particularly over the issue of electoral adjustments. The Jan Sangh declared its strategy to be of two-fold[1] nature: first, to secure the maximum number of seats possible; and second, to reach out to the maximum number of voters. It was not prepared to limit itself to a few constituencies. And it hoped to enter the legislatures in a big way and build up in the assembly a powerful and healthy influence for nationalization in politics and purity in administration. And Swatantra desired to become the party next to Congress. Thus, the rightist opposition failed to hammer out an agreed formula against the Congress. Nor could the other parties, PSP, SSP and the Republican decide such an issue.

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1. The Organizer, Jan. 26, 1967.

The confusion became worse confounded when some of the parties adopted the posture of "touch-me-not" even with a barge pole. The reasons given out however, were of ideological orientations. For instance, PSP insisted that an alliance of all opposition parties including the communists as partners be forged. And its assessment was based on political judgment that no alliance would be feasible in Andhra minus the Communists. Jan Sangh was not favourably disposed of such a proposal of 'accepting the Communists the lesser evil than the Congress'.[1]

This resulted in the failure of PSP's efforts reaching an understanding with the Jan Sangh. Equally for the Swatantra, an alliance with the Communist of either variety was anathema. Yet, the Organizer reported that in some constituencies, Swatantra candidates entered into an understanding covertly with the Communists[2] but Ranga, the Swatantra Chief was opposed by the Communists in the Chittoor Lok Sabha constituency. And in 16 assembly constituencies, the Jan Sangh and Swatantra were pitted

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1. The Organizer, Jan. 26, 1967.

2. Yet, the Organizer acknowledged Swatantra's mature politics 'though not very idealistic' as responsible for its success. The Organizer, March 5, 1967.

against the other. These conflicting trends in the major parties changed the general character of the election contests in Andhra.[1]

The Swatantra secured the second position with 29 seats in Andhra Pradesh in 1967, out of 90 contested, an increase from 19 in 1962. It could secure 11 seats by a close contest of less than 5,000 votes, 16 seats by fair contest of 5,000 to 10,000 votes. Only 2 seats were from remote contest of 15,000 and above votes. Jan Sangh secured only 3 seats out of 80 it had contested. It lost 77 seats of which 61 were from rural and 16 were from urban areas. It could have won only 1 seat which it had lost in a close contest.[2]

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1. Congress fielded at least a dozen Rajas and Zamindars with the exception of Raja of Bobbilli, a former CM of Madras.

Name	Party	Constituency	Won or lost
Raja Chalapati Rama Krishna Ranga Rao.	Ind.	Bobbilli	Won
Raja Ganjapati Raju, P.V.G.	Congress	Bheemunipatnam	Won
Raja Sagi Suryanarayana Raju	"	Narasipatnam	Won
Raja V. Venkata Krishnam Raju	"	Tuni	Won
Raja Meka Rangayya Appa Rao	"	Nuzvid	Won
Raja Yarlagadda Sivarama Prasad Challapalli	"	Avanigadda	Won
Rani Kumudani Devi	"	Nanaparti	Won
Raja Ramchandra Reddi of Papannapet	"	Medak	Won
Rani Kumar Devi of Jeypur	"	Madhugula	Won
Raja Janumpally Rameshwar Rao	"	Nanaparti	Won(LS
Raja Challapalli Ankineedu Pd	"	Machilipatnam	Won(LS
B. Prabhakara Pattabhirama Rao	"	Pamarru	Lost
Nawaz Mir Ahmed Ali Khan	"	Charminar	Lost

2. Close indicate success within 5,000 votes; Fair contest indicates 5,000 to 15,000 votes; Remote indicates above 15,000 votes. For future references this grouping is followed.

The 29 seats won by the Swatantra were all from rural areas. Out of the Swatantra's loss of 60 seats from Andhra Pradesh 10 were in close contests which it might have won if it had geared its organisation and also if both Jan Sangh and Swatantra had not fought in 16 assembly constituencies independently of the other. The Swatantra lost 24 seats in fair contests out of 60 seats. 54 were lost from rural areas and only 6 from urban areas.

In Hyderabad and adjoining areas,[1] the Jan Sangh emerged as the chief rival to the Congress contesting 11 assembly constituencies and 1 Lok Sabha seat, in an area dominated by the Majlis and Nizamists.

The Swatantra contested 23 seats out of 96 in the five Delta Districts (Vizag, East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna and Guntur Districts) and could hardly secure 6 seats. The Jan Sangh contested 24 seats but secured only 1 seat from Vizag district. In the Rayalaseema districts (a backward district), Swatantra could win 7 seats. Communists activities were prominent in Warangal, Nalagonda, Krishna and West Godavari districts and in these districts out of 57 seats Swatantra could contest only 16 seats without winning any one seat. Jan Sangh could capture 1 seat from Warangal. Out of 90 seats contested by Swatantra,

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1. For instance, in the Charminar constituency which was won by Shri S.S. Owaisi (Ind.), Jan Sangh's Meghraj scored 3670 more votes than Mir Ahmed Ali Khan who came third, Home Minister of Andhra Pradesh. In Secunderabad Lok Sabha constituency, Shri A. Lakshminarayana and in Warangal Shri L.S. Raju both from Jana Sangh secured second positions.

the maximum of 15 were from Srikakulam and the Swatantra won 10 seats. In Chittoor district, though they had contested 12 seats, the Swatantra could secure only 3 seats. The Jan Sangh did not have any representation in 1952, 1957 and 1962 but it could secure one seat each from Vigaz, Nellore and Warangal this time.

Assam, is a border State, wherein Assamese and Bengali are the two languages which created conflict between Bengalies and Assamese. The Jan Sangh could not secure a single seat in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967 elections. It lost deposit in almost all the seats in all the elections it contested. Out of 22 seats it contested in 1967, 10 were from Lakhimpur district out of 22 and the Jan Sangh lost 3 in close contest, 17 in fair contest all from rural areas. Swatantra contested 13 in 1967 and won 2 seats in close contest. It lost 10 seats, 8 in fair contests and 2 in remote contests. Swatantra's strong-hold was in Nowgong and Lakhimpur districts where it secured 1 seat each.

In Bihar, the Third General Election 1962 catapulted the Swatantra Party to the position of the official opposition with 50 seats. Soon after the Elections, however, the internal dissensions generated by the Raja of Ramgarh, and the party High Command's removal of the Raja (which incidentally gave the Raja all India fame for a while) resulted in the break up of the Party in the State. The Raja's followers left the Party en-bloc and it resulted in the Swatantra Party's non-existence in the State.

To enthrone the party once again to a respectable position in the State political arena, Swatantra was prepared for electoral alliances with other Opposition parties. Left with no one, Swatantra tried to find a natural ally in Jan Sangh. In fact, Dhahyabhai Patel was quite hopeful of such an alliance that he remarked "I will explore the possibility with the leaders of the Jan Sangh here".[1]

The Jan Sangh Pratinidhi Sabha[2] ruled out, however, joint fronts but only permitted electoral adjustments with national democratic elements. (Though such adjustments were arrived at by the Jan Sangh with Swatantra in Gujarat, Orissa, Rajasthan and Haryana as well, the attempts that were made in this regard in Bihar and U.P. did not bear any fruit). Jan Sangh set up a large number of candidates - 265 out of 318 - in the 1967 Elections.

The Raja of Ramgarh revived his Janata Party. He turned the focus of opposition parties against the Bihar Congress with a 'United Front' of Communists and Socialists to fight the elections. The two United Front Parties, the Janata and Jarkhand, though having a common base on the Chotanagpur plateau, politically had different issues to cope up with. For, the Jharkhand's demand for a separate Jharkhand State for the Adivasis which the remaining partners could support only at their peril, while the Janata Party

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1. The Hindu, Dec. 24, 1966.
2. Report on Fourth General Elections, by Deendayal Upadhyaya, 1967, pp. 1-2.

was keen on encashing on the economic ills of the people, which the Communists and the Socialists shared.[1]

The Right Wing parties secured 73 seats in 1962 and 7 seats to Lok Sabha. The Swatantra the largest single opposition party in 1962 with 50 seats dropped to 3 seats in 1967 due to the desertion of Raja of Ramgarh. (The Raja played a crucial role in inflicting a crushing defeat to the Swatantra Party which contested 126 seats out of which it lost deposit in 114 seats). It contested all the 15 seats from Ranchi, 14 each from Purnea and Shahabad districts but secured none. The 3 seats won were one from Darbhanga, 2 seats from Santal Parganas.

Out of 124 seats it lost, 9 were in close contests, which it could have easily won if the Jan Sangh and Swatantra had not contested 108 seats and it lost 68 in fair contest and 47 in remote contests. Even out of 124 seats it lost, 120 were from rural areas and 4 from urban areas.

The Jan Sangh contested 44 seats, 29 seats and 75 seats in 1952, 1957 and 1962 elections respectively, and it lost the security deposit in more than 90% of the seats. In 1967 its performance was no better since it lost 193 seats out of 271. It lost 33 seats in close contests, 116 in fair contests and 95 in remote contests. It could have easily won 33 seats which it had lost by a margin of less than 5,000 votes. Just as Swatantra, the Jan Sangh secured the maximum number of 5 seats

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1. The Hindu, June 8, 1966.

in Santal Parganas, 4 from Bagalpur, 3 each from Singhboom and Patna districts. It could not secure, however, even a single seat from Darbhanga, Saharsa, Monghyr, Sahabad and Dhanbad. Jan Sangh recorded a sharp increase in votes polled in Bihar. It won 26 assembly seats in 1967 compared to 3 in 1962 and polled 10.42% votes against 2.77% in 1962. Bhagalpur was the only district in which more than 20% of the vote was won and it gave the Jan Sangh 4 seats. Jan Sangh fared badly in Bihar. It won only 3 seats against Swatantra's 48 seats. Jan Sangh and Swatantra opposed each other in 108 Assembly and 24 Lok Sabha seats. The Swatantra Party won only 3 seats in the Assembly against Jan Sangh opposition. The Jan Sangh won 13 of its 26 seats against Swatantra and won 1 Lok Sabha seat.

The Swatantra party can be classified as a rural party, particularly in Gujarat. It has developed a rural awakening in the masses, thus rallying and revitalising certain class of persons: (a) The Nagpur resolution putting a ceiling on the land holdings and co-operative farming; (b) The imposition of the Kutch Inamdari Abolition Act of 1969 sparked off a vigorous agitation; More than 45,000 Inamdars felt the Act unduly harsh and unfavourable; and (c) Kutch Rajput Sabha drifted away from the Congress and the members joined the Swatantra Party.[1]

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1. Based on interviews.

The Congress levelled criticism against the Swatantra on three counts: (a) The leader in the Assembly, Shri Bhailalbhai Patel had neither a popular nor an impressive image; (b) the large number of ICS candidates have no public image practically; and (c) the performance of the Swatantra members in the Assembly was poor. Caste factors like Rajput and Patel were bound to affect the election results.[1] The two Saurashtra princes of Dhrol and Dhangadhra, whom the Congress persuaded to accept Congress tickets, however, refused.

The State representatives of Jan Sangh and Swatantra concluded election arrangements, as: all Parliamentary seats would be fought by the Swatantra whereas Jan Sangh would fight 15 Assembly seats. Out of these 15, 8 would go to the PSP. Swatantra would avoid contest with other opposition parties except the Communists but the same could not be said of other parties inter-se.[2]

The electoral adjustment was only to avoid multi-angular contests, and Jan Sangh and Swatantra would not put up candidates against each other for the agreed seats. That did not prevent

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1. The Weekend Review, Jan. 21, 1967.

2. The Hindustan Times, Oct. 15, 1966.
   The Gujarat Swatantra Party had selected all except 5 of its Parliamentary candidates. Among them 6 were Industrialists, 1 Ex-ruler, 2 Princes, 2 retired ICS Officers, 1 woman, 1 Professor, 1 Journalist and 8 Social and Political Workers. It is supporting 2 Independent candidates: H.H. Mayurdhwaj Sinhji and Sri Rajmohan Gandhi and also Republican candidate Shri Karsandas Parmar in Surendra Nagar, Junagadh and Gandhi Nagar Parliamentary constituencies respectively. Ibid., Oct. 22, 1966.

other parties from doing so. If the PSP did not have an agreement with the Jan Sangh, they could contest and Swatantra would remain neutral. The same applied to the PSP as well, and was almost certain that an adjustment would come through.[1]

S.S. Bhandari, Secretary, Jan Sangh, stated that his party was determined to help the Swatantra party to win power in Gujarat and hence avoided triangular fights with the Congress. Jan Sangh had not been able, however, to arrive at a similar agreement with the PSP. So also the Swatantra.[2]

In 1967, for the 168 Assembly seats there were 613 candidates. (Congress - 168, Swatantra - 145, Communists - 38, Janata Parishad - 46, Jan Sangh - 17, Independents - 175, Other Parties - 24). There were straight fights between the Congress and Swatantra in 32 constituencies, the highest in any State. Swatantra Party had put up 21 candidates for 24 seats of Lok Sabha. Of these 19 belong to Swatantra and 2 with its support in Surendranagar and Junagadh. For the 168 Assembly seats, it had put up 145 candidates and supported 6 more. Interestingly, Swatantra was the only party which had set up sufficient candidates to win office in Gujarat. There were straight contests in

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1. ibid., Dec. 3, 1966.
2. Swarajya, Dec. 17, 1966.

6 Parliamentary seats of Anand, Mehsana, Kutch, Dabhai, Valsad and Dhandhuka and for 35 Assembly seats. The results of the voting was:

Year	Votes	
	Jan Sangh	Swatantra
1962	76,033 (LS)	13,20,405 (LS)
	69,491 (LA)	12,71,809 (LA)
1967	-	25,86,300 (LS)
	1,20,147 (LA)	24,36,900 (LA)

The Congress had a stream roller majority with 113 seats in 1962 election and the Swatantra had 26 seats. In 1962 elections the Swatantra polled an impressive percentage of 24% securing 26 seats in Kutch, Panchmahals and Kheri districts. Its performance was good in Kutch with 61%, Kaira with 50%, Panchmahal with 46%. It secured 10 seats in Kaira district, 5 in Kutch district, 5 in Panchmahal, 2 each in Ahmedabad and Baroda districts, one each in Sabarkantha and Mehsana districts, thus it could secure 26 seats out of 106 it contested. Maharawal Jaydeep Singhji from Devgadh Baria in Panchmahal district polled 80% of the votes and topped the list.

In 1967 it secured 8 out of 8 it contested from Sabarkantha district, 7 from Kaira district, 6 each from Ahmedabad, Mehsana and Panchmahal districts. It drew blank in Amreli and Bulsar and Dangs. Out of 66 seats, 35 were in close contests were won and

62 were from rural areas and 4 from urban areas. It lost 82 seats, out of which, 39 were from close contests, 30 from fair contests and 13 under remote contests.

Maharaj Kumar Himmat Singhji of Kutch won[1] the Kutch Lok Sabha seat by defeating the Congress rival by more than 60,000 votes in 1962 whereas in 1967 he was beaten by just less than 3% votes by the Congress candidate Shri T.M. Sheth. Masani won the Rajkot seat in 1963 by-election by a wide margin of votes. In 1967, it was not a smooth sailing for him as his opponent Shri V. Patel belonged to the 'Patel' community; however Masani won this seat with less than 3% difference in votes.

Sabarkantha seat also attracted much attention as was contested by C.C. Desai, a former civil servant of the Ministry of Commerce. Desai won for the Swatantra ticket by polling 57% votes defeating his Congress rival, Purshottam Japee. In Anand, H.M. Patel, a former ICS, and earlier connected with the Mundhra deal, was defeated by the Congress candidate, Narendrasingh Mahida.

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1. Swatantra had the support of a number of native rulers in Gujarat. Prominent among them are:

   Maharaj Kumar Himmat Singhji of Kutch
   Maharaja Mayurdhwaja Singhji of Dhranghara
   Maharaja Jaideep Singhji of Devgro Baria
   Prince Shiva Bhadra Singhji of Bhavnagar
   Yuvaraj Digvijaya Singhji of Wankanar
   Yuvaraja Manohar Singhji of Rajkot
   Yuvaraja Shiv Kumar of Jasdan and others.

(Interestingly, Shri Kumar Narendrasingh Mahida, a Swatantra candidate in 1962 election won on its ticket, then). In Baroda, Acharya Kripalani withdrew making room for Swatantra and Congress to contest and P.C. Patel of Swatantra won by polling 53% votes defeating M.D. Chiksi, the Congress candidate and the Mayor of Baroda.

In Kaira Parliamentary constituency, the Swatantra candidate P.N. Solanki defeated the Congress candidate Shri D.D. Desai. In the Assembly seats, the main strong holds of the Jan Sangh were Rajkot, Junagadh, Manavadar, Jetpur, Jankara and Morvi. The President of the Gujarat Unit Harisinhji Gohil contested from Shihor, C.H. Shukla its Vice President from Rajkot and its General Secretary Gajendra Gadkar from Khadia. Out of 16 seats the Jan Sangh contested, it secured only one seat, that of Rajkot, by C.H. Shukla who polled 61% of the votes. It secured second position in 6 places, third position in 6 places and fourth in 3 constituencies.

The Jan Sangh hold in U.P. is evenly distributed all over the State backed by the RSS workers in urban areas and the dedicated and sincere workers and leaders including zamindars and taluqdars in rural areas.[1]

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1. Based on interview with Shri Harish Chandra Srivastava, State Secretary of the U.P. Jan Sangh.

An analysis of the election results revealed that the Congress was assured of support from the big business and ruling family. In U.P., apart from Nevatia, Satish Chandra, K.C. Pant, Hari Shastri et at., were connected with big business houses.[1] In the Third General Elections the Congress adopted the former ruler Manabendra Shah himself as a Lok Sabha candidate, and to his nominees in the Fourth Elections.[2]

Jan Sangh, led by the Raja of Jaunpur, Yadvendra Dutt Dubey was supported by Swatantra Party.[3] A much larger number of Rajas and Ranis contested as of Swatantra Party.

SSP entered into an alliance with the CPI and then approached the Jan Sangh for an electoral arrangement which the latter refused as it would not have any truck with the CPI. The Jan Sangh was prepared earlier to forge a joint front of all opposition parties to fight the Congress in the Fourth General Elections. Shri Nanaji Deshmukh, Zonal Secretary of the Party, stated that his Party was ready to participate in talks with the SSP to set up a common candidate to the Phulpur seat provided it withdrew its Bhopal resolution describing the Jan Sangh as a communal party.[4]

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1. Link, Jan. 15, 1967.
2. Link, Jan. 8, 1967. Congress gave tickets to Raja Ahmad Mehdi of Pirpur, Raja Rananjay Singh of Amethi, Raja Ajit Pratap Singh of Jamu, Raja Devendra Pratap Singh of Mankapur, Raja Yaduvendra Singh of Siswa, Nawabzada Sajjad Hussain, Rani Indra Mohini of Sahaspur and Rani Asar Saadat Ali of Nanpara. Apart from the Tehri-Garhwal family, some big zamindars were also given Congress tickets in the past but this was largely due to their long connection with the national movement. That is how Raja Dinesh Singh, Zamindar of Kalakankar came to the Lok Sabha.
3. Link, Jan. 8, 1967.
4. The Hindustan Times, Oct. 16, 1966.

The voters choice in U.P. had cut across all caste and communal barriers for parties and candidates set up by communal parties. When 2 or more castes dominate the electorate, the balance of power would count much. In Jaunpur, Thakurs and Brahmins dominate and Hargovind Singh, the former Home Minister lost to a Brahmin Yadavendra Dutt Dube. The balance of power was held by the Ahirs, Harijans, Muslims and Kayasthas. Likewise, out of the 8 Muslim candidates set up in U.P. for the 1967 elections by the Congress, 7 had been defeated by the candidates backed by the Muslim Mushawarat, a newly formed organization and in some others Muslims set up by the Congress were defeated by Hindus with Mushawarat's support. In U.P., Muslims form 16% of the total population and in some areas the percentage is as high as 45%. In places like Rampur, Moradabad, Bijnor, Sharanpur, Bareily, Muzaffarnagar and Bahraich they played a crucial role and tilted the voting results. Congress's earlier discrimination in economic, cultural and administrative spheres made them to look to the Majilis and "let us teach the Congress a lesson" became a popular slogan.[1] Similar is the case with the Harijans who voted for the SSP, CPI and Republican parties wherever they had a fair chance of victory.[2]

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1. Based on interviews.

2. Link, Nov. 18, 1966. Dr. Faridi, leader of the Muslims Majilis Mushawarat, declared that "the number of Muslim voters was 80 lakhs and they could tilt the balance in favour of any candidate in at least 110 Vidhan Sabha constituencies".

The major opposition parties tried to form a united front to avoid splitting of the votes. The Congress, on the other hand, tried to set up candidates as many as possible for this purpose, and there was a plan behind it. In one constituency,[1] considered a prestigious one, a Communist stood although all the left parties agreed to support an Independent candidate, with the idea of splitting the left vote in order that the Congress candidate might gain. The same phenomenon was noticed in many constituencies, particularly where the Congress candidate was doubtful of his chances. In one constituency as many as 21 contested for the Assembly seat.

In U.P., Jan Sangh became the largest party next only to the Congress. It had won 98 seats out of 401 contested in a 425-member assembly; annexed 12 out of 77 Lok Sabha seats, contested in a House of 85 seats for U.P. For the Assembly the percentage of vote polled increased from 16.46 in 1962 to 21.67 in 1967, and for the Lok Sabha from 17.57 in 1962 to 22.58 in 1967.

Jan Sangh contested 46 seats and won 13 in the U.P's north-east Gangetic Valley bordering Nepal consisting of Bareily, Bijnor, Budaun, Moradabad, Pilibhit, Rampur and Shahranpur districts. In the Northern borders touching Nepal very mountainous

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1. Swarajya, Feb. 18, 1967.

and having little habitation, Jan Sangh performance was poor, for, 1967 elections, it contested 14 assembly seats and got only 1 seat from the districts of Naini Tal, Almora, Garhwal, Tehri-Garhwal. Jan Sangh's performance in the western zone of Dehra Dun, Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut and Bulandshar was no better. It contested 37 seats in 1967 and got through in 5 of them. In the Central zone of Lucknow, Sitapur, Unnao, Hardoi, Rae Bareli and Kheri districts, it contested 47 of the 48 seats and won 18 of them. In the Central zone of old Rajas and Zamindari areas consisting of Faizabad, Sultanpur, Gonda, Pratapgarh, Bahraich and Bara Banki, the Jan Sangh contested 50 of 55 seats and won 18 seats. Adjoining the Nepal border and Bihar in the east lies Gorakhpur, Azamgarh, Deoria and Basti districts, and here the Jan Sangh contested 55 of the 57 seats and won 11 seats. In 1967 the Jan Sangh contested all the 46 seats of Varanasi division but could secure only 8 seats here. The Allahabad zone had 2 of the 5 KAVAL corporations consisting of Farrukhabad, Fatehpur, Etawah, Allahabad and Kanpur and out of all the 48 seats it contested, it could secure only 6. The Southern border of the State adjoining M.P. brought a surprise to the party in 1967 elections. Jhansi, Banda, Jalaun and Hamirpur districts gave the party an unexpected success when it secured 10 seats out of 19 it contested. The districts comprising of Aligarh, Mathura, Agra, Mainpuri and Etah adjoining Delhi where the Jan Sangh was the ruling party, gave the party substantially a good backing, it contested 39 and won 10 seats.

In Rampur, the principal of Gurukul Kangara, Shri S. Ketu of Jan Sangh stood against Nawabzada Zulfir Ali Khan a Swatantra member of the Nawab family of Rampur and lost the seat to the Nawab. Shri B.B. Lal of the Jan Sangh defeated the Union Minister of State Shri Satish Chandra in 1967 and he was defeated earlier in 1962 by the Jan Sangh candidate Shri Brij Raj Singh from Bareily constituency. Yuvaraj Lutt Singh who won the Sahabad seat in 1962 also carried along 4 of the 5 assembly seats but in 1967 he was shifted to Kheri seat where he lost to Shri B. Verma, the Congress. Shri J.B. Singh of the Jan Sangh held the Shahbad seat with a slender majority of less than 1% in a 10-cornered fight. Jan Sangh won both the Sitapur and Shahbad Lok Sabha seats but the party put different candidates in 1967. The Misrikh seat (SC) which was won in 1962 by Shri Gokaran of the Jan Sangh was lost to the Congress in 1967. Both the Swatantra and Jan Sangh did not contest the Rae Bareli seat at all.

For the second time A.B. Vajpayee faced Subhadra Joshi, Convener of the Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee. In 1962 she defeated Vajpayee by a narrow margin, and this time he avenged his defeat by a difference of about 30,000 votes. The local leader of the Majlis headed by a former Muslim Leaguer at first supported Vajpayee but later on supported to Khurshidal Hasan of the Swatantra. At Domariaganj constituency, a contest occurred between Keshava Dev Malaviya and Jan Sangh nominee Sharma. Banu Pratap Singh, State President of the Swatantra Party was also

in the triangular fight. Shri Narain Swarup Sharma had won this seat by a wide margin of over 30,000 votes. In spite of the fact Shri B.P. Singh secured the support of 20% Muslims. The Jan Sangh, in Gorakhpur, supported Mahant Digvijayanath of Hindu Mahasabha who defeated Shri Saxena of the Congress. Why Ishraj an Independent and Shareef a Swatantra candidate both of muslims opposed the Mahant is a matter of conjecture. In Domariaganj Lok Sabha seat, Jan Sangh lost to Congress and Shri Yadavendra Dutt Dubey was the loser. Raghu Vira, a former President of the Jan Sangh was defeated in Banaras in 1962 by Thakur Raghunath Singh, a seasoned and tried congressmen of the old guard. He was in turn defeated by Sathyanarain Singh of the Communist Party in 1967. In Kannauj constituency, Jan Sangh had lost to Ram Manohar Lohia, Vijalakshmi Pandit in Phulpur, Hari Krishna Sasthri in Allahabad and S.M. Banerjee, the labour leader in Kanpur. Krishnapal Singh Rao who was elected on the Swatantra ticket in 1962 from Jalesar in a 7-corner contest was defeated in 1967 on the Jan Sangh ticket from Etah in a 4-cornered fight.

Almora assembly seat which the Jan Sangh held in 1957 by Govind Singh was annexed by N. Chandra in 1967. From Sitapur Tambreshwari Prasad and Gaya Prasad Mehrotra from Biswan S. Gopal's success in Bangarmau in a 13-cornered contest deserved mentioning. The defeat of Shri Sharda Bakht Singh the leader of the Assembly from Bilgram against Kalarani who held this seat from 1962 was a blow to the Jan Sangh. Two seats from Lucknow were 16-cornered and 11-cornered and the split votes brought success

for Jan Sangh. All the 4 Lucknow seats went to Congress in 1962 but in 1967, 3 went to Jan Sangh. In Bahraich district, the Swatantra Party which had won 9 seats in 1967 had to give way to Jan Sangh which captured all including that of Raghavendra Pratap Singh of Mankapur, a sitting member of the Vidhan Sabha from 1957 and 1962. The party suffered due to the defect of Madho Prasad Tripathi, J. Prasad and B. Deo all in the three adjoining constituencies of Bansi, Khesrama and Fudhauli. In 1962 for Jaunpur seat Jan Sangh Assembly leader Yaduvendra Dutt Dubey, Raja of Jaunpur defeated the State Home Minister Hari Govind Singh. The Raja held this seat in 1957 also. This was, however, annexed by the Congress in 1967. In Bulandshar, Himmat Singh was a staunch supporter of Jan Sangh from Dasai constituency who was winning this seat for the Jan Sangh even in 1957, 1962.

The Re-organization of the Punjab State had undermined the political status of the Hindus who constituted 45% of the population. Added to this was the discriminate manner in which the Congress has distributed the tickets. The Sikhs had a grouse against the Congress as the Punjabi speaking state carved out by the bifurcation of the State into Punjab and Haryana was not the Punjabi Suba of their dream.[1] There were no electoral alliances and adjustments as such among the national as well as State parties. The Sant Akali Dal and Master Akali Dal fought the elections as separate entities. The Jan Sangh which had

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1. Based on interviews.

a two-day session in Jullundur to chalk out its electoral strategy and possibilities of adjustments, and ruled out understanding with the Communists and the Muslim League as its acceptance of adjustments could be only with national democratic parties. A spokesman clarified this further saying that an electoral adjustment was an understanding of "you do not fight us and we do not fight you".[1]

The 1967 election gave the Jan Sangh a new strength, however, as the Hindus in the Punjab area looked at this party for their protection and upliftment. The Jan Sangh contested 49 of the 104 Assembly constituencies in 1967 and 80 in 1962 in a house of 154 of the undivided Punjab. It won 9 seats in 1967. In 1962 the party had won 8 seats and lost deposit in 47 constituencies. Of the total strength of 104 Assembly seats, the Congress contested 102 and won 48 with 37.5% of the votes polled. Sant Akali Dal secured the second position with 24 seats out of 58 it contested and accounted for 20.5% of the votes polled. Jan Sangh captured 9 seats out of 49 it contested with 9.8% votes. CPI contested 22 and secured 6 with 5.9% votes. CPM secured 2 seats out of 10 it contested with 9.8% votes whereas the Republican Party accounted for 3 seats. Master Akali Dal, though set up an impressive number of 62 candidates could secure only 2 seats while SSP which contested 7 seats secured 1 with 0.7% votes. The Swatantra Party drew blank though it fielded 9 candidates and secured only 0.5% votes. Of the 256 Independents

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1. The Statesman, April 29, 1966.

contested for 96 seats, 9 seats were secured by them with 16.1% of the votes polled. Sant Fateh Singh group played a crucial role and this group was expected to put up candidates against the Congress. Congress circles, however, were hopeful that the Sant will co-operate with them. But the example of Gyani Zail Singh when he withdrew his candidature against the Maharaja of Patiala denoted the solidarity of the Sikhs.[1] Both the Parliamentary and Assembly list of candidates showed that whereas there are about 50% Hindus in the Punjab, the number of Hindus in the Assembly list showed only a percentage of 35. The Jan Sangh selected 42 Hindus and 10 Sikhs for the 52 seats it had contested to the State Assembly. It nominated 5 Sikhs and 3 Hindus for the 8 seats it contested to the Lok Sabha.

The Amritsar Parliamentary constituency, the prestigous one as such, as Shri Surjit Singh Majithia, former Dy. Defence Minister was pitted here against Shri Jayga Dutt Sharma, a prominent Jan Sangh leader who came into limelight for his fast during the anti-Punjabi Suba agitation, he defeated Surjit Singh Majithia. In another important Parliamentary constituency - Hoshiarpur - the former Chief Minister Shri Ram Kishen faced six rivals. The toughest among them being a retired Army officer, Major General Jai Singh, a Jan Sangh Rajput. Kishen Lal, Bharatiya Karya Samiti member from 1958 to 1963 and 1967 who had lost the Amritsar Lok Sabha seat both in 1957 and 1962 was shifted to Gurdaspur and finished second. Had the Swatantra candidate Shri U. Singh not opposed him, the Jan Sangh would have

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1. The Weekend Review, Jan. 21, 1967.

captured this seat. Shri Swaran Singh, former Union Defence Minister had to face 7 rivals to capture this seat in Jullundur. The most formidable among them being Sant Prakash Singh of Swatantra, a retired Inspector General of Police. He had the support of Jan Sangh and both wings of Akali Dal. In a constituency which has 56% Hindus and Harijan population, the Hindus looked upon Swaran Singh as the arch strategist in the battle for Punjabi Subha.[1] The Congress did not set up any candidate to the Dakala constituency in Patiala, which was left un-contested for the Maharaja Yadavendra Singh of Patiala, an independent. The Maharani of Patiala, competed as a Congress candidate from the Patiala Parliamentary constituency held by the former Lok Sabha Speaker Sardar Hukam Singh. She defeated the CPI rival by over one lakh votes. Incidentally, the Pradesh Congress Chief Shri Zail Singh, originally assigned the Dakola constituency was later persuaded by the Congress High Command to make room for the Maharaja.[2] Mrs. Ram Kaur, widow of the late Shri Pratap Singh Kairon, was elected on Congress ticket from Patti in Amritsar with a margin of 13,000 votes over her nearest rival Shri Jagbir Singh of the Sant Akali Dal. In Amritsar East, B. Prakash, Jan Sangh, won by a margin of 5,000 votes over his nearest rival Shri Nath of Congress. The Amritsar South was won by H. Lal, Jan Sangh, by a bare margin of 700 votes over his PSP rival Shri K. Singh, whereas the Amritsar Central was also secured by a margin of over 9,000 votes. Both Baldev Prakash and Balramdas won all the 3 General Elections in Amritsar Constituencies.

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1. The Hindu, Feb. 16, 1967.
2. ibid., Feb. 3, 1967.

Hira Lal, the Jan Sangh, secured the third one defeating the PSP candidate by a narrow margin of one per cent votes. The fourth Amritsar seat was held by Satya Pal Dang, the CPI leader and a top member of the Politbureu, defeating Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, a former Chief Minister. In 1962 Amritsar City had 3 seats which was increased to 4 in 1967. Out of 3, Jan Sangh held 2 seats in 1962. In Jullundur, out of 3 seats, Jan Sangh won 2 seats those of Lal Chand Sabarwal and Man Mohan and for the third seat of Jullundur Cant. it supported General Rajinder Singh which he won. Jan Sangh shifted Kuldip Singh who held the Ferozepur Assembly seat to Fazilka Lok Sabha constituency in 1967 where he lost to Congress ranking third. The Jan Sangh set up Smt. A. Kaur, sister of Bhagat Singh at Kapurtala and Kulbir Singh, brother of Bhagat Singh who were not successful.

In Rajasthan, Maharwal Laxman Singh of Dungarpur Mandhatta Singh of Swatantra Party, Adiyendra and Parmanand Tripathi, State Chairman and State Parliamentary Board Chairman, of SSP, Satish Chandra Agarwal, State Jan Sangh Chief and Jagdish Mathur, Organizing Secretary of the Jan Sangh in their confabulations, decided that out of the 23 Lok Sabha seats, 6 would be contested by Jan Sangh and 17 by Swatantra Party, and 65 of the Assembly seats by Jan Sangh and 119 seats by Swatantra. The SSP was given 1 Lok Sabha and "10 to 12" assembly seats if an agreement became possible between the two parties. The electoral alliances also indicated that the Swatantra and Jan Sangh

would not contest the 2 seats of Karni Singh of Bikaner and Maharaja Vijayendra Singh of Bharatpur. This alliance resulted in the Congress candidate Shri Raj Bahadur, former Union Minister, losing his Lok Sabha seat to Karni Singh by over one lakh votes. Smt. Gayatri Devi, in her press conference, had stated that her intention was not to become the State Chief Minister if the Swatantra-Jan Sangh alliance secured a majority in the 1967 election. She said that Maharwar Laxman Singh of Dungarpur (leader of the opposition) knew much more about Rajasthan than anyone else and therefore he was the right person to head the coalition.[1] She also stressed that in no case her party would back out from its alliance with the Jan Sangh and it would not in any case join the Congress in a coalition government.[2]

Inspite of such assurances, however, there was some hitch between the Swatantra Party, Jan Sangh and the Janta Party led by Kumbaram Arya. Swatantra Party's State Secretary Mandhata Singh was totally averse to any sort of understanding with the Janta Party leaders who can only tilt about 25 votes of the congressmen. Jan Sangh was quite averse to have any truck with such dissident congressmen as the Jan Sangh leaders had no faith in those who had come out of the ruling party and as such whose integrity was not beyond question. Maharajkumar Prithiraj Singh, M.P. and the Jan Sangh had agreed to abide by any understanding that might be reached

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1. The Hindu, Dec. 22, 1966.
2. Ibid., Feb. 11, 1967.

between its elder partner, the Swatantra and the Janta Party.[1] The policy adopted by the Jan Sangh for the selection of candidates was resented by its workers. Many Jan Sangh workers protested against the show of preference to new-comers or moneyed people. There were two camps, one led by the State President Satish Chandra Agarwal and the other by the Assembly Group leader Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat.[2]

As a counter weight to the Rajas and Maharajas, the Congress threw open its doors to the Jagirdars. It even offered a ticket to the Maharaja of Jaipur and Maharaja Karni Singh of Bikaner. While Jaipur Raja refused Bikaner felt he did not particularly need Congress support to retain his Lok Sabha seat. Even then, the Congress did not put a candidate against him. The young ruler of tiny Jhalawar, Harish Chandra Singh, resigned from the foreign service and was offered a Congress ticket for the Vidhan Sabha while the Lok Sabha seat was given to the Ruler of Kotah. Some of the Rajas and Jagirdars who had been given Congress tickets returned them. They formed a Jana Congress along with some disgruntled congressmen. Maharaja Karni Singh of Bikaner

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1. The Hindustan Times, Jan. 9 and Jan. 23, 1967.
   Kumba Arya a dissident leader from the Congress was given 2 Lok Sabha and 12 Vidhan Sabha seats and the Swatantra persuaded the Jan Sangh to give up 1 Lok Sabha and 4 Vidhan Sabha seats and thus mutually all of them had agreed for fresh electoral agreement and became signatories of the same. It was too late for the Swatantra and Jan Sangh to realise that association with the Janta Party was not a blessing and refusal to accommodate Arya would bring more disaster as Arya had put in Communist candidate in Jan Sangh constituencies.

2. Based on interviews.

stepped into the Lok Sabha as an Independent from 1957 and 1962 elections, with the Congress support.

In Rajasthan while Shri R.K. Birla and Surendra Tapuriah are brothers-in-law of Shri B.M. Birla, they were contesting under the Swatantra banner. The Congress had re-nominated Rameshwar Tantia, a sitting MP from 1957. He was defeated by Shri Saboo, a leading businessman who was associated with the Congress. Rajmata Gayatri Devi entered Parliament on Swatantra ticket defeating the Congress by a margin of over 90,000 votes from Jaipur. In Bharatpur Lok Sabha constituency, the SSP extended support to the candidature of Maharaja Brijendra Singh of Bharatpur who was opposed by the Union Information Minister, Raj Bahadur. As per the electoral arrangement, both Swatantra and Jan Sangh had not put up any candidate. The Socialist who had a sizeable backing in the area under Old Alwar and Bharatpur States had solidly supported the Raja. Kota and Jhalawar constituencies which returned Jan Sangh candidates were crucial ones. Jan Sangh's Onkar Lal Berwa retained the Kota seat (SC) which he had won in 1962. Maharaj Kumar Brij Raj Singh of Kotah elected with the Congress symbol in 1962 switched on to the Jan Sangh in 1967. The defeat of the Congress in Rajasthan was due to the desertion of Maharaja Harish Chandra Singh of Jhalawar and Maharaj Kumar Brijender Singh of Kotah. Mehta had the support of Sahu Jain's, and Birla's candidate was D.N. Patodia, a Swatantra nominee who won the Jalore seat. In the adjoining constituency of Barmer,

the Congress had set up Amrit Nahata, previously associated with the CPI. He defeated the Swatantra nominee Tan Singh who was elected on RRP ticket in 1962. L.M. Singhvi a sitting M.P., an Independent, stood as a Swatantra candidate but lost to N.K. Sanghi of the Congress. Brajendra Pal Singh, ruler of Karauli won as an Independent in 1957 against the Congress, but won in 1962 and 1967 Assembly elections on the Congress ticket. Malpura Assembly constituency proved a set back to Swatantra's Gayatri Devi, who suffered a crushing defeat from the Congress nominee Mr. Damodarlal Vyas, former Minister of Health and Panchayats. Vyas won as an unopposed Congress candidate in 1957 but was beaten by Raja Jai Singh in 1962. In 1967, he avenged his defeat, and also defeated Radha Krishnan in 1967, who was a successful Swatantra nominee in 1962 election. Maharwar Laxman Singh, leader of the Opposition in Rajasthan was opposed by Shri Bhogilal Pandya who was imprisoned during the freedom struggle. He defeated the Maharwal in the first two General Elections. The Raja defeated Bhogilal in 1962 and also in 1967 by less than 300 votes out of 44,000 votes polled. In Kota division, Maharaja Rana Harish Chandra Singh of Jhalawar, a Congress candidate in 1967 from Jalrapatan won as a Jan Sangh candidate in 1967.

In Jaisalmer constituency, the Maharaja, a Congress candidate in 1957 and 1962, stood as a Congress candidate in 1967 was defeated by a Swatantra nominee. The other 3 contestants

could not poll even a few hundred votes. Shri Bal Singh was refused a Congress ticket because of the invincibility of the Maharaja. Mohan Lal Sukhadia will set in Udaipur from 1957, 1962 and 1967 elections wrecked vengence against the Jan Sangh. A comparison of the 1967 results with those of 1962 would reveal that Swatantra gained considerably both in votes and seats. In 1962 it gained about 20% of the seats with 17% of the votes but in 1967 it gained 27% of the seats with 22.5% votes. Same is the case with Jan Sangh which also recorded a gain with 11.6% in 1967 of the votes in place of 9.2% in 1962. It annexed 22 seats in 1967 in place of 15 in 1962. Out of 26 districts in Rajasthan, Swatantra Party returned in 8 districts and the Jan Sangh in 10 districts. In the other 16, no Jan Sangh candidate could win. 5 districts of Bikaner, Bharatpur, Banswara, Bhilwara and Chittoorgarh had not returned any candidate of the Jan Sangh-Swatantra alliance. 6 districts of Alwar, Barmer, Dungarpur, Ganganagar, Joshpur and Udaipur had little right-wing influence as these districts could send one candidate only from each.

In Madhya Pradesh each of the princes in the Mahakoshal, Chattisgarh, Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal had their own peculiar, historical, racial and cultural background. These native rulers and zamindars joined hands with the opposition parties of the right. Ram Rajya Parishad, Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha opened their gates for such elements.

Madhya Pradesh with its 34% of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had a quota of 5 Scheduled Caste and 8 Scheduled Tribe Members of Parliament and 39 Scheduled Caste and 61 Scheduled Tribe for the State Assembly. The performance of the Jan Sangh in these reserved constituencies was:

		Lok Sabha		State Assembly	
		S.C.	S.T.	S.C.	S.T.
1962	Cong.	3	5		
	J.S.	1	-		
	PSP	1	-		
	Ind.	-	1		
	Soc.	-	1		
1967	Cong.	3	5	21	36
	J.S.	2	2	16	13
	Swa.	-	-	1	-
	PSP	-	-	-	2
	SSP	-	-	-	4
	Ind.	-	1	1	6

The native princes earlier were not only given party tickets but were allowed to nominate Congress candidates from their areas under their influence. That is how Congress was able to increase its vote from 46% in the poll to 48% in the Second Election. When these princes rebelled, Jan Sangh took over their patronage and Congress got reduced in its majority.

The Jan Sangh remained the main opposition party in the State Assembly. It increased its poll percentage from 10% in 1957 to 17% in 1962 and the number of seats from 10 to 41.

The Rajamata of Gwalior from the House of Scindias made her exit[1] from the Congress and provided patronage to Jan Sangh and also to the Takat-Mal-Deshlehra group of dissident Jana Congress.[2] Together they made a concerted effort to oust the Congress from power. The Scindia family was confident of achieving their modest election goals, viz., 26 Assembly and 32 Lok Sabha seats. In the Madhya Bharat region, the Congress strategy to make the opposition parties fight against each other was frustrated by the Rajmata-Jan Sangh[3] combination. For 296 seats to the State Assembly, there were 265 candidates from Jan Sangh and 21 from Swatantra. The Congress had set up candidates for all the Assembly seats. The SSP came next with 111 candidates, and the two Communists with 42 candidates. There was a record number of 634 Independents for the 37 Parliamentary seats. And for the 37 Parliamentary seats, the Congress had set up 37, Jan Sangh 32, SSP 12, PSP 15, the two Communists and the Swatantra 2 candidates. 40 princes contested the elections with different party affiliations.[4] The Organizer accused the Hindu Mahasabha leaders

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1. She denied a charge that at the time of the meeting of the Pradesh Congress Election Committee, she had asked for the inclusion of 55 nominees of her own in the Congress list for the State Assembly. She said that she only wanted to be consulted about the selection of the Congress candidates of certain areas which was never done.
   The Hindu, Feb. 8, 1967.
2. The Weekend Review, Feb. 18, 1967.
3. The Maharani was believed to have tentatively allotted about 40 of the 45 constituencies lying in the former Gwalior State to the Jan Sangh and the Jana Congress.
   The Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 1967.
4. The Hindu, Feb. 7, 1967.

as having entered into a secret alliance with the Congress which financed its candidates against the Jan Sangh to split the votes.[1]

The Congress secured 167 seats out of 296 it contested, polling 41% of the votes. Jan Sangh accounted for 78 seats out of 265 it contested with a poll percentage of 29%. Party-wise, the third in line was SSP with 10 seats, Swatantra 7, both Communists 1, Jana Congress 2, and Independents 20.

Rajmata wrecked vengence by forging an alliance with the Jan Sangh, Jana Congress and others "for the purpose of defeating the Congress". Explaining the reasons for her option for Swatantra symbol for Parliamentary and the Jan Sangh symbol for the Assembly, she said, "I have no loyalty for any of these parties" and added that she adopted both the symbols "for the sake of convenience". Regarding the ideologies of the parties, she said that she had "not yet given any thought to the ideology of these parties". Gautham Sharma elected to the State Vidhan Sabha from Karera right from 1957 mainly because of Rajmata's patronage was pitted against her in 1967. After her rupture with the Pradesh Congress, the Rajmata decided to contest this seat as "she wanted to teach a lesson" to Sharma, who she felt "was mainly responsible for undermining her relations with the Chief Minister Mishra".

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1. The Organizer, Jan. 26, 1967.

The Guna Lok Sabha constituency from where the Rajmata contested against D.K. Jadhav, a Congress nominee presented another interesting fight. For all the 8 Assembly seats in this constituency, she set up her own candidates. In Guna, she defeated the Congress candidate, D.K. Jadhav by a huge margin of about 2 lakh votes polling 79% votes. As a Congress nominee from Guna in 1957 and from Gwalior in 1962, she won both the elections. In 1967 she contested from Guna as a Swatantra candidate and from Karera as a Jan Sangh candidate winning both.

There was a loss in the former Vindhya Pradesh area and Madhya Bharat where the Maharajas like those of Rewa had aligned themselves with the former Chief Minister Mishra. Raja Vijay Bhushan Singh Deo, Maharaja of Jashpur lost his Satna seat to the Congress. The Maharaja's wife contested from Raipur against Acharya Kripalani and the seat was won by Lakhan Lal Gupta of the Congress. Shri Jagannatha Rao Joshi, one of Jan Sangh's top leaders wrecked vengence when he scored a spectacular success by trouncing the sitting Congress Muslim Member Maimoona Sultana who was holding this seat from 1957 from Bhopal. Jan Sangh's support from the Adivasis of the Bastar District led to several Lok Sabha wins. Sitting member Shri Nukam Chand Kachwai who won the 1962 election from Dewas (SC) constituency was re-elected from Ujjain (SC). Virendra Kumar Saklecha, Jan Sangh, the leader

of the Opposition in the out-going assembly was again re-elected this time from Jawad constituency. The Jan Sangh won the Lok Sabha seat with a businessman, Swatantra Singh Kothari from Mandsaur.[1]

The alliance between the Jan Sangh and Rajmata helped the former in gaining all the 6 seats in Gwalior district, all the three it contested in Shivpuri district, all the five seats in Shahjapur district and the five it contested in the Ujjain districts of Madhya Bharat region.

The Opposition parties decided to come to an understanding and presented a united front to the Congress in Mysore. A Co-ordination Committee was set up[2] for this purpose. The Committee met a number of times and allotted seats as:

Janata Paksha	-	42
SSP	-	33
PSP	-	11
Swatantra	-	11
JS	-	11
RPI	-	7
Lok Seva Sangh	-	4
CPM	-	4
CPI	-	3
Kolar Dist. U.F.	-	12

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1. The Jan Sangh majority districts in Madhya Pradesh were listed in order of percentage of votes polled:

1. Vidisha District	- 65%	6. Dewas District	- 46%
2. Mandsaur District	- 52%	7. Ujjain District	- 46%
3. Gwalior District	- 51%	8. Shivpuri District	- 45%
4. Shajapur District	- 51%	9. Dhar District	- 44%
5. Sehore District	- 48%	10. Nimar (Khargone)	- 42%

2. Weekend Review, Jan. 21, 1967.

The Committee could not decide for 9 seats in Bangalore City, 7 seats for the border areas and the remaining seats were left open so that former Congressmen might contest. The 4 major groups in the State are Vokkaligas, Lingayats, Brahmins and Harijans. Vokkaligas and Lingayats are the pillars of the Congress. Since Lingayats have been given more share than the Vokkaligas the Congress party had to face stiff opposition from both the groups. Muslims who form 2 millions of population were no less happy with the Congress. Even though the President of the Mysore Pradesh Congress Committee was a muslim, they had been allotted only 12 seats.

The Jan Sangh contested 4 Lok Sabha seats in 1952, 5 in 1957, 7 in 1962 and 5 in 1967 and could not secure any seat but lost deposit in most of them. For the State Assembly, the position was no better. In 1952, 25 seats were contested, 20 in 1957, 63 in 1962 and again it could not win any seat but lost deposit in most of them. In 1967, it could find an entry in the State Assembly by securing 4 seats out of 37 it contested. Swatantra's performance in the Lok Sabha election in Mysore was exemplary. It could not secure a single seat in 1962 when it contested for 7 seats but in 1967 it could capture 5 seats out of 11 contested. Notable Swatantra M.Ps were Lobo Prabhu of the ICS cadre and J.M. Imam. The percentage of vote of Swatantra rose from 8 to 14% in Mysore for the Lok Sabha.

In Haryana, Hindus were predominant whereas Sikhs and Muslims constitute 6.5 and 4 per cent, respectively. Caste appeal had been the potent factor in influencing the electorate. Jats, Ahirs and Brahmins who dominate the services and the trade influenced the electioneering campaign. The Jan Sangh-Swatantra alliance gained ground in industrial estates like Faridabad, Bahadurgarh and Sonepat located in the periphery in and around Delhi. While the industrialists were mostly backing Swatantra, the organized labour responded to the Jan Sangh appeal.

From the 7 district State of Haryana with 9 Parliamentary seats, 9 candidates from the Swatantra and Jan Sangh contested the 9 Parliamentary seats. The Jan Sangh and Swatantra forged an alliance and between them contested all the Lok Sabha seats and 60 Vidhan Sabha seats. The Congress contested all the 9 seats, Jan Sangh 7, Swatantra 2, with the result that Jan Sangh got 1 seat and Swatantra none. Jan Sangh lost 2 Parliamentary seats being second in the run.

For the 81 Assembly seats, the Congress contested all, the next in strength was the Jan Sangh with 48 candidates, the Republican Party fielded 24, SSP 23, Swatantra 12, CPI(R) 12, CPM 8, and the PSP 3. Jan Sangh secured 12 seats and Swatantra 3. The Jan Sangh increased its membership in the Assembly from 4 to 12 but got reduced from 3 to 1 in the Lok Sabha. The Jan Sangh lost 13 seats with second best; so also 2 by the Swatantra.

In Ambala, the Jan Sangh candidate representing the Scheduled Caste constituency succeeded against the Congress. Swami Rameshwaranand, a sitting candidate from 1962 lost the 1967 election by a margin of 203 votes out of 3,36,805 votes polled by the Congress candidate. In Kaithal constituency, the Jan Sangh supported the Swatantra candidate against Nanda. The Swatantra candidate lost by a margin of over 25,000 votes. It was a stronghold for the Congress as it held this seat since 1967. Rohtak seat which the Jan Sangh held in 1962 lost this time to the Congress. Hissar constituency proved interesting. Jan Sangh leader Yudhvir Singh who defeated Ram Kishen in 1962 from Mahendragarh area shifted to Hissar in 1967 where he was badly mauled by Ram Kishen, who faced a 7-cornered contest including the 2 sitting Members viz., Nani Ram Bhagri, SSP and Shri Yadhvir Singh, Jan Sangh.

Fateh Chand, the Jan Sangh candidate who defeated the Congress in 1962 election at Panipat in Karnal district again inflicted defeat in 1967 to the Congress candidate. The gain at Panipat was lost in Sonepat - Mukhtiar Singh the sitting Jan Sangh MLA in 1962 lost to the Congress in 1967. Mangal Sein in Rohtak who held the Jan Sangh seat from 1957, 1962, again held it in 1967. Shri Bhagwat Dayal Sharma, former Chief Minister won from Yamunanagar constituency in a quadrangular contest with his main rival Roshan Lal of Jan Sangh. Jan Sangh became the second largest single party in the State Assembly next to Congress with its 12 seats. Excepting Ferozepur Jhirka constituency

of Gurgaon district which faced a straight contest between the Congress, Muslim and the Swatantra Muslim, all other seats in Haryana were multi-cornered.

Orissa remained one of the problem States of the Congress:[1] (a) by its failure to secure the sympathy of its people before Independence; (b) even Independence could not improve its organizational lag in the presence of predominant feudal and aristocratic elements who were never favourably disposed of towards the Congress; and (c) the faulty land reforms of the Congress alienated the people further.

The Swatantra Party or the Ganatantra Parishad[2] as it was then known, did not fare well in the mid-term elections, 1961.

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1. Based on interview.

2. Formed sometime before the 1951-52 election, the leadership of the Ganatantra Parishad was provided by the Rulers of Patna and Kalahandi States, but after the election the Legislative leadership of the party was given to a lawyer thus proving 'its non-feudal character'. The animus between the Congress and Ganatantra Parishad started with the 1951-52 election eve: the Congress threatened the rulers "with forfeiture of their privy purses because of their participation in politics". (S.C. Dash notes that "the Congress candidates included two ex-rulers, The Raja of Dasapalla and the Rajmata of Ranapur, both of whom have found seats in the Government as Minister and Deputy Minister, respectively. Even a big Zamindar, the Raja of Khariar, had a seat in the Government as a Deputy Minister"). The Parishad's actual merger with the Swatantra was postponed after the 1962 elections, because of the problem of the allotment of electoral symbol.
   See S.C. Dash in Kogekar and Richard L. Park, Reports on the Indian General Elections - 1951-52, pp. 124-27.

It won only 30 seats as against 82 of the Congress out of a total of 140 seats.[1] In 1967, the combination of the Swatantra Party, PSP and the Jana Congress (formed by the Congress dissidents under the leadership of Dr. Mehtab) sailed together to have a decisive lead over the Congress. The opposition efforts, thus directed at cementing unity among themselves and between them besides having an understanding with the Communists and the SSP. The Swatantra Party recorded, however, that "it was unfortunate that an overall settlement could not be arrived at"[2] in narrowing down the differences.[3] The differences that could not be ironed out centred round each other's claims of bright prospects in certain constituencies. The Swatantra decided to "go all out to oust the Congress" and close "the chapter of negotiations". The necessity to avoid, however, multi-angular contests made the party acknowledge the prospects of other opposition parties as far as possible.

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1. Orissa had always been a problem state for the Congress. In 1952, it had won 67 seats out of 140. In 1957, its strength was reduced to 57. The Congress managed to be in power by winning over Independents and some from the opposition groups. In 1959, the Congress was forced to form a coalition with the Ganatantra Parishad (which is now the Swatantra Party in Orissa). It lasted barely a year and its dissolution caused a mid-term election in 1961. For the first time, the Congress got a clear lead winning 82 out of 140 seats, in the 1961 election.

2. The Hindu, Dec. 24, 1966.

3. The Organizer, Jan. 26, 1967 notes the failures of the negotiations between the two parties on the question of leadership issue of the expected non-Congress coalition. The Jana Congress demanded the acceptance of Dr. Mehatab as its leader which idea did not find favour with the Swatantra since it hoped to win more seats than the Jana Congress in the elections. However, see The Hindu, Jan. 9, 1967, for Pavitra Mohan Pradhan's (President of the Jana Congress) statement of his assurance to accept the Swatantra leadership, to bring about a non-Congress coalition government in the State.

The partial alliance, in its three-fold classification,[1] demarcated the sphere of influence of these two parties in respect of the constituencies they could contest. Accordingly, it was decided that the Swatantra would contest for 100 seats while the Jana Congress's contest would be for 48 out of a total of 140 assembly seats. The mutual understanding related first, in respect of 80 assembly seats which Swatantra would contest with the full support of the Jana Congress. Second, the Swatantra Party would lend its helping hand in regard to 28 Assembly seats to the Jana Congress and third, in respect of 20 assembly seats which both would contest. This apart, Jana Congress support to Swatantra would extend in regard to the 15 Lok Sabha seats. For the remaining 5, Jana Congress would support candidates of other parties like the PSP and the SSP on individual merit. This decision of not contesting for any of the 20 Lok Sabha seats by the Jana Congress, was made 'on practical grounds'.[2] With the goal of ousting the Congress by all means, the Jana Congress even surrendered its own strong-holds to the Swatantra to effect this electoral alliance feasible.[3] Political observers, however,

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1. The Organizer, Jan. 26, 1967 recorded that the State Election Committee of the Swatantra Party originally announced its intention to set up candidates in 115 constituencies but changed its position after electoral adjustment and alliances with Orissa Jana Congress.

2. The Hindu, Jan. 9, 1967.

3. See Weekend Review, Jan. 28, 1967 for the spirit of compromise and give and take policy which altered the whole electoral prospect in the State in a material way displayed by Dr. Mahtab. The failure of the earlier talks between the two parties was due to the rather unreasonable demand of the Swatantra that it be given 60% of the seats in the southern districts although its influence in those areas is negligible. Based on interview and party files.

interpreted this decision of the Jana Congress as of its meagre financial resources "which are insufficient to fight even 48 seats on its own strength".[1]

The personal rivalries and groupism stultified the Swatantra Organisation in several districts like Phulbani, Balasore, Ganjam, Korapur and Cuttack. Many members, including a few MLAs., either defected to the Congress or negotiated with other parties including the C.P.I. The P.S.P., with its sphere of influence confined to a few pockets of four or five districts in the coastal areas, did not enter into an alliance with the Swatantra. The Jan Sangh, for the first time, entered into the election arena with a decision to contest Swatanta in 15 constituencies, mostly in West Orissa.[2]

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1. Himmat, January 13, 1967.

2. The Organiser, January 26, 1967.

Defections and instability of United Front Ministries resulted in the mid-term elections in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. The inner-party strife of Congress led to a clamouring for radical changes in the socio-economic policies and programmes. Abolition of privy purses, nationalisation of banks, land reforms and other issues were activated and were embodied in the Ten Point Programme. The Presidential Election in 1967 highlighted the anti-congressism of the parties. Mid-term elections in 1969, in West Bengal, Bihar, U.P. and Punjab underlined the anti-congressism. The Presidential poll and the Unity Resolution, August 1969, notwithstanding the November 1969 witnessed the formalisation of the split.

The dissolution of Lok Sabha in 1971 and de-linking of National and State elections turned out to be a clever strategy of the Congress. The Congress (O) "eschewing competitive radicalism" in favour of "strict pragmatism", tried to forge an alliance with the rightist parties - Jan Sangh and Swatantra. The main plank of the election manifestos of all the parties was whether or not the abolition of private property be accepted.

The outcome of the mid-term General Election 1971, saw the eclipse of these parties vs the massive mandate secured by the Congress (R). For, the Congress (O) was cut down from 65 to 16, Swatantra from 43 to 8, Jan Sangh from 35 to 22 etc. And the 1972 elections to the State Assemblies, while Jan Sangh secured 105 seats, Swatantra was reduced to 16 seats only.

CHAPTER VIII

INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS

The dynamics of democracy, at the first glance, presents a party system which appears to be homogeneous. But on a closer examination, the conflict has been and is endemic - among, between and, more important, within a given party. In fact, the scale, the scope and the nature of the conflict within a party justify Michels's assertion that "in all modern popular parties, a spirit of genuine fraternity is conspicuously lacking, we do not see sincere and cordial mutual trust; there is a continual latent struggle, a spirit of irritation determined by the reciprocal mistrust of the leaders, and this spirit has become one of the most essential characteristics of every democracy".[1] This political principle, when repeated ad infinitum, assumes special significance in a plural Society[2] with a federal system of polity like India.

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1. Michels, Roberts., "Political Parties - A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy", The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958, p. 179.

2. Because in such a Society, the tendency of interests and parochial feelings will take place in local political groupings to resist central party discipline. These, however, could be somewhat adjustable with a rudimentary party organization to provide framework within which local influentials also would function. This, in turn, would enable the party organization to survive even after a major defection from its ranks.

What then are the contributory factors? Leaving aside the analysis of the material basis of national power, "the leaders of the political parties are only broadly representative of the general aspirations of the members and electors of the parties".[1] And more specifically, every leader is a contender for power vis-a-vis the others, thus believing in Jacsonian sentiments: "to the victors belong the spoils".

The question now invariably arises as to how far the 'process of consent' to come together modifies the equilibrium of constant conflicts. Adherence to this point of view naturally leads us to the starting point of the formation of these parties. By way of simplification, however, the conflicting elements present in the two parties, though there are some striking differences, may be grouped.

As a consequence of this and other related factors, the core of this phase of analysis is given the term intra-party conflict, and, for convenience, this could be sub-divided into two broad components: ideological and organizational. Surely, these do not need extensive elaboration, only the most consequential would pin-point the issue at stake. A word of caution, however, is in order. The logic of competetive success

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1. Blondel, J., "Voters, Parties and Leaders - The Social Fabric of British Politics", Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, U.S.A., 1963, p. 233.

juxtaposes these two factors, rather they get amalgamated, thus presenting a nice paradox. Projection of these factors separately, then, becomes at best a function of the ambiguity of the situation. The ambiguity which characterises this connection can, of course, be demonstrated in a number of ways.

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Jan Sangh, though born after Independence, was not beset with internal convulsions to the extent to which its political opponents suffered from, especially Swatantra.[1] For, shaped by RSS, (itself a well-knit organization with an intense nationalist philosophy), Jan Sangh's cohesion was jealously guarded by the latter. Neither the Party was developed at any time by followers clustering round a few personalities, aristocrats or otherwise, either from the apex or from below. The problems of Jan Sangh which were many and varied, however, centred round the relationship of the omnipresent and hence omnipotent RSS with the ever increasing membership of the Jan Sangh with or without the RSS background. The demarcation line thus drawn between the problems of Jan Sangh - between the two angles, organizational and ideological - becomes rather thin.

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1. This forms the second part of the same Chapter.

Outlining broadly then, the complexity of the problems of Jan Sangh can be grouped as under: National Policy matters and those pertaining to areas, regions and others. And in all this, both the tussle between RSS versus non-RSS elements as well as inter-personnel leadership tussle automatically fit in.

The contradictions between the RSS and non-RSS elements in the Jan Sangh which reached the surface, for the first time in 1954, was more than a mere struggle of leadership ins and outs. Rather, they coincided with the teething trouble of the Party in finding a successor to Dr. Mookerjee, its non-RSS founder-President. For, this raised significantly a fundamental issue, of the need for and the possibility of raising a non-RSS member of the Party to this highest post of office, for ever. In response to this challenge, both RSS and non-RSS leadership, by choosing Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma, unquestionably tried to bring about the requisite harmony between the RSS and non-RSS elements and also to continue the traditions of Dr. Mookerjee.[1] The efficacy and the ultimate choice, however, raised doubts, about the smooth functioning of Jan Sangh under the leadership of Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma, along the line indicated by the RSS, immediately after his induction into the office.

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1. Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma, founder-Member and General Secretary of Jan Sangh, took over the Presidentship of the Party on the demise of Dr. Mookerjee in an acting capacity before he was chosen as the President.

For, "the determined and self-less workers, who had passed through the open air university of natural education known as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, turned to Jan Sangh for the fulfilment of 'Artha' and 'Kama' which must go along with Dharma for the all-round development of an individual as well as of a nation's life". And here, the successor of Dr. Mookerjee "must be a synthetic force; he must be a living link", between "Dharma as represented by the RSS and Artha and Kama as represented by Jan Sangh".[1] Most important of all, Organiser spelt out succinctly the expected role of Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma as the leader of the Jan Sangh and hoped that he "will succeed in securing the willing cooperation of the Swayamsevak Sangh workers who form the core of the Jan Sangh". It exhorted that "let Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma carry them with him to build a great edifice on these grounds".[2]

In any case, as things turned out, Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma belied the expectations of the Organiser, questioned in his Presidential Address "the domination and interference" of the RSS in the working of a Working Committee nominated by himself, and alleged "vigorous and calculated drive on its part to turn the Sangh into a convenient handle".[3] He thereby tried to assert Jan Sangh's independence from RSS domination.

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1. Organiser, Aug. 5, 1953 carries the above comments of Balraj Madhok, a few days after Sharma's assumption of office.
2. Organiser, Feb. 8, 1954.
3. For the structural properties of the Working Committee (Bharatiya Karya Samiti) and its functions, supra Ch V especially, pp. ; Organiser, Nov. 8, 1954 carried the above comments of Sharma.

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The Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha took "strong exception to certain views expressed" by Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma in his Presidential Address on the question of reorganisation of Jan Sangh and sought "clarifications of those points" which dealt with matters affecting RSS.[1] The Working Committee, in its turn, resented his "attempt" to "artificially classify the party members on the basis of their associations with other organizations, working in various fields, and thus disrupt the harmony and homogeneity of the Party". It accused, that by his conduct, Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma had "progressively forfeited the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the Jan Sangh Organization", and asserted that "we (the Working Committee), hereby relieve Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma of his office".[2] And as a democratic body, the Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha "refused to suffer dictation even from its President".[3] This sort of a corrective procedure, however, actually started a process of disintegration.

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1. Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma did not attend the Indore Session in August 1954, which indicated the extent to which his breach of faith took him away from Jan Sangh. His address was read in in absentia, while the inaugural address was delivered by Pandit Premnath Dogra. Organiser, Nov. 8, 1954.

2. Organiser, Nov. 15, 1954. Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma was relieved officially on Nov. 7, 1954. The Statesman, Nov. 2, 1954, reported the RSS and non-RSS dispute within the Jan Sangh involving the attempts made by RSS members to gain complete control over the Party. Weiner notes that as a result of this, Sharma, the non-RSS President resigned from the Party. Weiner, Myron., Party Politics in India, op. cit., pp. 177-78.

3. Organiser, Nov. 15, 1954.

In demonstration of this nature of RSS domination and in his advocacy of expansion of Jan Sangh with Non-RSS elements, Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma was supported by Vasantrao Krishna Oke.[1] He, along with Kunwarlal Gupta and Amarnath Bajaj, tried to form a new Party but "realising the impossibility of the adventure", Bajaj, Oke and Gupta left Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma "in the lurch and stayed on", this time "to cause dissensions from within".[2] And a number of members, as Madhok notes, "began to feel that without Dr. Mookerjee, Jan Sangh would not be able to catch the imagination of the people and that there was little scope for their political ambition being fulfilled through this organization" and left the organization one by one "on one pretext or the other".[3] Viewed retrospectively, "the selection of a new captain to his (Dr. Mookerjee's) place was not an easy one" as the Jan Sangh had "to make experiments". Jan Sangh arrived at "a correct choice" through "trial and error" by electing Pandit Premnath Dogra. For, under his leadership, Jan Sangh "not only recovered from the blow of Dr. Mookerjee's untimely death and Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma's

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1. Surprisingly, Vasantrao Krishna Oke, a founder-member of Jan Sangh and also an RSS member, joined Mauli Chandra Sharma, in this.

2. They were expelled from the Party along with twelve other members. Organiser, Nov. 15, 1954. Gupta, however, returned to the Party fold later. Organiser, Sept. 26, 1955.

3. Madhok, Balraj., Political Trends in India, op. cit., p. 95.

betrayal but also forged ahead in all spheres".[1] Thus this episode exhibited the organizational problems a political part has to face in a democratic set up in all its ramifications. And, RSS became both the bane and blessing of the new party since its inception.

In examining the course of events since the 'Sharma episode' untill 1967 election, it is evident that Jan Sangh displayed a different set of problems. And before analysing them, certain observations are in order. For one thing, the logic of competetive success of Jan Sangh with the other political parties juxtaposed these problems, rather they got amalgamated, thus presenting a nice paradox. For another, surely these do not need extensive elaboration, only the most consequential would pin point them. And in all this, the leadership tussle on the one hand and the role of RSS underlining them in all subtlety on the other, automatically fit in. Viewed in this light, the cracks that appeared in the Jan Sangh's edifice during this period under different perspectives were to name a few: on caste, land reforms, language, Punjabi Suba and student unrest.

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1. Madhok in his review of Five Years of Bharatiya Jan Sangh at a later date justified Pandit Premnath Dogra's selection and criticised Sharma's betrayal. Organiser, Oct. 22, 1956. Premnath Dogra, an RSS Pracharak in Jammu and Kashmir and President of the Praja Parishad, announced Parishad's merger with Jan Sangh. Organiser, Nov. 15, 1954.

Uttar Pradesh presented a curious admixture of caste conflicts on the one hand and the loss of grace a notable suffered from the eyes of the RSS. For, the displacement of Raja Yaduvendra Dutt Dubey, (a Brahmin and himself a one time Sanghachalak of Jaunpur RSS) by Shardha Bakt Singh (a Takur) from the leadership of the Legislative Assembly group was interpreted as to the existence of such caste conflicts within Jan Sangh. The replacement of Shardha Bakt Singh, in his turn, by Madhav Prasad Tripati (a Brahmin) prior to the 1967 election proved Jan Sangh's anxiety to silence such conflicts reaching the surface.[1]

In Rajasthan, earlier, the problem of discipline took a different turn. Jan Sangh accused the ruling Samyukta Dal when it opposed the land reforms, keeping with its predominant Rajput membership, as "reactionery sections of opposition". It questioned the raison d'etre for "any continued association of the progressive Jan Sangh", and withdrew its 8-man membership from the Dal. Incidentally, Lal Singh, a Jan Sangh member and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly preferred the office to the membership of the Party.

The events that occurred in the South in 1965 as regards the language issue when assumed the dimensions of a national crisis, compelled the leadership of both Jan Sangh and RSS

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1. Based on interview with Madhav Prasad Tripathi. He denied, however, that RSS had anything to do with the replacement of the Raja Yaduvendra Dutt Dubey by Shardha Bakt Singh.

to modify their earlier stand. They also revealed the contradictions that existed among the party leadership as the group led by Vajpayee pleaded for a reappraisal of this issue, while the other advocated a counter-agitation against the DMK - Rajaji anti-Hindi agitation. These contradictions at the national level and the pressure exerted by the units in non-Hindi States helped evolve a realistic stand of the Jan Sangh policy.[1] For, its resolution adopted at its 2-day working committee meeting at Jaipur, advocated, in essence; (a) a shift in the emphasis from immediate introduction of Hindi as the all-India official language to early introduction of regional languages at State levels; (b) it granted ten years period to non-Hindi people before Hindi is made the official language; and (c) in the UPSC examinations, English be allowed as additional language for ten years.[2]

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1. For instance, Tamil Nadu unit of Jan Sangh pleaded, unsuccessfully though, for a 15 years moratorium in place of the official resolution for 10 years for non-Hindi people before Hindi is made the official language. Based on interview with K. Krishnamurthy, State Secretary, Tamil Nadu Jan Sangh.

2. Normally, RSS used to refrain from passing resolutions on political matters. In this instance, the Akil Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha of the RSS passed earlier a resolution similar to the one passed by Jan Sangh. Though similarities between the two resolutions were accepted, Jan Sangh leaders denied having followed the dictates of RSS. Unusually, Madhok accepted the interpretation (of Vajpayee though differences exist between them on many issues) that Jan Sangh as a political party should not take such a rigid stand as RSS advocated. Based on interview.

In fine, the language resolution passed at the 14th Session of Jan Sangh in December 1967 and specifically Vajpayee's amendment that Hindi must grow by "voluntary acceptance" created a widespread feeling that Jan Sangh was moving from rigidity to liberalism.[1]

Apart from the ideological ambivalence arising from the division of any part of the country, the Punjabi Suba agitation tore Jan Sangh asunder on organisational angles as well.[2] For, admittedly, its responsiveness to public demands presented conflicting interests of Jan Sangh leaders both from Haryana and Punjab. The bone of contention between the two groups was whether the 1961 census should be the basis for the demarcation of boundaries of the new States. In the meantime, Yagya Dutt Sharma's (MP from Haryana) fast as against the Congress Working Committee's resolution resulted in Jan Sangh volunteers' demonstrations. Most important of all, the decision of Yagya Dutt Sharma's fast was not blessed by either the Party leadership at the national level or of the Punjab unit.[3]

The President-elect, Balraj Madhok, in his attempt to persuade Sharma met Sant Fateh Singh, the Akali Dal leader as well on March 13.[4] The incident that occurred in certain parts

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1. Organiser, Jan. 7, 1968.
2. The first announcement came on March 9, 1966 when the Congress Party decided that as a Congress policy, the Suba should be created out of the existing Punjab state and a separate Hindi speaking Haryana should be created with the Hilly areas merged into Himachal Pradesh. The Hindustan Times, March 10, 1966.
3. Based on interview.
4. Based on interview.

of Punjab which were attributed to the presence of RSS volunteers in a demonstrable nature strained the relations of Jan Sangh with RSS further. Both Raja Ajit Pratap Singh of Pratapgarh and Chaudary Lahri Singh resigned from the Jan Sangh alleging JanSangh complicity in the violence.[1] The national leadership overcame the dilemma by appealing to all to accept the Boundary Commission's recommendations. And the decision of the Parliamentary group was similar to that of the Congress policy though Vajpayee as a member dissented.[2] The Party's substitute of the Punjab Himachal unit of the Jan Sangh by three ad hoc Committees was a logical outcome of the developments in the region.[3]

The student agitation and the police excesses during November 1966 highlighted the conflicting views that exist between Vajpayee and Madhok. In brief, Vajpayee denounced student agitation, justified police entry into educational institutions and the use of force. Madhok, in his turn, issued a call for observing an anti-repression day onNovember 13. However, he modified the issue of his call by condemning the violence of anti-social elements who indulged in anti-cow slaughter campaign.[4]

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1. Based on interview.
2. The Hindustan Times, March 19, 1966.
3. The Indian Express, Editorial, May 7, 1966.
4. Based on interview.

The 1967 electoral successes of Jan Sangh displayed a different set of problems, this time of a modified variety.[1] For, the politics of coalition raised numerous queries ranging from the Hameletian hesitancy of the rank and file to the political expediency, and of the leadership tussle. And, as things turned out, however, opinions varied on the subject, not in the assessment of Jan Sangh's immediate necessity of joining the coalitions but on its ideological intensity as a long term process.[2] And in all this, the leadership selection and the venu chosen for the 14th all-India Jan Sangh session as Calicut brought the analysis to a new phase.

The ideological objections raised by Rama Rao (AP) while centred round Jan Sangh's post election "softness" versus its pre-election policy of no-truck with the Communists attitude, one member from Ludhiana reminded the leaders that "our objective was not merely to displace the Congress but to replace it". And Naresh Johri, (Gwalior) compared Jan Sangh's compromise with its basic principle to political expediency in regard to Communists with Congress's earlier impatience to compromise about the country's unity to seize power from the Britishers. On the other hand, the supporters of the resolution on coalition politics, especially Krishan Lal, Malti Bai, Thakur Prasad, President of Bihar unit, et al., accepted the compulsion

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1. The Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha at its Delhi meeting on 23rd and 24th endorsed the Working Committee's stand on Coalition Governments. Organiser, April 30, 1967.

2. For a detailed discussion on coalition politics, *ibid.*

of the transitional period of comparative politics that the country was passing through and the tactical lines that Jan Sangh had to adopt as of association even with the Communists. This did not, however, amount to giving up of ideological opposition to communism as such. On the other hand, a decision not to join such a Government would be "flouting the people's verdict on the one hand and allow on the other all those very elements to shape Government's policies exclusively about whom they had misgivings". Thus, the Jan Sangh's decision to join the Coalition Governments' was "in the best interest of the country, of democracy and of the Party itself". Upto this point, the leadership stood united in its defense on coalitional politics.[1] The divergencies began, however, in its quest for the time perspective. Vajpayee, while sponsoring the resolution on "Coalition Governments and the Jan Sangh", reminded the Party that it would be childish to base politics on the "touch-me-not" principle, Deendayal argued that coalitions should be treated as a phase in the party's march towards becoming an alternative to the Congress. And, he added that the process of its consolidation as the alternative should take into account not only those who voted but also those who did not support the Party. And for Madhok, joining the Communists even as dictated by political expediency was anathema, for, he favoured coalition with Swatantra and the like-minded parties.

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1. Based on interview with Uttam Rao Patil, President, Maharashtra Pradesh Jan Sangh.

The complex political base of the Jan Sangh Vs its relationship with the RSS centred round, for the second time in 1967 since the Sharma episode, on the leadership tussle. Here again, the defensive problem was choosing the President of the Party, this time, however, within the RSS elements. As a prelude to this outcome, Vajpayee was installed as the leader of the Parliamentary party thus avoiding Madhok without eliciting the opinion of the members of the Party.[1] Kanwal Devgun, an MP, when he questioned the procedural aspects of such an installation, was replaced by Mahavir as President of the Delhi Pradesh Jan Sangh. Madhok was willing to continue as President of the Party and while Vajpayee was willing to offer himself as a candidate, the first preference of the RSS, though fell on Mahavir. Ultimately Deendayal Upadhyaya was preferred to offer a stiff fight, should Madhok persisted in his candidature. Madhok, to avoid embarrassment alround, withdrew from the contest.[2] The Madhok group decided to press hard for an anti-Communist policy as against the anti-Congress policy advocated by Vajpayee on two counts: (1) the venue of Calicut for the session would oblige the new President to openly come out against the Communists which would attune the delegates to their point of view; and (2) they were confident that with the acceptance of this policy by the delegates, the party would get not only more support particularly from the South but a way would be paved for a grand alliance of

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1. Based on interview.

2. Weekend Review, Dec. 30, 1967.

anti-Communist forces on a nation-wide scale. The parties they had in mind were Swatantra, DMK, PSP and SSP. Their thesis was that if there was a Communist-anti-Communist polarization outside the Congress, the Congress would also split between Nehruites and Patelites leading to a bi-polar politics in the country.[1]

The choice of Calicut as the venue for its 14th all India convention was "no accident" considering the thesis of Jan Sangh on the United Front Ministry of Kerala which was voted to power in the 1967 General Elections as "not because the Communists were popular or enjoyed the confidence of the people. It was the dissenting vote of the people against Congress misrule" that had catapulted the United Front Ministry into power. Jan Sangh argued that the people of Kerala had been "disillusioned with the successive regimes" that had fallen within a decade and "that a national party other than the Congress, like the Jan Sangh" would provide "a democratic alternative" in Kerala for the present "Communist-cum-Muslim League dominated" United Front Ministry.[2]

As the coalitional politics continued to agitate Jan Sangh, the deliberations at the Working Committee Session revolved round the efficacy of Jan Sangh's continuation

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1. Weekend Review, Dec. 30, 1967.

2. Karekatte, A.K., Jan Sangh goes South, The Hindustan Times, Jan. 4, 1968.

in the Coalition Ministries. Significantly, despite the strong anti-Communist line advocated by Madhok and as to the short span of existence of such Coalition Ministries, the Working Committee by its majority of members desired the continued support of Jan Sangh to such Ministries.[1] In addition, the rank and file from Bihar, UP and MP, in general, noted with satisfaction the smooth functioning of the United Front Ministries with Jan Sangh maintaining its dominant position. Bihar delegates' fear, however, centred round the threat from SSP of probable defections.[2] And as to the Communists, "an influential section of the Sangh leadership believes in facing the Left Communists on the political level rather than a ban on the party".[3]

The choice of Vajpayee, for Presidentship of the Party was proposed by Pitambar Das, Senior Vice President and natural successor as the past experience showed, as the successor to Deendayal Upadhyaya. Bharatiya Karya Samiti meeting convened at short notice which decided the issue was attended by Presidents, Secretaries and Organizing Secretaries of all the State Units as well as leaders of 10 Assembly Jan Sangh parties.[4]

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1. Based on interview with Uttam Rao Patil, President, Maharashtra Pradesh Jan Sangh.
2. Based on interview.
3. The Hindustan Times, Jan. 19, 1968.
4. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 14, 1968.

In May 1967, the Jan Sangh Deputy Leader in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council, Shiv Prasad Singh, formed a pressure group, of 37 Jan Sangh agriculturist members of the Legislature, called the Krishik Vidhayak Parishad.[1] In June, the Parishad set up one of its members against the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal nominee for Deputy Speakership. He was assured the support of Congress in an attempt to embaress the Chief Minister Charan Singh and the Jan Sangh constituent. The manouevere, however, failed as the sponsor withdrew the name of the nomination, but Jan Sangh, on its part, faced with a problem which could only be solved by the expulsion of Shiv Prasad Singh and his 37 members.[2]

Again, in Uttar Pradesh, Pitamber Das, leader of the Jan Sangh group in the Legislative Assembly was preferred by the party to the Rajya Sabha membership as a consequence of his criticism of the party leadership. He was, however, brought back to the State politics under pressure from the rank and file of the State Unit as its President since the party had to face the mid-term poll in the State. Meanwhile, there were open revolts in places like Agra, Lakhimpur, and Kheri against the leadership in general and Nanaji Deshmukh in particular.[3]

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1. Times of India, May 10, 1967.
2. Jan Sangh contested 2 of the 4 Legislative Council seats, and of the potential 214 votes the transport minister Verma could secure only 180 votes and Madhav Prasad Tripathi polled 202 votes. The differences in voting enabled the to press assume this as a measure of desertions from the Jan Sangh but also saw it as possible that the other constituent unit might have sabotaged the election of Verma and Tripathi as well. Times of India, July 19, 1967.
3. Based on interview.

Balraj Madhok and his group, in their turn, held the national leadership responsible on two counts. For one thing, although Jan Sangh had declared itself in favour of opposing the levy on foodgrains and in the demand for urdu to be given the status of the second language in Uttar Pradesh, the party failed to unleash a campaign on these issues as was done in Bihar. For another, the leadership sought to patronise the Muslims while Golwalkar, at the same time, started his campaign for his Hindu Rashtra Abhiyan as a move to bring about a polarisation between the Hindus and Muslims. This, the Madhok group interpreted, as the double-phased policy which was responsible for the party's reverses. In essence, however, the two groups within the Jan Sangh agreed on the basic elements of the policy, and the difference, naturally, was only on the question of the tactics to be adopted to realise these aims.[1]

At about this time, Vajpayee's election as President appeared to indicate that "the party is continuing the liberal trend that marked its Calicut Session". The specific and immediate problems that were to be tackled, however, by the Jan Sangh revolved round its attitudes towards Congress and non-Congress coalitions. For, the Jan Sangh's stand was "ambiguous" as it was not clear whether it wanted "a polarisatic of forces" as Balraj Madhok had suggested or it accepted the line of Vajpayee "of combining congruent opposition elements".[2]

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1. Based on interview.

2. The Hindustan Times, Editorial, Feb. 15, 1965.

In this context, the changed attitude of Jan Sangh towards the Congress well reflected in the advice that the late Deendayal Upadhyaya gave the Uttar Pradesh Jan Sangh unit to quit from the United Front Ministry even if it resulted in the Congress staging a come back to power. He had expressed such a view in the context of an apprehension that "the present stalemate, if prolonged may be taken advantage of by the CPI and SSP".[1] In contrast, an influential section of Uttar Pradesh leadership of Jan Sangh suggested to Nanaji Deshmukh and Pitambar Das that the political situation in the State should be reviewed in the context of the promulgation of President's rule. And, the party should adopt a policy so as to prevent the Congress from forming a Ministry.[2] Specifically, they held, that "many party workers do not seem to be happy with the role played by former Deputy Chief Minister Ram Prakash, during the SVD crisis". And, in their view, "no issue should be made a prestige issue and personalities should not matter with them".[3]

Despite the fact that whatever the differences that existed within Jan Sangh, it had been and still is the practise of Jan Sangh members to seldom allow them to come to the public view, the cracks that appeared in the Jan Sangh edifice after the 1967 elections came to the surface frequently. For,

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1. Weekend Review, Feb. 24, 1968. For an explanation of the 'present stalemate', see supra page

2. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 29, 1968.

3. Ibid.

while the leaders who controlled the party were more often than not RSS trained men, every Jan Sangh member was not necessarily an RSS member. In Uttar Pradesh as elsewhere, the domination of these RSS members was much resented by the non-RSS elements. And, for instance, Mahendra Pratap Singh, an MLA, stated that "the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and its RSS dominated policies have been a source of evil. Every sensible person in the State is aware of this".[1]

Though it was wrong to presume that the disgruntled Jan Sanghis would quit the Party, the situation in Uttar Pradesh was feared to be such that if a dozen MLAs were to resign from the Party it would have had made a big difference. It became more than probable to surmise that a large number of people belonging to the trading community were Jan Sanghis "but they are a bit liberal-minded" and they "resented the RSS domination" The reverses that the Party suffered did not come about as a surprise when the rank and file worked against the RSS men in the mid-term elections. In Uttar Pradesh, especially, the Party lacked a leader who could unify the two wings, as struggle for supremacy had already started.[2]

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1. Quoted in U.P. letter, Swarajya, April 6, 1968.
2. U.P. letter, Swarajya, April 30, 1968.

Both the Congress and the Jan Sangh were split on the eve of elections in Ambala district and faced prestigious contests. Over years, the Congress had learnt to live with this malady, but "for a type of organization that the Sangh is, it is a crippling blow".[1]

For instance, in its desperate attempt to retain the Ambala City seat, the Jan Sangh was greatly handicapped by the emergence on the scene of its former State Vice President and Municipal Chairman, Raghubir Sharma, as a BKD candidate who carried with him a number of J.S. workers. To the extent Sharma divided the Jan Sangh votes, the Press reported, that the Jan Sangh position would became weakened. For the cantonment seat Jan Sangh faced trouble, because of a split in its ranks on the selection of its nominee. Jan Sangh faced further harassment from its dissident, Bakheroo Singh, who "will divide the votes as an independent" at Yamunanagar.[2]

The unexpected defeats that Jan Sangh suffered in the corporation elections in Lucknow and Kanpur, were attributed to the disillusionment of businessmen and urban property owners who formed the bulk of its supporters. For one thing, they felt sore over the domination of RSS men in the party, and

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1. The Hindustan Times, May 7, 1968.

2. ibid. Sharma was the official nominee of Jan Sangh for this seat in 1957 and 1962 elections. He was defeated by the Congress candidate Abdul Gaffar Khan. Khan, however, lost the 1967 Elections to a Jan Sangh nominee.

for another, the President's rule had reversed whatever benefits the party could secure for them. Also, Jan Sangh did not repeal Bhumi Bhavan Kar tax with the result that it was collected with retrospective effect. This resulted in Jan Sangh sympathisers voting for independents in these two corporation elections.[1]

The Central Government Employees strike during Sept. 1968 led to serious differences in the Jan Sangh leadership. Madhok stood opposed to the strike as he described it as "primarily of a Communist game" and advised the Party to keep out of the issue Vajpayee took a sympathetic stand on the various demands of the Central Government Employees though the Jan Sangh had yet to prove "its credentials as champion of the Working Class".[2] Explaining the official stand, Vajpayee, however, referred to the General Council resolution at its Indore Session which laid down that the strike should not be opposed. For, Jan Sangh felt that the legitimate interests of the Government Employees could not be overlooked merely because the Communists were espousing their cause.[3]

The simmering differences in the Party, surfaced steadily when Madhok decided to challenge the leadership on both counts, viz., in his antipathy towards Left Communist Party and its ban,

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1. U.P. Letter, Swarajya, May 24, 1968.
2. The Hindustan Times, Sept. 21, 1968.
3. National Herald, Sept. 9, 1968.

and his desire to work for a polarization of "right political forces". On both counts he faced stiff opposition from the Vajpayee group.[1]

The Party resolution in May 1969 for the setting up of a "Second States' Reorganisation Commission" to review the political map of India "in an integrated and objective manner", was termed as of its going back on its major policy preference for a unitary form of Government. The proposal was mooted to pass the buck of intra-party problems in units like Haryana, Punjab, Andhra etc. Inspite of Vajpayee's elaboration, votes were cast against the resolution.[2]

The Presidential Election Vs. the Jan Sangh highlighted the differences between Madhok and Vajpayee, thus testing the disciplinary proceedings of the Party. Jan Sangh, in its anxiety to project itself as a rallying point of non-Congress, anti-Communist political opinion on the one hand and retain its progressive image, on the other, tried to look upon this contest as a Congress Vs. Opposition tie. Madhok, however, contested this opinion as too naive as issues involved were more fundamental.[3] Vajpayee, on his part, desired that other opposition parties bring about a national consensus and to avoid

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1. The Hindustan Times, Dec. 2, 1968.
2. Based on interview.
3. Madhok, in his personal capacity, announced Reddy as the right choice, though the Party did not officially adopt him as its candidate.

direct identification with both, Swatantra and Syndicate Congres as well. For, such an identification would lead to vulnerable attack as of association with reactionary elements in the popular mind.[1]

Madhok, though in Chandigarh, declared openly of his Party's second preference votes to the Congress nominee, Reddy, Vajpayee countered this declaration from Indore. Jan Sangh took objection to Madhok's declaration but sent five emissaries to various States to convey its decision in this regard.

A group of 80 Delhi Municipal Corporators, under the leadership of Shri Ram Prakash Gupta was determined to fight against the facist trends within the party as a gift of RSS bossism over the party. To this effect, memorandum containing the allegations by these Corporators about the poor performances was presented to Mayor Hans Raj Gupta. The Jan Sangh leadership threatened this group with CBI investigations in some cases against them.

Kedar Nath Sahni (the most trusted man of Golwalkar, Chairman of the standing Committee of the Corporation and incharge of the Delhi RSS and BJS funds) treated this opposition with contempt but due to pressure from Vajpayee was ready for a compromise which was reached.[2] Besides, Deputy Mayor

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1. Jan Sangh's support was officially asked for by the Congress President when he invited Masani and Vajpayee, on 2.8.1969. Based on interview.

2. Based on interview.

Balraj Khanna and his group were also under the suspicion of the leadership. Khanna (an ex Hindu Mahasabite) was accused of being under the influence of the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee.[1]

The debacle suffered by the Party in the Assembly elections, 1972, caused an uncomfortable situation for leadership. Though Vajpayee, the President, at the Working Committee meeting held in Delhi earlier, owned the entire responsibility for the dismal failure, his "softness" towards the Prime Minister following the victory over Pakistan, drew pointed reference from Madhok. Besides, in the Bagalpur Session the policies pursued by the Party came for much criticism, especially, its attitude towards Bank Nationalisation, abolition of Privy Purses etc. as it had allowed room for dubbing the Party of "rightist and reactionary" character. A similar stand on the question of land ceiling drew particular attention of the delegates and was explained for the extrangement of Harijans and tribals.

Sunder Singh Bandari offered an explanation that the Party's opposition as regards Bank Nationalisation and Privy Purse abolition was only on the "manner" and not on the issues as such. In the face of the Working Committees' unwillingness to officially endorse the lowering of ceilings on land, the leadership side stepped the issue by an official amendment

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1. Based on interview.

to the economic policy resolution which made provision for the ceiling of land monthly income to Rs. 1500/- (not income from other sources). The amended resolution, in the absence of any reliable assessment method, however, would prove ineffective. On questions of Harijans and others the party constitution was amended to provide for association of Harijans and tribals with the Party Organisation at all levels.[1] The statement of M.L. Sondhi of a reported split in the Party was countered by Bhai Mahavir as the Jan Sangh "has been and is even now a party of the youth".[2]

The clash between Madhok and the Party leadership got intensified and a 16-page charge-sheet framed accused him of anti-party activities and pronouncements.[3] The General Council adopted a resolution by 310 votes to two prescribing disciplinary action against Madhok. Specific instances were quoted in another charge-sheet which included, besides others: (a) his opposition to the Central Government Employees strike, 1969, thereby alienating their sympathies for the party; (b) his malignant attack on Vajpayee; and (c) his public waging of a campaign against the Party, thereby had given a rude shock

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1. Even the Working Committee membership at the national level was made elastic so as to accommodate these elements besides women in its forum. Based on interview and Party files.

2. Times of India, May 21, 1972.

3. Madhok in his book, had charged the leadership with bringing about a decline of the Party's image since 1967 when he relinquished the Presidentship.

(What book?

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to the "image of discipline and unity" of the Party.[1] Madhok, in his reply, denied the charges of his anti-party activities, and averred that "Discussion within the party forums is allowed even in Communist and Fascist parties. In a democratic party such discussions take place among workers, sympathisers and supporters", and "the Jan Sangh will have to make up its mind whether it wants to function as a democratic party or an authoritarian Party".[2] The Party, however, expelled him from its membership.

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1. The Statesman, March 4, 1973.
2. The Hindustan Times, March 15, 1973.

II

Viewed retrospectively, the problems[1] of Swatantra, many and varied as they were, were in dire contrast with that of Jan Sangh. Here again, these have to be tested in the crucible of both, from organisational and ideological angles. Significantly, Swatantra, born after Independence, could not build its organisation more schematic than suited to its exigencies. This significance lay, for one thing, in the nature of party building, rather the 'process of consent' in the coming together, among the "autonomous social forces' with their "altrustic self-interests". For another, the need for and the possibility of the party building had resulted in the close liaison within the party, between the social base and party organisation, thus exhibiting the compulsion exerted by the federal structure. More important of them all, was the absorption of these "autonomous" groups and leaders with a "feudal" outlook and aristocratic aversion to party discipline and control, both from the apex and below.

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1. This particular chapter has been developed largely from the material made available by the Party Central Office, and the printed literature distributed to the Members of the General Council.

Here, the operational significance of the 21st principle[1] helped solve the dilemma to a greater extent. As things turned out, however, these peculiarities manifested themselves in underlining the electoral strength of the party in a State and its too heavy reliance on the aristocrats and others. This exposure of the party to electoral politics revealed the existence of two conflicting trends: (a) even a single spectacular defection by a notable individual virtually obiliterated the party unit from the entire State and (b) the absence of a cohesive aristocracy created problems, that a State unit cannot even count on aristocratic solidarity as a substitute for a more formal party organisation. Added to these were such other problems which confronted other parties, of finance, electoral adjustments, political propaganda etc.

Organisational:

The Bihar episode in the Party history exhibited the organisational problems a political party has to face in a democratic set up in all its ramifications. In brief, the seeds of conflict[2] lay in the differences between Raja of Ramgarh with his Janata Party on the one hand and Janki Nandan Singh and his Jan Congress on the other. The unsuccessful

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1. The 21st principle, a new concept in the working of India's Party politics, is the ideal compromise which preserves individual liberty without sacrificing Party discipline.

2. Based on interviews and Party files.

attempt of the central leadership to solve some of the problems by delimiting the sphere of their respective influences led to the direct confrontation between the Central and State leadership of the Party. And the highlights of the episode were the unresponsiveness of the Raja to the central organisation's request[1] for information regarding the functioning of the State unit and its nominees for the Rajya Sabha elections, which added grist to the already irritated mill of the Central leadership. The head-on-collision of Ramgarh with the Central leadership, however, came with his successful appeal[2] to the Election Commission for retaining the Janata Party's symbol, "bicycle" in the 1962 elections instead of Swatantra Party's "Star". This, Masani interpreted as indicative of Ramgarh's anxiety to protect his political fortunes instead of Swatantra.[3] Interpreted in terms of inter-personal relationship, this episode resulted in the confrontation between Masani and the Raja. For, the resignation threat of Masani in 1963, should the appeal preferred by Ramgarh's followers to the General Council be sustained, won him the feud partially. Relations between Ramgarh and the Central leadership, however, became strained further. As a consequence of this trend, the Party's nominee, Parmanand Kejriwal, for the Rajya Sabha was

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1. Munshi's Report on Bihar affairs quoted in S.M. 46, August-Sept., 1964.
2. Based on Party files.
3. Ibid.

unsuccessful, instead, the Raja of Bilaspur, the second in line, won the seat.[1] In the meantime, Ramgarh succeeded in expelling Jankinandan Singh from the Party and twelve of the Swatantra MLAs defected to the Congress.[2]

Henceforth, the mutual recriminations between Masani and Ramgarh continued unabated and Ramgarh interpreted the successful attempt of the Central Bank[3] in bringing a suit against him as a malicious attempt of Masani against him.[4] This "demoralisation" and the consequent disintegration of the Bihar State Unit led to an investigation by the Central Party Organisation. Munshi, who investigated into this distressing chapters of the Party recommended for the dissolution of the Interim Executive Committee,[5] closely followed by an appeal preferred by Ramgarh against any such dissolution. The Central Party Organisation failed to achieve rapport among the party leadership when confronted with yet another problem which militated against any such favourable decision, for, Ramgarh had already submitted his application

1. S.N. 46, August-Sept., 1964.
2. Ibid.
3. The issue of "ban" secured by Ramgarh from the Central Bank have been discussed by Rajaji in Swarajya, Sept. 19, 1964.
4. Based on interview.
5. Munshi's Report to the Central Organising Committee of the Party was released to the Press on August 17, 1964. See S.N. 46, August-Sept., 1964 for the report and other matters. Bihar Unit of the Party was dissolved in Sept. 1964. Also, The Statesman, August 19, 1964.

for admission to the Congress Party along with his followers.[1] Provoked to the extreme, and left with no choice, the Party rejected his appeal against the dissolution of the Interim Executive Committee, and expelled Ramgarh. The politics of expediency, however, at the same time, compelled the leadership to leave the Swatantra Party's doors open to come back to those signatories who had earlier applied for Congress membership.[2] Undeniably, with the exit of Ramgarh, the Party had been virtually obliterated from Bihar.[3] In response to this challenge and also determined to start on 'a clean slate', an Advisory Committee was nominated by the Central Organising Committee "to help in putting the Party back on its legs" in that State.

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1. S.Ns 46, 47 and 50, August-Sept., Oct.-Nov. 1964 and March 1965 respectively for a detailed account of the Central Organising Committee's Reports to the General Council Members regarding Ramgarh episode and also for the Press Statement issued by the Party. The decision of Ramgarh to merge his identity with the Congress was announced on Sept. 12, 1964.
   The Express News Service in its Bihar Newsletter, analysing the real motives of Ramgarh to join the Congress, stated: "Besides the Raja seems to be most unconcerned about his future politics. His main concern is to get out of the trouble arising from the Dhori mine inquiry report. He also wants to save his skin from about three dozen civil and criminal cases he has been fighting with the State Government". Vide S.N. 60, July 1966.

2. Swatantra had made a fine distinction between those members who were not expelled but resigned from the Party. S.N. 50, March 1965.

3. Swarajya, Sept. 19, 1964 for Rajaji's views on the Ramgarh's 'Story of Bihar'. Rajaji stated: "we tried to get on with Sri Kamakhya Narain Singh and his group all these years in spite of many complaints from other friends in the party in Bihar. Acharya Ranga, Sri K.M. Munshi, and I supported him

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The absence of a cohesive aristocracy in Rajasthan displayed a different set of problems, a modified variety this time, that a State unit cannot even count on aristocratic solidarity as a substitute for party organisation. Maharaja of Dungarpur, by virtue of his seniority in the Rajput hierarchy, attained his position as State Party President and as the leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly.[1] This somewhat immediate rise in the party alienated some of the earlier entrants into the Party. Added to this, his preference to build a cohesive aristocracy and thereby organise the party on these lines alienated both lesser Rajputs and non-Rajputs further.[2] Dungarpur's ineffectual leadership was reflected[3] in the election of members to the committee in the Rajasthan Assembly in proportion to its strength therein. The entry of Maharani Gayatri Devi (now Rajmata), with her ability to adopt and adapt to the modern political style when led to her swift rise in the party hierarchy, set the stage for resentment among many Swatantrites who alleged that she "bought" the party. As a quid pro quo for her joining the party, Maharani insisted in having Devi Singh as the State General Secretary and Auywan Singh as the Organising Secretary, much to the chagrin of many Swatantrites about the Central leadership.[4]

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over every complaint and kept his authority in tact, because we thought we should not weaken his hands or his group .... with greatest reluctance and under a compelling sense of duty, we resolved to face the difficulties .... We have sometimes to reconcile ourselves to losing what looks li strength, when that strength is illusory and is accompanied by dissension and total failure of work".

1. Based on interviews.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.

In examining the course of events in the past, we find that Gujarat had given comparatively the least trouble to the National leaders, as the principal aristocratic figure at the State level, Maharaja Devgadh-Baria, "was amenable to some control from above".[1] In 1965, however, the episode of Narendra Singh Mahida, a Gujarat MP brought about yet another phase of Swatantra's problems who resigned from the Swatantra Party and stated:[2] that he had not only resigned from the Party but had also tendered his resignation from the Lok Sabha, to Morarji Desai; that he confessed his mistake in joining the Party and this he corrected by his resignation;[3] and that he had announced his decision to join the Congress as he was a 'Centrist'. Denying personal financial problems as responsible for his resignation from the Party, he declared that the Party had not spent any money on him and that no money was paid by the Party for him to fight the appeal (right upto the Supreme Court) against his election, which he won finally. The Treasurer of the Gujarat Unit of the Party Shri Chimanbhai Desai, however,

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1. Based on interview. Gujarat hit the lines, however, regularly since the Rajya Sabha Biennial Elections, 1966.
2. Based on interview and party files.
3. S.N. 55, Oct-Nov., 1965.

had a different story to tell, he issued a statement to correct the inaccuracies of the version of Mahida.[1]

The open revolt by the Gujarat unit in 1968 brings the analysis to a new phase. For, it raised numerous queries, the important among them being, the ins and outs of the leadership problems.[2] Wider in its implications than the actual struggle was the principle that determined the nature of party building

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1. The statement inter alia stated that:
   (a) Mr. Mahida had resigned from the party because the Anand Parliamentary constituency from which he was a member might have Mr. Bhalalbhai Patel as the Party's candidate next time;
   (b) Mr. Mahida's election expenses in 1962 were fully borne by the party;
   (c) The treasurer holds receipts from Mahida's lawyers which prove that the cost of contesting the election petition against him was borne by the Party; and
   (d) It was not proper on Mahida's part to hand over his resignation from the Lok Sabha to Morarji Desai. Mr. Mahida should have handed over his letter of resignation from the Lok Sabha to the Swatantra Party on whose ticket he was elected.

   SaN. 55, Oct.-Nov., 1965.

2. M.K. Dhar reported that these inter-personal conflicts led to Rajaji's remarks to the effect that "he (Rajaji) committed a mistake in conceiving the party". M.K. Dhar, The Hindustan Times, Dec. 26, 1968. Rajaji denied having made such a statement in his correspondence with the researcher. Vaidya, in his correspondence with Rajaji, stated: "... if this is the party you created for ousting the rotten Congress, I think - so far as Gujarat is concerned - you will have to face greater disappointments still. Swatantra Party of Gujarat needs large scale amputations more than the Congress People are fed up with the Congress, but where is the alternative? Certainly not in the Swatantra Party in Gujarat". Based on Party files.

under a federal system of polity.[1]

The circumstances that depicted the revolt centred round the Party's power at National level to issue directions to the State Units. This question of 'interference' by the National leadership on the Gujarat State leadership started in the nomination process of the Party to the Rajya Sabha election, 1966.[2] The Central Parliamentary Board nominated Biharilal Anantani[3] as the Party's candidate while the State Parliamentary

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1. This does not mean that (a) the State Units were all powerful and the national organization weak, and (b) the party was a group of State parties. The Swatantra Party Central Organization had succeeded in controlling the lower organs, though to a limited extent, the limitation being in the nature of the party-building itself in different States. These limitations were realised by the leaders as far back as August 1959 in Bombay, in regard to a regional controversy then current in Western India, and they were compelled to point out that there could not be one Swatantra Party in Bombay, another in Maharastra, and a third in Gujarat, but that these should all function as branches of a single party.

   S.N. 50, March 1965. Also S.N. 51, April-May, 1965 for Masani's emphasis.

2. To recall, 4 members were to be elected from the State which had 115 Congress members, 26 Swatantra, and 7 Independent Progressive Group of which Babu Vaidya (who was to figure later on so prominently in this leadership tussle) was the leader. The PSP had 3 members. Thus of the 4 seats, 3 should go to the Congress and the 4th to the Swatantra. Based on Party files.

3. "The newly elected Swatantra Party MP Dr. B. Anantani, B.A., Litt., (Oxen), Bar-at-Law, is widely travelled and scholarly. He came in close contact with Gandhiji in Africa. He led an Indian delegation to London to seek release of Mahatmaji when he was imprisoned. Dr. Anantani has been P.M. in some Indian State. He accompanied Jam Saheb to the U.N. as his Secretary".

   S.N. 58, May 1966.

Board favoured C.C. Desai.[1] The President and the Secretary of the State Unit, resented this as 'interference' and while protesting against this decision, threatened that in future the Gujarat Unit would not tolerate any such interference on the part of the Centre. Thus, this threat, however, did have only 'futurity' as its plan of action on the part of the State Unit, as it accepted Anantani as the Party's candidate at that time.

The Swatantra Party, short of the number of required members for getting the first preference votes to get its members elected, accepted support from the Independent Progressive Group. With the oral[2] agreement reached between the leader of the Independent Progressive Group, Babubhai Vaidya and the General Secretary of the State Swatantra Party, Jai Deep Singh of Bharia, and with the concurrence of the State President and the other members of the Assembly, the Party could get its member Anantani elected to the Rajya Sabha with the second preference votes

1. Shri C.C. Desai was the former Indian Commissioner to Pakistan and a member of the I.C.S. In a statement issued from New Delhi on January 14, 1966, Mr. Desai said he had come to the conclusion that the principles of the Swatantra Party were such as would offer the best scope for work and service. The argument put forth by the Central Parliamentary Board for preferring Dr. Anantani was that he was a tried party worker when compared to the new comer like Desai, which decision evidently caused resentment among the State leadership.
   S.N. 56, Jan.-Feb., 1966.

2. Based on Party files.

of the above group. As a quid pro quo for his support, the State Unit promised Vaidya that it would nominate him as its candidate[1] for the 1968 Rajya Sabha elections. Besides, it appraised the Central leaders the circumstances under which Vaidya rendered support and the promise of the State Unit sin the ultimate concurrence of such an action would be required from the Central Parliamentary Board and got the same.[2]

The State leaders failed to honour their "own" commitments in 1968, made to Vaidya in 1966, they developed cold feet, and a virtual non-co-operation movement with the Central leaders and Vaidya started on the ground that many of the State Assembly leaders were new and their decline to hold themselves bound by a commitment of their predecessors. Caste overtones came to the fore, for the rebel candidate U.N. Mahida, a Kshatriya, was able to get the support of a large number of Kshatriya MLAs.[3] This was in spite of the fact that the State Unit had informed the Central Office of the decision of the State Parliamentary Board to honour the commitment given to Vaidya.[4] The Central Parliamentary Board reaffirmed its intention of nominating Vaidya as its candidate for the Rajya Sabha elections.[5] The reluctance on the part of the State

1. Based on party files.
2. Based on party files.
3. Based on interviews and party files.
4. Based on party files.
5. Based on party files.

Party leaders to sign Vaidya's nomination papers, which Vaidya interpreted, as a suggestion "to the rebels that they can go on in their activities without any fear of disciplinary action, ... a subtle move. But anyone with commonsense can understand it".[1]

Curiously, U.N. Mahida, pledged his support to Vaidya provided that he was taken as the Party's second candidate. Despite these assurances, Mahida signed his nomination papers for the said Rajya Sabha elections, and on the strength of support from some leading members of the Assembly, despite the Whip refused to withdraw his candidature. This lukewarm sympathy for the official candidate, Vaidya, and in contrast the preferential treatment shown to Mahida by the party leaders was made clear by the press statement issued by Thakur Saheb of Dhrol.[2]

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1. As alleged by Vaidya in his correspondence with Rajaji, the leader of the Assembly Bhailalbhai Patel and the President of the State Unit H.M. Patel and other office-bearers of the party (Jai Deep Singh Bharia was away at that time) did not sign his nomination papers, instead a junior member of the party, Yuvaraj Digvijay Singh of Wankaner, did so. ibid.

2. Thakur Saheb stated: "I had filed Mr. Mahida's nomination after consulting Bhai Kaka before I signed the nomination paper. I had taken advice from Bhai Kaka and at that time a leading Swatantra MLA was present." He proceeded saying that when Jai Deep Singh Bharia came into the picture at a later stage, "it was then that Bhai Kaka and H.M. Pat l realised their mistakes but then it was too late". Phul Chhap, April 14, 1968. Quoted in Party files.

Added to this, a few days prior to the actual polling date, six MPs including C.C. Desai, worked against the official Party candidate Vaidya, and Vaidya was defeated.[1] The press reported[2] that Praveen Singh Solanki along with 30 Swatantra MLAs had decided to join the Jan Sangh should the National Executive take any disciplinary action against the rebels. In this background the National Executive was called upon to take a decision left with two alternatives viz. should it decide in taking any disciplinary action against all those who were responsible for this episode, or else, to take only those to task (5 MLAs) who had sponsored Mahida's candidature besides considering the nature of punishment to be meted out to them.

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1. Soon after the election results were announced, the Press commented: "after what has happened, nobody would have faith in our Party's word and, if somebody did so, he can be taken to be a fool". Phul Chhap, March 29, 1968. Quoted in Party files.
   H.M. Patel, the State Secretary, termed the official candidate Vaidya's defeat as "due to some misunderstanding". Times of India, April 22, 1968. Patel went to the extent of publically accusing Vaidya, the victim of the Party's breach of faith, of "ingratitude" for writing to Bajaji stating the facts about what happened to him. Gujarat Herald, April 16, 1968. At the same time, the Swatantra Sandesh, the Party's organ in Ahmedabad, levelled this charge of ingratitude and showered abuse on the unfortunate victim.

2. Vajpayee, the Jan Sangh leader, confirmed to the meeting of Solanki, the General Secretary of the State Party with him to this effect on April 13, and said that no final decision took place but they would meet again. In spite of the denial of Solanki of his meeting Vajpayee in this context, the latter confirmed his statement by a rejoinder. Phul Chhap, April 14, 1968. Quoted in Party files.

The National Executive was to remain rest content by issuing a show cause notice to the 5 MLAs. For, it was "accepted that the severity of the disciplinary action contemplated in any event of an explanation not being altogether satisfactory would exclude explusion from the party".[1] This failure of the National Executive to take any severe action was on two counts: (i) the leaders of the State Assembly and the party unit would be in no position to take such severe actions against MPs from the State; and (ii) because of their own failures to honour the obligations of the party.[2] In any event, the pervasive atmosphere in the National Executive prevented taking a drastic action, the dissolution of the State Unit.

Opinions varied on the subject, not in the assessment of guilt but who should be held responsible. Masani, the General Secretary of the party took exception to this matter of fact of view and this mild rebuke of the National Executive of the five Gujarat MLAs and resigned from his party position (from the National Executive and from the Central Parliamentary Board of the party) as a sort of 'atonement'.[3]

1. Based on Party files.
2. In contrast with this that in a somewhat similar situation in 1967, on the initiative of the U.P. State President Shri B.P. Singh, the National Executive dissolved the State Party Unit, and this had been explained elsewhere in the same chapter.
3. Based on Party files.

The matter did not end with the resignation of Masani from the National official posts, rather, it had started a spate of discussions about the state of affairs of the Party. The meeting of the General Council on June 1, 1968, presided over by the Vice President Ruthnaswamy, instead of President Ranga, (he abstained himself as he did not want his views to 'intrude upon the discussion on Gujarat affairs')[1] brought out the reactions of the leaders to the whole episode and the contradictions inherent in the Party leadership to the forefront. The thin attendance showed clearly that the crisis that afflicted the party was one of personality rather than on principles,[2] and an "indication of the party being in bad shape".[3]

Munshi viewed the developments in Gujarat as "distressing' He was in complete accord with Masani as "to the total disregard of ethics in morality - a total defiance of the party's discipline". He termed the nomination and securing the victory

1. The Times of India, June 2, 1968.
2. The Hindustan Times, June 5, 1968.
3. The Times of India, June 4, 1968.
4. Questioning the validity of the interpretation of this issue as "interference" by the Centre, Munshi stated: "Our Party is not a confederacy of autonomous units. It is not as if Units at the State level got together and decide to form a Party. The Swatantra Party is one Party, and State Units are its branches. There is no question of the Party at the national level "interfering" in the affairs of the branches. How can there be "interference" when there is only one Party? This is absolutely fundamental. This is what the General Council's resolution of 1965 emphasized. Abandon this position and we shall no longer be a well-knit national Party, but a convenient coalition of small units, each going in its own way". Based on Party files and Munshi's letter dated May 21, 1968 to all members of General Council of the Party.

of a rebel candidate as "incalculable harm done to the party's prestige and honour". He posed the query that "on what grounds we have been fighting for the retention of privy purses? - On the ground that abolishing privy purses would mean a violation of a pledge. But within, our party members have deliberately broken a promise". Describing the Party's role as primarily one of political education, he said that, "the moment we take to politics of expediency we abandon the raison d'etre for the party's very existence".

Rajaji[1] was faced with the dilemma of maintaining party discipline. Confronted on the one hand that a political party not in office and working against heavy odds, he feared it could not afford to be over severe. On the other hand, a national party that had to fight the ruling party entrenched in power could not hope to make any headway without the minimum discipline necessary for holding together in spite of frictions that might arise in human affairs. He was forced to balance these two contradictions against the background of a general feeling and what was considered as too much of Central domination.

1. He analysed the background of the Gujarat rebellion thus:
"To give an unconditional pledge in 1966 for action by party executive to be constituted two years later, and by a newly constituted body of legislators is not very wise. An unwise pledge must lead to difficulties. The pledge was not duly honoured and the persons guilty of indiscipline have been suitably dealt with. It is not good to be severe so as to drive permanent wedges into a community of persons who should ultimately work together. In any case it seems to me silly to keep up distrust and discord by enquiries which do not serve any constructive purpose".
Swarajya, June 8, 1968.

Rajaji considered the disciplinary action taken by the National Executive against the five MLAs as adequate. The differences of view thus in the two leaders Masani and Rajaji lay in the fact that "it is not in the assessment of the guilt that there is a difference of view but in regard to who should be held responsible".[1]

Both Dandekar and Masani issued contradictory statements. They disagreed[2] on the point whether the party was at 'cross-roads'. Dandekar maintained the 'rebellion' as a closed chapter, whereas to Masani 'it is a new situation'. Masani, declining to withdraw his resignation, accused the National Executive as having failed to take obvious steps to restore the 'credibility of the party' in Gujarat. For Dandekar moderation in disciplinary matters is a virtue. He denied the existence of any conflict of views between Ranga and Masani in regard to the party affairs in Gujarat and said there was only a difference of opinion as regards the "severity of disciplinary action against the recalcitrant members involved".[3]

While it would be wrong to suggest, however, that Desai's revolt against Masani had the sympathies of the Party President Ranga, in any way, it was no secret that the latter

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1. Swarajya, op. cit.
2. Times of India, June 4, 1968.
3. The Hindu, June 1, 1968.

felt unhappy over the way in which a crisis had been precipitated by resorting to strong action. To quote an earlier incident and to that the reactions of Ranga, Masani felt that the National Executive of a party is not a deliberative body but in the nature of a cabinet. There should be a broad similarity of approach on the part of its members towards the problems that come up before it for decision". He found a clear difference of approach to the problems that faced the party between him and several members of the National Executive. He felt that it would be better that they should be permitted to work out their policies without constant and repeated cleavages of opinion and divided counsel.

Masani posed significant queries: "Does the National Executive accept its obligation to implement the General Council Resolution[1] of February 1965? Are the decisions taken at

1. This resolution was moved by R.N. Singh Deo and unanimously adopted. The relevant passage of the statement on Organization passed by the General Council in February 1965 reads as follows:

"We must realise that there is only one Swatantra Party and that is The Swatantra Party. Our leader, Rajaji, put his finger on this truth as far back as August 1959 in Bombay, when he pointed out, in connection with our attitude in regard to a regional controversy then current in Western India, that could not be one Swatantra Party in Bombay, another in Maharastra and a third in Gujarat but that these should all function as branches of a single party.

... The size of our country certainly justifies our interposing an additional tier, namely the State Unit. But that cannot mean that the State Unit should claim territorial authority, seek a monopoly of developing the party in that area. The National Executive of the Party and the Parliamentary Board are there precisely to guide and direct the affairs of the party throughout the length and breadth of the country, whenever it is necessary in the party's interests". Based on Party files. See supra page of this chapter.

the meeting of April 14, 1968 in accordance with that Resolution? Is the Resolution still operative or is it not? That this was not an imaginary danger, Masani said, was proved by the remarks made by President Ranga on Party Organization at the General Council meeting in November 25 and 26, 1965.[1] Ranga suggested to Masani since he was no longer the General Secretary, he should not any longer seek to impose any policies on the party. Masani replied "I can assure our President and you that I have no desire whatsoever to impose any policies[2] on those who do not believe in them and I was grateful to our President even as he spoke for opening my eyes to the fact that my attempts at maintaining certain standards of behaviour and discipline had done some violence to him and perhaps some others amongst our colleagues". Thus apart from the technicalities of the matter these developments had a wider significance for the discipline and morale of the Party.

Ideological:

Swatantra, "a party with a difference", tried to solve the dilemma of the conflict between individual conscience on the one hand and requirements of party discipline on the other,

1. Prof. Ranga held that this Resolution was passed in 1965 to placate Masani as it did not wish to lose his services as General Secretary. Based on Party files.

2. Based on Party files.

by inscribing in its ideology a plurality of loyalties, within the broad outline of basic economic thinking. In other words, it laid down the limits of ideological loyalty of a member of the Party with a set of twenty principles as its raison d'etre. Its twenty first principle, however, declared that "the Swatantra Party holds that democracy is best served, if every political party allows freedom of opinion to its members on all matters outside the Fundamental Principles of the Party. It, therefore, gives its members full liberty on all questions not falling within the scope of Principles stated above".[1] More specifically, this principle preserved individual freedom, and liberty without sacrificing the party discipline at the same time. This enabled the leadership of the party 'to agree or disagree' among themselves in order to solve every controversial problem on a regional or sectional question on which individual members had been given freedom to hold contrary and even opposite stands. Ironic as it may sound, this ideological testament rocked its boat severely at times.

The very first incident that tested the ideology of the Party was the resignation of Raja Hutheesingh from the Swatantra Party. In his long statement he criticised the ideology of the Party and feared that "the programme of the Swatantra Party, if put in practice, would subject the Indian people to economic chaos and ruthless exploitation and put off all hopes of peaceful economic development". It may be recalled that Hutheesingh

1. See Statement of Policies issued in March 1960.

joined the Party at its very inception. This evoked the criticism from Murarji Vaidya, Chairman of the Bombay Unit, who stated that Hutheesingh seemed to be "in two minds about his own ideology. He could not forget his own loyalty to Socialism and while he was apparently in favour of organising a Democratic Opposition, he did not seem to realise what it meant or how it should be done".[1]

There had been occasions in the past when even the national leadership differed on issues like Prohibition, Birth Control, Language, Punjabi Suba etc. Of these, 'Language, and Punjabi Suba' deserve a brief mention. The General Council which met at Bombay in 1965 demanded that the Party would have a clear cut policy on such a vital question. Since a discussion could not be avoided, Masani proposed an informal discussion of the Party Workers even though the composition would be almost similar to that of the General Council. The meeting, however, ended in confusion and Rajaji's anti-Hindi stand had done a lot of damage to the Party in North India.[2]

And, in regard to the question of the Party's policies running counter to emotional attitudes was the fast unto death that was undertaken by Sardar Darshan Singh Pheruman. Both the

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1. S.N. 7, June 1960.
2. Based on interview with a State Party leader from U.P.

Central and State leadership found themselves in a rather embarassing situation particularly because the issues on which he fasted related to the status of Chandigarh. The Party had, as a matter of policy, decided not to take sides in such disputes. In view of this policy Sardar Pheruman himself resigned from the Presidentship of the party so that his fast would not embarass the Party. He, however, continued to be a member of the General Council. The Party was confronted, in more than one meeting of its National Executive, with this matter and apart from hoping that the Central and State Governments concerned would take an early decision and thus enable Sardar Pheruman to break his fast, took no sides on the merits of either Chandigarh or of his fast. This neutrality went to such an extent that the State leadership bitterly complained (after Sardar Darshan Singh Pheruman's death) that no national leader of the Party either bothered to call on Pheruman when he was fasting or to be present even at his funeral. The latter, was unintentional and the General Council apologized. But the point to be noted is that a highly emotional issue was kept lingering due to the Party's policy of keeping away from linguistic or regional issues.[1]

In the case of U.P., the Central Parliamentary Board of the Party directed the U.P. State Unit to support the candidature of Acharya Kripalani[2] for the Rajya Sabha elections, 1966.

1. Based on Party files and clarification from the Executive Secretary of the Party.
2. S.N. 87, April 1966.

It also announced that "it is the Acharya who will also guide the Delhi deliberations".[1] This it did in its anxiety to maintain its character as 'a party with a difference'.[2] In this, it neither perceived the implications of the issue nor the inclination of the members of the State Unit. Indeed, the concept of national interests over-riding partisan considerations "is something which is not easily understood by everyone".

The reasons for undertaking such an extraordinary step, was to utilise "the commanding position of Kripalani in the public life of the country and his long record of service and of the desirability of his continued presence in Parliament".[3] For, it felt that "his advanced age makes it difficult for him to go through the reforms of an election campaign. A place in the Rajya Sabha would therefore have ensured his continued presence and been a source of great strength to the democratic opposition". And, the party categorically rejected the suggestion that "this gesture would please many other ex-Congress men and possibly attract them to the Swatantra fold".

The failure of the Central Party leaders to carry the U.P. State Unit in this friendly gesture towards Kripalani had in store further embarassments to the Party. The Central Parliamentary Board directed that "no member of the party

1. Link, March 6, 1966.
2. Statement of Policies, issued in March 1960.
3. S.N. 57, April 1966.

should stand for election to the Rajya Sabha or the Vidhan Parishad from U.P. and that our members should be advised to abstain from voting for the election to the Rajya Sabha and to vote for the Jan Sangh candidate for the Vidhan Parishad in accordance with the understanding between the two parties".[1]

This failure made the press to editorially conclude that the Swatantra was a 'divided party'.[2] In passing, it also mentioned Bihar and said that "the Swatantra Party's dilemma in Bihar and U.P. showed that a party which has no firm roots among the masses can at least be an amorphous group whose unity cannot last long". Clarifying its position and also by way of reply to the speculations of the press, the Party said[3] that this conclusion was not only unfair but was based on an inadequate understanding of the reasons for its sponsoring of Acharya Kripalani. It concluded that "unfortunately certain vested interests in the State Unit proved too strong. The concept of national interests over-riding partisan considerations is something which is not easily understood by everyone. All the same, this act, where we literally sacrificed a party seat for a non-Party man was widely welcomed in the country. It opened the eyes of many to the fact that the Swatantra Party is different from others".

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1. S.N. 57, April 1966.
2. The Indian Express, March 17, 1966.
3. S.N. 57, April 1966.

As an aftermath of these developments, the majority of the party members of the State legislature tried to replace th State President, Banu Pratap Singh, elected new office-bearers and communicated accordingly to the Speaker of the Assembly for necessary action. This move naturally brought the central party intervention. This 'Central intervention' was justified on the grounds that the party members in the legislature purported in an unconstitutional manner to remove their leader. That is, no properly convened meeting of the legislature party was held for such an election of new office-bearers and it was alleged that some legislators did not receive the notice of such a meeting including the leader of the Party.[1] The Central Parliamentary Board rejected the move as improper as having no validity and the members involved were given show cause notice for disciplinary action.[2]

In what came to be known as the Swatantra Party and the conflict of West Asia, this ideological testament of the Party came to be tested further severely. This freedom of expression was misunderstood by some Muslim MLAs with regard to the party position in the Israel-Arab conflict. They resigned[3] from the Party in spite of the State President's clarifications.

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1. Based on interview.
2. Based on Party files.
3. Minister Aktar Ali Khan, the lone member of the Swatantra, a constituent of the S.V.D. was one of them.

B.P. Singh made it clear[1] that this question was neither covered by the Statement of Principles of the Party nor by its Manifesto and as such "is a free subject for discussion by party members". "Our Muslim friends", he said, "are as free to propagate ..." He added that Rajaji had already strongly expressed himself in favour of Israel and so had many others. But these are <u>personal views</u> and "cannot be taken as the official opinion of the Party". He pointed out that no resolution was passed favouring one or the other nation by the National Executive of the Party.[2] Dandekar set the record by holding that the party's attitude was not 'partisan' and 'I trust, therefore, you will agree that no question of any resignation arises".[3] However, speeches made in the Parliament and articles published in the Swarajya at the time of the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, "did alienate considerable number of Muslims from the party. The poll prospects of the Party would have been better if our leaders had exercised more discretion in their utterances, on issues, which are emotionally surcharged".[4]

In Gujarat, Bhagwanji Patel published an open letter addressed to Masani complaining that the latter had not bothered to represent in Parliament the problems of the farmers

1. <u>S.N.</u> 62, August-Sept., 1967. Emphasis added.
2. Based on interview.
3. <u>S.N.</u> 62, August-Sept., 1967.
4. Based on Party files.

and others connected with groundnut production in Saurashtra. Since there had been quite a few occasions on which Masani had spoken and written about the mistaken and unfair attitude of the Government towards the groundnut growers, he sent him his reply pointing out how unfair had been this complaint. Bhagwanji persisted in his accusation and addressed another letter to the press. Masani invited the attention of the State President Bhailalbhai Patel who promised that he would handle the two quarreling kisan leaders Rathi Bhai and Bhawanji Patel and said "you need not reply to him". Efforts made by the District President, the Yuvaraj of Jasdan, however, to meet Bhagwanji and try and work out some adjustments between him and Rathi Bhai failed since Bhagwanji Bhai evaded meeting the District President.[1]

Bhagwanji also accused that Masani was not taking any interest in the problems of 'Khuduts' and had failed to keep in touch with the rural areas. According to the reports "Mr. Masani has either failed to give replies to the letters written by the Khedut Samaj or has given evasive replies". This led Bhagwanji to wonder whether Masani would win the seat during the 1967 elections. Actually Masani took up this cause in his speech in the Lok Sabha and pointed out the evils of the ban of export of groundnut oil.

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1. ibid.

Against this background, the Gujarat leadership decided to nominate Bhagwanji to the State Parliamentary Board over the opposition of Rathi Bhai Patel. Although Masani had strong mental reservations, he persuaded Rathi Bhai, in the party interest not to oppose Bhagwanji's co-option to the State Parliamentary Board. At that time it was reported that the State President had accepted from Bhagwanji a large number of membership forms direct over the head of the District Unit but neither were the forms returned to the District Units nor any subscription received.

From the time it was decided that Masani should be the party's candidate to the Lok Sabha from Rajkot and throughout his long campaign in the constituency, Bhagwanji went round various places in the districts asking the people not to vote for Masani and boasted that he would have the latter defeated, and that he did not succeed was another matter. But the fact remained that Bhagwanji's aim was to damage not only Masani but also the candidates for the State Assembly from Jetpur, Deoraji and Upleta.

If Ramgarh of Bihar had rattled Swatantra foundations to the utmost on grounds of organisational problems, C.C. Desai of Gujarat went several steps ahead by questioning its raison d'etre[1] itself, the forbidden field for a member of this Party.[2]

1. K.M. Munshi had advocated that the National Executive should not hesitate in removing such a person. Based on Party files.
2. The literature pertaining to the Desai episode was made available by Desai himself to the researcher.

In fact, in both the cases, it was evident that from the beginning the inter-personal rivalries became inevitable. In brief, the charge-sheet framed by the Party against C.C. Desai and his eked out defence could be studied as under: economic and political issues. Paradoxically, these are issues easily agreeable even within the overall Swatantra commitment to the free enterprise in widest sense of the term.[1]

The fundamental planks of the Party, inter alia are: (a) free economy; (b) total elimination of permit licence raj; and (c) Governmental controls and regulations. And the twentyone principle has no application whatsoever to such issues.

In regard to the economic issues, Desai shared with the party a belief in the virtues of private enterprise but the differences arose in the interpretation of the term "Private Enterprise", as problems of smaller business men and industrialists versus those of big industrial houses. In line with his arguments, Desai took the stand that social control over banks was not a bad thing.[2] He accused the Party

1. The Hindustan Times, April 14, 1970.
2. Desai stated: "I have personal knowledge. There are a number of banks prior to this social control of banks where directors themselves appropriated loans. There are concerns in which they are interested or members .... Cases have occurred where Directors take away the bulk of the loan .... these big Industrialists appropriate the bulk of the advances leaving small industrialists in the lurch". Based on Party files. Mr. Desai was nominated by the Party to the Select Committee of the Parliament on the "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice Bill". Reproduced from the Extracts from the Proceedings. The Central Parliamentary Board defined its position in its resolution at its meeting on Jan. 27, 1968.

"of interference with the discharge of my parliamentary duties". He explained himself in favour of anti-monopoly and anti-concentration of economic power in a few hands always and preferred that the same power being exercised by the Government as it was broad-based.[1] He questioned the anachronism of the Managing Agency system[2] in the present day context of the World and requested the Central Parliamentary Board in August 1968 that he be allowed freedom of action on the floor of the Parliament when the question of its abolition came before Lok Sabha for discussion. The Party refused such a freedom since

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1. He expressed himself in favour of (a) the workers who are the essential constituents of any industry; (b) consumers who must be saved from the burden of rising prices; and (c) the great body of small share-holders whose life's savings are invested in the companies and who expect to reap the benefit of the protected markets and the various facilities given by Government holding the same time that managerial remuneration should rank after these interests of workers, consumers and small share-holders have been satisfied, and stated: "I consider that this stand is fully in conformity with the principles of the Swatantra Party and that my espousal of the case of the worker or the consumer or of the small share-holder is the only right policy that should be followed by the Swatantra Party unless it wishes to identify itself with monopolists and big industrial houses". Based on files and correspondence.

2. Desai explained: "The Managing Agency system breeds inefficiency because it perpetuates the hereditary principle of one family rule. Even if the son of an industrialist is a congenital idiot, he will have to be suffered by the share-holders .... And this is precisely why modern American corporation have never tolerated this unjust relic of the British imperialism of the 18th and 19th centuries. I should have thought that the Swatantra Party would like to be with the mainstream of modern economic thought as seen in the Western world and not degenerate into a protective society interested only in perpetuation of exploitation, by a few business houses at the cost of the country or the common man".

the issue involved was on the system of Management. Despite its refusal to this effect he persisted in expressing diametrically opposing views.[1] He averred: "I maintain that the publication of this article in the company Law Journal is not indiscipline but a sincere effort on my part to uphold party principles and to educate people of our party, even Shri Masani, for the good of the party. I am proud of my stand on the abolition of the 'Managing Agency System'. I have held these views before I have joined the Swatantra Party and have always consistently propagated them and thus contributed to the saving of the image of the party from being tarnished by the reactionary views of the people like Mr. Masani". He supported the Government's stand since the bill "seeks to give relief to a large number of small industrialists and to a large number of people who suffer from the evils of Monopoly", and hence, did not find "any serious objection to the principles of the bill". In fact, he desired for a more comprehensive bill than was contemplated. The Party, on its part, expressed its misgivings[2] about the regulatory powers granted by the bill which would lead to increased Government control over the private sector which aspect was anathema to the party.

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1. His article in the company Law Journal of March 5, 1969, was a case in point. Arguing that management of industrial venture through the Managing Agency System as anachronism in Modern India, he paid compliments to the Government after independence in appointing successive commissions and committees, for suggesting ways and means of abolishing it and insisted the passing of the bill soon.

2. Based on Party files.

Desai blunted the edge of the party arguments, though in accord with the same in opposition to Public Sector. The Party tried to add weight to its point by clubbing monopolies of both private and state owned together while speaking in the name of common man as the consumer. This, Desai refuted as possible since the case of a price-rise, the Government "can be pressurised into accepting lower terms than was the case in the Private owned enterprises". On this ground he saw "justification" for exempting public undertakings from the purview of the Monopolies Bill. In fine, Desai refuted the charge of "indiscipline" levelled by the Party and stated: "one may differ for holding or expressing views; but surely that does not amount to indiscipline .... To vote against a party mandate or whip is indiscipline. Whereas no such excuse can be found or proved against me. To think differently is no indiscipline nor is it a crime; and instead of being discouraged, it should be encouraged and given due credit".

Henceforth the repartee that took place between Desai and Masani developed into a confrontation.[1] Desai identifying himself with the rural elements in the Party, and accused Masani of "deliberately" drawing away from the farmers.[2] He played on the misgivings of the peasent proprietors of the Party

1. Based on Party files.
2. ibid.

and trying to draw a party with small business men and trends along with the rural peasent proprietors. He contemplated a wedge between the rich, urban and the rural middle classes of the party.

As regards political issues, the 'political sin' committed by Desai were his alleged support for the non-Official candidate (as against the party nominee) and by working for this candidate in the Rajya Sabha biennial elections 1968, thus transgressing the limits of discipline of the party. The party charged Desai as having accepted this fact before Rajaji in answer to a query put by Rajaji at the crucial meeting at Madras in June 1968. Desai stoutly denied this charge and asked "did you expect me to admit a lie". Charging the Central leaders of "bossism",[1] he said that the events at Gujarat had proved that his stand had whole-hearted support of the party MLAs.

While listing out Desai's anti-party activities, the party accused him of his "effrontery in joining the Communists".[2] The question arose like this. On November 12, 1967 when the Parliamentary Party Group considered the move by Communist members of the Lok Sabha to try to censure the Government by way of either an adjournment motion or by a motion of no confidence against the dismissal of the Communist dominated United Front Government in West Bengal by Governor Dharma Vira. It decided to oppose

1. ibid.
2. The Hindustan Times, April 13, 1970.

an adjournment motion of that nature if it was tabled. Later, when the matter was due to come up in the Lok Sabha by way of a motion of no confidence from Communists quarters, an urgent meeting was held on the morning of November 22, 1967, and after much deliberations in which Desai also participated, decided that its members should not rise in favour of the admission of th motion of no confidence. It also decided that at the time of final voting on the motion, its members, should abstain from voting. Despite, these clear decisions taken in his presence, and notwithstanding that he being one of the Secretaries of the Group Desai stood in support of the Communist motion when moved in the Lok Sabha thus openly defying the Party's decision. Desai's reply was characteristic. He said that .... "The Swatantra Party gives its members a right to democratically dissent. This is what Rajaji has been saying so often in the past. My motivation in support of communist motion of censure against the imposition of President's rule in West Bengal was as you will know the interests of and implication on our own Government in Orissa. I only symbolized the feeling of many of our party members regarding their fears of creating precedents which would hurt some day our own Government in Orissa. There was no party whip on the subject and the members were allowed to act in their discretion and so no indiscipline was involved".

In regard to Presidential Elections in 1969, the party charged him of issuing a press statement to the effect that while all MLAs would give their first preference votes to

Dr. Deshmukh, in regard to the second preference votes either to Mr. Reddy or Mr. Giri, contrary to the Party's instruction. Desai on his part, denied this charge and said that his interest in getting Reddy elected as President was second to none. And "if you want any proof of this, better refer to Reddy himself. I cast my first preference votes for Deshmukh and second preference votes to Reddy, I can give innumerable witnesses who will bear out my statement and my zeal in trying to get Reddy elected".

Apart from all these ideological overtures, a major reason for the 'revolt' arose on tactical lines, the party should adopt in Gujarat in regard to the Hitendra Desai Ministry now supported by 84 MLAs against 82 in opposition. Masani and the National Executive of the Party approved somewhat reluctently the Gujarat Party's bid to bring down the State Government, but on the condition that no arrangements regarding an alternate Government would be acceptable if these involved Co-operation with Mrs. Gandhi's supporters. Masani would rather use Hitendra Desai's defeat in the House to force him into coalition with Swatantra, which would be keeping with the party's national posture. The State Unit evidently considered this as an unworkable proposition.

In this conflict between the Centre and State Units of the Party, Desai had taken up sides on behalf of the Gujarat Unit.

In November 1969, he announced to the press that all Swatantra MLAs would help topple the Hitendra Desai's Government, and would be quite willing to support the Indira Gandhi group in the State Assembly to form an alternative Government. In this report he said: "Efforts to form a united front of Right Wing Swatantra Party and the Left Wing Congress are likely to be made during the forthcoming sessions of the Gujarat Assembly towards the end of the month".

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CHAPTER

THE POLITICAL FUTURISM OF JAN SANGH AND SWATANTRA.

Intelligible in terms of the preceding analysis, a study of the political futurism of these parties would involve a heavy emphasis on an assessment of probabilities. The general position, then, seems to be offering a number of suggestions, and the way to deal with them is to change the evaluation of these political forces and to open the system, further. And, initially, for building the bridge against the abyss, between the present and the future Indian Society, certain negative conclusions need to be demonstrated.

As a first premise, would a political system without parties be more satisfactory? though this poser begs the very point at issue, whether there is a viable intermediate alternative. An examination of such a harsh and complex control system, however, ought not blur our view of the fact, as the dilemma behind this argument is a central one. For, this sort of a corrective procedure underscores two very important qualifications, and there are other differences. The two important qualifications are: that, after all, political parties are organisations "whose purpose it is to affect a process which would continue with or without them".[1] And second, the basis for such a desired revolution should be within the frame-work of the Indian Constitution.

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1. Schlessinger, Joseph A., Political Party Organization, in March, James G., (ed) Hand Book of Organizations, Chicago, Rand Nelly, 1965, p. 774.

Democracy, by implication, means the acceptance of parties with differing ideologies, and it is explicable that political parties are integral components of modern democracies. And on a closer examination, the irony is confounded further, when we consider the axiom that a party may have Achilles heels, and nevertheless survive.[1] Leaving aside the material basis of national power, for the present, how well this contradiction be solved? Or, is it a mere speculative definition? For, protestations to the contrary, it would be a flight of logic to deduce from the fact - political disaffection - that the variety of political nuances that the various parties represent would die as of natural consequence. Rather, what is amazing in retrospect is that differing political norms arise neither as men showed an unquenchable thirst for freedom, nor willed by great men. They arise as of historical consequence towards political systems which demand a social feed-back. For, motivation becomes only one component of action, causation is larger than motivation. And in all this, a party functions "as that of an intermediary, the buffer, the adjuster between the Society and the individual".[2] Indeed, one may venture a general conclusion and agree with de Tocqueville that the party is "a necessary evil",[3] though it is difficult to comprehend, numerically, how many parties an ideal democratic society needs.

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1. The British Liberal Party is a case in point.
2. Meriam, Charles E., and Gosnell, H.F., The American Party System, 4th ed., New York, 1949, p. 399.
3. de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America, [illegible] Society New York, 1946, Vol. I, p. 184.

And second, the vexatious argument over the decline of structural oppositions may be an anachronistic thought. Are we, then, left with a choice between the stagnation implicit in the disaggregative trends as outlined elsewhere, and a simmering revolution, of a partyless democracy?[1] For, one hears the query, often, can there be a revolution without violence? In answer, equivocal, if not as pejorative as the first premise, is the truism: "if there is a Left, there must obviously be a Right", as analogous to the Newtonian Law in physics, that action and reaction are both equal and opposite in the psychological world as well. This sweeping generalization, however, would prove inadequate, as there are a few assumptions behind this suggestion. For instance, are they (both rightist and leftist trends) susceptible of measurement? Or, of isolation? And what of the cultural and political environment? For, it is one thing to create new hopes, it is quite another to create new institutions with its consequential effects.

What prescription, in short, can be extracted from the preceding analysis? Without our becoming prisoners of concepts, for once, to start at the beginning would help define operationally, and with the argumentation prefaced. Basically,

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1. Jayaprakash Narayan, a strong advocate of a partyless democracy for India earlier, argued at a later date, that though the abolition of parties was desirable, in the present circumstances "we can't wish them away". The Hindustan Times, Dec. 12, 1966. Recently, he turned, completely, away from his earlier stand, and pleaded for a "strong viable opposition" in the country for the successful working of Parliamentary Democracy in India". The Hindustan Times, Feb. 13, 1974.

the transition that is taking place in developing countries in modern times, is from a mutually inter-dependent and religiously motivated society to a competetive, individualistic and secular one. Faced with this stubborn reality, we need both a clarification of important long range social goals, and more important, a democratization of the way in which we arrive at them. As a consequence, the objectives be defined in terms of the Alpha and Omega of democracy - of freedom and equality - and not merely in terms of institutional changes by which these values are to be achieved.

Flatly stated, then, the basic issue is the perpetual task of reconciling personal freedom and social justice, when the logic of competetive success juxtaposes these two factors, often. And on the other, when politics become more and more sophisticated and the possible content of the future have rather high levels of adjustment, the most significant issue cutting across left-right dimension is "political democracy Vs. totalitarianism". Indeed, the merits of democracy are negative: it does not ensure good government, but it prevents certain evils (Russell). And it is this that marks all the difference. Since the criteria have changed, criticism also becomes uncompromising. And the results are paradoxical.

To reason logically, then, from premises to conclusions. Conceivably, an analysis of the data facilitates the examination of several questions regarding their political functions. For instance, what are the purposes of these parties? Under what conditions is one type of party, rather than another, likely to perform certain political functions? More particularly, how do they fit in within the overall purposes and into the specific conditions under which they must operate? In answer, the ineluctable difficulties that these parties encounter should be tested in the crucible of the institutional trappings of Indian democracy, of federalism and Welfare Statism, besides others. For one, the conditional and procedural limitations restrict the legislative programmes of any party. And for another, given the present conditions, and in the foreseeable future, it is difficult to comprehend these rightists in terms of political power, except as factors in strengthening the viability of the right. Within this frame of reference and shorn of verbiage, what is the political futurism of these Rightist parties? Rather, what is left of rightism postures of these parties? And more important, what is left of rightism in India? These are the questions posted in the form of testable hypotheses.

A study of the political futurism of these parties, Jan Sangh and Swatantra, would involve examining them in the context of their electoral successes or otherwise vis-a-vis their common political opponent, the Congress. For, the health of these parties are inseparable from that of the Indian democratic polity as a whole. An alternate plan would be examining them in their ultimate failures, in probable defects within their "societies", in faulty emphasis and inadequate scale of values. The plan, then, and indeed the continued existence of these parties, separate or unified, is predicated upon the assumption that they have arrived at some such moment of choice.

As a first premise and given the irresistible fact, that Jan Sangh's and Swatantra's views of "society" confronts a difficulty, the result of their respective special positions. For one, the question of one social system is better or worse than another becomes a matter of purely academic interest. And for another, this is inspite of the superficial similarities in some of the end-products envisaged in both of their philosophies. Among the operative factors, however, then, what kind of Society does each party positively contend for? For, the theoretical programmes of these rightist parties are as divorced from reality as these of the left, and they deserve to be examined to see whether they are workable propositions. Both stand against something; Swatantra, against the organised entity and Jan Sangh, against anarchic diversity. And these facts warrant an inference.

To recapitulate briefly.[1] Swatantra argues for a multiplicity of co-ordinated associations, each cancelling the excessive powers of the other, by their mutual inter-play. As a consequence, the sub-division of its "society" automatically leads to its fragmentation into individual members. Essentially, thus, Swatantra depicted the individual as the true unit and "society" as an artificial aggregation of individuals in associations. Swatantra's stress on the individual leads to his protests against the groups and in turn against the "society" composing of groups. Again, the possibilities of maintaining equilibrium and order among the associations qua associations and among the individuals qua associations, leads to the idea of maintaining a balance within the "society". Jan Sangh, veered to the opposite pole, has its own problems. Its desire to project the "society" with an integrating focus, led to its choosing an institution capable of absorbing the rest, and acting as a prime co-ordinator for the "society", on its own. For, in the absence of a co-ordinating institution, the "society" would contain a vaccum and thus there is an opportunity to fulfil. Here, the individual, based upon psychological assumptions, is subordinated to such an institution and through the same to the "society".

If these presuppositions are granted, we may still have to demonstrate the role of the State. Indeed, the balance is so delicately poised in both the parties and the essence of novelty

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consists in their bias against the State. The philosophical reasons that prompted the bias, however, are no less significant than the character of the bias itself, and they help explain the resulting consequences. In Swatantra, the State provides with a corrective mechanism against the extremes.[1] And as a consequence, the strategy of the offensive against the State, in the main, confined to the dictates of the economic policy, for instance, and the need arises for the State, the necessary and mitigated evil. For Jan Sangh, the State acts as an agency of the "society"[2] and with the result that similar objections are directed not so much against the feature of State ownership, but at the inherent difficulties therein. As the nature of controls, then, is diverse, so are the criticisms levelled against them. And their impact upon the politics of these diversities deserve description.

Given the general comparative frame-work of Federalism and juxtaposing them against the above generalities. The structure and norms of Jan Sangh's and Swatantra's respective societies need consideration in assessing the crucial task of delienating these relationships as precisely as possible. For one, far less than the over-all tendencies, it does, however, seem advisable to balance theoretical interpretations with a reasonable amount of factual material. And for another, rhetorical assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, their respective lines of development increasingly point away from each other, justifying that "federalism broadens opposition".

We generalize that the scope and intensity of federalism, at some stage, to paraphrase the Marxian conception, turns quantity into quality. For one, it is the process by which unity and diversity are politically organized and institutionalized and as such it is the organized and institutionalized co-operation of groups. This process, however, may operate in two directions - of integration and differentiation. Second, and related to the first is the corollary, that federalism diversifies the opposition's roles and thereby produces the danger of ineffectiveness of its impact upon major issues of national polity. And third, federalism offers to engender to a federalization of the parties themselves.

Swatantra's ideological postures fulfils the 'ifs', 'ends', 'provisos' and 'conditions' of federalism in all its facets, thus presenting a rather complex party pattern. For, modern societies become even more inter-dependent in its functions and groupings, and thus inter-dependence posits an essential unity. Jan Sangh's postures, when juxtaposed against the touch-stone of federalist features, on the other hand, abound with unsolved problems. This failure to come to terms with the federalist features, however, has not been the result of any adventious of circumstances but of its certain fundamental, social and economic factors. Rather, this failure centres round the conflict between its ideology and federalism and more so when it is watered down to its empiricism.[1] What brought about this change, which was so much more than a shift in emphasis?

The scope and intensity of these operative factors become more significant when we consider the Welfare State concept vis-a-vis these two parties' ideological propensities.

This, then, is the magnitude of the dilemma. Since some of these hypotheses which represent the fundamentals of these parties is workable, purely and unequivocally by themselves, and since any other option would raise the abhorrent spectre of revolution, the question that remains to be answered is, "What is left of rightism in India?"

In order to proceed rationally with this analysis, there are several essential pre-requisities. In discovering the scale of values and the frame-work or terms of reference, a recapitulation of their fundamental weaknesses becomes essential, in however brief a manner possible. For, one, the general conditions and trends in the height of historical background rather than from the individual party phenomena, reflects their contemporary development, well. And for another, the manifest and latent developments that accompany them would help define operationally their futurism, with argumentation prefaced. The prefaced argumentation rests on the predicated assumptions that (a) the party is a necessary evil; (b) a schematic and comprehensive analysis shows Right in a variety of manifestations and on different lines of inter-action. And third, the significant futurism of these parties has acquired a specific meaning and connotation. The logical syntax is to pose a Socratic question; how can Indian Democracy be strengthened democratically?

The fundamental weaknesses that these rightist parties suffered from, need an enumeration, in however brief a manner possible. For, these weaknesses prevented these parties from exploiting their present strength and which may continue in future as well. These weaknesses, thus, may be grouped for convenience, under the following heads:

I. Doctrinal
II. Organizational
III. Miscellaneous

I. DOCTRINAL.

i) In spite of their respective presentation of a philosophy they failed to create any positive image of the future. For one, their philosophies, are as a rule vague and confused. And for another, their focus was invariably in attacking the existing evils rather than on proposing concrete solutions.

ii) Their stress on the traditional patterns won them support from certain conservative sections of the society, especially in rural areas. This in turn alienated them from the other and larger section of the population viz., the people's aspirations for an improved material life. On this score they suffered in comparison with the leftist forces which for all intents and purposes were able to monopolise reformist sentiments. Again by focussing their attention on issues like the Hindu Code Bill, etc. rather than on the need for socio-economic reforms they alienated certain sections of the society viz., Organized Labour, intelligentsia and the youth that tended to be keenly aware of the inequities of their system.

iii) In comparison to their pretentions and ideals in their programmes and manifestoes, their accomplishments proved trivial. In fine, they have become systems of certain trends rather than had any effect on these trends. In so far as their political influence is concerned, they were benefitted, however, both practically and ideologically.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL.

i) Swatantra's diffused and disperate character in terms of its structural and doctrinal stands, stands in contrast to the relatively monolithic structure of Jan Sangh, the other rightist party. And more particularly, to the monolithic communist party which undoubtedly affected its survival capacity.

ii) In spite of their conscious efforts these rightist parties, with wildly divergent approaches and personalised bases of loyalty failed to forge a merger or a permanent alliance into presenting a single entity. This is in spite of their attempts for merger, though varied and numerous.

iii) In the absence of any effective unification, their significant support or their counter-balancing the elemental unified wing on the other side of the fence, became nullified. In the main, their failures in their attempts in these regard are of a fundamental nature. And unless they alter their character radically there seems to be little possibility of their future.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

i) These various aspects contributed to a further weakness viz., their inability to assess and win the mass sentiments from below. For one the underlying reason presented itself as a difficulty in creating any successful mass movement whenever important changes have been imposed from above. And for another their elitist conception failed to win any substantial backing from the people who tried to break the elitist tradition. Those who survived were too steeped in tradition and remotely capable of winning the popular support.

ii) Though Swatantra failed to create any mass movement, there had existed powerful support in the country to whom they had attached themselves as an auxiliary forces and through whom it had influenced considerably. The absence of any particular element or of any centre of power with which it could allay itself was because;

a) Congress sponsored land reforms and by alleviating most of the grievances of the agriculturists, had to a large extent removed a further source of traditional support for Swatantra. The middle-class which had provided much of the practical support was little inclined to back Rightists in a period of relative economic prosperity;

b) Congress and its influence were wide enough in their composition to reflect the economic and political demands of the most conservative elements and also seemed quite capable of to tackle any leftist threats to the existing order;

c) The Conservative establishment itself including leaders of the parties and also of the business accepted in most cases with the objectivesof the conservative ideology, than with those of the left. Yet, these were not prepared to encourage the growth of these parties;

d) Although there has been some co-operation with the anti-communist groups and although they have formed close associations with them, the official policy had been hostile to these groups. With the result they had little influence on shaping a conservative policy; and

e) The result had been that these parties are condemned to a sort of political vacuum - they themselves did not change considerably with the change in the political environment in which they are to operate.

As a partial consequence of this, let us pose the problem. The definition dilemma of ends and means presents the parties winning of seats in the political assemblies as one of the elements in their general activity to realise their over-all political ends. For one, the qualities necessary to acquire power and to exercise the same are not the same as essential to resolve the problems of a modern society. In fact, the promotion of certain spiritual and moral values in political life lays, equal, if not more, stress as these would tip the scales between the successes and failures of the party. For another, the re-emergence of these Rightist parties, nevertheless, reveals a greater symptomatic and

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political significance than is usually recognised. The development of these parties to a mass character by means of a United Front is certainly not the only method by which these parties can achieve in India. And, it would be a mistake now as it would have been earlier, to imagine that their divided counsels and little popular support, would ipso-facto allow them to be politically negligible.

What, then, are the potentialities of these Rightist parties? Since the imponderables are too varied and complex, it is hazardous to forecast their future, a few possible trends however can be cited:

i) The Industrial and Financial leaders, in the ultimate analysis stand to gain in the preservation of liberal politics though their approach may often be alien to the spirit of democracy. And, they have every reason to continue the present system. Under normal circumstances, they tend to oppose any state-nationalism.

ii) Given the present freedom of political activity, the Socialists, it appears as likely, continue to make modest though uneven gains in future elections.

iii) The Socialists may attain eventually the point of threatening these Rightist forces. At this juncture these Rightist forces, finding that "the more radical social elements"

becoming "the effective opposition" adopts "a defensive attitude and in so far as it does", become conservative. Business on its part may prefer some form of authoritarian regime to replace the parliamentary system of government which alone would seem capable of arresting the encroachment of the Leftist element. The Socialists on their part to win enough votes and broaden their base would moderate its postures to an extent that they will not represent any fundamental threat to these Rightist forces. A further preservative factor is that a well-informed public opinion can, in time, come to act as a powerful deterrent against undemocratic politics. These factors, in all, would compel the Congress party to develop into a positive force and provide the much needed political stability to democratic institutions. As a natural corollary the parliamentary politics would develop into a two-party system with an agreement on the fundamental principle of democracy. This final analysis is based on two broad premises that; (a) the absence of any external agression which would jeopardise its entity; and (b) the crucial importance of economic factors that would help under-mine the democratic structure. In the absence of a forceful liberalism with its concomittanda attendance replace old values and norms, the critical conditions on both the above counts would make the society vulnerable to the attack from both left and right. Here the nationalists would be left with an option of either receding gradually or changing their course to the Centrist position, a middle-of-the-road philosophy.[1]

iv) In the case of a critical weakening of the existing system the powerful conservative elements within the country (politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen) would almost invariably back these Rightist forces in preference to the Leftists. Under normal conditions, however, they may be expected to uphold the present system of government. Here again these groups give support to Rightist policies of the government which would appear to be the best defensive against the supreme disaster of communism.

Thus the realities would favour the Rightist postures and there are many influential forces both inside and outside India, while preferring a continued presence of the existing system, would favour the Rightists against the Leftists in the event of its break-down. On the other hand, it is arguable that despite the weak roots of democracy there are too many effective anti-rightist forces in the country to make a swing to the extreme right feasible. When these forces are examined one by one, however their probable effectiveness in preventing such a swing often seems to be a little less than that one might have imagined.

The extreme left, itself is a very small minority, is completely out of touch with the principal centres of power, including public opinion. In a period of crisis the danger that Communism would present to the State would in itself be the greatest spur to the rise of an equally strong extreme Right. It is doubtful that even in the time of crisis the left wing forces would overcome ~~the~~ their divisions to the extent that they would present a common front against the rise of Rightists to the power.

A final advantage of the Right in a country where the tradition is so highly valued as in India, is that their rise would in all probability not require any violent or abrupt change in the existing patterns of political power. In other words, while a swing to the extreme Left would involve disruption of the present order, a swing to the right would take place in such a way as to preserve the institutional facade of the existing system and assure continuity in administration and policy.

To put it differently it is neither enough to debate legitimacy of the party (both Right and Left) in terms of the dychotomy between unified and structuralised authority and divided parliamentary responsibility, nor for the opposition party to appear as if they might be more stable politically if voted to power. They must also be sufficiently pragmatic in their approach. For, in the developing countries, groups tend to remain ill-defined, diffused and fluid in membership, function and in relation to one another and more important to governmental policy. Rather, religious, ethenic and commercial groups overlap with groups of economic interest and politico-religious orientation. In fine, a comprehensive and schematic process of analysis shows the perpetuation of the 'Right' in its variety of manifestations and on different lines of inter-action within any given society.

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Anand Pal, Divisional Organizing Secretary, Jan Sangh

Bram Swarup Bhatnagar, Member, State Executive, Jan Sangh

Brij Raj Singh, M.P., Jan Sangh

Daya Behan, Member, State Working Committee, Jan Sangh

Devendra Shastri, Divisional Organising Secretary, Jan Sangh

Devi Sewak Tripathi, Leader, Jan Sangh

Girish Chand Jaiswal, Member, District Executive, Jan Sangh, Varanasi

Gopal Mehrotra, Divisional Organising Secretary, Jan Sangh, Gorakhpur

Gopal Sahu, Jan Sangh Organizer, Varanasi

Gopal Thompe, Member, District Executive, Jan Sangh, Varanasi

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Jhamar Singh, Member, District Executive, Jan Sangh, Varanasi

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Jyotsana Ghosal, Active Party Worker, Jan Sangh, Varanasi

Kalraj Mishra, Divisional Organising Secretary, Jan Sangh

K.K. Nayar, M.L.A., Jan Sangh, (1963-67)

Kunwar Sripal Singh, M.L.A., Jan Sangh, (1957-67)

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Madhav Rao Deshmuk, Organizer, RSS, U.P.

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Monika Roy Choudhry, President, South Mandal, Varanasi, Jan Sangh

Murli Manohar Joshi, Joint Secretary, State Working Committee, U.P.

Pitambar Das, President, U.P.; Member National Executive, Jan Sangh

Pratab Narain Tiwary, Member, State Executive, Jan Sangh

Raghav Ram Mishra, Divisional Organizing Secretary, Jan Sangh

Rajendra Kumar Gupta, Member, State Working Committee, Jan Sangh, U.P.

Ram Shankar Singh, District President, Mirzapur, Jan Sangh

Sabhapat Singh, Divisional Organizing Secretary, Jan Sangh

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J.P. Mathur

Balraj Madhok

K. Krishnamurthy

Nanaji,
Gunaji.

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Jagannadhan, Simma, State Council, A.P.

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Ranganayakulu, C., State Council, A.P.

Pedakondala Rao, C., State Council, A.P.

Sankaran, S.B., State Council, A.P.

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Rosaiah, K., State Council, A.P.

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Kothuri Venkateswaralu, State Council, A.P.

Venkatakrishnaiah Naidu, State Council, A.P.

Rajagopala Naidu, P., State Council, A.P.

Siddaiah Murthy, C.V., State Council, A.P.

16 Jogaiah, M., State Council, A.P.

1 Narayan Martin Majaw, General Secretary, Assam

Paramanand Kejriwal, Regional Council, Bombay

Adi Narayan, Regional Council, Bombay

Shroff, P.J., Regional Council, Bombay

4 Girish Munshi, Regional Committee, Bombay

1 Nanda, H.P., Regional Council, Delhi

Shanabhai Parmer, State Council, Gujarat

Kanji Bhagvanjibhai Patel, State Committee, Gujarat

Bhikhabhai Javerbhai, State Council, Gujarat

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Sardar Basant Singh, General Secretary, State Committee, Punjab

Thakur, Budhsinghji, Member, State Council, Rajasthan

Banu Pratab Singh, President, State Committee, U.P.

K.D.R. Pande, General Secretary, State Committee, U.P.

Aliyar Singh, Joint Secretary, State Committee, U.P.

Sardar Ram Singh, Treasurer, State Committee, U.P.

Trivikram Narain Singh, Member, State Committee, U.P.

Raja Ram Singh, Member, State Council, U.P.

Masani, M.R., General Secretary

Muthmaswamy, M., Vice President

Santhosham, M., Leader, Madras

Srinivasan, K.H., Leader, Kerala

Phillip Spratt, Associated with Swatantra

Rajagopalachari C., Founder Member

Ranga N.G., President

Piloo Modi, Member, General Council

Murthy R.V., Member, General Council

Murarji Vaidya, Member, General Council

Madhu Mehta, Member, General Council

Pasricha M.R., President, Delhi Unit

✓Amin R.K., M.P. Gujarat

Marisamy, S.S., M.P., Madras

Dr. H.P. Hande, Madras.

Ganapaiah N.K., Member, General Council, Mysore

Raju S.V., Executive Secretary

Mustafa Ali Rizvi, General Secretary, Central South District of Bombay

Dharmasheel Chaturvedi, District Secretary, Varanasi

Dandekar, General Secretary

Desai C.C., M.P.

SURVEY OF PARTY LEADERS*

I

Background and Recruitment.

1. Name

2. Religion 3. Caste

4. Age 5. Sex 6. Rural or Urban

7. Occupation 8. Income

9. Educational Qualification

   Literate only, matriculate, graduate, postgraduate, law degree, any other qualification.

10. Is/was your father/any near relative an active member/office bearer of any political party. Yes No
    If yes:

Who	Party	In what capacity	Year of joining	Year of leaving

11. To which political party you belong?

12. what first led you to become an active party worker?

13. what were your motives in entering politics at that time? We are going below a number of reasons. Mark those that apply to you.

    1. I had a personal friendship for a candidate.
    2. Political work is part of my way of life.
    3. I am strongly attached to the ideology of this party.
    4. I enjoy the friendship and social contact of the party members.
    5. I see party work as a way of influencing the policies of Government.

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* This questionnaire has been prepared jointly by Mrs. Saraswathi Srivastava, BHU (who completed her research on the "Pattern of Political Leadership in Emerging Areas") and Mrs. Lalitha Venkataraman, BHU, the present researcher.

6. I like the feeling of being close to people who are doing important things.

7. Party work helps me to fulfil my sense of community obligation.

8. Party work helps me make social/business contacts.

9. Party work gives me a feeling of recognition in my community.

14. Have these motives undergone any change since then? Yes No
In what respect?

II

Career Pattern.

15. Please indicate the qualifications on the basis of which you were selected for the office-bearer.

(a) Active worker of the party.

(b) Having academic qualification.

(c) Any other.

16. Here is a list of party positions. Which of these do you hold now?

i) Chairman National State District Local level of the party

ii) Vice-Chairman National State District Local level unit

iii) Secretary/ Joint Secretary National State District Local level

iv) Member of the Executive National State District level body

v) Delegate to the Conference National State District body

vi) Any other position

vii) No formal position

17. Which of these have you previously held.

18. Were you nominated/elected/co-opted for this office?

19. If you were elected what actually made you run for this office?

i) Suggestion by a friend/relative.

ii) Desire to influence the policies of the party.

iii) Desire to serve the interest of any particular group through the party?

iv) Any other reason.

19/A. a) Nomination for election done previous to the meeting/at the meeting.

b) Please state who are the Electors/Nominators.

19/B. Does canvassing for votes took place on the basis of caste? Yes No

20. Did you canvass for it? Yes No
If yes, was the canvassing done by yourself alone/by your friends from your district/by your friends outside your district/by friends from your district as well as outside.

21. Has the appointment ratified by the National Executive.
Yes No

III

Role Perception.

22. What are the duties connected with your office.

IV

Task Performance.

23. We are giving below some tasks which party leaders usually perform. Mark those in which you have contributed during the last few years.

1. Running the party machine.
2. Getting finances.
3. Recruiting party workers.
4. Promoting harmony among party factions.
5. Projecting the image of the party among the masses.
6. Helping the party select proper candidates.
7. Informing power level workers about party policies.
8. Deciding the election strategy.
9. Winning votes for the party.
10. Providing link between the different units of the party.
11. Representing the interests of different units in the party.
12. Any other.

24. i) How much direct contact you have with your party leaders at the national level.

Often Frequently Rarely Never

If ever: what sorts of things do you discuss.

ii) How much direct contact do you have with your party leaders at the State level?

Often Frequently Rarely Never

If ever: what sorts of things do you discuss?

iii) How much direct contact do you have with your party leaders at the district level?

Often Frequently Rarely Never

If ever: what sorts of things do you discuss?

iv) How much direct contact do you have with party leaders at the local level?

Often Frequently Rarely Never

If ever: what sorts of things do you discuss?

25. Whom do you consult when you take any decision in some party matter?

1. Your friends.
2. Other office-bearers in the party at your level.
3. Your higher-ups in the party.
4. Those who man the party offices at your lower level.
5. People outside the party.
6. Any other.

26. How much say you have in running the State party organization?

Very little Some A fair amount A great deal Not ascertainable

ii) In running the district party organization?

Very little / Some / A fair amount / A great deal/ Not ascertainable

iii) In running the local party organization

Very little / Some / A fair amount / A great deal / Not ascertainable

Are you interested in having more say in any of these party organizations? Yes No
at what level?

27. What steps do you take to maintain your leadership in the party.

28. What do you particularly like about your own party.

29. What will you miss if you were to leave this party.

30. Do you think that your party set-up the best available candidate in your area in the last general election? Yes No

ii) Did you canvass for him. Yes No

iii) Did you know the campaign strategy that the party had formulated? Yes No

iv) Were you associated in formulating this strategy? Yes No

31. What are your plans for the party work in the future?

32. a) How many Formal/Informal meetings are held by your unit of the party in a year.

Annual.

Ordinary Weekly Fortnightly Monthly Special

Emergency

Closed door / Outsiders allowed.

b) How many representatives are sent to conferences and committees:

Area / Divisional / State / National

33. Do you think that the system of training needs a reorganisation in fulfilment of the objectives of the party programme.

34. Do you feel that adequate co-ordination exists amongst various party organisations.

a) at Mandal

b) at Block

c) at District

d) at Regional

e) at Pradesh

35. What improvement would you suggest for the level/levels where you find lack of co-ordination.

36. Is there any major shift in the nature and quality of the leadership of the party unit

Local / District / State / National

37. Do you own allegiance/close relationship/effective friendship with any other leaders at the National/State/District/Local

Yes No

If yes,

Name of the person	Party he belongs	Duration of relationship	Type of relationship

38. Do you regularly attend political schools conducted by your party.

Nature	Frequency	Duration	At what level	No. attended
Training Camp				
Discussion groups				
Canvassers classes				
Speakers' classes				
Seminars				
Surveys conducted				

ooo

TOTAL NUMBER OF SEA
RURAL GAIN AND LOSS

BHARATIYA J

State	GAIN				LOSS				RURAL GAIN			
	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Rem
Andhra	3	2	-	1	77	1	17	59	2	1	-	1
Assam	-	-	-	-	22[1]	3	17	2	-	-	-	-
Bihar	27	13	13	1	244[2]	33	116	95	24	13	11	-
Gujarat	1	-	1	-	17[3]	5	6	6	1	-	1	-
Haryana	12	8	4	-	36	8	22	6	12	8	4	-
Jammu & Kashmir	3	3	-	-	26	18	8	-	1	1	-	-
Kerala	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	24	-	-	-	-
Madhya Pradesh	78	35	33	10	187	64	100	23	73	35	28	10
Madras*	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	24	-	-	-	-
Maharastra	4	3	-	1	163[4]	10	41	112	3	2	-	1
Mysore	4	1	3	-	35[5]	7	16	12	4	1	3	-
Orissa	-	-	-	-	17[6]	-	12	5	-	-	-	-
Punjab	9	6	3	-	40	8	24	8	2	1	1	-
Rajasthan	22	10	11	1	41	14	20	7	17	8	8	1
Uttar Pradesh	98	56	40	2	303	92	128	83	87	51	34	2
West Bengal	1	1	-	-	57	-	17	40	1	1	-	-
Himachal Pradesh	7	6	1	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	-	7	6	1	-

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* Now Tamil Nadu

1. Lost 20 as per Fourth General Elections Report, Election
2. Lost 245, ibid.
3. Lost 15, ibid.
4. Lost 161, ibid.
5. Lost 33, ibid.
6. Lost 19, ibid.

SOURCE: Fourth General Elections - an analysis.
Election Report prepared by the Government of India, and Registrar General of India, August 7, 1967.

'S GAINED/LOST SHOWING
AND URBAN GAIN AND LOSS

N SANGH (ASSEMBLY SEATS)

	RURAL LOSS				URBAN GAIN				URBAN LOSS			
te	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote
	61	1	9	51	1	1	-	-	16	-	8	8
	22	3	17	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	239	32	113	94	3	-	2	1	5	1	3	1
	9	4	4	1	-	-	-	-	8	1	2	5
	35	7	22	6	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
	24	16	8	-	2	2	-	-	2	2	-	-
	20	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4
	178	61	95	22	5	-	5	-	9	3	5	1
	11	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	13
	146	10	35	101	1	1	-	-	17	-	6	11
	28	5	11	12	-	-	-	-	7	2	5	-
	17	-	12	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	39	7	24	8	7	5	2	-	1	1	-	-
	38	12	19	7	5	2	3	-	3	2	1	-
	283	81	120	82	11	5	6	-	20	11	8	1
	44	-	13	31	-	-	-	-	13	-	4	9
	26	18	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Commission of India.

CLOSE CONTEST - Within 5000
FAIR CONTEST - 5001 to 15000
REMOTE CONTEST- 15001 +

Ministry of Information & Broadcasting

1967

TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS G
RURAL GAIN AND LOSS AN

SWATANTRA (ASS

State	GAIN				LOSS				RURAL GAIN			
	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remo
Andhra	29	11	16	2	60[1]	10	24	26	29	11	16	2
Assam	2	2	-	-	10[2]	-	8	2	2	2	-	-
Bihar	3	1	2	-	124[3]	9	68	47	3	1	2	-
Gujarat	66	35	25	6	82[4]	39	30	13	62	34	22	6
Haryana	3	3	-	-	9	1	6	2	3	3	-	-
Kerala	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	6	-	-	-	-
Madhya Pradesh	7	-	-	7	14	2	7	5	7	-	-	7
Madras*	20	6	9	5	7	3	2	2	19	5	9	5
Maharastra	-	-	-	-	33[5]	1	8	24	-	-	-	-
Mysore	16	10	5	1	31[6]	5	18	8	16	10	5	1
Orissa	49	25	20	4	82	21	21	10	49	25	20	
Punjab	-	-	-	-	9[7]	-	4	5	-	-	-	-
Rajasthan	49[8]	24	23	2	58	19	31	8	48	24	23	1
Uttar Pradesh	13[9]	7	3	3	198	16	88	94	12	7	3	2
West Bengal	1	-	1	-	20	2	8	10	1	-	1	-
Jammu & Kashmir	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nagaland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Himachal Pradesh	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-

* Now Tamil Nadu

1. Lost 61 as per Fourth General Election Report, Election Commi
2. Lost 11, ibid.
3. Lost 123, ibid.
4. Lost 81,ibid.
5. Lost 40, ibid.
6. Lost 29, ibid.
7. Lost 10, ibid.
8. Gain 48, ibid.
9. Gain 12 and total seats contested 207, ibid.

SOURCE: Electi Report prepared by the Government of India, Mini
Fourth General Elections - an analysis.
& Broadcasting and Registrar General of India, August 7,

NED/LOST SHOWING
RBAN GAIN AND LOSS

BLY SEATS)

RURAL LOSS				URBAN GAIN				URBAN LOSS			
Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote
54	9	23	22	-	-	-	-	6	1	1	4
10	-	8	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
120	9	67	44	-	-	-	-	4	-	1	3
76	38	27	11	4	1	3	-	6	1	3	2
9	1	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
13	2	6	5	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
7	3	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
20	-	5	15	-	-	-	-	13	1	3	9
28	4	16	8	-	-	-	-	3	1	2	-
52	21	21	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
58	19	31	8	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
184	16	83	85	1	-	-	1	14	-	5	9
20	2	8	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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LOK SABHA ELECTION
AND LOSSES - FOURTI

SWATANTRA PARTY

State	GAINS				LOSSES			
	Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote
Andhra	3	1	2	-	16	2	7	7
Assam	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Bihar	-	-	-	-	25	3	11	11
Gujarat	10[1]	6	4	-	9	4	3	2
Haryana	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	1
Kerala	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	2
Madhya Pradesh	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-
Madras*	6	3	3	-	2	1	1	-
Maharastra	-	-	-	-	4	-	1	3
Mysore	5	2	3	-	7[2]	1	2	4
Orissa	8	1	5	2	9	4	4	1
Punjab	-	-	-	-	6	-	1	5
Rajasthan	8	3	4	1	7[4]	1	5	1
Uttar Pradesh	1	1	-	-	37	1	19	17
West Bengal	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
Jammu & Kashmir	-	-	-	-	-[6]	-	-	-
Nagaland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Himachal Pradesh	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-

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* Now Tamil Nadu

1. 12 seats as per Report on the Fourth General Elec
   Election Commission of India.
2. Swatantra lost 6, ibid.
3. Jan Sangh lost 5, ibid.
4. Swatantra lost 6, ibid.
5. Jan Sangh lost 4, ibid.
6. Swatantra contested one seat and lost it, ibid.
7. Jan Sangh lost 2, ibid.

SOURCE: Fourth General Elections - an analysis.
Election Report prepared by the Government of
Broadcasting and Registrar General of India,

RESULT SHOWING GAINS
GENERAL ELECTION

BHARATIYA JAN SANGH

GAINS				LOSSES			
Total	Close	Fair	Remote	Total	Close	Fair	Remote
-	-	-	-	6	-	1	5
-	-	-	-	3	-	2	1
1	1	-	-	47	7	20	20
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	1	-	-	6	2	3	1
-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4
10	3	6	1	22	6	10	6
-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4
-	-	-	-	26	-	6	20
-	-	-	-	4[3]	-	-	4
-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
1	1	-	-	7	2	2	3
3	1	1	1	3[5]	-	2	1
12	3	9	-	65	20	35	10
-	-	-	-	7	-	1	6
-	-	-	-	3[7]	-	3	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	3	2	1	-

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ion 1967, Vol. II

CLOSE CONTEST - 25,000 Votes.
FAIR CONTEST - 25,001 to 75,000 Votes.
REMOTE CONTEST- Over 75,000 Votes.

India, Ministry of Information &
August 7, 1967.

BHARATIYA JAN SANGH

(An informal diagram of the party structural chart which does not purport to be comprehensive)

BHARATIYA PRATHINIDHI SABHA (Art. 13)

- Members nominated by BKS working in different fronts (not more than 2 for each)
- Members of BKS
- Members of PKS
- Additional members of BPS if the number of Parliamentary seats is more than 2
- Member of Parliament
- President & Secretary of Zila Karya Samiti
- Not more than 20 members co-opted in the first session of BPS

BHARATIYA KARYA SAMITI (Art.14)

- Parliamentary Adhikaran (Art. 15) (Elected by the Bharatiya Karya Samiti)
  - State Parliamentary Adhikaran (Art. 15(b) (Elected by the Pradeshik Karya Samiti)
- @President
  - Nominates upto 31 Members.
- Vice President
- Treasurer
- General Secretary
- Secretary
- (All nominated by the President taking into account of the fact the representation of different States in the Working Committee)
- Zonal Organising Secretary

PRADESHIK PRATHINIDHI SABHA (Art. 11 (a)

- Vidhan Sabha area representative
- Mahila representatives
- Members of BPS
- Nominated Members of BKS (not more than 5)
- Members of PKS
- Members of Vidhan Mandal
- President of Nagarpalika populated more than 20,000
- Not more than 20 members are co-opted in the first conference

PRADESHIK KARYA SAMITI (Elected by Pradeshik Prathinidhi Sabha)

- President
  - Nominates not more than 31 Members.
- Vice Presdent (not more than 3)
- Secretary
- Joint Secy. (not more than 3)
- Treasurer
- Divisional Organising Secretary (Art.12(f)

ZILA KARYA SAMITI (Art. 10) Elected by Zila Samiti)

- Elects

MANDAL SAMITI (Block area, since 1963)
(Elected Members of Staniya Karya Samiti)

STANIYA KARYA SAMITI (Art. 8)
(Elected by Staniya Samiti)

President Secy. Treasurer Members (4 upto 300 & 8 in case of more than 300 members).

STANIYA SAMITI

MEMBERS
(18 years. minimum 25 paise per year to the membership fund (Art. 6)

District Organising Secretary (Art. 12(f)

ZILA SAMITI
(Elected Members of Mandal Karya Samiti)

Elected President — Nominates 21 members

Vice President (not more than 2)

Secretary

Joint Secretary (not more than 2)

Treasurer

MANDAL KARYA SAMITI (Art. 9)
Elected by Mandal Samiti)

? Elected President — ? Nominates upto 21 Members.

Vice President (not more than 2)

Secretary

Joint Secretary (not more than 2)

Treasurer

(e) The General Secretary can demand for the nomination of only one man from each Pradeshik Karya Samiti. General Secretary can have the opinion of the nominated person, and the General Secretary sends the names to the members of Bharatiya Prathinidhi Sabha consisting of President, Secretaries of Zila Samiti and delegates from districts. (Art. 16)

* Inserted from 1958 only. Zonal Organising Secretary is appointed by BKS; whereas the District and Divisional Organising Secretaries are appointed by PSK.

Quorum: (Art. 18)

For Karya Samiti - 1/4 of total members.
For Prathinidh Sabha - 1/10 of total members.

Election (Art. 19)
All bodies
Yearly.

Amendments (Art. 20)

1) 2/3 majority present & voting by BPS
2) By BKS, with the approval of BPS.

SWATANTRA PARTY

(An informal diagram of the party structural chart which does not purport to be comprehensive)

NATIONAL CONVENTION - (Art. 13)

1) Delegates elected on the basis of direct election by workers/life workers and life members of the party once in 2 years.

2) Manner of election and strength of delegates shall be determined by National Executive.

STATE OR REGIONAL CONVENTION (Art. 14)

Delegates elected on the basis of direct election by workers, life workers, members in the State or region prescribed by the State Executive Committee at least once in 2 years.

GENERAL COUNCIL[1] (Art. 9)

1) Not more than 250 members every alternate year.
2) Shall be elected by the State or Region by proportional representation.
3) State or Regional Council will send 3-20 members each in proportion to thenumber of workers and life workers enrolled in State.
4) MPs., Presdents and General Secretaries of State Units, Leaders, Dy.Leaders, Chief Whips of Legislatures & Councils (no voting rights).
5) Past Presidents - Full members.

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE (Art. 10)

President	Vice President (one or more).	General Secretary.	Joint Secretary (1 or more)	Treasurer (1 or more)	Members (10-20)

CENTRAL PARLIAMENTARY BOARD[3]

NATIONAL ELECTION TRIBUNAL[2] (Art.10-A(b)

Shall consist of such persons as National Executive may direct.

STATE OR REGIONAL COUNCIL (Art. 8)

1) Shall be elected by the elected members of primary bodies of all district committees by proportional representation every alternate year.
2) MPs, MLAs, Presidents of district committees.
3) Leaders, Dy. Leaders, Chief Whips.
4) Past Presdents of State/Region shall be full members

STATE PARLIAMENTARY BOARD[4] ---------- ---------- **STATE ELECTION TRIBUNAL** (Art.20-A(a)

Shall consist of such persons as National Executive may direct in consultation wth the Executive Committee of the State or Region.

STATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Art. 8(a)

President	Vice President (one or more)	General Secretary	Joint Secretary (One or more)	Treasurer (One or more)	Members (10-20)

DISTRICT COMMITTEE (Art. 7)
Shall be elected by the elected members of the primary units of the district by proportional representation every alternate year.

President | Vice President (one or more) | General Secretary | Joint Secretary (one mor more) | Treasurer (one or more)

DISTRICT WORKING COMMITTEE (Art. 7)(d)[5]

PRIMARY UNIT ~~XX~~ (Art. 6)
State Assembly area, every alternate year.

PRIMARY UNIT COMMITTEE (Art. 6(b)
(Not less than 20 workers)

MEMBERS	WORKERS	LIFE WORKERS (Arts. 4 & 5)
18 years @ 10P yearly[6]	18 years Rs.3 yearly	18 years Rs.100 for life.

Amendments (Art. 16)

At the National Convetion on the recommendation of General Council or 3/4 of delegates or a proposal by 200 workers or life members, with 30 days clear notice to the National Executive.

Quorum (Art. 9(a)

All elected bodies from Primary Units to National Level - 1/7th of the strength of that body or 5 whichever is higher.

@Swatantra Organisation Series, No.1, page 4.

1. General Council was originally as appointed body with maximum number as 26-. The revised constitution of the party, 1964, changed the nomerclature of the Central Organising Committee into the National Executive. With the change in the name, the National Executive became an elected body of the General Council with provision for co-option. The revised constitution, 1964, reduced the age of eligibility to become a member from 21 to 18 years.
2. Prohibited from taking election disputes to courts of law.
3. Though there is no provision in the party consttution as the Central and
& State Parliamentary Boards, in view of the importance of these bodies, both
4. to their situational position and powers deleged, warrant their mention here.
5. Shall elect a District Working Committee if the strength of a District Committee 25 (Art. 7?d).
6. Not exceeding 50P. Art. 4(a) (ii) of the Constitution as amended on 5.10.68 Convention.